Freedom from Arrest
But 1987 Constitution states that for offenses
Martinez v Morfe
1. Manuel Martinez (falsification of public document) and
Fernando Bautista, Sr. (violation of Revised Election Code
for distributing food during campaigns) were delegates to
the 1972 Constitutional Convention. Both of them
were facing criminal prosecutions.
2. Judge Morfe ordered their arrest and the two were later
on arrested while the Constitutional Convention was still
in session.
3. Art 145 of RPC gives immunity to legislators: “arrest or
search any member thereof, except in case such member
has committed a crime punishable under [such] Code by a
penalty higher than prision mayor”
4. NO immunity. Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935
Constitution provides that immunity from arrest does not
cover any prosecution for treason, felony and breach of
the peace. (consti is ff since it came after rpc 1932)
5. Section 15 has revoked Art 145 of RPC (1932) since this
RPC provision is inconsistent with this section of the
constitution.
6. Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined
by the RPC or any special statute.
7. In this case, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista
were arrested fall under the category of “breach of
peace,” therefore, they cannot invoke the privilege from
arrest provision of the Constitution.
8. Any person who acted against public peace is susceptible
to prosecution.
9. There is a full recognition of necessity to have members of
Congress, and likewise delegates to the Constitutional
Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to enable
them to discharge their vital responsibilities.
10. In today’s rule, dapat immune sila.
People v Jalosjos
1. Rep. Romeo Jalosjos, a re-elected Representative of the
First District of Zamboanga del Norte, is asking that he be
allowed to attend legislative and committee meetings
despite being confined at the national penitentiary while
his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.
2. NO member in Congress is exempts from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons.
3. Being a member of Congress does not allow for a
difference in treatment because the court cannot validate
badges of inequality.
4. The necessities imposed by public welfare (i.e.
imprisonment and detention) may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain
groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
5. There is a provision in the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitution that allows for the immunity from arrest or
detention of Senators of members of the House of
Congress.
punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there
was no immunity from arrest (VI.11).
6. Court stated that Jalosjos did not give enough reason to
be exempted from Art. VI, Sec. 11 which states that
Congress cannot compel absent members to attend
sessions if the reason for the absence is a legitimate one
7. Leaving cell for emergency official or medical reasons is
acceptable.
8. Being a detainee, Jalosjos should not even have been
allowed by the prison authorities at the National
Penitentiary to perform his legislative functions.
a. Ang dami nang leniency na binigay sa kanya, so di
na talaga dapat pagbigyan pa.
Trillanes IV v Pimentel Sr.
1. BAIL SEASON. WALA PANG TRIAL. BAWAL LUMABAS KAHIT
WALA PANG TRIAL.
2. While being tried in a criminal case involving the Oakwood
Incident, Antonio Trillanes files an Omnibus Motion before
the RTC to let him attend Senate Sessions and work within
his place of detention. SC Denied.
3. His case is similar too People v. Jalosjos whose privileges
sought were similarly denied; that election to office does
not obliterate a criminal charge; and, that emergency or
temporary leaves are under the discretion of the
authorities or the courts as allowed to all detainees.
4. Presumption of innocence does not carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and political rights.
5. The determination that the evidence of guilt strong,
whether ascertained in a hearing of an application for bail
or imported from a trial court's judgment of conviction,
justifies the detention of an accused as a valid curtailment
of his right to provisional liberty "regardless of the stage of
the criminal action." Such justification for confinement with
its underlying rationale of public self-defense applies
equally to detention prisoners like petitioner or convicted
prisoners appellants like Jalosjos.
6. Trillanes’ election is NOT proper legal justification for him
to work in his capacity as senator.
7. The case against petitioner is not administrative in nature.
And there is no "prior term" to speak of.
8. The doctrine of condonation does not apply to criminal
cases.
9. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office, does not
obliterate a criminal charge.
10. His electoral victory only signifies pertinently that when the
voters elected him to the Senate, "they did so with full
awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action
[and] . . . with the knowledge that he could achieve only
such legislative results which he could accomplish within
the confines of prison."
Speech and Debate Clause
Jimenez v. Cabangbang
1. On November 14, 1958, Rep. Bartolome Cabangbang of
Bohol (2nd District), also chair of the House Committee on
National Defense, published in newspapers of general
 circulation an open letter addressed to President Carlos P.
Garcia alleging that there were three operational plans by
some members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, that
these AFP officers had colluded with communists, and that
the Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, was
planning a coup to place himself as President.
2. The letter alleged that the planners of the coup had
petitioners Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert, and Jose
Lukban, among other AFP officers, under their guise and
that said officers may or may not have been aware that
they were being used to meet such an end.
3. Petitioners thus filed a civil action for recovery of damages
against respondent for libel. Respondent moved to dismiss
the complaint, arguing that it was not libelous and that,
even if it were, said letter was privileged communication
due to it being part of his function in the House of
Representatives. The lower court granted the motion, thus
petitioners appealing to the Supreme Court, SC affirmed.
4. SC: Statement is not libelous since it noted that they may
have been “unwitting tools” and had “absolutely no
knowledge” of the plan.
5. The publication in question is NOT a privileged
communication because the letter, dated November 14,
1958, was written when Congress was not in session and
that Cabangbang’s act of publishing it in newspapers of
general circulation was not part of his official duty in
Congress or any of its Committees.
Pobre v Defensor-Santiago
1. Petitioner Antero J. Pobre submitted a letter of complaint
containing an excerpt from Sen. Miriam Defensor-
Santiago’s speech on the Senate floor which he deemed as
a disrespect towards Chief Justice Panganiban BAGO
MAGING C.J.and the rest of the court. He asserted that
such words constituted contempt of court and subjects
Sen. Defensor-Santiago to disciplinary actions and even
disbarment.
2. Sen. Defensor-Santiago asserted that the speech she made
was covered by parliamentary immunity as it was given in
discharge of her duties and was a statement against the
JBC for the injustice in their approach in the nomination
and application process for the soon-to-be vacant CJ post
3. Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution provides: A
Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall,
in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned
nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or
debate in the Congress or in any committee thereof.
4. Her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a
disciplinary proceeding under the Rules of Court.
5. The Courts have no jurisdiction over matters in the
Legislative department and as such, any and all possible
actions to be taken against member of the Legislative is up
to the discretion of the authority of the assembly and the
voters (Senate did not take any measures to address her
unbecoming conduct)
6. The Courts deemed it right to call her attention, as a
member of the Bar, to practice decency and professional
conduct since the utterances made by Sen. Defensor-
Santiago are more personal than professional
Disqualifications and Other Prohibitions
Roberto Flores, Daniel Figueroa, et al v. Hon. Franklin Drilon,
Executive Secretary, and Richard Gordon
1. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of paragraph d,
Section 13 of RA 7227 which states that the President shall
appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City as the chairman and
chief executive officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority (SBMA) for the first year of its operations. Said
provision is claimed to contravene Sec 7, Article IX-B of the
Constitution which provides that elective officials shall not
be eligible for appointment or designation to any public
office or position during his tenure.
2. The Court declared the provision as void as it obviously
runs counter to the said constitutional provision. It also
contravenes the President’s appointing authority because
the power to appoint involves discretion or choice of who
to appoint. Because only one individual qualifies for the
position, the Mayor of Olongapo City, the President is left
with no choice but to appoint him.
3. Mayor Gordon however may retain per diems, salaries,
allowances, and other emoluments which he may have
received during his tenure. His legitimate acts were also
upheld as a de facto officer.
4. An RA may not remove from the president his authority to
appoint an officer from a pool of choices (legislative
encroachment).
5. The provision violates the constitutional proscription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to
other government posts.
6. Sec 7 of Article IX-B express the policy against the
concentration of several public positions in one person, so
that a public officer or employee may serve full-time with
dedication and thus be efficient in the delivery of public
services. It is an affirmation that a public office is a full-time
job.
Liban v. Gordon
 Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors
 An elected official is prohibited from being appointed to
any other public office but since the PNRC is not a public
office, Gordon can have his post there.
 PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under international law.
It is the government’s humanitarian partner while
remaining independent.
 The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC.
Neither does the head of any department, agency,
commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus,
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Executive branch since his appointment does not fall
 under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly,
the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Judiciary or Legislature. This leads us to the obvious
conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Philippine Government. Not being a
government official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as
such, does not hold a government office or employment.
 He can be, by means of letter of the law.
DISSENTING OPINION
 Nachura, in his Main Dissenting Opinion claims that A) PNRC
is a GOCC since it was incorporated through a charter, a
special law; thus, it is nothing but a GOCC. (Test if it is a
GOCC: Is it created by its own charter for the exercise of a
public function, or by incorporation under the general
corporation law? – OWN CHARTER) and B) that Gordon
holds two incompatible offices in violation of the
Constitution as it may result in a divided focus of his
legislative functions, and in a conflict of interest as when a
possible amendment of the PNRC Charter is lobbied in
Congress or when the PNRC and its officials become
subjects of legislative inquiries.
o It is a creature of the law (letter of the law)
o His attention needs to be directed to one role only
o There could be a conflict of interest – when PNRC
faces the gov for whatever reason.
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD
1. Present qualifications: read and write, resident for certain
years. The Constitution did not say other requirements
could be added – express inclusion, implied exclusion.
2. Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the
Republic and a candidate for reelection in the May 10,
2004 elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec.
36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they
impose a qualification of being drug-free for candidates for
senators in addition to those already provided for in the
1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC from
implementing Resolution No. 6486.
3. Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and
the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA
9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm.
4. The Court partially grants their petition.
a. RA 9165, Sec. 36 (c – students schools) and (d –
public and private office employees) are
constitutional.
b. RA 9165, Sec. 36 (f – criminally convicted
persons) and (g – candidates for public office) are
unconstitutional.
5. Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486
impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator. An RA cannot expand the letter of a
Constitutional Provision about the exact same topic
(qualifications of a candidate).
6. Procedurally, no due process.
a. Compulsory drug testing defeats the purpose of
random drug testing.
7. Substantially, okay law.
Clarifications:
1. Police power delegated to…
Election of Officers
Santiago v Guingona SENATE
1. In the election of the officers of the Senate during the first
regular session of the 11th Congress, Sen. Marcelo Fernan
and Sen. Francisco Tatad were both nominated for the
position of Senate President.
2. Sen. Fernan won by a vote of 20-2 and was declared duly
elected President of the Senate.
3. Sen. Blas Ople was also elected as president pro tempore
while Sen. Franklin Drilon as majority leader.
4. Sen. Tatad alleged that he and Sen. Miriam Santiago were
members of the minority. As such, Sen. Tatad assumed the
position of minority leader. His basis was that those who
voted for Sen. Fernan were the majority, and those who
voted for him belonged to the minority.
5. However, Sen. Juan Flavier argued that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMPD party were those
that constituted the minority and elected Sen. Guingona
as the minority leader.
o Gloria Arroyo is affiliated, Guingona is her VP.
o LAKAS are members of majority, because they
voted to Fernan, the winner.
o Dapat minority ang magvovote, ksi automatic
that the 2nd ranker in the vote becomes the
minority leader.
6. They debated on the matter on the following day. And on
the third day, there was still no consensus met by the
Senate.
7. Subsequently, the majority leader informed the body that
he received a letter from the Lakas-NUCD-UMPD senators
stating that they elected Sen. Guingona as the minority
leader. By this virtue, Sen. Guingona was formally
recognized by the Senate President as the minority leader.
8. Next day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a petition quo
warranto seeking the ouster of Sen. Guingona and the
declaration of Sen. Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
9. The court has jurisdiction because is within the power and
jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the
Senate or its officials committed a violation of the
Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the
exercise of their functions or prerogatives.
10. There was no actual violation of the Constitution. While
the Constitution expressly states the manner for election
of Senate officers in Section 16(2) of Article VI, there is no
provision regarding the election of minority floor leader.
It is implied that the Constitution vests in each house of
Congress the power to determine the rules of its
 proceeding. The method of choosing officers is upon the
prerogative of the Senate, not by the court.
11. Observed practices of are NOT BINDING.
12. The Senate formulated and adopted rules for its internal
affairs (Rules of Senate). But RoS also doesn’t specify
election process on majority/minority floor leaders
(SenPres, President Pro Tempore, Sec, and Sgt at Arms)
13. Sen. Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully holding, and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader. There is
no specific norm or standard set by the Constitution,
statutes, or Senate that can be viewed as a guide to
determine who may lawfully occupy the said position.
Without such guidelines, it cannot be said that there was
an irregularity or illegality in the assumption and exercise
of Guingona of the position he held. There was also no
Grave abuse of discretion shown in his acts as minority
leader.
14. Sen. Fernan did not act with Grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Sen. Guingona as minority leader. Grave abuse
of discretion pertains to a capricious or whimsical exercise
of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Considering that the formal recognition came only after
two Senate sessions and upon the unanimous resolution
of the members of the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, it cannot be
said that Sen. Fernan committed Grave abuse of
discretion.
15. Minority is more important ng majority.
o They are the essence of democracy.
o We should therefore STOP feigning minority.
Baguilat v Alvarez HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Petition for mandamus filed by petitioners:
1. Representatives Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr.
2. Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman)
3. Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice
4. Emmanuel A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin,
5. Gary C. Alejano
Respondents:
1. Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker Alvarez)
2. Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Fariñas (Rep. Fariñas)
3. Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep. Suarez)
1. Petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th
Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles surfaced
about Rep. Suarez's (yung kinakalaban) announcement
that he sought the adoption or anointment of President
Rodrigo Roa Duterte's Administration as the "Minority
Leader" to lead a "cooperative minority" in the House of
Representatives.
2. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's
election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority
coalition in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of
its members to feign membership in the Minority, and
thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader.
3. July 25, 2016, prior to the election of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep.
Fariñas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an
interchange before the Plenary, wherein the Rep. Fariñas
said:
(a) All those who vote for the winning Speaker shall
belong to the Majority and those who vote for the
other candidates shall belong to the Minority
(b) Those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority;
(c) The Minority Leader shall be elected by the
members of the Minority
4. Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of
the House — where the candidate who garnered the
second (2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership
(Rep. Baguilat) automatically becomes the Minority
Leader. He was not recognized as such
5. After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that
petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs sought
because Records disclose that prior to the Speakership
Election Rep. Fariñas responded to a parliamentary inquiry
from Rep. Atienza as to who would elect the Minority and
after the inquiry, the election of the Speaker of the House
proceeded without any objection from any member of
Congress, including herein petitioners.
6. Thus the House of Representatives had effectively adopted
Rep. Fariñas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the
membership of the Minority, as well as the process of
determining who the Minority Leader would be. This also
demonstrates the House's deviation from the "legal bases"
of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the reliefs sought
before this Court (i.e. long standing tradition and abstaining
members as independent members of the House of
Representatives)
7. The deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules
is not averse to the Constitution. Section 16 (1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives, its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each house shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall be elected
by a majority vote of its entire membership.
Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method
and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control.
8. Section 16 (3), Article VI 26 of the Constitution vests in the
House of Representatives the sole authority to "determine
the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance is of no concern to the courts,
for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority
[of the House of Representatives]."
Leonen’s Separate opinion
9. Concurrence: A writ of mandamus does not lie to compel
the Speaker and the House to recognize a specific member
to be the Minority Leader.
10. Dissent: There is grave abuse of discretion since the House
itself accords due reverence to its established practices and
traditions as its collective interpretation of its rules but it
did not honor them in this case. Where there can be an
ambiguity, practice and tradition should also be read into
its Rules. Rule XXV, Section 161 of the Rules of the House
of Representatives also provides that "[t]he parliamentary
practices of . . . the House of Representatives . . . shall be
suppletory to these Rules.”
11. The House collectively considers the votes for the second
placer for House Speaker as the votes of the Minority for its
Minority Leader. Insofar as having the second placer
automatically become the Minority Leader, this
parliamentary practice was not merely suppletory to the
Rules of the 15th and 16th Congresses — rather, it took
primacy over the Rules themselves.
Rules of Proceedings
Osmeña v. Pendatun
1. President: Garcia.
2. Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. delivered a privilege
speech with the following statement: “The people, Mr.
President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your
unpopular administration the free things they used to get
from the government are now for sale at premium prices.
They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless
of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit
can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can
come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an
anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of
justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .”
3. Because of Osmeña’s imputation of bribery against the
President, House Resolution No. 59 was passed which
created a special committee to investigate the truth of this
charge against the President; Osmeña was summoned to
substantiate his charges and if he fails to do so, show cause
why he should not be punished by the House
4. Osmeña claimed that House Resolution No. 59 as it
infringed the principle of parliamentary immunity.
5. His words could be questioned because Section 15, Article
VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that “for any speech or
debate” in Congress, the Senators or Members of the HOR
“shall not be questioned in any other place” means that he
can be questioned by Congress itself.
6. “For unparliamentary conduct, members of Parliament or
of Congress have been, or could be censured, committed to
prison, even expelled by the votes of their colleagues”
7. “the House has exclusive power; the courts have no
jurisdiction to interfere.” To judge whether the
Congressman’s speech constituted disorderly behavior that
could be punished.
8. Now, Congress has full legislative powers and prerogatives
of a sovereign nation except as restricted by the
Constitution; now, the “Congress has inherent legislative
prerogative of suspension”
o Decision ng Congress if it is an unparliamentary
behavior.
Clarifications:
1. Any standards can be implied from the text of the law.
It is flexible!
Arroyo v. De Venecia
1. Inisnob siya ng Mr. Speaker. He did not pay respect before
speaker.
2. Speaker wanted to assail a tax law, and the house speaker
did not ask for a vote, no one raised a hand. Dapat daw
nagpavote.
3. What would be invalid is if people objected and and were
ignored.
4. Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings
5. What have been violated were internal rules and not
constitutional requirements for the enactment of the law
6. Said rules may be modified subject to the discretion and
pleasure of the body adopting them
7. Court intruding into the internal rules would constitute
violation of separation of powers
Arroyo v. De Venecia (Resolution - additional)
1. Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the
Court’s August 1997 decision dismissing their petition for
certiorari and prohibition regarding the validity of RA 8240
on four grounds.
2. Petitioners allege that when Rep. Joker Arroyo asked the
question “What is that, Mr. Speaker?,” the Chair ignored
him and the said line was allegedly a privileged question
or point of order which, under the rules of the House, has
precedence over other matters, except motions to adjourn
hence they claim that the chair violated Rule XIX, 112 and
Rule XVII 103 of the Rules of house which require that the
Chair should state a motion and ask for the individual
votes of the members instead of merely asking whether
there was any objection to the motion.
3. The Court held that Rep. Arroyo was not ignored since he
did not have the floor. He simply stood up and started
talking, and the Chair simply did not hear him.
- Rules of House of Representatives Rule XVI, 96: Manner
of Addressing the Chair.- When a member desires to speak,
he shall rise & respectfully address the Chair Mr. Speaker.
- Rules of the Senate Rule XXVI, 59:
Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and
request the President or the Presiding Officer to allow him
to have the floor which consent shall be necessary before
he may proceed.
4. The Chair was not wrong when it asked if there were
objections. There being no objections, he need not ask
for voting anymore since this is a practice that was
regularly done and accepted.
5. Arturo Tolentino defended this practice back in 1957: “The
fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned,
this has been a precedent since I came here seven years
ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.”
6. Besides, Arroyo could have asked for reconsideration right
after the session was suspended for almost an hour, but
he didn’t.
General Plenary Powers
Arnault v. Nazareno
1. Nature of the Case: Original Petition for Habeas Corpus
2. Petitioner: Jean Arnault, agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
Estate Deals, SOLD 2 PIECES OF LAND TO GOV OVERPRICED.
3. Senate caught it, and asked where did Arnault give the
money???
4. Arnault answered:
a. I don’t remember.
b. RIGHT AGAINST SELF INCRIMINATION.
i. This is contradictory!!
5. PWEDE BA IKULONG SI ARNAULT UNTIL HE DISCLOSES THE
INFO?
a. Depends.
b. The Senate is investigating, not to arrest, but in aid
of legislation.
c. Legislation is 3 pieces of legislation to prevent
overpriced purchases.
6. IS THE ANSWER SOUGHT RELEVANT TO LEGISLATION?
a. YES.
b. Yes, Arnault can be arrested until disclosure.
7. DISSENT:
a. Arresting will be separation of powers.
b. They do it themselves.
8. Respondents: Leon Nazareno, Senate Segreant-at-arms &
Eustaquio Balagtas, Director of Prisons
9. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to
his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
10. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise
of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member.
1. Every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation. A witness may
not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry.
2. The necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and
the form and character of the action itself are determined
by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question.
3. Where the alleged immateriality of the information sought
by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to
contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass
upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has
jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not
preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of
discretion in the exercise of that power.
4. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent
to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.
5. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with
each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other
is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the
latter.
6. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen
may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he
violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of
others.
7. No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness
before either House, unless his testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Facts
1. The Senate investigated the purchase by the government’s
Rural Progess Administration of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing
question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one
Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total
sum of Phps1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two
estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00 (since the
Buenavista estate was sold by San Juan de Dios Hospital to
Burt for Php 5M, but Burt has only paid Php 10K and the
Tambobong estate was sold by the Philippine Trust
Company to Burt for Php 1.2M, but Burt has only paid Php
10K), hence both should have been forfeited by Burt long
before due to non-payment of balances.
2. In February 27, 1950, the Senate issued Resolution No. 8
creating an investigatory committee sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government.
3. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt
in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of
the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to
divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the
amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
4. In, May 15, 1950, A Senate Resolution was issued.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed through to the custody of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment in the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
Ruling:
5. The Court held that his detention was legal. Tuazon
dissented saying it was not legal since the answer to the
 question asked to him was not material to the passing of
the new bills drafted by the investigatory committee.
Delegation of Legislative Powers
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita
DELEGATION OF POWERS IS OK.
1. Petitioners: Samson Alcantara & Ed Vincent Albano,
officers of Abakada Guro Party List (formerly AASJAS)
2. Respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
DOF Secretary Cesar Purisima,
BIR Commissioner Guillermo Parayno, Jr.
3. Nature of Case: Petition for prohibition questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4-6 of RA 9337
4. ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC).
5. Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties;
6. Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
7. Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or
lease of properties;
8. CLEAR GUIDELINES ALLOW FOR DELEGATION OF POWERS.
9. These provisions contain a provision which authorizing
the President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after any of the specified conditions have been
satisfied.
(i) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(ii) National government deficit as a percentage
of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).
10. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
11. The Court held that the law is constitutional since Article
VI Sec 28(2) allows the Congress to delegate its legislative
power if the statute was complete in all its terms and
provisions when it left the hands of the legislature so that
nothing was left to the judgment of any other appointee
or delegate of the legislature.
12. Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly
delegate power when it describes what job must be done,
who must do it, and what is the scope of his authority; in
our complex economy that is frequently the only way in
which the legislative process can go forward.
13. In this case, it is not a delegation of legislative power but a
delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which
enforcement and administration of the increased rate
under the law is contingent.
Protestas Delegata
1. You can only have one delegation – here, it is the
president.
a. Counting delegations is not based on
function, but by level.
2. Where is the other delegated?
a. The congress is the first delegee, by the
people, who elects them.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General
1. Nature of the Case: Special civil action to prohibit the
auditor general from disbursing funds
2. From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964, President
Marcos issued executive orders (93-121, 124, 126-129) to
create thirty-three municipalities all around Mindanao
(purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917).
3. Section 68 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE states “The President
may by executive order… separate any political division
other than a province, into such portions… and may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require…”.
a. PWEDE MUNICIPIO
4. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.
5. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President
Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the Auditor General from
disbursing funds claiming that EOs were unconstitutional.
6. He said that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly
repealed by Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that
barrios may “not be created or their boundaries altered
nor their names changed” except by Act of Congress.
a. BAWAL BARRIO
7. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?”
8. Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate
— and (b) fix a standard — whose limits are sufficiently
determinate or determinable — to which the delegate
must conform in the performance of his functions. In this
case, Sec. 68 lacked any such standard.
9. The Court declared that the power to create municipalities
is essentially and eminently legislative in character not
administrative (not executive). As the SC of Washington
has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart), "municipal
corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
10. It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in
question were issued after the legislative bills for the
 creation of the municipalities involved in this case had
failed to pass Congress.
11. WHAT REPEALED THE ADMIN CODE???
12. Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved or March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by
the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935,
which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment. (Agreed with by Bengzon in his
separate opinion).
a. SAYS BAWAL EITHER.
13. The executive orders are null and void, upon the ground
that the President does not have the authority to create
municipalities as this power has been vested in the
legislative department.

Why does the legis have exclsive power to create

municipalities?

1. Because of local knowledge of the representatives

who come from the places which shall be affected
should they be subdivided

Can they delegate?

1. Yes
2. As long as the legis provides specific, and complete
instructions for the delegee to specifically and strictly
follow.
3. We vote for the people precisely so they can do their
jobs, make the difficult decisions, implement the
important rules. If they can simply pass along those
jobs,
4. If they can pass the job, they can increase the power
of other branches
5. Will also allow them to denounce accountability (hindi
naman kami ang gumawa ng batas yan an eh, sila)

Weakening of non-delegation doctrine

1. The congress had made all these specialized agencies

(ad hoc)
2. Dati, only congress can creating municipal and private
corporations. You need to go to congress to avail of
the many benefits of having a corporation, there
should be a law before you can establish a charter.
Corporations are juridical persons, can enter into
contracts, can buy, sell, deal, etc. It is like a slow-
moving AI, and has its own logic. Now, anyone can just
make their own corporations. They passed that power
to the SEC. Now we even have single-person
corporations.
When is a low really ever complete?

1. If it is complete, why the need to delegate?

2. Laws are never complete, which is a good thing. We
cannot always calculate the future. We need to have
space for changes in case of future need.
 PHILCONSA v. Mathay (excluded)
Suit against the State | G.R. No. L-25554 | October 4, 1966
|Reyes, J. | By Martinez, E.
Recit Summary:
- RA 4134 was approved authorizing the payment of
increased salaries of the members of the Congress.
- RA 4642 was then approved, which broke down the
budget for the increase and stated that it was to take
effect in 1966, right after the end of the term of the
incumbent House members in 1965. However, the term of
the incumbent Senators was not to end until 1969.
- The Courts decided that is violative of Art. VI, Sec. 14
of the Constitution, which states that “No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the
Senate and of the House of Representatives
approving such increase.”
- Therefore, RA 4642 is null and void and RA 4134 should
take effect On December 30, 1969, the end of the
incumbent Senators’ term.
Facts of the Case:
- June 10, 1964: RA 4134 was approved authorizing the
payment of increased salaries of the members of the
Congress.
- Senate President and Speaker of the House: P40,000 from
P16,000; Senators and House Members: P32,000 from
P7,200.
- The act provided "that the salary increase of the President
of the Senate and of the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall take effect on the effectivity of the
salary increase of Congressmen and Senators.”
- RA 4642 (Appropriation Act) was then approved, breaking
down the budget for the implementation of RA 4134.
- RA 4642 stated that the budget increase of all officials
involved was to be implemented at the start of 1966,
because the term incumbent House Members was to end in
1965.
- However, the term of the incumbent Senators was to end
at 1969.
- Petitioners contend that this is violative of Art. VI, Sec. 14 of
the Constitution, which provides that “No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the
House of Representatives approving such increase.”
- Respondents allege that (1) Petitioners have no standing
because of lack of showing of injury, (2) Speaker and
Members of the House should be joined parties defendant
in the case, and (3) the expiration of the term of the House
Members was sufficient in adhering to the Constitution,
regardless of the term of the members of the Senate.
Issue:
1. Do the Petitioners have locus standi? YES
- As taxpayers, they may bring an action to restrain
officials from wasting public funds through the
enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law.
2. Do the Speaker and the Members of the House need
to be included as respondents? NO
- Since the action in question is the passing in audit and
the payment of the increased salaries, and not the
collection or receipt thereof, only the involvement of
the current respondents (Auditor General and Auditor
of the Congress) is needed.
3. Does RA 4642 sufficiently comply with Art. VI, Sec. 14
of the Constitution? NO
- The purpose of the provision is to place "a legal bar to
the legislators yielding to the natural temptation to
increase their salaries.
- The Courts highlighted the fact that the Constitutional
Convention of 1934, before the Legislature was
bicameral, initially recommended that increases in
salary were not to take effect until the expiration of
the term of all members of the Legislature that
improved the increase.
- The restrictive nature was carried over in the future
Constitutions of the Philippines:
o Constitution of the Commonwealth: No
increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full
term of the Members of the National
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval
of such increase.
o 1940 amendments (return to bicameralism):
No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and
of the House of Representatives approving
such increase.
- Presently: the use of the word “term” instead of
“terms” in the Constitutional provision proves that
the framers intended for both Legislative bodies to
be considered as one unit. This fact is reinforced by
the use of the word “all” in the same provision.
- Further, from the old Constitution to the present one,
maximum delay of six (6) years and a minimum of four
(4) from the time of approval is necessary before an
increase of legislators' compensation can take effect.
o For example, if the legislators pass an
increase of salary at the end of all their
terms, they will have to wait for at least 4
years before doing so.
o This is to avoid legislators who can anticipate
their re-election from increasing their own
salary.
Ruling:
Petition granted. RA 4642 (Appropriation Act) is null and void
for being unconstitutional. RA 4134 (Salary Increase) is
not operative until December 30, 1969, when the full
term of all members of the Senate and House that
approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired.
Pertinent provision:
Consti Art. VI, Sec. 14
 LIGOT v MATHAY (excluded)
Salaries | G.R. No. L-34676 (April 30, 1974) | Teehankee, J. | by
Medina, R.
PETITIONER: Benjamin Ligot
RESPONDENTS: Ismael Mathay and Jose V. Velasco
RECIT SUMMARY
1. Petitioner Ligot was a member of the House of
Representatives from 1957 to 1969.
2. In 1964, RA 4134 was passed, increasing the salary of
members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000 per
annum. However, the Court held in PHILCONSA v
Mathay that the increase would only take effect on Dec.
30, 1969 in accordance with Art. VI, Sec. 14 of the 1935
Constitution.
3. When Ligot’s term expired on Dec. 30, 1969, he filed a
claim for retirement and was issued a treasury warrant
of P122,429.86 as retirement gratuity computed based
on RA 4134.
4. Respondent Velasco requested petitioner to return this
warrant for re-computation of the latter’s retirement
claim in view of the Auditor General’s decision
disallowing a similar claim. Hence, the present petition.
5. The Court held that the salary increase under RA 4134
only applies to incoming members of Congress after
Dec. 30, 1969, and not to petitioner.
6. Because the Constitution already prohibited him from
receiving the increased salary during his tenure, it
would be illogical to allow him to collect such amount
now in the guise of retirement gratuity.
FACTS OF THE CASE
 Petitioner Benjamin Ligot served as a member of the
House of Representatives for 3 consecutive 4-year
terms (Dec. 30, 1957-Dec. 30, 1969)
 July 1, 1964 (during Ligot’s 2nd term in office) – RA 4134
took effect
o Salaries of members of Congress increased
from P7,200 to P32,000 per annum
 Ligot was re-elected to a 3rd term (1965-1969) but was
not entitled to the salary increase of P32,000 by virtue
of the Court’s decision in PHILCONSA v Mathay (1966)
o Increased compensation provided by RA 4134
is not operative until Dec. 30, 1969 when the
full term of all members of the Senate and
House that approved it will have expired
 Dec. 30, 1969 – Ligot’s term expired
o He thereafter filed a claim for retirement
under Commonwealth Act 186, sec. 12(c), as
amended by RA 4968
 May 8, 1970 – House of Representatives issued a
treasury warrant of P122,429.86 in petitioner’s favor as
his retirement gratuity
o This was computed based on the increased
salary of P32,000 per annum of members of
Congress (RA 4134)
 Respondent Velasco, as Congress Auditor, did not sign
the warrant because of a pending resolution by the
Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former
Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term had
also expired on Dec. 30, 1969
 July 22, 1970 – Velasco formally requested petitioner
to return the warrant for re-computation of the latter’s
retirement claim
o Attached was the Auditor General’s decision
disallowing Singson’s claim for retirement
gratuity computed based on salary increase
under RA 4134
 Petitioner’s request for reconsideration was denied;
hence the present petition
 He argues that his claim for retirement gratuity should
not have been disallowed because at the time of his
retirement, the increased salary under RA 4134 was
already P32,000 per annum
o Recall: increased salary under RA 4134 would
only take effect on Dec. 30, 1969, which was
also when Ligot’s final term expired
ISSUE: WON petitioner’s retirement gratuity should be
computed on the basis of the increased salary of P32,000 per
annum under RA 4134 – NO
 Salary increase under RA 4134 is operative only from
Dec. 30, 1969 for INCOMING members of Congress
and when the full term of all members that approved
the increase (including petitioner) have expired
o 1935 Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 14: "No
increase in said compensation shall take effect
until after the expiration of the full term of all
the members of the Senate and of the House
of Representatives approving such increase”
o Therefore, the salary rate for members
retiring ON Dec. 30, 1969 must be P7,200 per
annum, as this was the compensation
provided by law DURING their term of office
 During petitioner’s tenure from 1965-1969, he was
unable to receive the increased salary precisely
because of the constitutional ban (see 1935
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 14 above)
o It would be illogical to allow him to collect
such amount now in the guise of retirement
gratuity
 Retirement gratuity is limited to compensation and
other emoluments to the individual’s salary as
provided by law
o Sustaining petitioner’s claim would be a subtle
way of increasing his compensation during his
term and of achieving indirectly what he could
not obtain directly
RULING: Petition dismissed. Petitioner’s retirement gratuity
must be computed on the basis of P7,200 per annum, and not
P32,000 per annum under RA 4134.
Article VI – The Legislative Department
Section 8. Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular
election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
Section 9. In case of vacancy in the Senate or in the House of
Representatives, a special election may be called to fill such
vacancy in the manner prescribed by law, but the Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives thus elected shall
serve only for the unexpired term.
Section 10. The salaries of Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives shall be determined by law. No increase in
said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of
the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House
of Representatives approving such increase.
Section 11. A Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while
the Congress is in session. No Member shall be questioned nor
be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in
the Congress or in any committee thereof.
Section 12. All Members of the Senate and the House of
Representatives shall, upon assumption of office, make a full
disclosure of their financial and business interests. They shall
notify the House concerned of a potential conflict of interest
that may arise from the filing of a proposed legislation of which
they are authors.
Section 13. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Section 14. No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may personally appear as counsel before any
court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-
judicial and other administrative bodies. Neither shall he,
directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall
not intervene in any matter before any office of the
Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he may be
called upon to act on account of his office.
Section 20. The records and books of accounts of the Congress
shall be preserved and be open to the public in accordance
with law, and such books shall be audited by the Commission
on Audit which shall publish annually an itemized list of
amounts paid to and expenses incurred for each Member.
Article XI – Accountability of Public Officers
Section 17. A public officer or employee shall, upon
assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be
required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-
President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the
Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other
constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with
general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the
public in the manner provided by law.
Martinez v Morfe
March 24, 1972| Fernando, J| Mendizabal, C.
Facts:
 Manuel Martinez and Fernando Bautista,
Sr. were delegates to the 1972 Constitutional
Convention. Both of them were facing criminal
prosecutions.
 Martinez was charged for falsification of a public
document before the sala of Judge Morfe. The basis of the
case against him was his statement under oath that he
was born on June 20, 1945 instead of June 20, 1946.
 Bautista was charged for the violation of the Revised
Election Code. He was also accused to be in violation of
Section 51 of the RPC when he gave and distributed food
free of charge, drinks and cigarettes at two public
meetings.
 The respondent Judge Morfe ordered their arrest and the
two were later on arrested while the Constitutional
Convention was still in session.
 Petitioners Bautista and Martinez now assail the validity of
their arrest. They contend that under Art 145 or RPC
“arrest or search any member thereof, except in case such
member has committed a crime punishable under [such]
Code by a penalty higher than prision mayor” and that the
charges upon which they were arrested are within the
immunity granted to them as legislators.
 Martinez filed a petition for certiorari and habeas corpus
in SC while Bautista filed petition for certiorari and
prohibition also in SC.
ISSUE: W/N Martinez and Bautista are immune from arrest
NO. Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution provides
that immunity from arrest does not cover any prosecution for
treason, felony and breach of the peace. Section 15 has
revoked Art 145 of RPC since this RPC provision is inconsistent
with this section of the constitution.
Breach of the peace covers any offense whether defined by the
RPC or any special statute.
In this case, the crimes for which Martinez and Bautista were
arrested fall under the category of “breach of peace,”
therefore, they cannot invoke the privilege from arrest
provision of the Constitution.
Any person who acted against public peace is susceptible to
prosecution. There is a full recognition of necessity to have
members of Congress, and likewise delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, entitled to the utmost freedom to
enable them to discharge their vital responsibilities.
RULING:
The petition for certiorari and habeas corpus by Delegate
Manuel Martinez and the petitions for certiorari and
prohibition by Delegate Fernando Bautista, Sr are hereby
dismissed.
People v. Jalosjos
Freedom from Arrest|G.R. Nos. 132875-76. February 3, 2000 |
Ynares-Santiago, J. | By: Montano, J.
Recitation Summary:
9. Case of first impression wherein Jalosjos, a re-elected
Representative of the First District of Zamboanga del
Norte, is asking that he be allowed to attend legislative
and committee meetings despite being confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory
rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts
is pending appeal.
10. The issue is whether membership is Congress exempts an
accused from statutes and rules which apply to validly
incarcerated persons
11. The Court ruled that being a member of Congress does not
allow for a difference in treatment because the court
cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities
imposed by public welfare (i.e. imprisonment and
detention) may justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded.
Facts:
- This is a case of first impression wherein accused
appellant, Romeo Jalosjos is a member of Congress
(Representative of First District of Zamboanga del Norte)
and is confined at the national penitentiary while his
conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of
lasciviousness on six counts is pending appeal.
- Upon reelection, filed this motion to be allowed to fully
discharge his duties, including attendance at legislative
sessions and committee meetings although he is charged
with a non-bailable offense.
Issue:
W/N membership in Congress exempts an accused from
statutes and rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons
in general
- NO. Being a member of Congress does not allow a
difference in treatment. The necessities imposed by public
welfare may justify exercise of government authority to
regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly
assert that their interests are disregarded. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law
and apply to all those belonging to the same class.
- Jalosjos argues that the mandate of the sovereign will
must allow him because he was elected by popular vote;
not allowing him to do so would constitute taxation
without representation on the part of his constituents; and
that this mandate cannot be defeated by insuperable
procedural restraints arising from pending criminal cases
o Court stated that all officials of government are subject
to the majesty of the law
o The higher the rank, the greater the requirement of
obedience rather than exemption
o There is a provision in the 1935, 1973, and 1987
Constitution that allows for the immunity from arrest or
detention of Senators of members of the House of
Congress. But 1987 Constitution states that for offenses
punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there
was no immunity from arrest
- Argues also that it is his responsibility according to Art. VI,
Sec. 16(2) of the Constitution to attend sessions
o Court stated that Jalosjos did not give enough
reason to be exempted from Art. VI, Sec. 11
which states that Congress cannot compel
absent members to attend sessions if the reason
for the absence is a legitimate one
- Jalosos relied on Aguinaldo v. Santos which stated that:
“The Court should never remove a public officer for acts
done prior to his present term of office…”
o Court stated that: This does not apply to
imprisonment arising from the enforcement of
criminal law. Moreover, in the same way that
preventive suspension is not removal,
confinement pending appeal is not removal. He
remains a congressman unless expelled by
Congress or, otherwise, disqualified.
- Argues that plea of the electorate which voted him into
office cannot be supplanted by unfounded fears that he
might escape eventual punishment if permitted to
perform congressional duties outside his regular place of
confinement.
o But he evaded arrest when his warrant was first issued
- Argues that he has been allowed by the RTC Makati to
temporarily leave his cell for official or medical reasons
o Court stated that previous situations were of an
emergency nature. What he is asking for now is not.
o Allowing Jalosjos to attend congressional sessions and
committee meetings for 5 days or more in a week will
virtually make him a free man with all the privileges
appurtenant to his position. Such an aberrant situation
not only elevates accused-appellant's status to that of a
special class, it also would be a mockery of the purposes
of the correction system.
o He is also able to discharge his functions because he has
an office in the prison, was able to file bills and
resolutions, has been receiving his salary.
o He has been discharging his mandate as a member of the
House of Representative consistent with the restraints
upon one who is presently under detention. Being a
detainee, Jalosjos should not even have been allowed by
the prison authorities at the National Penitentiary to
perform these acts but he was allowed.
o Imprisonment in its general sense, is the restraint of
one's liberty.
  It is the detention of another against his will depriving
him of his power of locomotion and is something more
than mere loss of freedom. It includes the notion of
restraint w/in limits defined by wall / exterior barrier.

Ruling:
Court denied Jalosjos’ petition. Being re-elected to public
office does not give priority to any other right or interest,
including the State’s police power.
People v. Jalosjos (supplementary)
G.R. No. 132875-76 | November 16, 2001 | Ynares-Santiago, J |
By: Muhlach & Nebres
Recit Summary
- 12 year old Rosilyn was peddled by her own guardian,
Simplicio, for commercial sex
- She met Congressman Romeo Jalosjos and was
molested by him multiple times
- Jalosjos was found guilty of two counts of statutory
rape
Facts
- 12 year-old Maria Rosilyn Delantar claims she was
constantly being peddled by her own guardian,
Simplicio Delantar, for commercial sex
- She met through her guardian, then TV show
producer and Congressman Romeo Jalosjos
- Jalosjos constantly had Simplicio bring Maria to his
hotel so he could molest her
- Rosilyn eventually raw away and went to the DSWD,
which led to the filing of a statutory rape case against
Jalosjos
- Jalosjos said it was actually his brother Dominador
who was meeting with Maria, that he was in constant
meetings during the dates when they supposedly met,
and that this was all blackmail by his political
opponents
- Dominador backed up his brother’s claims
- Romeo was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
2 counts of statutory rape, thus sentenced to 2 counts
of reclusion perpetua, and he is to pay Maria 50k in
moral damages
- Although he was acquitted of some counts of
lasciviousness
- He filed an appeal regarding these issues:
Issues:
1. The trial court erred in convicting Romeo based on
the testimonies of Rosilyn, considering the
inconsistencies of the stories
- No. His claim that his acquittal of some acts
of his lasciviousness is not proof of Maria
fabricating her stories
- Testimonies are not always to be taken in full
belief of, can choose w/c has credence
- Maria’s testimony to be given full credence,
and she was able to give vivid details
- The DSWD were witnesses w/ testimonies as
well
- Testimonies of rape victims especially those
who are young and immature deserve full
credence considering that no woman would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an
examination of her private parts and
thereafter allow herself to be perverted in a
public trial if she was not motivated solely by
the desire to have the culprit apprehended
and punished.
- If there is inconsistency between the affidavit
of a witness and her testimonies given in
open court, the latter commands greater
weight than the former.
2. Maria’s failure to properly identify Romeo as the
rapist is fatal to her claims
- No. The fact that she was only able to
recognize his face and his body type, but not
his name, is not a valid defense (she is a kid
after all)
- A person’s identity does not depend solely on
his name, but also on his physical features.
Thurs, a victim of a crime can still identify the
culprit even without knowing his name.
3. The trial court erred in ruling that Maria was below
12 years old at the time of the incidents
- Can easily get the age of someone through a
birth certificate. If there is none, then can get
it through other means such as a baptismal
certificate, school records, etc
- The prosecution successfully proved that
Rosilyn was only eleven years of age at the
time she was sexually abused
4. Rape was not actually committed
- Rape is consummated by the slightest
penetration of the female organ.
- No. In cases of statutory rape, need not full
penetration be committed.
- The law presumes that a woman of tender
age does not possess discernment and is
incapable of giving intelligent consent to the
sexual act. Thus, it was held that carnal
knowledge of a child below twelve years old
even if she is engaged in prostitution is still
considered as statutory rape.
Ruling:
Romeo Jalosjos is sentenced to 2 reclusion perpetua for 2
counts of statutory rape, and 6 cases of reclusion temporal for
6 counts of lasciviousness
Moral damages to be paid increased to 50k
 Trillanes, IV v. Pimentel
Freedom from Arrest | G.R. No. 179817 June 27, 2008 | Carpio-
Morales, J. |by Nicoals, J.
Recitation Summary:
11. While being tried in a criminal case involving the
Oakwood Incident, Antonio Trillanes files an Omnibus
Motion before the RTC to let him attend Senate
Sessions and work within his place of detention.
12. The RTC denied the Motion so he assailed the order
with the SC.
13. The SC denied Trillanes’ Petition saying: that his case is
similar so People v. Jalosjos whose privileges sought
were similarly denied; that election to office does not
obliterate a criminal charge; and, that emergency or
temporary leaves are under the discretion of the
authorities or the courts.
Facts of the Case:
 On July 27, 2003, over 300 soldiers led by AFP junior
officers stormed into the Oakwood Premier
Apartments in Makati demanding the resignation of
the President and key national officials.
 Antonio F. Trillanes IV was charged with a criminal case
for coup d’etat before RTC Makati.
 Four years later while still in detention, Trillanes
became a Senator with his term to commence on June
30, 2007.
 On June 22, 2007, Trillanes filed with the RTC an
“Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to be Allowed to
Attend Senate Sessions and Related Requests.”
 On July 25, 2007, the RTC denied all the requests and,
on September 18, 2007, denied the Motion for
Reconsideration .
 Trillanes filed a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
Mandamus against the Respondent Judge before the
SC.
2. W/N Trillanes’ election is proper legal justification for
him to work in his capacity as senator—NO
a. The case against petitioner is not administrative in
nature. And there is no "prior term" to speak of.
b. The doctrine of condonation does not apply to
criminal cases.
c. Election, or more precisely, re-election to office,
does not obliterate a criminal charge.
d. His electoral victory only signifies pertinently that
when the voters elected him to the Senate, "they
did so with full awareness of the limitations on his
freedom of action [and] . . . with the knowledge
that he could achieve only such legislative results
which he could accomplish within the confines of
prison."
3. W/N liberal treatment is due to him as a detention
prisoner without bail—NO
a. Emergency or compelling temporary leaves from
imprisonment are allowed to all prisoners, at the
discretion of the authorities or upon court orders.
b. On the generality and permanence of his requests
alone, petitioner's case fails to compare with the
species of allowable leaves.
SC Ruling:
The petition is dismissed. The denial of his “Omnibus Motion for
Leave of Court to be Allowed to Attend Senate Sessions and
Related Requests” was upheld.

Issue:
1. W/N the Jalosjos Case is applicable to the present
case—YES
a. Presumption of innocence does not carry with it
the full enjoyment of civil and political rights.
b. In the present case, it is uncontroverted that
petitioner's application for bail and for release on
recognizance was denied.
c. The determination that the evidence of guilt
strong, whether ascertained in a hearing of an
application for bail or imported from a trial court's
judgment of conviction, justifies the detention of
an accused as a valid curtailment of his right to
provisional liberty.
d. This accentuates the proviso that the denial of the
right to bail in such cases is "regardless of the stage
of the criminal action." Such justification for
confinement with its underlying rationale of public
self-defense applies equally to detention prisoners
like petitioner or convicted prisoners appellants
like Jalosjos.
 Jimenez v. Cabangbang
Speech and Debate Clause | G.R. No. 15905 | August 3, 1966 |
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion | Gorgeous
FACTS:
On November 14, 1958, respondent Rep. Bartolome
Cabangbang of Bohol (2nd District), also chair of the House
Committee on National Defense, published in newspapers of
general circulation an open letter addressed to President Carlos
P. Garcia alleging that there were three operational plans by
some members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, that
these AFP officers had colluded with communists, and that the
Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, was planning a
coup to place himself as President.
The letter alleged that the planners of the coup had petitioners
Nicanor Jimenez, Carlos Albert, and Jose Lukban, among other
AFP officers, under their guise and that said officers may or may
not have been aware that they were being used to meet such an
end.
they may recover damages. Considering that they are
officers of the AFP, they are by law, under the control
of the Secretary of National Defense and the AFP Chief
of Staff, then there is the possibility that petitioners
were in fact unwitting tools who were unaware of the
details of any such planned coup.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Decision of lower court AFFIRMED.
PROVISIONS:
Article VI, 1935 Constitution
SEC. 15. The Senators and Members of the House of
Representatives shall in all cases except treason, felony, and
breach of the peace, be privileged from arrest during their
attendance at the session of the Congress, and in going to and
returning from the same; and for any speech or debate therein,
they shall not be questioned in any other place.
---compare with---

Petitioners thus filed a civil action for recovery of damages
against respondent for libel. Respondent moved to dismiss the
complaint, arguing that it was not libelous and that, even if it
were, said letter was privileged communication due to it being
part of his function in the House of Representatives. The lower
court granted the motion, thus petitioners appealing to the
Supreme Court.
Article VI, 1987 Constitution
SEC. 11. A Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
shall, in all offenses punishable by not more than six years
imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in
session. No Member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in
any committee thereof.

ISSUES AND RATIO:

1.) WON the publication in question is a privileged
communication.

NO: Article VI, Section 15 of the 1935 Constitution

mentions excusing members of Congress from arrest
for making any such “speech and debate therein” in
their function.

The Court ruled that the publication involved did not

fall under this provision’s purview. The letter, dated
November 14, 1958, was written when Congress was
not in session and that Cabangbang’s act of publishing
said letter in newspapers of general circulation was not
part of his official duty in Congress or any of its
Committees. Thus, said communication is not
absolutely privileged.

2.) WON said publication is libelous.

NO: Although the letter mentioned that petitioners

were under the control of the alleged coup’s planners,
it also noted that they may have been “unwitting tools”
and had “absolutely no knowledge” of the plan.

Thus, the very document that petitioners’ action is

based upon indicates that they may have been
absolutely unaware of the alleged operational plans
and therefore not derogatory to them to the point that
Pobre v Defensor-Santiago | A.C. No. 7399 August 25, 2009 |
Velasco, Jr., J. | by Orate, AJ
Facts:
-Petitioner Antero J. Pobre submitted a letter of complaint
containing an excerpt from Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s
speech on the Senate floor which he deemed as a disrespect
towards Chief Justice Panganiban and the rest of the court. He
asserted that such words constituted contempt of court and
subjects Sen. Defensor-Santiago to disciplinary actions and
even disbarment.
-In her comment, Sen. Defensor-Santiago asserted that the
speech she made was covered by parliamentary immunity as it
was given in discharge of her duties and was a statement
against the JBC for the injustice in their approach in the
nomination and application process for the soon-to-be vacant
Chief Justice post
-Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution provides: A Senator
or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses
punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other
place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any
committee thereof.
Issue: WON Sen. Defensor-Santiago speech is covered by
parliamentary immunity.
-the Courts have no jurisdiction over matters in the
Legislative department and as such, any and all possible actions
to be taken against member of the Legislative is up to the
discretion of the authority of the assembly and the voters
(Senate did not take any measures to address her unbecoming
conduct)
-the statements made by Sen. Defensor-Santiago are
not criminally actionable or is subject to any disciplinary action
under the Rules of Court, however the Courts deemed it right
to call her attention, as a member of the Bar, to practice
decency and professional conduct
-the utterances made by Sen. Defensor-Santiago are
more personal than professional
Ruling: letter-complaint dismissed pursuant to Article VI,
Section 11 of the Constitution
Roberto Flores, Daniel Figueroa, et al v. Hon. Franklin Drilon,
Executive Secretary, and Richard Gordon (G.R. No. 104732,
June 22, 1993, J. Bellosillo, Digest by: Quebec, A.)
RECIT SUMMARY
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of paragraph d, Section 13
of RA 7227 which states that the President shall appoint the
Mayor of Olongapo City as the chairman and chief executive
officer of the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) for the
first year of its operations. Said provision is claimed to
contravene Sec 7, Article IX-B of the Constitution which provides
that elective officials shall not be eligible for appointment or
designation to any public office or position during his tenure.
The Court declared the provision as void as it obviously runs
counter to the said constitutional provision. It also contravenes
the President’s appointing authority because the power to
appoint involves discretion or choice of who to appoint. Because
only one individual qualifies for the position, the Mayor of
Olongapo City, the President is left with no choice but to appoint
him.
Mayor Gordon however may retain per diems, salaries,
allowances, and other emoluments which he may have received
during his tenure. His legitimate acts were also upheld as a de
facto officer.
FACTS
Petitioners (taxpayers, employees of the US Facility at Subic,
Zambales, and officers and members of the Filipino Civilian
Employees Association in US Facilities in the Philippines) assail
the constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d) of R.A. 7227, otherwise
known as the “Bases Conversion and Development Act of 1992”.
Under the act, Mayor Richard Gordon of Olongapo City was
appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority.
Paragraph d reads: “d) Chairman/Administrator — The
President shall appoint a professional manager as administrator
of the Subic Authority with a compensation to be determined by
the Board subject to the approval of the Secretary of Budget,
who shall be the ex officio chairman of the Board and who shall
serve as the chief executive officer of the Subic Authority:
Provided, however, That for the first year of its operations from
the effectivity of this Act, the mayor of the City of Olongapo shall
be appointed as the chairman and chief executive officer of the
Subic Authority”
Petitioners maintain that the proviso infringes on the following
constitutional and statutory provisions:
(a) Sec. 7, first paragraph, Article IX-B of the Constitution – “[N]o
elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation
in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure”
– as the City Mayor of Olongapo city is an elective official
(b) Sec. 16, Article VIIl, of the Consti – “The President
shall…appoint all other officers of the Government whose
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law, and those
whom he may be authorized by law to appoint” – Since it was
Congress through the questioned proviso and not the President
who appointed the Mayor to the post
(c) Sec. 261, paragraph (g) of the Omnibus Election Code - Sec.
261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an
election offense: . . . . (g) Appointment of new employees,
creation of new position, promotion, or giving salary increases.
— During the period of forty-five days before a regular election
and thirty days before a special election, (1) any head, official or
appointing officer of a government office, agency or
instrumentality, whether national or local, including
government-owned or controlled corporations, who appoints or
hires any new employee, whether provisional, temporary or
casual, or creates and fills any new position, except upon prior
authority of the Commission. The Commission shall not grant
the authority sought unless it is satisfied that the position to be
filled is essential to the proper functioning of the office or
agency concerned, and that the position shall not be filled in a
manner that may influence the election. As an exception to the
foregoing provisions, a new employee may be appointed in case
of urgent need: Provided, however, That notice of the
appointment shall be given to the Commission within three days
from the date of the appointment. Any appointment or hiring in
violation of this provision shall be null and void. (2) Any
government official who promotes, or gives any increase of
salary or remuneration or privilege to any government official or
employee, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations
- The appointment to the subject posts where made by the
Executive Secretary within the prohibited 45-day period prior to
the 1992 Elections
ISSUES
WON the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against
appointment or designation of elective officials to other
government posts – YES
Sec 7 of Article IX-B express the policy against the concentration
of several public positions in one person, so that a public officer
or employee may serve full-time with dedication and thus be
efficient in the delivery of public services. It is an affirmation that
a public office is a full-time job.
Hence, a public officer or employee, like the head of an
executive department described in Civil Liberties Union v. Philip
Ella C. Juico, as Secretary of Agrarian Reform, ". . . . should be
allowed to attend to his duties and responsibilities without the
distraction of other governmental duties or employment. He
should be precluded from dissipating his efforts, attention and
energy among too many positions of responsibility, which may
result in haphazardness and inefficiency . . . ." Particularly as
regards the first paragraph of Sec. 7, "(t)he basic idea really is to
prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for
his appointment in an executive position in government, and
thus neglect his constituents . . . ."
ITC, the subject proviso directs the President to appoint an
elective official, i.e., the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other
government posts (as Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer of SBMA). Since this is precisely what the
constitutional proscription seeks to prevent, it needs no
stretching of the imagination to conclude that the proviso
contravenes Sec. 7, first part., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. The
fact that the expertise of an elective official may be most
beneficial to the higher interest of the body politic is of no
moment.
The view that an elective official may be appointed to another
post if allowed by law or by the primary functions of his office,
ignores the clear-out difference in the wording of the two (2)
paragraphs of Sec. 7, Art. IX-B, of the Constitution. While the
second paragraph authorizes holding of multiple offices by an
appointive official when allowed by law or by the primary
functions of his position, the first paragraph appears to be more
stringent by not providing any exception to the rule against
appointment or designation of an elective official to other
government posts, except as are particularly recognized in the
Constitution itself, e.g., the President as head of the economic
and planning agency; the Vice-President, who may be
appointed Member of the Cabinet; and, a member of Congress
who may be designated ex officio member of the Judicial and
Bar Council.
On the SMBA post being ex officio to the position of Mayor of
Olongapo City
It is argued that the SMBA post is ex officio to the position of
Mayor Olongapo City and thus an excepted circumstance, citing
Civil Liberties Union v Executive Secretary, which stated that the
prohibition does not comprehend additional duties and
functions required by the primary functions of the officials
concerned, who are to perform them in an ex officio capacity as
provided by law, without receiving any additional compensation
therefor.
The Court held that Congress did not contemplate making the
subject SBMA posts as ex officio or automatically attached to
the Office of the Mayor of Olongapo City without need of
appointment. The phrase "shall be appointed" unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not
merely adjunct to the post of Mayor of Olongapo City. Had it
been the legislative intent to make the subject positions ex
officio, Congress would have, at least, avoided the word
"appointed" and, instead, "ex officio" would have been used.
Legislative encroachment on the appointing authority of the
President
Section 13, par. (d), itself vests in the President the power to
appoint the Chairman of the Board and the Chief Executive
Officer of SBMA, although he really has no choice under the law
but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City.
An "appointment" is "[t]he designation of a person, by the
person or persons having authority therefor, to discharge the
duties of some office or trust," or "[t]he selection or designation
of a person, by the person or persons having authority therefor,
to fill an office or public function and discharge the duties of the
same."
Senior Associate Justice Isagani A. Cruz defines appointment as
"the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an
individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office."
Considering that appointment calls for a selection, the
appointing power necessarily exercises a discretion.
 Par (d), Sec 123, RA 7227 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL; the appointment of Richard
Gordon is INVALID. All per diems, allowances and other
emoluments received by Gordon, if any, as such
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer may be retained
by him, and all acts otherwise legitimate done by him
in the exercise of his authority as officer de facto of
SBMA are hereby UPHELD

.Once the power of appointment is conferred on the President,

such conferment necessarily carries the discretion of whom to
appoint. Even on the pretext of prescribing the qualifications of
the officer, Congress may not abuse such power as to divest the
appointing authority, directly or indirectly, of his discretion to
pick his own choice. Consequently, when the qualifications
prescribed by Congress can only be met by one individual, such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the
appointing power to choose and constitutes an irregular
restriction on the power of appointment.

ITC, only one can qualify for the post in question, the President
is precluded from exercising his discretion to choose whom to
appoint.

Since the ineligibility of an elective official for appointment

remains all throughout his tenure or during his incumbency, he
may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be
considered fit for appointment.

As incumbent elective official, respondent Gordon is ineligible

for appointment to the position of Chairman of the Board and
Chief Executive Officer of SBMA; hence, his appointment
thereto pursuant to a legislative act that contravenes the
Constitution cannot be sustained.

He however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as

SBMA official are not necessarily null and void; he may be
considered a de facto officer, "one whose acts, though not those
of a lawful officer, the law, upon principles of policy and justice,
will hold valid so far as they involve the interest of the public and
third persons, where the duties of the office were exercised . . . .
under color of a known election or appointment, void because
the officer was not eligible, or because there was a want of
power in the electing or appointing body, or by reason of some
defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power or defect being unknown to the public . . . . [or] under
color of an election, or appointment, by or pursuant to a public
unconstitutional law, before the same is adjudged to be such.

As per the ruling in Civil Liberties Union, any and all per diems,
allowances and other emoluments which may have been
received by respondent Gordon pursuant to his appointment
may be retained by him.
 Liban v. Gordon, Januray 18, 2011
Disqualifications and other prohibitions | G.R. No. 175352 |
Leonardo-De Castro, J. | by Bea Roque and Gab Ricasio
Recit Summary:
 Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate when he
accepted the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of Governors
 Gordon was allowed to hold position as Chairman of PNRC
while being a Senator does not ipso facto imply that PNRC
is a private corporation
 PNRC enjoys a special status as an important ally and
auxiliary of the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under international law.
It is the government’s humanitarian partner while
remaining independent.
Facts:
 In the Decision, Gordon did not forfeit his seat in the Senate
when he accepted the chairmanship of the Philippine
National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors. Office of the
PNRC Chairman is not a government office or an office in a
GOCC as prohibited in Article VI Section 13 of the
Constitution
 The Decision also declared void some sections of the PNRC
charter (RA No. 95) as it creates the PNRC as a private
corporation and that it should register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and incorporate under the
Corporation Code if it wants to be a private corporation
 In Gordon’s Motion for Clarification and/or Reconsideration,
he argued that the validity of RA No. 95 was a non-issue and
that there was no need to delve into its validity.
 PNRC’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration prays for the
constitutionality of its charter since “it functions as an
auxiliary to the government, it is a neutral entity separate
and independent of government control, yet it does not
qualify as strictly private in character”
 Issue of constitutionality of RA No. 95 was not raised by the
parties, and thus not the lis mota of the case. Therefore, the
Court should not have declared void the sections of RA No.
95 in the Decision.
 National Societies such as PNRC act as auxiliaries to the
public authorities of their own countries in the
humanitarian field, they are directly regulated by
international humanitarian law, in contrast to other
ordinary private entities, including NGOs. It is the
government’s humanitarian partner while remaining
independent.
 “it is at one and the same time a private institution and a
public service organization because the very nature of its
work implies cooperation with the authorities, a link with
the State”
Issue #1: W/N PNRC is a GOCC. -NO
1. PNRC is a Private Organization Performing Public
Issue #2-3: WON Sec. 13, Art. VI of the Philippine Constitution
Functions.
applies to the case of respondent who is Chairman of the PNRC
2. RA No. 95 – PNRC Charter signed by President Manuel A.
and at the same time a member of the Senate and WON
Roxas on march 22, 1947. (NOTE: THIS CHARTER WILL BE
REPEALED; THUS, PNRC WILL FALL UNDER A
CORPORATION INCOPORATED UNDER GENERAL LAW)
a. “The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded,
voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose
mission is to bring timely, effective, and
compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
most vulnerable without consideration of
nationality, race, religion, gender, social status, or
political affiliation.”
b. In accordance with the Geneva Red Cross
Convention.
c. National Society of the International Red Cross and
Red Crescent Movement (Movement)’s Seven
Fundamental Principles:
(3) NEUTRALITY — In order to continue to
enjoy the confidence of all, the Movement
may not take sides in hostilities or engage at
any time in controversies of a political, racial,
religious or ideological nature.
(4) INDEPENDENCE — The Movement is
independent. The National Societies, while
auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of
their governments and subject to the laws of
their respective countries, must always
maintain their autonomy so that they may be
able at all times to act in accordance with the
principles of the Movement.
d. “The government does not control the PNRC.
Under the PNRC Charter, as amended, only six of
the thirty members of the PNRC Board of
Governors are appointed by the President of the
Philippines.”
e. The Constitution recognizes two classes of
corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law. The
second refers to government-owned or controlled
corporations created by special charters. Section
16, Article XII of the Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by
general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private
corporations. Government-owned or
controlled corporations may be created or
established by special charters in the interest
of the common good and subject to the test of
economic viability.
f. (NOTE: GOCC’s assets are state-owned, and
subsidies are part of the General Appropriations
Act. THUS, There is no private capital; Also, control
must be by the state)
g. PNRC’s assets are private-owned, and majority
control is to private-citizens; thus, granting the
PNRC as a private corporation under general law.
respondent should be automatically removed as Senator
pursuant to the said law. – NO
h. Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution, the President appoints three groups
of officers. . .
i. The President does not appoint the Chairman of
the PNRC. Neither does the head of any
department, agency, commission or board appoint
the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the PNRC Chairman is
not an official or employee of the Executive
branch since his appointment does not fall under
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution.
Certainly, the PNRC Chairman is not an official or
employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads
us to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC
Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Philippine Government. Not being a government
official or employee, the PNRC Chairman, as such,
does not hold a government office or
employment.
Issue #4: Whether petitioners may legally institute this petition
against respondent. – No
j. For the said petition is considered an action for
quo warranto:
k. Rule 66, Sec. 1 - Action by Government against
individuals. — An action for the usurpation of a
public office, position or franchise may be
commenced by a verified petition brought in the
name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act
which by provision of law, constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his office.
“… The person instituting quo warranto
proceedings in his own behalf must claim and
be able to show that he is entitled to the office
in dispute, otherwise the action may be
dismissed at any stage. In the present case,
petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the
Senate office of respondent. Clearly,
petitioners have no standing to file the
present petition.”
SC Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the PNRC’s Charter as
void due to it being a private corporation; as such, the office
occupied by Sen. Gordon in the PNRC cannot be challenged by
Art. VI. Sec. 13. Quo warranto petition lacks merit; thus,
dismissed.
Pertinent Provision:
Article VI Section 13
No Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives may hold any other office or employment in the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality
thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without
forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office
which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected.
Main Dissenting Opinion by Nachura, J.:
I. The case should have been recognized as that of
a prohibition rather than a quo warranto petition,
since petitioner does not aim to take the Senate
seat of Sen. Gordon. Prohibition is a remedy that is
“preventive and restrictive – an injunction against
an alleged continuing violation of fundamental
law.”
II. PNRC is a GOCC. The PNRC was incorporated
through a charter, a special law; thus, it is nothing
but a GOCC.
a. Test if it is a GOCC: Is it created by its own
charter for the exercise of a public function, or
by incorporation under the general
corporation law? – OWN CHARTER
b. “we note that Section 1 of the charter starts
with the phrase, "(T)here is hereby created in
the Republic of the Philippines a body
corporate and politic to be the voluntary
organization officially designated to assist
the Republic of the Philippines in discharging
the obligations set forth in the Geneva
Conventions . . .".
III. The PNRC Charter does not violate the
constitutional proscription against the creation of
private corporate laws.
IV. The Constitutionality of a law is presumed.
a. “Two other important points militate against
the declaration of Section 1 of the PNRC
Charter as invalid and unconstitutional,
namely: (1) respondent does not question
the constitutionality of the said provision;
and (2) every law enjoys the presumption of
constitutionality.”
V. !!!!!IMPORTANT!!!!! The respondent holds two
incompatible offices in violation of the
Constitution
a. While we can only hypothesize on the extent
of the incompatibility between the two offices
— as stated in petitioners' memorandum,
Senator Gordon's holding of both offices may
result in a divided focus of his legislative
functions, and in a conflict of interest as when
a possible amendment of the PNRC Charter is
lobbied in Congress or when the PNRC and its
officials become subjects of legislative
inquiries.
Justice Nachura: THEREFORE, I grant the petition to declare
Senator Richard J. Gordon as having forfeited his seat in the
Senate.
 Liban v. Gordon
Disqualification and other prohibition| G.R. No. 175352 January
18, 2011 |Leonardo De-Castro, J. |By Arapoc, S.
Facts of the case:
- Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo and Salvador M.
Viani (Petioners), who were officers of the board of
directors of Quezon City Red Cross Chapter, filed a
petition to the Supreme Court to declare the respondent
Senator Richard J. Gordon as “having forfeited his seat
in the senate,” who was elected Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors during his incumbency as a senator pursuant
to Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, which
states that “ No Senator or member of the house of
representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the government, or any subdivision ,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government
–owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries,
during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall
he be appointed to any office which has been created on
the emoluments thereof increased during the term for
which he was elected”.
- Formerly, in its Decision dated July 15, 2009, the Court
held that the office of the PNRC Chairman is NOT a
government office or an office in a GOCC for purposes of
the prohibition in Sec. 13, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
o The PNRC Chairman is elected by the PNRC Board
of Governors; he is not appointed by the
President or by any subordinate government
official.
o Moreover, the PNRC is NOT a GOCC because it is
a privately owned, privately funded, and privately
run charitable organization and because it is
controlled by a Board of Governors four-fifths of
which are private sector individuals.
o Therefore, respondent Gordon did not forfeit his
legislative seat when he was elected as PNRC
Chairman during his incumbency as Senator.
- The Court however held further that the PNRC Charter,
R.A. 95, as amended by PD 1264 and 1643, is void
insofar as it creates the PNRC as a private corporation
since Section 7, Article XIV of the 1935 Constitution
states that “[t]he Congress shall not, except by general
law, provide for the formation, organization, or
regulation of private corporations, unless such
corporations are owned or controlled by the
Government or any subdivision or instrumentality
thereof.”
- The Court thus directed the PNRC to incorporate under
the Corporation Code and register with the Securities
and Exchange Commission if it wants to be a private
corporation. The fallo of the Decision read:
WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the Chairman of
the Philippine National Red Cross is not a government
office or an office in a government-owned or controlled
corporation for purposes of the prohibition in Section 13,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. We also declare that
Sections 1, 2, 3, 4(a), 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, and 13 of the
Charter of the Philippine National Red Cross, or Republic
Act No. 95, as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 1264
and 1643, are VOID because they create the PNRC as a
private corporation or grant it corporate powers.
- Respondent Gordon filed a Motion for Clarification
and/or for Reconsideration of the Decision. The PNRC
likewise moved to intervene and filed its own Motion for
Partial Reconsideration. They basically questioned the
second part of the Decision with regard to the
pronouncement on the nature of the PNRC and the
constitutionality of some provisions of the PNRC
Charter.
ISSUE/RATIO
1) WON the Court correctly passed upon and decided on
the issue of the constitutionality of the PNRC charter
a. NO, it was not correct for the Court to have
decided on the constitutional issue because it was
not the very lis mota of the case. The PNRC is sui
generis in nature; it is neither strictly a GOCC nor
a private corporation.
b. The issue of constitutionality of R.A. No. 95 was
not raised by the parties, and was not among the
issues defined in the body of the Decision; thus, it
was not the very lis mota of the case.
c. The Court reiterated the rule as to when the
Court will consider the issue of constitutionality.
In Alvarez v. PICOP Resources, the Court held that
it will not touch the issue of unconstitutionality
unless it is the very lis mota.
d. This Court should not have declared void certain
sections of the PNRC Charter. Instead, the Court
should have exercised judicial restraint on this
matter, especially since there was some other
ground upon which the Court could have based
its judgment.
e. Furthermore, the PNRC, the entity most adversely
affected by this declaration of unconstitutionality,
which was not even originally a party to this case,
was being compelled, as a consequence of the
Decision, to suddenly reorganize and incorporate
under the Corporation Code, after more than
sixty (60) years of existence in this country.
f. The passage of several laws relating to the PNRC’s
corporate existence notwithstanding the
effectivity of the constitutional proscription on
the creation of private corporations by law is a
recognition that the PNRC is not strictly in the
nature of a private corporation contemplated by
the aforesaid constitutional ban.
g. A closer look at the nature of the PNRC would
show that there is none like it, not just in terms of
 structure, but also in terms of history, public international law. This Court cannot all of a
service and official status accorded to it by the sudden refuse to recognize its existence,
State and the international community. There is especially since the parties never raised the issue
merit in PNRC’s contention that its structure is sui of the constitutionality of the PNRC Charter. It
generis. It is in recognition of this sui generis bears emphasizing that the PNRC has responded
character of the PNRC that R.A. No. 95 has to almost all national disasters since 1947, and is
remained valid and effective from the time of its widely known to provide a substantial portion of
enactment in March 22, 1947 under the 1935 the country’s blood requirements. Its
Constitution and during the effectivity of the 1973 humanitarian work is unparalleled.
Constitution and the 1987 Constitution. The PNRC 
Charter and its amendatory laws have not been SC Ruling: The sections of the PNRC Charter that were
questioned or challenged on constitutional declared void must therefore stay.
grounds, not even in this case before the Court
now. [Thus, R.A. No. 95 remains valid and constitutional in
h. This Court must recognize the country’s its entirety. The Court MODIFIED the dispositive
adherence to the Geneva Convention and respect portion of the Decision by deleting the second
the unique status of the PNRC in consonance with sentence, to now read as follows:
its treaty obligations. The Geneva Convention has
the force and effect of law. Under the WHEREFORE, we declare that the office of the
Constitution, the Philippines adopts the generally Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross is not a
accepted principles of international law as part of government office or an office in a government-owned
the law of the land. This constitutional provision or controlled corporation for purposes of the
must be reconciled and harmonized with Article prohibition in Section 13, Article VI of the 1987
XII, Section 16 of the Constitution, instead of Constitution.]
using the latter to negate the former. By requiring
the PNRC to organize under the Corporation Code
just like any other private corporation, the
Decision of July 15, 2009 lost sight of the PNRC’s
special status under international humanitarian
law and as an auxiliary of the State, designated to
assist it in discharging its obligations under the
Geneva Conventions.
i. The PNRC, as a National Society of the
International Red Cross and Red Crescent
Movement, can neither “be classified as an
instrumentality of the State, so as not to lose its
character of neutrality” as well as its
independence, nor strictly as a private
corporation since it is regulated by international
humanitarian law and is treated as an auxiliary of
the State.
j. Although [the PNRC] is neither a subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality of the government, nor
a GOCC or a subsidiary thereof so much so that
respondent, under the Decision, was correctly
allowed to hold his position as Chairman thereof
concurrently while he served as a Senator, such a
conclusion does not ipso facto imply that the
PNRC is a “private corporation” within the
contemplation of the provision of the
Constitution, that must be organized under the
Corporation Code.
k. The sui generis character of PNRC requires us to
approach controversies involving the PNRC on a
case-to-case basis. In sum, the PNRC enjoys a
special status as an important ally and auxiliary of
the government in the humanitarian field in
accordance with its commitments under
 SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY V. DANGEROUS DRUG BOARD
Disqualifications and other prohibitions | G.R. No. 157870|
November 3, 2008 |VELASCO, JR, J.| By Trinidad, C.
Recitation Summary:
- Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the
Republic and a candidate for reelection in the May 10, 2004
elections, filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under
Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for
being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification of
being drug-free for candidates for senators in addition to those
already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
- He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by
requiring, via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial
aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory
drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates
for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that
there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification
requirements of candidates for senator.
- Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the
ground that they are constitutionally infirm.
1. the provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative
power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
2. the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an
employee deemed undesirable.
3. a person's constitutional right against unreasonable searches
is also breached by said provisions
- On WON PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI. YES.
There is no doubt as to the legal standing of Pimentel.
Regarding SJS and Laserna, the Court is to relax the rule on
locus standi owing primarily to the transcendental importance
and the paramount public interest involved in the enforcement
of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
- On constitutionality of provisions, Sec 36 (c) and (d)
are CONSTITUTIONAL while (f) and (g) are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The drug test prescribed for secondary
and tertiary level students and public and private employees,
while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement.
There is a fit between the objective of the state to prevent
proliferation of drugs and the means of conducting random
drug testing. It being random does not infringe upon the right
to privacy and unreasonable searches because there is a valid
purpose for the state. For (g), the Constitution is the basic law
to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it
conflicts with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience to the commands of the
Constitution. For (f), it is unconstitutional because it singles out
a class of people and not necessarily randomize the drug
testing procedures.
Facts of the Case:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing- Authorized drug testing shall
be done by any government forensic laboratories or by any of
the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the
DOH to safeguard the quality of the test results… The drug
testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods,
the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which
will confirm a positive screening test… The following shall be
subjected to undergo drug testing:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools. — Students of
secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related
rules and regulations as contained in the school's student
handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a random
drug testing . . .;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices. —
Officers and employees of public and private offices, whether
domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random
drug test as contained in the company's work rules and
regulations, . . . for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
provisions of the Civil Service Law;
xxx xxx xxx
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor's office with a
criminal offense having an imposable penalty of imprisonment
of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a
mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or
elected both in the national or local government shall undergo
a mandatory drug test.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic
and a candidate for reelection in the May 10, 2004 elections,
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In
it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for
candidates for senators in addition to those already provided
for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin the COMELEC
from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a
maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate
for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate.
He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via
RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among
other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an
additional qualification that all candidates for senator must
first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision
in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for
senator.
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social
Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party, seeks to
prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs
(c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that
they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions
constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they
give unbridled discretion to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed
undesirable. And for a third, a person's constitutional right
against unreasonable searches is also breached by said
provisions
Issues:
1. WON PETITIONERS HAVE LOCUS STANDI
YES. There is no doubt as to the legal standing of Pimentel.
Regarding SJS and Laserna, the Court is to relax the rule on
locus standi owing primarily to the
transcendental importance and the paramount public interest
involved in the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
2. WON Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.
6486 impose an additional qualification for candidates for
senator. YES.
Corollary, can Congress enact a law prescribing qualifications
for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the
Constitution?
NO.
Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as,
unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative
rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that issuance is null
and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to
which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts
with the Constitution. In the discharge of their defined
functions, the three departments of government have no
choice but to yield obedience
to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it
imposes must be observed legislative power remains limited in
the sense that it is subject to substantive and constitutional
limitations which circumscribe both the exercise of the power
itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The substantive
constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights
and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
3. WON paragraphs (c), (d), and (f) of Sec. 36, RA 9165
unconstitutional. C & D NO. F YES.
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy,
the right against unreasonable searches and seizure, and the
equal protection clause? NO.
Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
NO.
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36 (c), (d) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private
employees, while mandatory, is a random and suspicionless
arrangement. The objective is to stamp out illegal drug and
safeguard in the process "the well-being of [the] citizenry,
particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous
drugs". This statutory purpose, per the policy declaration
portion of the law, can be achieved via the pursuit by the state
of "an intensive and unrelenting campaign against the
trafficking and use of dangerous drugs… through an integrated
system of planning, implementation and enforcement of
antidrug abuse policies, programs and projects". The primary
legislative intent is not criminal prosecution, as those found
positive for illegal drug use as a result of this random testing
are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even be
exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user
consent to undergo rehabilitation.
Guidelines from US Cases 1) schools and their administrators
stand in loco parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor
students have contextually fewer rights than an adult, and are
subject to the custody and supervision of their parents,
guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis,
have a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their
students and may adopt such measures as may reasonably be
necessary to discharge such duty; and (4) schools have the
right to impose conditions on applicants for admission that are
fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of
prohibited drugs in the country that threatens the well-being
of the people, particularly the youth and school children who
usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more
effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a
random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary
schools is not only acceptable but may even be necessary if the
safety and interest of the student population, doubtless a
legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and
protected.
Court finds the situation entirely different for Sec. 36 (f) in the
case of persons charged before the public prosecutor's office
with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1)
day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory
drug testing are "randomness" and "suspicionless". In the case
of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor's office,
a mandatory drug testing can never be random or
suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless
are antithetical to heir being made defendants in a criminal
complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they
beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded
against their will.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area
in the constitutional landscape. In the face of the increasing
complexity of the task of the government and the increasing
inability of the legislature to cope directly with the many
problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of
power, or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of
subordinate legislation, has become imperative, as here.
Ruling:
Sec. 36 (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL, Sec. 36 (f) and (g) are
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Santiago vs. Guingona
Election of Officers | G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998
Panganiban, J. | Jasper Valencia
Facts of the case:
16. In the election of the officers of the Senate during the first
regular session of the 11th Congress, Sen. Marcelo Fernan
and Sen. Francisco Tatad were both nominated for the
position of Senate President.
17. Sen. Fernan won by a vote of 20-2 and was declared duly
elected President of the Senate.
18. Sen. Blas Ople was also elected as president pro tempore
while Sen. Franklin Drilon as majority leader.
19. Sen. Tatad alleged that he and Sen. Miriam Santiago were
members of the minority. As such, Sen. Tatad assumed the
position of minority leader. His basis was that those who
voted for Sen. Fernan were the majority, and those who
voted for him belonged to the minority.
20. However, Sen. Juan Flavier argued that the senators
belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMPD party were those that
constituted the minority and elected Sen. Guingona as the
minority leader.
21. They debated on the matter on the following day. And on
the third day, there was still no consensus met by the
Senate.
22. Subsequently, the majority leader informed the body that
he received a letter from the Lakas-NUCD-UMPD senators
stating that they elected Sen. Guingona as the minority
leader. By this virtue, Sen. Guingona was formally
recognized by the Senate President as the minority leader.
23. On the following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed a
petition quo warranto seeking the ouster of Sen. Guingona
and the declaration of Sen. Tatad as the rightful minority
leader.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court has jurisdiction over the petition
a. The court has jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over
the subject matter of a case is determined by the
allegations of the complaint or petition,
regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is
entitled to the relief asserted. It is within the
power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire
whether indeed the Senate or its officials
committed a violation of the Constitution or
gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions or prerogatives.
2. WON there was an actual violation of the Constitution.
a. There was no actual violation of the Constitution.
While the Constitution expressly states the
manner for election of Senate officers in Section
16(2) of Article VI, there is no provision regarding
the election of minority floor leader. It is implied
that the Constitution vests in each house of
Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceeding. The method of choosing officers is
upon the prerogative of the Senate, not by the
court.
b. The Senate formulated and adopted rules for its
internal affairs (Rules of Senate). But RoS also
doesn’t specify election process on
majority/minority floor leaders (SenPres,
President Pro Tempore, Sec, and Sgt at Arms)
3. WON Sen. Guingona was usurping, unlawfully holding, and
exercising the position of Senate minority leader.
a. Sen. Guingona was not usurping, unlawfully
holding, and exercising the position of Senate
minority leader. There is no specific norm or
standard set by the Constitution, statutes, or
Senate that can be viewed as a guide to
determine who may lawfully occupy the said
position. Without such guidelines, it cannot be
said that there was an irregularity or illegality in
the assumption and exercise of Guingona of the
position he held. There was also no Grave abuse
of discretion shown in his acts as minority leader.
b. Usurpation - unauthorized arbitrary assumption
and exercise of power without color or title
c. Quo warranto proceeding - proper legal remedy
to determine the right or title to the contested
public office
d. In order for a quo warranting proceeding to be
successful, person suing must show that he has a
right to the office being contested. Petitioner
failed to establish this.
4. WON Sen. Fernan acted with grave abuse of discretion in
recognizing Sen. Guingona as the minority leader.
a. Sen. Fernan did not act with Grave abuse of
discretion in recognizing Sen. Guingona as
minority leader. Grave abuse of discretion
pertains to a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Considering that the formal recognition came
only after two Senate sessions and upon the
unanimous resolution of the members of the
Lakas-NUCD-UMDP, it cannot be said that Sen.
Fernan committed Grave abuse of discretion.
SC RULING:
Petition is dismissed
Baguilat Jr. v. Alvarez, July 25, 2017 - Election of Officers
GR 227757 | PERLAS-BERNABE, J. | By Luy, C. & Medina, G.
Petition for mandamus filed by petitioners:
6. Representatives Teddy Brawner Baguilat, Jr.
7. Edcel C. Lagman (Rep. Lagman)
8. Raul A. Daza, Edgar R. Erice
9. Emmanuel A. Billones, Tomasito S. Villarin,
10. Gary C. Alejano
Respondents:
4. Speaker Pantaleon D. Alvarez (Speaker Alvarez)
5. Majority Leader Rodolfo C. Fariñas (Rep. Fariñas)
6. Representative Danilo E. Suarez (Rep. Suarez)
FACTS
12. Petition alleges that prior to the opening of the 17th
Congress on July 25, 2016, several news articles surfaced
about Rep. Suarez's announcement that he sought the
adoption or anointment of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte's
Administration as the "Minority Leader" to lead a
"cooperative minority" in the House of Representatives (or
the House)
13. The petition further claims that to ensure Rep. Suarez's
election as the Minority Leader, the supermajority coalition
in the House allegedly "lent" Rep. Suarez some of its
members to feign membership in the Minority, and
thereafter, vote for him as the Minority Leader.
14. July 25, 2016, prior to the election of the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, then-Acting Floor Leader Rep.
Fariñas and Rep. Jose Atienza (Rep. Atienza) had an
interchange before the Plenary, wherein the Rep. Fariñas
said:
(d) All those who vote for the winning Speaker shall
belong to the Majority and those who vote for the
other candidates shall belong to the Minority
(e) Those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority;
(f) The Minority Leader shall be elected by the
members of the Minority
15. Thereafter, the Elections for the Speakership were held
o 252 Members voting for [Speaker] Alvarez
o Eight [(8)] voting for Rep. Baguilat
o Seven [(7)] voting for Rep. Suarez
o 21 abstaining
o one [(1)] registering a no vote
16. Petitioners hoped that as a "long-standing tradition" of the
House — where the candidate who garnered the second
(2nd)-highest number of votes for Speakership (Rep.
Baguilat) automatically becomes the Minority Leader. He
was not recognized as such
17. One of the "abstentionists," Representative Harlin Neil
Abayon, III (Rep. Abayon), manifested before the Plenary
that on July 27, 2016, those who did not vote for Speaker
Alvarez (including the 21 "abstentionists") convened and
elected Rep. Suarez as the Minority Leader.
18. Thereafter, on August 15, 2016, Rep. (now, Majority Leader)
Fariñas moved for the recognition of Rep. Suarez as the
Minority Leader.
19. Motion for recognition was opposed by Rep. Lagman
essentially on the ground that various "irregularities"
attended Rep. Suarez's election as Minority Leader,
particularly (was overruled):
(a) That Rep. Suarez was a member of the Majority as
he voted for Speaker Alvarez, and that his
"transfer" to the Minority was irregular
(b) That the "abstentionists" who constituted the bulk
of votes in favor of Rep. Suarez's election as
Minority Leader are supposed to be considered
independent members of the House, and thus,
irregularly deemed as part of the Minority.
20. Petitioners filed the instant petition for mandamus,
insisting that Rep. Baguilat should be recognized as the
Minority Leader
21. Respondent Rep. Suarez maintains that the election of
Minority Leader is an internal matter to the House of
Representatives. Thus, absent any finding of violation of the
Constitution or grave abuse of discretion, the Court cannot
interfere with such internal matters of a coequal branch of
the government; OSG agrees.
ISSUE & RATIO
1. Whether or not respondents may be compelled via a
writ of mandamus to recognize:
(a) Rep. Baguilat as the Minority Leader of the House
of Representatives
(b) Petitioners as the only legitimate members of the
House Minority.
22. The petition is without merit.
23. Mandamus
o a writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board
or person to do the act required to be done when
it or he unlawfully neglects the performance of an
act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty
resulting from an office, trust or station, or
unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office or which such other
is entitled, there being no other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
o An extraordinary remedy that is issued only in
extreme necessity, and the ordinary course of
procedure is powerless to afford an adequate and
speedy relief to one who has a clear legal right to
the performance of the act to be compelled.
24. After a judicious study of this case, the Court finds that
petitioners have no clear legal right to the reliefs sought.
25. Records disclose that prior to the Speakership Election Rep.
Fariñas responded to a parliamentary inquiry from Rep.
Atienza as to who would elect the Minority Leader of the
House of Representatives. Rep. Fariñas then articulated
that
(a) All those who vote for the winning Speaker shall
belong to the Majority and those who vote for
other candidates shall belong to the Minority
(b) Those who abstain from voting shall likewise be
considered part of the Minority
(c) The Minority Leader shall be elected by the
members of the Minority.
26. After the inquiry, the election of the Speaker of the House
proceeded without any objection from any member of
Congress, including herein petitioners.
27. It was only during Rep. Lagman’s privilege speech, a full day
after everything had already happened that he questioned
Rep. Fariñas' interpretation of the Rules.
o This was a late query
o The Journal for that session does not indicate any
motion made, seconded and carried to correct the
entry in the Journal of the previous session (July 25,
2016) pertinent to any recording error that may
have been made, as to indicate that in fact, a
protest or objection was raised.
28. Thus the House of Representatives had effectively adopted
Rep. Fariñas' proposal anent the new rules regarding the
membership of the Minority, as well as the process of
determining who the Minority Leader would be. This also
demonstrates the House's deviation from the "legal bases"
of petitioners' claim for entitlement to the reliefs sought
before this Court (i.e. long standing tradition and abstaining
members as independent members of the House of
Representatives)
29. The deviation by the Lower House from the aforesaid rules
is not averse to the Constitution. Section 16 (1), Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution reads:
Section 16. (1) The Senate shall elect its President
and the House of Representatives, its Speaker,
by a majority vote of all its respective
Members. Each house shall choose such other
officers as it may deem necessary.
Under this provision, the Speaker of
the House of Representatives shall be elected
by a majority vote of its entire membership.
Said provision also states that the House of
Representatives may decide to have officers
other than the Speaker, and that the method
and manner as to how these officers are
chosen is something within its sole control.
30. Section 16 (3), Article VI 26 of the Constitution vests in the
House of Representatives the sole authority to "determine
the rules of its proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike
statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are
subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure
of the body adopting them.' Being merely matters of
procedure, their observance is of no concern to the courts,
for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body at will, upon the concurrence of a majority
[of the House of Representatives]."
31. Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect
and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal
branch prevents the Court from prying into the internal
workings of the [House of Representatives]."
32. Although the court can strike actions down on the ground
of grave abuse of discretion it may be gleaned from the
circumstances as to how the House had conducted the
questioned proceedings and its apparent deviation from its
traditional rules, the Court is hard-pressed to 􀀶nd any
attending grave abuse of discretion which would warrant its
intrusion in this case. By and large, this case concerns an
internal matter of a coequal, political branch of government
which, absent any showing of grave abuse of discretion,
cannot be judicially interfered with
Separate opinion
33. I concur in the result. While there was a violation of the
rules of the House of Representatives, a writ of mandamus
does not lie to compel the Speaker and the House to
recognize a specific member to be the Minority Leader.
34. The petitioners have ably established the presence of
grave abuse of discretion. Truly, the justiciability of the
issue is anchored on the capricious, whimsical, and arbitrary
judgment committed by respondents in neglecting and
refusing to recognize Representative Baguilat as the ipso
facto Minority Leader, in accordance with a long-
established parliamentary practice and Rules of the House
of Representatives.
o Clear indication that the House itself accords due
reverence to its established practices and
traditions as its collective interpretation of its rules.
Where there can be an ambiguity, practice and
tradition should also be read into its Rules. Rule
XXV, Section 161 of the Rules of the House of
Representatives also provides that "[t]he
parliamentary practices of . . . the House of
Representatives . . . shall be suppletory to these
Rules.”
o The House collectively considers the votes for the
second placer for House Speaker as the votes of
the Minority for its Minority Leader. Insofar as
having the second placer automatically become
the Minority Leader, this parliamentary practice
was not merely suppletory to the Rules of the 15th
and 16th Congresses — rather, it took primacy
over the Rules themselves. There is no reason to
treat the 17th Congress differently. Like the 15th
and 16th Congresses, the 17th Congress involves a
race among many candidates for Speaker and not
simply one (1) unopposed candidate as in the 14th
Congress.
o The Chair recognized Representative Suarez as
Minority Floor Leader, notwithstanding the
questions raised. Representative Suarez and other
members of the Minority were then elected into
various offices and House committees.
o On the day of the election for Minority Leader,
Representative Suarez himself belonged to the
Majority and was thus disqualified from being the
Minority Leader.
o Likewise, the 20 abstaining members and the one
(1) who registered a no-vote were independent
members. Not being part of the Minority, these
independent members were disqualified from
electing a Minority Leader
Rule II, Section 8 of the Rules states in full:
Members who vote for the winning candidate for
Speaker shall constitute the Majority in the House and they shall
elect from among themselves the Majority Leader. The Majority
Leader may be changed, at any time, by a majority vote of all the
Majority Members.
The Minority Leader shall be elected by the Members
of the Minority and can be changed, at any time, by a majority
vote of all the Minority Members.
The Majority and Minority shall elect such number of
Deputy Majority and Minority Leaders as the rules provide.
A Member may transfer from the Majority to the
Minority, or vice versa, at any time: Provided, That:
a. The concerned Member submits a written request to
transfer to the Majority or Minority, through the
Majority or Minority Leaders, as the case may be. The
Secretary General shall be furnished a copy of the
request to transfer;
b. The Majority or Minority, as the case may be, accepts
the concerned Member in writing; and
c. The Speaker shall be furnished by the Majority or the
Minority
Leaders, as the case may be, a copy of the acceptance in writing
of the concerned Member.
In case the Majority or the Minority declines such
request to transfer, the concerned Member shall be considered
an independent Member of the House.
In any case, whether or not the request to transfer is
accepted, all committee assignments and memberships given
the concerned Member by the Majority or Minority, as the case
may be, shall be automatically forfeited.
Members who choose not to align themselves with the
Majority or the Minority shall be considered as independent
Members of the House. They may, however, choose to join the
Majority or Minority upon written request to and approval
thereof by the Majority or Minority, as the case may be.
35. Neither Representative Fariñas' erroneous interpretation of
Rule II, Section 8 nor petitioners' alleged silence cured the
violation of the Rules and parliamentary practice of the
House.
o The records do not show that Representative
Fariñas' own interpretation of Rule II, Section 8
was submitted for adoption by the requisite
number of members or was ruled upon by the
Presiding Officer. The records show that after
giving his own interpretation of Rule II, Section 8,
Representative Fariñas simply moved to proceed
to the election for House Speaker without asking
for a vote on whether the Body would adopt his
opinion or not.
36. In ignoring the third category of independent membership
and in allowing the independent members to intrude into
the prerogative of the Minority to select its Minority Leader,
Representative Fariñas clearly wanted to suspend or amend
Rule II, Section 8 of the Rules.
37. Representative Fariñas' mere insistence on a different set
of governing rules is invalid.
38. There is no "estoppel by silence" that could amount to an
amendment of the Rules.
o Estoppel bars a person who admitted or
represented something from later on denying or
disproving that thing in any litigation arising from
such admission or representation.
 Certainly, petitioners have not been silent.
 The sessions before the House are not
litigations; the election of its Minority
Leader does not approximate a
proceeding in court. Estoppel by silence
may only be invoked if the person's
failure to speak out caused prejudice or
injury to the other.
39. The legislative branch of the government, in its most ideal
form, is one that accommodates all voices. Drowning the
voice of dissent restricts the right of the people to effective
and reasonable participation in public affairs. Having a
genuine Minority maintains the integrity of democracy
40. In determining the process of choosing the Minority Leader,
the reason for the Rules and the parliamentary tradition
observed by the House must be taken into context and
adopted.
41. Respondents unfortunately decided to dilute the votes of
the actual Minority "as soon as possible to wrest from [the
Minority] the leadership which, upon democratic principles,
rightly belongs to" someone else.
Why not mandamus?
42. An act is considered ministerial where the public officer
must do it, out of a legal obligation, without having any right
to decide on the manner, time, or propriety of doing it. On
the other hand, an act is considered discretionary where
the public officer has the right to exercise his or her
judgment or official discretion in doing the act.
43. Thus, it is up to the House leadership to extend recognition
to the duly designated Minority Leader. Mandamus,
however, does not lie to allow this Court to choose the
Minority Leader.
Final thoughts:
44. With deep regret, in the absence of a showing of a clear and
unmistakable present right on the part of petitioners,
considering the possibility of shifting political alliances, I
cannot vote to issue the writ of mandamus, even as I find
that there was grave abuse of discretion.
45. Accordingly, I vote to DISMISS the petition but only because
it was the wrong remedy.

Osmeña v. Pendatun
Rules of Proceedings|GR. No. L-17144 (October 28, 1960) |
Bengzon, J.| by Marquez, A.
Facts of the Case:
9. Congressman Sergio Osmeña Jr. delivered a privilege
speech with the following statement: “The people, Mr.
President, have been hearing of ugly reports that under your
unpopular administration the free things they used to get
from the government are now for sale at premium prices.
They say that even pardons are for sale, and that regardless
of the gravity or seriousness of a criminal case, the culprit
can always be bailed out forever from jail as long as he can
come across with a handsome dole. I am afraid, such an
anomalous situation would reflect badly on the kind of
justice that your administration is dispensing. . . . .”
10. Because of Osmeña’s imputation of bribery against the
President, House Resolution No. 59 was passed which
created a special committee to investigate the truth of this
charge against the President; Osmeña was summoned to
substantiate his charges and if he fails to do so, show cause
why he should not be punished by the House
11. Osmeña submitted to the court a petition for declaratory
relief, certiorari, and prohibition with preliminary
injunction against the fifteen members of the special
committee to annul House Resolution No. 59 as it infringed
the principle of parliamentary immunity
Issues:
1) WON words spoken in the House by a member of the
HOR cannot be questioned because of the
Constitution’s grant of parliamentary immunity. NO.
a. Section 15, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that “for any speech or debate” in
Congress, the Senators or Members of the
HOR “shall not be questioned in any other
place”
b. Even though a member of the legislature is
exempt from criminal or civil liability for
words uttered in the Congress, the members
of the Congress may be questioned by the
Congress itself
c. “For unparliamentary conduct, members of
Parliament or of Congress have been, or could
be censured, committed to prison, even
expelled by the votes of their colleagues”
2) WON the Congressman’s speech constituted no
disorderly behavior that could be punished. NOT
ANSWERED
a. It is for the House to answer the question as
the Constitution has conferred jurisdiction
upon it
b. If the court answered this question, it would
have assumed the role of an appellate court
which the Constitution did not intent because
of the theory of separation of powers
c. “the House has exclusive power; the courts
have no jurisdiction to interfere.”
3) WON the House lost it power to punish the
Congressman because it had taken up other business
before approving Resolution No. 59. NO.
a. “Rule XVII, sec. 7 of the Rules of House
provides that if other business has intervened
after the member had uttered obnoxious
words in debate, he shall not be held to
answer therefor nor be subject to censure by
the House”
b. “Resolution No. 59 was unanimously
approved by the House, that such approval
amounted to a suspension of the House Rules,
which according to standard parliamentary
practice may done by unanimous consent”
c. “Parliamentary rules are merely procedural…
and they may be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body"; "mere failure to conform to
parliamentary usage will not invalidate the
action (taken by a deliberative body) when the
requisited number of members have agreed
to a particular measure."
4) WON the House has no power to suspend one of its
members. NO.
a. The Alejandrino precedent does not apply in
this case because at the time it was decided,
the Legislature has limited powers and were
only those that was granted by the Jones Law
b. Now, Congress has full legislative powers and
prerogatives of a sovereign nation except as
restricted by the Constitution; now, the
“Congress has inherent legislative prerogative
of suspension”
5) WON the petition has become moot and academic.
YES.
a. Because no preliminary injunction was issued,
the Committee has already performed its task
and approved the suspension of Osmeña
b. The House has already closed its session and
the Special Committee has ceased to exist
c. The only thing the petitioner could do is to file
new pleadings and include all members of the
House as respondents but would probably be
dismissed because of lack of jurisdiction
SC Ruling:
 ACCORDINGLY, the petition has to be DISMISSED, and
is hereby dismissed. So ordered
Pacete v. Secretary of Commission of Appointments
(excluded)
Internal Government of Congress, Rules of Proceedings | [G.R.
No. L-25895. July 23, 1971.] | Fernando, J. | Montano, J.
Recitation Summary:
1. Petitioner was appointed as municipal judge
2. He was asked to vacate his position 9 months later by
the Sec. of Justice because his appointment was by-
passed.
3. A member of the Commission on Appointments filed a
motion for reconsideration of his confirmation as an
appointee.
4. But as discussed in Altarejos v. Molo and as in the
Court’s interpretation of Rule 21 of the Revised Rule
on Commission of Appointments, mere filing of a
motion for reconsideration did not have the effect of
setting aside a confirmation.
Facts:
- In 1964, Pacete was appointed by then President as
Municipal Judge of Picgayawan, Cotabato
- His appointment was made when Congress was in
recess so it was submitted in the next session in 1965.
- His appointment was confirmed and he was
congratulated by Senate President Marcos who was
the Chairman of the Commission on Appointments
- 9 months later, the Secretary of Justice asked him to
vacate his position because his appointment was by-
passed.
- He was informed by the Secretary of the Commission
on Appointments that a day after his confirmation,
one of the members of the Commission on
Appointments, then Senator Rodolfo Ganzon, wrote
to its Chairman stating that he was filing a motion for
the reconsideration of the confirmation of the
appointment in view of derogatory information which
he had received
- Respondent then informed the Secretary of Justice
- Petitioner now prays for prohibition against the
enforcement of the directive of respondent Secretary
of Justice for him to vacate his position and
mandamus to compel respondent Secretary of the
Commission on Appointments to issue to him the
certificate of confirmation
o On ground that the letter of then Senator
Ganzon, even on the assumption that it was a
motion to reconsider an appointment duly
confirmed, was without force and effect as it
was not approved by the body as a whole.
Issue:
W/N the filing of a motion for reconsideration with the
Commission on Appointments, without its being thereafter
acted on, suffices to set at naught a confirmation duly made of
an ad interim appointment
- NO.
- The power to disprove appointments is conferred by
the Constitution to the Commission and not the
individual members
o The Commission exercises this power thru
the vote of the majority of the members
present at a quorum as provided by Section
10 of its Rules
o Motion to reconsider appointment must be
approved by the majority
o Otherwise it is as if an individual is more
powerful than the Commission
- It was contended that his confirmation became final
and irrevocable upon the adjournment of the fourth
regular session of the Fifth Congress on May 21, 1965
o There is no rule of the Commission as to a
motion for reconsideration could have the
force and effect of defeating the
constitutional provision that an ad interim
appointment is effective “until disapproved
by the Commission on Appointments or until
the adjournment of the next session of the
congress.”
- In Altarejos v. Molo:
o Interpreted Rule 21 of the Revised Rule on
Commission of Appointments
o Mere filing of a motion for reconsideration
did not have the effect of setting aside a
confirmation.
o It must be voted upon and approved.
o President can appoint during recess of
Congress, such appointments shall be
effective only until disapproval by the
Commission on Appointments or until the
next adjournment of the Congress. This
appointment takes effect at once
- Pacete garnered unanimous vote of confirmation.
Ruling:
Petitioner is entitled to writ of mandamus and certificate of
confirmation. He is to discharge his duties as municipal judge.
His right to perform his functions as municipal judge of
Pigcawayan, Cotabato is in accordance with law, because his
confirmation has been duly confirmed.
Arroyo v De Venecia | Rules on Proceedings | G.R. No. 127255
August 14, 1997 | by Orate & Susano
Recit Summary: In this petition for certiorari, petitioners are
assailing the validity of RA 8240 regarding the imposition of sin-
taxes on beer and cigarettes. Petitioner Rep. Arroyo, after the
third reading of the bill, expressed the apparent lack of quorum
but upon objection and a roll call, a quorum was declared
present. After the interpellation, the conference committee
report was moved for ratification and confirmation. Upon
having received no objections, the Chair declared it approved.
The bill was subsequently signed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Senate President and the Secretaries of
both Houses of Congress. President Ramos signed the bill into
law the day after.
Lightning Recit:
 Each House may determine the rules of its proceedings
 What have been violated were internal rules and not
constitutional requirements for the enactment of the
law
 Said rules may be modified subject to the discretion
and pleasure of the body adopting them
 Court intruding into the internal rules would constitute
violation of separation of powers
Facts:
 RA 8320, which amends certain provisions of the
National Internal Revenue Code by imposing so-called
sin taxes (actually specific taxes) on the manufacture
and sale of beer and cigarettes, started originated as
HB No. 7198
 After being approved after the third reading, it was
sent to the Senate where it approved said bill with
certain amendments
 A bicameral conference was then called to reconcile
the disagreeing provisions between the two
 During the session, petitioner Joker Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum but he was but his motion
was defeated
 After petitioner was given the chance to interpellate,
he did not announce the question regarding the
quorum although he announced beforehand that he
would
 The petitioners then averred that there were 4 diff.
versions of the transcript
1. Audio-sound recording after 3:40 pm
2. Transcript from 3-3:40 pm of 21 Nov. 1986
certified by Chief of the Transcription Division on
the same day
3. Same transcript certified on 28 Nov. 1986
4. Transcript quoted
 They then alleged that there were differences between
the versions
1 Section 26. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof. (2) No bill passed by the either House shall become
a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in
its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except
 However, on the same day, it was signed by the House
Speaker and the Senate President and enrolled bill was
signed by then-President Fidel V. Ramos the next day,
22 November 1996
Issues:
1. WON RA 8240 is null and void for having been passed in
violation of the proceedings of the House rules.
Petitioner arguments:
a. did not call for the yeas or nays, but simply asked for its
approval by motion in order to prevent petitioner
Arroyo from questioning the presence of a quorum
b. the session was hastily adjourned to prevent petitioner
Rep. Arroyo from formally challenging the existence of
a quorum and asking for a reconsideration
Respondent arguments
a. Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement of
the rules of the House
b. no justification for reconsidering the enrolled bill
doctrine (an enrolled Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having the official attestations
of the Speaker of the HoR, of the President of the
Senate, and of the President, carries on its face a
solemn assurance by the legislative and executive
departments that it was duly passed by Congress)
- Art. VI, Section 16(3) states that “each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings” hence, a violation of
House rules is tantamount to a constitutional violation
- what is alleged to have been violated in the
enactment of R.A. No. 8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than constitutional
requirements for the enactment of a law1
- Rules, which are procedural in nature, are subject to
modification, revocation and waiver at the discretion and
pleasure of the body adopting them, as such, is not for the
Court to inquire into
- The Court may only inquire as to the issues when the
violation of said rules have effects beyond the legislative body,
such as the private rights of citizens
-The Court may not declare the nullity of an act of
legislature on account of violation of rules of proceedings
- As the issue is beyond that of the jurisdiction of the
Court in respect to the separation of powers, the proper
remedies would be those within the Legislative department
such as a move for amendment, a repeal or the enactment of a
new law
- under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing by the House
Speaker and Senate President are conclusive of its due
enactment
when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public
calamity or emergency. Upon last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and
nays entered in the Journal.
 Arroyo v. De Venecia (Resolution - additional) - The Chair followed a practice that was regularly done and
accepted.
Rules of Proceedings | G.R. No. 127255 | June 26, 1998 | - Arturo Tolentino defended this practice back in 1957: “The
Mendoza, J. | By Martinez, E. fact that nobody objects means a unanimous action of the
House. Insofar as the matter of procedure is concerned,
Facts of the Case: this has been a precedent since I came here seven years
- Petitioners seek a rehearing and reconsideration of the ago, and it has been the procedure in this House that if
Court’s August 1997 decision dismissing their petition for somebody objects, then a debate follows and after the
certiorari and prohibition regarding the validity of RA 8240 debate, then the voting comes in.”
on four grounds. - Besides, Arroyo could have asked for reconsideration right
7. Petitioners allege that when Rep. Arroyo asked the after the session was suspended for almost an hour, but
question “What is that, Mr. Speaker?,” the Chair he didn’t.
ignored him. 4. W/N petitioners were correct in questioning the
8. “What is that, Mr. Speaker?” is allegedly a privileged quorum repeatedly? NO.
question or point of order which, under the rules of - Arroyo questioned the existence of a quorum at 11:48 am,
the House, has precedence over other matters, except and it was proven that there was one.
motions to adjourn. - He then announced that he would again question the
9. Chair violated Rule XIX, 112 and Rule XVII 103 of the quorum. Apparently, this was a method to delay the voting
Rules of house which require that the Chair should on the conference report.
state a motion and ask for the individual votes of the
members instead of merely asking whether there was Ruling:
any objection to the motion. Petition denied. Rules were not disregarded and there was no
10. Petitioners disagree with the statement in the grave abuse of discretion on the part of the House of
decision that “The question of quorum cannot be Representatives.
raised repeatedly especially when the quorum is Additional point - Even though petitioner’s contentions were
obviously present for the purpose of delaying the true, the disregard of the rules would not affect the validity of
business of the House.” RA 8240 because the rules violated are merely internal rules of
procedure and not constitutional requirements.
Issue:
1. W/N Rep. Arroyo was ignored? NO. Pertinent provisions:
- Arroyo did not have the floor. He simply stood up and Rules of House of Representatives Rule XVI, 96
started talking, and the Chair simply did not hear him. Rules of the Senate Rule XXVI, 59
- Rules of House of Representatives Rule XVI, 96: Manner Rules of House Rule XX, 121
of Addressing the Chair.- When a member desires to speak,
he shall rise and respectfully address the Chair Mr.
Speaker.
- Rules of the Senate Rule XXVI, 59:
Whenever a Senator wishes to speak, he shall rise and
request the President or the Presiding Officer to allow
him to have the floor which consent shall be necessary
before he may proceed.
2. W/N Rep. Arroyo was raising a privileged question or
point of order? NO.
- Rules of House Rule XX, 121 defines the terms*:
Privileged question - those affecting the duties,
conduct, rights, privileges, dignity, integrity or
reputation of the House or of its members, collectively
or individually
Point of order - legislative devices used in requiring
the House or any of its Members to observe its own
rules and to follow regular or established
parliamentary procedure. In effect, they are either
objections to pending proceedings as violative of
some of those rules or demands for immediate return
to the aforementioned parliamentary procedure
(No further explanation in the Resolution)
3. W/N Chair should have asked for individual votes
instead of merely asking for objections? NO.
Santiago v. Sandiganbayan (excluded) while the latter is a punitive
Discipline of Members| G.R. No. 128055| April 18, 2001| Vitug, measure
J.| Valencia, Isis Kyle iii. Thus, the two are not repugnant to
Recit Summary: each other
1. Miriam Defensor-Santiago was charged with a c. The Constitutional guarantee of separation of
violation of R.A. No. 3019 powers is not absolute
2. Sandiganbayan ordered the suspension of Defensor- i. The Judiciary is vested with the right
Santiago and responsibility to investigate the
3. Defensor-Santiago contested the suspension order acts of the Executive and Legislative
based on Article VI Sec. 16(3) in cases where there is a grave
4. The SC denied the petition citing that that suspension abuse of discretion amounting to
order is only a preventive measure and does not run lack or excess of jurisdiction
counter to the Legislative discretion to discipline its d. R.A. No. 3019 did not exclude from its
members as the latter is a punitive measure coverage members of the Congress,
therefore the Sandiganbayan did not err in
Facts: ordering the suspension order
 In 1991, Miriam Defensor Santiago was accused of
violating the R.A. 3019 Anti-Graft and Corrupt Held:
Practices Act for unlawfully approving the stay of The petition for certiorari is dismissed.
multiple disqualified aliens during her tenure as the
Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation
o She was also charged with libel and violation
of P.D. No. 46 (Punishing public officials for
receiving gifts)
o Charges were filed in the Sandiganbayan
 Pursuant to this criminal information, the
Sandiganbayan issued a warrant of arrest against Se.
Defensor-Santiago
 Defensor-Santiago petitioned for provisional liberty,
as she is still recovering from a recent car accident
 In 1995, the prosecution moved to suspend Defensor-
Santiago from her public office (at the time, she was
already a Senator)
o After a failed motion for reconsideration and
SC appeal, the Sandiganbayan granted the
prosecution’s motion and granted a 90-day
suspension against Defensor-Santiago
 Hence, the current petition for certiorari

Issue/s:
1. WON the Sandiganbayan has the authority to suspend
from public office members of the Senate
a. Yes, the Sandiganbayan can suspend
members of the Senate
b. Defensor-Santiago interposes as defense Art.
VI Sec. 16(3) of the Constitution, which states
that “Each house may determine the rules of
its proceedings, punish its members for
disorderly behavior, xxx” (emphasis
supplied)
i. However, the legal basis for
Sandiganbayan’s decree to suspend
the petitioner, RA 3019 Sec. 13,
does not run against the
Constitutionally enshrined discretion
of the Senate to discipline its
members
ii. The former is merely a preliminary,
preventive measure pendente lite,
Arnault v. Nazareno, General Plenary Powers of Congress
GR L-3820 / July 18, 1950 / Ozaeta / Jules
Nature of the Case: Original Petition for Habeas Corpus
Petitioner: Jean Arnault, agent of Ernest Burt in the subject
Estate Deals
Respondents: Leon Nazareno, Senate Segreant-at-arms &
Eustaquio Balagtas, Director of Prisons
Recitation Summary (Rules):
8. Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the
jurisdiction of a legislative body to make, the investigating
committee has the power to require a witness to answer
any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to
his constitutional right against self-incrimination.
9. The inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative
body to make, must be material or necessary to the exercise
of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to
legislate, or to expel a Member.
10. Every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation. A witness may
not be coerced to answer a question that obviously has no
relation to the subject of the inquiry.
11. The necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and
the form and character of the action itself are determined
by the sum total of the information to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question.
12. Where the alleged immateriality of the information sought
by the legislative body from a witness is relied upon to
contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass
upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has
jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not
preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of
discretion in the exercise of that power.
13. Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent
to a refusal to testify and is punishable as contempt,
assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable.
14. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with
each other, and one is doubtful or uncertain while the other
is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the
latter.
15. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen
may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he
violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of
others.
16. No person can be punished for contumacy as a witness
before either House, unless his testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire.
(Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Facts:
14. The Senate investigated the purchase by the government’s
Rural Progess Administration of two parcels of land, known
as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An intriguing
question that the Senate sought to resolve was the
apparent irregularity of the government’s payment to one
Ernest Burt, a non-resident American citizen, of the total
sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest in the two
estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00 (since the
Buenavista estate was sold by San Juan de Dios Hospital to
Burt for Php 5M, but Burt has only paid Php 10K and the
Tambobong estate was sold by the Philippine Trust
Company to Burt for Php 1.2M, but Burt has only paid Php
10K), hence both should have been forfeited by Burt long
before due to non-payment of balances.
15. In February 27, 1950, the Senate issued Resolution No. 8
creating an investigatory committee sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the government.
16. Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt
in the subject transactions, was one of the witnesses
summoned by the Senate to its hearings. In the course of
the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly refused to
divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the
amount of Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the
Php1.5 million proceeds pertaining to Ernest Burt.
17. In, May 15, 1950, A Senate Resolution was issued.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed through to the custody of the Senate
Sergeant-at-Arms for imprisonment in the New Bilibid
Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal until he answers the questions. He
thereafter filed a petition for habeas corpus directly with
the Supreme Court questioning the validity of his detention.
Issue # 1: Did the Senate have the power to punish the
petitioner for contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom he gave the Php440,000.00? YES.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to
make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions as to be implied. In other words,
the power of inquiry – with process to enforce it – is an essential
and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative
body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body
does not itself possess the requisite information – which is not
infrequently true – recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such
information are often unavailing, and also that information
which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to
the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be
disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not
challenged by the petitioner, requires the Special Committee,
among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the
Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that
the name of the person to whom the witness gave the P440,000
involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in
fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is
not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry
but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed
legislation. We have already indicated that it is not necessary for
the legislative body to show that every question propounded to
a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter
under inquiry.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the
range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed
testimony of the witness called relates to that subject,
obedience, to its process may be enforced by the committee by
imprisonment.
Issue # 2: Did the Senate have the authority to commit
petitioner for contempt for a term beyond its period of
legislative session? YES.
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative
body to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not
to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that
body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish
for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction.
Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the
duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing relative
to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the
power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat
the very purpose for which that the power is recognized in the
legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is
legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-
preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted
by the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not
cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . .
There is no limit as to time to the Senate’s power to punish for
contempt in cases where that power may constitutionally be
exerted as in the present case.
The Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose
members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that
the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years,
two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as
vacancies may occur thru death or resignation. Members of the
House of Representatives are all elected for a term of four
years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The
Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on
December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The
resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was
adopted during the first session of the Second Congress, which
began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in May 18,
1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the
House of Representatives, we think it could be enforced until
the final adjournment of the last session of the Second
Congress in 1953.
Issue # 3: May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against
self-incrimination? NO.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal,
and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt
in compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no
basis upon which to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of
that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for
the determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the
witness to say that the answer will incriminate him as he is not
the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination
must appear reasonable and real to the court, from all the
circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his
general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the
facts thus developed, it is the province of the court to determine
whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or
not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to show
that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to
claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution
and punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his
privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection
against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
person.
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the
facts and circumstances of the case whether the witness is
justified in refusing to answer. A witness is not relieved from
answering merely on his own declaration that an answer might
incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide
that question.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too
shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him safety. At first he told
the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws
were violated, and that all requisites had been replied with;
but at the time he begged to be excused from making answers
"which might later be used against me."
A little later he explained that although the transactions were
legal he refused to answer questions concerning them
"because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his
dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on my privilege to
dispose of the money that has been paid to me as a result of a
legal transaction without having to account for the use of it."
But after being apparently convinced by the Committee that
his position was untenable, the witness testified that, without
securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain
person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's
verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far as he know, that
certain person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the
settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he
had seen that person several times before he gave him the
P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had
seen him again two or three times, the last time being in
December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to
40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in
height. But the witness would not reveal the name of that
person on these pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he
was a representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember
the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the
important question, what is the name of that person to whom
you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent
claim before the bar of the Senate that if he should reveal the
name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he
knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the
P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
Ruling: The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by
Arnault. He is to be detained until he answers the questions of
the Senate.
Dissent by Tuazon:
There is a limit to the legislative power to punish for contempt.
The limit is set in Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge Land is
approved — "the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed."
The estates deal aroused popular indignation since it
represented the fight against graft and corruption. The Senate
is commendable in leading this Crusade, however, it has
overstepped its allowable scope of power. The influence of
strong public passions should not get the better of our
judgment. Only thus can a government of laws, the foundation
stone of human liberty, be strengthened and made secure for
that very public.
1. The question has no relation to the contemplated
legislation.
The Senate wants the witness to give names because the fiscal
or the courts will not initiate an action against parties who
should be prosecuted but the institution of a criminal or civil
suit is a matter is alien to the duties of the Congress.
The committee has finished its investigation and submitted its
final report and the Senate has approved a bill on the bases of
the facts found and the result will not be any different if the
name of the person who received the bill is known or not.
(Trivia: it seems that a certain Antonio Quirino, maybe a
brother of Elpidio Quirino, is the target of the Senate
inquisition.)
The House of Representatives and the President do not need
the name to decide on the wisdom of the new legislations the
Senate would like to pass. They have their own idea of what
they need to guide them in the discharge of their respective
duties, and they have the facilities of their own for obtaining
the requisite data. The two Houses of Congress and the Chief
Executive were meant to act separately although the
concurrence of the three is required in the passage of
legislation and of both Houses in the approval of resolutions.
2. Abuse of power by Congress is dangerous.
A Judge who abuses such power may be impeached and he
acts at all times under the sense of this accountability and
responsibility. His victims may be reached by the pardoning
power. But if the Congress be allowed this unbounded
jurisdiction of discretion, there is no redress, The Congress may
dispoil of a citizen's life, liberty or property and there is no
power on earth to stop its hand. There is, there can be, no such
unlimited power in any department of the government of the
Republic. (Loan Association vs. Topeka; Taylor vs. Porter)
3. Flawed US-PH comparison.
The ponencia mentions that "in the Philippines, the legislative
power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone, and
therefore that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider
range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States
or any state legislature (since they scope of their legislative
fields is divided among State and Federal Legislatures."
A. Even if this distinction is true, inquiries should be for
specific objects, and should not embark upon fishing
expeditions in search of information which by chance may
be useful to legislation.
B. Even if this distinction is true, it is apparent that the power
of a legislature to punish for contempt can be no greater
nor less than that of any other. Were it possible for the
Philippine Senate and the United States Senate to
undertake an investigation of exactly identical anomalies
in their respective departments of justice, could it be
asserted with any support of logic that one Senate has a
wider authority to imprison for contempt in such
investigation simply because it has a "wider range of
legislative field?"
The 3 Bills recommended by the investigating committee and
approved by the Senate as a result of the yet uncompleted
investigation:
(1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any other
department head from discharging functions and exercising
powers other than those attached to his own office,
without ]previous congressional authorization;
(2) prohibiting brothers and near relatives of any President of
the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in
whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government is a
party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of
executive or administrative officers who are appointees of the
President; and
(3) providing that purchases of the Rural Progress
Administration of big landed estates at a price of P100,000 or
more, shall not become effective without previous
congressional confirmation.

The power of our legis is plenary. Whateer is implied by that
broad grant of powers is ok.
ABAKADA Guro Party List vs. Ermita – Valid Delegation
GR 168056 / September 1, 2005 / Austria-Martinez / Jules
Petitioners: Samson Alcantara & Ed Vincent Albano, officers of
Abakada Guro Party List (formerly AASJAS)
Respondents: Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
DOF Secretary Cesar Purisima,
BIR Commissioner Guillermo Parayno, Jr.
Nature of Case: Petition for prohibition questioning the
constitutionality of Sections 4-6 of RA 9337
Facts:
18. ABAKADA GURO Party List, et al., filed a petition for
prohibition questioning the constitutionality of Sections 4,
5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amending Sections 106, 107 and
108, respectively, of the National Internal Revenue Code
(NIRC).
19. Section 4 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of goods and
properties;
20. Section 5 imposes a 10% VAT on importation of goods; and
21. Section 6 imposes a 10% VAT on sale of services and use or
lease of properties;
22. These provisions contain a provision which authorizing the
President, upon recommendation of the Secretary of
Finance, to raise the VAT rate to 12%, effective January 1,
2006, after any of the specified conditions have been
satisfied.
(iii) Value-added tax collection as a percentage of
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the
previous year exceeds two and four-fifth
percent (2 4/5%); or
(iv) National government deficit as a percentage
of GDP of the previous year exceeds one and
one-half percent (1 ½%).
23. Petitioners argue that the law is unconstitutional, as it
constitutes abandonment by Congress of its exclusive
authority to fix the rate of taxes under Article VI, Section
28(2) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
Issues:
Issue #1: Whether or not there is a violation of Article VI,
Section 24 of the Constitution.
Held: No.
Ratio: The revenue bill exclusively originated in the House of
Representatives, the Senate was acting within its constitutional
power to introduce amendments to the House bill when it
included provisions in Senate Bill No. 1950 amending corporate
income taxes, percentage, and excise and franchise taxes.
Issue #2: Whether or not there is undue delegation of
legislative power in violation of Article VI Sec 28(2) of the
Constitution.
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix
within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and
restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export
quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or
imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
Held. No, there is no undue delegation of legislative power but
only of the discretion as to the execution of a law. This is
constitutionally permissible.
Ratio:
In testing whether a statute constitutes an undue delegation of
legislative power or not, it is usual to inquire whether the
statute was complete in all its terms and provisions when it left
the hands of the legislature so that nothing was left to the
judgment of any other appointee or delegate of the legislature.
Congress does not abdicate its functions or unduly delegate
power when it describes what job must be done, who must do
it, and what is the scope of his authority; in our complex
economy that is frequently the only way in which the
legislative process can go forward. In this case, it is not a
delegation of legislative power but a delegation of
ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and
administration of the increased rate under the law is
contingent.
Issue #3: Whether or not there is a violation of the due process
and equal protection under Article III Sec. 1 of the Constitution.
Held. No.
Ratio: The power of the State to make reasonable and natural
classifications for the purposes of taxation has long been
established. Whether it relates to the subject of taxation, the
kind of property, the rates to be levied, or the amounts to be
raised, the methods of assessment, valuation and collection,
the State’s power is entitled to presumption of validity. As a
rule, the judiciary will not interfere with such power absent a
clear showing of unreasonableness, discrimination, or
arbitrariness.
Ruling:
1. Petition dismissed.
2. Sections 4-6 of RA 9337 are constitutional.
3. There was no undue delegation of Congressional
Power.
Emmanuel Pelaez vs. The Auditor General – Delegation
GR L-23825 / Dec. 24, 1965 / Concepcion / Jules
Nature of the Case: Special civil action to prohibit the auditor
general from disbursing funds
Facts:
1. From September 4, 1964 to October 29, 1964, President
Marcos issued executive orders (93-121, 124, 126-129) to
create thirty-three municipalities all around Mindanao
(purportedly pursuant to Section 68 of the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917).
2. Section 68 states “The President may by executive order…
separate any political division other than a province, into
such portions… and may change the seat of government
within any subdivision to such place therein as the public
welfare may require…”.
3. Public funds thereby stood to be disbursed in the
implementation of said executive orders.
4. Suing as a private citizen and taxpayer, Vice President
Emmanuel Pelaez filed a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction against the Auditor General. It
seeks to restrain from the respondent or any person acting
in his behalf, from passing in audit any expenditure of
public funds in implementation of the executive orders
aforementioned.
5. Pelaez claims that the EOs were unconstitutional. He said
that Section 68 of the RAC had been impliedly repealed by
Section 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may “not
be created or their boundaries altered nor their names
changed” except by Act of Congress.
6. Pelaez argues: “If the President, under this new law,
cannot even create a barrio, how can he create a
municipality which is composed of several barrios, since
barrios are units of municipalities?”
7. The Auditor General countered that there was no repeal
and that only barrios were barred from being created by
the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and
that a municipality can be created without creating
barrios.
8. The Auditor General further maintains that through Sec.
68 of the RAC, Congress has delegated such power to
create municipalities to the President.
Issue:
W/N the executive orders are null and void, upon the ground
that the President does not have the authority to create
municipalities as this power has been vested in the legislative
department.
Held: Yes, Congress has not given a valid delegation to the
President to create municipalities.
Ratio:
1. Section 10(1) of Article VII of the fundamental law ordains:
“The President shall have control of all the executive
departments, bureaus or offices, exercise general
supervision over all local governments as may be provided
by law, and take care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
2. The power of control under this provision implies the right
of the President to interfere in the exercise of such
discretion as may be vested by law in the officers of the
executive departments, bureaus, or offices of the national
government, as well as to act in lieu of such officers. This
power is denied by the Constitution to the Executive,
insofar as local governments are concerned. Such control
does not include the authority to either abolish an
executive department or bureau, or to create a new
one. Section 68 of the Revised Administrative Code does
not merely fail to comply with the constitutional mandate
above quoted, it also gives the President more power than
what was vested in him by the Constitution.
3. Congress may delegate to another branch of the
government the power to fill in the details in the
execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is
essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of
separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in
itself — it must set forth therein the policy to be executed,
carried out or implemented by the delegate — and (b) fix
a standard — whose limits are sufficiently determinate or
determinable — to which the delegate must conform in
the performance of his functions. In this case, Sec. 68
lacked any such standard.
4. Further, although Sec. 68 provides the qualifying clause
“as the public welfare may require” – which would mean
that the President may exercise such power as the public
welfare may require – is present, still, such will not replace
the standard needed for a proper delegation of power. In
the first place, what the phrase “as the public welfare may
require” qualifies is the text which immediately precedes
hence, the proper interpretation is “the President may
change the seat of government within any subdivision to
such place therein as the public welfare may require.”
Only the seat of government may be changed by the
President when public welfare so requires and NOT the
creation of municipality.
5. The Court declared that the power to create municipalities
is essentially and eminently legislative in character not
administrative (not executive). As the SC of Washington
has put it (Territory ex rel. Kelly vs. Stewart), "municipal
corporations are purely the creatures of statutes."
6. It may not be amiss to note that the executive orders in
question were issued after the legislative bills for the
creation of the municipalities involved in this case had
failed to pass Congress.
7. Section 68, as part of the Revised Administrative Code,
approved or March 10, 1917, must be deemed repealed by
the subsequent adoption of the Constitution, in 1935,
which is utterly incompatible and inconsistent with said
statutory enactment. (Agreed with by Bengzon in his
separate opinion)
Ruling:
The Executive Orders in question are hereby declared null and
void ab initio and the respondent permanently restrained from
passing in audit any expenditure of public funds in
implementation of said Executive Orders or any disbursement
by the municipalities referred to.