Mind Association

Acting From Virtue

Author(s): Robert Audi
Source: Mind, New Series, Vol. 104, No. 415 (Jul., 1995), pp. 449-471
Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Mind Association
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 Acting From Virtue
ROBERTAUDI

Virtueethics shouldtell us not only what virtueis but also what consti-
tutesactingfromit, Merelyto do the rightthing,say fromself-interest,is
not to live up to a standardof virtue.But despitethe extensiverecentdis-
cussionof virtueethicsthe notionof actingfromvirtuestill needs clarifi-
cation.The problemis especiallychallengingbecauseit straddlesethics
andactiontheory.It cannotbe solvedwithoutan adequateunderstanding
of virtue,butthe relationof actionsfromvirtueto the virtuesthey express
is-I shall argue-mainly a question of how such actions are to be
explained.Aristotleis highly instructiveon this problemandis my point
of departure.It is also rewardingto considerKant'sconceptionof acting
from duty,construedas a case of actingfrommoralvirtue,for instance
fromrectitude,andviewed as a foil for Aristotle'snotionof such action.
Even if Kantianactionfromdutyoughtnot to be so viewed, Kantianeth-
ics, like anyruleethics,needsan accountof somethingclosely analogous
to actingfromvirtue:actingfromwhateverrule-guidedelementsof char-
acterrenderthe actionsthatexpressthemmorallypraiseworthy.My first
taskwill be to sketch-of necessitywithoutdoingdetailedtextualanaly-
sis-Aristotelian and Kantianconceptionsof acting from virtue.I shall
then constructa generalaccountof actingfromvirtue.The final section
will show how the accounthelps in answeringan importantquestionof
generalethics:whetherregularlyactingfromvirtue-and therebyachiev-
ing the chief normativegoal of virtueethics-is sufficientfor a morally
good life.

1. Aristotelian and Kantian conceptions of action from virtue

Aristotledistinguishesbetweenacting fromvirtueand actingmerely in

accordancewith it.' Thiswording,thoughtrueto Aristotle,recallsKant's
distinctionbetween acting from duty and merely acting in conformity
' This is not exactlyhis wording,but the distinctionseems clearlyimpliedin
his contrastbetweenmerelydoingjust andtemperatedeedsanddoingthemin the
"way in whichjust and temperatepeople do them".See NE 1105a25-1105b15.
TerenceIrwin'stranslation(1985) is used throughout.

Mind, Vol. 104 . 415 . July 1995 ? Oxford University Press 1995
450 RobertAudi

with it.2On the plausibleassumptionthatactingfromdutyis, often, act-

ing from moral virtue, Kantianactions from duty are often similar in
importantways to Aristotelianactions from virtue.Aristotle'sconcern
withvirtueandwith actingfromit went farbeyondthe moraldomain,but
thereis muchto be learnedaboutmoralityfromstudyinghis generalcon-
ceptionof actingfromvirtue.
By way of preliminaryexplication,althoughfor manyvirtues,such as
fidelity,generosity,and kindness,we speaksimply of acting"from"the
trait,for othersthe notionis usuallyexpressedless directly,for instance
by locutionslike "actingfroma sense ofjustice"and"payingthe debtout
of an honourablenature".Ourtask has two main parts:to capturethe
explanatoryforce of "actingfrom",wherethe sourceof the actionis vir-
tue, andto clarifyhow such actionis fromvirtue, especiallywith respect
to the normativeandcharacterelementsthis entails.Thefirsttaskis com-
plicatedbecause,as a disposition,a virtuedoes not produceactionin the
"direct"way typicalof, say, decisionsor volitions,but only throughcog-
nitive and motivationalprocessesconnectedwith the virtue.The second
task is complicatedbecausemany kinds of normativeand dynamicele-
ments can figure in connectingthe traitwith the action. Both tasks are
complicatedbecause some virtuenames, e.g. "beneficence"and "fidel-
ity",also namepassingdesireswiththe appropriate content.Aristotlewas
awareof this rangeof problems,but left muchto be workedout.
In explaininghow virtuediffersfrom craft,Aristotlenotes thatwhile
the productsof craftdetermineby themselveswhetherthey arewell pro-
duced,this does not applyto the productsof virtue,since
for actionsexpressingvirtueto be donejustly ortemperately[and
hence well] it does not suffice thatthey are in themselvesin the
rightstate.Rather,the agentmustalso be in the rightstatewhen
he does them.First,he mustknow [thathe is doing virtuousac-
tions]; second,he must decide on them, and decide on them for
themselves;and,third,he mustdo themfroma firmandunchang-
ing character.(1105a29ff)
Considerthis fromthe pointof view of justice, which is adequatelyrep-
resentativeof a moral virtue (at least in the currentsense of "justice",
which, though narrowerthanAristotle's, will serve adequately).Aris-
totle's firstpointis negative.Whereasa statue,for instance,can be beau-
tiful when it is in the aesthetically right state, regardless of how the
sculptorproducedit, it wouldbe a mistaketo say that,regardlessof how
an actionis produced,thatactioncan be performedfromjustice. It is not
sufficientthatan actionsimplybe of the righttype, e.g. a metingout of
equalsharesto equallydeservingclaimants.In short,actionfromvirtueis
2 See especiallyKant(1959, pp. 397-400, and p. 406). Lewis WhiteBeck's
translationis used throughout,andtheAcademynumbersaregiven in the text.
 ActingFrom Virtue 451

not a behaviouralconcept,in the sense of one definedin termsof whatis

accomplished,as opposed to how. Thus the adverbialforms of virtue
terms such as "courageously","honestly",and "justly"-can apply to
actionsnotperformedfromtherelevantvirtues,andevento actionsaimed
at pretendingto manifestthosevirtues.Giventhisthinuse of virtueterms,
thedistinctionbetweenactionmerelyin conformitywithvirtueandaction
fromit maybe regardedas a specialcase of a distinctionbetweenconduct
of a behaviourallyspecifiedtype, e.g. metingout equal shares,and con-
ductdescribedmainlyin termsof how it is to be explained,e.g. as done
froma sense of justice.
Threefurtherpointsin the passagehelp to explainits centralcontrast.
SupposeI amthe agent.First,I mustknowthatI am,say,metingoutequal
shares;it will not do if, in signingan orderby whichI do this,I mistakenly
takeit to be a check.Callthisthe recognitionrequirement. Second,I must
decide on this equal distributionand decide on it for its own sake. This
implies two conditions:that my action must be (a) decided upon-call
this the selectionrequirement-and(b) in a specialway motivatedby the
relevant virtue-call this the intrinsic motivation requirement. Not just
any intrinsicmotivationwill do, however;it wouldnot sufficeto makethe
distributionfor its own sake, in the way I do things for their own sake
whenI do themsimplyforpleasure,as whereI swim simplybecauseI like
doing it. Aristotleseems to requirethatI decideon the actionon the basis
of a conceptionof it as, say,just, or as renderingeacha deservedshare,or
as somethingelse thatconnectsmy deedwithjustice as an elementin my
character.This intrinsicmotivationrequirementis confirmed(thoughnot
entailed) by his third condition: that one must act from a firm and
unchangingcharacter.If Jackis usuallymotivatedby greedbut, aftera
movingmoralexhortationfroma colleague,passes into a temporaryjust
disposition,then even if Jack'sresultingjust behaviourtowarda hated
rival meets the otherconditions,it does not expressthe virtueof justice.
Call this the character requirement:virtues are elements of character;
those elementsare "firmand unchanging";hence, an actionfromvirtue
mustbe froman elementwith the appropriate entrenchmentandstability.
Some of the deontologicalcounterpartsof these requirementsseem
implicitin Kant'sconceptionof actingfromduty.3Acting fromduty,for
him, seems necessaryfor actingfrom moralvirtue.If we may conceive
good will as roughlythe mastervirtue,this point is easily explained,at
least in so far as actingfrom duty is a case of acting from good will. A
I Kantsays,e.g., "virtuesignifiesa moralstrengthof will ... themoralstrength
of a mans will [as opposedto thatof a "superhuman" being]in fulfillinghis duty,
a moralnecessitation by his own legislativereasonin so faras reasonitself con-
stitutesa power of executing the law."See the "Introduction to the Doctrineof
Virtue"(1964, p. 66, A. 404).
452 RobertAudi

strongerrequirementfor Kantianactionfromdutyis suggestedby Kant's

secondprincipleof morality:"An actionperformedfrom duty does not
have its moralworthin the purposewhichis to be achievedthroughit but
in the maximby which it is determined"(p. 400). Takenin the contextof
his examples,this requirementsuggeststhatKantconceivesactionfrom
dutyas motivatedsolely by a commitmentto a suitableprincipleof duty.
Even promotingone's happinessfromdutymustbe groundedin a com-
mitmentto the dutyof so doing,andnot the happinessto be achieved(p.
399). This positionparallelsAristotle'sintrinsicmotivationrequirement.
If we supposethatactionon a maximrequiresa decisionfavouringthat
actionoverone ormorealternatives,thenKant,likeAristotle,wouldhave
a selectionrequirementon actingfromduty and therebyon actingfrom
moralvirtue.
One thesis of Kant's, however, has no exact counterpart in the
NicomacheanEthics:"asan act fromdutywholly excludesthe influence
of inclination... nothingremainswhich can determinethe will objec-
tively exceptthe law,andnothingsubjectivelyexceptpurerespectforthis
practicallaw" (p. 401). This exclusiveness requirementrules out any
motive otherthanduty as actuallymotivatingan actiontrulyperformed
from duty.Aristotle does not say that an action cannot express virtue
unless nothingelse (i.e., nothingbesides elementsin the virtue)plays a
partin motivatingit, though he might perhapshave said, what Kant's
overallpositionseemedto allow Kantto say, thatan actionpurely from
virtuemustmeetthe exclusivenessrequirement. I shallreturnto this ques-
tion.4
Aristotle'sselectionrequirementmay soundpsychologicallyunrealis-
tic, but I do not thinkhe shouldbe readas holdingthata virtuousaction
mustarisefroma piece of deliberation.Foronething,he stressesthathabit
is requiredto developvirtue,andhe allows thatactingfromvirtuecan be
an expressionof habit;it can even be a habitualaction. Moreover,he
describesthe grammarian as an analogueof the virtuousagent:the "way"
the formerproducesa grammaticalsequence is to producesomething
"expressingthe grammaticalknowledgethatis in us"(1105a25);presum-
ably,Aristotleconceived such knowledgeas capableof yielding action
quicklyandwithoutourconsideringalternatives.Similarly,Kant'snotion
4 Fordiscussionof some of the possiblekindsof mixedmotivationand some
of Kant'stheoreticaloptionsconcemingthem, see Audi (1989, ch. 3). I would
add,on the bearingof the categoricalimperative,that(1) we surelyneed not be
treatingpeoplemerelyas means,or failingto treatthemas ends, if we actjustly
towardthembothfroma just characterandfromlove; (2)perhapsin sucha case
one mightstill regardthe relevantmaximof the actionas one formulablein terms
of thejust motivealone.Themotiveofjustice mighthaveto be notonly sufficient
butprimaryrelativeto thatof love; buteven thenthe motiveof love couldplay a
significantmotivationalrole.
 ActingFrom Virtue 453

of maxims from which we act does not seem to.requiretheir conscious

rehearsalbeforeaction.Granted,in reconstructingthe genesisof an action
with a view to judgingthataction,Kantimaginesagentscarefullyformu-
latingmaxims(as with his famousfourexamples);buthe does not require
this kind of reflectionfor actingfromduty in general.It may sometimes
be neededto determineone's duty,butnot for simplyactingfroma grasp
of whatthatdutyis, as whereit is obviousthatone is to tell the truth.5

2. The motivation and range of action from virtue

My own accountof actingfromvirtuepresupposessome of whatAristotle

andKantsay,extendsotherpointstheymake,andsets forthrequirements
not containedin theirtreatmentsof the topic.I beginwiththe questionsof
intentionality,deliberateness,andvoluntariness.
An action that, undera given description,is performedfrom virtue,
must at least normallyalso be intentionalunderthat description.6To be
sure, if I do somethingknowinglybut not intentionally,as where, on a
weekend visit, I benefitone child as a foreseenbut not intendedconse-
quence of giving its sibling a Ping-Pongset, I am not acting merelyin
accordancewith a relevantvirtue,say generosity.My benefitingthe sec-
ond child is not merely fortuitous;and more important,this predictable
resultof my generositymightbe bothan incentivetowardmy actingfrom
thatvirtueagainandan indicationthatI havedonesomethingfromvirtue.
A deed not done fromvirtuemay still be at once a resultof virtue,a nat-
uralsign of it, andidenticalwith an actionthat,underanotherdescription,
is performedfromvirtue.
An actionfromvirtuemay,however,be intentionalwithoutbeing pre-
meditatedor even deliberatein the strongsense thatimplies underlying
deliberation.Perhapsin someplacesKantconceivedactionfromvirtueas
emergingfrompieces of practicalreasoningand,on thatground,consid-
I For a defence, see Audi (1989, ch. 3). Note that Aristotle's term prohairesis

is usually translated as "decision", when Aristotle himself describes it as "delib-

erative desire" (1 13alO). Meyer calls it "the desire most important to virtue and
vice of character"(1993, p. 24). Cf. Broadie (1991, pp. 78-9). If it is any kind of
desire, "decision" is not quite the right word, since, unlike desires, decisions are
made and are events in the ordinary sense entailing change.
6 Even qualified by "normally" this point may be too strong. If a humble per-
son characteristically and "automatically" does not intervene in an argument be-
tween parties who, though competent, know less about the topic, might this be
both an action from humility and non-intentional? Supposing the answer is af-
firmative, it still appears that an action from virtue must have some description
under which it is performed from virtue and intentional, e.g. avoiding the appear-
ance of instructing people.
454 Robert Audi

eredsuch actiondeliberatein the strongsense.7Dependingon the condi-

tions for acting on the basis of practicalreasoning,such deliberateness
mightbe entailedby Kantianactionfromvirtue.I preferto conceiveprac-
tical reasoningas possiblewithoutsuch deliberation,for instancewhere
one seeks a means,reasonsinstrumentallyto the conclusionthat it will
achieve one's end, and concludesin favouror it, but never weighs any
alternative.8
The matterof voluntarinessis more difficult.If "havingto do" some-
thing,say reprimanda friend,becauseit is a duty,is a case of not doingit
voluntarily,then obviouslyactingfromvirtueneed not be voluntary.Let
us call this discretional involuntariness: you act not at yourpleasurebut
becauseyou "must";yet you do somethingthatis "upto you". By con-
trast, volitional involuntariness, the kind reflex "actions"exemplify,
bypassesthe motivationalsystem, "thewill". Discretionalvoluntariness
may be set aside as clearlynot necessaryfor actingfromvirtue,whereas
volitional voluntarinessis necessary:actions from an inescapableduty
may expressvirtue,in thatspecialway impliedby actingfromduty;invol-
untary"actions"do not go throughone's will andcannotexpressvirtue.
The moredifficultissue is lack of voluntarinessowing to (non-moral)
compulsion-coercive involuntariness. If, underthreat,I amcompelledto
keep a promise,can my keepingit be donefromvirtue,say fromfidelity?
One would think not; but there is at least one hardcase. Suppose that
althoughI wouldkeepthe promiseowingto the threat,I would also do so
fromduty,andeach reasonfiguresin me as an actual,causallysufficient
motiveforthe deed.Mightwe say thatthe actionis performedpartlyfrom
virtue?Arguably,it canexpressvirtuein therightway;it simplyexpresses
fearas well. Thisis a permissiveview, allowingboththatactionsfromvir-
tue be heterogeneouslymotivatedandthatmotivesof virtuenot be neces-
saryconditionsfor the agent'sperformingthe act in question.Onemight
insteadhold the strongview thatthe motive of virtuemust be at least a
necessary conditionfor the action. (Therethe elements of compulsion
would not be sufficient:if the compulsivepressurewould not succeed
withoutthe cooperationof the virtuousmotive,thenthe actionis not com-
pelled.)Kantwouldprobablyrequirestillmore:thata motiveof dutyoper-
ate as bothnecessaryandsufficientin the actualgroundingof the action.
Boththe permissiveandthe strongview havesomeplausibility,though
the strongview is less plausiblewhen separatedfromcompulsion,since
compulsionmaybe felt to be apre-emptive ratherthanmerelycooperating
7 Kant'sfamousfourexamplesin Sc. 2 of theFoundations,especiallyin their
firstoccurrenceintendedto illustrateuniversalization
of maxims,wouldbe a case
in point.
8 A possibilityarguedfor in Audi (1989, ch. 5). Cf. Broadie(1991, pp. 85-9).
 Acting From Virtue 455

motive, eliminating ratherthan enhancing the effect of any virtuous

motivethatis also necessaryfor the sameaction.I doubtthatcompulsion
mustbe pre-emptive;9in any case, the wisest courseis to allow different
degreesto which actionsmay be performedfromvirtue,and hence pro-
gressivelystrongerconceptionsof actingfromvirtue.Actionsmaybe per-
formedwholly from virtue when no other kind of motive cooperates;
partlyfromvirtuewhen anotherkind does; and,in this mixed case, they
maybe performedfromvirtueto variousdegreesdependingon therelative
weightsof the aretaicandnon-aretaicmotivesin producingor sustaining
the action.The notionof sustenanceis crucial,especiallyfor actionsand
activities-which I am not here distinguishingfromactions-that take a
significantamountof time, such as giving a lesson as a fulfilmentof the
duty to instruct.Self-interestand dutycould alternateas sustainers,and
an actionI am performingfromdutyat one momentmightbe performed
fromself-interestatthenext.Thispossibilityis notruledoutby Aristotle's
characterrequirement;for even a firmlyentrenchedvirtueneed not pre-
empt a quite different, independent motive that is aligned with it.
Entrenchmentof a traitin one's characteris one thing;exclusivityof its
motivationalinfluenceon a given actionis quiteanother.
Perhapseven morethanKant,Aristotleexpresseswhatseems a strong
requirementon the contentof the motivationunderlyingan actionfrom
virtue.WhenAristotlesays of an actionfromvirtuethatone must"decide
on it for its own sake",he may appearto be implyingthatif an actionis
virtuous under a description, the agent must decide on it under that
description(orunderthe corresponding concept,the one expressedby the
relevantdescription-the requirement wouldnotbe linguistic).But surely
his examplesandoveralldiscussionallow a widerreading:theremustbe
some descriptionof the action relevantto the virtue such that (roughly
speaking)the agent decides on the action on accountof its fitting that
description.This thesis needs bothqualificationandexplication.'0
If decidingon an actionimplies selectingit fromamongoptions,then
the view thatan actionfromvirtuemustbe decidedupon-the selection
requirement-seems mistaken.Thereneed be no questionin the agent's
mindof options,e.g. of alternativesto giving eachneedypersonan equal
9Whatchieflymakesit seem so is thatfor typicalcompulsionsthe agentwill
be preoccupiedwith, e.g., avoidingthe threatenedconsequence;but preoccupa-
tion with one motivatingscenarioneed not be proportionateto its impacton ac-
tion: people can do things mainly for prestige or money while stressing to
themselvesandothersthatthey areactingfromcharityor friendship.
I0Cf. theview,commonlyattributed toAristotle,that"Ourrationalactions[in-
cludingactionsfromvirtue]aretheactionswe performbecausewe thinktheywill
contributeto ourhappiness"(Meyer1993, p. 25). Rationalactionis subordinate
to ourdesirefor happiness,butI doubtAristotleimpliesthatall suchactionis di-
rectlyaimedat it. Fora defence,see Audi (1989, ch. 1).
456 RobertAudi

amountof rice.If Aristotle'spointis thatthe actionis in some sense "cho-

sen,"it is probablytrue,at leastif simplychoosingto do somethingis dis-
tinguishedfromchoosingit fromamongalternatives.But if decidingon
an actionimplieseitherits priorconsiderationor, especially,its selection
fromone or more alternatives,then decidingis not necessaryfor action
fromvirtue.
The largerquestionhereis not how the elementsunderlyingthe action
interactin the mindto produceor sustainthataction,butwhatthose ele-
mentsare.Whatis it thatmakesa descriptionrelevantto the virtuein the
right way. That is, what reason-indicatingdescriptionof a would-be
actionfromvirtueis suchthatif one performsthe actionfor a reasonthe
descriptionindicates,then it is an actionfromthe virtuein question?No
name of the virtueneed occurin the description;my equaltreatmentof
those in my carecanbe intentionalanddonefromjustice even if I do not,
internallyor aloud,describeor conceive it specificallyas just. Must the
descriptionentailthatthe actionis of the kindthat"bydefinition"may be
saidto instantiatethe virtue,e.g. justice (as thatvirtueappliesto action)?
I thinknot. Forone thing,it is enoughif thereis a strongpresumption,say
a strongprobabilitythatjustice is servedby proportioningthe pay one
gives to severalhourlyco-workersto theirtimeon thejob; the description
of this act would not be, by definition,a case ofjustice (not an easy con-
ditionto satisfynon-trivially,in any case). For another,an actioncan be
done fromvirtuewhen thereis only good reasonfor the agentto believe
that it meets an appropriatecondition.Virtueallows for fallibility,and
althoughthereare limits to how faroff the markone can be, actionfrom
virtueis consistentwith some degreeof "unavoidable" error.
Justwhatis requiredin the virtuousagent'sconceptionof the action,if
thatactionis to be performedfromvirtue?Theproblemis to capturewhat
I shall call areta-icconnectedness,the connectionbetweenthe actionand
the agent'sbeliefs anddesires,thatwe mustclarifyin orderto understand
action from virtue.Perhapsit is in partthe difficultyof explicatingthis
specialconnection,as distinctfromthe commonlydiscusseddifficultyof
formulatingrules for virtuousaction,that led Aristotle,and leads other
virtuetheorists,to try to understandvirtuousaction,in the sense of the
kindof actionappropriate to a virtuousagent,in termsof what is conso-
nantwith virtuouscharacter,as opposedto understanding such agentsin
termsof dispositionsto performa kind of action specifiableindepend-
entlyof the virtue,say in termsof the categoricalimperative,theprinciple
of utility,or Ross's primafacie duties.Doing the rightkindof deed in the
wrongway is not virtuous,even if the deed is just the one requiredby
soundprinciples.
 Acting From Virtue 457

Wemightbegin,in the spiritof Aristotle,withthe ideathatthe relevant

rangeof descriptionsis of a kindby which a personof practicalwisdom
would,in exercisingvirtue,be motivated,andthatthesewill fall on some
dimension from excess to deficiency. This is vague, but if we try to
achievespecificityin someof the standardways, we encounterfalsehood;
e.g., not just any descriptionimplyingthatthe actionmaximizeshuman
happinesswill serve:one couldwantto do the deedfor the wrongkindof
reason and therebyfail to qualify, at the time, as a (morally)virtuous
agent.For instance,being motivatedby considerationsof aggregatehap-
piness mightlead one to makean optimificbutinequitabledistributionof
rewardsto employees.Moreover,virtuetheorists,at least, seem commit-
ted to denyingthataretaicconnectednesscanbe capturedby descriptions
which, in the lightof rules(suchas the principleof utility),determinethe
appropriateaction.
One might thinkthat a Kantianapproachto acting from virtuecould
lead us to a solution of the aretaicconnectednessproblem.But if that
approachis to be morethanschematic,it musttakeus froman accountof
action from a morally acceptablemaxim to an accountof acting from
some appropriately relatedvirtue.It mightbe arguedthatall Kantianism
needs here is a notion of acting frommoralvirtueconceivedas dutiful-
ness, and it matterslittle how we distinguish,say, the virtue of justice
fromthatof fidelity,since, independentlyof these terms,ouroveralleth-
ical theorywill requirethe sameactionsin anygiven circumstancecalling
for moraldecision. But this high-handedapproachwould leave us with
too thin a theoryof how to describe,credit,criticize,and even educate,
people morally.Even if all we caredaboutwere gettingpeople to do the
right thing from some appropriatemoralreason,we must surely teach
moralityin termsof morespecificcategories-and quitepossiblyin terms
of the "departments" of moralitythatthe virtuescanbe takento represent.
I believe, then, that for both normativeand analyticalpurposeseven a
well-developedKantianethicsneedsa betterway of clarifyingthenotions
of virtueandof actionfromit.

3. The cognitive and motivational grounding of actionfrom

virtue

I wantnow to proposean accountof actingfromvirtuebuilt aroundsix

notions,corresponding to situational,conceptual,cognitive,motivational,
behavioural,and teleological dimensionsof such action. These dimen-
sions are,first,thefield of a virtue,roughlythe kindof situationin which
458 RobertAudi

it characteristically operates;second,the characteristictargetsit aims at,

suchas the well-beingof othersin the case of beneficenceandthe control
of fear in the case of courage;third,the agent's understandingof that
field; fourth,the agent'smotivationto act in thatfield in a certainway,
wherethatway is appropriate to the virtue;fifth,the agent'sactingon the
basis of thatunderstanding andmotivation;andsixth,the beneficiariesof
the virtue,aboveall (andperhapssolely) the person(s)who properlyben-
efit from our realizing it: for beneficence,otherpeople in general;for
charitableness,the needy;for fidelity,family and friends;etc. These six
notionsarespeciallyappropriate to explicatingactionfromvirtue(and,to
a lesser extent, action from emotionsand vices), as opposedto actions
fromvery differentsortsof dispositions,e.g. boredom,fatigue,andmis-
apprehension.None of those actionshas, for instance,a distinctfield or
target,thoughemotions,suchas love (of one kind)may also have benefi-
ciaries or, like vices, characteristicsufferers,such as the victims of pas-
sionate anger; and with fatigue, at least, while the "from"is (as in
combinationwith action-locutionsin general) explanatory,it does not
implywhat it most oftendoes with those locutions:a motivationalexpla-
nation."I Let us firstconsiderthe field of a virtue.
The field of justice mightbe roughlyretributionandthe distributionof
goods and evils; thatof fidelitymightbe conductrequiredby explicit or
implicit promises;and so forth. Such fields may overlap other aretaic
fields,but each has some distinctivefeature(s).How does a virtuousper-
sonunderstandthe fieldof, e.g., fidelity?Itwouldbe naturalforthe appro-
priateunderstanding to manifestitself in believingthatpromisescreatea
dutyto keepthem,thatworkingwithothersgeneratesobligationsto them,
andso on. But supposesomeonedid not use the conceptsof dutyor obli-
gation(at least here)andthoughtsimplythatit is good to keep promises
andgood to criticizepeoplewho do not.A virtuouspersoncouldbe skep-
tical aboutmoralconcepts or thinkthem indistinguishablefrom aretaic
conceptsin general.Wecanimaginesomeonewho, uponmakinga prom-
ise, wants to keep it becausethat is appropriateto humanrelationships,
and tendsto feel disapprovalof anyonewho does not keep promises,on
the groundthatthe behaviouris inappropriate to such relationships.And
of course,a personmightwantto keep a promisebecausepromise-keep-
ing is commandedby God.A moralfield cannotbe understoodwithouta
I I thankthe Editorfor drawingmy attentionto this contrast(whichdeserves
independentelaborationon anotheroccasion).I mustalso forgoaddressingcon-
trastsbetweenactionsfromvirtueand (certain)actionsfromvice (e.g. slovenli-
ness) and from emotion(e.g. anxiety). Still, some of what is said below about
actionfromvirtueshouldhelpin clarifyingactionfromvices andemotions,espe-
cially where the latteris intentionaland to the extentthatvices or emotionsare
constitutedby desiresor beliefs or combinationsthereof.
 ActingFrom Virtue 459

sense of its (moral)normativity,but that sense is not restrictedeitherto

virtueconcepts(as Aristotlemay seem to imply) or to hedonicones (as
some utilitariansperhapstendto think)or to deontologicalprinciples(as
Kantiansmay tend to think).It does appearthatthereare some general
requirementsfor understanding any moralfield, e.g. thata kindof impar-
tialitybe recognizedas necessary,thatthe well-beingof people mustbe
given some weight, and thatthe relevantnormsbe, if not "designed"to
overruleself-interest,thencapableof conflictingwith it.12 It may be that
actionfromvirtuerequiresan exerciseof somenormativeconcept,if only
thatof whatis in someappropriate way goodorbad;andcertainlythepos-
session of a virtueentailsa recognitionalcapacity.A loyal person,e.g.,
musthave a sense of whento act in supportof friends:this is partof what
it is to understandthe field of a virtue,andwithoutit one would not act
from virtue. But neitherthis special requirementfor understandingthe
field of a virtue nor the general requirementsfor comprehensionof a
moralfieldentailthatactionfroma virtuemusthaveanyparticularmotive
amongthose appropriate to its field.
Withall this in mind,we can see thataretaicconnectednessneed not
proceedthroughanydirectapplicationof a moralor even a virtueconcept
(thoughthis apparentlydoes not hold for all normativeconcepts).This
point bearsespeciallyon the motivationaldimensionof actingfromvir-
tue. Most important,action from a given virtueneed not be internally
motivated,i.e. (roughly),performedfrom a desireto realizethatvirtue.
Let me clarifythis by examplefirst,then in generalterms.SupposeI see
two childrendividingapplesthey havejust picked,andI notice thattheir
pickings are aboutequal. I see one child take far more thanhalf, and I
want to intervene.I do so in orderto persuadethe greedy one to share
equally.I may see this persuasionas just; but I may also see it as appro-
priateto their similarinvestmentsof time and energy;as imposing on
them the way civilized people shouldtreateach other;as affirmingthe
equalityof the two as persons;as promotingharmonybetweenthem;or
in othernormativeways appropriatelyconnectedwith justice. If I am
12 Oneproblemis how to characterize the moralpointof view. Fordiscussion
of this see KurtBaier's book of that title (1958); Frankena(1973); and Gert
(1988). I assumethatjust as one can takethe moralpointof view even if one re-
gardsit as derivativefromthatof rationality,people can takethe moralpoint of
view even if theyconsidermoralstandardstheologicallygrounded,andthatthere
is thusa way to conceivedivinecommandsso thatobedienceto themcan be mor-
ally,notjust religiously,motivated.A similarproblemis how to squarethe possi-
bility of conflicts between moralityand self-interestwith the kind of egoism
apparentlyimplicitin Aristotleand otherswho offer a plausibleethical theory
from egoistic startingpoints. The beginningof an answeris that for Aristotle,
while moralvirtueis essentialto ourflourishingandhence moralconducttends
to serveself-interest,long-runself-interesthas socialdimensionsandcanthereby
conflictwith moraldemands.
460 RobertAudi

motivatedto interveneon thebasisof anyof theseconceptions,my action

seems suitablyconnectedwithjustice forme to countas actingfromit: in
the firstcase the conceptofjustice appliesdirectly,in the others(on plau-
sibleassumptions)indirectly.If I act fromanyof thesemotives,I act from
justice and,if they areproperlygroundedin my character,fromvirtue.'3
Wecandiscern,then,two ways in which,on thebasisof anunderstand-
ing of the field of a virtue,an agentcanact fromit: directlyandindirectly.
Both notions which we might pair with direct and indirect aretaic
grounding-need explication.I act directlyfrom, say,justice provided
that,first,an adequateconceptof justice (whetherI would use the word
ornot) figurescentrallyin niy motivation;second,the contentof my moti-
vationis appropriate tojustice,as whereI wantto compensatea victimof
wrongdoing; third,the motivationitself, e.g. a desireto treatpeople
and
equallyin distributivematters,is properlygroundedin my character.I act
indirectlyfromjusticewhenan adequatesubsidiaryconcept,suchas fair-
ness, is motivationallycentralin thatway, or where(a) my motivationis
appropriatelysubsumableunderthe relevantvirtueconceptor a subsidi-
aryone, say whereI act in orderto dividethe children'stakingsin accord-
ance with their efforts, and (b) the relevantmotivationhas a specific
contentappropriateto justice and is sufficientlyconnectedwith the rele-
vantaretaicelementsto groundthe actionin them.(Themotivationof an
actionfromvirtueneed not, however,be a standingelementin the agent,
e.g. a long-term commitmentto the moral education of children, as
opposedto a desirerespondingto a uniquesituation.)The second,indirect
case is morecomplicated.Supposethatneed, in additionto effort,is cru-
cial forthejustice of the divisionin question;thenmy (exclusive)concern
with equalityof effortwill not sufficeto subsume,underthe conceptof
justice, my attemptto distributein accordwith effort:I am too faroff the
mark.I might qualify as trying to act fromjustice, and even as coming
close;butthereis a limitto how muchone canmisunderstand the features
of a situationrelevantto a virtueandstill countas actingfromthatvirtue
as opposedto unsuccessfullytryingto do the relevantkindof action.
One way to give a theoreticalaccountof actingindirectlyfromvirtue
is to assumethatan action'sbeing performedfromvirtuesuperveneson
naturalpropertiesof the action,or at leaston someset of propertiesunder-
lying its virtuousness.Theideawouldbe thatan actionfromvirtueis such
becauseof its morebasic properties,such as being motivatedby a belief
thatthe childrenshouldhavesharesof applesproportionate to theirefforts
in pickingthem.The suggestionis meantto be minimallycontroversial,
II
Actingfromjusticewouldbe actingfortherelevantreason.Actingfora rea-
son is a complicatednotionwhich I presupposehere;an accountof it, and ap-
praisalof otheraccounts,is given in my (1986).
 Acting From Virtue 461

andfor anyonewho findsthe notionof supervenienceunhelpfulwe could

alsoputthepointin termsof a dependenceof thevirtuousnessof an action
on otherpropertiesof it. Thus,even anintuitionistwho thinksthattheobli-
gationof beneficenceis normativelybasiccouldallowthatanactioncould
be performedfrom beneficencewhenmotivatedby propertiesof the action
that are, for the agent,psychologicallymore basic thanits beneficence.
The agentmight,e.g., conceive the actionthatin fact is performedfrom
beneficence,not in termsof beneficencebutsimplyas relievingsuffering.
It is difficultto specify in a generalway what propertiesare basic to an
actionfromvirtue,but supposefor the sake of argumentthat,say, gener-
osity in an actionsuperveneson its characteras a givingof somethingvol-
untarilyand in the (reasonable)belief thatit will benefitthe recipient(as
opposedto giving it froma sense thatit is owed).We cannow say thatan
actionis indirectlygroundedin a virtueprovidedit is notdirectlygrounded
in it butis basedon the agent'sbelievingthe actionto havea suitablesub-
set of the base propertiesforthatvirtue(thoughnot necessarilyunderthis
or any othertechnicaldescription).Roughly,the differenceis between
aiming at the targetof the virtueunderthe relevantaretaicconceptand
aimingatit undersomeappropriate descriptionframedin termsof thebase
propertiesof actionfromthatvirtue.Thisneednot be all of thoseproper-
ties: if Carolgives moretime to studentsthanshe thinksthey deserve,in
orderto teachthemmore,this may be enoughto qualifyherpedagogical
actionsas performedfromgenerosity.Butone canactfroma virtueby act-
ing fromits groundswithouthavingthatveryvirtuein mind.Thisis a pat-
terncharacteristicof indirectaretaicgrounding.
The case of generosityraises the questionwhether,for some virtues,
indirectaretaicgroundingis the onlykindpossible.SupposeI give a Ping-
Pong set to a child, not in orderto benefitthe child,but simplybecause,
afteryears of preferringthe sibling,I wantto behavegenerouslytoward
this child.Canthis actbe performedfromgenerosity(andtherebydirectly
groundedin it)? Acting from generosityis surelynot entailedby acting
from a desire to be generous.Even if one has this virtue,one might be
insteadactingforthe wrongkindof reason,thoughin accordwith the vir-
tue. Surelymy actionhere,unlikea just deedperformedfroma desireto
be just towardthose concerned,wouldnot be an actionfromvirtueat all
andso wouldnot exhibitdirectaretaicgrounding.'4
14 This sortof problemis insightfullydiscussedby Williams(1985, pp. 10-1).
He has suggested(in conversation)thatjustice is one virtuesuchthatactionfrom
it mustbe intemallymotivated.Justicedoes seem the best candidatefor a virtue
meetingthis condition,but I doubtthatit does-unless, perhaps,we restrictit to
just (Broadie1991,p. 88). If
a specifickind,e.g. the "trait"of beingretributively
we construeanytraitnarrowlyenough,actionsfromit will be correspondingly re-
strictedas to appropriatemotivation.
462 RobertAudi

Suppose,however,thatI give the Ping-Pongset bothbecauseI wantto

benefitthe childforits own sakeandbecauseI wantto behavegenerously.
PerhapsI may now be acting from virtue thoughnot purely so. This
wouldbe a case of partialdirectaretaicgrounding.The actionwouldalso
be performedin the service of virtue, since I act partlyfrom a second
orderproattitudetowardgenerosity.Suchhigherorderattitudesare,how-
ever,notnecessaryforhavingvirtue,nordoes actingfromthementailact-
ing from virtue.Acting from a virtue requirespromotingor otherwise
properlydealingwith certainelementsin its field-its beneficiaries,say
childrenor the needy or the oppressed,wherethe beneficiariesfigurein
the targetof thevirtue.Actingin theserviceof a virtuerequirespromoting
the virtue.Doing thatmay affectthe beneficiarieslittleor not at all. There
is no need to explicatehere all the categoriesthese pointsbringout. It is
enoughto have provideda frameworkfor doing thatand to have shown
thatan action'sbeingexplicitlydirectedtowardpromotinga virtueis nei-
thernecessarynor sufficientfor its constitutingactingfromvirtue.
The distinctionbetweendirectandindirectgroundingin virtueis neu-
tral between Kantianand Aristotelianconceptionsof virtue and acting
therefrom:it applieswhethervirtuesareinternalizations of independently
knowablemoral(or other)principlesor whether,on the contrary,moral
(or other)principlesareknowableonly as generalizationsfromthebehav-
iour of people with virtuesof character.The distinctionis also neutral
with respectto the problemsof cooperatingmotivesin ethicaltheory.My
conceptionof acting fromvirtuedoes not requirethatone be motivated
solely by the relevant aretaic ground(s),the ground(s) appropriateto
actionfromthatvirtue.This exclusivityof motivationis requiredonly for
actingpurelyfromvirtue.If one actsfrombothlove anda sense ofjustice,
one does not actpurelyfrommoralvirtue;butlove is nota companionthat
must prevent,as opposedto outshining,one's acting from the virtueof
justice.
Imagine, however, that by contrast with a cooperating non-moral
motive, I have afurther reason;e.g., I am persuadingthe greedychildren
to shareequally,not for its own sakebut in orderto promotehumanhap-
piness, or in orderto abideby the will of God.Thereare at least two rel-
evantpossibilities(bothalso applicableto non-moralvirtues):first,thatI
takethe furtherendto be morallyrelevant,e.g. to be an appropriate moral
groundof the action,andsecondly,thatI takethe furtherendto be an ade-
quategroundbut have no moralconceptionof how this is so. In the first
case, we could say thatthe ultimateend of my actionis moral;andin part
in the light of suchcases we mightadoptwhatI shallcall the moralmoti-
vation thesis: that an action from (moral)virtuemust be morallymoti-
vated,thoughnot alwaysintrinsicallyso motivated,e.g. performedforthe
 ActingFrom Virtue 463

sake of justice. Heremy action serves a moralend, but not directly,"in

itself'; if it is from, e.g., justice, it need not be internallymotivated,
althoughit wouldbe motivatedby some considerationconsonantwithan
aretaicallyinternalmotive, suchas to rectifyan unequaldistribution.
The secondcase suggestsa moralconnectionthesis:thatgiven a suita-
ble immediatemotive connectedin the rightway with the moralfield of
thevirtue,the actioncanbe performedfromthatvirtueeven if the action's
ultimatemotivation is not moral.'"Acting ultimatelyfrom love, e.g.,
seems consonantwith acting(partly)fromjustice, providedthe immedi-
ate motivationof the action is of the rightkind, say a determinationto
treatpeople equally.This would be a beneficent,perhapsa natural,kind
of justice.'6 If naturaljustice exists, it showsthatactionfromvirtueneed
not be froma single virtue-a pointthatis in any case implicitin the pos-
sibility of acting at once from, say, courageandjustice, as where one
justly andcourageouslydeniesan unfairrequestmadeby an intimidating
employee.
The moralmotivationthesis seems plausible:it appearscharacteristic
of actingfrommoralvirtuethatthe agentactat leastindirectlyfroma suit-
able moralmotive.The moralconnectionthesis, which denies thateven
ultimatemoralmotivationis necessaryfor actionfromvirtue,also seems
plausible,but is harderto assess (thereare of coursecounterpartaretaic
connectionandmotivationtheses,nor shouldwe presupposea sharpdis-
tinction between moral and othervirtues).What if moral obligationis
rootedin (non-moral)considerationsof happiness,or in God'swill, con-
ceived non-morally?If this is possible,thenit shouldbe possiblefor con-
siderationsof humanhappinessor of divinewill to groundmoralactions,
and hence to be ultimate,independentmotives for actions from virtue.
Perhapswe mustallow thatpossibilityif we areto havean accountof act-
ing fromvirtueneutralwith respectto all of the majormoraltheories.For
suppose that a hedonistic or divine commandview of the grounds of
moralityis correct.Why,then,could I not be actingfrommoralvirtueif
I ammotivatedby hedonicconsiderations,orby divinecommand,even if
II An immediatemotive is one thatthe actionis performed
(directly)in order
to satisfy,as whereone drinkssimplyto slakethirst;butone could drinkto rehy-
dratethe body,which one does in tum to avoid suffering.If one does not avoid
sufferingin orderto satisfya still furthermotive,this (self-protective)motive is
ultimate.Motivationalchainscan be long, so thatthe connectionbetweenan ac-
tion anda virtueultimatelygroundingit may be extended;and since the (direct)
in-order-torelationis non-transitive(in the sensethatone canA in orderto B and
B in orderto C, yet notA in orderto C), an action'sultimatemotivesneednot un-
derlieit in the way its immediatemotivesdo.
16 This contrastswith the austereprincipledkind of justice Kantwould have
us cultivateandact from.He is not, however,committedto treatingactingfrom
virtueas somethingwe can do "atwill", nor is therea directdutyto satisfythis
description.
464 RobertAudi

I see no connectionbetweenthosemotivesandmoralityas such(perhaps

becauseI simplydo not operate,directlyat least,with moralcategories)?
I am, afterall, actingfromthe groundsof such virtue,andto this extent
one might regardmy action as (indirectly)aretaicallygrounded.There
wouldthusbe a connection,which I couldcome to see, betweenmy con-
ceptionof the actionandmoralvirtue;still, my actingfrommoralvirtue
wouldnot requiremy being,in anydirectway if in anyway at all, morally
motivated.
Therightconclusionto drawheremaybe thatit is simplynot clearhow
narrowlywe shouldconstrueactingfrommoralvirtue(or actingfromvir-
tue simpliciter).It is best to distinguisha narrowerand broadernotion:
One mighthold thatin the case of actingultimatelyfor a non-moralpur-
pose, say froma desireto treatsomeonelovingly,the agent,if actingfrom
a moralvirtue,is nonethelessnot doingso in a moralway.Perhapsso; but
mustwe requireof all actionsfroma moralvirtuethatthey mustbe per-
formedin a moralway?If actingfromvirtuewereequivalentto actingfor
the sake of it (in some senses of this phrase),thatmightbe so; but acting
for the sake of virtueis not necessaryfor actingfromit. This appliesboth
to acting for the sake of the virtuepromotionally,as where one tries to
enhancethe amountof honestyin the world,andto actingfor the sake of
it acquisitionally,as whereone actsto tryto producethe virtuein oneself.
The lattercase shows thatactingfor the sake of a virtueis also not suffi-
cient for actingfromit.
We shouldadd, then, to the distinctionamongdegreesof acting from
virtuewhich emergewhen we considerthe cooperationof virtuouswith
non-virtuousmotives, a distinctionbetween (a) acting, to any degree,
froma virtue,in the way(s) (conceptuallyspeaking)most closely tied to
it as to the groundsof the action, particularlyin regardto the action's
being conceivedin termsof the relevantconcept,e.g. justice or fidelity,
and(b) simplyactingfromit in some otherway thatmanifeststhatvirtue.
The formercases are most often foundamongactionsthatexhibitdirect
aretaicgrounding;one actsbothfromthevirtueandin a certainway under
the concept of it. The latter are most often found among actions that
exhibitindirectaretaicgrounding;one acts fromthe virtuebut not under
the conceptof it, only undersome suitablyconnectedconcept.Aristotle
sometimeshadin mindthe former,strongernotion-acting fromvirtuein
theway mostclosely tiedto it as to the groundsof the action;buthis over-
all moraltheory,like the most plausiblevirtueandruletheoriesin ethics
generally,leaves roomfor the weakernotion.It is clearthatin eithercase
the actionis rootedin the agentin a way thatmakesit plausibleboth to
say,withAristotle,thattheactionexpressesvirtueas a featureof character
and, with Kant,that it manifestsgood will. These points, in turn,make
 ActingFrom Virtue 465

clearer an importantpoint suggested above: action from virtue, as

opposedto actionmerelyin conformitywith virtue,is very importantin
appraisingpeople: the former,unlike the latter,is commonlya reliable
indicationof theiraretaiccharacter.'7

4. The moral scope of acting from virtue

In the light of the connectionsnow apparentbetweenvirtueconceptsand

moregeneralones, bothmoralandnon-moral,we can explorethe moral
scope of actionfromvirtueand,in particular,whetheractionfrommoral
virtueis sufficientlycomprehensivefor a morallyadequatelife. Suppose
(artificially)thatone actedonly frommoralvirtue,andalwaysfromsome
moralvirtueappropriatein the circumstances.Wouldthis sufficefor liv-
ing a morallyadequatelife?
An affirmativeansweris certainlyplausible,at least for those views
that take the possession of the moralvirtuesto be the internalizationof
some comprehensiveset of soundmoralstandards.If, however,we tryto
framea list of moralvirtuesin termsof whichto focus the question,there
is greaterdifficulty.One problemis gettinga sufficientlycomprehensive
list of virtuesfromthe moraldomainalone:wouldjustice, fidelity,hon-
esty, andbeneficencebe sufficient,if broadlyconstrued,or mustwe add
to the agent'srepertoire,say, courageandeven intellectualvirtues,since
theseseem requiredforrealizingthemoralvirtueswheredangerproduces
fear, or where insufficient informationthreatensto make reasonable
choice impossible?A moredifficultproblemis how to coveraretaic con-
flicts: just as obligationsof beneficenceand fidelity can conflict when
beneficentlyhelping someonein distressrequiresbreakinga promise,a
virtuousagent can be pulled in two directionsby differentvirtuousten-
dencies.Herepracticalwisdomis requiredin the sameway that,for Ross,
it seems requiredto deal with conflictsamongthe primafacie dutieshe
thoughtmorally fundamental.'8Practicalwisdom is not a specifically
moralvirtuebuta higherorderone applicableto reflectionsanddecisions
concerningmoraland otherkindsof virtues.If, as is likely, it is required
fora morallyadequatelife on thepartof an otherwisevirtuousagent,then
II Humegoes so far as to say it is the motive, not the action,that(directly?)
deservespraiseor blame(Treatise, p. 477; cf. p. 464).
18 See especiallyRoss (1939, ch. 2). The sortsof problemsemergingin the text
may indicateone reasonwhy Aristotlemighthavethoughtthe virtuesunified; re-
flectionon the problemscertainlysuggeststhatin a virtuouspersonat leastmany
virtuesareinterconnected, butthatby no meansrequiresa strongkindof unity.
466 RobertAudi

the exerciseof moralvirtuealone is not sufficientfor such a life, even if

the exerciseof virtue, overall,is.
To say,however,thatactingfrommoralvirtueis not sufficientby itself
for a morallyadequatelife does not entailthatvirtueethics is not suffi-
cient for the action-guidingtask of normativeethics. By virtueethics I
meanroughlythe kindof ethicalpositionaccordingto which the follow-
ing two ideas arecentral:first,the fundamentalmoralconceptsarevirtue
concepts,as opposed,above all, to rule concepts;and second, the basic
normativeaimsof moralagentsarearetaicallydetermined,in theways we
have seen, by the requirementsof actingfromvirtue,as opposed,say, to
being dictatedby a commitmentto followingcertaindeonticrules.Aris-
totle can be read as holdingsuch a view in some places, for instancein
sayingthat
actionsare calledjust or temperatewhen they are the sortthata
just ortemperatepersonwoulddo. Butthejust andtemperateper-
son is not one who [merely]does these actions,but the one who
does themin the way in whichjust or temperatepeople do them.
(1 105b6-9)19
Takenas a statementof virtuetheoryas appliedto thesetraits,thispassage
impliesthatwhatmakesan act,e.g.,just, is its beingthekindajust person
as suchwouldperform(in a certainway);we do not explicatewhata just
personis by firstidentifyingcertaintypes of acts andthen characterizing
thatkindof personin termsof a suitabledispositionto performacts of that
kind.20This metaphysicalconceptionof virtueethics is consistentwith
takingpracticalwisdomor otherhigherordervirtuesas crucialfor direct-
ing the virtuousagentin everydaylife. Thus,a virtueethicsis at leastnot
preventedon thatscore fromprovidinga basis for the morallyadequate
life.
Thereremains,however,a significantproblem.Even if the notionof a
virtuous person is metaphysicallymore basic than that of a virtuous
action,thereis the epistemologicaldifficultyof determiningwhat, or even
who, a morallyvirtuouspersonis withoutalreadyknowingwhat sortsof
thing such an agent would do. Can we reasonablytake someone as a
modelofjustice orfidelitywithoutrelyingon someideaof whatdeedsare
appropriateto such a person?If not, how can a virtuetheoryever tell us
whatwe shoulddo, even in the matterof buildingcharacter,if we do not
alreadyknow? One Aristoteliananswer is that if we know our proper
functionand see how it is properlyexercised,i.e., so exercisedas to pro-
19Cf. NE 1129a7-9,which seems at least to reversethe emphasis:"thestate
everyonemeansin speakingof justice is the statethatmakesus doersof just ac-
tions".
defenderof virtuetheoryespeciallysensitiveto someof the
20 A contemporary

conceptualproblemsarisinghereis JorgeGarcia(e.g., Garcia1989,pp. 277-83).

 Acting From Virtue 467

duce a life of flourishing,we can see how the agentin question-the vir-
tuous agent-chooses in mattersinvolving pleasure and pain, which
constitutethe largerfield of moral virtue. In rough terms,the virtuous
agentaimsat targetsappropriate to humanflourishingandacts so as to hit
a meanbetweenexcess and deficiency.Supposethis is correct.Thereis
still a normativenotionbuiltintoflourishing,andthis would seem at best
difficultto discernwithouta senseof whatbehaviouraloutcomes areto be
sought.Some such outcomesseem essentialfor hittingthe righttargets.
Are we happywhen merelycontent,or mustwe performcertainintellec-
tual, aesthetic,andphysicaltaskswith a certainkindof result?Are there
not intellectualstandards,suchas thoseof logic andmathematics,at least,
thatmustbe broughtto ouractivitiesas guideswithinwhichvirtuedevel-
ops? (Aristotlehimself must have thoughtso, for he consideredphilo-
sophical contemplation the highest happiness and surely saw it as
governedby logical andepistemicstandards.)21
It is truethatonce we have role models, virtuecan be taughtby their
example and withoutantecedent(propositional)standards.Historically,
then,virtueethicsmightoperateindependentlyof ruleor othernon-virtue
accounts, such as intuitionism.But conceptually,virtue notions seem
dependenton othernormativeconcepts.
This negative conclusion must not be overstressed.It remainsquite
possible that the moral worthof actionsdependson theirbeing actions
from virtue:even if virtue concepts cannotby themselvestell us what
conductbefits us as moralagents, it may be thatthe only (or the most)
morallycreditableway to do the thingsin questionis fromvirtue.A sec-
ond majormoralthesis is also left open:that even the moralworth-in
the sense of goodness-of personslies in theirvirtuouscharacter(or lack
of it).22Togetherthese theses constitutea virtuetheoryof moral worth,
andthey may be regardedas partiallyexplicatingwhatit is for character
to be morallyfundamental.This kind of virtueethics is consistentboth
with Kantianismand with otherviews commonlycontrastedwith virtue
ethics when the latteris construedas embodyinga theoryof moralobli-
gation.23

21 Some of the largeliterature on Aristotle'sconceptionof happinesssupports

my points here. See, e.g., Cooper (1975); Kraut(1979); Maclntyre (1981);
Broadie(1991);andPrior(1991).
22 Moralworthin the sense of dignityis a different,capacitynotion;but it is

related:it is largelythe capacityfor good character.

23 Regarding Kant,we wouldhaveto assumethatactionsfromduty,whichhave
moralworth,arealso performedfromvirtue.Somepassagesin Humesuggesthe
mightbe committedto the virtuetheoryof moralworth,e.g., "'Tisevident,that
when we praiseany actions,we regardonly the motivesthatproducedthem ...
The externalperformancehas no merit ... all virtuousactionsderivetheirmerit
only fromvirtuousmotives,andareconsider'dmerelyas signs of thosemotives"
468 RobertAudi

If thereis a conceptualdependenceof virtueconceptson othernorma-

tive concepts,it does not indicatea one-waystreet.Any moralruleswith
enoughspecificityto guideday-to-daybehaviourneed interpretation and
refinementto be useful in makingmoraldecisions.It could turnout that
practicalwisdomis indispensablein usingtheserules,andthata basicele-
ment in such wisdom is a tendency to seek a reflective equilibrium
between plausiblerules and virtuousinclinations.Even thoroughgoing
virtuetheoristscan grantrulesa place.Suchrulesas theycountenanceare
generalizationsfrom virtuousconduct,for instancefrom the choices of
thephronimos,ratherthan,say, formulaefor optimizingnon-moralgood
(as for utilitarianism),or specificationsof obligatoryact-types(as for the
Kantiantradition).But theserulesstill have a degreeof authorityandcan
overridevirtuousinclinationsin some cases.At worst,the rulesarea gen-
eralizationfrommany such inclinations,andthese rulesmay thus imply
thatinclinationsconflictingwith themarearetaicallydeviant.Evenmak-
ing virtuesconceptuallyfundamentalneed not make them indefeasible
sources of moral authority.Similarly,if one could specify the types of
actionsa virtuousagentshouldin generalperform,practicalwisdomand
a virtuousdispositionwouldbe requiredforapplyingthe relevantrulesin
particularcases.

Conclusion

On the broadconceptionof actingfromvirtuedevelopedhere,it is areta-

ically groundedintentionalaction:it is action groundedin virtueeither
directly,as wherethe agentactsexplicitlyin the lightof the conceptof the
virtuein question,or indirectly,as whereone acts on the basis of a differ-
ent kindof considerationthatis suitablyrelevantto the virtuein termsof
its field andtarget.Suchactionis, then,fromvirtuein beingexplainedby

(1888, pp. 477-8). Even a utilitariancan holdthe virtuetheoryof moralworth-

thoughonly as a contingenttruth-since virtuouscharacter,or its producingac-
tions, need not contributeto intrinsicvalue. Frankenasuggeststhat"a man and
his actionsaremorallygood if it is at leasttruethat,whateverhis actualmotives
in actingare,his sense of dutyor desireto do the rightis so strongin him thatit
wouldkeephimtryingto do his dutyanyway"(1973,p. 70). Thisdiffersfromthe
virtuetheoryof moralworthin at leasttwo ways:therelevantactionsneednot be
performedfromvirtue(since the actualmotivesarenot crucial);andthe content
of the relevantmotivationis both specificallymoraland indeedrestrictedto the
deonticconceptof rightandduty.(However,I see nothingin Frankena'soverall
positionthatrequireshis holdingeitherthe first,permissive,thesisor the second,
restrictiveone.)
 ActingFrom Virtue 469

beliefs and desires properlyconnectedwith the appropriatearetaicele-

ments in character,and it is virtuous bothbecauseof its connectionwith
those elementsand becauseof whatkind of actionit is. This conception
of actionfromvirtueprovidesa model for understanding moralactionin
general, conceived as action having moral worth:just as action from
moralvirtuedoes not requireactingfor the sake of moralvirtue,and can
be groundedonly indirectlyin it throughbeliefs andmotivationappropri-
ate to the moral virtue in question,moral action, even conceived non-
aretaically,neednotbe performedforthe sakeof a moralprincipleor even
as an applicationthereof,and can be groundedonly indirectlyin such a
principle.Moreover,therearedegreesto which one may act fromvirtue,
dependingespecially on the extent to which non-virtuousmotives con-
tributeto the action in question.The moralworthof an action can also
dependon the balanceamongmoralandnon-moralinfluenceson its per-
formance,andthis pointappliesto non-virtuetheoriesas well as to virtue
theories.
One of the largestquestionsraisedby the accountof actingfromvirtue
presentedhereis whatvalues,if any,constrainthe developmentof virtue.
If the notionof virtueis not merelyhistorical,notjust a notionrootedin
the establishedpracticesof one or anothersociety,if insteadit belongsto
a universallyvalid ethic, then it is apparentlynot entirelyautonomous
with respectto moralandothervalues.Moralvirtueseemsbest construed
as a kindof internalization of moralvaluesor perhapsmoralprinciplesor
other standardsof moral conduct.It is not their ground,though it may
influencetheir contentthroughthe effortwe regularlymake to achieve
reflectiveequilibriumbetween virtuousinclinationsand generalprinci-
ples. Moralvirtuemay groundmoralconductgenetically,butnot concep-
tually; and this is confirmedby the way in which we must understand
acting from moral virtue:not simply in relationto people with certain
traits,but in relationto the reasonsfor whichthey act, aboveall the kinds
of reasons pertainingto what is of moral value or to what is morally
requiredby generalrulesor standards.
In the theoryof moralworth,however,virtueis absolutelycentral.This
point is easily obscuredby the commonattemptto construevirtueethics
as providingby itself an adequatetheoryof moralobligation.Virtuecan
be the groundof moral worth even withoutbeing the groundof moral
rightnessor obligatoryconduct.Agents cannottruly act morally if, as
moralnihilismhas it, thereare no soundmoralstandards;but according
to both virtuetheoriesand otherplausibleethicalviews, actionsgain no
moral worth by mere conformitywith sound standardsof conduct:the
rightactionsperformedin the wrongway, andespeciallyfromthe wrong
motives, have no moralworth. The mere existence of objectively true
470 RobertAudi

moral standards,even together with our regularconformityto them,

would not guaranteemoralaction-action from virtue or from duty or
fromany othermorallyappropriate ground-and mightfor thatvery rea-
son bringno moralgoodnessinto the world.
Virtueneed not be acquired,moreover,fromstudyingmoralvalues as
such;it is normallyacquiredby imitationandsocialization,andit proba-
bly cannotbe taughtwithoutmodels.Thesetwo truthsdo muchto account
for the appearanceof conceptualautonomythe notionof virtueseems to
have. In normalhumanlives, virtuemay be geneticallypriorto moral
principles.It also has a kind of operationalautonomy,both in the sense
thatone can act fromvirtuewithoutbeing motivatedby any aretaically
externalstandardsandeven in the sense thatone's immediatemotivation
need not be moralat all. Whetherthe fundamentalmoralstandardsare
rules or intuitionsor non-moralgoods or somethingelse again,virtueis
requiredto realize those standards,and acting from virtue is the main
basis of the moralworthof agents.24

Department of Philosophy ROBERT AUDI

University of Nebraska
Lincoln, Nebraska 68588-0321
USA

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24 An earlier
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