CIRCULAR NO.

14-93 July 15, 1993

TO: ALL REGIONAL TRIAL COURTS, METROPOLITAN TRIAL

COURTS, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT
TRIAL COURTS

SUBJECT: GUIDELINES ON THE KATARUNGANG

PAMBARANGAY CONCILIATION PROCEDURE TO PREVENT
CIRCUMVENTION OF THE REVISED KATARUNGANG
PAMBARANGAY LAW (SECTIONS 399-422, CHAPTER VII, TITLE I,
BOOK III, R.A. 7160. OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL
GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991).

The Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law under R.A. 7160, otherwise known
as the local Government Code of 1991, effective on January 1, 1992, and which
repealed P.D. 1508, introduced substantial changes not only in the authority
granted to the Lupong Tagapamayapa but also in the procedure to be observed in
the settlement of disputes within the authority of the Lupon.

In order that the laudable purpose of the law may not be subverted and its
effectiveness undermined by indiscriminate, improper and/or premature issuance
of certifications to file actions in court by the Lupon or Pangkat Secretaries,
attested by the Lupon/Pangkat Chairmen, respectively, the following guidelines are
hereby issued for the information of trial court judges in cases brought before them
coming from the Barangays:

I. All disputes are subject to Barangay conciliation pursuant to the Revised

Katarungang Pambarangay Law (formerly P.D. 1508, repealed and now replaced
by Secs. 399-422, Chapter VII, Title I, Book III, and Sec. 515, Title I, Book IV, R.A.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991), and prior
recourse thereto is a pre-condition before filing a complaint in court or any
government offices, except in the following disputes:
1. Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

2. Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the performance
of his official functions;

3. Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities and municipalities,
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their difference to amicable settlement by an
appropriate Lupon;

4. Any complaint by or against corporations, partnership or juridical entities, since only

individuals shall be parties to Barangay conciliation proceedings either as complainants or
respondents (Sec. 1, Rule VI, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);

5. Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or

municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate Lupon;

6. Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding one
(1) year or a fine over five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);
 7. Offenses where there is no private offended party;

8. Disputes where urgent legal action is necessary to prevent injustice from being committed or
further continued, specifically the following:

a. Criminal cases where accused is under police custody or detention (see

Sec. 412 (b) (1), Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law);

b. Petitions for habeas corpus by a person illegally deprived of his rightful

custody over another or a person illegally deprived or on acting in his behalf;

c. Actions coupled with provisional remedies such as preliminary injunction,

attachment, delivery of personal property and support during the pendency of
the action; and

d. Actions which may be barred by the Statute of Limitations.

9. Any class of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of justice or upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of Justice;

10. Where the dispute arises from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) (Sec. 46 &
47, R.A. 6657);

11. Labor disputes or controversies arising from employer-employee relations (Montoya vs.
Escayo, et al., 171 SCRA 442; Art. 226, Labor Code, as amended, which grants original and
exclusive jurisdiction over conciliation and mediation of disputes, grievances or problems to
certain offices of the Department of Labor and Employment);

12. Actions to annul judgment upon a compromise which may be filed directly in court (See
Sanchez vs. Tupaz, 158 SCRA 459).

II. Under the provisions of R.A. 7160 on Katarungang Pambarangay conciliation,

as implemented by the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules and Regulations
promulgated by the Secretary of Justice, the certification for filing a complaint in
court or any government office shall be issued by Barangay authorities only upon
compliance with the following requirements:
1. Issued by the Lupon Secretary and attested by the Lupon Chairman (Punong Barangay),
certifying that a confrontation of the parties has taken place and that a conciliation settlement
has been reached, but the same has been subsequently repudiated (Sec. 412, Revised
Katarungang Pambarangay Law; Sec. 2[h], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules);

2. Issued by the Pangkat Secretary and attested by the Pangkat Chairman, certifying that:

a. a confrontation of the parties took place but no conciliation/settlement has

been reached (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules; or

b. that no personal confrontation took place before the Pangkat through no

fault of the complainant (Sec. 4[f], Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules).

3. Issued by the Punong Barangay, as requested by the proper party on the ground of failure of
settlement where the dispute involves members of the same indigenous cultural community,
which shall be settled in accordance with the customs and traditions of that particular cultural
community, or where one or more of the parties to the aforesaid dispute belong to the minority
and the parties mutually agreed to submit their dispute to the indigenous system of amicable
settlement, and there has been no settlement as certified by the datu or tribal leader or elder to
the Punong Barangay of place of settlement (Secs. 1,4 & 5, Rule IX, Katarungang
Pambarangay Rules); and
 4. If mediation or conciliation efforts before the Punong Barangay proved unsuccessful, there
having been no agreement to arbitrate (Sec. 410 [b], Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law;
Sec. 1, c. (1), Rule III, Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), or where the respondent fails to
appear at the mediation proceeding before the Punong Barangay (3rd par. Sec. 8, a, Rule VI,
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules), the Punong Barangay shall not cause the issuance at this
stage of a certification to file action, because it is now mandatory for him to constitute the
Pangkat before whom mediation, conciliation, or arbitration proceedings shall be held.

III. All complaints and/or informations filed or raffled to your sala/branch of the
Regional Trial Court shall be carefully read and scrutinized to determine if there
has been compliance with prior Barangay conciliation procedure under the
Revised Katarungang Pambarangay Law and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations, as a pre-condition to judicial action, particularly whether the
certification to file action attached to the records of the case comply with the
requirements hereinabove enumerated in par. II;

IV. A case filed in court without compliance with prior Barangay conciliation which
is a pre-condition for formal adjudication (Sec. 412 [a] of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law) may be dismissed upon motion of defendant/s, not for lack of
jurisdiction of the court but for failure to state a cause of action or prematurity
(Royales vs. IAC, 127 SCRA 470; Gonzales vs. CA, 151 SCRA 289), or the court
may suspend proceedings upon petition of any party under Sec. 1, Rule 21 of the
Rules of Court; and refer the case motu proprio to the appropriate Barangay
authority, applying by analogy Sec. 408 [g], 2nd par., of the Revised Katarungang
Pambarangay Law which reads as follows:
The court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the Lupon under this
Code are filed may at any time before trial, motu proprio refer case to the Lupon concerned for
amicable settlement.

Strict observance of these guidelines is enjoined. This Administrative Circular shall

be effective immediately.

Manila, Philippines. July 15, 1993.

(Sgd.) ANDRES R. NARVASA

Chief Justice
Barangay tanods including the barangay chairman may be deemed law enforcement officers;
extra-judicial confession before them is inadmissible.

Facts: Appellant Edna Malngan was convicted with arson. On appeal, she questioned the admissibility of her
extrajudicial confessions given to the barangay chairman and a neighbor of the private complainant.

Held: Article III, Section 12 of the Constitution in part provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
xxxx
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this Section or Section 17 hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence.
To be admissible in evidence against an accused, the extrajudicial confessions made must satisfy the
following requirements:

1. it must be voluntary;
2. it must be made with the assistance of competent and independent counsel;
3. it must be express; and
4. it must be in writing.

Arguably, the barangay tanods, including the Barangay Chairman, in this particular instance, may be
deemed as law enforcement officer for purposes of applying Article III, Section 12(1) and (3), of the
Constitution. When accused-appellant was brought to the barangay hall in the morning of 2 January 2001,
she was already a suspect, actually the only one, in the fire that destroyed several houses as well as killed
the whole family of Roberto Separa, Sr. She was, therefore, already under custodial investigation and the
rights guaranteed by Article III, Section 12(1), of the Constitution should have already been observed or
applied to her. Accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo was made in
response to the “interrogation” made by the latter – admittedly conducted without first informing accused-
appellant of her rights under the Constitution or done in the presence of counsel. For this reason, the
confession of accused-appellant, given to Barangay Chairman Remigio Bernardo, as well as the lighter found
by the latter in her bag are inadmissible in evidence against her as such were obtained in violation of her
constitutional rights.

Be that as it may, the inadmissibility of accused-appellant’s confession to Barangay Chairman Remigio

Bernardo and the lighter as evidence do not automatically lead to her acquittal. It should well be recalled
that the constitutional safeguards during custodial investigations do not apply to those not elicited through
questioning by the police or their agents but given in an ordinary manner whereby the accused verbally
admits to having committed the offense as what happened in the case at bar when accused-appellant
admitted to Mercedita Mendoza, one of the neighbors of Roberto Separa, Sr., to having started the fire in
the Separas’ house. The testimony of Mercedita Mendoza recounting said admission is, unfortunately for
accused-appellant, admissible in evidence against her and is not covered by the aforesaid constitutional
guarantee. Article III of the Constitution, or the Bill of Rights, solely governs the relationship between the
individual on one hand and the State (and its agents) on the other; it does not concern itself with the
relation between a private individual and another private individual – as both accused-appellant and
prosecution witness Mercedita Mendoza undoubtedly are. Here, there is no evidence on record to show that
said witness was acting under police authority, so appropriately, accused-appellant’s uncounselled
extrajudicial confession to said witness was properly admitted by the RTC. [People of the Philippines
vs Edna Malngan, G. R. No. 170470, September 26, 2006]
Extrajudicial confession before a barangay captain who is also a lawyer is an uncounselled
confession and therefore, inadmissible in evidence.

Facts: Appellant Elizar Tomaquin was convicted with murder. There were no eyewitnesses to the incident,
and the prosecution’s evidence, aside from appellant’s extrajudicial confession, was mainly circumstantial.
Said extrajudicial confession was given in the presence of Atty. Parawan, a barangay captain who is also a
lawyer. Tomaquin questions the admissibility of the extrajudicial confession because it was an uncounselled
confession. Tomaquin contends that the barangay captain, although a lawyer, may not be considered an
independent counsel within the purview of Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

Held: Section 12, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides:

(1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
The words “competent and independent counsel” in the constitutional provision is not an empty rhetoric. It
stresses the need to accord the accused, under the uniquely stressful conditions of a custodial investigation,
an informed judgment on the choices explained to him by a diligent and capable lawyer.

A barangay captain is called upon to enforce the law and ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace and
order at all times.

In fact, a barangay captain is deemed a person in authority under Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
Art. 152. Persons in authority and agents of persons in authority. – Who shall be deemed as such. – In
applying the provisions of the preceding and other articles of this Code, any person directly vested with
jurisdiction, whether as an individual or as a member of some court or government corporation, board, or
commission, shall be deemed a person in authority. A barrio captain and a barangay chairman shall also be
deemed a person in authority.
On these bases, it is not legally possible to consider the barangay captain as an independent counsel of
appellant.

In this case the role of the barangay captain, was a peacekeeping officer of his barangay and therefore in
direct conflict with the role of providing competent legal assistance to appellant who was accused of
committing a crime in his jurisdiction, the barangay captain could not be considered as an independent
counsel of appellant, when the latter executed his extrajudicial confession. What the Constitution requires is
the presence of an independent and competent counsel, one who will effectively undertake his client’s
defense without any intervening conflict of interest.

Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a competent counsel, i.e., an effective and vigilant counsel. An
“effective and vigilant counsel” necessarily and logically requires that the lawyer be present and able to
advise and assist his client from the time the confessant answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs. Velarde:

. . . The competent and independent lawyer so engaged should be present at all stages of the interview,
counseling or advising caution reasonably at every turn of the investigation, and stopping the interrogation
once in a while either to give advice to the accused that he may either continue, choose to remain silent or
terminate the interview.

[People of the Philippines vs Elizar Tomaquin, G.R. No. 133188, July 23, 2004]