INDIA’S QUEST FOR NSG MEMBERSHIP

India has sought NSG membership since 2008. India had been fast-pacing its pitch for
membership to the 48-member nuclear club. Pakistan had also submitted the application to
join the NSG, just days after India.

There was no decision on India’s application for membership in the June plenary of NSG.
Although it has been able to secure membership at other platforms such as MTCR.

India faced opposition from China and other countries. Government officials held that at least
32 countries had made positive interventions on India’s behalf, but the NSG’s actions are
governed by consensus and not by majority.

Disappointed by the outcome, the government lashed out at China in a veiled reference to
“one country”, that had “persistently raised” “procedural hurdles”, and said that an “early
decision on [India’s] application remains in larger global interest.”

In practical terms, the outcome of the Seoul NSG session is a setback to India’s declared
efforts for “immediate membership” at the NSG, Moreover, the government warned that it
could impact India’s quest for clean energy in the near future.

India has since tried to extract statements of support from the holdout countries that didn’t
back India during the June plenary of NSG.

-Views of Rakesh Sood:

Agreeing to formally join the NSG and the other export control regimes such as the Australia
Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and the Wassenaar Arrangement
reflects a policy shift by the Indian government. During the Cold War, India had been critical
of these regimes — condemning them as mechanism to deny technology to developing
countries although, in practice, India has maintained equally strict controls on exports of
sensitive materials and technologies.  In the run up to the 2008 waiver, India began to modify
its position and demonstrate its credentials as a responsible nuclear weapon state. 

-Views of T.P. Sreenivasan:

India did not allow itself time to explain the rationale of its policy change, not only to the
NSG members but also the other adherents to the NPT. This also explains the hesitations of
many friendly countries to support it.

First and foremost, credibility is the hallmark of success in the international community.
Policy changes should appear slow, deliberate and logical. Sudden shifts and turns are viewed
with suspicion. India had a fundamental position that our objective is disarmament and not
merely non-proliferation. 
Our sudden anxiety to join the NSG and other non-proliferation groupings is a departure from
the traditional Indian position, particularly since we have not fully utilised the waiver given to
us by the NSG. The art of persuasion works only when the ground is prepared and there is a
degree of satisfaction for all parties involved. India’s NSG push violated this sacred principle.
India’s miscalculation on the NSG membership was a foreign policy fiasco, which not only
resulted in a rebuff to India but also gave a veto to China on India’s nuclear credentials
and hyphenated India and Pakistan.

Moreover, we have elevated NSG membership to such heights that it appears more important
and urgent than other items on our wish list such as permanent membership of the UN
Security Council, signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a nuclear weapon
state, and membership of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC).

POSSIBLE BENEFITS OF NSG MEMBERSHIP:

NSG membership is an assertion of right. When the one-time NSG waiver was granted to India
in 2008, India agreed that it would abide by any rules that NSG may make in the future. Being
inside would mean participating in that rule-making.
Besides, NSG membership will give India a chance to expose Pakistan’s terrible proliferation
record.

OPPOSITION FROM CHINA:

India’s membership to the NSG was opposed primarily by China, among other countries.
However, China claimed that it had not opposed India’s membership per se, and that NSG
sessions had only spoken broadly of non-NPT states.
Others who raised a similar opposition were Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland.
Some nations like Brazil and Turkey called for a ‘criteria-based’ process to be put in place
first.
Both India and China have since initiated a separate dialogue process on this issue. Leaders
from the two countries have discussed this on the sidelines of the G20 Summit in September
and the BRICS Summit recently held in India.

REASONS FOR CHINA’s MOVE:

According to China, only those countries should be granted membership, who are signatory to
NPT. It believes that for admission the NSG has 5 criteria for members, most noticeably the
NPT. This is not a rule set by China, this is the rule set by the NSG and reaffirmed by the
international community.
There have also been other viewpoints behind China’s move:

• Some believe that China is just posturing, taking a hard stance against India, only to
sacrifice its position later in the hope of muting global opposition to its moves in the
South China Sea.

• There is also hope that China may trade-off its opposition in return for its own
membership into the Missile Technology Control Regime.

• However, going by Beijing’s statements, it is clear that China will agree only if Pakistan
is also admitted into the NSG. But nobody will let that happen given the country’s
terrible proliferation track record.

-Views of Pratap Bhanu Mehta:

Indian discourse on the temporary setback in pursuing membership of the Nuclear Suppliers
Group has become a game of smoke and mirrors. There is no dishonour in trying for NSG
membership and challenging an exclusionary global order. But what is worrying about this
engagement is the false pretences under which we undertook it. The issue is not our claims;
the issue is our capacity to delude ourselves about what we were doing.

The delusion came at 3 levels:

1. The first was a delusion about our own interests. Even if NSG membership was
desirable, is the political capital invested in this venture worth the costs? India still
enjoys plenty of benefits it got from the 2008 waiver.

If the domestic criticism has been high, it is because government raised the pitch: It
appeared desperate to project a political triumph where a routine handling might have
served it better.

2. The second delusion was about the international order. The cardinal fact about
international politics at the moment is this. China has a more aggressive outward
posture and it is seeking its due. Its concern with India, contrary to what we think, is
incidental. But it is deeply concerned with the US.

That concern will now manifest in the ambition that it will not allow the US to write
the rules of the international order according to its wishes. It will show that the US
cannot claim hegemony over redefining the rules of the game. 

It is also important not to belittle the hesitations and ambiguities shown by countries
like Brazil and others. These countries are not insignificant. But more importantly,
they are all interested in what kind of a power India will be, and whether India will
follow in the footsteps of the great power exceptionalism of US and China when it
comes to international law.

3. The third delusion is the cynical use to which the American security lobby is putting
this episode. 

 The lesson from this episode is that until India has the power to dictate terms it is in
our interest to be an arena of great power agreement. Whether Pakistan or NSG, the
US alone cannot deliver what we want.

The idea of strategic autonomy requires that each issue should be taken on its merits;
we should not close off options by overblown pre-commitments. We need to find ways
of putting pressure on China.

-Views of Rakesh Sood

Pakistan’s application to join the NSG, made just days after India’s request, was clearly part
of a coordinated strategy with China to block India’s admittance.

Chinese statements that India’s entry into the NSG would upset the balance in South Asia also
revealed Beijing’s preference to keep India hyphenated with Pakistan and locked into regional
frameworks. 

China also used procedural debates on the technical, legal, and political aspects behind the
participation of non-NPT states, to block a decision at Seoul. A number of smaller countries
that take a somewhat evangelical view of the NPT and are active supporters of the
“humanitarian initiative” against nuclear weapons, thus, fell for the Chinese ploy.

In hindsight, India underestimated China’s opposition. As compared to 2008, when it had to

reluctantly agree for the waiver, China is now more assertive.

-Views of Rajesh Rajagopalan (JNU Professor)

Though India did not get the membership, this will be policy failure only if India fails to
respond to what is clearly yet another indicator of China’s determined effort at containment
of India.

India does not need NSG membership in order to engage in nuclear commerce, of course. But
the NSG makes the rules for such commerce and it is always possible that they can frame
rules in future that will hurt India’s interests.  Additionally, India’s road to a partnership in
global governance is ill-served if there are governance groups that explicitly leave India out.

India had no reason but to apply in a high profile way for the following reasons:

• To convince many friendly states who had legitimate concerns about NPT and the
nonproliferation regime, concerns that were not motivated by any balance of power
considerations (unlike China’s opposition). This required an argument to be made, and
making this argument to a number of international partners meant that this could no
longer be a low-profile effort.

• India had to appear motivated so that well-wishers press India’s case with other NSG
members and smoothen the way for the application. 
 • The third reason is probably the most important: strategy. Raising the stakes was
necessary to concentrate the minds of all the members. Simply put, raising the stakes
reduced the opposition.

Moreover, it would be a mistake to see India’s application as being the victim of a US-China
power struggle or that China’s opposition was a response to India’s increasing closeness to US.

China’s strategy has been consistent since the 1960s and its sole objective was the
containment of India. China containment strategy shows little correlation with the state of
US-India relations. 

With respect to India’s future response:

• Since China’s move was primarily a balance of power move, India’s response should
also be on that particular chessboard. India can imitate what China is doing with
Pakistan: build up the military capabilities of others on China’s periphery who share
India’s worry about China.  This can take the form of military assistance as well as
training and other forms of cooperation.

• India should also ask its existing partners to expand the Malabar naval exercise to
include all other countries in the Asia-Pacific that are worried about China.

• Finally, India should restart the Quadrilateral Strategic Dialogue that was suspended
because of China’s objections (and Australian reticence) but seek, once again, to
include others such as Vietnam, Philippines and even Indonesia.

-Views of Manoj Joshi,

One of the main reasons for China’s actions in the NSG is that it is today an Asian regional
power, aspiring to global primacy, and it is not about to give India, a regional state with some
geoeconomic and military heft, a leg up.

Realist international discourse is built on the principle of give and take and, as the adage
goes, there are no free lunches.  Each country ruthlessly pursues its national interest and if
other states get in the way, they find ways of winning them over, neutralising them or
punishing them. Kautilyan injunctions call for pitilessly
using saam (suasion), daam (purchase), dand (punishment) and bhed (division) as the ways
of getting on in the real world. Thus, there are Kautilyan lessons that India needs to learn
from the NSG fiasco.

Outfits like the NSG are not about international law, but about geopolitics. China’s views are
not too difficult to understand.  Of all the Asian countries that have the potential to rival
China in terms of geographical spread, military power and economy, India does. China has no
intention of aiding a rival’s rise, even if that rival is way behind it. It is, of course, ready for
normal relations, one involving carefully calibrated give and take.
The second lesson of international politics India needs to learn is that geopolitics always
trumps world order. And of all the countries that have excelled in exploiting this, Pakistan is
without a peer. Today it has convinced China that its best chance of getting into the NSG lies
in appending its application to that of India.

WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN DONE?

-Views of T. P. Sreenivasan

In bilateral relations, the reality of power is what matters and deals can be struck on the
basis of give and take. But the dynamics of multilateral diplomacy depend on equations that
go beyond the actual size and power of individual countries. Often, clever use of the rules of
procedure alone can bestow extraordinary powers on nations. 

India could have pursued membership of the NSG quietly, without making any claims of
support from anyone. We should have handled the issue with dignified detachment and
waited for a consensus to emerge among the interested countries. If only we had played by
the rules of the multilateral game, the Seoul fiasco could have been turned into a victory.
 BRICS (INDIA-CHINA)

Bilateral Meeting between PM Modi and Chinese President Xi Jinping

• This was their third bilateral in four months.

• Mr. Modi made the most direct attempt by India to pin China to a commitment after it
decided to put a technical hold on Azhar’s designation at the UN, and declared that
India and China “cannot afford” to have differences on terrorism, as no country is
immune from terrorism.

• Mr. Xi raised other outstanding issues including addressing the trade imbalance
between both countries, even as both leaders noted that investment and trade had
registered a “significant increase”.

• President Xi said we should strengthen our security dialogue and partnership. PM Modi
said that both India and China had been victims of terrorism which was a scourge
afflicting the entire region.

• Pakistan remained the elephant in the room, since New Delhi believes that Beijing
is stonewalling on both issues — Azhar’s listing at the UN sanctions committee and
India’s entry into the NSG — to protect Islamabad’s core interests.

• Moreover, while India decided to name and shame and diplomatically isolate Pakistan
on terrorism, neither the Goa declaration nor any other country mentioned cross-
border terrorism. Rather, the Chinese President called for “political solutions” to
“regional hotspots” in an oblique reference to the Kashmir issue and the need for
dialogue between India and Pakistan.

• However, such divergences did not prevent India from using the Goa meeting to relate
to China bilaterally. For instance, the two leaders decided to hold a dialogue on India’s
bid for membership to the NSG, even though there wasn’t any major shift in China’s
opposition yet.

-Views of C. Raja Mohan:

President Xi Jinping’s reluctance at the BRICS summit in Goa to yield either on India’s
membership of the Nuclear Suppliers Group or its concerns about Pakistan’s support for cross-
border terrorism reflects the huge power imbalance that now defines Beijing’s engagement
with Delhi. On its part, India must move away from the idea of parity with China to finding
ways to cope with the consequences of the growing gap in material capabilities.

Considering Xi Jinping’s stopover at Dhaka on his way to the BRICS summit offering
investments more than $25 million, as compared to Modi’s $2 billion, China’s footprint in the
Subcontinent grows at India’s expense.
The problem is rooted in the fact that ideology has long dominated Delhi’s China policy.
Beijing, in contrast, has never stopped seeing India through the prism of power politics. 

CHINA’S ATTEMPTS FOR AN FTA

China was attempting to bring to the negotiating table a proposal for a Free Trade Agreement
(FTA) between the five major emerging economies. It was aimed at boosting trade ties in the
grouping through binding commitments on eliminating tariffs.

However, BRICS members barring China were not keen on such a pact. Their apprehensions
about the plan include the fear that it could lead to a surge in imports of Chinese goods into
their territory — in turn, hurting local manufacturing. South Africa even said that an
immediate push for a BRICS FTA may even polarize nations.

There was also no interest to start negotiations on a separate ‘BRICS Investment (protection &
promotion) Treaty.
 INDIA – IRAN

PM Modi and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani Meet (July 2015)

• They met on the sidelines of the BRICS and SCO summits being held in Ufa.

• This was the first high-level interaction between the two nations, after the new
government came to power in New Delhi.

• The talks included countering the continuing menace of terrorism in the region, along
with connectivity, energy, trade and investment.

Iranian Foreign Minister’s visit to India (August 2015)

• His visit was with the aim to lay the groundwork for increased bilateral cooperation.

• The two sides also discussed Indian investment in the strategically critical Iranian port
of Chabahar.

18th India-Iran Joint Commission Meeting (New Delhi, December 2015)

• It was co-chaired by India’s External Affairs Minister (EAM) and The Commerce and
Industry Minister from Iran.

• India’s EAM mentioned that India considers Iran as an important partner and expressed
satisfaction at the growing bilateral interaction in diverse area.

• She underlined the efforts underway to enhance bilateral economic cooperation in

energy, infrastructure – including shipping, ports and railways - and trade and
commerce. She stressed that connectivity afforded by Indian participation in
Chahbahar Port will facilitate linking Afghanistan and Central Asia with India.

• The Iranian side suggested participation of India’s public and private sectors in
development of Chahbahar Port and Chahbahar Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and in setting
up industrial units in the FTZ.
• The EAM emphasized the need for early completion of all necessary procedures for
India’s participation in Farzad-B field and pointed out India’s desire to participate in
other oil and gas explorations in Iran as well.
 • The two Ministers reviewed the progress in trade and economic cooperation and a
number of related matters, and discussed the possibilities in cooperation in railways,
including by supply of rails, rolling stock, signalling and other works and India’s
participation in Chahbahar – Zahedan -Mashhad railway line.

Petroleum Minister Dharmendra Pradhan’s visit to Iran (April 2016)

• This was the 1st visit by an Indian minister since the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

• India had indicated a willingness to invest $20 billion in the near future.

• It also indicated interest in setting up petrochemical and fertiliser plants, including in

the Chabahar SEZ, either through joint venture between Indian and Iranian public
sector companies or with private sector partners.



External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s visit to Iran (April 2016)

• The two sides agreed that the contract and modalities for a $ 150 million credit for
the Chabahar port would be signed soon.

These ministerial visits reflected not only New Delhi’s desire to re-invigorate bilateral
cooperation but also to ensure that tangible results ensue from the prime minister’s
forthcoming visit to Tehran. 

PM Modi’s visit to Iran (May 2016)

• It was the first bilateral visit to Tehran by an Indian prime minister in 15 years, and
was aimed to provide the timely thrust to the relations. It was expected to bridge the
trust deficit in bilateral cooperation and boost energy and trade ties while expediting
India’s connectivity plans.

• Chahbahar Port: India pledged $500 million for this project. The strategic location of
the port will allow India to access Central Asia through Afghanistan, more importantly
skipping Pakistan, and the Persian Gulf as it is the only Iranian port with access to the
Indian Ocean. The bilateral agreement signed will provide India the right to develop
and operate two terminals and five berths with multipurpose cargo handling capacities
in the port of Chabahar for 10 years. 

• Trilateral Transport and Transit Corridor connecting Chahbahar with Afghan road and
rail network was also signed by India, Afghanistan and Iran.

• The new corridors have been rightly described by PM Modi as “new routes for
peace and prosperity”.

• He also said that the arc of economic benefit from this agreement could extend to
the depths of the Central Asian countries. When linked with the International North
 South Transport Corridor, it would touch South Asia at one end and Europe at another.”
Even the fact that the Afghan President travelled to Iran to sign the deal, shows
the importance of the agreement.

• Vowing to jointly combat terrorism and extremism, radicalism and cyber-crime as the
two strategic partners, India and Iran agreed to share intelligence in a bid to fight the
menace that is “rife and rampant” in the region.

• They also agreed to explore the possibility of manufacturing aluminium metal by

setting up of a smelter on joint venture basis in Iran.

• Other MoUs signed were related to science and technology cooperation, cultural
exchanges, projects involving National Archives and policy dialogue involving think
tanks and foreign ministries.

• They also decided to step up the momentum of economic engagement through early
conclusion of a Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA), preferably within a year. The two
leaders also directed that Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement (DTAA) and Bilateral
Investment Treaty (BIT) should be concluded before the end of the year.

• Modi’s visit was also significant as it came a month after Modi’s visit to Saudi Arabia,
indicating the necessity of ensuring “parallel levels of engagement”.

Joint Naval Drills (June 2016)

India and Iran conducted joint naval drills which focused on the Strait of Hormuz. This was
the first exercises held after the lifting of sanctions on Iran.

BACKGROUND
Even though PM Modi, during his recent visit described the relationship between India and
Iran as “'dosti' as old as history”, bilateral ties between India and Iran took a beating during
the sanctions years. India had voted against Iran at the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) over its clandestine nuclear programme and, under pressure from the U.S.,
slashed oil imports from the country by up to 40 per cent during the period. New Delhi had
also backed off from a pipeline project that aimed to bring natural gas from Iran to India
through Pakistan. 

But with sanctions removed and foreign countries and companies rushing back to Tehran to
seize business and economic deals, it is important for India to reboot relations. Iran also
seems keen on pursuing stronger ties with India.

Mr. Modi’s visit also assumes great significance in the larger context of his own policy of
enhanced engagement with West Asia. 
Moreover, the Iran visit comes after his trips to the United Arab Emirates and Saudi
Arabia and ahead of visits to Qatar and Israel. The government appears to be trying to
reach out to the three poles of the region. While it will pursue good ties with the Sunni Gulf
for energy supplies, Iran would act as a gateway to Central Asia besides enhancing India’s
energy security. Israel remains one of India’s top defence and technology suppliers. The
success of this policy, thus, depends on New Delhi’s capacity to do the balancing act. The Iran
visit is an opportunity to restore equilibrium in India’s foreign policy, which, of late, was seen
to be skewed towards Israel and Saudi Arabia.

However, India will have to ensure that its engagement is not taken as an approval for
regional power politics by any of the regional big players.”

CONNECTIVITY AS A MAJOR FACTOR

The issue of reliable connectivity through Iran has become paramount in the wake of India’s
growing ambitions in the Central Asian region. This connectivity is critical to two major
initiatives.

1. First, it is needed to gain access to the oil and gas fields of Central Asia to fuel India’s
growing economy and to open up the Central Asian markets for Indian products.

2. Second, India needs easy land access to Afghanistan, enabling New Delhi to strengthen
its strategic and economic ties with the country. With Pakistan effectively blocking any
direct land route from India, Iran must be a reliable transit point.  

There were various projects that were envisioned to fulfil the above objectives, two of which,
Chahbahar port and Trilateral Transit Corridor have also been translated into corridors.

Apart from those, Iran has also supported India’s inclusion in the Ashgabat Agreement, of
which Turkmenistan, Iran, Oman and Uzbekistan are founding members. It came into force on
April 23, 2016, and is an important corridor connecting Central Asia with the Persian Gulf.

Moreover, while officials say that the much-delayed Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is best
forgotten, a series of other pipelines — the Iran-Oman-India undersea pipeline and the
Turkmenistan-Iran-India pipeline among them — still hold promise.

CHABAHAR PORT
The project involves developing Chabahar port (which is barely a thousand kilometers from
Kandla, Gujarat) with road and rail connectivity linking it to Zaranj, on the Afghan-Iran
border, 900 km to the north. Once the Chabahar port in Iran is developed, it will offer India
alternative access to landlocked Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. It is the first foreign project
that India is involved in developing to such a large extent. This plan has been hanging fire
since the 2000s and only now, after the Chinese put in their bid to develop it, did New
Delhi get its act together.
It is situated in South Eastern part of Iran, and on the northern coast of Gulf of Oman. It is
surrounded by Afghanistan in the North, Pakistan in the North-East and India in the East. It is
the only Iranian port with direct access to the ocean. 

According to C. RAJA MOHAN, although India has taken long to get it off the ground, the
Chabahar project has the potential to alter the hostile regional geography that Delhi had
inherited in 1947. The partition of the subcontinent and Pakistan’s control of parts of Kashmir
had left India without physical access to Afghanistan. Pakistan, which resented Kabul’s special
relationship with Delhi, had no desire to provide overland transit rights to India or facilitate
an expansive cooperation between Afghanistan and India.

Chabahar’s significance also rose, as China began to develop Gwadar and unveiled ambitious
plans for linking its far western province of Xinjiang with the Arabian Sea with a transport
corridor running through Pakistan.

The agreement signed during Modi’s visit marks a new level in India’s overseas ambitions,
establishing a genuinely strategic presence not just in one of the world’s great energy
markets, but potentially giving Indian business access to some of the fastest-growing
economies of the future.

The deal will also allow India to expand its strategic presence in Afghanistan, allowing
businesses in both countries to bypass a Pakistan that has proven reflexively hostile to
allowing transit rights to trade between them. In short, the deal signals that India, like
China, has big-league ambitions.

INSTC
Coupled with the Chabahar Port, the International North-South Transit Corridor (INSTC) can be
the cornerstone of the India-Iran relationship. The INSTC trade corridor, running through Iran
and Afghanistan, is a consolidated transportation network, including rail, road, and water
transport connecting Mumbai to Moscow, via Bandar Abbas in Iran.  It would allow India to
bypass the overland routes through Pakistan and China to Central Asia. Not only does the
INSTC have the potential to serve as a strategic counterbalance to China’s One Belt, One-Road
Initiative, it would also allow India to integrate with Eurasian markets and firmly establish
itself in Central Asian oil and gas production.

This is also significant as the Central Asian Republics, which were in the vortex of competition
between the US, Russia and China a decade ago, have now been anxious to see a larger Indian
presence in the region.

ENERGY SECURITY
Strong ties with Iran are vital for India. The key factor is energy. Till sanctions were imposed
on Iran, it was India’s second largest source of crude oil after Saudi Arabia.
Given that India is a net importer of energy and Iran a net exporter, this sector provides a
foundation for bilateral relations. Iran’s abundant oil and gas fields have the potential to
meet India’s ever-growing demands.

India’s bid to develop the Farzad B gas field also remains in contention after Iran’s
initial refusal to give India the project. India’s diplomatic activism revived
negotiations thereafter, but did not lead to any conclusion over the issue. The signing of
an agreement to develop the Farzad-B gas fields, therefore, would be a welcome step in this
direction.

Iran would also serve as a safe and stable transit point for Central Asian gas and oil, either via
pipelines or other means. India must however act decisively so as to not lose any advantage in
this critical area.

However, there has also been a major issue of contention arising out of India’s energy ties
with Iran. India owes $6.5 billion in lieu of oil imports, which is possibly the thorniest of the
current issues between the two countries. India is the second biggest customer of Iranian
crude after China. But it has built up a backlog of payments over three years while Iran was
under sanctions over its nuclear program. Although a settlement plan has been reached, India
should expedite the clearing of this payment backlog as soon as possible.

IRAN & CHINA

In a state visit to Iran, Xi Jinping emphasized China’s place as Iran’s biggest trading partner
for six years in a row. This relationship will only grow stronger as both countries have agreed
to increase trade to $600 billion over the coming decade. The Chinese filled a void created by
Western sanctions and earned trust and goodwill with the Iranian people. Given their deep
cultural and civilizational ties, India’s absence was conspicuous.


IRAN & AFGHANISTAN

Iran has maintained contact with the Taliban, to ensure its eastern borders remain free of
influence from the self-proclaimed Islamic State, participants said. However, given the
theological differences between the Taliban and Iran, this contact will not have long-term
consequences. India must ensure Iran’s objectives in Afghanistan are clearly outlined to
determine their convergence with New Delhi’s goal of a peaceful and stable Afghanistan, they
concluded.

Both Iran and India share the goal of a stable government in Kabul free of the Taliban’s
influence. Globally, New Delhi and Tehran are on the same page in their opposition towards
groups like al-Qaeda and the Islamic State.

VIEWS OF IMPORTANT PERSONS:

-C. Raja Mohan

• The rare trilateral agreement with Afghanistan and Iran underlines the extraordinary
strategic opportunities that continue to present themselves for India in the region.
This agreement, along with the one for Chahbahar port project, raises hopes for
reordering India’s geopolitics to the north-west of the subcontinent.

• Delhi’s vote against Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on the
nuclear issue has done a lot less damage than India’s inability to find practical ways to
advance the relationship on the ground. 

• The real challenge in India’s engagement with Iran was not about holding up the high
principles of “strategic autonomy”, but of effectively navigating the international
complexities surrounding economic and energy ties and seizing upon the few
opportunities that were available for building a partnership under adverse conditions.
India’s performance here has been underwhelming.

• The problem has been less about the definition of new grand strategic objectives for
Indian foreign policy. It was largely about the institutional competence to translate
them into outcomes. Even when consensus existed on some key issues and relevant
international understandings were hammered out with some diplomatic skill, Delhi has
struggled to implement them. Overcoming Delhi’s internal incoherence has often
turned out to be a bigger challenge than the arguments within the political class.

-Srinath Raghavan:

• There has been absence of a strategic view of Iran. Barring some exceptions, South
Block regarded our ties with Iran as purely transactional, essentially a buyer-seller
relationship centered on energy. Although there were some difficulties posed by
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, but the fact remains that New Delhi did not squarely
reckon with the upshots of a strategic relationship with Iran. For starters, we could
have accessed eyes-and-ears on the Makran coast to monitor not only the Gwadar port
being developed by the Chinese, but also Pakistani naval activity under the UN
umbrella in the Persian Gulf.

• The basic point is that Iran has always potentially been the most important power in
the region. It has a unique geopolitical location owing to its reach in Central Asia and
Caucasus as well as in West Asia and the Persian Gulf. Because of its geography, Iran
was historically an important arena of great power jostling for influence.

• With respect to Pakistan: New Delhi must avoid any facile assumption that Mr. Modi’s
trip has already positioned us better vis-à-vis Pakistan or Afghanistan. Tehran has also
reset its ties with Islamabad following a successful visit by President Hassan Rouhani.

• With respect to Afghanistan: As far as Afghanistan is concerned, it is clear that Iran

does not share India’s opposition to any attempt at reaching out to the Taliban. With
increasing turbulence in Iraq and Syria and the possibility of the Islamic State
 expanding into Afghanistan, Iran wants to keep its northern frontiers stable. So, while
the trilateral transit agreement showcases cooperation among India, Iran and
Afghanistan, it is unlikely to translate into effective political cooperation between
them.

India’s fundamental problems in Afghanistan persist: lack of strategic presence or

leverage, and the absence of any regional partners. Hence, India will remain marginal
to the evolving political situation in that country — unless we rethink our approach.

-Rakesh Sood:

• For the deals done with Iran, the challenge for India will be to ensure timely
implementation. Delivery is key for a nation that wants to make up for lost time, and
Tehran has no dearth of suitors from east or west, at the moment
• The regional backdrop is more complex today compared to 2003. Developments in
Iraq, Syria and Yemen, strains in Iran’s relations with Saudi Arabia and rising
sectarianism in the Islamic world are exposing new fault lines. In these troubled times,
there is much that can draw India and Iran together provided a degree of trust can be
restored.

-K C Singh (Former Ambassador to Iran)

• Iran will on the one hand play China and Pakistan against India selectively, and on the
other seek from the West high technology for advanced manufacturing. The latter can
make it a competitor for India in energy intensive industries, as it has nursed self-
reliance due to sanctions.

• If Indian diplomacy has to succeed, the skill needed to engage this new Iran will have
to be greater and sensitivity to their concerns adequately factored in when partaking
the theatre of GCC sheikhs and the Indian diaspora.

-Kanchi Gupta

While the challenge for Prime Minister Modi will be to secure India’s place in Iran’s economic
and strategic calculus, his visit also signals a more assertive Middle East policy. Even though
the Middle East political climate may have eclipsed relations with Iran, Modi’s visit will boost
the pursuit of India’s strategic priorities in the region. The simultaneous efforts to strengthen
economic and strategic relations with Iran and Saudi Arabia will give greater purpose to
India’s profile in the region.

-Amb Dinkar Srivastava (Former Ambassador to Iran)

 • India should not view its relations with Iran as a subset of her relations with other
countries, keeping in mind other countries of West Asia and Pakistan.

• Post–sanction, while Iran seeks to emerge as a regional power and mainstream itself
into the international order, India finds in Iran a potential stabilizer in Afghanistan.

• Iran is also increasingly important for India, insofar as keeping an eye on China’s
growing activities in the Indian Ocean is concerned. India’s assistance to develop Iran’s
Chabahar port, barely 72 nautical miles from Pakistan’s Gawadar port, is largely
perceived as India’s answer to Pakistan’s habitual intransigence, provided India walks
the extra mile and helps Iran connect the Chabahar port with the hinterland and
beyond.

-Talmiz Ahmad

The signing of the Chahbahar port agreement and the trilateral trade and transit
agreement during Modi’s recent visit will have the potential to significantly change
strategic equations in the region. These agreements will put in place geo-economic, political
and military relationships that will pull India out of the narrow straitjacket of South Asia
and make it a role-player in the security and stability of its extended neighbourhood.
 INDIA – RUSSIA

16th India-Russia Annual Summit (December 2016, Russia)

• The main purpose of the visit was to tilt the impression that the relation has been
strained in a year when India grew closer to the United States and Russia made
overtures to Pakistan for the first time.

• PM Modi said that Russia is a strong and reliable friend of India and both countries
have a “truly strategic” partnership.
• India and Russia decided to expand cooperation across various sectors as they signed
16 pacts, including deals on joint manufacture of 226 military helicopters and
construction of 12 atomic plants with involvement of local companies in India.

• The agreements included a second site for Russian six Russian nuclear reactors in
Andhra Pradesh and the manufacture of Russia's Kamov Ka-226T light helicopters under
Modi's 'Make in India' programme; negotiations were also on for India to seal the deal
on the lease of another Akula II class nuclear submarine, the acquisition of the S-400
air defence system, an order for three more Krivak III class stealth frigates, and the
FGFA.

• The two sides expressed commitment to realize the target of $30 billion in the next 10
years set during the 2014 Annual Summit, up from the present $10 billion. The two
countries are also moving forward on the India and Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union
Free Trade Agreement.

• Modi also underlined the need for the world to unite against terrorism “without
distinction and discrimination between terrorist groups and target countries”, an
apparent reference to sources of the menace like Pakistan. They also discussed a host
of global geo-political issues including situation in Syria.

• Putin also conveyed Russia’s “strong support” to India’s bid for permanent membership
of the UN Security Council, saying it is a “deserving and a strong candidate ”.

17th India-Russia Annual Summit (October 15, 2016, India)

• India and Russia held a bilateral annual summit on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in
Goa.

• Russian President Vladimir Putin expressed that Russia remains one of India’s leading
suppliers of advanced weapons and defence technology as “India is Russia’s especially
privileged strategic partner” and also highlighted Russia’s “stable” approach to ties
with India.
 • Both sides also came strongly against terror.

• India has signed a series of key defence deals under the Modi government as part of a
$100-billion upgrade of its Soviet-era military hardware, making it an attractive
proposition for arms exporters. 

• Russia, in a show of “special and privileged strategic partnership”, announced plans to

set up a joint venture to build the Kamov KA 226 helicopters in India, which will also
buy surface-to-air missile systems from its former Cold War ally, as the two tighten
their military relationship.

• They also signed Inter-Governmental Agreements (IGA) for five S-400 Triumf air
defence systems and four stealth frigates. The S-400 is considered one of the most
advanced long range defence system in the world and a game changer in countering
airborne threats. The system has the capability to destroy incoming hostile aircraft,
missiles and even drones at ranges of up to 400 km. This means that Pakistani aircraft
can be tracked even when they are in their airspace soon after take-off.

• The year 2017 will mark the 70th anniversary of establishment of diplomatic ties
between the two nations.

RELATIONS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE URI ATTACKS

Russia’s reactions stood in sharp contrast to its reaction to the 2008 strikes by expressing
concern instead of steadfast support to India. The statements captured the changing nature
of India-Russia ties, also reflected in Moscow’s military relationship with Pakistan.

Although Russia condemned the terror strike in Uri but went ahead with the military exercise
with Pakistan even as India blamed Pakistan for not acting against the terror modules.

Rather, the Russian ambassador assured India not to be concerned over the military exercises
which is in India's interest as they will be teaching the Pakistani army how not to use army
for the terror attacks. 

Russian government think tank sources indicated that Russia may not be on the same page
with India on Pakistan, and that Russia had re-evaluated its ties with Pakistan.

As per some scholars in Russia, Pakistan is a victim of terrorism as well. It has therefore

revised the Cold War assessment of Pakistan as a supporter of the Afghan mujahideen,
highlighting that Moscow did not want to leave Pakistan alone.

The response from India in similar incidents, even though Russia-India trade has not grown to
great heights despite the encouragement of both states, has been supportive of Russian
positions and has a careful and calibrated response to all Russian actions — in Chechnya,
Syria, Ukraine and elsewhere, India has supported Russia.

In this light, India has to rebuild on its strengths and common concerns with the Russians.
They have to revitalize their earlier agreement on sharing intelligence for a joint strategy on
terrorism. If India is concerned with state-sponsored terrorism from Pakistan, Russia is
concerned with the backing that states are directly or indirectly giving to terror groups in
West Asia and Central Asia. India will have to be more forthright in condemning states that on
the pretext of regime change or local geopolitics are allowing the growth of terror groups in
West Asia.

DEFENCE PARTNERSHIP WITH RUSSIA

Defence cooperation is an important pillar of the India-Russia strategic partnership. It has a
historical perspective, and has been one of the foundations of the India-Russia relationship,
which had also seen a progressive change from a buyer-seller relationship to joint
partnership. But geostrategic implications of the countries have changed the scenario to some
extent.

According to Ashok Sajjanhar, India has so far been heavily dependent on Russian armaments
with more than 70 per cent of its weapons being sourced from Russia, and the Indian defence
market continues to be important to Russia. Although in absolute terms Russia is still the
largest supplier of defence equipment to India, its share in overall imports has progressively
declined. Most recently, India’s reported decision to sign the three ''foundational'' defence
Agreements with USA, viz., Logistics Support Agreement (LSA), Communications
Interoperability and Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA) and Basic Exchange and
Cooperation Agreement (BECA) for Geo-spatial Cooperation, has surfaced as a cause of serious
concern for Russia. There are real and perceived shifts in Indian armament policies where
Russia dominated for years. India has opened up to the U.S., France, Israel, all of whom are
gradually edging out the Russians in some sectors. The latter feels that India is virtually
entering into a military alliance with USA, which will severely restrict Russia's ability to share
sophisticated defence technology such as for India’s nuclear submarine programme with it.

However, even as India increases its indigenous defence production capacity and diversifies its
procurement sources, the military’s dependence on Russia for some critical technologies still
remains.
Many government officials assert that the geostrategic moves by Moscow — whether of joint
drills with Pakistan or naval exercises with China in the South China Sea — will not alter the
transactional nature of its defence relationship with New Delhi.

Moreover, with the last visit of Modi, there has been an upward movement in the relationship.
India-Russia ties reached a new landmark in nuclear energy cooperation with the dedication
of Unit 1 of the Kudankulam nuclear power project jointly inaugurated by Prime Minister
Narendra Modi and President Vladimir Putin through video conference. Both sides also agreed
to work together on the remaining stages of Kudankulam 2,3,4,5 and 6.

During Putin’s recent visit to India, the two nations also put up an emphatic display of deep
bilateral ties, setting aside recent discord, by concluding some visible, high-ticket, defence
deals. The import and progressive manufacture in India of KAMOV-226 helicopters, which was
discussed during Modi’s visit in December 2015 and that of the S400 Triumph air defence
systems, can be a game changer. Some other pending deals on which decision has been unduly
delayed because of the reported obduracy of the Ministry of Defence should also be
concluded expeditiously in a similar manner.

As per Shyam Saran, maintaining traditional India-Russia ties has become more challenging in
the wake of the Ukraine crisis of 2013 and Russia’s annexation of Crimea. This has had two
major consequences.
1. One, it has led to a serious deterioration in the US-Russia and the Russia-Europe
relations, reviving the flavour, if not yet the substance, of the Cold War. In this
relatively more confrontational setting, India’s relations with the US and Russia,
respectively, become more difficult to manage. As India moves to expand its security
and defence relationship with the US, concerns in Russia will increase.
2. Two, Russia has inevitably moved closer to China in order to compensate for its
worsening relations with the West. A case in point is the S-400 Triumph Air Defence
Missile System. India has contracted to buy five such systems for $6 billion. China has
concluded a deal for the same system in September 2014.

CHANGING ALIGNMENTS
South Asia has seen historic blocs from the Cold War turn on their head in recent years in the
light of growing terrorism emanating from Pakistan, India-Pak tension, India’s growth as a
major regional power and China’s emergence as global force. This is seen most prominently
with regard to four countries – India, Pakistan, Russia and China.

That a sovereign has no permanent friends is part of traditional wisdom around the world.
Nothing illustrates this more than the evolution of Russia’s ties with China and Pakistan. Few
countries in the non-Western world have done more damage to Russian interests. The Chinese
alignment with the West from the 1970s and the Pakistani jihad against Moscow in the 1980s
were central to the defeat of the Soviet Union in the Cold War. That was then; Russia now
believes it can play the China card in enhancing its leverage with the US, and there are also
some in Moscow that may also bet that cozying up to Pakistan would help caution India
against drawing too close to America. While another school of thought point to the
unintended consequence of pushing India into the arms of the US.

• Russia-China Relations
According to Anuradha M. Chenoy, demonized by the West, Russia has become a strategic
partner of China and they have significant convergence of interests.

But also, Russia is aware that China is leveraging its economy and relationships to build a
hegemony with the US, and has its own concerns about the Chinese dominating Russian
markets, exploiting Russian resources, and not backing Russian security concerns. 

China is enticing countries, including Russia, with its One Belt, One Road plan that will
develop huge new linkages and develop trade routes. Pakistan is a satellite state for China.
Russia has concerns about Central Asia vis-à-vis China and Pakistan.

As per Shyam Saran:

India-Russia relations have lost the strategic glue that held them together from 1960 to 1990
— the shared concern over a Chinese threat. Although India-Russia relations continued to be
close and cordial but that has been more because of inertial factors rather than driven by any
fresh strategic vision.

On the political side, China has refrained from criticizing Russia on Crimea while the latter
has returned the favour by endorsing China’s stand that the South China Sea issue should be
resolved through dialogue between interested parties and without “outside interference”.

• Russia – Pakistan Relations



Russia and Pakistan carried out joint military exercises named Druzhba-2016 with combat
troops that engaged in combat and target elimination operations in Pakistan, even in the
aftermath of the Uri attacks.

Although the two countries have carried out naval exercises in the past as well but they were
strictly counter narcotic operation drills. But, these recent drills were proper military
exercises. Russia had also signed a deal with Russia for four Mi-35 attack helicopters in the
last two years, after the lifting of sanctions on Pakistan by Russia in 2014.

These incidents need to be seen in the light of India’s cozying up to the US and the American
support to India’s fight against terrorism, entry into NSG and the UN Security Council, defence
and economic cooperation and the fact that India-US partnership changes the power dynamic
in Asia completely. US-Russia fallout has done little to pacify the situation.
As a reaction to their growing closeness, India has conveyed its views to the Russian side that
military cooperation with Pakistan, which is a state that sponsors and practices terrorism as a
matter of state policy, is a wrong approach. It will only create further problems.

In fact, the military exercises were initially meant to be conducted in the Gilgit-Baltistan
region, but the venue was changed with due respect to Indian sensitivities. But the damage
had been done. The timing of the exercise was bad enough. It comes at a moment when India
was trying to isolate Pakistan after the Uri attacks, coping with fresh political violence inside
Kashmir, and drawing international attention to India’s claims over Gilgit-Baltistan.

India officially conveyed unhappiness over the growing Pakistan-Russia ties after both
countries held the first ever joint military exercise in Pakistan’s northwest. India had
expressed concern over the exercise with Pakistan during the 22nd India-Russia Inter-
Governmental Commission (IRGC) that was being held around the same time.

There are various viewpoints that explain the Russian overtures to Pakistan:

• Views of Andrew Korybko:

Russia lifted its arms embargo on Pakistan in 2014 and rapidly moved to enter into a

historic rapprochement with it, eager to also reap the benefits of Pakistan’s pivotal
role as the zipper of pan-Eurasian integration in a 21st century increasingly defined
by infrastructure connectivity prospects and New Silk Roads.

• Achieving Regional Influence: Russians are likely to be seeing this as a one-up over
Pakistan by forging a relationship with one of US’ old partners–Pakistan, who is also a
major non-NATO ally of the US. Russia would see this as a victory over the US in
regional influence. This is, however, a clear sign of age-old complex defence and
foreign policy formulated by Russian bureaucrats.

If Russia continues to formulate its south Asia policy in relation to its competition with
the US, it risks losing one of its oldest allies, one that it cannot afford to lose at a time
when much of the West stands against the Putin regime.

• Russia’s rising hostility with the United States and Europe is the zero-sum prism
through which it sees the rest of the world – and its moves in South Asia can be viewed
as a sub-set of Moscow’s wider global behaviour.

• Against the threat from ISIS and Islamic extremism: The “sense” that Moscow has
officially conveyed to Delhi is that they “are not in it for defence deals and
money”. “It is Islamist militancy and terrorism where they want to work with Pakistan.
By actively coordinating with Pakistan, Moscow believes that it should be able to halt
the radical jihadists’ future spillover to Central Asia. Therefore, Russia is trying to
portray its own security concerns as the raison d’être behind the rapprochement.
 • Using “Pakistan card” over India: The Kremlin wants to slow down the impending
downward trend, as well as leverage its influence over New Delhi, by skillfully utilizing
the “Pakistan card.” By engaging with Pakistan, Russia leaves New Delhi with a hard
choice: to honor its strategic commitment to Russia and make concessions or to
observe Russian-Pakistani rapprochement, which could potentially erode India’s
military advantage.

Moscow was sensitive to the India-Pakistan rivalry before; however, altering

geopolitical realities goaded Russian foreign policy into exploring new horizons. In
particular, the recent U.S. refusal to subsidize Pakistan’s purchase of F-16 fighter jets
may have pushed both countries farther away from each other, with Russia potentially
emerging as an alternative supplier.

Views of Anuradha M. Chenoy:

Why is India’s time-tested strategic partner engaging with Pakistan at this juncture? Is there a
shift in Russian geostrategy and linkage with China that is impacting Moscow’s relations with
India? Have India’s own foreign policy shifts and new relations set off a reaction in Russia? The
Russia-Pakistan joint exercises raise many questions.

Russia dependent on arms and energy exports is constantly looking for new markets and
Pakistan is a potential one. The planned exercises were an extension of this search.

The U.S. will always have a dual approach to India and Pakistan, because it needs both.
Russia, on the other hand, will not. But India has to actively ensure that and not take this
strategic partnership for granted.

Views of C. Raja Mohan:

Russia’s new warmth towards Pakistan may have, wittingly or unwittingly, begun to nudge
India towards a relationship with Russia that is founded in realism rather than inertia.

At the heart of the Indian perception of Russia as the most reliable international partner was
Moscow’s attitude towards the dispute between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir,
giving a constant support to India. But the recent participation of Russia in the joint military
exercises has changed the scenario.

Moscow’s reluctance to defer to Indian sensitivities this time suggests that a new phase in
India-Russia relations is finally with us. Only the sentimentalists in Delhi will be surprised at
Russia’s decision to redo its South Asian sums.
FUTURE OF TIES:
• At a moment of great turbulence in great power relations, Russia is rightly jockeying
for position. This demands that Delhi must stop taking Moscow for granted. It must
focus instead on reconstituting the partnership with a country that will remain a
powerful force in Eurasia, on its own merits.

• There is an urgent need to train and raise a new generation of Indologists in Russia.
Scholars and academics have always played a critical role in promoting cooperation
between the two countries.
• India’s participation in the European Economic Union should be encouraged.
• India needs to make Russia understand that expanding ties with USA are neither at the
expense of Russia nor are they in any way directed against Russia or detrimental to its
interests. Strategically they are designed to provide greater political space as well as
maneuverability for healthy relations with China. 

• As far as Russia is concerned, it might appear that there is some strategic shift. But
Russia has been pushed into that position. In reality, it knows that India is still its most
reliable ally. It has no conflict of interest or anxiety about India as it does about
others. India was instrumental in the construction of a multipolar international
system. This system has benefitted India and Russia, not to speak of others like China.
To retain this, India and Russia need to be active strategic and economic allies. But
both will have to make an effort for this.

• Even on a personality level, the frequency and comfort level in meetings between
Modi and Obama are perceived to be higher than with Putin. 

• As per Ashok Sajjanhar, in the current scenario also, it would devolve upon Modi to
take charge of bilateral ties with Russia, as he has done with several other significant
partners.

Views of Shyam Saran:

The recent developments inevitably present India with a difficult and complex foreign policy
challenge. The response should not be to let Indo-Russian relations slide into indifference – or
worse, mutual resentment – but to maintain and wherever possible expand political,
economic and security engagement. A strong Indo-Russian relationship will give both countries
more room for maneuver in an uncertain and rapidly changing geopolitical environment.
Neither side would want to see a US-China G-2, or conversely, a major power confrontation
re-emerge. Bilateral cooperation in defence and nuclear sectors will remain important. There
are enough reasons to remain strongly invested in the relationship.