In re: Saturnino Bermudez
justiciable matter but belongs to the realm of politics,
Structure of Government | G.R. No. 76180 | October 24, 1986
| Per Curiam | Senadoza, E
Nature of petition: declaratory relief impleading
Petitioner: Saturnino Bermudez, a lawyer
Respondent: none
FACTS:
• Saturnino Bermudez, a lawyer, files a petition for
declaratory relief asserting that Sec. 5(1) of Art. XVIII of
the proposed 1986 Constitution is unclear as to who is
being referred as President and Vice President among
incumbent President Corazon Aquino and VP Salvador
Laurel & President Ferdinand Marcos and VP Arturo
Tolentino
o Art. XVIII, Sec. 5. of proposed 1986 Constitution
The six-year term of the incumbent
President and Vice-President elected in the February
7, 1986 election is, for purposes of synchronization of
elections, hereby extended to noon of June 30, 1992."
"The first regular elections for the President
and Vice-President under this Constitution shall be
held on the second Monday of May, 1992."
ISSSUE/S:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over the petition -- NO
Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for
declaratory relief
More importantly, the petition amounts to a suit against
incumbent Pres. Aquino, which is prohibited in light of
incumbent President’s immunity from suit or from being
brought to Court
2. WON the petition poses a cause of action – NO
Petition has no cause of action because petitioner’s
allegation of ambiguity of Sec. 5 is manifestly gratuitous
because it is a matter of public record and common public
knowledge that the ConCom are referring to incumbent Pres.
Aquino and VP Laurel when the commissioners wrote the said
provision
The legitimacy of the government of Pres. Aquino had
already been questioned and decided upon by the court,
wherein the petition was dismissed outright for lack of cause
of action and personality to sue
- Question of legitimacy of Aquino government is not a
where only the Filipino people are the judge
- Government of Pres. Aquino is recognized as a de jure
government (A de jure government is the legal,
legitimate government of a state and is so recognized
by other states. In contrast, a de facto government is
in actual possession of authority and control of the
state) instead of merely being a de facto government.
- Plus, the community of nations has recognized the
legitimacy of the present government
There being no question that Pres. Aquino and VP Laurel are
the incumbent and legitimate President and Vice President of
the Republic of the Philippines, the petition is hereby
dismissed
SC Ruling: petition alleging the ambiguity of Sec. 5 of Art. XVIII
is DISMISSED
Separate Opinions
1. Melencio-Herrera, J. Concurring:
Agrees with the outright dismissal of the petition
The petition has no cause of action
• Petition should have been address to other departments
of government constitutionality burdened with the task of
making the declaration as to who were elected President
and VP in the February 7. 1986 elections
• 1935, 1973, 1986 Draft Constitution uniformly provide
1. the boards of canvassers in each province and city
shall certify who were elected Pres. And VP in their
respective areas
2. certified returns are transmitted to the legislature
3. legislator proclaims who were duly elected
• in the absence of a legislature, the Courts cannot
assume its role of stating and declaring who were
elected Pres. And VP
• Agrees that there is no doubt that the 1986 Draft
Constitution was referring to Pres. Aquino and VP
Laurel as the incumbent President and VP
2. Cruz, J. Concurring
• The Constitution the Court is being asked to interpret
is not yet ratified and not yet effective.
• Thus, there is no actual conflict of legal rights
susceptible to judicial determination at this time
Social Security System Employees Association v Soriano
Structure of Government | G.R. No. L-18081 (April 30, 1963) |
Bautista Angelo , J. | by Soller, P.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
• On October 20, 1960, petitioner Social Security System
Employees Association sent a letter to the Social Security
Commission containing demanding to be recognized as a
collective bargaining agent.
• On December 14, 1960, the Commission instead filed a
motion with the CFI of Manila to be declared as a
 government agency performing governmental functions
which would prevent petitioners from joining labor
unions and going on strike.
• Petitioners contended that SSS performs propriety
functions, not governmental functions. The Commission
continued to refuse to enter into a CBA with petitioners,
which resulted in petitioners going on strike and filing a
case for unfair labor practices.
• The Commission responded by filing for an injunction
with the CFI to require petitioners to go back to work end
their strike, which was granted by respondent judge, ex
parte.
• Petitioners filed for certiorari claiming that respondent
judge acted outside of his jurisdiction when he granted
the injunction ex parte.
ISSUES:
WON SSS exercises governmental functions and is therefore
exempted from entering into a collective bargaining
agreement with its members – NO
• The court cited Bacani v National Coconut Corporation to
differentiate entities which exercises functions of the
government as an attribute of its sovereignty (municipal
corporations) and those entities which are given
separate personalities from the government and must
follow the Corporation Law.
• SSS, like the NCC, was found not to exercise
governmental functions for 4 reasons:
• It is not a municipal corporation
• Its powers are not exercised as an
attribute of sovereignty
• It was given personality and powers
separate from the government
• It may sue and be sued like any private
corporation
• The court also held that SSS was vastly similar to
the GSIS, which was also ruled in a previous case
to exercise proprietary and not governmental
functions
SC RULING:
• SSS exercises governmental functions, therefore
respondent judge acted outside of his jurisdiction in
issuing the injunction. Said writ is set aside. Court
also affirmed this decision in its resolution after the
Commission filed a motion for reconsideration.
SSS Employees Association (PAFLU) v. Soriano - Resolution
Structure of Government
G.R. No. L-18081, November 18, 1963 | Bautista Angelo, J. | by
Jecs Susano
Notes:
SSC – Social Security Commission
SSS – Social Security System
GOCC – government owned or controlled corporation
BPW – Bureau of Public Works
Ministrant - undertaken only by way of advancing the general
interest of society which are merely optional which includes
public works, public charity, health and safety regulations that
are exercised by SSS and other GOCCs to promote certain
aspects of the economic and social life of our people
Facts:
• This is a motion for reconsideration filed by respondent
Judge E. Soriano or in the alternative, require the Court to
elevate the evidence submitted by the parties in Civil Case
No 48516
• Petitioner’s evidence
1. Consolidated balance sheets from 1958 to 1962
2. SSC Resolution 669 endorsing the opinion of the
Government Corporate Counsel concerning the
Php5M building SSS plans to erect in Quezon City
which stated that said construction is an
investment and pertains more to the ministrant
aspect of its functions, thus the BPW could not
exercise supervision unless requested
3. Nov 16 1962 letter from the Acting Finance
Secretary Rodrigo Perez denying SSS’ application
for customs duty and tax exemption on its
importation of one Recordak Reliant 500
Microfilmer pursuant to Section 1205 of the
Tariff and Customs Code, on the ground that it
was a government entity but said application was
denied since it was not performing a strictly
governmental function
4. June-July 1961 issue of the Phil. Social Security
Bulletin showing that SSS is 1) run like a
government corporation and applying to it RA
Republic Act 2254 governing government-owned
or controlled corporations and 2) it is a
counterpart of GSIS
5. SSC 1958 report showing how its funds are
invested
6. SSC 1960 report showing that the SSS is operated
on the Social insurance principles
• Respondents’ evidence
1. SSS structural and functional charts
2. Social Security Act of 1954 showing that the SSC
has quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers
3. Agreement between SSC and PAFLU showing
that 1) the latter is the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent and 2) SSC would pay the wages
and salaries of those who went on strike 3)
actuarial graph showing expenses, contributions
and interest earned
4. Rebuttal on the Nov. 16, 1962 letter from Acting
Secretary Perez with said rebuttal stating that the
customs duty and tax is subject to refund if it
shown that it is used by SSS

Issue: W/N SSS is a government exercising proprietary
functions – YES
• SSC Resolution 669 endorsing the opinion of the
Government Corporate Counsel was acquiesced by a
majority of its members
o Said opinion also stated that the SSS is NOT
a part of the National or other branch of the
Government
• A brochure prepared by the Research and Public
Information Staff of the SSS states that SSS is an
insurance scheme of general application
• The 1962 issue of the SSS Philippine Social Security
Bulletin of the SSS explained that its funds have been
invested in real estate, banks, stocks government
bonds, private companies, time deposits and savings
deposits
• There is also a jump in its total benefit payments,
assets and income as shown in the consolidated
balance sheets
o Total benefit payments jumped from
P75,437.68 as of Dec. 31 1957 to
P7,751,348.56 as of June 30, 1962
o Assets jumped from P17,234,869.61 as of
June 30, 1957 to P194,424,319.38 as of June
30, 1962
o Total income jumped from P12,215,269.36
as of June 30, 1957 to P69,316,986.71 as of
June 30, 1962
SC Ruling: Motion is DENIED
Dimaporo v. Mitra
Congress – House of Representatives| G.R. No. 96859 |
October 15, 1991| Davide, Jr., J.| Valencia, Isis Kyle
Facts:
• Petitioner was a duly elected Representative for the
Second Legislative District of Lanao del Sur
• 3 years after he was sworn into office, he filed a
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional
Governor of ARMM
• Citing Sec. 67, Article IX of the BP Blng. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code), herein respondent, the Speaker of the
House, removed the petitioner’s name from the Roll
of Members of the HoR
o Section 67. Candidates holding elective
office. - Any elective official, whether
national or local, running for any office
other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity, except for President
and Vice-President, shall be considered ipso
facto resigned from his office upon the filing
of his certificate of candidacy.
• Petitioner lost the ARMM elections and subsequently
expressed his intentions to resume his functions as an
“elected member of the Congress”
o Petitioner wasn’t allowed to regain his
Congress seat
• Hence, this petition
• According to the petitioner:
o Even though he filed a CoC for another
position, the same did not cause him to lose
his Congress seat
o Section 67, Article IX of BP Blng. 881 is
contrary to the present Constitution and is
not applicable to the present case
o Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution already
outlines how the term of members of the
HoR may be shortened, filing of a CoC not an
option
▪ Section 13: Forfeiture of his seat by
holding any other office or
employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations or subsidiaries;
▪ Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a
disciplinary action for disorderly
behavior
▪ Section 17: Disqualification as
determined by resolution of the
Electoral Tribunal in an election
contest; and,
▪ Section 7, Par. 2: Voluntary
renunciation of office.
Issue/s:
WoN Sec. 67, Art. IX of BP Blng. 881 is operative under the
present Constitution.
1. YES, the questioned statute can operate alongside the
1987 Constitution
2. Questioned provision is rooted in several past provisions,
all of which has been upheld (C.A. No. 666, Sec. 2; R.A. No.
180, Sec. 27; 1971 Election Code, Sec. 24)
3. The fact that the contents of the questioned provision was
not explicitly included in the Constitution does not
preclude its application
a. Art. XI Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution says: “All
other public officers and employees may be
removed from office as provided by law (in this
case, the law is the PB) , but not by
impeachment.”
b. The Court ruled that the language employed in
this provision shows that the 4 ground for
shortening the term of a Representative
mentioned in Art. VI is not exhaustive
 c. Death also not mentioned in Art. VI, but it would
be preposterous not to consider it a ground for
termination of office
4. The petitioner contends that his term is being cut short by
said provision when the Constitution prescribes that
terms of office may not be extended or shortened by the
legislature
a. The Court ruled that the petitioner is confusing
term with tenure.
b. The provision cut short his tenure, but the term
of his office remains intact, the remainder of
which will be served by his successor.
c. Public officials must serve the people with
utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate
which they have received from their
constituents by running for another office just
to go back to their previous positions upon
losing
WON the Speaker and/or the Secretary of the House can
exclude the petitioner from the rolls of the HoR.
5. YES, as head of the HoR, the Speaker exercises
administrative powers and functions
6. Given the tenor of the Omnibus Election Code, it was the
respondents’ ministerial duty to remove the petitioner’s
name from the rolls
Held:
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC
Appointment and Reappointment | G.R. No. 176970, July 16,
2008 |Brion, J. | Jasper Valencia
Recitation Summary:
• A bill was sponsored that will give Cagayan de Oro
two legislative districts instead of one.
• It was passed as RA 9371.
• Bagabuyo filed a petition stating that the law is
unconstitutional.
• The creation of a second legislative district is
considered as a division or conversion of local
government and COMELEC cannot enforce it without
conducting a plebiscite, which is a constitutional
requirement.
• No. RA 9371 does not have the effect of dividing or
converting Cagayan de Oro as a local government
unit.
• It merely provides legislative apportionment or
reapportionment.
• Petition dismissed. The law is not unconstitutional.
Facts of the case:
• Congressman Constantino Jaraula sponsored a bill
which gives Cagayan de Oro two legislative districts
instead of one.
• This bill was eventually passed as Republic Act 9371.
Each district would elect their own representatives to
Congress and the Sanguniang Panglungsod for the
May 2007 elections.
• On March 13, 2007, COMELEC promulgated
Resolution No. 7837 which implements RA 9371.
• Rogelio Bagabuyo went to the Supreme Court to
enjoin COMELEC from enforcing the law during the
elections on the grounds that the law is
unconstitutional.
• He contends that the creation of a second legislative
district is considered as a division or conversion of
local government and COMELEC cannot enforce it
without conducting a plebiscite, which is a
constitutional requirement.
ISSUES:
1. WON RA 9371 involves the division or conversion of a
local government unit.
a. No. RA 9371 does not have the effect of
dividing or converting Cagayan de Oro as a
local government unit.
b. It merely provides legislative apportionment
or reapportionment.
c. Legislative apportionment is defined by as
the determination of the number of
representatives which a State, county or
other subdivision may send to a legislative
body.
d. It is the allocation of seats in a legislative
body in proportion to the population in
order to equalize voting power among
districts.
e. Reapportionment, on the other hand, is the
realignment or change in legislative districts
brought about by changes in population and
mandated by the constitutional requirement
of equality of representation.
f. Creation, division, merger, abolition, and
alteration of boundaries require the
commencement of a plebiscite as stated by
Art. X, Sec. 10 of the Constitution. On the
other hand, Legislative apportionment or
reapportionment under Art. VI, Sec. 5 does
not require a plebiscite.
g. RA 9371 enhances voter representation by
giving each city voter more and greater say,
both in Congress and in the Sangguniang
Panglunsod. Before, Cagayan de Oro only
had one congressman representing 500,000
citizens.
h. Now, there are two congressmen
representing 250,000 citizens each.
 i. The presence of two congressmen from the
same city is an improvement of the city’s
representation in congress.
j. To ensure quality representation through
commonality of interests and ease of access
by the representative to the constituents, all
that the Constitution requires is that every
legislative district should comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory.
k. Thus, the Constitution leaves the local
government units as they are found and
does not require their division, merger or
transfer to satisfy the numerical standard it
imposes. Its requirements are satisfied
despite some numerical disparity if the units
are contiguous, compact and adjacent as far
as practicable.
SC RULING:
Petition dismissed. The law is not unconstitutional.
AQUINO v COMELEC (1995) 248 SCRA 400
Apportionment and reapportionment (House of
Representatives) | G.R. No. 120265 | September 18, 1995 |
Kapunan | By Baquiran, Benjamin
RECIT SUMMARY:
1. Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his Certificate of
Candidacy for the position of Representative for the new
Second Legislative District of Makati.
2. Private respondents petitioned to disqualify petitioner
Aquino as the latter lacked the residence qualification of
a congressman candidate pursuant to Section 6, Art VI of
the 1987 Constitution.
3. Petitioner won the elections but COMELEC suspended
petitioner’s proclamation until issue of residence
requirement is resolved.
4. COMELEC, in a Resolution, declared herein petitioner
ineligible and disqualified as a candidate for lack of
Constitutional qualification of residence and directed the
Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati to determine the
winner out of the remaining qualified candidates.
5. Petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the COMELEC
contending that the House of Representative Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) should have been the judge in the
disputed position.
6. Petitioner also avers that COMELEC erred in disqualifying
him on the ground of non-compliance with residence
requirement.
7. Additionally, he argues that COMELEC also erred in
proclaiming the winner out of the remaining qualified
candidates.
8. The court held that COMELEC retains its jurisdiction over
the case even after the elections and that the HRET
assumes jurisdiction only for cases of election disputes for
the members of the HoR.
9. It further held that there is no showing that petitioner is
indeed a resident of Makati. For election purposes,
“residence” is deemed synonymous with “domicile.” In
this case, the petitioner’s domicile of origin remains in
Tarlac.
10. On the issue of who should be proclaimed the winner, the
Court held that ineligibility of a candidate receiving the
majority votes does not entitle the eligible candidate
receiving the next higher number of votes to be declared
elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot
be declared elected to the office.
11. However, the Court concluded that in the absence of one
of the essential qualifications for petitioner’s candidacy,
not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters
would substitute for a requirement mandated by the
fundamental law itself.
12. Petition is hereby dismissed and the Court issued a
permanent order restraining COMELEC from proclaiming
the candidate with next highest number of votes.
FACTS:
• March 20, 1995: Petitioner Agapito Aquino filed his
Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District
of Makati. In his CoC, it was stated that petitioner is a
resident of Makati for 10 months.
• April 24, 1995: Private respondents, Move Makati (a
political party) and Mateo Bedon (Chairman of LAKAS-
NUCD-UMDP of Cembo, Makati), filed a petition to
disqualify petitioner Aquino as the latter lacked the
residence qualification of a congressman candidate
pursuant to Section 6, Art VI of the 1987 Constitution
which should be a period of not less than 1 year
immediately preceding the day of the elections.
• The day after, petitioner filed an amended CoC stating
that he had resided in Makati for 1 year and 13 days.
• May 2, 1995: Aquino then filed an answer praying for
the dismissal of the disqualification case. On the same
day, COMELEC conducted a hearing wherein petitioner
presented evidence, among others, a lease contract for
a condominium unit in Makati dated April 1, 1994.
• May 6, 1995: Second Division of the COMELEC
promulgated a Resolution dismissing the petition for
disqualification and declaring herein petitioner Aquino
an eligible candidate. Thereafter, private respondents
filed an MR of the said Resolution.
 • May 8, 1995: Elections were held and petitioner Aquino
won against Augusto Syjuco.
• May 10, 1995: Private respondents filed an Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of
petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion
for Reconsideration of the COMELEC's May 6 Resolution
and a 2nd Urgent Motion Ad Cautelum.
• May 15, 1995: COMELEC suspended petitioner’s
proclamation until private respondent’s MR is resolved.
• In effect, petitioner filed urgent motion to lift order of
suspension of proclamation invoking Section 17, Article
VI of the Constitution: “The Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
2.
[HRET for HoR] which shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their Members.”
• June 2, 1995: COMELEC, in a Resolution, reversed the
May 6 Resolution of the Second Division, declared
herein petitioner ineligible and disqualified as a
candidate for lack of Constitutional qualification of
residence and directed the Board of Canvassers of the
City of Makati to determine the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates, who shall be
immediately be proclaimed; hence, the case at bar.
ISSUE/S & RATIO:
1. (A) W/N the COMELEC has jurisdiction to determine and
adjudge the disqualification issue involving
congressional candidates after the May 8, 1995 elections
and assuming such jurisdiction, (B) W/N the same
committed serious error and grave of discretion in
directing the suspension of petitioner’s proclamation as
the winning candidate
o YES (A). Contrary to Aquino’s claim, such
determination is not reserved/ lodged exclusively by
the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
▪ There is a distinction between an
unproclaimed candidate of the HoR vs
member of the same which the petitioner
confuses
▪ HRET assumes jurisdiction to contests only
after a candidate becomes a member of the
HoR.
▪ Highest # of votes does NOT automatically vest
position to winning candidate
▪ Unproclaimed candidate who has not taken his
oath IS NOT a member
o NO (B). Jurisdiction did NOT cease in the instant case
after the elections; no grave abuse of discretion
when COMELEC promulgated the questioned
decision despite its own recognition that the decision
must be judiciously reviewed again
▪ RA 6646 (The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)
allows suspension of proclamation
▪ COMELEC has power to hear/decide questions
relating to qualifications of candidates even
after elections
▪ Sec. 6 RA 6646: If disqualification comes after
election and the candidate wins, Court/
Commission continues the trial and hearing
and the proclamation of such candidate can be
suspended if the evidence of guilt is strong
▪ Sec. 7 RA 6646: Sec. 6 applies to petitions to
deny due course/cancel CoC based on Sec. 78
of BP 881
W/N petitioner is disqualified due to non-compliance
with residency requirement.
o YES. Petitioner did not prove that “he has established
not just residence but domicile of choice”
o Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled
meaning in our jurisdiction.
▪ In Co v Electoral Tribunal of HoR, the Court
held that the term "residence" has always
been understood as synonymous with
"domicile" not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987
Constitution
Domicile – where a party actually or
constructively has his permanent home; where
a party eventually intends to return and
remain, to which the Constitution refers as
regards residence for the purposes of election
law
Note the “essence of representation”: to put
those most cognizant and sensitive to the
needs of a particular district. Those who fail
residency req. are unfamiliar with these
conditions and needs and may take advantage
of the circumstances of the community for
electoral gain.
Petitioner is a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac
for 52 years immediately preceding the 1995
election. He was born there + parents were born
there + He is registered voter there + he filed his most
recent CoC there which proves that his domicile is
NOT Makati.
Property ownership should never be indicator
of right to vote or to be voted upon, BUT
evidences prove that the transfer of residence
of the petitioner is only to qualify for
candidacy in Makati and not to acquire a new
domicile.
• he only leased his Makati condo unit for
2 years
 • Petitioner himself said he only wanted
to stay for 1 year because he has “other
residences” in Manila & QC
o Req of change of domicile: actual removal/ intention
of abandoning former place of residence to establish
a new one elsewhere
o Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be
legally impossible to impose the one year residency
requirement in a newly created political district is
specious and lacks basis in logic.
3. W/N the COMELEC erred in issuing its Order instructing
the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as
winner the candidate receiving the next higher number
of votes.
o YES. Ineligibility of a candidate receiving the majority
votes does not entitle the eligible candidate receiving
the next higher number of votes to be declared
elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate
cannot be declared elected to the office.
▪ To contend that Syjuco, the first among the
qualified candidates, should be proclaimed is
to misconstrue the nature of democratic
electoral process and the sociological and
psychological underpinnings behind the
voters’ preferences.
▪ He [Syjuco] could not be considered the first
among qualified candidates because in a field
which excludes the disqualified candidate, the
conditions would have substantially changed.
The votes for Aquino would not have
automatically gone to the second placer.
o Ph jurisprudence in these cases swings in a pendulum.
▪ Topacio v. Paredes: the Court declared that
the votes cast in favor of a disqualified,
ineligible or dead candidate cannot be
considered stray votes, consequently, the
candidate who obtained the next higher
number of votes cannot be proclaimed as
winner.
▪ Ticson v. Comelec: …a disqualified candidate is
no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the
eyes of the law. The court upheld the
proclamation of the only candidate left in the
questioned position
▪ Geronimo v. Ramos: reiterated Topacio v.
Paredes ruling
▪ Santos v. Comelec: reverts back to Ticson v.
Comelec ruling.
▪ However, in the more recent cases of Labo, Jr.
v. Comelec, Abella v. Comelec, and Benito v.
Comelec, the Court upheld the Topacio and
Geronimo ruling. In the absence of a statute
which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes
were cast in sincere belief that that candidate
was alive, qualified, or eligible; they should not
be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
o Nevertheless, as petitioner clearly lacks one of the
essential qualifications for candidacy, not even the
will of a majority or plurality of the voters would
substitute for a requirement mandated by the
fundamental law itself.
SC RULING:
Petition DISMISSED. Order restraining COMELEC from
proclaiming candidate [Syjuco] with next highest number of
votes in the congressional elections for the 2nd District of
Makati City is made PERMANENT.
Pertinent provisions:
SEC. 5, ART. 6
o (3) legislative district shall comprise (as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact and
adjacent territory) Each city, pop of at least
250k or each province = at least 1 rep
o (4) reapportionment of legislative districts
According to standards provided in this sec
w/in 3 yrs after every census
SEC. 17, ART. 6
o Senate and House of Representatives shall
each have an Electoral Tribunal
o ET= Sole judge of all contests relating to the
election, returns, and qualifications of their
resp. Members
o Composition: 9 (3 Justices of SC, designated
by the CJ+ 6 from Sen/ HoR, chosen based on
proportional representation form the
political parties and the parties/ orgs
registered under the party-list system
o Senior Justice in the Tribunal = its Chairman
SEC. 6 (RA 6646- Electoral Reforms Law of 1987)
o Effect of Disqualification Case. — Any
candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is
not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for
and receives the winning number of votes in
such election, the Court or Commission shall
continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion
 of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of guilt is
strong. Under the above-quoted provision,
not only is a disqualification case against a
candidate allowed to continue after the
election (and does not oust the COMELEC of
its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the highest
number of votes will not result in the
suspension or termination of the
proceedings against him when the evidence
of guilt is strong

Mariano v. Comelec

Appointment and Reappointment| G.R. No. 118577 March 7,

1995 | Puno, J. |By Arapoc, S.

Facts of the case:
- Two petitions are filed assailing certain provisions of
RA 7854, An Act Converting The Municipality of
Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as
the City of Makati, as unconstitutional.
- Section 52 of RA 7854 is said to be unconstitutional
for it increased the legislative district of Makati only
by special law in violation of Art. VI, Sec. 5(4) of the
Constitution requiring a general reapportionment law
to be passed by Congress within 3 years following the
return of every census.
- Also, the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is not in accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the population
of Makati stands at only 450,000.
ISSUE/RATIO:
1. WON the addition of another legislative district in
Makati is unconstitutional
a. NO. As the Court held in Tobias v. Abalos,
reapportionment of legislative districts may
be made through a special law, such as in the
charter of a new city. The Constitution
clearly provides that Congress shall be
composed of not more than 250 members,
unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus
worded, the Constitution did not preclude
Congress from increasing its membership by
passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment law. This is exactly what
Congress in did enacting RA 7854 and
providing for an increase in Makati’s
legislative district.
b. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment can
only be made through a general
apportionment law, with a review of all the
legislative districts allotted to each local
government unit nationwide, would create
an inequitable situation where a new city or
province created by Congress will be denied
legislative representation for an
indeterminate period of time. The
intolerable situations will deprive the people
of a new city or province a particle of their
sovereignty.
c. Petitioner cannot insist that the addition of
another legislative district in Makati is not in
accord with Sec. 5(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution for as of the 1990 census, the
population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
Said section provides that a city with a
population of at least 250,000 shall have at
least one representative. Even granting that
the population of Makati as of
the 1990 census stood at 450,000, its
legislative district may still be increased
since it has met the minimum population
requirement of 250,000.
SC Ruling: Petition dismissed.
Aquino III and Robredo vs. COMELEC
DOCTRINE: Section 5(3) of Article VI of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population only for a city to be
entitled to a representative, but not so for a province.
Population is just one of several other factors to be
determined to compose a legislative district in a province.
FACTS:
• Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo signed R.A. 9716,
which reapportioned the First (1st) and Second (2nd)
Legislative Districts in the Province of Camarines Sur
to create an additional legislative district. The first
district municipalities of Libmanan, Minalabac,
Pamplona, Pasacao, and San Fernando were
combined with the second district municipalities of
Milaor and Gainza to form a new second legislative
district.
• Sen. Aquino III and Naga Mayor Robredo filed a
petition for certiorari and prohibition. Petitioners
contend that the reapportionment introduced by
Republic Act No. 9716, runs afoul of the explicit
constitutional standard that requires a minimum
population of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
for the creation of a legislative district. The
petitioners claim that the reconfiguration by Republic
Act No. 9716 of the first and second districts of
Camarines Sur is unconstitutional, because the
proposed first district will end up with a population of
less than 250,000 or only 176,383.
• Section 5(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
o Each legislative district shall comprise, as far
as practicable, contiguous, compact, and
adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative.
Petitioner’s arguments:
• Save in the case of a newly created province, the
constitution requires that each legislative district created
by Congress must be supported by a minimum
population of at least 250,000 in order to be valid.
 o “Article VI Sec. 5 (3) Each legislative district shall
comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact, and adjacent territory. Each city with a
population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.”
o Intent of the framers of the 1987 constitution
was to create a population minimum of 250,000
per legislative district.
▪ When the Constitutional Commission
fixed the original number of district
seats in the House of Representatives to
200, they took into account the
projected national population of
55,000,000 in 1986.
▪ 55 million people represented by 200
district representatives translates to
roughly 250,000 people for every one
(1) representative.
• RA 9716 violates the principle of proportional
representation provided in Article VI, Sec 5 par (1), (3)
and (4) of the Constitution.1
Respondent’s arguments:
• Substantive:
o There is an apparent distinction between
cities and provinces drawn by Section 5(3),
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
o The existence of a 250,000 population
condition but only as to the creation of a
legislative district in a city and not to a
province.
• Procedural:
o The petitioners should not have availed of
Certiorari and Prohibition as a remedy but
should have filed a petition for Declaratory
Relief because it was to declare a law
unconstitutional.
o Petitioners have no locus standi as they have
not proven that they will incur any
substantial injury by the implementation of
the law.
ISSUES/HELD:
1
Article VI Sec 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be
composed of not more than two hundred and fifty
members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be
elected from legislative districts apportioned among the
provinces, cities and the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants,
and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a
party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations.
WON Petitioners have locus standi.
• Yes.
o Absence of direct injury on the part of the party
seeking judicial review may be excused when the
latter is able to craft an issue of transcendental
importance.
WON certiorari and prohibition were the correct remedies
• No.
o The remedy of Certiorari and Prohibition must be
directed against a tribunal, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial, or ministerial functions. Respondents
maintain that in implementing Republic Act No.
9716, they were not acting as a judicial or quasi-
judicial body, nor were they engaging in the
performance of a ministerial act.
o BUT the transcendental importance of the issues
involved in this case warrants that we set aside
the technical defects and take primary
jurisdiction over the petition at bar.
WON: RA 9716 is unconstitutional for creating a legislative
district in a province with a population less than 250,000.
• No.
o Section 5(3) of Article VI of the Constitution
requires a 250,000 minimum population
only for a city to be entitled to a
representative, but not so for a province.
o Any law duly enacted by Congress carries
with it the presumption of constitutionality.
There must be a clear showing that a specific
provision of the constitution has been
violated to be declared unconstitutional.
There is no provision requiring a 250,000
minimum population requirement for the
creation of a legislative district.
o The second sentence of Section 5(3), Article
VI of the Constitution provides: "Each city
with a population of at least two hundred
fifty thousand, or each province, shall have
at least one representative.”
o The use of a comma to separate the phrase
"each city with a population of at least two
(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as
practicable, contiguous, compact, and adjacent territory.
Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty
thousand, or each province, shall have at least one
representative
(4) Within three years following the return of every census,
the Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative
districts based on the standards provided in this section.
 hundred fifty thousand" from the phrase "or
each province" means that the 250,000
minimum population is only required for a
city, but not for a province.
o Mariano Jr. Vs. Comelec: Issue was the
constitutionality of a law converting the
Municipality of Makati to a Highly Urbanized
City. Said law also created an additional
legislative district. The Mariano case limited
the application of the 250,000 minimum
population requirement for cities only to its
initial legislative district. While Section 5(3),
Article VI of the Constitution requires a city
to have a minimum population of 250,000 to
be entitled to a representative, it does not
have to increase its population by another
250,000 to be entitled to an additional
district.
o “Sec.461 of LGC Requisites for Creation. – (a)
A province may be created if it has an
average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than
Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00)
based on 1991 constant prices and either of
the following requisites:
▪ a contiguous territory of at least
two thousand (2,000) square
kilometers, as certified by the Lands
Management Bureau; OR
▪ a population of not less than two
hundred fifty thousand (250,000)
inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office.”
• the requirement of
population is not an
indispensable
requirement, but is
merely
an alternative addition to
the indispensable income
requirement.
• Records of the Constitutional Commission show
population was not the sole determinant of the creation
of a legislative district. Other factors were considered.
• The factors mentioned during the deliberations on House
Bill No. 4264 to be considered in the creation of legislative
districts:
(a) the dialects spoken in the grouped municipalities;
(b) the size of the original groupings compared to that
of the regrouped municipalities;
(c) the natural division separating the municipality
subject of the discussion from there configured
District One; and
(d) the balancing of the areas of the three districts
resulting from the redistricting of Districts
• The Constitution, does not require mathematical
exactitude or rigid equality as a standard in gauging
equality of representation. x x x. To ensure quality
representation through commonality of interests and
ease of access by the representative to the constituents,
all that the Constitution requires is that every legislative
district should comprise, as far as practicable, contiguous,
compact and adjacent territory. – Bagabuyo vs. COMELEC
Dissenting opinion: Carpio J,
• RA 9716 is unconstitutional for going against Sec. 5
Art. VI of the 1987 Constitution for the creation of
legislative districts.
o Section 5(4) of Article VI mandates that
"Congress shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the standards"
fixed in Section 5. These constitutional
standards, as far as population is concerned,
are: (1) proportional representation; (2)
minimum population of 250,000 per
legislative district; (3) progressive ratio in the
increase of legislative districts as the
population base increases; and (4)
uniformity in apportionment of legislative
districts "in provinces, cities, and the
Metropolitan Manila area."
o The constitutional standard of proportional
representation is rooted in equality in voting
power -- that each vote is worth the same as
any other vote,
o In terms of legislative redistricting, this
means equal representation for equal
numbers of people or equal voting weight
per legislative district.
• Section 5(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provided that Members of the House "shall be
elected from legislative districts in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio x x x."
• “on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio" - the
rule on proportional representation shall apply
uniformly in the apportionment of every legislative
district.
• "on the basis of a uniform x x x ratio"- means that the
ratio of one legislative district for every given number
of people shall be applied uniformly in all
apportionments, whether in provinces or cities or in
metro manila.
• The law goes against democracy and the republican
system of government.
• That the Constitution never meant to exclude
provinces from the requirement of proportional
representation is evident in the opening provision of
Section 5(1), which states:
The House of Representatives shall be composed of x
x x members, x x x, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in
 accordance with the number of their respective
inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and
progressive ratio x x x."
• Mariano vs. Comelec and Bagabuyo vs. Comelec is
inapplicable because when it was acting as a
constitutional commission it exercised absolute
power to relax the standards in Section 5, Article VI.
• The Court in Mariano v. COMELEC took note of the
certification by the NSO that at the time of the
enactment of RA 7854, the population of Makati City
was 508,174, entitling it to two representatives
Concurring, and Dissenting Opinion: Carpio-Morales, J.
• Concur with discussion of procedural issue:
o Petitioners have locus standi as taxpayers as
RA 9716 mandates the creation of another
legislative district which involves the
expenditure of public funds
• Dissent with conclusion on substantive issue that a
population of 250, 000 is not an indispensible
requirement for the creation of a new legislative
district
• The ponencia misinterprets Mariano v. Comelec.
o Nothing in Mariano reflects that the Court
disregarded the 250,000 population
requirement as it merely stated that
Makati's legislative district may still be
increased as long as the minimum
population requirement is met. The
permissive declaration at that time
presupposes that Makati must still meet the
constitutional requirements before it can
have another congressional district.
• The ponencia likewise misinterprets Bagabuyo v.
Comelec. The ponencia spliced that portion of the
decision in Bagabuyo which it cited to suit its
argument. Thus the ponencia quotes: ….The
Constitution, however, does not require
mathematical exactitude or rigid equality as a
standard in gauging equality of representation…
o It omitted that portion which speci􀁁ed the
respective total population of the two
districts as above 250,000
• The two legislative districts of Cagayan de Oro subject
of Bagabuyo met the minimum population
requirement at the time of reappportionment. The
ponencia's construal of the disparity in population
sizes of the districts involved in Bagabuyo clearly
differs from the disparity of population in the present
case.
• R.A. 9716 created one legislative district by
recon􀁁guring the first and second districts. It did not,
however, touch the third and fourth districts which,
when properly reapportioned, can easily form
another district.
• The resulting population distribution in the present
case violates theuniform and progressive ratio
prescribed in the Constitution.
ATONG V PAGLAUM v COMELEC
Congress- Party-list representatives| Carpio| Bitancor &
Codamon
Recit Summary:
1. 54 Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition filed by 52
party-list groups and organizations assailing the
Resolution of the COMELEC disqualifying them for
participating in the May 13, 2013 elections either by
denial of their petitions for registration under the party-
list system or cancellation of their registration and
accreditation as party-list organizations.
2. The Court held that COMELEC did not commit grave abuse
of discretion in following the prevailing decisions of this
Court.
3. However, new parameters were adopted by the Court in
this decision, thereby abandoning the rulings applied by
the COMELEC. The petitions were remanded to the
COMELEC to determine who are qualified to register
under the party-list system, and who may participate in
the coming May 13, 2013 party-list elections under these
new parameters. (see new parameters under the second
issue)
Facts:
• Approximately 280 groups and organizations registered
and manifested their desire to participate in the May 13,
2013 party-list elections.
• December 5, 2012 (Resolution)- COMELEC granted Partido
ng Bayan ng Bida (PBB) registration and accreditation as a
political party in NCR
• PBB was denied participation in the May 13, 2013 party-
list elections because
o PBB does not represent any “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector;
o It failed to apply for registration as a party-list
group
o It failed to establish its track record as an
organization that seeks to uplift the lives of the
“marginalized and underrepresented.
• COMELEC excluded the names of 13 petitioners (ASIN,
Manila Teachers, ALA-EH, 1AAAP, AKIN, AAB, AI, ALONA,
ALAM, KALIKASAN, GUARDJAN, PPP, and PBB) in the
printing of the official ballot for the party-list elections.
• COMELEC En Banc scheduled summary evidentiary
hearings to determine whether the groups and
organizations have continually complied with the
requirements of R.A. 7041 and Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. COMELEC
• COMELEC disqualified 39 petitioners (see original case for
the party-lists and grounds). These petitioners were able
to secure a mandatory injunction from this court, directing
 RA 7941 NEW PARAMETERS
the COMELEC to include their names in the printing of the d. The present petitions are therefore remanded to the
official ballot for the party-list elections. COMELEC. The following parameters shall be adhered to
• Petitioners prayed for the issuance of a TRO and/or writ in determining who may participate in the coming May
of preliminary injunction 2013 elections.
• Court issued Status Quo Ante Orders in all petitions. This 1. Three different groups may participate in the
Decision governs only the 54 consolidated petitions that party-list system:
were granted Status Quo Ante Orders. (1) national parties or organizations,
(2) regional parties or organizations,
Issues: (3) sectoral parties or organizations.
1. Whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of must be 2. National parties or organizations and regional
bona-fide parties or organizations do not need to organize
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
members of along sectoral lines and do not need to represent
disqualifying petitioners from participating in the 13 May 2013 such parties or
party-list elections, either by denial of their new petitions for organizations. any "marginalized and underrepresented"
registration under the party-list system, or by cancellation of sector.
their existing registration 3. Political parties can participate in party-list
Regional party elections provided they register under the party-
and accreditation as party-list organizations implies the party list system and do not field candidates in
whose area legislative district elections. A political party,
a. NO.
operation is limited
b. The Court cannot fault the COMELEC for following and so their whether major or not, that fields candidates in
prevailing jurisprudence in disqualifying petitioners. activities are legislative district elections can participate in
In following such, the COMELEC could not have restricted to only a party-list elections only through its sectoral wing
committed grave abuse of discretion. few states that can separately register under the party-list
c. Petitioners may have been disqualified: system. The sectoral wing is by itself an
1. because as political or regional parties, they are national party independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
not organized along sectoral lines and do not refers to a political political party through a coalition.
party is a registered4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be
represent the “marginalized and
party that operates
underrepresented.” in more than four
"marginalized and underrepresented" or lacking
2. Nominees who do not belong to the sectors they states of the in "well-defined political constituencies." It is
represent country and their enough that their principal advocacy pertains to
3. One or more of its nominees failed to qualify, area of operation the special interest and concerns of their sector.
even if the party has at least one remaining extends over the The sectors that are "marginalized and
qualified nominees. entire country underrepresented" include labor, peasant,
d. These disqualifications are contrary to the 1987 fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
Constitution and R.A. 7941. communities, handicapped, veterans, and
overseas workers. The sectors that lack "well-
2. Whether or not the criteria for participating in the party-list defined political constituencies" include
system laid down in Ang Bagong Bayani and Barangay professionals, the elderly, women, and the
Association for National Advancement and Transparency v. youth.
Commission on Elections (BANAT) should be applied by the 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or
COMELEC in the coming 13 May 2013 party-list elections. organizations that represent the "marginalized
a. No. and underrepresented" must belong to the
b. In disqualifying petitioners, the COMELEC used the criteria "marginalized and underrepresented" sector
prescribed in Ang Bagong Bayani and BANAT. Ang Bagong they represent.
Bayani laid down the guidelines for qualifying those who Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral
desire to participate in the party-list system: parties or organizations that lack "well-defined
- First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition political constituencies" must belong to the
must represent the marginalized and underrepresented sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
groups identified in parties or organizations that represent the
Section 5 of RA 7941. . . . "marginalized and underrepresented," or that
- Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization represent those who lack "well-defined
must represent marginalized and underrepresented TRACK political constituencies," either must belong to
sectors; so also must its RECORD their respective sectors, or must have a track
nominees. . . . . record of advocacy for their respective
c. For the 13 May 2013 party-list elections, new parameters sectors. The nominees of national and regional
will be imposed and mandated based on the party-list parties or organizations must be bona-fide
system actually envisioned and authorized under the 1987 members of such parties or
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941. organizations.
 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of
their nominees are disqualified, provided that
they have at least one nominee who remains
qualified.
SC Ruling:
WHEREFORE, all the present 54 petitions are GRANTED.
The 13 petitions which have been granted Status Quo Ante
Orders but without mandatory injunction to include the names
of petitioners in the printing of ballots, are remanded to the
COMELEC only for determination w/n petitioners are qualified
to register under the party-list system, under the parameters
prescribed in this Decision, but they shall not participate in the
May 13, 2013 party-list elections.
The 41 petitions, which have been granted mandatory
injunctions to include the names of petitioners in the printing
of ballots, are remanded to the COMELEC for determination
w/n are qualified to register under the party-list system and to
participate in the May 13 2013 party-list elections, under the
parameters prescribed in this Decision.
See pertinent provisions:
Section 5, Article VI, 1987 Constitution
Section 7-8, Article IX-C, 1987 Constitution
Separate Opinions:
A. Sereno, C.J., concurring and dissenting
1. The party-list system is primarily a tool for social
justice.
• What the ponencia fails to appreciate is that
the party-list system under the 1987
Constitution and the party-list law or RA
7941 is not about mere political plurality, but
plurality with a heart for the poor and
disadvantaged.
• The heart of the 1987 Constitution is the
Article on Social Justice – Hon. Cecilia Munos
Palma of 1986 Code Commission.
2. Under the second parameter, "[n]ational parties or
organizations and regional parties or organizations do
not need to organize along sectoral lines and do not
need to represent any "marginalized and
underrepresented" sector." In a nutshell, the
ponencia interprets "marginalized and
underrepresented" in Section 2 of RA 7941 to qualify
only sectoral parties or organizations, and not
national and regional parties or organizations. Dissent
due to the following reasons:
• The standard of "marginalized and
underrepresented" under Section 2 must be
deemed to qualify national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations.
• It is apparent that "marginalized and
underrepresented" qualifies "sectors",
"organizations" and "parties"
• Even assuming that it is not so apparent, in
terms of statutory construction, when the
law can be interpreted in more ways than
one, an interpretation that favors the
underprivileged must be favored.
• Deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission show that the party-list system
is a countervailing means for the weaker
segments of our society to overcome the
preponderant advantages of the more
entrenched and well-established political
parties.
3. Fourth parameter: National, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations must both represent the
"marginalized and underrepresented" and lack "well-
defined political constituencies". Dissent because:
• They are cumulative requirements, not
alternative. Thus, sectoral parties and
organizations intending to run in the party-
list elections must meet both.
• the exact content of what it means to be
“marginalized and underrepresented” and
to “lack a well-defined constituency” should
be left to the COMELEC because these are
evolving concepts.
4. I propose the view that the disqualification of a party-
list group due to the disqualification of its nominee is
only reasonable if based on material
misrepresentations regarding the nominee's
qualifications. Otherwise, the disqualification of a
nominee should not disqualify the party-list group
provided that: (1) it meets Guideline
Nos. 1-5 of Ang Bagong Bayani (alternately, on the
basis of the new parameters set in the ponencia, that
they validly qualify as national, regional or sectoral
party-list group); and (2) one of its top three (3)
nominees remains qualified.
5. Only nine of the petitions should be remanded.
• The remand should only pertain to those
party-list groups whose registration was
cancelled on the basis of applying the
standard of "marginalized and
underrepresented" and the qualification of
nominees wherein the "new parameters"
apply.
6. The COMELEC did not violate Section 3, Article IX-C of
the Constitution.
• Section 3 only applies when the COMELEC is
exercising its quasi-judicial powers which
 can be found in Section 2 (2) of the same
article. However, since the conduct of
automatic review and summary evidentiary
hearing is an exercise of COMELEC's
administrative powers under Section 2 (5),
the prior motion for reconsideration in
Section 3 is not required.
7. In view of the foregoing, I vote to REMAND only the
following cases: ARARO, AIPRA, AT, A BLESSED, ALIM,
BUTIL, AKO BAHAY, AKIN, and 1-UTAK. The Petitions
of all the other Petitioners should be dismissed.
B. Brion, J., concurring
1. The Party-list System of Elections under the
constitution and RA 7941: Revisiting Ang Bagong
Bayani and its errors
a. Its main mistake is its erroneous reading of
the constitutional intent, based on
statements taken out of context. This led to
a bias for social justice view.
b. The aim or objective of the Party-list system
based on Section 5, Article VI of the
Constitution is principally to reform the then
existing electoral system, not to provide
social justice mechanism.
c. The objective of RA 7941 is also electoral
reform expressed as promotion of
proportional representation in the election
of representatives under a full, free and
open party system.
2. Party Participation under the Party-list system
a. A combined reading of Section 2 and Section
3 or RA 7941 shows that the status of being
"marginalized and underrepresented" is not
limited merely to sectors, particularly to
those enumerated in Section 5 of the law.
The law itself recognizes that the same
status can apply as well to "political parties."
b. political parties are not only "not excluded"
from the party-list system; they are, in fact,
expressly allowed by law to participate. This
participation is not impaired by any
"marginalized and underrepresented"
limitation understood in the Ang Bagong
Bayani sense.
c. On COMELEC's refusal and cancellation of
registration or accreditation of parties based
on Section 6 of RA No. 7941, I maintain the
view that essential distinctions exist
between the parties and their nominees that
cannot
be disregarded.
d. The grounds for removal and/or cancellation
of Registration only pertains to the party
itself.
e. The nominee in the party-list system is
effectively merely an agent of the party.
C. Reyes (concurring and dissenting):
PROCEDURAL
a. I agree with the majority that the action of the
COMELEC En Banc was well within its authority.
b. The COMELEC’s determination as to whether a
party is a political party entitled to registration is
an exercise of its constitutional power of
administering the laws relative to the conduct of
elections. The same principle applies in the
registration of party-list groups, organizations
and coalitions.
c. COMELEC cannot be estopped from cancelling
existing registration and/or accreditation in
case the concerned party-list group or
organization failed to maintain its
qualifications.
d. COMELEC cannot be precluded from reviewing
pending and existing registration and/or
accreditation of party-list groups, organizations
and coalitions on the ground of res judicata.
i. The doctrine of res judicata applies
only to judicial or quasi-judicial
proceedings, not to the exercise of
administrative powers.
e. Procedural due process was properly observed.
Section 6 of RA 7941 only commands the
minimum requirements of due notice and
hearing to satisfy procedural due process in the
refusal and/or cancellation of a party,
organization or coalition’s registration under the
party-list system.
SUBSTANTIVE
f. Contrary to the view of the majority, it is my
staunch position that the party-list system, is
primarily intended to benefit the marginalized
and underrepresented.
g. The party-list system is a social justice tool
designed to give more law to the great masses of
our people who have less in life and to enable
theme to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. It is not simply a mechanism for
electoral reform.
h. The term “marginalized and underrepresented”
effectively limits the party-list system to sectors
which directly need support and
representation. (Section 2, RA 7941)
i. A mere association of individuals espousing
shared “beliefs: and “advocacies” cannot qualify
as a marginalized and underrepresented sector.
j. However, I agree with the view of the majority
that it is unjustified to absolutely disqualify from
the party-list system the major political parties
solely by reason of their classification as such.
Nonetheless, the privilege to be accorded to
them shall not be without reasonable
restrictions.
 k. The move to open the party-list system free-for
all will create a dangerous precedent as it will
open the doors even to illegitimate
organizations.
l. ON NOMINEES
i. Two types of nominees:
1. One who actually shares the
attribute or characteristic
which makes the sector
marginalized or
underrepresented
2. An advocate or one who is
genuinely and actively
promoting the causes of the
sector he wishes to represent.
ii. The COMELEC disqualified some party-
list groups on the ground that one or
some of its nominees are disqualified. I
agree with he majority that the
construction made by the COMELEC is
misplaced.
iii. The provision did not intend to hold the
group liable for violation of election
laws for such a shortcoming and to
penalize the same with
disqualification. This could not have
been the intention of the law.
iv. The party-list group must be treated
separate and distinct from its
nominees.
v. The COMELEC did intrude in the party-
list groups’ freedom to choose their
nominees when it disqualified some of
them on the ground that their nominees
are disqualified.
m. RULING
i. I deem it unnecessary to remand ALL the
petitions to the COMELEC.
ii. I vote instead to REMAND only the
petitions of the party-list groups whose
remaining ground for
denial/cancellation of registration
involves the new guideline on the
qualifications of a party’s nominees.
D. LEONEN (concurring and dissenting):
• I agree with the ponencia in substance, but dissent in
so far as there is no finding of grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
• I also agree that they need not be organized sectorally
and/or represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented”
• There is no constitutional requirement that all those
who participate in the party list system must
represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups as mentioned in RA 7941.
• This law is unconstitutional in so far as it makes a
requirement that it is not supported by the plain text
of the Constitution.
• I vote for the grant of the Petitions and the
nullification of COMELEC Resolution No 9513, s.
August 2, 2012.
• Only one-half of the seats within that period is
reserved to the "sectors" that were enumerated,
clearly implying that there are other kinds of party list
groups other than those who are sectoral. ( Sec. 5(2),
Article VI, 1987 Constitution)
• To require that all the seats for party list
representatives remain sectoral in one form or the
other is clearly and patently unconstitutional. It is not
supported by the text.
• “Marginalized and underrepresented” is ambiguous.
• What is plain is that the COMELEC declared ex
cathedra sans any standard what were the
"marginalized and underrepresented sectors." This,
in my opinion, constitutes grave abuse of discretion
on the part of the COMELEC.
• SEE ORIGINAL FOR J. LEONEN’S PROPOSED
BENCHMARKS!
• Jurisdiction to disqualify is clearly reposed on the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (Sec. 17,
Article VI, 1987 Constitution).
• VOTE:
o Grant petitions and nullify COMELEC
Resolution No. 9315
o Remand cases to COMELEC for proper
proceedings in line with our Decision
Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. COMELEC
Party-list Representatives | G.R. Nos. 179271 & 179295| April
21, 2009 | Carpio, J. | by Concha, A.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• In July and August 2007, the COMELEC, sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers (NBC), made a partial
proclamation through NBC Resolution No. 07-60 of the 13
winners in the party-list elections which was held in May
2007.
• Thereafter, COMELEC promulgated NBC Resolution No.
07-72 which declared the additional seats allocated to the
appropriate parties.
• In proclaiming the winners and apportioning their seats,
the COMELEC considered the following rules:
 WINNERS AND SEATS FORMULA
1. In the lower house, 80% shall comprise the seats
for legislative districts, while the remaining 20% shall
come from party-list representatives (Sec. 5, Article
VI, 1987 Constitution);
2. Pursuant to Sec. 11(b) of R.A. 7941 or the Party-List
System Act, a party-list which garners at least 2% of
the total votes cast in the party-list elections shall be
entitled to one seat;
3. If a party-list garners at least 4% of the number of
total votes, then it is entitled to 2 seats; if it garners
at least 6%, then it is entitled to 3 seats – this is
pursuant to the 2-4-6 rule or the Panganiban
Formula from the case of Veterans Federation Party
vs COMELEC.
• In determining the additional seats for the
“first party” – the correct formula is
yun nasa No. of votes of first party/Total votes for
top ng party-list system = Proportion of votes of
tanking first party relative to total votes for party-
list system
• For additional seats of other qualified
parties:
Additional seats for concerned party = No.
of voters of concerned party/No. of votes of
first party x No. of additional seats allocated
to first party
4. In no way shall a party be given more than three
seats even if it garners more than 6% of the votes cast
for the party-list election (3 seat cap rule, same case).
• The Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT), a party-list candidate, questioned
the proclamation as well as the formula being used
through a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of Party-
List Representatives Provided by the Constitution.
• BANAT averred that:
o the 2% threshold is invalid;
o Sec. 11 of RA 7941 is void because its provision
that a party-list, to qualify for a congressional
seat, must garner at least 2% of the votes cast in
the party-list election, is not supported by the
Constitution. Further, the 2% rule creates a
mathematical impossibility to meet the 20%
party-list seat prescribed by the Constitution.
• BANAT also questions if the 20% rule is a mere ceiling or is
it mandatory. If it is mandatory, then with the 2%
qualifying vote, there would be instances when it would
be impossible to fill the prescribed 20% share of party-lists
in the lower house. BANAT also proposes a new
computation: here case, it is not mandatory. So what??
o FIRST INTERPRETATION (result: 44 party-list
seats)
o Initially, all party-list groups shall be given the
number of seats corresponding to every 2% votes
they received
o the additional seats shall be allocated in
accordance with Sec. 12 of RA 7941, IN
PROPORTION TO THE PERCENTAGE OF VOTES
OBTAINED BY EACH PARTY-LIST GROUP IN
RELATION TO THE TOTAL NATIONWIDE VOTES
CAST IN PARTY-LIST ELECTION, after deducting
the corresponding votes of those which were
allocated seats under the 2% threshold rule.
o SECOND INTERPRETATION (result: 34 party-list
seats)
o COMELEC shall tally votes for the parties, rank
them and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of
votes obtained by party as against the total
nationwide votes cast for party-list system
(making the votes of a party-list with a median
percentage of votes as the divisor in computing
the allocation of seats)
• COMELEC, through its NBC Resolution No. 07-041 denied
the petition.
• Thus, this petition for certiorari and mandamus. Arts
Business and Science Professionals (ABC), Aangat Tayo
(AT), and Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the
Philippines, Inc. (Senior Citizens) intervened.
• On the other hand, Bayan Muna, Abono, and Advocacy for
Teacher Empowerment Through Action, Cooperation and
Harmony Towards Educational Reforms (A Teacher),
party-list candidates, filed a Petition for certiorari and
mandamus and assailed NBC Resolution No. 07-60, also:
13 winners in the party-list elections May 2007
o questioned the validity of the 3-seat rule
(Section 11(a) of RA 7941)
o whether or not major political parties are
allowed to participate in the party-list elections
or is the said elections limited to sectoral parties.
• These cases were consolidated.
ISSUES & RATIO
• PH style party-list election has at least 4 inviolable
parameters as clearly stated in Veterans case:
o 20% allocation – combined number of all party-
list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total
membership of the House of Representatives,
including those elected under the party-list
 o 2% threshold – only those parties garnering a
minimum of 2% of total valid votes cast for the
party-list system are “qualified” to have a seat in
the House of Representatives
o 3-seat limit – each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is
entitled to a maximum of 3 seats; one
“qualifying”, and 2 additional seats
o Proportional representation – additional seats
which a qualified party is entitled to shall be
computed “in proportion to the total number of
voters”
1. How is the 80-20 rule observed in apportioning the seats in
the lower house?
• Section 5(1), Article VI of Constitution: “House of
Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250
members, unless otherwise fixed by law”
• Section 5(2), Article VI of Constitution: party-list
representatives shall constitute 20% of the total number
of representatives including those under the party-list.
• Originally, the 1987 Constitution provides that there shall
be not more than 250 members of the lower house. Using
the 80-20 rule, 200 of that will be from legislative districts,
and 50 would be from party-list representatives.
• However, the Constitution also allowed Congress to fix the
number of the membership of the lower house as in fact,
it can create additional legislative districts as it may deem
appropriate.
• As can be seen in the May 2007 elections, there were 220
district representatives, hence applying the 80-20 rule,
there should be 55 seats allotted for party-list
representatives.
Formula:
(Current Number of Legislative District Representatives ÷ 0.80)
x (0.20) = Number of Seats Available to Party-List
Representatives
Hence,
(220 ÷ 0.80) x (0.20) = 55
2.Whether or not the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives mandatory or a mere ceiling. – CEILING
• The 20% allocation for party-list representatives is merely
a ceiling – meaning, the number of party-list
representatives shall not exceed 20% of the total number
of the members of the lower house. However, it is not
mandatory that the 20% shall be filled.
3. Whether or not the 2% threshold used in computing the
allocation of additional seats is valid. – NO.
• Section 11(a) of RA 7941 prescribes the ranking of the
participating parties from the highest to the lowest based
on number of votes they garnered during the election
• Section 11(b) of RA 7941 GUARANTEES parties,
organizations and coalitions who receive 2% total votes
cast for party-list system to 1 seat.
• 2nd clause of Section 11 (b) of RA 7941 provides that those
garnering more than 2% of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes.
• Veterans: proportion to votes of 1st party
• Section 11(b) of RA 7941 is unconstitutional. The 2%
threshold creates a mathematical impossibility to attain
the ideal 80-20 apportionment. The Supreme Court
explained:
• There are 55 available party-list seats. Suppose there are
50 million votes cast for the 100 participants in the party-
list elections. A party that has 2% of the votes cast, or one
million votes, gets a guaranteed seat. Let us further
assume that the first 50 parties all get one million votes.
Only 50 parties get a seat despite the availability of 55
seats. Because of the operation of the two percent
threshold, this situation will repeat itself even if we
increase the available party-list seats to 60 seats and even
if we increase the votes cast to 100 million. Thus, even if
the maximum number of parties get two percent of the
votes for every party, it is always impossible for the
number of occupied party-list seats to exceed 50 seats as
long as the two percent threshold is present.
• It is therefore clear that the 2% threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of
Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution and prevents
the attainment of “the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of
Representatives.”
• (NOTE: 2% threshold GUARANTEES seat, not qualifies!)
4. Whether or not the 3-seat cap rule (3 Seat Limit Rule) is
valid. YES.
• The 3-seat limit rule is valid. This is one way to ensure that
no one party shall dominate the party-list system.
4. How are party-list seats allocated?
• In determining the allocation of seats for party-list
representatives, SC laid down rules:
1. The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be
ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the
number of votes they garnered during the elections.
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at
least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-
list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.
3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according
to the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of
votes until all the additional seats are allocated.
4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to
not more than three (3) seats.
• In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats
shall no longer be included because they have already
been allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter.
• Thus, the remaining available seats for allocation as
“additional seats” are the maximum seats reserved under
the Party List System less the guaranteed seats.
• Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of a
provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.
• In short, there shall be 2 rounds in determining the
allocation of the seats. In the first round, all party-lists
which garnered at least 2% of the votes cast (called
the two-percenters) are given their one seat each. The
total number of seats given to these two-percenters are
then deducted from the total available seats for party-
lists.
• In this case, 17 party-lists were able to garner 2% each.
There are a total 55 seats available for party-lists hence,
55-17 = 38 remaining seats.
1. 1 seat for all percenters
• The number of remaining seats, in this case 38, shall be 2. additional seats for inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
used in the second round, particularly, in determining, 2 percenters
first, the additional seats for the two-percenters, and 3. extra seats for others common good
second, in determining seats for the party-lists that did
not garner at least 2% of the votes cast, and in the
process filling up the 20% allocation for party-list
representatives.
• The 3-seat limit rule shall still be observed.
5. Whether or not major political parties are allowed to
participate in the party-list elections. – NO.
• By a vote of 8-7, the Supreme Court continued to disallow
major political parties from participating in the party-list
elections.
• Although there is no prohibition either from the
Constitution or from RA 7941 against major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections as the
word “party” was not qualified and that even the framers
of the Constitution in their deliberations deliberately
allowed major political parties to participate in the party-
list elections provided that they establish a sectoral wing
which represents the marginalized (indirect participation).
• SC decided to continue the ruling in Veterans disallowing
major political parties from participating in party-list
elections, directly or indirectly.
• Those who voted to continue disallowing major political
parties from the party-list elections joined CJ Puno in his
separate opinion - major political parties cannot
participate in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
RULING: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. 2% threshold –
unconstitutional; major political parties disallowed from
participating in party-list elections.
SEPARATE OPINIONS
PUNO, C.J. concurring and dissenting
• Rationale for existence of party-list: history has borne
witness to the struggle of the faceless masses to find their
voice
o benefit the marginalized and underrepresented
o social justice vehicle
• Limiting party-list system to marginalized, excluding major
pol parties from participating in the election of their
representatives is aligned with the constitutional mandate
to:
o reduce social, economic, and political
equitably diffusing wealth and pol power for the
o right of the people and their organizations to
effective and reasonable participation at all
levels of social, political, and economic decision-
making
o right of women to opportunities that will
enhance their welfare and enable them to realize
their full potential in the service of the nation
o right of labor to participate in policy and
decision-making processes affecting their rights
and benefits and in keeping with its role as a
primary social economic force
o right of teachers to professional advancement
 o rights of indigenous cultural communities to the
consideration of their cultures, traditions and
institutions in the formulation of national plans
and policies, and the indispensable role of the
private sector in national economy
• In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how
the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups
can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who
have the machinery to dominate our political
institutions.
• If we allow major political parties to participate in the
party-list system electoral process, we will surely
suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their
sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the
Constitution.
NACHURA, J., concurring
• Support the proposition that the inflexible 2% threshold
vote required for entitlement by a party-list group to a
seat in House of Representatives in RA 7941 is
unconstitutional.
• Party-list provision in Constitution intends to open the
system of representation by allowing different sectors,
FACTS OF THE CASE:
parties, organizations and coalitions to win a legislative
seat – diversifies membership in legislature and “gives
genuine power to the people”
• ON 2% threshold – maximum number of party-list seats in
House of Representatives will not exceed 50.
o inconsistent with steady increase in party-list
seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation
of additional legislative districts, and foreseeable
growth of party-list groups
• ON minimum vote requirement: Congress shall have
effected an acceptable amendment to the minimum vote
requirement – proportional representation – and adopt a
gradually regressive threshold vote requirement,
inversely proportional to the increase in the number of
party-list seats.
o Thus, minimum vote requirement will gradually
lessen as the number of party-list seats increases.
Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC
Party List Representatives | G.R. No. 190582 April 8, 2010 | Del
Castillo, J. | By Emma Guanco and John Lansangan
IMPORTANT NOTES:
1. Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs). It
was incorporated in 2003.
2. Ang Ladlad’s petition, Paragraph 6F: 'Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians
who are already of age.'
3. Ang Ladlad’s petition, Paragraph 24: 'In 2007, Men
Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were
estimated as 670,000.’
4. Article 695, CC defines nuisance as 'Any act, omission,
establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which…(3) shocks, defies; or disregards
decency or morality…
5. Article 1306, CC: 'The contracting parties may
establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided
they are not contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy.’
6. Article 1409, CC: 'Contracts whose cause, object or
purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order or public policy' are inexistent and void
from the beginning.’
7. Article 201, RPC imposes the penalty of prision mayor
upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim
doctrines openly contrary to public morals."
1. The case at hand is a petition for certiorari under rule
65 of the RoC with an application for writ of
preliminary mandatory injuction filed by Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) stemming from 2 assailed
resolutions of the COMELEC.
2. The case is rooted in COMELEC’s refusal to accredit
Ang Ladlad as a party-list organization under R.A. No.
7941 (Party-List System Act).
3. 2006. Ang Ladlad was denied accreditation on the
ground that it had no substantial membership base.
4. Ang Ladlad filed another petition for registration
before the COMELEC in Aug 17, 2009.
a. Ang Ladlad argues that the LGBT community
is a marginalized and under-represented
sector.
i. Those disadvantaged due to sexual
orientation and gender identity;
victims of exclusion, discrimination,
and violence; forced to hide their
orientation due to societal
attitudes.
ii. Ang Ladlad also defined sexual
orientation as “a person's capacity
for profound emotional, affectional
and sexual attraction to, and
intimate and sexual relations with,
individuals of a different gender, of
the same gender, or more than one
gender.”
 b. Ang Ladlad said that it complied with the 8-
point guidelines laid out in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC.
c. Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership
base consisting of individual members and
organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance.
5. COMELEC dismissed the petition on Nov 11, 2009 on
moral grounds.
6. COMELEC said that Ang Ladlad’s definition of the
LGBT sector shows that they tolerate immorality
which offends religious beliefs and that it goes against
morals and good customs.
a. COMELEC cites Romans 1:26, 27 and
multiple verses from the Koran as support.
b. It brought up its Law Department’s comment
dated in which it also referred to biblical
verses and also said that Ang Ladlad
tolerates sexual immorality as seen from
multiple paragraphs (see impt. notes) in its
petition.
i. Law Department also cited Articles
695, 1306, 1409 of the CC,
specifically those pertaining to
morals and good customs.
c. COMELEC, on the basis of safeguarding the
morality of the Filipino community, also
cited Article 201 (Immoral doctrines,
obscene publications and exhibitions, and
indecent shows) of the RPC.
7. COMELEC also said that aside from advocating
immoral doctrines and alluding to the
aforementioned articles, Ang Ladlad should also be
denied accreditation for not being truthful when it
said that "its nominees/party-list representatives
have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules,
or regulations relating to the elections."
8. COMELEC also said that should the petition be
granted, the youth would be exposed to an
environment contrary to the teachings of their faith.
a. State's avowed duty under Section 13,
Article II of the Constitution to protect our
youth from moral and spiritual degradation.
9. Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration which ended in a
3-3 tie between the commissioners until the
chairman ruled in favor to uphold the first assailed
resolution.
10. Basing it on Section 2 of R.A. No. 7941, the chairman,
in his separate opinion expressed that even if Ang
Ladlad is able to prove its marginalization, it cannot
be said that the party’s expressed sexual orientations
per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
a. “[T]he party-list system is a tool for the
realization of aspirations of marginalized
individuals whose interests are also the
nation's — only that their interests have not
been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until
the time comes when Ladlad is able to
justify that having mixed sexual
orientations and transgender identities is
beneficial to the nation, its application for
accreditation under the party-list system
will remain just that.”
11. The chairman also mentions how the United States
does not recognize members of the LGBT Community
as a special class of individuals and that
homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected
fundamental right.
a. Thus, even if society’s understanding and
acceptance of LGBT is raised, the
constituents at hand are still males and
females and they will remain either male or
female protected by the same Bill of Rights
that applies to all citizens alike.
12. The chairman also said that what are being adopted
as moral parameters and precepts are generally
accepted public morals.
a. The chairman states how more than 500
years of Muslim and Christian cannot be
ignored.
13. The chairman also mentioned how the
aforementioned has also become part of the law of
the land.
a. He reiterates the paragraphs in Ang Ladlad’s
petition and deems them unlawful as per the
previously mentioned articles.
14. Ang Ladlad filed the herein petition on Jan 4, 2010
praying that the Court annul the assailed resolutions
and direct the COMELEC to grant their application
for accreditation.
a. They also sought the issuance ex parte of a
preliminary mandatory injunction against
the COMELEC, which had previously
announced that it would begin printing the
final ballots for the May 2010 elections by
Jan 25, 2010.
15. SC ordered OSG on Jan 6 to file its Comment before
Jan 11 but OSG filed for a Motion for Extension
instead until Jan 16.
16. OSG later filed a Comment in support of petitioner.
17. SC issues a temporary restraining order on the
implementation of the assailed resolutions and
required COMELEC to file its own Comment instead
so that it may fully ventilate its position.
a. COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed
one on Feb 2.
18. Commission on Human Rights filed a Motion to
Intervene or to appear as Amicus Curiae on Jan 13 and
was granted on Jan 19.
a. CHR said that the denial of the petition on
moral grounds violated the standards and
principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and
the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR).
 b. On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr.
also filed his Motion to Intervene which
motion was granted on February 2, 2010
The Parties Arguments
19. Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation on
religious dogma violated the constitutional
guarantees against the establishment of religion.
a. They also claimed that the assailed
resolutions contravened its constitutional
rights to privacy, freedom of speech and
assembly, and equal protection of laws, as
well as constituted violations of the
Philippines' international obligations against
discrimination based on sexual orientation.
20. The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and
argued that the COMELEC erred in denying
petitioner's application for registration since there
was no basis for COMELEC's allegations of immorality
a. OSG also said that LGBTs have their own
special interests and concerns which should
have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classification.
b. OSG finds that there were no restrictions,
however, on the aforementioned freedom
of speech, expression, and assembly.
21. COMELEC, in its comment, reiterated that petitioner
does not have a concrete and genuine national
political agenda to benefit the nation and that the
petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds.
a. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated
by the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941 (Party-
List System Act), and that petitioner made
untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence contrary to
actual verification reports by COMELEC's
field personnel.
22. SC grants the petition.
ISSUE:
1. W/N there has been misrepresentation on Ang
Ladlad’s part and if they complied with the necessary
requirements for accreditation.
2. W/N COMELEC violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion.
3. W/N COMELEC was proper in its assertion of public
morals as grounds to deny Ang Ladlad’s accreditation.
4. W/N there has been a violation of the equal
protection clause pertaining to Ang Ladlad and its
constituents.
5. W/N there has been a violation of Ang Ladlad’s
freedom of expression and association.
RULING:
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and
R.A. No. 7941.
1. COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application on the
ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in
the Constitution and R.A. No. 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.
a. Enumeration: labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women,
youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
b. COMELEC is mistaken in understanding that
SC’s ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani (see
#4.a.ii.c. of facts) stands for the proposition
that only those sectors specifically
enumerated in the law or related to said
sectors may be registered under the party-
list system.
i. The crucial element is not whether
a sector is specifically enumerated,
but whether a particular
organization complies with the
requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.
2. COMELEC argued that Ang Ladlad made untruthful
statements when it alleged that it had nationwide
existence through its members and affiliate
organizations.
a. This is a new argument absent from the
COMELEC’s denial of accreditation in the
assailed resolutions as they previously only
stated that Ang Ladlad was "not being
truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have
not violated or failed to comply with laws,
rules, or regulations relating to the
elections."
b. SC finds this to be irregular, a belated
afterthought, a change in respondent’s
theory, and a violation of petitioner’s right to
procedural due process.
3. SC finds that there has been no misrepresentation.
Ang Ladlad’s initial petition shows that it never
claimed to exist in each province of the Philippines.
a. Ang Ladlad presented itself as a “national
LGBT umbrella organization”
i. Estimated to constitute at least
670,000 persons; that it had 16,100
affiliates and members around the
country, and 4,044 members in its
electronic discussion group.
ii. Affiliated with 34 other LGBT
networks found all over the country
(see case for extensive list).
b. COMELEC only searched for ANG LADLAD
LGBT or LADLAD LGBT and it’s no surprise
that it would not have any presence in any
other region. Petitioner does not even exist
 in Quezon City which is registered as its place
of business.
4. COMELEC’s moral objections and allegations of non-
existence aside, SC finds that Ang Ladlad complied
with the legal requirements for accreditation.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlad's
Petition for Registration
5. Article III, Section 5 of the Constitution says that "[n]o
law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof."
a. Refers to government neutrality in religious
matters and that reliance on religious
justification is inconsistent with this policy.
b. SC finds COMELEC to be in grave violation of
the non-establishment clause when it used
the Bible and Koran to justify the exclusion
of Ang Ladlad.
6. The legitimacy of the assailed resolutions should
depend on whether the COMELEC is able to justify its
rulings beyond religious doctrine.
a. Government cites Estrada v. Escritor (also
mentioned in Persons)
i. “In other words, government
action, including its proscription of
immorality as expressed in criminal
law like concubinage, must have a
secular purpose… Thus, although
the morality contemplated by laws
is secular, benevolent neutrality
could allow for accommodation of
morality based on religion,
provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.”
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
7. COMELEC contends that although their moral
condemnation of homosexuality and related conduct
is religion-based, it has long been transplanted into
generally accepted public morals.
a. SC finds that though the LGBT community
has been subjected to societal disapproval,
the Philippines does not criminalize
homosexual conduct.
i. Therefore, these "generally
accepted public morals" have not
been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law.
8. The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any
specific overt immoral act performed by Ang Ladlad.
Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a
finding by the COMELEC that the group's members
have committed or are committing immoral acts."
a. COMELEC has failed to explain what societal
ills are sought to be prevented by denying
Ang Ladlad’s admission into the party-list
system, or why special protection is required
for the youth.
9. SC finds COMELEC’s reference to violations of articles
in the RPC and CC to be flimsy or lacking.
a. Mere allegation of violation of laws is not
proof. A mere blanket invocation of public
morals cannot replace the institution of civil
or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
b. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on
purely moral grounds amounts more to a
statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further
any substantial public interest.
c. Respondent's blanket justifications give rise
to the inevitable conclusion that the
COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves
as a class, not because of any particular
morally reprehensible act.
d. It is this selective targeting that implicates
the equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
10. COMELEC suggests that majority of the Philippine
population views homosexual conduct as immoral
and unacceptable, hence there is sufficient reason for
the disqualification of Ang Ladlad.
a. On the contrary, Philippine electorate
expresses no belief.
i. No law exists to criminalize
homosexual behavior or
expressions or parties about
homosexual behavior.
b. Even if what COMELEC suggests is true, it is
still not a legitimate state interest that would
merit a rational basis review or lead to a
legislation that would benefit the nation.
11. SC says that laws of general application should apply
with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to
participate in the party-list system on the same basis
as other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
a. It disagrees, however, with the OSG's
position that homosexuals are a class in
themselves for the purposes of the equal
protection clause (see 20.a. of Facts).
i. SC is not prepared to single out
homosexuals as a separate class
meriting special or differentiated
treatment as it does not have
sufficient evidence to reach this
effect.
b. SC says that Ang Ladlad merely demanded
that it be recognized under the same basis as
all other groups similarly situated, and that
the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by
the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and Association
 12. Any restriction imposed on the freedom of expression and are entitled without any
and association must be proportionate to the discrimination to the equal
legitimate aim pursued. protection of the law. In this
a. With no compelling state interest, COMELEC respect, the law shall prohibit any
cannot interfere with speech for no better discrimination and guarantee to all
reason than promoting an approved persons equal and effective
message or discouraging a disfavored one. protection against discrimination
b. Homosexual conduct is not illegal in the on any ground such as race, colour,
Philippines. sex, language, religion, political or
i. It therefore follows that other opinion, national or social
expressions concerning one's origin, property, birth or other
homosexuality and the activity of status.
forming a political association that b. Non-discrimination requires that laws of
supports LGBT individuals are general application relating to elections be
protected. applied equally to all persons, regardless of
c. SC says that though people may be sexual orientation.
discomforted, LGBTs and their supporters
believe with equal fervor that relationships Final Judgment
between individuals of the same sex are 16. Petition is granted and the 2 assailed resolutions are
morally equivalent to heterosexual set aside. COMELEC is directed to grant Ang Ladlad’s
relationships and they are entitled to uphold application for party-list accreditation.
that view.
13. Referring to foreign jurisprudence, the Court said that
to justify the prohibition of certain expressions it
must be proven that it affords more than merely
trying to avoid discomfort which is usually attached to
unconventional or unpopular opinions.
a. A political group should not be hindered
solely because it seeks to publicly debate
controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines
concerned. [Senior Citizens Party List] v Comelec
i. Protection of the freedom of
association does not stand, Party List Representatives | G. R. 206844-45 July 23, 2013 |
however, if said group incites Leonardo-de Castro | R. Leal
violence or advocates for policies
incompatible with democracy.
14. SC also says that that there was a transgression of Recit Summary:
petitioner's fundamental rights in response to the
OSG’s argument that there has been no impediments
to or imposed upon the their freedom of expression
Comelec disqualified SENIOR CITIZENS as participants in the
or association of Ang Ladlad (see 20.bs of Facts).
May 2013 elections on the grounds that they’re term sharing
a. Ang Ladlad fulfilled all the necessary
agreement (Having one of their representatives resign as to let
requirements to participate in the party-list
another take his place) was unconstitutional and violative of
system but was barred by COMELEC.
Section 7, Rule 4 of COMELEC Resolution No. 9366
Non-Discrimination and International Law

15. SC upholds the nation’s international obligations to

"SEC. 7. Term sharing of nominees. — Filling of
protect and promote human rights.
vacancy as a result of term sharing agreement among
a. It recognizes the principle of non-
nominees of winning party-list groups/organizations shall not
discrimination as it relates to the right to
be allowed."
electoral participation as per the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) among other international The two petitioners (Datol Party & Arquiza Party) file for
agreements. Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Prayer for
i. Example; Article 26 of ICCPR: All the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and
persons are equal before the law Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or Status Quo Ante
Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and the Very Urgent
Petition for Certiorari (With Application for a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary Injunction) in G.R.
No. 206982 respectively. These assail the disqualification as
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, said that the Comelec resolution shouldn’t have
been retrospective, and that they were deprived of their rights
to due process.
The court finds the petitions meritorious
Facts of the case:
March 2007 - COMELEC accredited Senior Citizen as a party-list
organization. Senior Citizen then participated in the May 2007
elections, however failed to get the 2% total votes cast.
May 10, 2010 elections - SENIOR CITIZENS ranked second
among all the party-list candidates and was allocated two seats
in the House of Representatives. The first seat was occupied by
its first nominee, Rep. Arquiza, while the second was given to
its second nominee, David L. Kho (Rep. Kho).
December 8, 2011 - David Kho tendered his resignation letter
as representative which was followed by a board resolution of
Senior Citizen accepting such resignation in accordance with
the term-sharing agreement made between the nominees of
the party-list.
1. Godofredo V. Arquiza
2. David L. Kho
3. Francisco G. Datol, Jr. (was expelled from the group
due to some infighting)
4. Remedios D. Arquiza (was supposed to take over
Kho’s seat if his resignation was valid/accepted by
Comelec)
5. Linda Gaddi David
COMELEC did not recognize the resignation saying that it is
against public policy. The term of public officials cannot be
made subject to any agreement of private parties for public
office is not a commodity that can be shared, apportioned or
be made subject to any private agreement. COMELEC
resolved to cancel the registration of the Senior Citizens as
party-list.
December 11, 2012 - SC initially granted status quo ante orders
of Senior Citizens and directed COMELEC to include the name
of Senior Citizens in the printing of official ballots for the May
2013 elections. SC later ruled that the cancellation of
registration was in order – which leads to instant petitions
Main issues of the case:
WON the organization's disqualification and cancellation of its
registration and accreditation were effected in violation of its
right to due process. – YES
• Petitioners argue that they were not advised, before
or during the hearing regarding their disqualification,
that the issue of term sharing would be a basis for the
review of its registration and accreditation
• They alleged that they were not given the opportunity
to show that they complied with the parameters laid
down in Atong Paglaum (Prior case which discussed
rules and parameters regarding Party lists)
• Section 6 of Republic Act No. 7941 46 provides for the
procedure relative to the review of the registration of
party-list organizations, to wit:
o SEC. 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of
Registration. — The COMELEC may, motu
proprio or upon verified complaint of any
interested party, refuse or cancel, after due
notice and hearing, the registration of any
national, regional or sectoral party,
organization or coalition on any of the
following grounds: (not going to put the
grounds na, focus on the bold part)
o The appropriate due process standards that
apply to the COMELEC, as an administrative
or quasi-judicial tribunal, are those outlined
in the seminal case of
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations,
quoted below:
▪ (1) The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes
the right of the party interested or
affected to present his own case
and submit evidence in support
thereof. . . . .
• In its Comment 48 to the petitions, the COMELEC
countered that petitioners were actually given the
opportunity to present their side on the issue of the
term-sharing agreement during the hearing on April
18, 2012. 49 Said hearing was allegedly conducted to
determine petitioners' continuing compliance for
accreditation as a party-list organization.
 o Said hearing was not for the purpose of
discussing the resignation of Rep. Kho and
not how their term sharing agreement
would be grounds for disqualification.
WON the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed Omnibus Resolution, disqualifying and cancelling the
registration and accreditation of SENIOR CITIZENS solely on
account of its purported violation of the prohibition against
term-sharing. – YES
• Petitioners claim that the COMELEC resolution was
not to be applied retro actively but the court thinks
otherwise – statutes that are remedial – those that do
not create new or take away vested rights – could be
applied retroactively
o As the Constitution expressly states, a
'[P]ublic office is a public trust.' No one has
a vested right to any public office, much less
a vested right to an expectancy of holding a
public office."
• The term-sharing agreement among the nominees of
SENIOR CITIZENS, was not implemented. This fact was
manifested by the Arquiza Group even during the
April 18, 2012 hearing conducted by the COMELEC En
Banc in E.M. No. 12-040 wherein the Arquiza Group
manifested that it was withdrawing its petition for
confirmation and approval of Rep. Kho’s
replacement.
• Thereafter, in its Resolution dated June 27, 2012 in
E.M. No. 12-040, the COMELEC En Banc itself refused
to recognize the term-sharing agreement and the
tender of resignation of Rep. Kho. The COMELEC even
declared that no vacancy was created despite the
execution of the said agreement.
• Subsequently, there was also no indication that the
nominees of SENIOR CITIZENS still tried to implement,
much less succeeded in implementing, the term-
sharing agreement.
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby rules that:
(1) The Extremely Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With
Prayer for the Forthwith Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order [TRO] and/or
Status Quo Ante Order [SQAO]) in G.R. Nos. 206844-45 and
the Very Urgent Petition for Certiorari (With Application for
a Temporary Restraining Order and Writ of Preliminary
Injunction) in G.R. No. 206982 are GRANTED;
(2) The Omnibus Resolution dated May 10, 2013 of the
Commission on
Elections En Banc in SPP No. 12-157 (PLM) and SPP No. 12-191
(PLM) is REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines, Inc. is
concerned; and
(3) The Commission on Elections En Banc is ORDERED to
PROCLAIM the Coalition of Associations of Senior Citizens in
the Philippines, Inc. as one of the winning party-list
organizations during the May 13, 2013 elections with the
number of seats it may be entitled to based on the total
number of votes it garnered during the said elections.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
COCOFED v COMELEC – Party-list system in Congress
GR 207026 / August 6, 2013 / Brion / Jules
Petitioner: Philippine Coconut Producers Federation, Inc.
(COCOFED) is an organization and sectoral party whose
membership comes from the peasant sector, particularly the
coconut farmers and producers.
Recitation Summary: Facts #1, 3-4, 8-11, Issue-Ratio #1, Issue
Ratio #2 (7-11) explanations based on highlights, Ruling.
Facts:
1. May 29, 2012, COCOFED manifested with the COMELEC its
intent to participate in the party-list elections of May 13,
2013 and submitted the names of only two nominees –
Atty. Emerito S. Calderon (first nominee) and Atty.
Domingo P. Espina.
2. August 23, 2012, the COMELEC conducted a summary
hearing, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution No. 9513,5 to
 determine whether COCOFED, among several party-list
groups that filed manifestations of intent to participate in
the May 13, 2013 party-list elections, had continuously
complied with the legal requirements.
3. November 7, 2012, the COMELEC issued a resolution that
cancelled COCOFED’s registration and accreditation as a
party-list organization on several grounds. Notably, the
Concurring Opinion of Commissioner Christian Lim cited,
as additional ground, that since COCOFED submitted only
two nominees. (Section 8 of RA 7941 requires a list of not
less than five nominees).
4. December 4, 2012, COCOFED submitted the names of
Charles R. Avila, in substitution of Atty. Espina, as its
second nominee and Efren V. Villaseñor as its third
nominee.
5. COCOFED, among several others, questioned the
COMELEC’s cancellation of its registration and
accreditation before the SC, with a prayer for the issuance
of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.
6. By reason of the SC status quo ante order, COCOFED’s
name was included in the printing of the official ballots for
the May 13, 2013 elections.
7. April 2, 2013, the Court rendered its Decision in Atong
Paglaum v COMELEC: all present petitions are remanded
to the COMELEC. In determining who may participate in
the coming 13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list
elections, the COMELEC shall adhere to the following
parameters: 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations shall not be disqualified if some of their
nominees are disqualified, provided that they have at
least one nominee who remains qualified.
8. May 10, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution
maintaining cancellation of COCOFED’s registration and
accreditation for its failure to submit a list of not less than
five nominees.
9. On May 20, 2013, COCOFED filed a Manifestation with
Urgent Request to Admit Additional Nominees with the
COMELEC, Felino Gutierrez (4th) and Rodolfo de Asis (5th).
10. On May 24, 2013, the COMELEC issued a resolution
declaring the cancellation of COCOFED’s accreditation
final and executory.
11. COCOFED filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that the
COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in issuing the
assailed resolution, with prayer for TRO and/or status quo
ante order. They claim that the COMELEC did not comply
with the Directives of the SC in Atong Paglaum v
COMELEC.
12. With the petition for Certiorari, COCOFED hopes that the
SC will 1) annul the COMELEC assailed resolution, 2)
declare that COCOFED is still eligible to participate in
elections and 3) order the COMELEC to count and tally the
votes garndered by COCOFED.
13. Despite the issuance of the assailed resolution three days
before the elections, COCOFED remained in the ballot and
its votes were counted and tallied. As of 8:26:02 a.m. of
May 29, 2013, the official results showed that it only
received 80,397 votes or 0.36% of the total number of
votes cast for the party-list elections.
Issue #1: Has the issue been moot due to the May 2013
elections being finished already?
Held: No.
Ratio: Not only was COCOFED not allowed to participate in the
May 2013 elections, they are also not allowed to participate in
subsequent elections thereafter without need of undergoing
registration proceedings anew. Hence, even if the May 2013
elections are done, this case still has to be decided.
Issue #2: Did the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion in
cancelling COCOFED’s resolution and accreditation?
Held: No.
Ratio:
COCOFEDs arguments are as follows:
1. COMELEC violated its right to due process because the it
did not even conduct a summary hearing, as ordered by
the Court in Atong Paglaum, to give it an opportunity to
explain and comply with the requirement. Also, COCOFED
submits that the requirement of submitting the names of
at least five nominees should not be strictly applied "in
light of the nature of party-list representation" which
"looks to the party, and not to the nominees per se."
2. Its failure to submit the required number of nominees was
based on the good faith belief that its submission was
sufficient for purposes of the elections and that it could
still be remedied since COCOFED could simply submit the
names of its additional two nominees. COCOFED adds that
the number of nominees becomes significant only "when
a party-list organization is able to attain a sufficient
number of votes which would qualify it for a seat in the
House of Representatives."
3. COMELEC violated its right to equal protection of the laws
since at least two other party-list groups (ACT-CIS and
MTM Phils.) which failed to submit five nominees were
included in the official list of party-list groups.
COMELECs arguments are as follows:
4. It merely applied the clear requirement of Section 8, in
relation to Section 6, of RA No. 7941 which requires at
least 5 nominees. The importance of a complete list of
five nominees cannot be overemphasized. Based on this
list, the COMELEC checks a party’s compliance with the
other legal requirements, namely: (i) that a person is
nominated in only one list; and (ii) that the list shall not
include any candidate for any elective office or a person
who has lost his bid for an elective office in the
immediately preceding election.
5. The submission of a complete list goes into the right of the
voters to know and make intelligent and informed choice.
6. Atong Paglaum v COMELEC did not mandate the COMELEC
to conduct summary evidentiary hearings.
Court’s Ruling

7. COCOFED failed to submit a list of five nominees despite Ruling: The petition is dismissed. COCOFED’s registration
ample opportunity to do so before the elections, thus it is remains cancelled.
a violation imputable to the party under Section 6(5) of RA
No. 7941. In Section 8 of RA No. 7941, the mandatory
word "shall" goes with "not less than five." This reiterated Notes #1: Registration of party-list groups
by the COMELEC through its resolutions – COCOFED
cannot now claim good faith, much less dictate its own
terms of compliance. In order to maintain a party in a
continuing compliance status, the party must prove not 1. Under Section 4 of RA No. 7941, a party-list group already
only its continued possession of the requisite registered "need not register anew" for purposes of every
qualifications but, equally, must show its compliance with subsequent election, but only needs to file a
the basic requirements of the law. manifestation of intent to participate with the COMELEC.
8. While COCOFED’s failure to submit a complete list of These two acts are different from each other.
nominees may not have been among the grounds cited by 2. Under Section 5 of RA No. 7941, an applicant for
the COMELEC in earlier canceling its registration, this is registration has to file with the COMELEC, not later than
not sufficient to support a finding of grave abuse of ninety (90) days before the election, a verified petition
discretion. It is not true that COCOFED was not given prior stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
notice since they were actually able to submit 3 more a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a
names, albeit belatedly. COCOFED also did not submit an coalition of such parties or organizations.
explanation justifying its inability to comply prior to the 3. The applicant is required to submit its constitution, by-
elections, showing a disregard for administrative laws, platform or program of government, list of officers,
requirements. The disqualification was an exercise of coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC’s administrative powers, hence the compliance COMELEC may require. Aside from these, the law requires
of “due notice and hearing” need not be as strict and the publication of the applicant’s petition in at least two
exacting as if it were a a judicial or quasi-judicial (2) national newspapers of general circulation. The
proceeding. COMELEC then resolves the petition, determining
9. Even if a party-list group is entitled to no more than three whether the applicant has complied with all the necessary
seats in Congress, the requirement of 5 nominees is still requirements.
not optional because the additional two nominees is for
contingencies that may happen during the term of these
party-list representatives (Sec. 16, RA 7941). The Notes #2: RA 7941
publication of the list of nominees in 2 newspapers of
1. Section 8. Nomination of Party-List Representatives. Each
general circulation does not only serve as the reckoning
registered party, organization or coalition shall submit to
period of certain remedies and procedures under the
the COMELEC not later than forty-five (45) days before the
resolution. Most importantly, the required publication
election a list of names, not less than five (5), from which
satisfies the people’s constitutional right to information
party-list representatives shall be chosen in case it obtains
of the individuals behind the party they are voting for. It is
the required number of votes.
so important to the point that only minimal changes can
2. Section 16. Vacancy. In case of vacancy in the seats
be made after the submission of a list of nominees such as
reserved for party-list representatives, the vacancy shall
when (voluntary) the nominee withdraws in writing his
be automatically filled by the next representative from the
nomination) or (involuntary) when the nominee dies or
list of nominees in the order submitted to the COMELEC
becomes incapacitated.
by the same party, organization, or coalition, who shall
10. There is no valid reason why a party-list group cannot
serve for the unexpired term. If the list is exhausted, the
comply with the statutory requirement. The party-list
party, organization coalition concerned shall submit
system operates on the theoretical assumption that a
additional nominees.
party-list group has national constituency. We quote with
approval the COMELEC’s observation: if the party cannot
even come up with a complete list of five names out of a
purported more than one million members, then it is
highly doubtful that COCOFED deserves accreditation.
ANAD v. COMELEC
11. The 6th parameter in Atong Paglaum, the Court said that
“the disqualification of some of the nominees shall not Party-list representatives | G.R. No. 206987. September 10,
result in the disqualification of the party-list group 2013| Perez, J. | By Luy, C.
provided that they have at least one nominee who
remains qualified," did not in any way allow a submission Recit Summary
of less than 5 nominees in the first place.
 1. ANAD file a Petition for Certiorari against COMELEC
with Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary
Restraining Order and Writ of Mandamus
2. COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution
cancelling petitioner's Certificate of Registration
and/or Accreditation on three grounds: (1) ANAD not
a marginalized sector (2) submitted only 3/5
nominees (3) failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007 National
and Local Elections
3. SC dismissed the Petition, finding no grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections
4. ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing
5. Facts that ANAD did not comply with election laws are
backed by proof thus COMELEC had the power to
cancel the registration of ANAD
FACTS
❖ ANAD filed before the SC a Petition for Certiorari with
Urgent Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order and Writ of Mandamus, seeking to compel the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to canvass the votes
cast for petitioner Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy
(ANAD) in the recently held 2013 Party-List Elections.
❖ COMELEC En Banc promulgated a Resolution cancelling
petitioner's Certificate of Registration and/or
Accreditation on three grounds:
1. Petitioner ANAD does not belong to, or come within
the ambit of, the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors enumerated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 7941 and
espoused in the cases of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party v. Commission on Elections and Ang
Ladlad LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections.
2. The Certificate of Nomination, shows that ANAD
submitted only the names of three nominees. It
necessarily follows, that having only three (3)
nominees, ANAD failed to comply with the procedural
requirements set forth in Section 4, Rule 3 of
Resolution No. 9366.
3. ANAD failed to submit its Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures for the 2007 National and Local
Elections as required by Section 14 of Republic Act
No. 7166 ("R.A. No. 7166").
❖ In its resolution the COMELEC affirmed the cancellation of
petitioner's Certificate of Registration and/or
Accreditation and disqualified it from participating in the
2013 Elections.
❖ COMELEC says that while ANAD can be classified as a
sectoral party lacking in well-defined political
constituencies, it is disqualified for its violation of election
laws and regulations, particularly for failure to submit at
least five nominees, and for its failure to submit its
Statement of Contributions and Expenditures for the
2007 Elections.
ISSUES & RATIO
❖ COMELEC, being a specialized agency tasked with the
supervision of elections all over the country, its factual
findings, conclusions, rulings and decisions rendered on
matters falling within its competence shall not be
interfered with by this Court in the absence of grave abuse
of discretion or any jurisdictional infirmity or error of law.
1. Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in promulgating the assailed Resolution
without the benefit of a summary evidentiary hearing
mandated by the due process clause
▪ ANAD was already afforded a summary hearing
on 23 August 2013, during which Mr. Domingo
M. Balang, ANAD's president, authenticated
documents and answered questions from the
members of the COMELEC pertinent to ANAD's
qualifications.
▪ On ANAD’s insistence that COMELEC should have
called for another summary hearing after the
case was remanded for re-evaluation:
• ANAD was already given the opportunity to
prove its qualifications during the summary
hearing of 23 August 2012, during which
ANAD submitted documents and other
pieces of evidence to establish said
qualifications. In re-evaluating ANAD's
qualifications The COMELEC need not have
called another summary hearing. The
Comelec could, as in fact it did, readily resort
to documents and other pieces of evidence
previously submitted by petitioners in re-
appraising ANAD's qualifications.
2. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding that
petitioner submitted only three nominees (Factual
issue)
▪ The Finding of the COMELEC that ANAD
submitted only three nominees instead of five
was based on the Certificate of Nomination
presented and marked by petitioner during the
22 and 23 August 2012 summary hearings.
▪ Compliance with Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941 is
essential as the said provision is a safeguard
against arbitrariness. Section 8 of R.A. No. 7941
rids a party-list organization of the prerogative to
substitute and replace its nominees, or even to
switch the order of the nominees, after
submission of the list to the COMELEC
• The list of the party-list nominees is
published in newspapers of general
circulation in order to uphold the right of the
people, enabling the voters to make
intelligent and informed choices.
• Allowing the party-list organization to
change its nominees through withdrawal of
their nominations, or to alter the order of
the nominations after the submission of the
list of nominees circumvents the voters’
demand for transparency. The lawmakers'
exclusion of such arbitrary withdrawal has
 eliminated the possibility of such
circumvention.
3. Whether or not the COMELEC erred in finding that
petitioner failed to submit its Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures in the 2007 Elections
(Factual issue)
▪ Failure to submit a proper Statement of
Contributions and Expenditures for the 2007
Elections is in violation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 9476 (see pertinent provision)
• Exhibits submitted by ANAD consisted
mainly of a list of total contributions from
other persons, a list of official receipts and
amounts without corresponding receipts,
and a list of expenditures based on order
slips and donations without distinction as to
whether the amounts listed were advanced
subject to reimbursement or donated. This
factual finding was neither contested nor
rebutted by ANAD.
❖ We herein take the opportunity to reiterate the well-
established principle that the rule that factual findings of
administrative bodies will not be disturbed by the courts
of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or
no substantial evidence in support of such findings should
be applied with greater force when it concerns the
COMELEC, as the framers of the Constitution intended to
place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher
than statutory administrative organs.
❖ As empowered by law, the COMELEC may motu proprio
cancel, after due notice and hearing, the registration of
any party-list organization if it violates or fails to comply
with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections
❖ In any event, the official tally results of the COMELEC show
that ANAD garnered 200,972 votes. As such, even if
petitioner is declared qualified and the votes cast for it are
canvassed, statistics show that it will still fail to qualify for
a seat in the House of Representatives.
RULING
The Court Resolves to DISMISS the Petition, finding no grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections
Pertinent Provision:
Rule 8, Sec. 3. Form and contents of statements. — The
statement required in next preceding section shall be in
writing, subscribed and sworn to by the candidate or by the
treasurer of the party. It shall set forth in detail the following:
a. The amount of contribution, the date of receipt, and the
full name, profession, business, taxpayer identi􀁁cation
number (TIN) and exact home and business address of
the person or entity from whom the contribution was
received; (See Schedule of Contributions Received, Annex
"G")
b. The amount of every expenditure, the date thereof, the
full name and exact address of the person or entity to
whom payment was made, and the purpose of the
expenditure; (See Schedule of Expenditures, Annex "H")
A Summary Report of Lawful Expenditure categorized
according to the list specified above shall be submitted by the
candidate or party treasurer within thirty (30) days after the
day of the election. The prescribed form for this Summary
Report is hereby attached to these Rules as Annex "H-1."
c. Any unpaid obligation, its nature and amount, the full
name and exact home and business address of the person
or entity to whom said obligation is owing; and (See
Schedule of Unpaid Obligations, Annex "I")
d. If the candidate or treasurer of the party has received no
contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending
obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact;
e. And such other information that the Commission may
require.
The prescribed form for the Statement of Election
Contributions and Expenses is attached to these Rules as
Annex "F." The Schedules of Contributions and Expenditures
(Annexes "G" and "H", respectively) should be supported and
accompanied by certified true copies of official receipts,
invoices and other similar documents.
An incomplete statement, or a statement that does
not contain all the required information and attachments, or
does not conform to the prescribed form, shall be considered
as not 􀁁led and shall subject the candidate or party treasurer
to the penalties prescribed by law.
Lico v. Commission on Electiona
Party-list Representatives|GR. No. 205505 (September 29,
2015) | Sereno, C.J.| by Marquez, A.
Facts of the Case:
• Adihakaing Tinataguyod ng Kooperatiba (Ating Koop),
a multi-sectoral party-list organization earned a seat
in the House of Representatives during the 2010
elections
• Petitioner Atty. Isidro Q. Lico served as the Party-list
representative being the first nominee of Ating Koop;
• However, Ating Koop’s Central Committee passed a
resolution which incorporated a term sharing
agreement, signed by its nominees, where the
petitioner would only serve for the first year of the
three-year term
• May 14, 2011- The Second National Convention of
Ating Koop introduced amendments to its
Constitution and By-laws which modified the
composition of its Central Committee and mandated
the holding of elections for members of the Central
Committee
 • The Interim Central Committee (dominated by the
allies of respondent Amparo T. Rimas) of Ating Koop
expelled Lico from Ating Koop for disloyalty due to
allegations of malversation, graft and corruption, and
his refusal to honor the term sharing agreement
• Lico filed a Motion for Reconsideration; during the
pendency of the motion, Lico, along with his allies in
the party-list (the Lico Group), held a special meeting
in Cebu where they elected the new members for the
Central Committee
• On the other hand, the Rimas Group held a separate
meeting which elected their own set of officers for
the Central Committee
• The Rimas Group filed a case before the COMELEC
Second Division to order Lico to vacate the office of
Ating Koop in the HOR and to order the succession of
the second nominee, Roberto Mascarinas; they also
prayed for the nullification of the election held by the
Lico group
• The COMELEC Second Division upheld the expulsion
of Lico from Ating Koop and declared Mascarinas as
the representative of the party-list; they
characterized the issue as an intra-party dispute
which is within the jurisdiction of COMELEC
• The Lico group filed a motion for reconsideration
before the COMELEC en banc which upheld the
earlier decision expelling Lico from Ating Koop but
dismissed the petition to expel Lico from the HOR due
to lack of jurisdiction
• The COMELEC en banc also recognized the Rimas
Group as the legitimate representative of Atin Koop
because the Lico Group did not act in accordance with
the Ating-Koop’s Amended Constitution
• Hence, the petition for certiorari under Rule 64 in
relation to Rule 65 before the Supreme Court
Issues:
1) WON the COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
expulsion of Lico, a Member of the HOR, from his
party-list organization. NO.
a. COMELEC correctly dismissed the petition to
expel Lico from the HOR
b. However, COMELEC ruling on the validity of
Lico’s expulsion from Ating Koop was beyond
it’s jurisdiction
c. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution grants exclusive jurisdiction to
the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal (HRET) over matters relating to the
qualifications of members of Congress
d. “HRET acquires jurisdiction over a
disqualification case upon proclamation of
the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives”
which is the case here. Hence, it is HRET that
has jurisdiction over the disqualification case
e.The action COMELEC in upholding the
expulsion of Lico from Ating Koop si without
legal basis because it already affects the
qualification of a party-list representative
f. In expelling Lico from Ating Koop, it
automatically affects his title as a member of
the Congresss because he needs to be a
member of the party-list for him to be its
representative
g. “COMELEC failed to recognize that the issue
on the validity of petitioner Lico's expulsion
from Ating Koop is integral to the issue of his
qualifications to sit in Congress”
2) WON the Rimas Group is the legitimate
representative of Ating Koop. NO
a. Any amendment to the by-laws and
constitution of a party-list should be filed
with the COMELEC and will be effective only
upon approval by the COMELEC
b. No showing the amended constitution was
filed before the COMELEC
c. Any elections conducted under the
Amended Constitution would be invalid.
Hence, the elections held by the two groups
are both invalid since they both claimed that
their elections were held in accordance with
the Amended Constitution
d. Even if the amendment was valid, the
evidences presented by the parties were
evenly balanced.
e. With that, the equipoise doctrine would
come into play. The party having the burden
of proof fails in that issue. Since it was the
Rimas Group who filed the petition before
the COMELEC and they failed to discharge
the burden, their petition should have been
dismissed.
f. The leadership should fall under the Interim
Central Committee due to the hold-over
principle in corporation law which could
apply in this case (“officers and directors of
a corporation hold over after the expiration
of their terms until such time as their
successors are elected or appointed”)
SC Ruling:
• WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The COMELEC Resolution dated 31
January 2013 and the COMELEC En Banc Second
Division Resolution dated 18 July 2012 in E.M.
No. 12-039 are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
insofar as it declares valid the expulsion of
Congressman Lico from Ating Koop and it
upholds the ATING KOOP Party-list Group
represented by its President, Amparo T. Rimas, as
the legitimate Party list Group.
A new one is entered DECLARING that the
legitimate Central Committee and set of officers
 legitimately representing Ating Koop are the
Interim Central Committee and set of officers
prior to the split of Ating Koop.
PHILCONSA v. Mathay
Suit against the State | G.R. No. L-25554 | October 4, 1966
|Reyes, J. | By Martinez, E.
Issue:
Recit Summary:
- RA 4134 was approved authorizing the payment of
increased salaries of the members of the Congress.
- RA 4642 was then approved, which broke down the
budget for the increase and stated that it was to take
effect in 1966, right after the end of the term of the
incumbent House members in 1965. However, the
term of the incumbent Senators was not to end until
1969.
- The Courts decided that is violative of Art. VI, Sec. 14
of the Constitution, which states that “No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase.”
- Therefore, RA 4642 is null and void and RA 4134
should take effect On December 30, 1969, the end of
the incumbent Senators’ term.
Facts of the Case:
- June 10, 1964: RA 4134 was approved authorizing the
payment of increased salaries of the members of the
Congress.
- Senate President and Speaker of the House: P40,000
from P16,000; Senators and House Members:
P32,000 from P7,200.
- The act provided "that the salary increase of the
President of the Senate and of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall take effect on the
effectivity of the salary increase of Congressmen and
Senators.”
- RA 4642 (Appropriation Act) was then approved,
breaking down the budget for the implementation of
RA 4134.
- RA 4642 stated that the budget increase of all officials
involved was to be implemented at the start of 1966,
because the term incumbent House Members was to
end in 1965.
- However, the term of the incumbent Senators was to
end at 1969.
- Petitioners contend that this is violative of Art. VI, Sec.
14 of the Constitution, which provides that “No
increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the
Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase.”
- Respondents allege that (1) Petitioners have no
standing because of lack of showing of injury, (2)
Speaker and Members of the House should be joined
parties defendant in the case, and (3) the expiration
of the term of the House Members was sufficient in
adhering to the Constitution, regardless of the term
of the members of the Senate.
1. Do the Petitioners have locus standi? YES
- As taxpayers, they may bring an action to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
2. Do the Speaker and the Members of the House need
to be included as respondents? NO
- Since the action in question is the passing in audit and
the payment of the increased salaries, and not the
collection or receipt thereof, only the involvement of
the current respondents (Auditor General and
Auditor of the Congress) is needed.
3. Does RA 4642 sufficiently comply with Art. VI, Sec. 14
of the Constitution? NO
- The purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to
the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to
increase their salaries.
- The Courts highlighted the fact that the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, before the Legislature was
bicameral, initially recommended that increases in
salary were not to take effect until the expiration of
the term of all members of the Legislature that
improved the increase.
- The restrictive nature was carried over in the future
Constitutions of the Philippines:
o Constitution of the Commonwealth: No
increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the Members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to the
approval of such increase.
o 1940 amendments (return to bicameralism):
No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives approving
such increase.
- Presently: the use of the word “term” instead of
“terms” in the Constitutional provision proves that
the framers intended for both Legislative bodies to
be considered as one unit. This fact is reinforced by
the use of the word “all” in the same provision.
- Further, from the old Constitution to the present one,
maximum delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four
(4) from the time of approval is necessary before an
increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.
 o For example, if the legislators pass an
increase of salary at the end of all their
terms, they will have to wait for at least 4
years before doing so.
o This is to avoid legislators who can anticipate
their re-election from increasing their own
salary.
Ruling:
Petition granted. RA 4642 (Appropriation Act) is null and void
for being unconstitutional. RA 4134 (Salary Increase)
is not operative until December 30, 1969, when the
full term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired.
Pertinent provision:
Consti Art. VI, Sec. 14
LIGOT v MATHAY
Salaries | G.R. No. L-34676 (April 30, 1974) | Teehankee, J. |
by Medina, R.
PETITIONER: Benjamin Ligot
RESPONDENTS: Ismael Mathay and Jose V. Velasco
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Petitioner Ligot was a member of the House of
Representatives from 1957 to 1969.
2. In 1964, RA 4134 was passed, increasing the salary of
members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000 per
annum. However, the Court held in PHILCONSA v
Mathay that the increase would only take effect on
Dec. 30, 1969 in accordance with Art. VI, Sec. 14 of
the 1935 Constitution.
3. When Ligot’s term expired on Dec. 30, 1969, he filed
a claim for retirement and was issued a treasury
warrant of P122,429.86 as retirement gratuity
computed based on RA 4134.
4. Respondent Velasco requested petitioner to return
this warrant for re-computation of the latter’s
retirement claim in view of the Auditor General’s
decision disallowing a similar claim. Hence, the
present petition.
5. The Court held that the salary increase under RA 4134
only applies to incoming members of Congress after
Dec. 30, 1969, and not to petitioner.
6. Because the Constitution already prohibited him from
receiving the increased salary during his tenure, it
would be illogical to allow him to collect such amount
now in the guise of retirement gratuity.
FACTS OF THE CASE
• Petitioner Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the
House of Representatives for 3 consecutive 4-year
terms (Dec. 30, 1957-Dec. 30, 1969)
• July 1, 1964 (during Ligot’s 2nd term in office) – RA
4134 took effect
o Salaries of members of Congress increased
from P7,200 to P32,000 per annum
• Ligot was re-elected to a 3rd term (1965-1969) but was
not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000 by virtue
of the Court’s decision in PHILCONSA v Mathay (1966)
o Increased compensation provided by RA
4134 is not operative until Dec. 30, 1969
when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it will have
expired
• Dec. 30, 1969 – Ligot’s term expired
o He thereafter filed a claim for retirement
under Commonwealth Act 186, sec. 12(c), as
amended by RA 4968
• May 8, 1970 – House of Representatives issued a
treasury warrant of P122,429.86 in petitioner’s favor
as his retirement gratuity
o This was computed based on the increased
salary of P32,000 per annum of members of
Congress (RA 4134)
• Respondent Velasco, as Congress Auditor, did not
sign the warrant because of a pending resolution by
the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former
Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term had
also expired on Dec. 30, 1969
• July 22, 1970 – Velasco formally requested petitioner
to return the warrant for re-computation of the
latter’s retirement claim
o Attached was the Auditor General’s decision
disallowing Singson’s claim for retirement
gratuity computed based on salary increase
under RA 4134
• Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied;
hence the present petition
• He argues that his claim for retirement gratuity
should not have been disallowed because at the time
of his retirement, the increased salary under RA 4134
was already P32,000 per annum
o Recall: increased salary under RA 4134
would only take effect on Dec. 30, 1969,
which was also when Ligot’s final term
expired
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s retirement gratuity should be
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000 per
annum under RA 4134 – NO
• Salary increase under RA 4134 is operative only from
Dec. 30, 1969 for INCOMING members of Congress
and when the full term of all members that approved
the increase (including petitioner) have expired
o 1935 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 14: "No
increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the members of the Senate and of
the House of Representatives approving
such increase”
o Therefore, the salary rate for members
retiring ON Dec. 30, 1969 must be P7,200
per annum, as this was the compensation
provided by law DURING their term of office
• During petitioner’s tenure from 1965-1969, he was
unable to receive the increased salary precisely
because of the constitutional ban (see 1935
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 14 above)
o It would be illogical to allow him to collect
such amount now in the guise of retirement
gratuity
• Retirement gratuity is limited to compensation and
other emoluments to the individual’s salary as
provided by law
o Sustaining petitioner’s claim would be a
subtle way of increasing his compensation
during his term and of achieving indirectly
what he could not obtain directly
RULING: Petition dismissed. Petitioner’s retirement gratuity
must be computed on the basis of P7,200 per annum, and not
P32,000 per annum under RA 4134.
Martinez v Morfe
March 24, 1972| Fernando, J| Mendizabal, C.
Facts:
• Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista,
Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both of them were facing criminal
prosecutions.
• Martinez was charged for falsification of a public
document before the sala of Judge Morfe. The basis
of the case against him was his statement under oath
that he was born on June 20, 1945 instead of June 20,
1946.
• Bautista was charged for the violation of the Revised
Election Code. He was also accused to be in violation
of Section 51 of the RPC when he gave and distributed
food free of charge, drinks and cigarettes at two
public meetings.
• The respondent Judge Morfe ordered their arrest and
the two were later on arrested while the
Constitutional Convention was still in session.
• Petitioners Bautista and Martinez now assail the
validity of their arrest. They contend that under Art
145 or RPC “arrest or search any member thereof,
except in case such member has committed a crime
punishable under [such] Code by a penalty higher
than prision mayor” and that the charges upon which
they were arrested are within the immunity granted
to them as legislators.
• Martinez filed a petition for certiorari and habeas
corpus in SC while Bautista filed petition for certiorari
and prohibition also in SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest
NO. Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution provides
that immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for
treason, felony and breach of the peace. Section 15 has
revoked Art 145 of RPC since this RPC provision is inconsistent
with this section of the constitution.
Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the
RPC or any special statute.
In this case, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were
arrested fall under the category of “breach of peace,”
therefore, they cannot invoke the privilege from arrest
provision of the Constitution.
Any person who acted against public peace is susceptible to
prosecution. There is a full recognition of necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.
RULING:
The petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate
Manuel Martinez and the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr are hereby
dismissed.
People v. Jaloslos
G.R. No. 132875-76 | November 16, 2001 | Ynares-Santiago, J
| By: Muhlach & Nebres
Recit Summary
 - 12 year old Rosilyn was peddled by her own guardian,
Simplicio, for commercial sex
- She met Congressman Romeo Jalosjos and was
molested by him multiple times
- Jalosjos was found guilty of two counts of statutory
rape
Facts
- 12 year-old Maria Rosilyn Delantar claims she was
constantly being peddled by her own guardian,
Simplicio Delantar, for commercial sex
- She met through her guardian, then TV show
producer and Congressman Romeo Jalosjos
- Jalosjos constantly had Simplicio bring Maria to his
hotel so he could molest her
- Rosilyn eventually raw away and went to the DSWD,
which led to the filing of a statutory rape case against
Jalosjos
- Jalosjos said it was actually his brother Dominador
who was meeting with Maria, that he was in constant
meetings during the dates when they supposedly
met, and that this was all blackmail by his political
opponents
- Dominador backed up his brother’s claims
- Romeo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
2 counts of statutory rape, thus sentenced to 2 counts
of reclusion perpetua, and he is to pay Maria 50k in
moral damages
- Although he was acquitted of some counts of
lasciviousness
- He filed an appeal regarding these issues:
Issues:
1. The trial court erred in convicting Romeo based on
the testimonies of Rosilyn, considering the
inconsistencies of the stories
- No. His claim that his acquittal of some acts
of his lasciviousness is not proof of Maria
fabricating her stories
- Testimonies are not always to be taken in full
belief of, can choose w/c has credence
- Maria’s testimony to be given full credence,
and she was able to give vivid details
- The DSWD were witnesses w/ testimonies as
well
- Testimonies of rape victims especially those
who are young and immature deserve full
credence considering that no woman would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and
thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a
public trial if she was not motivated solely by
the desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.
- If there is inconsistency between the
affidavit of a witness and her testimonies
given in open court, the latter commands
greater weight than the former.
2. Maria’s failure to properly identify Romeo as the
rapist is fatal to her claims
- No. The fact that she was only able to
recognize his face and his body type, but not
his name, is not a valid defense (she is a kid
after all)
- A person’s identity does not depend solely
on his name, but also on his physical
features. Thurs, a victim of a crime can still
identify the culprit even without knowing his
name.
3. The trial court erred in ruling that Maria was below
12 years old at the time of the incidents
- Can easily get the age of someone through a
birth certificate. If there is none, then can get
it through other means such as a baptismal
certificate, school records, etc
- The prosecution successfully proved that
Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the
time she was sexually abused
4. Rape was not actually committed
- Rape is consummated by the slightest
penetration of the female organ.
- No. In cases of statutory rape, need not full
penetration be committed.
- The law presumes that a woman of tender
age does not possess discernment and is
incapable of giving intelligent consent to the
sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal
knowledge of a child below twelve years old
even if she is engaged in prostitution is still
considered as statutory rape.
Ruling:
Romeo Jalosjos is sentenced to 2 reclusion perpetua for 2
counts of statutory rape, and 6 cases of reclusion temporal for
6 counts of lasciviousness
Moral damages to be paid increased to 50k
People v. Jalosjos
Freedom from Arrest|G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000 |
Ynares-Santiago, J. | By: Montano, J.
Recitation Summary:
1. Case of first impression wherein Jalosjos, a re-elected
Representative of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte, is asking that he be allowed to attend
legislative and committee meetings despite being
confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts
of lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.
2. The issue is whether membership is Congress
exempts an accused from statutes and rules which
apply to validly incarcerated persons
3. The Court ruled that being a member of Congress
does not allow for a difference in treatment because
the court cannot validate badges of inequality. The
necessities imposed by public welfare (i.e.
imprisonment and detention) may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby
certain groups may plausibly assert that their
interests are disregarded.
Facts:
- This is a case of first impression wherein accused
appellant, Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress
(Representative of First District of Zamboanga del
Norte) and is confined at the national penitentiary
while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts
and acts of lasciviousness on six counts is pending
appeal.
- Upon reelection, filed this motion to be allowed to
fully discharge his duties, including attendance at
legislative sessions and committee meetings although
he is charged with a non-bailable offense.
Issue:
W/N membership in Congress exempts an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons
in general
- NO. Being a member of Congress does not allow a
difference in treatment. The necessities imposed by
public welfare may justify exercise of government
authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups
may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all
those belonging to the same class.
- Jalosjos argues that the mandate of the sovereign
will must allow him because he was elected by
popular vote; not allowing him to do so would
constitute taxation without representation on the
part of his constituents; and that this mandate cannot
be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints
arising from pending criminal cases
o Court stated that all officials of government
are subject to the majesty of the law
o The higher the rank, the greater the
requirement of obedience rather than
exemption
o There is a provision in the 1935, 1973, and
1987 Constitution that allows for the
immunity from arrest or detention of
Senators of members of the House of
Congress. But 1987 Constitution states that
for offenses punishable by more than six
years imprisonment, there was no immunity
from arrest
- Argues also that it is his responsibility according to
Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution to attend
sessions
o Court stated that Jalosjos did not give
enough reason to be exempted from Art. VI,
Sec. 11 which states that Congress cannot
compel absent members to attend sessions
if the reason for the absence is a legitimate
one
- Jalosos relied on Aguinaldo v. Santos which stated
that: “The Court should never remove a public officer
for acts done prior to his present term of office…”
o Court stated that: This does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the
enforcement of criminal law. Moreover, in
the same way that preventive suspension is
not removal, confinement pending appeal is
not removal. He remains a congressman
unless expelled by Congress or, otherwise,
disqualified.
- Argues that plea of the electorate which voted him
into office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears
that he might escape eventual punishment if
permitted to perform congressional duties outside his
regular place of confinement.
o But he evaded arrest when his warrant was
first issued
- Argues that he has been allowed by the RTC Makati
to temporarily leave his cell for official or medical
reasons
o Court stated that previous situations were of
an emergency nature. What he is asking for
now is not.
o Allowing Jalosjos to attend congressional
sessions and committee meetings for 5 days
or more in a week will virtually make him a
free man with all the privileges appurtenant
to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellant's status
to that of a special class, it also would be a
mockery of the purposes of the correction
system.
o He is also able to discharge his functions
because he has an office in the prison, was
able to file bills and resolutions, has been
receiving his salary.
 o He has been discharging his mandate as a
member of the House of Representative
consistent with the restraints upon one who
is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, Jalosjos should not even have
been allowed by the prison authorities at the
National Penitentiary to perform these acts
but he was allowed.
o Imprisonment in its general sense, is the
restraint of one's liberty.
▪ It is the detention of another
against his will depriving him of his
power of locomotion and is
something more than mere loss of
freedom. It includes the notion of
restraint within limits defined by
wall or any exterior barrier.
Ruling:
Court denied Jalosjos’ petition. Being re-elected to public
office does not give priority to any other right or interest,
including the State’s police power.
Trillanes, IV v. Pimentel
Freedom from Arrest | G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008 | Carpio-
Morales, J. |by Nicoals, J.
Recitation Summary:
1. While being tried in a criminal case involving the
Oakwood Incident, Antonio Trillanes files an Omnibus
Motion before the RTC to let him attend Senate
Sessions and work within his place of detention.
2. The RTC denied the Motion so he assailed the order
with the SC.
3. The SC denied Trillanes’ Petition saying: that his case
is similar so People v. Jalosjos whose privileges sought
were similarly denied; that election to office does not
obliterate a criminal charge; and, that emergency or
temporary leaves are under the discretion of the
authorities or the courts.
Facts of the Case:
➢ On July 27, 2003, over 300 soldiers led by AFP junior
officers stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati demanding the resignation of
the President and key national officials.
➢ Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with a criminal
case for coup d’etat before RTC Makati.
➢ Four years later while still in detention, Trillanes
became a Senator with his term to commence on
June 30, 2007.
➢ On June 22, 2007, Trillanes filed with the RTC an
“Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.”
➢ On July 25, 2007, the RTC denied all the requests and,
on September 18, 2007, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration .
➢ Trillanes filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus against the Respondent Judge before the
SC.
Issue:
1. W/N the Jalosjos Case is applicable to the present
case—YES
a. Presumption of innocence does not carry with it
the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
b. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that
petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.
c. The determination that the evidence of guilt
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial
court's judgment of conviction, justifies the
detention of an accused as a valid curtailment of
his right to provisional liberty.
d. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of
the right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the
stage of the criminal action." Such justification
for confinement with its underlying rationale of
public self-defense applies equally to detention
prisoners like petitioner or convicted prisoners
appellants like Jalosjos.
2. W/N Trillanes’ election is proper legal justification for
him to work in his capacity as senator—NO
a. The case against petitioner is not administrative
in nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak
of.
b. The doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases.
c. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office,
does not obliterate a criminal charge.
d. His electoral victory only signifies pertinently that
when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on
his freedom of action [and] . . . with the
knowledge that he could achieve only such
legislative results which he could accomplish
within the confines of prison."
3. W/N liberal treatment is due to him as a detention
prisoner without bail—NO
a. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court
orders.
b. On the generality and permanence of his
requests alone, petitioner's case fails to compare
with the species of allowable leaves.
SC Ruling:
The petition is dismissed. The denial of his “Omnibus Motion
for Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests” was upheld.

FACTS:
On November 14, 1958, respondent Rep. Bartolome
Cabangbang of Bohol (2nd District), also chair of the House
Committee on National Defense, published in newspapers of
general circulation an open letter addressed to President
Carlos P. Garcia alleging that there were three operational
plans by some members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, that these AFP officers had colluded with
communists, and that the Secretary of National Defense, Jesus
Vargas, was planning a coup to place himself as President.
The letter alleged that the planners of the coup had petitioners
Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert, and Jose Lukban, among
other AFP officers, under their guise and that said officers may
or may not have been aware that they were being used to
meet such an end.
Petitioners thus filed a civil action for recovery of damages
against respondent for libel. Respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that it was not libelous and that, even if it
were, said letter was privileged communication due to it being
part of his function in the House of Representatives. The lower
court granted the motion, thus petitioners appealing to the
Supreme Court.
ISSUES AND RATIO:
1.) WON the publication in question is a privileged
communication.
NO: Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution
mentions excusing members of Congress from arrest
for making any such “speech and debate therein” in
their function.
The Court ruled that the publication involved did not
fall under this provision’s purview. The letter, dated
November 14, 1958, was written when Congress was
not in session and that Cabangbang’s act of publishing
said letter in newspapers of general circulation was
not part of his official duty in Congress or any of its
Committees. Thus, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.
2.) WON said publication is libelous.
NO: Although the letter mentioned that petitioners
were under the control of the alleged coup’s
planners, it also noted that they may have been
“unwitting tools” and had “absolutely no knowledge”
of the plan.
Thus, the very document that petitioners’ action is
based upon indicates that they may have been
absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans
and therefore not derogatory to them to the point
that they may recover damages. Considering that
they are officers of the AFP, they are by law, under
the control of the Secretary of National Defense and
the AFP Chief of Staff, then there is the possibility that
petitioners were in fact unwitting tools who were
unaware of the details of any such planned coup.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Decision of lower court AFFIRMED.
PROVISIONS:
Article VI, 1935 Constitution
SEC. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place.
---compare with---
Article VI, 1987 Constitution
SEC. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is
in session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable
in any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or
in any committee thereof.
Pobre v Defensor-Santiago | A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009 |
Velasco, Jr., J. | by Orate, AJ
Facts:
-Petitioner Antero J. Pobre submitted a letter of complaint
containing an excerpt from Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech on the Senate floor which he deemed as a disrespect
towards Chief Justice Panganiban and the rest of the court. He
asserted that such words constituted contempt of court and
subjects Sen. Defensor-Santiago to disciplinary actions and
even disbarment.
-In her comment, Sen. Defensor-Santiago asserted that the
speech she made was covered by parliamentary immunity as
it was given in discharge of her duties and was a statement
against the JBC for the injustice in their approach in the
nomination and application process for the soon-to-be vacant
Chief Justice post
-Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution provides: A Senator
or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Issue: WON Sen. Defensor-Santiago speech is covered by
parliamentary immunity.
-the Courts have no jurisdiction over matters in the
Legislative department and as such, any and all possible
actions to be taken against member of the Legislative is up to
the discretion of the authority of the assembly and the voters
(Senate did not take any measures to address her unbecoming
conduct)
-the statements made by Sen. Defensor-Santiago are
not criminally actionable or is subject to any disciplinary action
under the Rules of Court, however the Courts deemed it right
to call her attention, as a member of the Bar, to practice
decency and professional conduct
-the utterances made by Sen. Defensor-Santiago are
more personal than professional
Ruling: letter-complaint dismissed pursuant to Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution
Roberto Flores, Daniel Figueroa, et al v. Hon. Franklin Drilon,
Executive Secretary, and Richard Gordon (G.R. No. 104732,
June 22, 1993, J. Bellosillo, Digest by: Quebec, A.)
RECIT SUMMARY
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of paragraph d, Section
13 of RA 7227 which states that the President shall appoint the
Mayor of Olongapo City as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) for the
first year of its operations. Said provision is claimed to
contravene Sec 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution which
provides that elective officials shall not be eligible for
appointment or designation to any public office or position
during his tenure.
The Court declared the provision as void as it obviously runs
counter to the said constitutional provision. It also
contravenes the President’s appointing authority because the
power to appoint involves discretion or choice of who to
appoint. Because only one individual qualifies for the position,
the Mayor of Olongapo City, the President is left with no choice
but to appoint him.
Mayor Gordon however may retain per diems, salaries,
allowances, and other emoluments which he may have
received during his tenure. His legitimate acts were also
upheld as a de facto officer.
FACTS
Petitioners (taxpayers, employees of the US Facility at Subic,
Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in US Facilities in the Philippines) assail
the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of
1992”. Under the act, Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City
was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority.
Paragraph d reads: “d) Chairman/Administrator — The
President shall appoint a professional manager as
administrator of the Subic Authority with a compensation to
be determined by the Board subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Budget, who shall be the ex officio chairman of
the Board and who shall serve as the chief executive officer of
the Subic Authority: Provided, however, That for the first year
of its operations from the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of
the City of Olongapo shall be appointed as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Authority”
Petitioners maintain that the proviso infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7, first paragraph, Article IX-B of the Constitution –
“[N]o elective official shall be eligible for appointment or
designation in any capacity to any public office or position
during his tenure” – as the City Mayor of Olongapo city is an
elective official
(b) Sec. 16, Article VIIl, of the Consti – “The President
shall…appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and
those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint” – Since
it was Congress through the questioned proviso and not the
President who appointed the Mayor to the post
(c) Sec. 261, paragraph (g) of the Omnibus Election Code - Sec.
261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an
election offense: . . . . (g) Appointment of new employees,
creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases.
— During the period of forty-five days before a regular election
and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official
or appointing officer of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints
or hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant
the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to
be filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or
agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the
foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in
case of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the
appointment shall be given to the Commission within three
days from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or
hiring in violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2)
Any government official who promotes, or gives any increase
of salary or remuneration or privilege to any government
official or employee, including those in government-owned or
controlled corporations
- The appointment to the subject posts where made by the
Executive Secretary within the prohibited 45-day period prior
to the 1992 Elections
ISSUES
WON the proviso violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts – YES
Sec 7 of Article IX-B express the policy against the
concentration of several public positions in one person, so that
a public officer or employee may serve full-time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
job.
Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an
executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v.
Philip Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, ". . . .
should be allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities
without the distraction of other governmental duties or
employment. He should be precluded from dissipating his
efforts, attention and energy among too many positions of
responsibility, which may result in haphazardness and
inefficiency . . . ." Particularly as regards the first paragraph of
Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to prevent a situation where a
local elective official will work for his appointment in an
executive position in government, and thus neglect his
constituents . . . ."
ITC, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no
stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso
contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution.
The fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most
beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no
moment.
The view that an elective official may be appointed to another
post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office,
ignores the clear-out difference in the wording of the two (2)
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the
second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be
more stringent by not providing any exception to the rule
against appointment or designation of an elective official to
other government posts, except as are particularly recognized
in the Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the
economic and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may
be appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of
Congress who may be designated ex officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council.
On the SMBA post being ex officio to the position of Mayor of
Olongapo City
It is argued that the SMBA post is ex officio to the position of
Mayor Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance,
citing Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary, which stated
that the prohibition does not comprehend additional duties
and functions required by the primary functions of the officials
concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity
as provided by law, without receiving any additional
compensation therefor.
The Court held that Congress did not contemplate making the
subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to
the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it
been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex
officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word
"appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used.
Legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the
President
Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to
appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive
Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the
law but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
An "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the
person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the
duties of some office or trust," or "[t]he selection or
designation of a person, by the person or persons having
authority therefor, to fill an office or public function and
discharge the duties of the same."
Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as
"the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office."
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
.Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President,
such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications
of the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest
the appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion
to pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.
ITC, only one can qualify for the post in question, the President
is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to
appoint.
Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment
remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment.
As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible
for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment
thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained.
He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as
SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not
those of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and
justice, will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the
public and third persons, where the duties of the office were
exercised . . . . under color of a known election or appointment,
void because the officer was not eligible, or because there was
a want of power in the electing or appointing body, or by
reason of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such
ineligibility, want of power or defect being unknown to the
public . . . . [or] under color of an election, or appointment, by
or pursuant to a public unconstitutional law, before the same
is adjudged to be such.
As per the ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems,
allowances and other emoluments which may have been
received by respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment
may be retained by him.
➢ Par (d), Sec 123, RA 7227 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; the appointment of Richard
Gordon is INVALID. All per diems, allowances and
other emoluments received by Gordon, if any, as such
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained
by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him
in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of
SBMA are hereby UPHELD
Liban v. Gordon
Disqualifications and other prohibitions | G.R. No. 175352
Januray 18, 2011 | Leonardo-De Castro, J. | by Bea Roque and
Gab Ricasio
Recit Summary:
• Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors
• Gordon was allowed to hold position as Chairman of
PNRC while being a Senator does not ipso facto imply
that PNRC is a private corporation
• PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field
in accordance with its commitments under
international law. It is the government’s
humanitarian partner while remaining independent.
Facts: nationality, race, religion, gender,
social status, or political affiliation.”
• In the Decision, Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the ii. In accordance with the Geneva Red
Senate when he accepted the chairmanship of the Cross Convention.
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of iii. National Society of the
Governors. Office of the PNRC Chairman is not a International Red Cross and Red
government office or an office in a GOCC as Crescent Movement (Movement)’s
prohibited in Article VI Section 13 of the Constitution Seven Fundamental Principles:
• The Decision also declared void some sections of the (3) NEUTRALITY — In order to
PNRC charter (RA No. 95) as it creates the PNRC as a continue to enjoy the confidence of
private corporation and that it should register with all, the Movement may not take
the Securities and Exchange Commission and sides in hostilities or engage at any
incorporate under the Corporation Code if it wants to time in controversies of a political,
be a private corporation racial, religious or ideological
• In Gordon’s Motion for Clarification and/or nature.
Reconsideration, he argued that the validity of RA No. (4) INDEPENDENCE — The
95 was a non-issue and that there was no need to Movement is independent. The
delve into its validity. National Societies, while auxiliaries
• PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration prays for in the humanitarian services of
the constitutionality of its charter since “it functions their governments and subject to
as an auxiliary to the government, it is a neutral entity the laws of their respective
separate and independent of government control, yet countries, must always maintain
it does not qualify as strictly private in character” their autonomy so that they may
• Issue of constitutionality of RA No. 95 was not raised be able at all times to act in
by the parties, and thus not the lis mota of the case. accordance with the principles of
Therefore, the Court should not have declared void the Movement.
the sections of RA No. 95 in the Decision. iv. “The government does not control
• National Societies such as PNRC act as auxiliaries to the PNRC. Under the PNRC Charter,
the public authorities of their own countries in the as amended, only six of the thirty
humanitarian field, they are directly regulated by members of the PNRC Board of
international humanitarian law, in contrast to other Governors are appointed by the
ordinary private entities, including NGOs. It is the President of the Philippines.”
government’s humanitarian partner while remaining v. The Constitution recognizes two
independent. classes of corporations. The first
• “it is at one and the same time a private institution refers to private corporations
and a public service organization because the very created under a general law. The
nature of its work implies cooperation with the second refers to government-
authorities, a link with the State” owned or controlled corporations
created by special charters. Section
16, Article XII of the Constitution
Issues: provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress
1. WON PNRC is a government-owned or controlled shall not, except by
corporation. -NO general law, provide for
a. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing the formation,
Public Functions. organization, or
b. RA No. 95 – PNRC Charter signed by regulation of private
President Manuel A. Roxas on march 22, corporations.
1947. (NOTE: THIS CHARTER WILL BE Government-owned or
REPEALED; THUS, PNRC WILL FALL UNDER A controlled corporations
CORPORATION INCOPORATED UNDER may be created or
GENERAL LAW) established by special
i. “The PNRC is a non-profit, donor- charters in the interest of
funded, voluntary, humanitarian the common good and
organization, whose mission is to subject to the test of
bring timely, effective, and economic viability.
compassionate humanitarian vi. (NOTE: GOCC’s assets are state-
assistance for the most vulnerable owned, and subsidies are part of
without consideration of
 the General Appropriations Act.
THUS, There is no private capital;
Also, control must be by the state)
vii. PNRC’s assets are private-owned,
and majority control is to private-
citizens; thus, granting the PNRC as
a private corporation under
general law.
petitioners have no standing to file the
present petition.”
SC Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the PNRC’s Charter as
void due to it being a private corporation; as such, the office
occupied by Sen. Gordon in the PNRC cannot be challenged
by Art. VI. Sec. 13. Quo warranto petition lacks merit; thus,
dismissed.

2. WON Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution

applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman Pertinent Provision:
of the PNRC and at the same time a member of the
Senate and WON respondent should be Article VI Section 13
automatically removed as Senator pursuant to the
said law. – NO No Senator or Member of the House of
a. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
Constitution, the President appoints three the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
groups of officers. . . instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term
b. The President does not appoint the without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to
Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the any office which may have been created or the emoluments
head of any department, agency, thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
commission or board appoint the PNRC
Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is not
an official or employee of the Executive Main Dissenting Opinion by Nachura, J.:
branch since his appointment does not fall
I. The case should have been recognized as that of
under Section 16, Article VII of the
a prohibition rather than a quo warranto
Constitution. Certainly, the PNRC Chairman
petition, since petitioner does not aim to take
is not an official or employee of the Judiciary
the Senate seat of Sen. Gordon. Prohibition is a
or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious
remedy that is “preventive and restrictive – an
conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an
injunction against an alleged continuing violation
official or employee of the Philippine
of fundamental law.”
Government. Not being a government
II. PNRC is a GOCC. The PNRC was incorporated
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as
through a charter, a special law; thus, it is nothing
such, does not hold a government office or
but a GOCC.
employment.
a. Test if it is a GOCC: Is it created by its own
3. Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition
charter for the exercise of a public function,
against respondent. – No
or by incorporation under the general
a. For the said petition is considered an action
corporation law? – OWN CHARTER
for quo warranto:
b. “we note that Section 1 of the charter starts
b. Rule 66, Sec. 1 - Action by Government
with the phrase, "(T)here is hereby created
against individuals. — An action for the
in the Republic of the Philippines a body
usurpation of a public office, position or
corporate and politic to be the voluntary
franchise may be commenced by a verified
organization officially designated to assist
petition brought in the name of the Republic
the Republic of the Philippines in
of the Philippines against:
discharging the obligations set forth in the
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act
Geneva Conventions . . .".
which by provision of law, constitutes a
III. The PNRC Charter does not violate the
ground for the forfeiture of his office.
constitutional proscription against the creation
“… The person instituting quo warranto
of private corporate laws.
proceedings in his own behalf must claim
IV. The Constitutionality of a law is presumed.
and be able to show that he is entitled to the
a. “Two other important points militate against
office in dispute, otherwise the action may
be dismissed at any stage. In the present the declaration of Section 1 of the PNRC
Charter as invalid and unconstitutional,
case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled
namely: (1) respondent does not question
to the Senate office of respondent. Clearly,
the constitutionality of the said provision;
 and (2) every law enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality.”
V. !!!!!IMPORTANT!!!!! The respondent holds two
incompatible offices in violation of the
Constitution
a. While we can only hypothesize on the extent
of the incompatibility between the two
offices — as stated in petitioners'
memorandum, Senator Gordon's holding of
both offices may result in a divided focus of
his legislative functions, and in a conflict of
interest as when a possible amendment of
the PNRC Charter is lobbied in Congress or
when the PNRC and its officials become
subjects of legislative inquiries.

Justice Nachura: THEREFORE, I grant the petition to declare

Senator Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the
Senate.