Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
PROPERTY RELATIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES; GENERAL
PROVISIONS
Art 74 FC. The property relationship between husband and wife
shall be governed in the following order:
(1) By marriage settlements executed before the marriage;
(2) By the provisions of this Code; and
(3) By the local custom. (118)
1. Ante nuptial contract; agreement entered into before marriage,
in consideration thereof, between an intended husband and
wife, by which the enjoyment or devolution of property is
regulated.
2. Manresa: contract entered into by those who are to be united
in marriage, in order to establish conditions of conjugal
partnership with respect to present and future property.
3. Theory of freedom of stipulation in determination of economic
regime for the marriage.
Art 75 FC. The future spouses may, in the marriage settlements,
agree upon the regime of absolute community, conjugal
partnership of gains, complete separation of property, or any other
regime. In the absence of a marriage settlement, or when the
regime agreed upon is void, the system of absolute community of
property as established in this Code shall govern. (119a)
1. Forms of property regimes:
a. Regime absorption – aka complete
appropriation/merger; Hubby acquires ownership
over all property of wife (time of celebration + during
marriage), since the personality of the wife if
absorbed by the hubby.
b. Regime community – common patrimony is formed
to answer for the fam, etc. Upon dissolution,
common property is divided between spouses or
heirs.
i. Absolute or universal community – All props
of spouses, present, future, movable, and
immovable, acquired by onerous, or
gratuitous title  singly patrimony.
ii. Relative or limited community – Some
properties exclusively belonging to each
spouse + common fund with variable
composition. May be a community of
personal property, in which case the real
property, however acquired belong
separately to the spouses; or a community
of acquisition in which all the income of the
spouses from work or property, and all
acquisitions by onerous title, form a
common mass, while all their property
brought to marriage as well as those
acquired by lucrative title remain separate
prop; or a community of future property, in
which all future acquisitions of spouses by
whatever title form a common patrimony,
while property owned by each at the celeb
of marriage continue to pertain to them
separately.
iii. Regime of separation – (a) single
administration system – admin and
enjoyment of all prop of wife is vested in
hubby; (b) dotal system – prop of wife is
divided into dowry and paraphernal prop,
former being given to hubby in admin and
usufruct, latter retained by wife; (c)
absolute separation – each spouse has the
ownership, admin, and enjoyment of
his/her respective property.
*dotal system – hubby has admin of separate prop of wife, and is
entitled personally ads usufructuary to all fruits which should have
been conjugal had partnership existed.
2. Renunciation of absolute community. If in the marriage
settlement it was stipulated that no ACP, but no statement of
rules or regime to govern:
a. Custom
b. Intention of parties shall be sought: via conduct
during marriage.
c. System most equitable, closes to their current
practice, while protecting creditors.
d. Ordinary partnerships.
3. Validity of stipulations. Marriage settlements are contracts, and
therefore subject to general limitations on freedom to contract.
a. Art 1306 of CC requires that stipulations of contracts
should not be contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public policy, order.
b. Void stipulations: (1) those contrary to nature and
purpose of marriage; (2) violate legal provisions of
prohibitory or mandatory character; (3) derogatory to
authority of spouses, or contrary to public policy.
c. Nature and purpose of marriage. Void contracts:
i. Dissolving marriage for purposes other than
annulment/nullity/divorce/death
ii. Relieving spouse of marital obligations to
other or children.
iii. Monetary penalty for infidelity
iv. Depriving spouse of right to seek LS when
ground is proper.
v. Effecting purchase of one of spouses
vi. Giving consent contrary to morals, public
policy.
d. Prohibitive/mandatory laws:
i. Contracts contrary to prohibitives are void.
ii. Mandatories may be modified by will.
e. Authority of spouses. Void contracts:
i. Contracts that wife shall not follow
domicile.
ii. Wife should have sole oblig to support as
patria protestas, etc.
f. Admin of property.
i. Can validly stipulate that hubby or wife shall
admin community property.
ii. Cannot give such to 3rd persons.
4. Effect of voids. Nullity of stipulation does not make entire
settlement void. Stipulations related to void ones are affected
by nullity.
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
Art 76 FC. In order that any modification in the marriage
settlements may be valid, it must be made before the celebration
of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Articles 66, 67, 128,
135 and 136. (121)
1. Invariability of regime. Adopted regime cannot be changed
during marriage, until marriage dissolved.
2. Can have judicial separation of properties during marr.
3. Cannot abandon regime to replace with FC ACP, since FC is
merely suppletory.
4. Exceptions:
a. Art 66 & 67 FC: Reconciliation after LS
b. Art 128 FC: If spouse abandons other or fails to
comply with obligs, aggrieved spouse may ask court
for receivership or judicial separation of property, or
for sole admin of conjugal partnership of gains.
c. Art 135 & 136 FC: permit sep of prop either by (1)
petition of one spouse for a just cause; (2) joint
petition.
5. Alteration after dissolution. After dissolution of marr, parties
may make a contract relative to the liquidation or prop of
marriage.
a. Surviving spouse and heirs of the deceased spouse
may validly agree to divide props is manner different
from the marriage settlement.
b. Agreement, tho cannot be upheld to prejudice 3rd
persons
c. If in settlement, there is to be absolute merger in
hubby, and then upon death of wife, hubby agrees to
give her heirs ½ of such as if there was a relative
community, agreement of valid between parties, but
void as against creditors of hubby who may be
prejudiced by reduction of funds available to satisfy
them.
Art 77 FC. The marriage settlements and any modification thereof
shall be in writing, signed by the parties and executed before the
celebration of the marriage. They shall not prejudice third persons
unless they are registered in the local civil registry where the
marriage contract is recorded as well as in the proper registries of
properties. (122a)
1. Taken from Article 122, CC (registry used to be in the registry of
property alone).
2. Marriage settlements are mere accessories to the marriage and
take effect from the moment of the marriage celebration.
a. Any stipulation regarding the effectivity of the
stipulated regime shall be void as per Article 88, FC
and Article 107, FC.
3. Marriage settlements are required to be in writing to be
enforceable between the parties and so that it may be
recorded in the proper registries and effective against third
persons.
a. Third persons must know the spouses property
regime for obligations and contracts. Authority over
properties may be vested in one spouse depending
on their marriage settlement and therefore, they are
the only ones capable of entering into an agreement
regarding such.
Art 78 FC. A minor who according to law may contract marriage
may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but they shall be
valid only if the persons designated in Article 14 to give consent to
the marriage are made parties to the agreement, subject to the
provisions of Title IX of this Code. (120a)
1. The minor must act personally and not through his/her
parents/guardian/etc. since they only give their authorization
to his/her act.
2. Parents must not only give their consent but also take part in
the execution of the settlement.
a. In marriage where the girl is 18 years of age, the
mother must sign the contract or else it will not be
legally valid.
3. CONFLICT: Order of consent in Article 14, FC = Father, Mother,
Surviving parent/Guardian, persons with legal charge. Consent
in Title IX = minors are under joint parental authority (see
Article 211, FC).
a. Tolentino argues that Article 14, FC should be
followed as it is specifically and directly applicable to
marriages.
b. Rules in Title IX may modify the precedence of the
father if he is deprived of parental authority or in
cases where the parents are separated and the court
designated the mother to exercise parental authority.
i. Mother shall participate in the execution of
the settlement in such cases.
ii. If the court appoints a guardian to exercise
substitute parental authority, even if the
parents are alive, then the former shall
intervene in a minor’s marriage settlement.
Art 79 FC. For the validity of any marriage settlement executed by
a person upon whom a sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced or who is subject to any other disability, it shall be
indispensable for the guardian appointed by a competent court to
be made a party thereto. (123a)
1. Disabilities restricting capacity to act: Articles 38 and 39 of the
CC; Rules of Court 39, section 2.
a. While these parties may have the capacity to consent
to a marriage, the marriage settlement must be
signed by a guardian appointed by court.
Art 80 FC. In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a marriage
settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall be governed
by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the celebration of the
marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
(1) Where both spouses are aliens;
(2) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts affecting
property not situated in the Philippines and executed in the
country where the property is located; and
(3) With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts entered into in
the Philippines but affecting property situated in a foreign country
whose laws require different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
1. Intrinsic validity: [T]the intrinsic validity of the will, deals with
dispositions stipulated by the testator. It refers to the legality of
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
the provisions of the will for the right granted to a person to
designate the person or persons who are to succeed him or her,
is not absolute. It is subject to limitations placed by law. For
example, a person who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his
estate subject to the condition that he or she does not
contravene the law on legitime (Art. 842, Civil Code). – Persida
Acosta for the Manila Times1
2. Extrinsic validity: Extrinsic validity deals with the form of the
will and its due execution, rather than its content. It determines
(1) whether the instrument is truly the decedent’s last will; 2)
whether it complies with the formalities prescribed by law; 3)
whether the testator had testamentary capacity at the time he
executed the will; and, 4) whether the testator voluntarily
executed the will (Ajero v. Court of Appeals, 236 SCRA 488).
These tests will be applied to determine the extrinsic validity of
your father’s last will. If it passes the tests, then his will is
extrinsically valid. It will be allowed in court, regardless of its
content. –Persida Acosta for The Manila Times2
3. Article 16, CC (lex situs).
a. Stipulations of the marriage contract must give way
or yield to contrary provisions of the laws of the
foreign country where the property is situated.
b. The inapplicability of Philippine law to the extrinsic
validity of the marriage settlement in (2), pertaining
property in a foreign country, should extend to the
intrinsic validity of the contract by virtue of Article 16,
CC if the property laws of the foreign country differ
from that of the Philippines.
4. Article 17, CC (lex loci contractus).
a. It is contrary to accepted principle to make Philippine
law yield to the law of the country where the
property located, as to the extrinsic validity of a
marriage executed in the Philippines.
5. CONFLICT: The property in question is located abroad and
should then be subject to its laws by virtue of Article 16, CC.
However, the settlement and its stipulations was executed in
the Philippines therefore it should abide to Philippine law by
virtue of Article 17, CC.
a. Tolentino argues that the third provision should have
been suppressed or interpreted in the light of conflict
of laws principles in relation to real property.
Art 81 FC. Everything stipulated in the settlements or contracts
referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future
marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses
made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not take
place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the
celebration of the marriages shall be valid. (125a)
COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE V FISHER (1961)
1 2
https://www.manilatimes.net/extrinsic-intrinsic-validity-
persons-last-will/158588/
PETITIONER: THE COLLECTOR OF INTERNAL REVENUE
RESPONDENTS: DOUGLAS FISHER AND BETTINA FISHER, and the
COURT OF TAX APPEALS
FACTS:
British Walter G. Stevenson and Beatrice Mauricia Stevenson were
married in Manila in 1909. Walter died on Feb. 22, 1951 in California
where the couple established their permanent residence since 1945.
This case is on the determination and settlement of his hereditary
estate.
In his will, Walter instituted Beatrice as his sole heiress to real and
personal properties they acquired while residing in the Philippines
amounting to P130k.
ISSUE: WON in determining the taxable net estate of the decedent,
one-half (½) of the net estate should be deducted therefrom as the
share of the surviving spouse.
HELD:
YES. The SC held that in determining the taxable net estate of the
decedent, ½ of the net estate should be deducted as the share of
the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on CPG. Thus, only
the one-half share of Walter in the conjugal partnership property
constituted his hereditary estate subject to estate and inheritance
taxes.
NOTES: Under the old CC, where one spouse is a foreigner and there
is no ante-nuptial agreement, it is the national law of the husband
that becomes the dominant law in determining property relations.
Since both are British citizens, British laws should apply; however, in
the absence of proof of what English law is, court is justified to
indulge in “processual presumption" in presuming that the law of
England is the same as our law.
GENERAL PROVISIONS; REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS
Art 82 FC. Donations by reason of marriage are those which are
made before its celebration, in consideration of the same, and in
favor of one or both of the future spouses. (126)
1. Propter nuptias = a marriage gift or settlement required by law
of the husband or his family early during the later Roman
Empire and that was required by Justinian to be equal to the
wife's dowry but permitted to be made after and used for
expenses of the marriage —formerly called when made before
the marriage donatio ante nuptias – Merriam-Webster
2. Marriage, in relation to a donation, is not merely a condition.
An act and a condition can be separated; an act can take place
without a condition and a condition need not always require to
be acted upon in order to be valid. Donation, in this sense
however, cannot be taken apart from the marriage. The
marriage is the very reason for the existence of the donation
for without the context of a coming marriage, then no
donations will be given.
3. The definition of donations propter nuptias exclude the
following:
Id.
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
a. Donations made in favor of the spouses after the
celebration of the marriage;
b. Those in favor of the future spouses, made before the
celebration of the marriage, but not in consideration
of the marriage;
c. Those in favor of persons other than the spouses,
even though they may be founded on the marriage.
4. The donations in consideration of a marriage may be given:
a. By the spouses to each other;
b. By the parents to one or both of the spouses;
c. By third persons to either or both of the spouses.
Art 83 FC. These donations are governed by the rules on ordinary
donations established in Title III of Book III of the Civil Code,
insofar as they are not modified by the following articles. (127a)
1. Donations propter nuptias are governed by provisions of
Articles 82-87 of the FC.
2. Provisions of Articles 725-773 of CC are also applicable, in so far
as they are not modified by articles 82-87 of the FC.
3. Principal modifications of the general rules on donations are:
a. Donations propter nuptias do not require express
acceptance by the donee;
b. If made by minors (below 21 years), they must be
with the consent of those who are required to
consent to the marriage;
c. They cannot exceed 1/5th part of the present property
of the donor, when made by future spouses to each
other;
d. They can include future property:
e. They are not revoked by subsequent birth or
appearance of children;
f. They are revoked by the non-performance of the
marriage and the other causes mentioned in Article
86 of the FC.
DOMALAGAN V BOLIFER (1916)
PLAINTIFF: Jorge Domalagan
DEFENDANT: Carlos Bolifer
FACTS:
In November 1909, Domalagan and Bolifer entered into a verbal
contract wherein Domalagan was to pay Bolifer P500 upon the
marriage of their children (son Cipriano Domalagan and daughter
Bonifacia Bolifer). In August 1910, plaintiff paid P500, together with
the further sum of P16 "as hansel or token of future marriage."
Despite the said agreement, Bonifacia Bolifer married Laureano Sisi
and upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded that
Bolifer return the P516 he gave earlier, together with the interest
and payment for damages which he suffered after being obliged to
sell certain real property in order to fulfill the said contract.
Plaintiff then filed a complaint against defendant in the Court of First
Instance in Misamis. The defendant presented a general denial and
alleged that there was no cause of action. The lower court ruled in
favor of Domalagan and ordered Bolifer to return the sum of P516
with an interest of 6% from Dec. 17, 1910. Defendant then appealed
to the SC.
ISSUE:
WON contract was valid and effective despite being against the
provision stated under paragraph 3, Section 335 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Action that a contract should be reduced to
writing?
RATIO:
Yes. The provision does not render oral contracts invalid. It simply
provides the method by which the contract mentioned may be
proven. A contract may be a perfectly valid contract even though it
is not clothed with the necessary form. If the parties to an action,
during the trial of the cause, make no objection to the admissibility
of oral evidence to support contracts like the one in this case and
permit the contract to be proved by evidence other than in writing,
it will be just as binding upon the parties as if it had been reduced to
writing. In this case, the lower court found that a large
preponderance of the evidence showed that the plaintiff had
delivered to the defendant the sum of P516 in substantially the
manner alleged in the complaint, thus proving the existence and
validity of the said contract.
RULING: Lower Court affirmed.
SERRANO V SOLOMON (1959)
FACTS:
Melchor Solomon married Alejandria Feliciano on June 21, 1948. On
the same day, but before the marriage ceremony, he executed a
Deed of Donation where he donated all his exclusive properties as
basic capital for their conjugal and family life. The donation further
provides in the case that they begot no children that, should he die
before his wife, that his brothers and sisters will be heirs to ½ of his
property (including those acquired in the conjugal union) and if the
wife dies before him, that Estanislao Serrano will be heirs to the
same half.
Less than nine months after the marriage, the wife died. Then,
Serrano commenced the action to enforce the terms of the
donation. Solomon filed a motion for dismissal and was granted by
the trial court, who ruled that the said donation cannot be counted
as donation propter nuptias because it was not made in
consideration of the marriage and that the donation was made not
to either of the parties but to a third person. Serrano appealed the
decision.
ISSUE:
WON the donation can be validly considered as a donation propter
nuptias.
No. The court agrees fully with the trial court, citing in support
Article 1327 of the Civil Code on donation proper nuptias, which was
reproduced for Article 126 of the New Civil Code1. Whether the Old
Civil Code (as the marriage was contracted in 1948) or the New Civil
Code will apply, the result will be the same.
The court questioned whether the donation was made in
consideration of their marriage or in consideration of the death of
either of them in the absence of children. The court ruled that
marriage in itself was not the only consideration or condition; it
must be a childless marriage and either spouse must die before for
the donation to operate. Even granting that it is in consideration of
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
the marriage, the donation was not in favor of the wife but of
Serrano. Citing Manresa’s commentary, the court said that
donations granted to persons other than the spouses even If
founded on the marriage are among those excluded from those
excluded from Art. 1327.
WON the donation may be held valid and effective as a donation
other than donation propter nuptias.
No. It cannot be considered a donation inter vivos because it was
never accepted by the donee either in the same instrument or
donation or in a separate document as required by law.
Neither can it be considered a donation mortis causa because the
donor is still alive, and time and occasion have not arrived for
considering its operation and implementation, and, as it will be
counted equivalent to a last will, it must conform to the strict
requisites and provisions for executing wills, which the donation
does not.
SOLIS V BARROSO (1928)
DOCTRINE: Donations Propter Nuptias are covered by Title II Book III
of CC (Arts618-656). Under Art 633 CC, a donation of real property is
valid only if it is made in a public instrument.
FACTS:
1. The spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a
donation propter nuptias in favour of their son Alejo and his
fiancée Fortunata
2. One of the conditions of the donation is that in case of the
death of one of the donees, one-half (½) of the lands donated
would revert to the donors.
3. 2 months after the marriage, Alejo died. Juan, the father, died
in the same year.
4. Maxima Barroso, the mother, recovered possession of the
donated lands, for which Fortunata, Alejo’s wife, filed an action
demanding the execution of the proper deed of donation
5. The lower court ruled in Fortunata’s favour, basing the
judgement on Art 1279 CC (relating to contracts).
6. Hence this appeal by the Barrosos.
ISSUES: WON the donation propter nuptias in this case is valid; WON
the same is covered by Ar t 1279 CC relating to contracts.
The donation is NOT VALID and it DOES NOT fall under Art1279 CC.
REVERSED on the ff grounds:
1. Donation propter nuptias, according to Art 1328 CC, is
governed by Title II, Book III of the Civil Code (Arts 618-656)
2. Art 633 CC provides that a donation of real property is valid
only if it is made in a public instrument. o Only exceptions to
Art 633 CC: onerous and remuneratory donations
3. Therefore, the donation propter nuptias in this case was NOT
VALID and did not create any right since it was not made in a
public instrument.
4. The lower court was in error when it considered the donation
onerous, which, pursuant to Art 622 CC, would make the
donation fall under the rules on contracts. The donation was
made only in consideration of marriage and not, as may be
inferred in Art 619 CC, for donations for valuable
considerations.
5. In donations propter nuptias, the marriage is “really a
consideration, but not necessary to give birth to the
obligation.” Even without marriage, t h e r e may be a valid
donation propter nuptias, and such a donation would forever
be valid even if no marriage ever took place.
6. This is so because the marriage in a donation propter nuptias is
a resolutory condition and not a condition necessary for the
birth of the obligation.
MATEO V LAGUA (1969)
PETITIONERS: Bonifacia Mateo, et. al.
RESPONDENTS: Gervasio Lagua, et. al.
FACTS:
1. Cipriano Lagua = owner of the 3 parcels of land
2. Cipriano Lagua and Alejandro Dumlao are the parents of
Alejandro Lagua
3. Alejandro Lagua was to be married to Bonifacia Mateo
4. Cipriano Lagua, in a public instrument, donated 2 out of the 3
lots to his son in consideration of the latter’s marriage
5. The newlyweds took possession of the properties but the
Certificate of Title remained in the donor’s name.
a. 6 years later, Alejandro Lagua died, his wife and
daughter stayed with Cipriano Lagua.
6. Cipriano Lagua undertook the farming of the donated lots
a. At start, he was giving the owner’s share
b. After 3 years, he refused to deliver the share
c. Mateo filed a case for possession and damages =
GRANTED
7. Cipriano Lagua executed a deed of sale of the same 2 parcels in
favor of his younger son, Gervasio Lagua.
a. Share of the proceeds of the land were still being
given to Mateo until 1965
b. On the stopping of the share, she found out about the
sale
c. She filed for recovery of possession of the properties
= GRANTED
8. Gervasio Lagua filed for annulment of the donation of the 2 lots
a. ARGUMENT: When Cipriano donated the lots (which
were allegedly the only properties he owned), he
neglected leaving something for his own support and
for Gervasio’s legitime as forced heir.
b. Cipriano Lagua died while the case was pending.
ISSUE: WON inofficious donations can be reduced.
HELD:
1. YES.
2. DPN properties may be reduced for being inofficious
3. DPN are without onerous consideration (no obligation
burdening the done), the marriage being merely the occasion
or motive for the donation, not its causa.
a. They are subjection to reduction if they should
infringe the legitime of a forced heir.
Steps to consider in determining legal share of compulsory heirs.
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
 Net estate = Value of properties at the time of death LESS
payable obligations and charges
 Net Estate + all donations subject to collation
 Determination of legitimes per heir
4. In order to say that a donation is inofficious, it should be
proven that it exceeds that of the disposable free portion plus
the donee’s share as legitime in the properties of the donor.
a. Pieces of evidence to such are incomplete. They
lacked proof that these were the only properties of
Cipriano Lagua and that there are only 2 heirs left.
RULING: DISMISSED.
GENERAL PROVISIONS; DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS
OF PRESENT OR FUTURE PROPERTY
Art 84 FC. If the future spouses agree upon a regime other than the
absolute community of property, they cannot donate to each other
in their marriage settlements more than one-fifth of their present
property. Any excess shall be considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the provisions
on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills. (130a)
1. If spouses adopt ACP, then the limitation is not applicable due
to the fact that all property owned becomes communal.
2. Construction of Article 85 suggests that if the donation is not
made in a marriage settlement, then it can be more than 1/5th
of the present property.
a. However, the law would not allow such based on the
policy that no spouse should be allowed to take
advantage of the love or tender feelings of the other
in order to acquire property from them.
i. Thus, there is a total prohibition on
donations between spouses during the
marriage under Article 87, FC.
b. Donations are allowed when made before or at the
time of the marriage in a marriage settlement due to
the custom of giving property to the spouses at the
time of the marriage.
3. Donations of future property are those which take effect upon
the death of the donor spouse.
a. Cannot be made in a marriage settlement but is
allowed in a will or testament.
i. Since a will can be revoked by a testator at
any time before his death, so can the future
property donation be revoked.
Art 85 FC. Donations by reason of marriage of property subject to
encumbrances shall be valid. In case of foreclosure of the
encumbrance and the property is sold for less than the total
amount of the obligation secured, the donee shall not be liable for
the deficiency. If the property is sold for more than the total
amount of said obligation, the donee shall be entitled to the
excess. (131a)
1. If the donee is aware of the encumbrance or if it is registered
under him/her, then it can be enforced on the property against
the donee.
2. Donee may keep the property and prevent foreclosure by
paying the obligation secured by the encumbrance to the
creditor.
a. Failure to do so and following a foreclosure, the
property may be sold to pay the obligation.
b. If the sale is not enough to cover the whole
obligation, then the liability to pay the deficiency
would fall under the donor.
c. On the contrary, excess proceeds shall go to the
donee.
GENERAL PROVISIONS; GROUNDS FOR REVOCATION
OF DONATION PROPTER NUPTIAS
Art 86 FC. A donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by the
donor in the following cases:
(1) If the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared void ab
initio except donations made in the marriage settlements, which
shall be governed by Article 81;
(2) When the marriage takes place without the consent of the
parents or guardian, as required by law;
(3) When the marriage is annulled, and the donee acted in bad
faith;
(4) Upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty spouse;
(5) If it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is complied
with;
(6) When the donee has committed an act of ingratitude as
specified by the provisions of the Civil Code on donations in
general. (132a)
1. Donations propter nuptias which are revoked by operation of
law, and the donor does not have to bring an action for
revocation:
a. When a subsequent marriage is contracted by one
whose spouse has been declared presumptively dead,
if the donee had contracted the marriage in bad faith
(Article 43, FC);
b. Donations made in the marriage settlement, if the
marriage does not take place (Article 81, FC);
c. If the donation is subject to a suspensive condition
and the condition does not take place, in which case
the donations does not take effect.
***suspensive condition = rights and obligations
are suspended until the occurrence of a future
event.
2. Acts of ingratitude which are grounds for revocation of
donations:
a. If the donee should commit some offense against the
person, honor or property of the donor, or of his wife
or children under his parental authority;
b. If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal
offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act
has been committed against the donee himself, his
wife or children under his authority;
c. If the donee unduly refuses to support the donor
when he is legally or morally bound to give such
support.
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
GENERAL PROVISIONS; VOID DONATIONS
Art 87 FC. Every donation or grant of gratuitous advantage, direct
or indirect, between the spouses during the marriage shall be void,
except moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on
the occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife without a
valid marriage. (133a)
1. Refers to donations inter vivos and is dictated by the principle
of unity of personality.
2. The law seeks to avoid situations in which the weaker spouse is
under the power of the other and that they be obliged, either
by abuse of affection or threats of violence, to transfer
properties to the other.
a. This also applies to those in common law marriages
since if it did not, then the offender would be in a
better position than those in legal union.
3. Gifts of moderate value are valid.
a. Moderation is determined by the social position of a
family and other relevant circumstances.
4. A husband may make a gift of an automobile to his wife using
the community funds.
5. Existence of a donation may be invoked at any time by the
donor or his heirs, or by any person prejudiced thereby,
whether as an action or defense.
6. Spouses cannot stipulate that donations between made them
during the marriage shall be valid.
7. A donation made to a stepchild or persons whom the other
spouse is a presumptive heir at the time of the donation is void
since it is indirectly in favor of the other spouse.
SYSTEM OF ABSOLUTE COMMUNITY
ACP; GENERAL PROVISIONS
Art 88 FC. The absolute community of property between spouses
shall commence at the precise moment that the marriage is
celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied, for the
commencement of the community regime at any other time shall
be void. (145a)
Art 89 FC. No waiver of rights, shares and effects of the absolute
community of property during the marriage can be made except in
case of judicial separation of property.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of
property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled, the
same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be recorded as
provided in Article 77. The creditors of the spouse who made such
waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver to the extent
of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of their
credits. (146a)
Art 90 FC. The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to the
absolute community of property between the spouses in all
matters not provided for in this Chapter. (n)
ACP; WHAT CONSTITUTES COMMUNITY PROPERTY
Art 91 FC. Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of all
the property owned by the spouses at the time of the celebration
of the marriage or acquired thereafter. (197a)
Art 92 FC. The following shall be excluded from the community
property:
(1) Property acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title by
either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income thereof, if any,
unless it is expressly provided by the donor, testator or grantor
that they shall form part of the community property;
(2) Property for personal and exclusive use of either spouse.
However, jewelry shall form part of the community property;
(3) Property acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a former marriage, and the fruits as
well as the income, if any, of such property. (201a)
Art 93 FC. Property acquired during the marriage is presumed to
belong to the community, unless it is proved that it is one of those
excluded therefrom. (160)
ACP; CHARGES UPON THE ACP
Art 94 FC. The absolute community of property shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this
Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage by the
designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the community,
or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the consent of the
other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have been
benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major or minor
repairs, upon the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse used by the
family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or complete a
professional or vocational course, or other activity for self-
improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in
favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or vocational
course or other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling
under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either spouse
by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of absence or
insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse, the
payment of which shall be considered as advances to be deducted
from the share of the debtor-spouse upon liquidation of the
community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit is
found to be groundless.
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their separate
properties. (161a, 162a, 163a, 202a-205a)
Art 95 FC. Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any game
of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of gambling,
whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be borne by the
loser and shall not be charged to the community but any winnings
therefrom shall form part of the community property. (164a)
ACP; OWNERSHIP AND DISPOSITION OF THE ACP
Art 96 FC. The administration and enjoyment of the community
property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
disagreement, the husband's decision shall prevail, subject to
recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which must
be availed of within five years from the date of the contract
implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise unable
to participate in the administration of the common properties, the
other spouse may assume sole powers of administration. These
powers do not include disposition or encumbrance without
authority of the court or the written consent of the other spouse.
In the absence of such authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void. However, the transaction shall be
construed as a continuing offer on the part of the consenting
spouse and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or authorization
by the court before the offer is withdrawn by either or both
offerors. (206a)
Art 97 FC. Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her interest in
the community property. (n)
Art 98 FC. Neither spouse may donate any community property
without the consent of the other. However, either spouse may,
without the consent of the other, make moderate donations from
the community property for charity or on occasions of family
rejoicing or family distress. (n)
ACP; DISSOLUTION
Art 99 FC. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage
under Articles 134 to 138. (175a)
Art 100 FC. The separation in fact between husband and wife shall
not affect the regime of absolute community except that:
(1) The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to live
therein, without just cause, shall not have the right to be
supported;
(2) When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be obtained in a
summary proceeding;
(3) In the absence of sufficient community property, the separate
property of both spouses shall be solidarily liable for the support of
the family. The spouse present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer or
encumber any specific separate property of the other spouse and
use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the latter's
share. (178a)
Art 101 FC. If a spouse without just cause abandons the other or
fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family, the
aggrieved spouse may petition the court for receivership, for
judicial separation of property or for authority to be the sole
administrator of the absolute community, subject to such
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to marital, parental or property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when her or she
has left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The
spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a period of three
months or has failed within the same period to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling. (178a)
ACP; LIQUIDATION OF ASSETS AND LIABILITIES
Art 102 FC. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime,
the following procedure shall apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the
properties of the absolute community and the exclusive properties
of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be
paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the
spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the
second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses
shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community
shall constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally
between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless
there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided in this
Code. For purpose of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),
the said profits shall be the increase in value between the market
value of the community property at the time of the celebration of
the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition, in accordance with Article 51.
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of
the properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is
situated shall be adjudicated to the spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below
the age of seven years are deemed to have chosen the mother,
unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there in no such
majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best
interests of said children. (n)
Art 103 FC. Upon the termination of the marriage by death, the
community property shall be liquidated in the same proceeding for
the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the community property either judicially or
extra-judicially within six months from the death of the deceased
spouse. If upon the lapse of the six months period, no liquidation is
made, any disposition or encumbrance involving the community
property of the terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a mandatory
regime of complete separation of property shall govern the
property relations of the subsequent marriage. (n)
Art 104 FC. Whenever the liquidation of the community properties
of two or more marriages contracted by the same person before
the effectivity of this Code is carried out simultaneously, the
respective capital, fruits and income of each community shall be
determined upon such proof as may be considered according to
the rules of evidence. In case of doubt as to which community the
existing properties belong, the same shall be divided between the
different communities in proportion to the capital and duration of
each. (189a)
ONAS V JAVILLO (1934)
FACTS:
Crispulo Javillo contracted two marriages. His first marriage was with
Ramona Levis where they had 5 children [petitioners-appellees].
Ater Ramona’s death, he married Rosario Onas [oppositor-appellant]
where four children were born. During the first marriage, 11 parcels
of land were acquired while 20 parcels of land were acquired during
the 2nd marriage.
Crispulo Javillo died intestate on the 18th of May, 1927 and Santiago
Andrada was named administrator of his estate. He submitted two
projects of partition, the first disapproved by the lower court and
second partition is the one now on appeal in this case. Partition was
made on the claim that the properties of the 2nd marriage were
products of the first marriage. Appellant now alleges that the lower
court committed the following errors:
1. All the properties acquired during the second marriage were
acquired with the properties of the first marriage.
2. Lower court erred in approving the partition dated Sept. 9,
1931 notwithstanding that the same did not include all of the
properties of the deceased, Crispulo Javillo.
ISSUES:
WON the community partnership shall continue to exist between
the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse.
NO. Gutierrez adopting the view of Matienzo states that: When the
marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought about the community
ceases, for the principle of an ordinary partnership are not
applicable to this community, which is governed by special rules.
Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to have any
effect for the community of property is admissible and proper in so
far as it conforms to unity of life, to the mutual affection between
husband and wife, and serve as a recompense for the care of
preserving and increasing the property; all of which terminates by
the death of one of the partners.
Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved or annuled or
when during the marriage an agreement is entered into to divide the
conjugal property. The conjugal partnership does not exist as long as
the spouses are united.
WON the properties of the second marriage can be claimed as
products of the properties of the first marriage.
NO. Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the dissolution
if the partnership by death or presumption of death whether the
acquisition be made by his or her lucrative title, it forms part of his
or her own capital, in which the other consort, or his or her heirs,
can claim no share.
WON the partition that was approved by the lower court is valid.
NO. The project of partition approved the lower court is based on
the absurd claim that “it does not appear that there was liquidation
of the partnership of property of the first marriage nor does it
appear that they asked for such liquidation”. Partition was based on
the erroneous assumption that the properties of the second
marriage were produced by the properties of the first marriage.
Partition is not in conformity with the law.
RULING: Judgment of the lower court is reversed and case
REMANDED for further proceedings.
VDA. DE DELIZO V DELIZO (1976)
FACTS:
In dispute are the conjugal properties of Nicolas Delizo from his first
and second marriages. Delizo was married to Rosa Villasfer from
1981 to 1909 and to Dorotea de Ocampo from 1911 to 1957. The
partition for the separation was initiated by the heirs of the first
marriage whose claims were refuted by the claims of the second
marriage. The main problem was that they could not agree on which
properties fell under the property regime of the first marriage and
which fell under the second.
This was complicated because of the extensive scope of properties
Delizo acquired throughout his lifetime—17 pieces of property were
under consideration. In particular, however, 66-hectares found in
Caanawan, Nueva Ecija are being disputed. While the trial court and
Court of Appeals found that it was acquired during the first
marriage, the division of the fruits of the properties was not clear
mainly because majority of the improvement of the 66-hectare
property were implemented during the second marriage; only 20
hectares of the 66 were cultivated during the first marriage. This was
Persons HW# 16 (Property Relations Between Spouses)
made more complicated by the fact that although only 20 hectares 1. NO. Two of these stepchildren were already of legal age when
were cultivated during the first marriage, it was the money made Joena filed her Affidavit. As toone of the children, parental
from the 20 hectares that was used to acquire all subsequent authority over him belongs to his parents. Absent any special
property. Taking those facts into consideration, the Court of Appeals ower of attorney authorizing Joena to represent Erlando’s
held that 20% of all properties acquired during the first marriage children, her claim cannot be sustained.
should go to the children of the first marriage and 80% to the 2. Art. 92, par. (3) of the Family Code excludes from the
conjugal partnership of Nicolas and Dorotea. community property the property acquired before the marriage
of a spouse who has legitimate descendants by a former
ISSUE: How much were each of the heirs of Nicolas Delizo entitled to marriage; and the fruits and the income, if any, of that
given the fact that properties acquired during his first and second property. Thus, neither these two vehicles nor the house and
marriages could not be divided with mathematical precision? lot belong to the second marriage.
HELD: RULING: DENIED.
The Supreme Court held that the lands composing the Caanawan
properties could not have been the properties of the first marriage
because they were public lands before becoming homesteads.
According to the law, it was only after 5 years of cultivation that
lands from the public domain would be given to the occupant. The
court also held that possession of these lands was not established
during the start of the occupation but at the precise time that the
occupants were given ownership.

However, although the first marriage did not technically own any
lands and imparted to its heirs only inchoate rights, the Court held
that justice and equity demanded that the rights to the properties
by apportioned in proportion to the extent to which the
requirements of the public land laws had been complied with during
the existence of each conjugal partnership. Since the capital of
either marriage could not be determined with mathematical
precision, the Court divided the total mass of the properties in
proportion to the duration of each partnership.

Thus the second conjugal partnership had 46/64 of the total mass of
properties and the first 18/64. Of these Nicolas is entitled to half;
32/64. Dorotea and her heirs are entitled to 23/64 while Rosa
Villasfer’s share would be 9/64. Each of the kids of the first marriage
are entitled to 142/1664 of the entire estate while the children of
the second marriage are entitled to 64/1664 of the all the
properties.

ABRENICA V ABRENICA (2012)

FACTS:

1. P and R were law firm partners. R filed a case against P d to

return partnership funds representing profits from the sale of a
parcel of land and sought to recover from petitioner retainer
fees that he received from two clients of the firm and the
balance of the cash advance that he obtained.
2. P filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that the sheriff had
levied on properties belonging to his children and petitioner
Joena. Joena filed an Affidavit of Third Party alleging that she
and her stepchildren owned a number of the personal
properties sought to be levied and that it was under their ACP.
3. A Sheriff’s Certificate of Sale was issued on 3January 2008 in
favor of the law firm for the P’s properties.

ISSUE: WON Joena had the right to the claim?

HELD: