LEONOR B. CRUZ, v. TEOFILA M. CATAPANG,
Thus, the case went to the Supreme
G.R. No. 164110, 2008 February 12, Quisumbing,
L.A.J., (Second Division)
Case Doctrine: Co-owners cannot devote common
property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice
of the co-ownership.
FACTS: Petitioners Leonor Cruz, Luz Cruz and
Norma Maligaya are the co-owners of a parcel of
land covering an area of 1,435 square meters
located at Barangay Mahabang Ludlod, Taal,
Batangas. Sometime in 1992, Teofila Catapang,
with the consent of Norma Maligaya as one of the
aforementioned co-owners, built a house on a lot
adjacent to the subject parcel of land. The house
built by Catapang intruded on a portion of the co-
owned property.
In September 1995, Cruz learned about the
intrusion and made several demands for Catapang
to demolish and vacate the part of the structure
encroaching upon their property. However,
Catapang refused and disregarded the demands of
Cruz. Cruz then filed a complaint for forcible entry
against Catapang before the MCTC of Taal,
Batangas. The MCTC decided in favor of Cruz,
ruling that consent of only one of the co-owners is
not sufficient to justify defendant’s construction
of the house and possession of the portion of
the lot in question. On appeal, the RTC
affirmed the decision of the MCTC.
Catapang filed a petition for review with the Court
of Appeals, which reversed the RTC’s decision and
ruled in favor of her. The Court of Appeals held
that there is no cause of action for forcible entry
in this case because respondent’s entry into
the property, considering the consent given by
co-owner Norma Maligaya, cannot be
characterized as one made through strategy or
stealth which gives rise to a cause of action for
forcible entry.
Court.
ISSUE: Whether the consent given by one of the
co-owners is sufficient to warrant the
dismissal of a complaint for forcible entry.
HELD: No, Co-owners cannot devote common
property to his or her exclusive use to the prejudice
of the co-ownership. In this case, the act of Norma
Maligaya is tantamount to devoting the property to
her exclusive use. Under Article 491 of the Civil
Code, none of the co-owners shall, without the
consent of the others, make alterations in the
thing owned in common. The Court ruled that it
would necessarily follow that none of the co-
owners can, without the consent of the other
co-owners, validly give consent to the making of
an alteration by another person, such as Catapang
in this case, in the thing owned in common.
In addition, Article 486 of the same Code states
each co-owner may use the thing owned in
common provided he does so in accordance with
the purpose for which it is intended and in such a
way as not to injure the interest of the co-
ownership or prevent the other co-owners from
using it according to their rights. The Court ruled
that, to give consent to a third person to construct
a house on the co-owned property would be to
injure the interest of the co-ownership and would
prevent other co-owners from using the property
in accordance with their rights.
In this case, the consent of only one co-owner will
not warrant the dismissal of the complaint for
forcible entry filed against the respondent
Catapang. The consent given by Norma Maligaya
in the absence of the consent of her other co-
owners did not grant Catapang any right to
enter and even build upon the co-owned
property.
1
 Nieves who are as INDISPENSABLE as the
latter in the final determination of the case.
NIEVES PLASABAS and MARCOS MALAZARTE,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Special  CA: affirmed RTC ruling; held that the non-
Former Ninth Division), DOMINADOR LUMEN, and joinder of the indispensable parties would
AURORA AUNZO, respondents. violate the principle of due process, and
that Article 487 of the Civil Code could not
Facts:
be applied considering that the complaint
 petitioners filed a complaint for recovery of was not for ejectment, but for recovery of
title to property (a parcel of coconut land in title or a reivindicatory action.
Canturing, Maasin) with damages before
Issue: whether petitioners' complaint is one for
the RTC of Maasin, Southern Leyte against
ejectment or for recovery of title.
respondents
Held:
 petitioners prayed that judgment be
rendered confirming their rights and legal  No need to determine. Article 487 applies
title to the subject property and ordering to both actions.
the defendants to vacate the occupied
 Article 487 of the Civil Code provides that
portion and to pay damages.
any one of the co-owners may bring an
 Respondents denied petitioners' allegation action for ejectment. The article covers all
of ownership and possession of the kinds of actions for the recovery of
premises, and interposed that the subject possession, including an accion publiciana
land was inherited by all the parties from and a reivindicatory action. A co-owner may
their common ancestor, Francisco Plasabas. file suit without necessarily joining all the
other co-owners as co-plaintiffs because
 In the course of trial: petitioner Nieves was
the suit is deemed to be instituted for the
not the sole and absolute owner of the land.
benefit of all. Any judgment of the court in
Based on the testimonies of petitioners'
favor of the plaintiff will benefit the other
witnesses, the property passed on from
co-owners, but if the judgment is adverse,
Francisco to his son, Leoncio; then to Jovita
the same cannot prejudice the rights of the
Talam, petitioner Nieves' grandmother;
unimpleaded co-owners.
then to Antonina Talam, her mother; and
then to her and her siblings — Jose, Victor  The only exception to this rule is when the
and Victoria. action is for the benefit of the plaintiff
alone who claims to be the sole owner and
 RTC: the instant case should have been
is, thus, entitled to the possession thereof.
dismissed without prejudice a long time ago
In such a case, the action will not prosper
for lack of cause of action as the plaintiffs
unless the plaintiff impleads the other co-
spouses Marcos Malazarte and Nieves
owners who are indispensable parties.
Plasabas Malazarte have no complete legal
personality to sue by themselves alone  Here, the allegation of petitioners in their
without joining the brothers and sisters of complaint that they are the sole owners of

2
 the property in litigation is immaterial,
considering that they acknowledged during
the trial that the property is co-owned by
Nieves and her siblings, and that petitioners
have been authorized by the co-owners to
pursue the case on the latter's behalf.
Impleading the other co-owners is,
therefore, not mandatory, because, as
mentioned earlier, the suit is deemed to be
instituted for the benefit of all.
 Petition GRANTED. Case REMANDED.
Abing v Waeyan
FACTS:
John and Juliet, respondent, without the benefit of
marriage bought a 2-storey residential house from
Macua, on a land owned by a certain Diño. The tax
declaration was transferred in the name of Juliet.
Juliet went to Korea for work and would send
money to John in their joint bank account. Later on,
the house underwent renovation, a sari-sari store
was annexed to the house as a result of the
renovation. Juliet returned from Korea and
managed the sari-sari store while John worked as a
mine employee. Later on, their relationship
became sour and decided to partition their
properties. They executed a Memorandum of
Agreement which was left unsigned by the parties
but signed by the witnesses. Under the agreement,
John shall leave the couples’ dwelling with Juliet
paying him an amount representing John’s share in
all their properties. Juliet was able to make a
partial payment and the balance is to be paid in 12
monthly installment. Juliet failed to pay such and
John demanded her to vacate the annex structure
housing the sari-sari store. Juliet refused prompting
John to file an ejectment suit against her.
John alleged that he alone spent for the
construction of the annex structure with his own
funds and the money he borrowed from his
relatives. He added that the TD for the structure
was under his name, he also claimed exclusive
ownership of the subject property.
Juliet countered that their original house was
renovated thru their common funds and that the
subject structure was annexed thereto was merely
an attachment or an extension of their original
residential house, hence the same pertained to the
two of them in common.
MTC ruled in favor of John and ordered Juliet’s
eviction. It found that the money used in the
construction of the structure solely came from
John. On appeal, RTC affirmed the MTC ruling. CA
reversed the RTC ruling. It said that since they lived
together without the benefit of marriage, their
property relations is governed by the rule on co-
ownership, that the parties’ share in respect of the
properties they have accumulated shall be equal
unless there is proof to the contrary.
ISSUE:
W/N the property is owned solely by John
RULING:
The Court affirmed the CA ruling. John failed to
reveal how much he spent, nor divulge the name of
the alleged relatives from whom he borrowed
money, let alone the amount borrowed. All he
shown was an affidavit that he borrowed money
from a certain Macaraeg, but such was in 1990 and
the house was only constructed in 1992, it is
doubtful that the money borrowed went into the
construction of the structure in dispute. Art. 147 of
the FC states that when a man and a woman live
exclusively with each other as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage, all property
acquired by them shall be governed by the rules on
co-ownership. As such, the owned their properties
in common in equal shares. Being herself a co-
3
owner of the structure in question, Juliet may not
be ejected therefrom.
RAUL V. ARAMBULO AND TERESITA A. DELA
CRUZ, Petitioners, v. GENARO NOLASCO AND
JEREMY SPENCER NOLASCO, Respondents.
Doctrine: Right of ownership of Co-owner; non-
interference
Facts: Petitioners Raul V. Arambulo and Teresita A.
Dela Cruz, along with their mother Rosita Vda. De
Arambulo, and siblings Primo V. Arambulo, Ma.
Lorenza A. Lopez, Ana Maria V. Arambulo,
Maximiano V. Arambulo, Julio V. Arambulo and
Iraida Arambulo Nolasco (Iraida) are co-owners of
two (2) parcels of land located in Tondo, Manila,
with an aggregate size of 233 square meters. When
Iraida passed away, she was succeeded by her
husband, respondent Genaro Nolasco and their
children, Iris Abegail Nolasco, Ingrid Aileen
Arambulo and respondent Jeremy Spencer Nolasco.
On 8 January 1999, petitioners filed a petition for
relief under Article 491 of the Civil Code with the
RTC of Manila, alleging that all of the co-owners,
except for respondents, have authorized
petitioners to sell their respective shares to the
subject properties and that under same, if one or
more co-owners shall withhold their consent to the
alterations in the thing owned in common, the
courts may afford adequate relief.
On 19 September 2002, the trial court ruled in
favor of petitioners and ordered respondents to
give their consent to the sale.
In appeal, the Court of Appeals granted the appeal
and reversed the trial court’s decision. The Court of
Appeals held that the respondents had the full
ownership of their undivided interest in the subject
properties, thus, they cannot be compelled to sell
their undivided shares in the properties. (Art. 493)
Hence, the instant petition seeking the reversal of
the appellate court’s decision and praying for the
affirmance of the trial court’s decision that ordered
respondents to give their consent to the sale of the
subject properties.
Issue: Whether or not respondents, as co-owners,
can be compelled by the court to give their consent
to the sale of their shares in the co-owned
properties.
Ruling: We affirm the reversal by the Court of
Appeals of the judgment of the trial court.
This Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells
the whole property as his, the sale will affect only
his own share but not those of the other co-owners
who did not consent to the sale.
The ultimate authorities in civil law, recognized as
such by the Court, agree that co-owners such as
respondents have over their part, the right of full
and absolute ownership. Such right is the same as
that of individual owners which is not diminished
by the fact that the entire property is co-owned
with others. That part which ideally belongs to
them, or their mental portion, may be disposed
of as they please, independent of the decision of
their co-owners. So we rule in this case. The
respondents cannot be ordered to sell their portion
of the co-owned properties. Each party is the sole
judge of what is good for him.
MELENCIO vs DY TIAO LAY
[GR. No. 32047. November 1, 1930]
FACTS: Plaintiffs brought an action against
defendant for the recovery of a parcel of land in
Nueva Ecija and demanded a monthly rental of
P300 for the use of occupation of the land. They
also prayed that if found that defendant occupied
land by virtue of a contract of lease, such contract
4
be declared null and void for lack of consent,
concurrence, and ratification by the owners
thereof.
Land was originally owned by Julian Melencio. He
died, left wife Ruperta Garcia, and 5 kids Juliana,
Ramon, Ruperta (same name sila ng nanay), Pedro
R. and Emilio. Emilio had a son, Jose P. Then Emilio
died so Jose P succeeded his father’s interest in the
land.
Ruperta Garcia, Pedro R., Juliana, and Ruperta
executed lease contract in favor of a Yap Kui Chin.
(No mention of Ramon or Jose P. in the lease.) The
lease was for 20 years extendible for another 20 at
lessee’s option. After termination of original
period, lessors had option to buy all the
improvements on the land but if they didn’t
exercise that privilege, lease would continue for
another 20 years The document was duly
acknowledged but was never recorded with
register of deeds.
It appeared that Yap Kui Chin always dealt
with Pedro R. in lease matters. But then Pedro died.
Yap Kui Chin died also, so the lease was transferred
to Uy Eng Jui, then to defendant Dy Tiao Lay.
When Ramon (co owner na hindi sinama sa lease)
died, his widow Liberata was appointed
administratrix of his estate, which included the
land registered under the torrens system. The lease
wasn’t mentioned in the certificate of title but it
was stated that one house and three warehouses
were property of Yap Kui Chin.
Liberata, as administratrix of estate of deceased
Ramon, collected rent for the lease at P20, and
later she demanded that the rent be raised to P300.
Defendant then told her that there was a written
lease and that he was entitled to an extension.
Plaintiffs insisted that there was no contract of
lease and anyway if there was, it was void because
of the following:
- Lease contract called for an alteration of the
property and thus needed to be signed by all co-
owners
-Contract duration was for a term over six years,
making it null and void because of Civil Code Art
1548 o Contract duration was unreasonably long,
and against public policy
Trial court ruled in favor of defendant.
Hence the appeal
ISSUE: WON the contract of lease is void because it
contained alterations to the property and it wasn’t
signed by all co-owners
RULING: No. Plaintiff’s contention is based on
article 397 of the Civil Code which provides that
"none of the owners shall, without the consent of
the others, make any alterations in the common
property even though such alterations might be
advantageous to all."
The Supreme Court ruled that while the property
referred to in this case was leased, (without the
consent of all the coowners) building thereon one
house and three warehouse, it cannot be
considered that the alterations are of sufficient
importance to nullify the lease, especially so since
none of the coowners objected to such alterations
until over twenty years after the execution of the
contract of lease.
However the Supreme Court still voided the
contract of lease, being for a term of over six years,
the same is null and void pursuant to the provision
of article 1548 of the Civil Code. Also, the duration
of the same is unreasonably long, thus being
against public policy.
5
Melencio vs Dy Tiao Lay’s SUMMARY: Plaintiffs
are children/heirs of Ramon, who co-owned land
with his siblings and his nephew Jose P. The land
was leased to Yap Kui Chin by their Ramon’s
siblings, without signature of Ramon or Jose P. The
rights of Yap were assigned to defendant. Plaintiffs
prayed that the contract of lease be declared void
because it involved alteration of property but had
no signature of all co-owners. SC held the contract
to be void, not because it lacked the signature of
all the co-owners but because it went beyond the
6-year limit set by the Civil Code, since the contract
was for 20 years extendible by 40 more years (60
years total). The part owners representing the
greater portion of the property held in common
have no power to lease said property for a longer
period than six years without the consent of all the
coowners, whose propriety rights, expressly
recognized by the law, would by contracts of long
duration be restricted or annulled.
EDC vs Samson-Bico
G.R. No. 191090
October 13, 2014
Facts: Sps. Ballesteros owned a parcel of land
which was inherited by Juan and Irenea. When the
latter died, the heirs of Juan and Irenea became co-
owners of the property. The heirs of Juan, without
the consent of the heirs of Irenea executed in favor
of petitioner EDC a Deed of Absolute Sale covering
the subject property for P2,974,800.00. The heirs
of Irenea filed a Complaint for Annulment of
Contract and Tax Declaration No. 00-BI-030-3512
and Reconveyance of Possession with
Damages. The heirs of Juan claimed that
respondents received their share in the
downpayment made by EDC but they were both
unpaid of the balance on the cost of the land.
The RTC declared the Deed of Absolute Sale as null
and void and found that respondents and the heirs
of Juan are co-owners of the subject property. The
Court of Appeals partially affirmed the RTC
Decision. According to the appellate court, the
same is valid with respect to the transfer of the
rights of the co-owners-sellers heirs of Juan over
the one-half portion or 14,874 square meters of
the subject property, thereby making EDC a co-
owner thereof. Consequently, the appellate court
ordered the heirs of Ballesteros to return to EDC
the amount of P1,487,400.00 or one-half of the
purchase price of P2,974,800.00.
Issue: Whether or not Deed of Absolute Sale is
valid.
Held: YES. The execution of the Deed of Absolute
Sale over the subject property which they do not
exclusively own but is co-owned by them together
with the heirs of Irenea was valid only to the extent
of the former's undivided one-half share thereof,
as they had no title or interest to transfer the other
one-half portion which pertains to the heirs of
Irenea without the latter's consent. It is an
established principle that no one can give what one
does not have nemo dat quod non
habet. Accordingly, one can sell only what one
owns or is authorized to sell, and the buyer can
acquire no more than what the seller can transfer
legally. Having established respondents' co-
ownership rights over the subject property, the
Deed of Absolute Sale is valid but only with respect
to the rights of the heirs of Juan over one-half of
the property. Therefore, it is correct for the heirs of
Juan to return the amount of P1,487,400.00,
representing one-half of the purchase price to
prevent unjust enrichment at the expense of EDC.
Heirs of Dela Rosa vs Batongbacal
FACTS:
6
The subject property consists of a 3,750 square
meter-portion of the 15,001 square meters parcel
of land situated in Barrio Saog, Marilao, Bulacan
under the names of Reynaldo Del a Rosa
(Reynaldo), Eduardo Dela Rosa (Eduardo), Araceli
Del a Rosa (Araceli) and Zenaida Dela Rosa
(Zenaida).
Sometime in 1984, Reynaldo offered to sell the
subject property to Guillermo Batongbacal
(Guillermo) and Mario Batongbacal (Mario) for
P50.00 per square meter or for a total of
Pl87,500.00. Pursuant to the agreement, Reynaldo
received an advance payment of P31 ,500.00
leaving a balance of P156,000.00. As shown in the
document denominated as Resibo and signed by
Reynaldo on 18 February 1987, the parties agreed
that the amount of P20,000.00 as part of the
advance payment shall be paid upon the delivery of
the Special Power-of-Attorney (SPA), which would
authorize Reynaldo to alienate the subject property
on behalf of his co-owners and siblings namely,
Eduardo, Araceli and Zenaida. The balance thereon
shall be paid in P10,000.00 monthly installments
until the purchase price is fully settled.
Subsequent to the execution of the said agreement,
Mario and Guillermo, on their own instance,
initiated a survey to segregate the area of 3,750
square meters from the whole area covered by TCT
No. T-107449, delineating the boundaries of the
subdivided parts. Mario and Guillermo thereafter
made several demands from Reynaldo to deliver
the SPA as agreed upon, but such demands all went
unheeded.
Consequently, Guillermo and Mario initiated an
action for Specific Performance or Rescission and
Damages before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Malolos, Bulacan, seeking to enforce their Contract
to Sell dated 18 February 1987. Mario and
Guillermo asserted that they have a better right
over the subject property and alleged that the
subsequent sale thereof effected by Reynaldo to
third persons is void as it was done in bad faith. It
was prayed in the Complaint that Reynaldo be
directed to deliver the SPA and, in case of its
impossibility, to return the amount of P31,500.00
with legal interest and with damages in either case.
To protect their rights on the subject property,
Mario and Guillermo, after initiating Civil Case No.
215-M-90, filed a Notice of Lis Pendens registering
their claim on the certificate of title covering the
entire property.
Reynaldo in his Answer[8] countered that the
purported Contract to Sell is void, because he
never gave his consent thereto. Reynaldo insisted
that he was made to understand that the contract
between him and the Batongbacals was merely an
equitable mortgage whereby it was agreed that the
latter will loan to him the amount of P31,500.00
payable once he receives his share in the proceeds
of the sale of the land registered under TCT No. T-1
07449.
RTC RULING:
The RTC, in a Decision dated 24 March 1999,
dismissed Civil Case No. 215-M-90 and ordered
Reynaldo to return to the former the sum of
P28,000.00 with 12% annual interest. Reynaldo
failed to convince the court a quo that the contract
he entered into with Mario was an equitable
mortgage. It was held by the trial court, however,
that the supposed Contract to Sell denominated as
Resibo is unenforceable under Article 1403 of the
New Civil Code because Reynaldo cannot bind his
co-owners into such contract without an SPA
authorizing him to do so. As such, Reynaldo cannot
be compelled to deliver the subject property but he
was nonetheless ordered by the court to return the
7
amount he received as part of the contract price
since no one should be allowed to unjustly enrich
himself at the expense of another.
CA RULING:
On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision
dated 7 December 2006, brushed aside the claim of
equitable mortgage and held that the sale effected
by Reynaldo of his undivided share in the property
is valid and enforceable. According to the appellate
court, no SPA is necessary for Reynaldo's
disposition of his undivided share as it is limited to
the portion that may be allotted to him upon the
termination of the co-ownership. The Batongbacals
could have validly demanded from Reynaldo to
deliver the subject property pursuant to the
Contract to Sell but such option is no longer
feasible because the entire property has already
been sold to third persons to whom a new title was
issued. The appellate court thus proceeded to
rescind the contract and ordered Reynaldo to
return the amount he received as consideration
thereby restoring the parties to their situation
before entering into the agreement.
On 9 September 2007, the appellate court was
notified of the death of Reynaldo, and his heirs
sought to be substituted as party in this case.
Petitioners Heirs of Reynaldo are now before this
Court via this instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari praying that the Court of Appeals
Decision and Resolution be reversed on the ground
that it was rendered not in accordance with the
applicable law and jurisprudence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is a contract of sale between
Dela Rosa and Batongbacal
RULING:
Reynaldo's right to sell, assign or mortgage his ideal
share in the property held in common is sanctioned
by law. The applicable law is Article 493 of the New
Civil Code, which spells out the rights of co-owners
over a co-owned property, to wit:
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full
ownership of his part and or the fruits and benefits
pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another
person in its enjoyment, except when personal
rights arc involved. But the effect of the alienation
or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners,
shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to him m the division upon the termination
of the co-ownership.
Pursuant to this law, a co-owner has the right to
alienate his pro-indiviso share in the co-owned
property even without the consent of his co-
-owners. This right is absolute and in accordance
with the well-settled doctrine that a co-owner has
a full ownership of his pro-indiviso share and has
the right to alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
substitute another person for its enjoyment. In
other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner
from selling, alienating, mortgaging his ideal share
in the property held m common.
Thus, even if the impression of the Court of
Appeals were true, i.e., that the entire propc1iy has
been sold to thirds persons, such sale could not
have affected the right of Mario and Guillermo to
recover the property from Reynaldo. In view of the
nature of co-ownership, the Court of Appeals
correctly ruled that the terms in the Contract to
Sell, which limited the subject to Reynaldo's ideal
share in the property held in common is perfectly
valid and binding. In fact, no authority from the
other co-owners is necessary for such disposition
to be valid as he is afforded by the law
full-ownership of his part and of the fruits and
benefits pertaining thereto. A condition set forth in
8
a sale contract requiring a co-owner to secure an
authority from his co-owners for the alienation of
his share, as seemingly indicated in this case,
should be considered mere surplusage and docs
not, in any way, affect the validity or the
enforceability of the contract. Nor should such a
condition indicate an intention to sell the whole
because the contrary intention has been clearly
written:
x x x Ang bahaging aking ipinagbibili ay ang !.ole
No. 1, may sukat na 3,750 sq.m. na makikita sa
nakalakip na sketch plan na aking ding nilagdaan
sa ikaliliwanag ng kasulatang ito.
Indeed, the intention clearly written, settles the
issue regarding the purchase price. A contract of
sale is a consensual contract, which becomes valid
and binding upon the meeting of minds of the
parties on the price and the object of the sale.
PNB v Garcia
Facts:
The subject of the present case is a parcel of
residential land with all its improvements (subject
property) in Isabela. It was acquired by Jose Sr.,
during his marriage with Ligaya Garcia. The
marriage of Jose Sr. and Ligaya produced the
following children: Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy,
all surnamed Garcia, who are the respondents in
the present case. Ligaya died on January 21, 1987
Later, Jose Sr., without the knowledge and consent
of his children, executed SPAs authorizing spouses
Garcia to convey the subject property in order to
secure a loan from PNB by way of mortgage and an
Amendment of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
PNB which were inscribed in the title.
The respondents filed a Complaint for Nullity of the
said Amendment against spouses Garcia and PNB
alleging that the property was conjugal, being
acquired during the marriage of Jose Sr. to Ligaya
and they became owners pro indivisio upon the
death of Ligaya on 1987.
PNB contends that the subject property was
registered to Jose Sr. alone, and who was described
in the as a “widower”.
During the proceedings, Nora, Jose Jr, Bobby and
Jimmy executed an SPA dated May 31, 1996
authorizing Jose Sr. to act attorney-in-fact during
the pretrial of the case.
Issue:
1. Whether the subject property was a
conjugal property?
2. Whether or not Jose Sr., may mortgage the
subject property entirely?
Ruling:
1. Yes. Article 119 of the Civil Code in line with
Article 160 applies.
All properties acquired during marriage are
conjugal and the registration of it in the name of
one spouse does not destroy the presumption that
it is conjugal. What is material being the time when
the property was acquired. The conjugal
partnership was converted into an implied ordinary
co-ownership upon the death of Ligaya thus
governed by Article 493 of Civil Code.
2. No. Jose Sr. constituted the mortgage over
the entire subject property after the death
9
 of Ligaya, but before the liquidation of the
conjugal partnership. While under Article
493 of the Civil Code, even if he had the
right to freely mortgage or even sell his
undivided interest in the disputed property,
he could not dispose of or mortgage the
entire property without his children’s
consent. As correctly emphasized by the
trial court, Jose Sr.’s right in the subject
property is limited only to his share in the
conjugal partnership as well as his share as
an heir on the other half of the estate which
is his deceased spouse’s share. Accordingly,
the mortgage contract is void insofar as it
extends to the undivided shares of his
children (Nora, Jose Jr., Bobby and Jimmy)
because they did not give their consent to
the transaction. Thus, Jose Sr. cannot
mortgage the entire property.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Represented by
MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
AUTHORITY (MCIAA), petitioner VS. HEIRS OF
FRANCISCA DIGNOS-SORONO respondent
FACTS
Lot Nos. 2296 and 2316(2 parcels of lands for
brevity) were adjudicated in favor of Francisca, Tito,
Isabel (all surnamed Dignos) and Silveria Amistuoso.
The heirs of Tito Dignos inherited ¼ of the above
mentioned property and the said heirs sold this
portion to Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)
via a public instrument entitled "Extrajudicial
Settlement and Sale" executed on October 11,
1957, without the knowledge of respondents
whose predecessors-in-interest were the
adjudicatees of the rest of the 3/4 portion of the
two lots. 6
In 1996, CAA's successor-in-interest, the Mactan
Cebu International Airport Authority
(MCIAA)(Petitioner), erected a security fence
traversing Lot No. 2316 and relocated a number of
families, who had built their dwellings within the
airport perimeter and MCIAA later caused the
issuance in its name of a Tax Declarations of the 2
lots.
On January 8, 1996 a Complaint for
Quieting of Title, Legal Redemption with Prayer for
a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was filed by the
respondents (the heirs of Isabel, Francisca and
Silveria who owns ¾ of the property) against
MCIAA before the RTC of Lapu-lapu City claiming a
petitioner obtained a tax declaration that was
prejudicial to their title for it covers their property.
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
MCIAA (hereafter petitioner), in its Answer with
Counterclaim, maintained that from the time the
lots were sold to its predecessor-in-interest CAA, it
has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession thereof; through acquisitive
prescription, it had acquired valid title to the lots
since it was a purchaser in good faith and for value;
and assuming arguendo that it did not have just
title, it had, by possession for over 30 years,
acquired ownership thereof by extraordinary
prescription.
The RTC ruled that the sale of is void insofar as the
¾ share of the other heirs are concerned and the
CA affirmed this.
ISSUES
Main Issue: WON the sale of the entire 2 lots by
the heirs of Tito binding to the respondents
Additional Issue: WON estoppel and laches should
work against respondents
MAIN RULING
10
NO. Article 493 of the Civil Code provides:
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation of the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership.
CASE DOCTRINE
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a
co-owner sells the whole property as his, the sale
will affect only his own share but not those of the
other co-owners who did not consent to the
sale.This is because under the aforementioned
codal provision, the sale or other disposition
affects only his undivided share and the
transferee gets only what would correspond to his
grantor in the partition of the thing owned in
common.
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a
co-owner is entitled to sell his undivided share, a
sale of the entire property by one co-owner
without the consent of the other co-owners is NOT
null and void. However, only the rights of the co-
owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the
buyer a co-owner of the property.
Petitioners predecessor-in-interest CAA thus
acquired only the rights pertaining to the sellers-
heirs of Tito Dignos, which is only ¼ undivided
share of the two lots.
Additional ruling: Registered lands cannot be the
subject of acquisitive prescription. Petitioners’
insistence that it acquired the property through
acquisitive prescription, if not ordinary, then
extraordinary, does not lie.
METROBANK VS PASCUAL
FACTS:
Respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia
Nevalga were married on January 19, 1985. During
the union, Florencia bought from spouses Clarito
and Belen Sering a 250-square meter lot with a
three-door apartment standing thereon located in
Makati City. Subsequently, Transfer Certificate of
Title covering the purchased lot was canceled and,
in lieu thereof, TCT No. 156283 of the Registry of
Deeds of Makati City was issued in the name of
Florencia, "married to Nelson Pascual" a.k.a.
Nicholson Pascual.
In 1994, Florencia filed a suit for the declaration of
nullity of marriage. After trial, the RTC in Quezon
City declared the marriage of Nicholson and
Florencia null and void on the ground of
psychological incapacity on the part of Nicholson.
In the same decision, the
RTC, ordered the dissolution and liquidation of the
ex-spouses' conjugal partnership of gains.
Subsequent events saw the couple going their
separate ways without liquidating their conjugal
partnership.
On April 30, 1997, Florencia, together with spouses
Norberto and Elvira Oliveros, obtained a PhP58
million loan from petitioner Metropolitan Bank and
Trust Co. (Metrobank). To secure the obligation,
Florencia and the spouses Oliveros executed
several real estate mortgages (REMs) on their
properties, including one involving the lot covered
by TCT No. 156283.
Due to the failure of Florencia and the spouses
Oliveros to pay their loan obligation when it fell
due, Metrobank, initiated foreclosure proceedings
11
under Act No. 3135, as amended, before the Ofice
of the Notary Public of Makati City. Subsequently,
Metrobank caused the publication of the notice of
sale on three issues of Remate. At the auction sale
on January 21, 2000, Metrobank emerged as the
highest bidder
After knowing the foreclosure proceedings,
Nicholson filed before the RTC in Makati City, a
Complaint to declare the nullity of the mortgage of
the disputed property. Nicholson alleged that the
property, which is still conjugal property, was
mortgaged without his consent. Metrobank, in its
Answer with Counterclaim and Cross-Claim, alleged
that the disputed lot, being registered in Florencia's
name, was paraphernal. Metrobank also asserted
having approved the mortgage in good faith.
Florencia did not file an answer within the
reglementary period and, hence, was subsequently
declared in default.
RTC - declared the real estate mortgage on the
property covered by [TCT] No. 156283 of the
Registry of Deeds for the City of Makati as well as
all proceedings thereon null and void.
- declared Metrobank as a mortgagee in bad faith
on account of negligence
CA - affirmed with Modification the RTC's Decision
Issue:
W/N the declaration of nullity of marriage between
the respondent Nicholson Pascual and Florencia
Nevalga ipso facto dissolved the regime of
community of property of the spouses.
RULING
Termination of Conjugal Property Regime does not
ipso facto End the Nature of Conjugal Ownership
Metrobank next maintains that, contrary to the
CA's holding, Art. 129 of the
Family Code is inapplicable.
Art. 129. Upon the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
(7) The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties shall constitute the profits, which shall
be divided equally between husband and wife,
unless a different proportion or division was agreed
upon in the marriage settlements or unless there
has been a voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such
share as provided in this Code.
While the declared nullity of marriage of Nicholson
and Florencia severed their marital bond and
dissolved the conjugal partnership, the character of
the properties acquired before such declaration
continues to subsist as conjugal properties until
and after the liquidation and partition of the
partnership. This conclusion holds true whether we
apply Art. 129 of the Family Code on liquidation of
the conjugal partnership's assets and liabilities
which is generally prospective in application, or
Section 7, Chapter 4, Title IV, Book I (Arts. 179 to
185) of the Civil Code on the subject, Conjugal
Partnership of Gains. For, the relevant provisions of
both Codes first require the liquidation of the
conjugal properties before a regime of separation
of property reigns.
In Dael v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we ruled
that pending its liquidation following its dissolution,
the conjugal partnership of gains is converted into
an implied ordinary co-ownership among the
surviving spouse and the other heirs of the
deceased.
In this pre-liquidation scenario, Art. 493 of the Civil
Code shall govern the property relationship
between the former spouses, where:
12
Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his
part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining
thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
mortgage it, and even substitute another person in
its enjoyment, except when personal rights are
involved. But the effect of the alienation or the
mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him
in the division upon the termination of the co-
ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
In the case at bar, Florencia constituted the
mortgage on the disputed lot on April
30, 1997, or a little less than two years after the
dissolution of the conjugal partnership on July 31,
1995, but before the liquidation of the partnership.
Be that as it may, what governed the property
relations of the former spouses when the mortgage
was given is the aforequoted Art. 493. Under it,
Florencia has the right to mortgage or even sell her
one-half (1/2) undivided interest in the disputed
property even without the consent of Nicholson.
However, the rights of Metrobank, as mortgagee,
are limited only to the ½ undivided portion that
Florencia owned. Accordingly, the mortgage
contract insofar as it covered the remaining 1/2
undivided portion of the lot is null and void,
Nicholson not having consented to the mortgage of
his undivided half. aHTEIA
The conclusion would have, however, been
different if Nicholson indeed duly waived his share
in the conjugal partnership. But, as found by the
courts a quo, the April 9, 1995 deed of waiver
allegedly executed by Nicholson three months prior
to the dissolution of the marriage and the conjugal
partnership of gains on July 31, 1995 bore his
forged signature, not to mention that of the
notarizing o cer. A spurious deed of waiver
does not transfer any right at all, albeit it may
become the root of a valid title in the hands of an
innocent buyer for value.
Upon the foregoing perspective, Metrobank's right,
as mortgagee and as the successful bidder at the
auction of the lot, is confined only to the 1/2
undivided portion thereof heretofore pertaining in
ownership to Florencia. The other undivided half
belongs to Nicholson. As owner pro indiviso of a
portion of the lot in question, Metrobank may ask
for the partition of the lot and its property rights
"shall be limited to the portion which may be
allotted to [the bank] in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership." 18 This
disposition is in line with the well-established
principle that the binding force of a contract must
be recognized as far as it is legally possible to do
so –– quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum
valere potest.
HEIRS OF THE LATE GERRY * ECARMA, NAMELY:
AVELINA SUIZAECARMA, DENNIS ECARMA, JERRY
LYN ECARMA PEÑA, ANTONIO ECARMA and
NATALIA ECARMA SANGALANG , petitioners, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and RENATO A. ECARMA ,
respondents.
Facts:
Arminda and Natalio Ecarma begat 7 children
named (1) Angelita; (2) Rodolfo; (3) respondent
Renato; (4) Maria Arminda; (5) Gerry Anthony
Ecarma, husband and father respectively of herein
petitioners (6) Fe Shirley; and (7) Rolando. They
have also acquired several properties which among
these are the 4 properties in dispute designated as
Kitanlad, Cuyapo and Lala (consist of 2 lots).
After Natalio's death in 1970, his heirs executed an
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate, the four (4)
properties were partitioned among them: Arminda
was assigned an undivided two-ninth's (2/9's)
proportion and all their children in equal
proportion of one-ninth (1/9) each. Significantly,
despite the partition agreement, no physical
13
division of the properties was effected, Natalio's
heirs remaining in co-ownership (pro indiviso) even
at the time of their mother's, decedent Arminda's,
death in 1983.
Renato (respondent) as the Special Administrator
in the intestate proceedings filed a Project of
Partition of the Lala and Cuyapo land. The RTC
finding the motions with merit issued a lengthy
Order approving the proposed partition of the
properties:
1. That the Kitland property be divided
longitudinally from the frontage down to
the other end in seven (7) equal parts. The
shares of Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma
shall be contiguous to each other on one
side of the property nearest the main
entrance, while the shares of the other five
(5) legal heirs shall comprise the balance
thereof.
2. The Cuyapo farm lot shall be partitioned
into seven (7) equal parts substantially in
accordance with "Partial Project of Partition
of Estate". Lots 1 and 2 will be allocated to
Jerry Ecarma and Rodolfo Ecarma, so that
the remaining balance will remain
contiguous to one another. The remaining
balance, as prayed for, can now be donated
by the five (5) other legal heirs to the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP).
3. The Lala Property consisting of two 2 farm
lots contiguous to each other, one
consisting of more than six 6 hectares and
the other more than 13 hectares shall each
be partitioned into seven 7 equal parts
substantially in accordance with the "Partial
Project of Partition of Estate". Lots 6 and 7
of the six-hectare lot will while Lots 1 and 2
of the 13-hectare lot will be likewise
allocated to Jerry Ecarma and each other.
The remaining balance can now be donated
by the Lve (5) other legal heirs to the AFP.
Gerry objected because the proposed partition is
not feasible, impractical and detrimental. The
planned partition is not accordance with the wishes
of decedents, but however, it was denied by the
lower court. He brought up the case to the CA but
before the controversy has been settled, he died.
Therefore, the heirs of Gerry Ecarma filed their
Appellant’s Brief in substitution of the deceased.
Issue: WON the Order of Partition is proper where
one of the co - owners refuse to accede to such
proposed partition on the ground that it is not
feasible, impractical and detrimental.
Held: Yes. Upon Arminda's death, her heirs' rights
to the succession vested and their co-ownership
over the subject properties has consolidated by
operation of law. Effectively, without a valid will of
Arminda, and as Arminda's compulsory heirs,
herein parties (specifically Gerry Ecarma prior to
his death and substitution by herein petitioners) all
ipso facto co-owned the subject properties in equal
proportion being compulsory heirs of the deceased
spouses Natalio and Arminda.
Their objection to the actual partition
notwithstanding, herein petitioners and even
Rodolfo Ecarma (who alleged that the RTC has
without/ in excess of jurisdiction by ordering the
partition of the subject properties, portions of
which do not belong to the intestate estate of
Arminda) cannot compel the other co-heirs to
remain in perpetual co-ownership over the subject
properties. Article 494, in relation to Article 1083,
of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in
the co-ownership. Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing owned in
common, insofar as his share is concerned.
14
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing
undivided for a certain period of time, not
exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may
be extended by a new agreement.
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a
period which shall not exceed twenty years.
Neither shall there be any partition when it is
prohibited by law.
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or
co-heir against his co-owners or co-heirs so long as
he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-
ownership.
Art. 1083. Every co-heir has a right to demand the
division of the estate unless the testator should
have expressly forbidden its partition, in which
case the period of indivision shall not exceed
twenty years as provided in Article 494. This power
of the testator to prohibit division applies to the
legitime.
Even though forbidden by the testator, the co-
ownership terminates when any of the causes for
which partnership is dissolved takes place, or when
the court finds for compelling reasons that division
should be ordered, upon petition of one of the co-
heirs.
Therefore, herein petitioners' absolute opposition
to the partition of the subject properties which are
co-owned has no basis in law. As mere co-owners,
herein petitioners, representing the share of the
deceased Gerry Ecarma, cannot preclude the other
owners likewise compulsory heirs of the deceased
spouses Natalio and Arminda, from exercising all
incidences of their full ownership.
JUAN P. CABRERA vs. HENRY YSAAC
G.R. No. 166790 NOVEMBER 19, 2014
FACTS: Henry Ysaac is one of the co-owners of the
co-owners of a parcel of land covered by OCT
Number 506 with an area of 5,517 sq. meters. He
leased out a portion of the property to several
lessees including Juan Cabrera who leased a 95 sq.
meter lot but Juan demurred because the lot was
too small for his needs since there was no parking
space for his vehicle. To deal with Juan’s need,
Henry expanded his offer to include two adjoining
lands which was the leased by two families but
warned that the sale could only proceed if the two
families would agree. The deal was almost closed
with the agreed price of P250/sq. meter but Juan
stated that he could only pay the full price after his
retirement. Henry agreed but demanded for an
initial payment of P1,500 which Juan paid.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid contract of
sale between petitioner and respondent.
HELD:
We find that there was no contract of sale. It was
null and void ab initio. As defined by the Civil Code
“a contract is a meeting of minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect
to the other, to give something or to render some
service.” For there to be a valid contract, there
must be consent of the contracting parties, an
object certain which is the subject matter of the
contract, and cause of the obligation which is
established.
Sale is a special contract. The seller obligates
himself to deliver a determinate thing and to
transfer its ownership to the buyer.
In turn, the buyer pays for a price certain in money
or its equivalent. A “contract of sales is perfected
at the moment there is a meeting of minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and
15
upon the price.” The seller and buyer must agree as
to the certain thing that will be subject of the sale
as well as the price in which the thing will be sold.
The thing to be sold is the object of the contract,
while the price is the cause or consideration. The
object of the sales contract between petitioner and
respondent was a definite portion of a co-owned
parcel of land.
At the time of the alleged sale between the
petitioner and respondent, the entire property was
still held in common. This is evidence by the
original certificate of title, which was under the
names of Matilde Ysaac, Priscilla Ysaac, Walter
Ysaac, Henry Ysaac, Elizabeth Ysaac, Norma Ysaac
and other Ysaac’s.
The rules allow respondent to sell his undivided
interest in the coownership.However, this was not
the object of the sale between him and petitioner.
The object of the sale was a definite portion. Even
if it was respondent who was benefiting from the
fruits of the lease contract to petitioner,
respondent has “no right to sell or alienate a
concrete, specific or determinate part of the thing
owned in common, because his right over the thing
is represented by quota or ideal portion without
any physical adjudication.”
JOAQUIN QUIMPO, SR., substituted by Heirs of
Joaquin Quimpo, Sr., petitioners, vs. CONSUELO
ABAD VDA. DE BELTRAN, IRENEO ABAD, DANILO
ABAD, MARITES ABAD, ANITA and HELEN ABAD,
respondents.
Facts:
 Eustaquia was the owner of several parcels
of land in Goa, Camarines Sur (Parcel I, II, III,
IV). Eustaquia died intestate in 1948 leaving
these parcels of land to her grandchild and
great grandchildren, namely, Joaquin
Quimpo and respondents Consuelo, Ireneo,
Danilo, Marites, Anita and Helen, all
surnamed Abad.
 Joaquin and respondents undertook an oral
partition of parcel III and parcel IV. No
document of partition executed because
Joaquin refused to execute a deed.
 Joaquin became administrator of minor
great grandchildren’s shares. Other
grandchildren occupied their shares or
installed tenants.
 The then minor great grandchildren (Danilo,
Marites, Anita and Helen) wanted to take
possession but Joaquin prevented them and
refused partition of Parcels I and II. Hence,
respondents filed a complaint for judicial
partition and/or recovery of possession
with accounting and damages with the RTC.
 Joaquin (1) asserted absolute ownership
over parcels III and IV, claiming that he
purchased these lands from Eustaquia
evidence by deeds of sale and (2) claimed
continuous, peaceful and adverse
possession of these lots since 1946, and (3)
alleged that Consuelo's occupation of the
portion of the San Jose property was by
mere tolerance. During the pendency of the
case, Joaquin died and was substituted by
his wife and children.
 RTC: In favor of respondents; held them as
co-owners of all the properties left by
Eustaquia. Deeds by Joaquin were false and
fictitious; Eustaquia was 91 years old and
cannot give her consent to Joaquin;
possession and occupation of Joaquin and
respondents for 23 years furnish sufficient
evidence.
16
  CA: Affirmed RTC ruling; rejected
petitioners' argument that the action was
barred by prescription and laches,
explaining that prescription does not run
against the heirs so long as the heirs, for
whose benefit prescription is invoked, have
not expressly or impliedly repudiated the
co-ownership.
Issue: WON THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
ERRED IN RULING THAT COOWNERSHIP EXISTS
AMONG PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS OVER
THE SUBJECT PARCELS OF LAND
Held:
 Petition has no merit. SC affirm the CA
ruling that respondents are co-owners of
the subject four (4) parcels of land, having
inherited the same from a common
ancestor — Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad.
Petitioners' assertion that respondents
failed to prove their relationship to the late
Eustaquia deserves scant consideration.
 Consuelo was the grandchild of Eustaquia,
while respondents Danilo, Helen, Marites,
Anita and also Joaquin Quimpo were
Eustaquia's great grandchildren. As such,
respondents can rightfully ask for the
confirmation of the oral partition over
parcels III and IV, and the partition of
parcels I and II. Jurisprudence is replete
with rulings that any co-owner may demand
at any time the partition of the common
property unless a coowner has repudiated
the co-ownership. This action for partition
does not prescribe and is not subject to
laches.
 Petition DENIED. CA affirmed.
**other issue: WON the notarized deeds of sale
and the tax declarations should have adequately
established Joaquin's ownership of parcels III and
IV
Held: NO.
 Eustaquia was already mentally
incapacitated by then, and could no longer
be expected to give her consent to the sale.
 these tax declarations are all in the name of
Eustaquia Perfecto-Abad. These documents,
therefore, do not support their claim of
absolute dominion since 1946, but enervate
it instead. Besides, the fact that the
disputed property may have been declared
for taxation purposes in the name of
Joaquin Quimpo does not necessarily prove
ownership for it is well settled that a tax
declaration or tax receipts are not
conclusive evidence of ownership.
For 43 years, Consuelo and Ireneo occupied their
portions of the San Jose property and significantly,
Joaquin never disturbed their possession. They also
installed tenants in parcel IV, and Joaquin did not
prevent them from doing so, nor did he assert his
ownership over the same. These unerringly point
to the fact that there was indeed an oral partition
of parcels III and IV.
Austria v Lichauco
FACTS:
Plaintiffs-appellees Constancia Lichauco, Consuelo
Jalandoni, defendants Benedicto Quintos and
Antonio Quintos, and defendant-appellant
Consolacion Austria are siblings of full blood. Jose
Alberto, Ricardo, Jr., Aileen and Tyrone, all
surnamed Quintos, are the nephews and niece of
17
the defendant-appellant. The above named are co-
owners of 2 parcels of land that has permanent
improvements thereon namely, a residential
bungalow and 2 uits, two-storey apartments, the
titles of which are registered jointly in the names of
the parties as co-owners. Plaintiff informed the
defendants their desire to have the subject
property partitioned based on their respective
shares. Defendant-appellant Austria refused to
accede to any of the schemes presented by the
realtor. Because of this, plaintiffs filed a complaint
with the RTC against Austria and 2 others for
partition of the subject property. Austria filed an
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss which was denied.
Austria then filed a M/R which was also denied.
Austria then filed a petition for Certiorari before
the CA who required the plaintiffs to comment and
temporarily restrained the respondent judge from
proceeding with the partition case. The petition for
certiorari was dismissed, as well as, her M/R.
During the pendency of the petition for certiorari
before the CA, the plaintiffs filed with the RTC
where the case is pending, a motion praying that a
declaration of default be issued against all
defendants and for the plaintiffs to present
evidence ex-parte. While the M/R before the CA
was pending, RTC declared defendants in default
and eventually, the lower court ruled in favor of
the plaintiffs. A motion for new trial filed by Austria
was denied for lack of merit. Austria avers that her
motion for new trial and appeal of the judgment by
default are valid remedies. Respondents argued
that petitioner was correctly declared in default
because of her obstinate refusal to file an answer
to the complaint.
ISSUE:
W/N the partition is valid
RULING:
There are two stages in every action for partition.
The first is the determination of a co-ownership
and the second commences when it appears that
the parties are unable to agree upon the partition
directed by the court. The proceedings in this case
have only reached the first phase. It must be
mentioned as an aside that even if the order
decreeing partition leaves something more to be
done by the trial court for the complete disposition
of the case, i.e., the appointment of commissioners,
the proceedings for the determination of just
compensation by the appointed commissioners,
the submission of their reports and hearing
thereon, and the approval of the partition, it is
considered a final order and may be appealed by
the party aggrieved thereby. There is no question
that a co-ownership exists between petitioner and
respondents. To this extent, the trial court was
correct in decreeing partition in line with the Civil
Code provision that no co-owner shall be obliged to
remain in the co-ownership.
ANITA UNGAB-VALEROSO, joined in by her
husband, RUSELO VALEROSO,
Petitioners, vs. AMANCIA UNGAB-GRADO,
Doctrine: Successor vs. Co-owners
Facts: Subject of this case is a 14.3375-hectare land
in Binuni, Lanao del Norte registered in the name
of Timoteo Ungab under Original Certificate of Title
(OCT) No. (P-41)-1,550. Petitioner Anita Ungab is
the only child of Timoteo, now deceased.
Respondent Felix Ungab is the brother of Timoteo
while the other respondents are the heirs of
Timoteos other brothers and sisters.
In 1972, the heirs of Ciriaco Ungab filed a
complaint docketed as Civil Case No. II-74 in the
Court of First Instance (CFI) of Iligan City, Lanao del
Norte against the brothers, sisters and heirs of
Timoteo for the partition, accounting and
reconveyance of the subject land.
18
The parties submitted a written compromise
agreement whereby the parties did not have the
land partitioned but divided the proceeds of the
land. However, in December 1996, Anita refused
to give respondents their respective
shares. Respondents then filed against petitioners
Anita and her husband Ruselo Valeroso, a
complaint for recovery of possession, partition,
enforcement of compromise agreement and
damages. In their defense, the Spouses Anita and
Ruselo claimed that Anita exclusively owns the land
as sole heir of Timoteo. They maintained that the
decision in Civil Case No. II-74 had become
dormant and could no longer be executed. Besides,
they aver, Anita was not privy to the compromise
agreement.
The lower court ruled in favor of respondents
which prompted the petitioner to elevate the issue
to the CA which affirmed the trial courts decision
but deleted the award of attorneys fees. It held
there is evidence showing that the land under OCT
No. (P-41)-1,550 was owned in common by the
parties, and that Anita is estopped by her own act
of signing the Affidavit of Acknowledgment
dated August 4, 1960 from denying the co-
ownership.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals commit
a reversible error of law which merits review by
this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court?
Ruling: We rule in the negative.
The records lack evidence sufficiently showing that
the land covered by Homestead Application No.
218565 referred to in the Affidavit of Timoteo is
the same land covered by OCT No. (P-41)-1,550
which originated from Homestead Patent No. V-
4777. The records do not show whether
Homestead Application No. 218565 was the one
granted in Homestead Patent No. V-4777. The
court cannot just fill in the deficiency in the
evidence submitted by the concerned parties.
We note, however, that even without the Affidavit
of Timoteo, there is still evidence on record proving
that the respondents and Timoteo indeed own the
land in common.For one, there is the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment dated August 4, 1960. Moreover,
the Affidavit of Acknowledgment, being a notarized
document, enjoys the presumption of
regularity. Petitioners mere allegation that Anita
[13]
was misled by her mother into signing the affidavit
could not overcome this presumption.
jose maria RAMIREZ vs RAMIREZ (7 silang
defendants)
FACTS: Jose Maria Ramirez, brought this action
against the defendants for the partition of a parcel
of land situated in Escolta, Manila otherwise known
as Lot 1 of Block 2120 of the Cadastral Survey of
Manila. Pro indiviso to both parties, one sixth (1/6)
to the plaintiff and five-sixths (5/6) to the
defendants.
Defendants objected to the physical partition of
the property in question, upon the theory that said
partition is "materially and legally" impossible and
"would work great harm and prejudice to the co-
owners."
By agreement of the parties the lower Court
referred the matter to a Commission to determine
whether the property is susceptible of partition,
and submit a plan therefor, if feasible, as well as to
report thereon. Then the commissioners submitted
their reports.
After due hearing, the Court rendered a decision
declaring that plaintiff is entitled to the segregation
of his share, and directing that the property be
partitioned in accordance with the plan submitted
by commissioner Valencia, and that the expenses
19
incident thereto be paid by both parties
proportionately. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE: WON the lower court has erred in holding
that said property is legally susceptible of physical
division
RULING: No, the Supreme Court affirmed the
decision. It is urged that a physical division of the
property will cause "inestimable damage" to the
interest of the co-owners. No evidence, however,
has been introduced, or sought to be introduced, in
support of this allegation. Moreover, the same is
predicated upon the assumption that a real estate
suitable for commercial purposes — such as the
one herein sought to be partitioned — is likely to
suffer a proportionately great diminution in value
when its area becomes too small.
Aguilar v. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 76351
October 29, 1993
Facts: Petitioner Virgilio and respondent Senen are
brothers, and were among the seven (7) children of
the late Maximiano Aguilar. In 1969, the two
brothers purchased a house and lot in Parañaque
where their father could spend and enjoy his
remaining years in a peaceful neighborhood.
Initially, the brothers agreed that Virgilio's share in
the co-ownership was two-thirds while that of
Senen was one-third. By virtue of a written
memorandum, Virgilio and Senen agreed that
henceforth their interests in the house and lot
should be equal, with Senen assuming the
remaining mortgage obligation of the original
owners with the SSS in exchange for his possession
and enjoyment of the house together with their
father.
Since Virgilio was then disqualified from obtaining
a loan from SSS, the brothers agreed that the deed
of sale would be executed and the title registered
in the meantime in the name of Senen. It was
further agreed that Senen would take care of their
father and his needs since Virgilio and his family
were staying in Cebu.
After Maximiano Aguilar died in 1974, petitioner
demanded from private respondent that the latter
vacate the house and that the property be sold and
proceeds thereof divided among them. Because of
the refusal of respondent to give in to petitioner's
demands, the latter filed an action to compel the
sale of the house and lot so that the they could
divide the proceeds between them. Rendering
judgment by default against defendant, for failure
to appear at pre- trial, the trial court found him and
plaintiff to be co-owners of the house and lot, in
equal shares on the basis of their written
agreement. Since plaintiff could not agree to the
amount offered by defendant for the former's
share, the trial court held that this property should
be sold to a third person and the proceeds divided
equally between the parties. The CA set aside the
order of the trial court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner may demand
partition of the property.
Held: YES. We uphold the trial court in ruling in
favor of petitioner, except as to the effectivity of
the payment of monthly rentals by respondent as
co-owner which we here declare to commence
only after the trial court ordered respondent to
vacate in accordance with its order.
20
Article 494 of the Civil Code provides that no co-
owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership, and that each co-owner may demand
at any time partition of the thing owned in
common insofar as his share is concerned.
Corollary to this rule, Art. 498 of the Code states
that whenever the thing is essentially, indivisible
and the co-owners cannot agree that it be, allotted
to one of them who shall indemnify the others, it
shall be sold and its proceeds accordingly
distributed. However, being a co-owner
respondent has the right to use the house and lot
without paying any compensation to petitioner, as
he may use the property owned in common long as
it is in accordance with the purpose for which it is
intended and in a manner not injurious to the
interest of the other co-owners.
Since petitioner has decided to enforce his right in
court to end the co-ownership of the house and lot
and respondent has not refuted the allegation that
he has been preventing the sale of the property by
his continued occupancy of the premises, justice
and equity demand that respondent and his family
vacate the property so that the sale can be
effected immediately. When petitioner filed an
action to compel the sale of the property and the
trial court granted the petition and ordered the
ejectment of respondent, the co-ownership was
deemed terminated and the right to enjoy the
possession jointly also ceased. Thereafter, the
continued stay of respondent and his family in the
house prejudiced the interest of petitioner as the
property should have been sold and the proceeds
divided equally between them. To this extent and
from then on, respondent should be held liable for
monthly rentals until he and his family vacate.
Quintos vs Nicolas
Facts:
Petitioners Vilma Quintos, Florencia Dancel, and
Catalino Ibarra, and respondents Pelagia Nicolas,
Noli Ibarra, Santiago Ibarra, Pedro Ibarra, David
Ibarra, Gilberto Ibarra, and the late Augusto Ibarra
are siblings. Their parents, Bienvenido and
Escolastica Ibarra, were the owners of the subject
property, a 281 sqm. parcel of land situated along
Quezon Ave., Poblacion C, Camiling, Tarlac,
covered by TCT No. 318717.
The deceased parents left their 10 children
ownership over the subject property. In 2002,
respondent siblings brought an action for partition
against petitioners. The case was docketed as Civil
Case No. 02-52 and was raffled to the RTC at
Camiling, Tarlac but was later on dismissed as
neither of the parties appeared and appealed.
Respondent siblings instead resorted to executing a
Deed of Adjudication to transfer the property in
favor of the 10 siblings. As a result, TCT No. 318717
was canceled and TCT No. 390484 was issued in the
names of the 10 heirs of the Ibarra spouses. The
siblings sold their 7/10 undivided share over the
property in favor of their co-respondents, the
spouses Recto and Rosemarie Candelario by virtue
of a Deed of Absolute Sale and Agreement of
Subdivision, and the title was partially cancelled as
a result.
Petitioners filed a complaint for Quieting of Title
and Damages against respondents wherein they
alleged that during their parents’ lifetime, the
couple distributed their real and personal
properties in favor of their 10 children. Upon
distribution, petitioners alleged that they received
the subject property and the house constructed
thereon as their share. They had been in adverse,
open, continuous, and uninterrupted possession of
the property for over 4 decades and are allegedly
21
entitled to equitable title. Participation in the
execution of the aforementioned Deeds was
denied.
Respondents, on the other hand, countered that
petitioners’ cause of action was already barred by
estoppel when in 2006, one of petitioners offered
to buy the 7/10 undivided share, which is an
admission petitioners’ part that the property is not
entirely theirs. The Ibarras allegedly mortgaged the
property but because of financial constraints,
respondent spouses Candelario had to redeem the
property. Not having been repaid, the Candelarios
accepted their share in the subject property as
payment. Lastly, respondents sought, by way of
counterclaim, the partition of the property.
RTC Ruling
Dismissed petitioners’ complaint, as it did not find
merit in petitioners’ asseverations that they have
acquired title over the property through acquisitive
prescription and noted there was no document
evidencing that their parents bequeathed the
property. Subsequent transfer of the siblings’
interest in favor of respondent spouses Candelario
was upheld.
CA Ruling
Upheld lower court decision and held that since the
property is co-owned by the plaintiffs- appellants,
( 3/10 undivided interest) and defendants-
appellees Spouses Candelarios (7/10 undivided
interest) and considering that plaintiffs-appellants
had already constructed a 3-storey building at the
back portion of the property, partition is in order,
in accord with the subdivision plan.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondents’ counterclaim for
partition is already barred by laches
or res judicata
Ruling:
As to the issue of partition as raised by
respondents in their counterclaim, the petitioners
countered that the action for partition has already
been barred by res judicata.
The Court had the occasion to rule that dismissal
with prejudice satisfies one of the elements of res
judicata. It is understandable why petitioners
would allege res judicata to bolster their claim.
However, dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17,
Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court cannot defeat the right
of a co-owner to ask for partition at any time,
provided that there is no actual adjudication of
ownership of shares yet. This is pertinent to Article
494 of the Civil Code which discusses how the law
generally does not favor the retention of co-
ownership as a property relation, and is interested
instead in ascertaining the co-owners’ specific
shares so as to prevent the allocation of portions to
remain perpetually in limbo. Thus, the law provides
that each co-owner may demand at any time the
partition of the thing owned in common.
Between dismissal with prejudice under Rule 17,
Sec. 3 and the right granted to co-owners under Art.
494 of the Civil Code, the latter must prevail. To
construe otherwise would diminish the substantive
right of a co-owner through the promulgation of
procedural rules. Such a construction is not
sanctioned by the principle, which is too well
settled to require citation, that a substantive law
cannot be amended by a procedural rule. Art. 494
is an exception to Rule 17, Sec. 3 of the Rules of
Court to the effect that even if the order of
dismissal for failure to prosecute is silent on
22
whether or not it is with prejudice, it shall be
deemed to be without prejudice.
This is not to say, however, that the action for
partition will never be barred by res judicata. There
can still be res judicata in partition cases
concerning the same parties and the same subject
matter once the respective shares of the co-owners
have been determined with finality by a competent
court with jurisdiction or if the court determines
that partition is improper for co- ownership does
not or no longer exists.
The counterclaim for partition is not barred by
laches. We now proceed to petitioners’ second line
of attack. According to petitioners, the claim for
partition is already barred by laches since by 1999,
both Bienvenido and Escolastica Ibarra had already
died and yet the respondent siblings only belatedly
filed the action for partition, Civil Case No. 02-52,
in 2002. And since laches has allegedly already set
in against respondent siblings, so too should
respondent spouses Candelario be barred from
claiming the same for they could not have acquired
a better right than their predecessors-in-interest.
Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time, to do that which––
by the exercise of due diligence––could or should
have been done earlier. It is the negligence or
omission to assert a right within a reasonable
period, warranting the presumption that the party
entitled to assert it has either abandoned or
declined to assert it. The principle is a creation of
equity which, as such, is applied not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping upon one’s right, but
rather to avoid recognizing a right when to do so
would result in a clearly inequitable situation. As an
equitable defense, laches does not concern itself
with the character of the petitioners’ title, but only
with whether or not by reason of the
respondents’ long inaction or inexcusable neglect,
they should be barred from asserting this claim at
all, because to allow them to do so would be
inequitable and unjust to petitioners.
As correctly appreciated by the lower courts,
respondents cannot be said to have neglected to
assert their right over the subject property. They
cannot be considered to have abandoned their
right given that they filed an action for partition.
The fact that respondent siblings entered into a
Contract of Lease with Avico Lending Investor Co.
over the subject property is evidence that they are
exercising rights of ownership over the same.
Heirs of Padilla v Magdua
Facts:
Juanita Padilla (Juanita), the mother of petitioners,
owned a piece of land in Leyte. After Juanita’s
death petitioners, as legal heirs of Juanita, sought
to have the land partitioned. Petitioners sent word
to their eldest brother Ricardo Bahia (Ricardo)
regarding their plans for the partition of the land.
In a letter dated 5 June 1998 written by Ricardo
addressed to them, petitioners were surprised to
find out that Ricardo had declared the land for
himself, prejudicing their rights as co-heirs. It was
then discovered that Juanita had allegedly
executed a notarized Affidavit of Transfer of Real
Property (Affidavit) in favor of Ricardo on 4 June
1966 making him the sole owner of the land. The
records do not show that the land was registered
under the Torrens system.
Petitioners filed an action with the RTC for
recovery of ownership, possession, partition and
damages. Petitioners sought to declare void the
sale of the land by Ricardo’s daughters to
respondent Dominador Magdua (Dominador). The
sale was made during the lifetime of Ricardo.
23
Petitioners alleged that Ricardo, through
misrepresentation, had the land transferred in his
name without the consent and knowledge of his
co-heirs. Petitioners also stated that prior to 1966,
Ricardo had a house constructed on the land.
However, when Ricardo and his wife Zosima
separated, Ricardo left for Biliran and the house
was leased to third parties.
Petitioners further alleged that the
signature of Juanita in the Affidavit is highly
questionable because on 15 May 1978 Juanita
executed a written instrument stating that she
would be leaving behind to her children the land
which she had inherited from her parents.
Issue:
1. Whether or not there is a repudiation of co-
ownership in this case?
2. Whether or not Ricardo acquired the
subject property through acquisitive
prescription?
Ruling:
Ricardo and petitioners are co-heirs or co-owners
of the land. Co-heirs or co-owners cannot acquire
by acquisitive prescription the share of the other
co-heirs or co-owners absent a clear repudiation
of the co-ownership, as expressed in Article 494 of
the Civil Code which states:
Art. 494. x x x No prescription shall run in favor of a
co-owner or co-heir against his co-owners or co-
heirs as long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes
the co-ownership.
Since possession of co-owners is like that of a
trustee, in order that a co-owners possession may
be deemed adverse to the cestui que trust or other
co-owners, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that he has performed unequivocal acts of
repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui
que trust or other co-owners,
(2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been
made known to the cestui que trust or other co-
owners, and
(3) that the evidence thereon must be clear and
convincing.
1. Yes. There is a repudiation of co-
ownership in this case. All three
requisites have been met. After Juanitas
death in 1989, petitioners sought for
the partition of their mother’s land. The
heirs, including Ricardo, were notified
about the plan. Ricardo, through a letter
dated 5 June 1998, notified petitioners,
as his co-heirs, that he adjudicated the
land solely for himself. Accordingly,
Ricardo’s interest in the land had now
become adverse to the claim of his co-
heirs after repudiating their claim of
entitlement to the land.
In Generosa v. Prangan-Valera, SC held that in
order that title may prescribe in favor of one of the
co-owners, it must be clearly shown that he had
repudiated the claims of the others, and that they
were apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive
ownership, before the prescriptive period begins to
run.
2. No. Prescriptive period began to run
only from 5 June 1998, the date
petitioners received notice of Ricardo’s
repudiation of their claims to the land.
Since petitioners filed an action for
recovery of ownership and possession,
partition and damages with the RTC on
24
 26 October 2001, only a mere three
years had lapsed. This three-year period
falls short of the 10-year or 30-year
acquisitive prescription period required
by law in order to be entitled to claim
legal ownership over the land. Thus,
Dominador cannot invoke acquisitive
prescription.
QUIJANO, petitioner, vs. ATTY. AMANTE,
respondent.
G.R. No. 164277,
FACTS
The petitioner and her siblings, namely: Eliseo, Jose
and Gloria, inherited from their father, the late
Bibiano Quijano a registered parcel of land in Cebu
City.
On April 23, 1990, prior to any partition among the
heirs, Eliseo sold a portion of his share, measuring
600 square meters, to respondent Atty. Daryll A.
Amante (respondent) and on July 25, 1991, Eliseo,
sickly and in need of money, sold an additional 1/3
portion of his share in the property to the
respondent.
On September 30, 1992, Fe, Eliseo, Jose and Gloria
executed a deed of extrajudicial partition to divide
their father's estate (consisting of the
aforementioned parcel of land) among themselves
however, this partition resulted in the portions
earlier sold by Eliseo to the respondent being
adjudicated to the petitioner instead of to Eliseo.
Due to the petitioner's needing her portion that
was then occupied by the respondent, she
demanded that the latter vacate it. She alleged
therein that she was the registered owner of the
parcel of land covered by TCT No. 6555, a portion
of which was being occupied by the respondent,
who had constructed a residential building thereon
by the mere tolerance of Eliseo when the property
she and her siblings had inherited from their father
had not yet been subdivided, and was thus still co-
owned by them; and that the respondent's
occupation had become illegal following his refusal
to vacate despite repeated demands.
The respondent denied that his possession of the
disputed portion had been by mere tolerance of
Eliseo. He even asserted that he was in fact the
owner and lawful possessor of the property, having
bought it from Eliseo; that the petitioner and her
siblings could not deny knowing about the sale in
his favor because they could plainly see his house
from the road; and that the deed of absolute sale
itself stated that the sale to him was with their
approval, and that they had already known that his
house and fence were existing; that before he
purchased the property, Eliseo informed him that
he and his co-heirs had already orally partitioned
the estate of their father, and that the portion
being sold to him was Eliseo's share; and that with
his having already purchased the property before
the petitioner acquired it under the deed of
extrajudicial partition, she should respect his
ownership and possession of it.
MTCC ruled in favor of petitioner and said that the
sale did not convey the property because during
when the sale was made the property was not yet
partitioned this was reversed by the RTC and the
reversal was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE
WON the respondent should be considered as a co-
owner despite the fact that the sale was made
before partition.
RULING
Yes, Even if an heir's right in the estate of the
decedent has not yet been fully settled and
25
partitioned and is thus merely inchoate, Article 493
of the Civil Code gives the heir the right to exercise
acts of ownership. Accordingly, when Eliseo sold
the disputed property to the respondent in 1990
and 1991, he was only a co-owner along with his
siblings, and could sell only that portion that would
be allotted to him upon the termination of the co-
ownership. The sale did not vest ownership of the
disputed property in the respondent but
transferred only the seller's pro indiviso share to
him, consequently making him, as the buyer, a co-
owner of the disputed property until it is
partitioned.
CASE DOCTRINE
As Eliseo's successor-in-interest or assignee, the
respondent was vested with the right under
Article 497 of the Civil Code to take part in the
partition of the estate and to challenge the
partition undertaken without his consent.
However, respondent is already bound by the
agreement of the co heirs because despite the
knowledge of Eliseo's co-ownership with his co-
heirs, and of their oral agreement of partition the
respondent still did not exercise his right under
Article 497 when the partition was being made.
SULPICIO CARVAJAL, petitioner, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and EUTIQUIANO
CAMARILLO and LIBERATA
CACABELOS,respondents.
RECIT READY FACTS:
A complaint for ejectment and recovery of a 1/5
Portion of a parcel of and, inherited from their
parents by the five Espique children, two of them
being Evaristo and Estefanio, was filed by the
private respondent spouses against petitioner, the
occupant thereof. The subject parcel of land was
allegedly bought by the private respondents from
Evaristo Espique on April 15, 1964, while the
petitioner claimed to have bought the same from
Estefanio Espique on April 26, 1967. Both sales
were made while the petition for partition of the
land filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending in
court. The lower court rendered a decision which
was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, declaring the
respondents the lawful owners of the land in
question and ordering the petitioner to pay P30.00
in monthly rentals until possession of the property
is surrendered to respondents.
The Supreme Court held that the action for
ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by
the private respondents in the lower court is
premature, for what must be settled first is the
action for partition; and that until the partition of
the estate is ordered by the Court of First instance
of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceeding
and the share of each co-heir is determined by
metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor
respondents can rightfully claim that what they
bought is the part in dispute. Judgment reversed.
FACTS:
Private respondents, who are husband and wife,
had instituted a complaint before the Court of First
Instance for ejectment and recovery of possession
against herein petitioner, alleging that they are the
owners in fee simple of a parcel of commercial land,
pro-indiviso, consisting of 150.8 sq. meters, more
or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan,
having bought the same from Evaristo G. Espique
by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on
April 15, 1964. They also demand that petitioner
pay a monthly rental for the use of the property at
the rate of P40.00 until the property is surrendered
26
to them. The property in question is a 1/5 portion
of a 754 sq. meter land originally owned by
Hermogenes Espique and his wife, both dead. After
their death, their five children, namely: Maria,
Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio and Trofinia
succeeded them in the ownership of the whole lot.
Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the
whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the Espique
children . Petitioner alleges that he purchased the
northern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying
(which is also claimed by respondents) from
Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half
portion is leased to him by Tropinia Espique. The
land subject of the controversy is the most
southern portion of the whole lot inherited by the
Espique children which petitioner claims he had
bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and which
respondents claim they had bought from Evaristo
on April 15, 1964.
Both sales were made while the petition for
partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still pending
before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, CA
and RTC declared the respondents the lawful
owners of the land in question and ordering the
petitioner to pay P30.00 in monthly rentals until
possession of the property is surrendered to
respondents
ISSUE:
W/N respondents are the rightful owner of the
land?
RULING:
NO. The action for ejectment and recovery of
possession instituted by herein respondents in the
lower court is premature, for what must be settled
first is the action for partition. Unless a project of
partition is effected, each heir cannot claim
ownership over a definite portion of the
inheritance. Upon the death of a person, each of
his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the
whole estate left with respect to the part or
portion which might be adjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among
the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it
remains undivided.
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each
co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto
and he may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and
even substitute another person in its enjoyment,
the effect of the alienation or the mortgage with
respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by
mandate of the same article, to the portion which
may be allotted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to
sell or alienate a concrete, specific, or determinate
part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the
other co-owners because his right over the thing is
represented by an abstract or ideal portion without
any physical adjudication. An individual co-owner
cannot adjudicate to himself or claim title to any
definite portion of the land or thing owned in
common until its actual partition by agreement or
judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-
owner has is an ideal or abstract quota or
proportionate share in the entire thing owned in
common by all the co-owners. What a co-owner
may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share,
which shall be limited to the portion that may be
allotted to him upon partition. 5 Before partition, a
coheir can only sell his successional rights.
In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed
by Evaristo G. Espique in favor of respondents and
the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of
petitioner were made before the partition of the
property among the co-heirs does not annul or
invalidate the deeds of sale and both sales are valid.
However, the interests thereby acquired by
petitioner and respondents are limited only to the
27
parts that may be ultimately assigned to Estefanio
and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the
estate 7 subject to provisions on subrogation of the
other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-
purchaser provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code.
8 Respondent court's ruling that the sale by
Estefanio in favor of petitioner is not valid because
of lack of notice to his co-heirs is erroneous. Such
notice in writing is not a requisite for the validity of
the sale. Its purpose is merely to apprise the co-
heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate, for them
to exercise their preferential right of subrogation
under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code, that is,
the right to redeem the property sold within one
month from the time they were notified in writing
of the sale by a co-heir. (There is nothing in the
record to indicate that such right of subrogation
was in effect sought to be exercised upon the co-
heirs' having learned of the sale, which is not in
issue here.).
Thus, respondents have no right to eject
petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for the
use of the property in dispute. Until the partition of
the estate is ordered by the Court of First Instance
of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings
and the share of each co-heir is determined by
metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor
respondents can rightfully claim that what they
bought is the part in dispute.
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK , petitioner, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FIRST
DIVISION), PEDRO BITANGA, FERNANDO BITANGA,
GREGORIO BITANGA, GUILLERMO BITANGA,
CLARITA BITANGA together with her husband
AGRIPINO L. RABAGO and MELITONA LAGPACAN,
assisted by her husband JORGE MALACAS ,
respondents.
Facts:
The property in question originally belonged to the
spouses Iñigo Bitanga and Rosa Ver as their
conjugal property. Before the issuance of the said
original certificate of title, death came to Iñigo
Bitanga in 1935, and was survived by his wife, Rosa
Ver, and his children, the plaintiffs herein. A little
over a year from the death of her husband, or on
October 20, 1936, Rosa Ver mortgaged the entire
property in favor of the Philippine National Bank
for the sum of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00).
The mortgage was registered and secured by SPA
w/c in favor of the mortgagee Philippine National
Bank 'to take possession of, and retain the
property herein mortgaged, to sell or lease the
same or any part thereof, and to do such other acts
as necessary in the performance of the power
granted to the mortgagee should the mortgagor
fail or violate the term of the mortgage.
Meantime, Rosa Ver had defaulted in the
fulfillment of her obligation with the Manila
Trading Company. So the said company levied upon
her share in the lot in question. Her interest in the
lot in question was afterwards sold at public
auction, at which the Manila Trading Company was
the highest bidder; that was on March 19, 1940,
and the deed of sale in favor of the Manila Trading
Company was annotated on the title. Then, the
Manila Trading Company sold its rights over the lot
in question to Santiago Sambrano, who secured the
annotation of the said sale on the title Thereafter,
as stated, one-half of the said property passed into
the hands of the intervenors.
Also, Rosa failed to settle her obligation with PNB.
Hence, PNB, pursuant to the PA, sold the WHOLE
LOT at a public auction. PNB became the owner
since it was the highest bidder. Rosa failed to
redeem and PNB consolidated its title over the lot.
28
However, the consolidation was not annotated on Issue: WON a property under conjugal may
the owner’s duplicate title since Rosa failed to alienate by the surviving spouse without the heirs
surrender it. So, PNB petition before the trial court consent?
to declare null and void the owner's certificate and
Held:
prayed that a new certificate of title be issued in its
name. The trial court favors PNB. The court ruled that the said that lot was conjugal.
When Inigo died, a co-ownership was established
Thereafter, PNB sold the property to Felizardo
between the heirs and Rosa Ver. Hence, Rosa
Reyes, where also a new duplicate title was issued
cannot validly mortgage the whole lot since it
under his name.
would prejudice the rights of her co-owners, the
Then in 1954, the heirs of Heirs of Inigo Bitanga, heirs.
filed a complaint before the CFI against the
One of the essential requisites to the contract of
Philippine National Bank, the Register of Deeds of
pledge and mortgage is that the pledgor or
Ilocos Norte and Felizardo Reyes, for reconveyance
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the thing. The
of real property and damages, with a prayer for the
effect of the mortgage, with respect to the co-
issuance of an ex-parte writ of preliminary
owners, shall be limited to the portion that may be
injunction restraining and enjoining the PNB and
allotted to him in the division upon the
Felizardo Reyes from consummating the sale of the
TERMINATION OF THE CO-OWNERSHIP. Thus, Rosa
property in question and prohibiting the Register of
could only mortgage her share and not the whole
Deeds from registering the sale in favor of
lot. She cannot give what is not hers. She only had
Felizardo Reyes. The writ of preliminary injunction
usufrutuary rights over the estate left by the
was issued. Melitona Lagpacan and Jorge Malacas,
husband. Not being an owner, she cannot alienate
filed a Motion to admit their complaint in
or dispose of the objects included in the usufruct.
intervention, alleging that they had a legal interest
(as per the old civil code which was in force during
in the subject matter of the case, and the same was
the time of Inigo’s death).
granted.
Though there were tax declarations in the name of
CFI ruled in favor of the heirs of Bitanga and the
Rosa, it does not alter the conjugality of the lot. Tax
Malacas spouses. It mentioned that the lot in
declarations are not sufficient evidences of title
question was conjugal in nature; that half would go
and should not prejudice the rights of the co-
to the heirs and half would go to rosa ver. The
owners. As far as the shares are concerned, the
mortgage to PNB is not an existing lien since it did
respective shares of the co-owners were not
not have a special mention in the decree of
included in the mortgage.
registration and that the acquisition of MTC was
valid and legal. Since the MTC acquisition was valid
and legal, the sale made to Sambrano is likewise
valid and legal, as well as the sale to the Malacas FELICIANO V. CANOZA
spouses.
GR No. 161746, September 1, 2010
PNB and Reyes appealed.
FACTS: The deceased Antonio Feliciano left behind
a parcel of land as his only property.

29
On March 28, 1972, Leona, Maria, Pedro and Salina
Feliciano declared themselves to be the only
surviving heirs of Antonio, with the exception of
Salina. They executed an extrajudicial settlement of
Antonio’s estate and appropriated among
themselves the said parcel of land, to the exclusion
of the heirs of Esteban and Doroteo, deceased
children of Antonio. Said property was then sold
the property to Felisa Feliciano and Pedro Canoza,
who each secured their respective patents
corresponding to the portion of the land they
purchased. On October 18, 1993, the heirs of the
Esteban and Doroteo filed a complaint against
Salina and Felisa Feliciano, Pedro Canoza and the
heirs of the late Jacinto Feliciano for the
Declaration of Nullity of Documents and Title,
Recovery of Real Property and Damages. They
alleged that the settlement of the estate and sale
were done without their participation and consent
as heirs of Esteban and Doroteo. Likewise, they
averred that the ancestral home of the Felicianos is
erected on the subject property and that they have
occupied the same since birth. Canoza and Jacinto
falsely declared that the property was not occupied,
so their titles to the property should be declared
null and void on the ground that they have made
false statements in their respective applications for
free patent. Before an answer could be filed, they
amended their complaint to include the allegation
that they sought to recover the shares of their
fathers, Esteban and Doroteo, which they could
have acquired as heirs of Antonio. In their Answer,
Canoza and his spouse alleged that they were
buyers in good faith and for value, and that
assuming that there was preterition of legal heirs,
they never took part in it.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition of
legal heirs
HELD: YES. The heirs of Doroteo and Esteban did
not participate in the extrajudicial partition
executed by Salina with the other compulsory heirs,
Leona, Maria and Pedro. The said deed was
fraudulently obtained as it deprived the known
heirs of Doroteo and Esteban of their shares in the
estate. A deed of extrajudicial partition executed
without including some of the heirs, who had no
knowledge of and consent to the same, is
fraudulent and vicious. Hence, an action to set it
aside on the ground of fraud could be instituted
which must be brought within 4 years from the
discovery of the fraud. However, in this case, said
action has prescribed since the complaint was filed
only on October 18, 1993, or almost 16 years after
Jacinto Feliciano was issued a free patent and 14
years from the time Pedro Canoza was issued an
original certificate of title. As petitioners are
deemed to have obtained constructive notice of
the fraud upon the registration of the Free Patent,
they clearly failed to institute the present civil
action within the allowable period. The same result
obtains even if their complaint is treated as
one (1) essentially for reconveyance as more than
ten (10) years have passed since petitioners’ cause
of action accrued. Petition for review on certiorari
was denied.
DANILO L. PAREL, petitioner, vs. SIMEON B.
PRUDENCIO, respondent
FACTS:
Simeon Prudencio (respondent) filed a complaint
for recovery of possession and damages against
petitioner with the RTC Baguio alleging that: he is
the owner of a two-storey residential house
located at No. 61 Forbes Park National Reservation
near Department of Public Service (DPS) compound,
Baguio City; such property was constructed solely
from his own funds and declared in his name under
30
Tax Declaration No. 47048; he commenced the
construction of said house in 1972 until its
completion three years later; when the second
floor of said house became habitable in 1973, he
allowed petitioner's parents, Florentino (now
deceased) and Susan Parel, to move therein and
occupy the second Aoor while the construction of
the ground floor was ongoing to supervise the
construction and to safeguard the materials;
respondent allowed petitioner's parents and
children to transfer and temporarily reside thereat;
it was done out of sheer magnanimity as
petitioner's parents have no house of their own
and since respondent's wife is the older sister of
Florentino, petitioner's father;
respondent wrote Florentino a notice for them to
vacate the said house as the former was due for
retirement; however, without respondent's
knowledge, petitioner and his family unlawfully
entered and took possession of the ground floor of
respondent's house; petitioner's refusal to vacate
the house despite repeated demands
Petitioner filed his Answer with Counterclaim
alleging that: his parents are the coowners of the
said residential house, his parents spent their own
resources in improving and constructing the said
two-storey house as co-owners thereof
RTC rendered decision declaring the late Florentino
Parel and Respondent here in as co-owners on the
basis that petitioner's father was an allocatee of
the land on which the subject house was erected;
one of the lowly-paid government employees; that
respondent failed to show proof of any contract,
written or oral, express or implied, that the late
Florentino and his family stayed on the house not
as co-owners but as mere lessees
Furthermore, the trial court questioned the fact
that it was only after 15 years that respondent
asserted his claim of sole ownership of the subject
house; respondent failed to disprove that
petitioner's father contributed his own funds to
3nance the construction of the house
Respondent assailed the decision to the CA. The CA
reversed the decision of the RTC and declared the
respondent as the sole owner. The CA found as
meritorious respondent's contention that since
petitioner failed to formally offer in evidence any
documentary evidence, there is nothing to refute
the evidence offered by respondent. The CA found
the aHdavit dated September 24, 1973 of
Florentino, petitioner's father, stating that he is not
the owner of the subject house but respondent, as
conclusive proof of respondent's sole ownership of
the subject house as it is a declaration made by
Florentino against his interest.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner was able to
prove by preponderance of evidence that his father
was a co-owner of the two-storey residential house?
HELD: NO.
The respondent had shown sufficient evidence to
support his complaint for recovery of possession of
the ground floor of the subject house as the
exclusive owner thereof. Respondent presented
the affidavit which states that FLORENTINO PAREL,
the father of the petitioner herein, he “is the
occupant of a residential building located in Forbes
Park, Reservation No.1, Baguio City”, “is not the
owner of the building in question” and “that the
building in question is owned by Mr. Simeon B.
Prudencio . . .”.
Section 38 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court
provides:
“SEC. 38. Declaration Against Interest. —
The declaration made by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration
was at the time it was made so far contrary to the
31
declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in
his position would not have made the declaration
unless he believed it to be true, may be received in
evidence against himself or his successors-in-
interest and against third persons”
The theory under which declarations against
interest are received in evidence notwithstanding
they are hearsay is that the necessity of the
occasion renders the reception of such evidence
advisable and, further that the reliability of such
declaration asserts facts which are against his own
pecuniary or moral interest.
In the affidavit, Florentino categorically declared
that he is the occupant of the residential building,
he is not the owner of the same as it is owned by
respondent. It is safe to presume that he would not
have made such declaration unless he believed it to
be true, as it is prejudicial to himself as well as to
his children’s interest as his heirs.
While Tax receipts and declarations are not
incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they
constitute at least proof that the holder has claim
of title over the property. The house which
petitioner claims to be co-owned by his late father
had been consistently declared for taxation
prupose in the name of the respondent, and this
fact, taken with the other circumstances,
inexorably lead to the conclusion that the
respondent is the sole owner of the house.
The records show that although petitioner's
counsel asked that he be allowed to offer his
documentary evidence in writing, he, however, did
not rule the same. Thus, the CA did not consider
the documentary evidence presented by petitioner.
A formal offer is necessary because it is the duty of
a judge to rest his findings of facts and his
judgment only and strictly upon the evidence
offered by the parties to the suit. It is a settled rule
that the mere fact that a particular document is
identi3ed and marked as an exhibit does not mean
that it has thereby already been offered as part of
the evidence of a party.
Reyes v Judge Concepcion
FACTS:
The parties in this case are co-owners of the
subject properties which are 3 parcels of land.
Plaintiffs received a letter from defendants and the
intervenor that the Volcano Securities Traders and
Agri-Business Corp. had offered to buy the latter’s
share in the properties, it is also requested from
the plaintiffs to exercise their pre-emptive right to
purchase defendants’ and intervenor’s shares or
agree to a physical partition of the properties or to
sell their shares, jointly with the defendants and
the intervenors. According to the plaintiffs the
subject properties are incapable of physical
partition, the price of 12.50 per square is grossly
excessive, that they are willing to exercise their
pre-emptive right for a fair and reasonable value of
the properties and that the statutory period for
exercising such right was suspended upon filing of
the complaint. Defendants and intervenor on the
other hand said that the reasonable price is 12.50,
that plaintiffs’ right of legal pre-emption had
lapsed upon their failure to exercise the same
within the period prescribed in ART 1623, that it
would be to the best interest of the plaintiffs to sell
their shares and that the subject properties may be
physically partitioned. Respondent judge rendered
a pre-trial order granting petitioners a period of 10
days from receipt of the subdivision plan to express
their approval or disapproval of said plain or
submit an alternate plan. Counsel for private
respondents sent to the counsel for petitioners the
subdivision plan. Petitioner filed their comment,
contending that the question of reasonable value
remains a contentious issue of fact ascertainable
only after a full trial. Private respondent sent
32
another subdivision plan to petitioners. Still, no
definite communication was sent by petitioners
signifying their approval or disapproval. Private
respondent then filed a motion requesting that
petitioners be required to formally specify which of
the 2 options under ART 498 they wish to avail of,
which was granted by respondent judge for the
determination of the applicability of ART 498.
Private respondents filed a “Constancia” expressing
that they were willing to allot their shares to
Zaballero and that they did not know any other
party who was willing and able to purchase the
properties other than Volcano Lakeview Resorts,
Inc. Petitioners filed a motion for clarification as to
the true identity of the third party allegedly willing
to purchase the properties but was denied on the
ground that it was irrelevant. Petitioners then filed
a “Compliance and Motion” reiterating the
relevance of ascertaining the true identity of the
third party buyer, that there is actually no bona
fide and financially able third party, and again
insisting on their pre-emptive right to purchase the
shares. This was denied by respondent judge,
holding that petitioners did not possess a pre-
emptive right to purchase the shares in the co-
ownership.
ISSUE:
W/N the respondent judge acted without
jurisdiction
RULING:
No. The legal provisions on co-ownership do not
grant to any of the owners of a property held in
common a pre-emptive right to purchase the pro-
indiviso shares of his co-owners. Petitioners'
reliance on Article 1620 of the New Civil Code is
misplaced. Article 1620 contemplates of a situation
where a co-owner has alienated his pro-indiviso
shares to a stranger. By the very nature of the right
of "legal redemption", a co-owner's light to redeem
is invoked only after the shares of the other co-
owners are sold to a third party or stranger to the
co-ownership [See Estrada v. Reyes, 33 Phil. 31
(1915)]. But in the case at bar, at the time
petitioners filed their complaint for injunction and
damages against private respondents, no sale of
the latter's pro-indiviso shares to a third party had
yet been made. There is likewise no merit to
petitioners' contention that private respondents
had acknowledged the pre-emptive right of
petitioners to purchase their shares at a
"reasonable price". Although it appears that
private respondents had agreed to sell their pro-
indiviso shares to petitioners, the offer was made
at a fixed rate of P12.50 per square meter [See Pre-
trial Order dated July 9, 1980, Annex "C" of the
Petition; Rollo, pp. 43-45]. It cannot be said that
private respondents had agreed, without
qualification, to sell their shares to petitioners.
Neither do petitioners have the legal right to enjoin
private respondents from alienating their pro-
indiviso shares to a third party. The law does not
prohibit a co-owner from selling, alienating or
mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in
common. The law merely provides that the
alienation or mortgage shall be limited only to the
portion of the property which may be allotted to
him upon termination of the co-ownership.
CORNELIO PAMPLONA alias GEMINIANO
PAMPLONA and APOLONIA ONTE, petitioners,
vs.
VIVENCIO MORETO, respondents.
Doctrine:
Facts: Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were
husband and wife. During their marriage, they
acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496
of the Calamba Friar Land Estate, situated in
Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021
square meters respectively and covered by
33
certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano
Moreto, married to Monica Maniega."
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega
begot during their marriage six (6) children, namely,
Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro,
all surnamed Moreto.
On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after
the death of his wife Monica Maniega, Flaviano
Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said
deceased wife Monica, and before any liquidation
of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano
could be effected, executed in favor of Geminiano
Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte,
the deed of absolute sale covering lot No. 1495 for
P900.00.
After the execution of the above-mentioned deed
of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses Geminiano
Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their
house on the eastern part of lot 1496. While Rafael
Pamplona, son of the spouses Geminiano
Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house
within lot 1496 about one meter from its boundary
with the adjoining lot. The Pamplona family
thought all the time that the portion of 781 square
meters which was the subject matter of their sale
transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495
appears to be the subject matter in the deed of
sale (Exh. "1") although the fact is that the said
portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No.
1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the
plaintiffs demanded on the defendants to vacate
the premises where they had their house and
piggery on the ground that Flaviano Moreto had no
right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal
partnership of Flaviano and his deceased wife and
the latter was already dead when the sale was
executed without the consent of the plaintiffs who
are the heirs of Monica.
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment,
declaring the deed of absolute sale pertaining to
the eastern portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of
781 square meters null and void as regards the
390.5 square meters of which plaintiffs are hereby
declared the rightful owners and entitled to its
possession.
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the
eastern one-half (1/2) of 1781 square meters of Lot
1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which
defendants are declared lawful owners and
entitled to its possession.
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with
said judgment, appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which affirmed the judgment, hence they now
come to this Court.
Issue: Whether or not petitioners are entitled to
the full ownership of the property in litigation, or
only one-half of the same.
Ruling: We are persuaded and convinced to rule
that private respondents are in estoppel by laches
to claim half of the property, in dispute as null and
void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of equity which
bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by
reason of abandonment and negligence, he
allowed a long time to elapse without presenting
the same.
It is undisputed that private respondents who are
the heirs of Monica Maniega as well as of Flaviano
Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956,
lived as neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet
lifted no finger to question the occupation,
possession and ownership of the land purchased by
the Pamplonas, so that We are persuaded and
convinced to rule that private respondents are in
34
estoppel by laches to claim half of the property, in
dispute as null and void.
Moreover, at the time of the sale in 1952, the
conjugal partnership was already dissolved six
years before and therefore, the estate became a
co-ownership between Flaviano Moreto, the
surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased
wife, Monica Maniega. We agree with the
petitioner that there was a partial partition of the
co-ownership when at the time of the sale Flaviano
Moreto pointed out the area and location of the
781 sq. meters sold by him to the petitioners-
vendees on which the latter built their house and
also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners
likewise erected his house and an adjacent coral
for piggery.
Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full
ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the eastern
portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said
petitioners and whereon their houses and piggery
coral stand.
(maraming) CASTRO vs ATIENZA
[G.R. No. L-25014. October 17, 1973]
FACTS: On January 24, 1956 the brothers
Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de Castro, Sr. leased
to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26
hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part
of a bigger parcel of land. The lessors are co-
owners in equal shares of the leased property.
According to the contract of lease (Exh. 1) the term
of the lease was for five years from January 24,
1956 at a rental of P5,000 a year.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
In the month of November, 1956, Atienza and
Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed
to set aside and annul the contract of lease and for
this purpose an agreement (Exh. A) was signed by
them. However Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro
(widow of Tomas de Castro) refused to sign the
agreement.
In It was then found out by the appellate court that
Arsenio wanted to cancel the lease because he was
planning to lease the pond to another person.
Hence Arsenio should be the one securing the
signature of the Vda.
ISSUE: WON Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond
owned proindiviso by him with his brother Tomas
(succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could validly
lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent
Atienza) independently of his co-owner, (yes)
and in case his co-owner also leased his other half
interest to the same third party, whether Arsenio
could cancel his own lease agreement with said
third party? (yes)
RULING: Yes to both. The Supreme Court
ruled that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as
co-owner of an undivided one-half interest in the
fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third
party independently of his co-owner (although said
co-owner had also leased his other undivided one-
half interest to the same third party). It would
result in a partnership*pero sa tingin ko co-
ownership ibigsabihin nila dito* between the
lessee and the owner of the other undivided half.
Estoque vs Pajimula
G.R. No. L-24419
July 15, 1968
Facts: Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of
Rosario, covered by original certificate of title No.
RO-2720 (N.A.) was originally owned by the late
35
Sps. Bernal who were survived by Crispina Perez,
Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo Perez who is also now
dead. Crispina P. Vda. de Aquitania sold her 1/3
southeastern portion to Estoque. Lorenzo Perez
and Emilia P. Posadas, widow of Ricardo, assigned
all their right, interest and participation in Lot No.
802 to Crispina Perez sold the 2/3 western portion
to Pajimula.

Estoque argues, when Crispina sold an undivided

2/3 that she was entitled to redeem, pursuant to
Article 1620 of the New Civil Code. Pajimula
claimed that Estoque bought the 1/3 southeastern
portion, which is definitely identified and
segregated, hence there existed no co-ownership
upon which right of legal redemption can be
exercised or taken advantage of.

The lower court, upon motion of defendant,

dismissed the complaint, holding that the deeds of
sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque
was different from that of the defendants Pajimula.

Issue: Whether or not Estoque and Pajimula are co-

owners of Lot 802.

Held: NO. Estoque and Pajimula never became co-

owners, and the alleged right of legal redemption
was not proper. The deed of sale to Estoque clearly
specifies the object sold as the southeastern third
portion of Lot 802. Wherefore, she never acquired
an undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight
years later Crispina Perez sold to the appellees
Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot,
appellant did not acquire a right to redeem the
property thus sold, since their respective portions
were distinct and separate.
36