Gutierrez v The House of Representatives Committee on Justice
Power of Impeachment
FACTS:
The Ombudsman, Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez (petitioner), challenges via
petition for certiorari and prohibition the Resolutions of September 1 and 7,
2010 of the House of Representatives Committee on Justice (public
respondent).
Before the 15th Congress opened its first session on July 26, 2010 (the fourth
Monday of July, in accordance with Section 15, Article VI of the Constitution)
or on July 22, 2010, private respondents Risa Hontiveros-Baraquel, Danilo
Lim, and spouses Felipe and Evelyn
Pestaño (Baraquel group) filed an impeachment complaint[1] against
petitioner, upon the endorsement of Party-List Representatives Arlene Bag-
ao and Walden Bello.[2]
On August 3, 2010, private respondents Renato Reyes, Jr., Mother Mary
John Mananzan, Danilo Ramos, Edre Olalia, Ferdinand Gaite and James Terry
Ridon (Reyes group) filed another impeachment complaint[5] against
petitioner with a resolution of... endorsement by Party-List Representatives
Neri Javier Colmenares, Teodoro Casiño, Rafael Mariano, Luzviminda Ilagan,
Antonio Tinio and Emerenciana de Jesus.[6] On even date, the House of
Representatives provisionally adopted the Rules of
Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the 14th Congress. By letter still
of even date,[7] the Secretary General transmitted the Reyes group's
complaint to Speaker Belmonte who, by Memorandum of August 9, 2010,[8]
also directed... the Committee on Rules to include it in the Order of Business.
On August 11, 2010 at 4:47 p.m., during its plenary session, the House of
Representatives simultaneously referred both complaints to public
respondent.[11]... fter hearing, public respondent, by Resolution of
September 1, 2010, found both complaints sufficient in form, which
complaints it considered to have been referred to it at exactly the same
time.
On September 6, 2010, petitioner tried to file a motion to reconsider the
September 1, 2010 Resolution of public respondent. Public respondent
refused to accept the motion, however, for prematurity; instead, it advised
petitioner to await the notice for her to file an answer to... the complaints,
drawing petitioner to furnish copies of her motion to each of the 55
members of public respondent.
On September 13, 2010, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
with application for injunctive reliefs.
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI... thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
House of Representatives the exclusive power to initiate impeachment
cases, provides for several limitations to the exercise of such power as
embodied in Section 3(2), (3), (4) and (5), Article XI... thereof. These
limitations include the manner of filing, required vote to impeach, and the
one year bar on the impeachment of one and the same official.
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the
expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the
power to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion... amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Francisco characterizes the power of judicial review as a duty which, as the
expanded certiorari jurisdiction[20] of this Court reflects, includes the
power to "determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion... amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government."
Petitioner alleges that public respondent's chairperson, Representative Niel
Tupas, Jr. (Rep. Tupas), is the subject of an investigation she is conducting,
while his father, former Iloilo Governor Niel Tupas, Sr., had been charged by
her with violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the
Sandiganbayan. To petitioner, the actions taken by her office against Rep.
Tupas and his father influenced the proceedings taken by public respondent
in such a way that bias and vindictiveness played a big part in arriving at the
finding of... sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints against her.
Petitioner further claims that public respondent failed to ascertain the
sufficiency of form and substance of the complaints on the basis of the
standards set by the Constitution and its own Impeachment Rules.
ISSUE:
W/N public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing its two assailed Resolutions.
HELD:
NO.
Petitioner basically anchors her claim on alleged... violation of the due
process clause (Art. III, Sec. 1) and of the one-year bar provision (Art. XI, Sec
3, par. 5) of the Constitution.
The swift completion of the Investigating Panel's initial task cannot be
relegated as shoddy or shady without discounting the presumably regular
performance of not just one but five state... prosecutors.
Rule III(A) of the Impeachment Rules of the 15th Congress reflects the
impeachment procedure at the Committee-level, particularly Section 5[34]
which denotes that petitioner's initial participation in the impeachment
proceedings
the opportunity to file an Answer - starts after the Committee on Justice
finds the complaint sufficient in form and substance. That the Committee
refused to accept petitioner's motion for reconsideration from its finding of
sufficiency of form of the impeachment... complaints is apposite,
conformably with the Impeachment Rules.
Notatu dignum is the fact that it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a
determination of sufficiency of form and substance of an impeachment
complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly found in the
organic law, as Section 3(2),... Article XI of the Constitution basically merely
requires a "hearing."[38] In the discharge of its constitutional duty, the
House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and substance in an
impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry... out" the
impeachment process, hence, such additional requirement in the
Impeachment Rule.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August
3, 2010, public respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of
the 14th Congress and thereafter published on September 2, 2010 its
Impeachment Rules, admittedly... substantially identical with that of the
14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation... the provisional
adoption of... the previous Congress' Impeachment Rules is within the
power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the avowed purpose.
the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the
Constitution, merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of
impeachment
The assailed Resolutions of September 1, 2010 and September 7, 2010 of
public respondent, the House of Representatives Committee on Justice, are
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
"promulgate" and "publish," the case of the Judiciary is in point. In
promulgating rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their
effectivity. As far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however,
promulgation means "the delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for
filing and publication.
"promulgation" and "publication" likewise take on different meanings as
they are part of a multi-stage procedure in quasi-legislation. As detailed in
one case,[48] the publication of implementing rules occurs... after their
promulgation or adoption.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally
understood--that is, to make known. Generalia verba sunt generaliter
inteligencia.
general must prevail unless it was clearly intended that the restricted sense
was to be used.
Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to
enforce a constitutional mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions
of the... constitution are self-executing.
in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather
than non-self-executing . . . .
"effectively carry[ing] out the purpose"... impeachment is primarily for the
protection of the people as a body politic,... Francisco[58] states that the
term "initiate" means to file the complaint and take initial action on it.[59]
The initiation starts with the filing of the complaint which... must be
accompanied with an action to set the complaint moving. It refers to the
filing of the impeachment complaint coupled with Congress' taking initial
action of said complaint. The initial action taken by the House on the
complaint is the referral... of the complaint to the Committee on Justice...
rom the records of the Constitutional Commission, to the amicus curiae
briefs of two former Constitutional Commissioners, it is without a doubt that
the term "to initiate" refers to the filing of the impeachment complaint
coupled with Congress'... taking initial action of said complaint.
initiation takes place by the act of filing and referral or endorsement of the
impeachment complaint to the House Committee on Justice or, by the filing
by at least one-third[61] of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General of the House, the meaning of
Section 3 (5) of Article XI becomes clear.
CJ Corona v Senate
Power of Impeachment
FACTS:
A verified complaint for impeachment was filed against Chief Justice Renato
Corona by respondent Members of the House of Representatives (HOR). The
complaint was transmitted to the Senate which convened as an
impeachment court.
Petitioner Corona received a copy of the complaint charging him with
culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and graft and
corruption:
a. when he failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities
and net worth as required under Sec. 17, Art. XI of the 1987 Constitution;
b. by failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII,
Section 7 (3) of the Constitution that provides that “[a] member of the
judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence” in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed
by a counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and
executory cases;
c. in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her
appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing with litigants regarding
cases pending before the Supreme Court; when he blatantly disregarded the
principle of separation of powers by issuing a “status quo ante” order
against the HOR in the case concerning the impeachment of then
Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez;
d. through wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding
the principle of res judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created
cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province;
e. by arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority
and jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for
the purpose of exculpating him. Such authority and jurisdiction is properly
reposed by the Constitution in the HOR via impeachment.
f. through his partiality in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in
favor of former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband in
order to give them an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate
the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court decision on the
effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions
of the Supreme Court’s own TRO.
g. when he failed and refused to account for the Judiciary Development
Fund (JDF) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary (SAJ) collections.
The Impeachment Court granted the prosecution’s request for subpoena
directed to the officers of two private banks where petitioner allegedly
deposited millions in peso and dollar currencies. PSBank filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition (G.R. No. 200238) seeking to enjoin the
Impeachment Court and the HOR prosecutors from implementing the
aforesaid subpoena requiring PSBank thru its authorized representative to
testify and to bring the original and certified true copies of the opening
documents for petitioner’s alleged foreign currency accounts, and
thereafter to render judgment nullifying the subpoenas including the bank
statements showing the year-end balances for the said accounts.
This Court issued a TRO in G.R. No. 200238 enjoining the Senate from
implementing the Resolution and subpoena ad testificandum et duces
tecum issued by the Senate sitting as an Impeachment Court, both dated
February 6, 2012. The Court further resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for
the inhibition of Justices Carpio and Sereno “in the absence of any applicable
compulsory ground and of any voluntary inhibition from the Justices
concerned.”
On the same day, the present petition was filed arguing that the
Impeachment Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it proceeded to trial on the basis of the
complaint filed by respondent Representatives which complaint is
constitutionally infirm and defective for lack of probable cause. Petitioner
filed a Supplemental Petition claiming that his right to due process is being
violated in the ongoing impeachment proceedings because certain Senator-
Judges have lost the cold neutrality of impartial judges by acting as
prosecutors. Petitioner particularly mentioned Senator-Judge Franklin S.
Drilon, whose inhibition he had sought from the Impeachment Court, to no
avail. He further called attention to the fact that despite the Impeachment
Court’s January 27, 2012 Resolution which disallowed the introduction of
evidence in support of paragraph 2.4 of Article II, from which no motion for
reconsideration would be entertained, “the allies of President Aquino in the
Senate abused their authority and continued their presentation of evidence
for the prosecution, without fear of objection”. In view of the persistent
efforts of President Aquino’s Senator-allies to overturn the ruling of
Presiding Officer Juan Ponce Enrile that the prosecution could not present
evidence on paragraph 2.4 of Article II -- for which President Aquino even
thanked “his senator allies in delivering what the prosecution could not”--
petitioner reiterates the reliefs prayed for in his petition before this Court.
In the Comment Ad Cautelam Ex Superabundanti filed on behalf of the
respondents, the Solicitor General argues that the instant petition raises
matters purely political in character which may be decided or resolved only
by the Senate and HOR, with the manifestation that the comment is being
filed by the respondents “without submitting themselves to the jurisdiction
of the Honorable Supreme Court and without conceding the constitutional
and exclusive power of the House to initiate all cases of impeachment and
of the Senate to try and decide all cases of impeachment.” Citing the case of
Nixon v. United States, respondents contend that to allow a public official
being impeached to raise before this Court any and all issues relative to the
substance of the impeachment complaint would result in an unnecessarily
long and tedious process that may even go beyond the terms of the Senator-
Judges hearing the impeachment case. Such scenario is clearly not what the
Constitution intended.
Respondents maintain that subjecting the ongoing impeachment trial to
judicial review defeats the very essence of impeachment. They contend that
the constitutional command of public accountability to petitioner and his
obligation to fully disclose his assets, liabilities and net worth prevail over
his claim of confidentiality of deposits; hence, the subpoena subject of this
case were correctly and judiciously issued. Considering that the ongoing
impeachment proceedings, which was initiated and is being conducted in
accordance with the Constitution, simply aims to enforce the principle of
public accountability and ensure that the transgressions of impeachable
public officials are corrected, the injury being claimed by petitioner allegedly
resulting from the impeachment trial has no factual and legal basis. It is thus
prayed that the present petition, as well as petitioner’s prayer for issuance
of a TRO/preliminary injunction, be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court may be invoked to
assail matters or incidents arising from impeachment proceedings, and to
obtain injunctive relief for alleged violations of right to due process of the
person being tried by the Senate sitting as Impeachment Court.
HELD:
Impeachment, described as “the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of
democracy,”14 was foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities,
or highlighting pre-existing factions with the greatest danger that “the
decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of parties, than
by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.”15 Given their concededly
political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is
a matter of utmost importance to ensure the effective functioning of the
separate branches while preserving the structure of checks and balance in
our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of any branch or
instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted
to the political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted
with grave abuse or arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for
serious crimes or misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism
designed to check abuse of power, impeachment has its roots in Athens and
was adopted in the United States (US) through the influence of English
common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitution’s provisions on impeachment were adopted from the
US Constitution. Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided
under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner that he claims was accomplished
with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective for lack of
probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the
trial under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some
Senator-Judges who were apparently aiding the prosecution during the
hearings.
On the other hand, respondents contend that the issues raised in the
Supplemental Petition regarding the behavior of certain Senator-Judges in
the course of the impeachment trial are issues that do not concern, or allege
any violation of, the three express and exclusive constitutional limitations
on the Senate’s sole power to try and decide impeachment cases. They
argue that unless there is a clear transgression of these constitutional
limitations, this Court may not exercise its power of expanded judicial
review over the actions of Senator-Judges during the proceedings. By the
nature of the functions they discharge when sitting as an Impeachment
Court, Senator Judges are clearly entitled to propound questions on the
witnesses, prosecutors and counsel during the trial. Petitioner thus failed to
prove any semblance of partiality on the part of any Senator-Judges. But
whether the Senate Impeachment Rules were followed or not, is a political
question that is not within this Court’s power of expanded judicial review.
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the
conviction of petitioner by more than the required majority vote of the
Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately accepted the verdict and without
any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar Council is already
in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of
the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the
prescribed 90-day period from among those candidates shortlisted by the
JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue raised by petitioner had been
mooted by supervening events and his own acts.
Pascual v Secretary of Public Works
Power of Appropriation
FACTS:
Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this action for
declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that RA 920, entitled
"An Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", contained, in section 1-C (a)
thereof, an item of appropriation of P85,000.00 for the construction of Pasig
feeder road terminals. At the time of the passage and approval of said Act,
the planned feeder roads were located within the Antonio Subdivision which
was a private property of Jose C. Zulueta, then a member of the Senate of
the Philippines.
The respondents maintained that petitioner could not assail the
appropriation in question because "there is no actual bona fide case . . .in
which the validity of RA 920 is necessarily involved" and petitioner has not
shown that he has a personal and substantial interest in said Act and that its
enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury.
ISSUE:
W/N the appropriation of P85K (public fund) is for public purpose
HELD:
NO.
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for
public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expended only for
public purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. The test of
the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether
the statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the
furtherance of the advantage of individuals, although each advantage to
individuals might incidentally serve the public. It is the essential character of
the direct object of the expenditure which must determine its validity as
justifying a tax. Incidental to the public or to the state, which results from
the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private enterprises
or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time
of its passage or approval, not upon events occurring, or acts performed,
subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an amendment of the
organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional
limitation infringed by said statute.
Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in
question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were
public or private property when the bill was passed by Congress, or was
approved by the President. Inasmuch as the land on which the projected
feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta,
the result is that said appropriation sought a private purpose, and hence,
was null and void.
The donation to the Government, over five months after the approval and
effectivity of the Act did not cure its basic defect. Consequently, a judicial
nullification of said donation need not precede the declaration of
unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Garcia v Mata
Power of Appropriation
FACTS:
Garcia held the rank of captain with a monthly emolument of P478.00
comprising of his base and longevity pay, quarters and subsistence
allowances.
On June 18, 1955: Garcia was in active commissioned service in the AFP for
9 years, 4 months, and 12 days when RA 1382 was enacted. RA 1382, Sec. 1
provided, “Reserve officers with at least 10 years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval
of this act shall not be reverted into active status except for cause after
proper court-martial proceedings or upon their own request. Provided, that
for purposes of computing the length of service, six years or more of active
service shall be considered one year.”
On July 11, 1956, Garcia was in active service in the AFP for 10 years, 5
months, 5 days when RA 1600 was enacted. RA 1600, Par. 11 provides
“Reserve officers with at least 10 years of active accumulated service shall
not be reverted into inactive status except for cause after proper
court-martial proceedings or upon their own request.”
On Nov 15, 1960, Garcia was reverted to inactive status pursuant to RA
2334. This was neither of his own request nor after court proceedings. He
also did not receive any emoluments from the AFP and was never employed
in the Government in any capacity.
Garcia filed an action for mandamus and recovery of a sum of money to
compel the respondents (Secretary of National Defense and Chief of Staff of
AFP) to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of the AFP, readjust
his rank and pay all the emoluments and allowances from the time of his
reversion to inactive status. He contends that reversion to inactive status
was in violation of Par. 11 of RA 1600. Respondents contend that the said
provision has no relevance to the budget in question.
ISSUE:
W/N the Par. 11 is clearly embraced in the subject of RA 1600
HELD:
NO.
RA 1600: Appropriated money for the operation of the government for fiscal
year 1956-1957
● Par. 11: Refers to the active duty and the reversion to inactive status of
reserve officers in the AFP.
It is a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the Appropriation
Act. In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in
the subject and is properly connected, the subject to be considered is the
one expressed in the title of the act, and every doubt should be indulged in
favor of the validity of the legislative enactment When an act contains
provisions which are clearly not embraced in the subject of the act, such
provisions are inoperative. The title of an act is not required to be an index
to the body of the act
It is sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the
general subject and all the provisions of the statute are germane to that
general subject. The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the
insertion of riders in legislation
■ Rider: A provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill
PHILCONSA v GIMENEZ
Power of Appropriation
FACTS:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of
Republic Act No. 3836 as it allows retirement gratuity and commutation of
vacation and sick leave to Senators and Representatives. PHILCONSA now
seeks to enjoin Pedro Gimenez, the Auditor General, from disbursing funds
therefor.
PHILCONSA is challenging the constitutionality of the law on the following
propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain
officers of Congress is not expressed in the title of the bill;
2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent
the Constitutional ban on increase of salaries of the members of
Congress during their term of office;
3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it
allows members of Congress to retire after 12 years of service and
gives them a gratuity equivalent to oneyear salary for every four
years of service, while all other public employees can retire only
after at least 20 years of service with a gratuity of only one-month
salary for every year of service, not to exceed 24 months; and
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the
highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are
concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further increase
their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The Solicitor General, arguing for Congress, averred that the grant of
retirement or pension benefits under RA 3836 to the officers does not
constitute “forbidden compensation” within the meaning of Section 14 of
Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely
“in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring
member” and, therefore, is not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
ISSUE:
W/N RA 3836 is unconstitutional

HELD:
YES
Under Republic Act No. 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12,
subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, the retirement benefits are
granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System who have
rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This provision is
related and germane to the subject of Commonwealth Act 186. On the other
hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act No. 3836 refers to members
of Congress and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the
Government Service Insurance System. To provide retirement benefits,
therefore, for these officials would relate to subject matter, not germane to
Commonwealth Act No. No. 186.
Paragraph 8 of the said RA refers to members of Congress and to elective
officers thereof who are not members of the GSIS. To provide retirement
benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which
is not germane to Commonwealth Act 186. This portion of the amendment
dealing with retirement benefits for members of Congress and elected
officers, such as the Secretary and Sgt. at Arms for each House, is not related
to in any manner to the Commonwealth Act 186 which establishes the GSIS
and which provides for both retirement and insurance benefit to its
members.
In conclusion, RA 3836 violated three provisions in the constitution, namely:
a. The prohibition regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress
(Art. VI, § 14);
b. The equal protection clause (Art. III, § 1, ¶ 1); and
c. The prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than one
subject (Central Capiz v Remirez)
Belgica v Executive Secretary
Power of Appropriation
FACTS:
Pork Barrel: General Concept
Historically, its usage may be traced to the degrading ritual of rolling out a
barrel stuffed with pork to a multitude of black slaves who would cast their
famished bodies into the porcine feast to assuage their hunger with morsels
coming from the generosity of their well-fed master. This practice was later
compared to the actions of American legislators in trying to direct federal
budgets in favor of their districts. While the advent of refrigeration has
made the actual pork barrel obsolete, it persists in reference to political bills
that "bring home the bacon" to a legislator‘s district and constituents.
"Pork Barrel" refers to an appropriation of government spending meant for
localized projects and secured solely or primarily to bring money to a
representative's district. Some scholars on the subject further use it to refer
to legislative control of local appropriations.
In the Philippines, "Pork Barrel" has been commonly referred to as
lumpsum, discretionary funds of Members of the Legislature, although, its
usage would evolve in reference to certain funds of the Executive.
The “Congressional Pork Barrel” can be traced from Act 3044 (Public Works
Act of 1922), the Support for Local Development Projects during the Marcos
period, the Mindanao Development Fund and Visayas Development Fund
and later the Countrywide Development Fund (CDF) under the Corazon
Aquino presidency, and the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF)
under the Joseph Estrada administration, as continued by the
Gloria-Macapagal Arroyo and the present Benigno Aquino III
administrations.
SPECIAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2013 PDAF ARTICLE
2. Project Identification. Identification of projects and/or designation of
beneficiaries shall conform to the priority list, standard or design prepared
by each implementing agency: PROVIDED, That preference shall be given to
projects located in the 4th to 6th class municipalities or indigents identified
under the MHTS-PR by the DSWD. For this purpose, the implementing
agency shall submit to Congress said priority list, standard or design within
ninety (90) days from effectivity of this Act.
All programs/projects, except for assistance to indigent patients and
scholarships, identified by a member of the House of Representatives
outside of his/her legislative district shall have the written concurrence of
the member of the House of Representatives of the recipient or beneficiary
legislative district, endorsed by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.
3. Legislator’s Allocation. The Total amount of projects to be identified by
legislators shall be as follows:
a) For Congressional District or Party-List Representative: Thirty
Million Pesos (P30,000,000) for soft programs and projects listed
under Item A and Forty Million Pesos (P40,000,000) for
infrastructure projects listed under Item B, the purposes of which
are in the project menu of Special Provision No. 1; and
b) For Senators: One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for soft
programs and projects listed under Item A and One Hundred
Million Pesos (P100,000,000) for infrastructure projects listed
under Item B, the purposes of which are in the project menu of
Special Provision No. 1.
Subject to the approved fiscal program for the year and applicable Special
Provisions on the use and release of fund, only fifty percent (50%) of the
foregoing amounts may be released in the first semester and the remaining
fifty percent (50%) may be released in the second semester.
4. Realignment of Funds. Realignment under this Fund may only be allowed
once. The Secretaries of Agriculture, Education, Energy, Interior and Local
Government, Labor and Employment, Public Works and Highways, Social
Welfare and Development and Trade and Industry are also authorized to
approve realignment from one project/scope to another within the
allotment received from this Fund, subject to the following:
(i) for infrastructure projects, realignment is within the same implementing
unit and same project category as the original project;
(ii) allotment released has not yet been obligated for the original
project/scope of work; and
(iii) request is with the concurrence of the legislator concerned. The DBM
must be informed in writing of any realignment within five (5) calendar days
from approval thereof: PROVIDED, That any realignment under this Fund
shall be limited within the same classification of soft or hard
programs/projects listed under Special Provision 1 hereof: PROVIDED,
FURTHER, That in case of realignments, modifications and revisions of
projects to be implemented by LGUs, the LGU concerned shall certify that
the cash has not yet been disbursed and the funds have been deposited back
to the BTr.
Any realignment, modification and revision of the project identification shall
be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the
implementing agency, as the case may be.
5. Release of Funds. All request for release of funds shall be supported by
the documents prescribed under Special Provision No. 1 and favorably
endorsed by the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance, as the case may be. Funds shall be released to the
implementing agencies subject to the conditions under Special Provision No.
1 and the limits prescribed under Special Provision No. 3.
It was in 1996 when the first controversy surrounding the "Pork Barrel"
erupted. Former Marikina City Representative Romeo Candazo (Candazo),
then an anonymous source, "blew the lid on the huge sums of government
money that regularly went into the pockets of legislators in the form of
kickbacks." He said that "the kickbacks were ‘SOP‘ (standard operating
procedure) among legislators and ranged from a low 19 percent to a high 52
percent of the cost of each project, which could be anything from dredging,
rip rapping, sphalting, concreting, and construction of school buildings."
"The publication of the stories, including those about congressional
initiative allocations of certain lawmakers, including P3.6 Billion for a
Congressman, sparked public outrage."
In 2004, several concerned citizens sought the nullification of the PDAF as
enacted in the 2004 GAA for being unconstitutional. Unfortunately, for lack
of "any pertinent evidentiary support that illegal misuse of PDAF in the form
of kickbacks has become a common exercise of unscrupulous Members of
Congress," the petition was dismissed. Recently, or in July of the present
year, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) began its probe into
allegations that "the government has been defrauded of some P10 Billion
over the past 10 years by a syndicate using funds from the pork barrel of
lawmakers and various government agencies for scores of ghost projects."
The investigation was spawned by sworn affidavits of six (6) whistle-blowers
who declared that JLN Corporation – "JLN" standing for Janet Lim Napoles
(Napoles) – had swindled billions of pesos from the public coffers for "ghost
projects" using no fewer than 20 dummy NGOs for an entire decade.
While the NGOs were supposedly the ultimate recipients of PDAF funds, the
whistle­blowers declared that the money was diverted into Napoles‘ private
accounts.
Thus, after its investigation on the Napoles controversy, criminal complaints
were filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, charging five (5) lawmakers
for Plunder, and three (3) other lawmakers for Malversation, Direct Bribery,
and Violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Commission on Audit (CoA) released the results of a three-year audit
investigation covering the use of legislators' PDAF from 2007 to 2009, or
during the last three (3) years of the Arroyo administration. The purpose of
the audit was to determine the propriety of releases of funds under PDAF
and the Various Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP) by the DBM,
the application of these funds and the implementation of projects by the
appropriate implementing agencies and several government owned and
controlled corporations (GOCCs).
The total releases covered by the audit amounted to P8.374 Billion in PDAF
and P32.664 Billion in VILP, representing 58% and 32%, respectively, of the
total PDAF and VILP releases that were found to have been made
nationwide during the audit period.
Accordingly, the CoA‘s findings contained in its Report No. 2012-03 (CoA
Report), entitled "Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) and Various
Infrastructures including Local Projects (VILP)," were made public. As for the
"Presidential Pork Barrel", whistle-blowers alleged that" at least P900
Million from royalties in the operation of the Malampaya gas project off
Palawan province intended for agrarian reform beneficiaries has gone into
a dummy NGO." According to incumbent CoA Chairperson Maria Gracia
Pulido Tan (CoA Chairperson), the CoA is, as of this writing, in the process of
preparing "one consolidated report" on the Malampaya Funds.
PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
The “Presidential Pork Barrel” questioned by the petitioners include the
Malampaya Fund and the Presidential Social Fund. The Malampaya Fund
was created as a special fund under Section 8,
Presidential Decree (PD) 910 by then-President Ferdinand Marcos to help
intensify, strengthen, and consolidate government efforts relating to the
exploration, exploitation, and development of indigenous energy resources
vital to economic growth. The Presidential Social Fund was created under
Section 12, Title IV, PD 1869 (1983) or the Charter of the Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), as amended by PD 1993
issued in 1985. The Presidential Social Fund has been described as a special
funding facility managed and administered by the Presidential Management
Staff through which the President provides direct assistance to priority
programs and projects not funded under the regular budget. It is sourced
from the share of the government in the aggregate gross earnings of
PAGCOR.
ISSUES:
1. W/N the 2013 PDAF Article and all other Congressional Pork Barrel
Laws similar thereto are unconstitutional considering that they
violate the principles of/constitutional provisions on (a) separation
of powers; (b) nondelegability of legislative power; (c) checks and
balances; (d) accountability; (e) political dynasties; and (f) local
autonomy.
2. W/N the phrases (a) "and for such other purposes as may be
hereafter directed by the President" under Section 8 of PD 910,116
relating to the Malampaya Funds, and (b) "to finance the priority
infrastructure development projects and to finance the restoration
of damaged or destroyed facilities due to calamities, as may be
directed and authorized by the Office of the President of the
Philippines" under Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993,
relating to the Presidential Social Fund, are unconstitutional insofar
as they constitute undue delegations of legislative power.
HELD:
a. SEPARATION OF POWERS- YES./ unconstitutional
At its core, legislators have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various
Congressional Pork Barrel allocations. Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the
statutory authority of legislators to identify projects post-GAA may be
construed from Special Provisions 1 to 3 and the second paragraph of
Special Provision 4. Legislators have also been accorded post-enactment
authority in the areas of fund release (Special Provision 5 under the 2013
PDAF Article) and realignment (Special Provision 4, paragraphs 1 and 2
under the 2013 PDAF Article).
Thus, legislators have been, in one form or another, authorized to
participate in “the various operational aspects of budgeting,” including “the
evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities” and the
“regulation and release of funds”, in violation of the separation of powers
principle. That the said authority is treated as merely recommendatory in
nature does not alter its unconstitutional tenor since the prohibition covers
any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law. Towards this end,
the Court must therefore abandon its ruling in Philconsa. The Court also
points out that respondents have failed to substantiate their position that
the identification authority of legislators is only of recommendatory import.
In addition to declaring the 2013 PDAF Article as well as all other provisions
of law which similarly allow.
legislators to wield any form of post-enactment authority in the
implementation or enforcement of the budget, the Court also declared that
informal practices, through which legislators have effectively intruded into
the proper phases of budget execution, must be deemed as acts of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and, hence,
accorded the same unconstitutional treatment.
b. NON- DELEGABILITY of legislative power YES. Unconstitutional
The 2013 PDAF Article violates the principle of non-delegability since
legislators are effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of
appropriation, which, as settled in Philconsa, is lodged in Congress. The
power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation, pursuant
to Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states: “No money
shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation
made by law.” The power of appropriation, as held by the Court in Bengzon
v. Secretary of Justice and Insular Auditor, involves (a) setting apart by law
a certain sum from the public revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Under the
2013 PDAF Article, individual legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund
from which they are able to dictate (a) how much from such fund would go
to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves also determine.
Since these two acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation as
described in Bengzon, and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes
individual legislators to perform the same, undoubtedly, said legislators
have been conferred the power to legislate which the Constitution does not,
however, allow.
c. CHECKS AND BALANCES. YES. Unconstitutional
Under the 2013 PDAF Article, the amount of P24.79 Billion only appears as
a collective allocation limit since the said amount would be further divided
among individual legislators who would then receive personal lump-sum
allocations and could, after the GAA is passed, effectively appropriate PDAF
funds based on their own discretion. As these intermediate appropriations
are made by legislators only after the GAA is passed and hence, outside of
the law, it means that the actual items of PDAF appropriation would not
have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus effectuated
without veto consideration. This kind of lump-sum/post-enactment
legislative identification budgeting system fosters the creation of a “budget
within a budget” which subverts the prescribed procedure of presentment
and consequently impairs the President’s power of item veto. As petitioners
aptly point out, the President is forced to decide between (a) accepting the
entire P24. 79 Billion PDAF allocation without knowing the specific projects
of the legislators, which may or may not be consistent with his national
agenda and (b) rejecting the whole PDAF to the detriment of all other
legislators with legitimate projects.
Even without its post-enactment legislative identification feature, the 2013
PDAF Article would remain constitutionally flawed since the lump-sum
amount of P24.79 Billion would be treated as a mere funding source allotted
for multiple purposes of spending (i.e. scholarships, medical missions,
assistance to indigents, preservation of historical materials, construction of
roads, flood control, etc). This setup connotes that the appropriation law
leaves the actual amounts and purposes of the appropriation for further
determination and, therefore, does not readily indicate a discernible item
which may be subject to the President’s power of item veto.
The same lump-sum budgeting scheme has, as the CoA Chairperson relays,
“limit[ed] state auditors from obtaining relevant data and information that
would aid in more stringently auditing the utilization of said Funds.”
Accordingly, she recommends the adoption of a “line by line budget or
amount per proposed program, activity or project, and per implementing
agency.”
d. Accountability- yes . unconstitutional
To a certain extent, the conduct of oversight would be tainted as said
legislators, who are vested with post-enactment authority, would, in effect,
be checking on activities in which they themselves participate. Also, this very
same concept of post-enactment authorization runs afoul of Section 14,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that: “...[A Senator or
Member of the House of Representatives] shall not intervene in any matter
before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office.” Allowing legislators to
intervene in the various phases of project implementation renders them
susceptible to taking undue advantage of their own office.
However, the Court cannot completely agree that the same post-enactment
authority and/or the individual legislator’s control of his PDAF per se would
allow him to perpetrate himself in office. This is a matter which must be
analyzed based on particular facts and on a case-to-case basis.
Also, while the Court accounts for the possibility that the close operational
proximity between legislators and the Executive department, through the
former’s post­enactment participation, may affect the process of
impeachment, this matter largely borders on the domain of politics and does
not strictly concern the Pork Barrel System’s intrinsic constitutionality. As
such, it is an improper subject of judicial assessment.
e. Political dynasties - NO. constitutional
Section 26, Article II of the 1987 Constitution is considered as not
self­executing due to the qualifying phrase “as may be defined by law.” In
this respect, said provision does not, by and of itself, provide a judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for
legislative or executive action. Therefore, since there appears to be no
standing law which crystallizes the policy on political dynasties for
enforcement, the Court must defer from ruling on this issue.
In any event, the Court finds the above-stated argument on this score to be
largely speculative since it has not been properly demonstrated how the
Pork Barrel System would be able to propagate political dynasties.
f. LOCAL AUTONOMY - YES UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Court, however, finds an inherent defect in the system which actually
belies the avowed intention of “making equal the unequal” (Philconsa,
1994). The gauge of PDAF and CDF allocation/division is based solely on the
fact of office, without taking into account the specific interests and
peculiarities of the district the legislator represents. As a result, a district
representative of a highly-urbanized metropolis gets the same amount of
funding as a district representative of a far-flung rural province which would
be relatively “underdeveloped” compared to the former. To add, what
rouses graver scrutiny is that even Senators and Party-List Representatives
– and in some years, even the Vice-President – who do not represent any
locality, receive funding from the Congressional Pork Barrel as well.
The Court also observes that this concept of legislator control underlying the
CDF and PDAF conflicts with the functions of the various Local Development
Councils (LDCs) which are already legally mandated to “assist the
corresponding sanggunian in setting the direction of economic and social
development, and coordinating development efforts within its territorial
jurisdiction.” Considering that LDCs are instrumentalities whose functions
are essentially geared towards managing local affairs, their programs,
policies and resolutions should not be overridden nor duplicated by
individual legislators, who are national officers that have no law-making
authority except only when acting as a body.
RULING ON ISSUE ON PRESIDENTIAL PORK BARREL
YES. UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Regarding the Malampaya Fund: The phrase “and for such other purposes
as may be hereafter directed by the President” under Section 8 of PD 910
constitutes an undue delegation of legislative power insofar as it does not
lay down a sufficient standard to adequately determine the limits of the
President’s authority with respect to the purpose for which the Malampaya
Funds may be used. As it reads, the said phrase gives the President wide
latitude to use the Malampaya Funds for any other purpose he may direct
and, in effect, allows him to unilaterally appropriate public funds beyond the
purview of the law.
That the subject phrase may be confined only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government”
under the principle of ejusdem generis, meaning that the general word or
phrase is to be construed to include – or be restricted to – things akin to,
resembling, or of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned, is
belied by three (3) reasons: first, the phrase “energy resource development
and exploitation programs and projects of the government” states a singular
and general class and hence, cannot be treated as a statutory reference of
specific things from which the general phrase “for such other purposes” may
be limited; second, the said phrase also exhausts the class it represents,
namely energy development programs of the government; and, third, the
Executive department has used the Malampaya Funds for non-energy
related purposes under the subject phrase, thereby contradicting
respondents’ own position that it is limited only to “energy resource
development and exploitation programs and projects of the government.”
However, the rest of Section 8, insofar as it allows for the use of the
Malampaya Funds “to finance energy resource development and
exploitation programs and projects of the government,” remains legally
effective and subsisting.
Regarding the Presidential Social Fund: Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended
by PD 1993, indicates that the Presidential Social Fund may be used “to
[first,] finance the priority infrastructure development projects and
[second,] to finance the restoration of damaged or destroyed facilities due
to calamities, as may be directed and authorized by the Office of the
President of the Philippines.”
The second indicated purpose adequately curtails the authority of the
President to spend the Presidential Social Fund only for restoration
purposes which arise from calamities. The first indicated purpose, however,
gives him carte blanche authority to use the same fund for any
infrastructure project he may so determine as a “priority“. Verily, the law
does not supply a definition of “priority infrastructure development
projects” and hence, leaves the President without any guideline to construe
the same. To note, the delimitation of a project as one of “infrastructure” is
too broad of a classification since the said term could pertain to any kind of
facility. Thus, the phrase “to finance the priority infrastructure development
projects” must be stricken down as unconstitutional since – similar to
Section 8 of PD 910 – it lies independently unfettered by any sufficient
standard of the delegating law. As they are severable, all other provisions of
Section 12 of PD 1869, as amended by PD 1993, remains legally effective
and subsisting.
Araullo v Aquino
Power of Appropriation
FACTS:
Sept. 25, 2013, Senator Jinggoy Estrada delivered a privileged speech in the
Senate to reveal that some Senators, including himself, had been allotted an
additional 50M each as an incentive for voting in favor of the impeachment
of CJ Corona. Secretary Abad of the DBM issued that the funds released to
the Senators had been part of the DAP → designed by DBM to ramp up
spending to accelerate economic expansion. It has been released to
Senators based on their letters of request for funding. It was not the first
time that releases from the DAP had been made because it existed since
2011 to ramp up spending after sluggish disbursements caused slowing
down of the growth of GDP
○ Source of DAP:
■ Unreleased appropriations under Personnel Services
■ Unprogrammed funds
■ Carry-over appropriations unreleased from the previous year
■ Budgets for slow-moving items or projects that had been realigned to
support faster-disbursing projects
DBM soon claimed in its website that the DAP releases were from savings
generated by the Government and from unprogrammed funds.
Pooling of unreleased appropriations → Personnel Services appropriations
that lapsed at the end of the year, unreleased appropriations of
slow-moving projects and discontinued projects for zero-based budget
findings
Withdrawal of unobligated allotments for slow-moving programs and
projects that had been earlier released to the agencies of the National
Government
DBM used Sec. 25(5) , Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which granted the
President the authority to augment an item for his office in the general
appropriations law, Sec 49 and 38 of EO 292, and the GAA of 2011, 2012,
2013 (on the use of savings) as its legal basis.
Nine petitions assailed the constitutionality of the DAP and issuances
relating to the DAP. Petitioner Araullo brought to the Court’s attention NBC
541 which was issued to implement the DAP, directed the withdrawal of
unobligated allotments of government agencies and offices with low level
of obligations. Respondents submitted 7 Evidence Packets.
ISSUE:
W/N the DAP, NBC 541, and other executive issuances implementing the
DAP violate Sec. 25 Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, thus unconstitutional
HELD:
YES.
The UNRELEASED APPROPRIATIONS and WITHDRAWN UNOBLIGATED
ALLOTMENTS under the DAP were NOT SAVINGS, and the use of such
appropriations were unconstitutional. GAAs of 2011 and 2012 lacked valid
provisions to authorize transfers of funds under the DAP, thus were
unconstitutional. There were NO SAVINGS from which funds could be
sourced for the DAP.
Cross-border augmentations from savings were prohibited by the
Constitution. It was also invalid for sourcing the DAP from unprogrammed
funds despite the original revenue targets not having been exceeded.
Executive discretion and flexibility may be necessary in the execution of the
budget, but any transfer of appropriated funds should conform to Sec. 25(5)
Article VI of the Constitution.
Requisites for the valid transfer of appropriated funds:
1. There is a law authorizing the President, Senate President, Speaker
of the House, CJ of the SC, and the Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions to transfer funds within their respective offices.
a. Sec. 59 of 2011 GAA and Sec. 53 of 2012 GAA authorized
the authorities to augment “any item in this Act” which
was in violation of the requisite that it should be within
their respective offices → similar to Sec. 44 of PD 1177
2. Funds to be transferred are savings generated from the
appropriations for their respective offices.
a. Unreleased appropriations (i.e. Personnel Services
appropriations) refer to appropriations with allotment but
without disbursement authority → cannot be considered
as savings
MOOE are divided into twelve monthly, thus savings can be generated
monthly, but future months cannot be considered as savings. Unobligated
allotments are not considered as savings (although it could be if it meets the
requirements) because it could be reissued because not fully abandoned
Withdrawal of unobligated allotments in the middle of the fiscal year
deprived funding for the PAPs with existing appropriations under the GAA
Principles in ascertaining the meaning of savings:
● Congress has the power of the purse – how budget will be spent, what
PAPs, how much each PAP
● Executive is expected to faithfully execute the GAA
● Congress recognizes the need for flexibility in budget execution
● Savings should be “actual” → real and substantial
● Savings refer to portions of any programmed appropriation in this Act free
from any encumbrance or obligations which are:
a. Still available after the completion or final discontinuance or
abandonment of awork for which the appropriation was approved
b. From appropriations balances arising from unpaid compensation
and related costs pertaining to vacant positions and leave of
absence without pay
 c. From appropriations balances realized from the implementation of
measures resulting in improved systems and efficiencies → extra
fund due to lesser costs
d. Savings can only be generated when the purpose of the
appropriation is fulfilled, or upon the need for the appropriation
being no longer existent.

The 7 evidence packets showed that the “savings” pooled under the DAP
were allocated to PAPS not covered by any appropriations in the pertinent
GAAs. Purpose of the transfer is to augment an item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices.

Funds amounting to Php 143,700,000 and 250,000,000 were transferred

under the DAP respectively to the COA and House of Representatives →
cross-border augmentations because it was from the Executive to COA and
HoR. It is the President who proposes the budget, but it is the Congress that
has the final say on the matters of appropriations.

Governing Principles:
1. Principle of Public Fiscal – asserting that all monies received from
whatever source by any part of the government are public funds
2. Principle of Appropriations Control – prohibiting expenditure of
any public money without legislative authority