G.

Power to Construe

1. Judicial Construction

CASE:

FACTS:
United States vs Ang
Tang Ho; GR No.
17122; February 27, ISSUE:
1922

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:

L.S. Moon & Co. vs

Harrison; GR No. ISSUE:
17226; March 1, 1922

(Ponente)
RULING:

RATIO:
DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS: Respondent City, in accordance with Presidential Decree No. 231, enacted in 1973 the
challenged ordinance, otherwise known as the Mandaue City Tax Code. The City Treasurer demanded
from petitioner payment of the specific tax on the total volume of beer it produced in the City of Mandaue.

Petitioner, on April 8, 1974, contested the correction of said specific tax "on the ground that Section 12(e)
(7) in relation to Section 12(e) (1) and (2), Mandaue City Ordinance No. 97, is illegal and void because it
imposed a specific tax beyond its territorial jurisdiction."

The matter was then referred by respondent City to its City Fiscal pursuant to such Presidential Decree.
Its validity was sustained. Then came the appeal to the Secretary of Justice, with the then Acting
San Miguel Secretary of Justice Macaraig, as noted, rendering the opinion that it is "of doubtful validity." A suit for
Corporation vs collection was thereafter filed by the City where it squarely put in issue the validity of such ordinance.
Avelino; GR No.
39699; March 14, 1979
Petitioner contends that a suit for collection is not an appeal, therefore making the decision of Secretary
(Fernando) of Justice Macaraig final and executory, in accordance with Section 47 of the Judiciary Act. Respondent
City disagrees. Respondent submits that the suit for collection is an appeal. Respondent City definitely
contested the correctness of the decision of the Secretary of Justice in a court of competent jurisdiction
and therefore said opinion is not yet final and executory.

ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a collection suit after an opinion was rendered may be considered an
appeal.

RULING: Yes.

RATIO: To so construe Section 47 would be to raise a serious constitutional question for it would in effect
bar what otherwise would be a proper case cognizable by a court precisely in the exercise of the
conceded power of judicial review, just because the procedure contended for which is that of an "appeal"
under the circumstances a term vague and ambiguous, was not followed. Petitioner may not be
 sufficiently aware of the implications of such a proposition. It would run counter to the well-settled doctrine
that between two possible modes of constructions, the one which would not be in conflict with
what is ordained by the Constitution is to be preferred. Every intendment of the law should lean
towards its validity, not its invalidity. The judiciary, as noted by Justice Douglas, should favor that
interpretation of legislation which gives it the greater chance of giving the test of constitutionality.

The inherent weakness of this suit is likewise discernible from the fact that the then Acting Secretary of
Justice Macaraig limited himself to a finding that the ordinance in question was "of doubtful validity.” That
is far from a categorical declaration of its being repugnant to the Constitution or its being ultra vires. That
betrays a realization that unless and until the judiciary speaks in no uncertain terms, the
presumption of validity continues misgivings as to the likelihood of an alleged infringement of any
binding norm do not suffice. There is this aphorism from Justice Malcolm "To doubt is to sustain.”
That is merely to accord recognition to the well-settled and binding doctrine that only in a very clear case
is the judiciary judged in nullifying a statute, or ordinance.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:

Chinese Flour On September 5, 1950, the Chinese Flour Importers Association, Manila Philippines, filed in the Court of
Importers Association, First Instance of Manila a petition for mandamus to compel the Philippine Relief and Trade
Manila, Philippines vs Rehabilitation Administration (PRATRA) and the Philippine Wheat Flour Board to issue in favor of
Price Stabilization
petitioner's members the import quota allocations of wheat flour to which they claim to be entitled
Board (PRISCO); GR
No. 4465; July 12, 1951 under sections 12 and 14 of Republic Act No. 426, known as Import Control Law, with a prayer that a
writ of preliminary injunction be issued to restrain the PRATRA and the Wheat Flour Board from
(BAUTISTA, J.) granting flour allocations and imports licenses therefore to new importers in excess of the latter's
shares in the portion reserved for new importers by the provision. After hearing, the writ was granted.
In the meantime, Manuel S. Rustia, Ernesto Y. Sibal, and other allowed to intervene. The parties having
agreed to submit the case on the pleadings and on their respective memoranda, because it involves
only a question of law, the trial court rendered judgment as stated in the early part of this decision.
From this judgment respondent and intervenors appealed. On November 16, 1950, petitioner filed
motion for a writ of execution pending appeal from the judgment of the trial court. The motion was
granted over the objection of the respondent were allowed to file a supersedes bond. The case is now
before us purely on question of law.
The Respondents argues that the importation and allocation of wheat flour must be governed by
sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 305, in conjunction with section 15 of Republic Act No. 426."
They allege that the allocation of wheat flour is not subject to the provisions of Republic Act No. 426;
that wheat flour being considered as a class by itself, Republic Act No. 426 does not apply to this
particular commodity; and that in so far as wheat flour is concerned, the PRATRA, now PRISCO, has the
exclusive power to use its discretion in the allocation of wheat flour, which discretion is not subject to
judicial control.

It is contended that, under the above quoted provisions, wheat flour has been removed from the scope
and operation of Republic Act No. 426 and placed under Executive Order No. 305 and the rules and
regulations promulgated thereunder by the Wheat Flour Board because, while on one hand, section 15
of paid Act declares that no government office, agency or instrumentality, except the Import Control
Commissioner, shall allocate the import quota among the various importers, on the other hand, the
same section declares in its proviso that Pratra shall have exclusive power and authority to determine
and regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers

ISSUE: Shall the PRATRA, now PRISCO, make the allocation of import quota on wheat flour in
accordance with the provisions of Republic Act No. 426, as claimed by the appellee, or shall it make
such allocation in accordance with sections 1 and 2 of Executive Order No. 305 in conjunction with
section 15 of Republic Act No. 426, as claimed by the appellants?
RULING:

PRISCO is the one that makes the allocation of import quota on wheat flour in accordance with the
 provisions of Republic Act No. 426.

If wheat flour was excepted from Appendix "C", it is because the amount of wheat flour which may be
imported into the Philippines and its price are already fixed and determined in the International Wheat
Agreement. There is, therefore, no need for fixing the import quota of wheat flour.

The only purpose of the appendices is to itemize the commodities which are deemed controlled, the
import quota of which need to be fixed by the Import Control Board in accordance with section 7 of the
law for the purpose of allocating them to the importers. They do not necessarily indicate that those
excluded therefrom are not subject to the operation of said Act, because they also come under the
provisions of section 9 which have reference to the items of import not enumerated in the appendices.

When the Pratra decided to ignore entirely the rights of the old importers, simply because they are
aliens, in complete disregard of this policy of our Government, these importers have the right to recur
to the sanctuary of justice for redress, for they too are entitled to certain rights under our Constitution.

As a general rule, the functions of legislation may not be delegated by the legislative to the executive
department or to any executive or administrative officer, board, or commission, except as such
delegation may be expressly authorized by a constitutional provision. And a statute that vests an
arbitrary discretion in administrative officers with respect to an ordinary lawful business, profession or
appliance, or fails to prescribe a uniform rule of action or to lay down a guide or standard whereby the
exercise of discretion may be measured, is void and unconstitutional.

RATIO:

DOCTRINE: It is an elementary rule of construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says.
 CASE: Defendant, MARIA MIRANO, niece of Julia Mendoza, was adopted by spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana
Mendoza. A few years later, the spouses opened up a store from which they generated a substantial income that
enabled them to acquire several lands that were bought in the name of Maria Mirano. After a lingering illness, Maria
Mirano died and left as her only nearest relatives the herein respondents who are claiming ownership over the lands
in question by virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court

FACTS:
1. Defendants-appellants’ spouses Doroteo Banawa and Juliana Mendoza took care of MARIA MIRANO,
Juliana’s niece, since Maria is 9 years old and treated her the same way as they treated the co-appellant Gliceria
Abrenica, their legally adopted child.
2. 5 MAY 1921, the spouses bought a parcel of land situated at Brgy. Iba, Taal, Batangas from Placido
Punzalan and registered the said parcel of land in the name of Maria, because the said spouses wanted
something for Maria after their death.
3. 31 JUL 1949, after a lingering illness, Maria Mirano died
4. At the time of her death she left only as her nearest relatives the herein plaintiffs-appellees, namely
Primitiva, who is a surviving sister, and Gregoria, Juana and Marciano, all surnamed Mirano, who are children of
the deceased’s brother.
Endencia vs David; GR 5. The Miranos filed a case in court against the Banawas with regards to the possession of the Iba property as
Nos. 6355-56; August legal heirs of Maria. The court decided in favor of the Miranos.
31, 1953 6. Petitioners then appealed to the Court of Appeals stating that they are entitled to the land in question by
virtue of Section 5, Rule 100 of the Old Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of which reads:
(Ponente) In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be
his legal heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his
parents by adoption, which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who
shall participate in the order established by the Civil Code for intestate estates.
7. The defendant spouses died during the pendency of the case at the Court of Appeals and were substituted
by their legally adopted child Gliceria Abrenica and her husband Casiano Amponin.
8. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court. The Appellants filed at the Supreme Court a
petition for review by certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals regarding its ruling that Sec. 5, Rule 100 of
the Old Rules of Court does not apply in the instant case because Maria Mirano was not legally adopted. It is
very clear in the rule involved that specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted child and does not
include extrajudicial adoption. It is an elementary rule in statutory construction that when the language of the law
is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean exactly what it says.

ISSUE: Should Rule 100, Sec. 5 of the Rules of Court be applicable? NO

RULING: Judgment of the CA AFFIRMED.

 RATIO:
1. In case of the death of the child, his parents and relatives by nature, and not by adoption, shall be his legal
heirs, except as to property received or inherited by the adopted child from either of his parents by adoption,
which shall become the property of the latter or their legitimate relatives who shall participate in the order
established by the Civil Code for intestate estates
2. The submission of the petitioners is that extrajudicial adoption is within the contemplation and spirit of this
rule of reversion adoptive.
3. The rule involved specifically provides for the case of the judicially adopted child. It is an elementary rule of
construction that when the language of the law is clear and unequivocal, the law must be taken to mean
exactly what it says.
DOCTRINE: Construction: Power to Construe: Judical Construction
Construction is a judicial function • It is the court that has the final word as to what the law means. • It construes laws as it decide cases based on
fact and the law involved • Laws are interpreted in the context of a peculiar factual situation of each case • Circumstances of time, place, event,
person and particularly attendant circumstances and actions before, during and after the operative fact have taken their totality so that justice can
be rationally and fairly dispensed.
CASE:
The PCGG sought to sell at public auction numerous paintings and silverware alleged to be part of ill-gotten wealth
of Marcos. Petitioners, as taxpayers, sought to enjoin the PCGG to preserve and protect the country’s artistic wealth

FACTS:
Mateo Caparas, then Chairman of the PCGG, through the authority granted by
then Pres. Aquino, signed a Consignment Agreement allowing Christie’s of New York
to auction off Old Masters Paintings and the 18th and 19th century silverware alleged to be part of the ill-gotten
Joya vs Presidential
wealth of Pres. Marcos, his relatives, and cronies, for and on behalf of RP. 35 petitioners in this Special Civil Action
Commission on Good
for Prohibition and Mandamus With Prayer for Preliminary Injunction and/or Restraining Order sought to enjoin
Government; GR No.
PCGG from proceeding with the auction sale which nevertheless proceeded on schedule. Petitioners claim that, as
96541; August 24,
Filipino citizens, taxpayers, and artists deeply concerned with the
1993
preservation and protection of the country’s artistic wealth and that
the paintings and silverware are public properties collectively owned by them and the people in general to view and
(Bellosillo, J)
enjoy as great works of art alleging that they have been deprived of their right to public property without due process
of law, they have the legal personality to restrain the respondents who are acting contrary to their public duty to
conserve the artistic creations as mandated by Sec. 14-18 of Art. XIV of the Constitution and RA 4846

ISSUE: Whether the petition complies with the legal requisites of judicial inquiry, whether petitioners has the legal
standing & the actual controversy of the petition.
 RULING: NO. Petitioners failed to show that they have the legal standing, i.e. a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that they have sustained or would sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being
challenged, because they are not the legal owners of the artworks/silverwares or that the valued pieces have
become publicly owned since such artworks are in fact owned by the Metropolitan Museum of Manila Foundation, a
non-profit, non-stock corporation established to promote non-Philippine arts and the silverwares were in fact gifts to
the Marcos couple on their silver wedding anniversary. The mandamus suit cannot prosper because what the
petitioners seek is the enjoining of an official act because it is constitutionally infirm not because they are after the
fulfilment of a positive duty required of the respondent public officials which is the only ground for a writ of
mandamus to be
issued. The taxpayer's’ suit cannot prosper as well since the items in question were
acquired from private sources and not with public money.

RATIO: In relation to the issue of the legal standing and the actual controversy, with the allegation of the petitioners,
“that the paintings were donated by private persons from different parts of the world to the Metropolitan Museum of
Manila Foundation, which is a non-profit and non-stock corporations established to promote non-Philippine arts.“The
foundation's chairman was former First Lady Imelda R. Marcos, while its president was Bienvenido R. Tantoco. On
this basis, the ownership of the paintings legally belongs to the foundation or corporation or the members thereof.
Similarly, the pieces of antique silverware were given to the Marcos couple as gifts from friends and dignitaries from
foreign countries on their silver wedding and anniversary, an occasion personal to them.The confiscation of the
properties by the Aquino administration however should not be understood to mean that the ownership of the
paintings has automatically passed on the government without complying with constitutional and statutory
requirements of due process and just compensation. The court held that one having no right or interest to protect
cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-plaintiff in an action on the premised of Sec. 2, Rule 3, of the
Rules of Court which provides that every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, and that all persons having interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be
joined as plaintiffs. And since the purpose of the petition for prohibition is to enjoin respondent public officials from
holding the auction sale of the artworks on a particular date — 11 January 1991 — which is long past, the issues
raised in the petition have become moot and academic. WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the petition for prohibition
and mandamus was DISMISSED.

DOCTRINE: As general rule, it is not within the function of a court to act upon and decide a moot question or speculative, theoretical, or abstract
question or proposition, or a purely academic question, . . . The application of the rule that a court will not determine moot questions or abstract
propositions has resulted in other expression or rules to the effect that the court will not express an opinion in a case in which no practical relief
can be granted, or which can have no practical effect|||
CASE:
Castro vs Tan; GR No.
9515; February 20, FACTS:
1957
· William L. Burr was ordered to pay Maria B. Castro accrued rents amounting to P9,225 plus P1,000 as
(Ponente) attorneys fees.
· Burr appealed to the Court of First Instance and filed a supersedeas bond in the amount of P10,225 "to
secure the payment to the plaintiff (Castro) of the rents, damages and costs adjudicated to the plaintiff. It
was subscribed by him as principal, and by the Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. as surety.
· Hon. Bienvenido A. Tan, Judge of the Manila court of first instance, found that full enjoyment of his
mental-faculties. It should be stated reversed the decision, and awarded Burr P2,000 as attorneys fees to be
paid by plaintiff after deducting the corresponding rent for five days. About a week later, Burr submitted a
motion to cancel the supersedeas bond, for being functus officio, in view of the decision favorable to him,
Maria B. Castro objected, contending that the Court's decision had not yet become final, and that the bond
answered for rents "down to the time of final judgment in the action".
· The judge granted the motion explaining (1) there was no reason for the bond to subsist, inasmuch as
the decision it sought to stay had become functus officio and (2) the supersedeas bond should continue only
when "it is the defendant who appeals from the decision of the court of first instance" — which was not the
case.
· Having failed in a motion to reconsider, Maria B. Castro instituted this special civil action to vacate the
order of cancellation, alleging want of jurisdiction and/or abuse of discretion.
· Thereafter she brought to the Court of Appeals the main case, insisting on her right to collect rents. And
she won: she got in that Court judgment for rents in the sum of P9,225. But the quashing of the bond was
not discussed in such appeal.

ISSUE: W/N resolution be considered moot

RULING: The case is moot and dismissed

RATIO:
● Associated Insurance & Surety Co., Inc. is not a party before this Court. Therefore any judgment in
this case revoking JudgeTan's order and/or reviving the supersedeas bond will not affect said
Surety Co. To direct its inclusion will not do; because, as to such surety the cancellation order has
 become final long ago
● The application of the rule that a court will not determine moot questions or abstract propositions has
resulted in other expressions or rules to the effect that the court will not express an opinion in a case in
which no practical relief can be granted, or which can have no practical effect

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS: · That on Spetember 1992, the DILG issued a resolution through Secretary Alunan
exempting the City of Manila from holding its SK election on December 1992;
· That the respondents filed a petition for review for certiorari and mandamus in the RTC of
Manila, which then issued an injunction ordering petitioners to desist from implementing the
order from the DILG;
· The respondents questioned the the power to enforce and administer of the SK elections by
the DILG, for that state that these powers are vested in the COMELEC

Alunan vs Mirasol; GR ISSUE: WON the case is moot and academic

No. 108399; July 31,
1997
RULING:
(Ponente)
RATIO: The case is not moot and academic

We hold that this case is not moot and that it is in fact necessary to decide the issues raised by
the parties. For one thing, doubt may be cast on the validity of the acts of those elected in the May
26, 1990 KB elections in Manila because this Court enjoined the enforcement of the decision of the
trial court and these officers continued in office until May 13, 1996. For another, this case comes
within the rule that courts will decide a question otherwise moot and academic if it is "capable of
repetition, yet evading review. For the question whether the COMELEC can validly vest in the DILG
the control and supervision of SK elections is likely to arise in connection with every SK election
and yet the question may not be decided before the date of such elections.
DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
-Petitioner Luis Malaluan and private respondent Joseph Evangelista were both mayoralty candidates in the Municipality of Kidapawan, North
Cotabato, in the Synchronized National and Local Elections held on May 11, 1992. Private respondent Joseph Evangelista was proclaimed by the
Municipal Board of Canvassers as the duly elected Mayor for having garnered 10,498 votes as against petitioners 9,792 votes. Evangelista was,
thus, said to have a winning margin of 706 votes. But, on May 22, 1992, petitioner filed an election protest with the Regional Trial Court contesting
64 out of the total 181 precincts of the said municipality. The trial court declared petitioner as the duly elected municipal mayor of Kidapawan,
North Cotabato with a plurality of 154 votes. Acting without precedent, the court found private respondent liable not only for Malaluans protest
expenses but also for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. On February 3, 1994, private respondent appealed the trial court
decision to the COMELEC.

-Just a day thereafter that is, on February 4, 1994, petitioner filed a motion for execution pending appeal. The motion was granted by the trial
court, in an order, dated March 8, 1994, after petitioner posted a bond in the amount of P500,000.00. By virtue of said order, petitioner assumed
the office of Municipal Mayor of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, and exercised the powers and functions of said office. Such exercise was not for
long, though. In the herein assailed decision adverse to Malaluan’s continued governance of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, the
First Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ordered Malaluan to vacate the office, said division having found and so declared
Malaluan vs private respondent to be the duly elected Municipal Mayor of said municipality. The COMELEC en banc affirmed said decision.
Commission on
-Malaluan filed this petition before us on May 31, 1995 as a consequence.
Elections; GR No.
120193; March 6, 1996 -It is significant to note that the term of office of the local officials elected in the May, 1992 elections expired on June 30, 1995. This petition, thus,
has become moot and academic insofar as it concerns petitioners right to the mayoralty seat in his municipality because expiration of the term of
office contested in the election protest has the effect of rendering the same moot and academic
(Ponente)

ISSUE:

Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion in awarding the aforementioned damages in favor of private
respondent.

RULING:

-We find respondent COMELEC’s reasoning in awarding the damages in question to be fatally flawed. The COMELEC found the election protest
filed by the petitioner to be clearly unfounded because its own appreciation of the contested ballots yielded results contrary to those of the trial
court. Assuming, ex gratia argumentis, that this is a reasonable observation not without basis, it is nonetheless fallacious to conclude a malicious
intention on the part of petitioner to molest private respondent on the basis of what respondent COMELEC perceived as an erroneous ruling of the
trial court. In other words, the actuations of the trial court, after the filing of a case before it, are its own, and any alleged error on its part does not,
in the absence of clear proof, make the suit clearly unfounded for which the complainant ought to be penalized. Insofar as the award of protest
expenses and attorney’s fees are concerned, therefore we find them to have been awarded by respondent COMELEC without basis, the election
 protest not having been a clearly unfounded one under the aforementioned circumstances.

-Respondent COMELEC also found the order granting execution of judgment pending appeal to be defective because of alleged non-compliance
with the requirement that there be a good and special reason to justify execution pending appeal. We, however, find that the trial court acted
judiciously in the exercise of its prerogatives under the law in issuing the order granting execution pending appeal. First, it should be noted that
the applicability of the provisions of the Rules of Court, relating to execution pending appeal, has ceased to be debatable after we definitively ruled
in Garcia vs. de Jesus that Section 2, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which allows Regional Trial Courts to order executions pending appeal upon
good reasons stated in a special order, may be made to apply by analogy or suppletorily to election contests decided by them. It is not disputed
that petitioner filed a bond in the amount of P500,000.00 as required under the Rules of Court.

-It is also now a settled rule that as much recognition should be given to the value of the decision of a judicial body as a basis for the right to
assume office as that given by law to the proclamation made by the Board of Canvassers.

-The petition for certiorari is GRANTED. While we uphold the COMELEC decision dated May 5, 1995 that private respondent Joseph Evangalista is the winner
in the election for mayor of the Municipality of Kidapawan, North Cotabato, that portion of the decision is deemed moot and academic because the term of
office for mayor has long expired. That portion of the decision awarding actual damages to private respondent Joseph Evangelista is hereby declared null and
void for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion and in excess of jurisdiction.

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

Philippines Today, Inc. FACTS:

vs National Labor
Relations
Commission; GR No. ISSUE:
112965; January 30,
1997
RULING:
(Ponente)

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

1. Where legislative intent is ascertained

 CASE:

FACTS: The instant case was an appeal form the judgment of the Municipal Court of Batangas finding the
accused guilty of the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. The validity of the conviction
was based upon a retroactive application of the Supreme Court’s ruling in People vs. Mapa.

As to the facts, a determined by the trial court, the accused admitted that on September 5, 1964, he was in
possession of the revolver and the ammunition described in the complaint was without the requisite license
a permit. He however, contended that he was a SECRET AGENT appointed by the governor, and was
likewise subsequently appended as Confidential Agent, which granted him the authority to possess fire arm
in the performance of his official duties as peace officer. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in People
People vs Jabinal; GR vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero, the accused sought for his acquittal.
No. 30061; February
27, 1974 Noting and agreeing to the evidence presented by the accused, the trial court nonetheless decided
otherwise, citing that People vs. Macarandang and People vs. Lucero were reversed and subsequently
(Ponente) abandoned in People vs. Mapa.

ISSUE: Whether or not Macarandang and Lucero should apply in this case.

RULING: The Supreme Court reversed the ruling and acquitted the appellant.

RATIO: Considering that appellant conferred his appointments as Secret Agent and Confidential Agent and
authorized to possess a firearm pursuant to the prevailing doctrine enunciated in Macarandang and Lucero,
under which no criminal liability would attach to his possession of said firearm in spite of the absence of a
license and permit therefor, appellant must be absolved. Certainly, appellant may not be punished for an act
which at the time it was done was held not to be punishable.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
People vs. Jabinal; GR
No. 30061; February
FACTS:
27, 1974

(Ponente) ISSUE:
 RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
· Go Chico displayed in one of the windows and one of the show cases of his store a number of medallions in
the form of a small button, upon the faces of which were imprinted in miniature the picture of Emilio Aguinaldo,
and the flag or banner or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine Islands to designate and
identify those in armed insurrection against the United States
· Defendant is charged with violation of Section 1 of Act No. 1696 of the Philippine Commission:
Any person who shall expose, or cause or permit to be exposed, to public view on his own premises,
or who shall expose, or cause to be exposed, to public view, either on his own premises or
elsewhere, any flag, banner, emblem, or device used during the late insurrection in the Philippine
Islands to designate or identify those in armed rebellion against the United States, or any flag,
United States vs Go
Chico; GR No. 4963; banner, emblem, or device used or adopted at any time by the public enemies of the United States in
September 15, 1909 the Philippine Island for the purpose of public disorder or of rebellion or insurrection against the
authority of the United States in the Philippine Islands, or any flag, banner, emblem, or device of the
(Ponente) Katipunan Society, or which is commonly known as such, shall be punished by a fine of not less that
five hundred pesos for more than five thousand pesos, or by imprisonment for not less than three
months nor more than five years, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the
court.
· Appellant contends that he had no criminal intent.

ISSUE: Whether or not criminal intent is necessary

RULING: NO

RATIO: The court ruled that the act alone, irrespective of its motive, constitutes the crime.
 In the opinion of this court it is not necessary that the appellant should have acted with the criminal intent. In many
crimes, made such by statutory enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial.
This is necessarily so. If it were not, the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be
impossible of execution.

In such instances the entire function of the court is to find out the intention of the legislature, and to enforce the law
in absolute conformity to such intention. And in looking over the decided cases on the subject it will be found that in
the considered adjudications this inquiry has been the judicial guide.

The statute, then, being penal, must be construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the
defendant and at the same time preserve the obvious intention of the legislature. If the language be plain, it will be
construed as it reads, and the words of the statute given their full meaning; if ambiguous, the court will lean more
strongly in favor of the defendant than it would if the statute were remedial. In both cases it will endeavor to effect
substantial justice."

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
· In 1960, Caltex launched their "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest", which called for participants to estimate the
actual number of liters a hooded gas pump at each Caltex station will dispense during a specified period.
· Participants were not required consideration nor pay a fee. No purchase of Caltex products was also required
to be made. Entry forms were to be made available upon request at each Caltex station where a sealed can
Caltex Philippines, Inc. would be provided for the deposit of accomplished entry stubs.
vs Palomar; Supra · Foreseeing the extensive use of the mails not only as amongst the media for publicizing the contest but also
for the transmission of communications relative thereto, representations were made by Caltex with the postal
(Ponente:castro) authorities for the contest to be cleared in advance for mailing, having in view the Anti-lottery provisions of the
Revised Administrative Code.
· Postmaster General Enrico Palomar denied the request, arguing that the said contest violated the provisions
of the law on subject. CALTEX sought judicial intervention wherein the trial court ruled in its favor.
Respondent Palomar appealed, posing the same argument that the said contest violated the prohibitive
provisions of the Postal Law
ISSUE:
· Whether or not the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" fell on the purview of the prohibitive provisions of the
 Postal Law.

RULING: No

RATIO:
· The Postal Law does not allow “any lottery, gift enterprise, or scheme for the distribution of money, or of any
real or personal property by lot, chance, or drawing of any kind".

· The Court held that the "Caltex Hooded Pump Contest" by CALTEX is not a “lottery” nor a “gift enterprise” but
rather a gratuitous distribution of property by chance, which the law does not prohibit.
· The term "lottery" extends to all schemes for the distribution of prizes by chance, such as policy playing, gift
exhibitions, prize concerts, raffles at fairs, etc., and various forms of gambling. The three essential elements of a
lottery are: First, consideration; second, prize; and third, chance. The contest in question, lacking the element of
“consideration”, cannot be deemed al lottery. The rules of the contest made no mention of a valuable
consideration of some kind being paid directly or indirectly for the chance to draw a prize. The term “gift
enterprise” also could not embrace the scheme at bar. As already noted, there is no sale of anything to which the
chance offered is attached as an inducement to the purchaser. The contest is open to all qualified contestants
irrespective of whether or not they buy the appellee's products.

By virtue of noscitur a sociis — which Opinion 217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of
chance is concerned — it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning
than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it
involves a consideration, so also must the term "gift enterprise" be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law
the slightest indication of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the "gift enterprise" therein
included.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
Banawa vs Mirano; GR
No. 24750; May 16,
FACTS:
1980

(Ponente) ISSUE:
 RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
Resins, Incorporated
vs Auditor General;
GR No. 17888; October ISSUE:
29, 1968

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE: The petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Usec of Labor by the former Executive on November
18 1965.The petitioner contends that the position extended to respondent by the incumbent Executive is invalid despite a
Memorandum Circular declaring all ad interim appointments of former Executive invalid since it has lapsed with the
adjournment of the special session of Congress about midnight of Jan 22 1966. This is a quo warranto seeking to be
declared the person legally entitled to said office of Usec of Labor.
Guevara vs Inocentes;
GR No. 25577; March FACTS:
15, 1966 · The petitioner was extended an ad interim appointment as Usec of Labor by the former Executive on November
18 1965.The petitioner contends that the position extended to respondent by the incumbent Executive is invalid despite a
(Ponente) Memorandum Circular declaring all ad interim appointments of former Executive invalid since it has lapsed with the
adjournment of the special session of Congress about midnight of Jan 22 1966
· The petition claimed the following grounds:
(1) Article VII, Section 10(4) of the Constitution, petitioner's ad interim appointment is valid and permanent and
may only become ineffective either upon express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments or upon the
adjournment of the regular session of Congress of 1966;
 (2) No express disapproval by the Commission on Appointments because it has never been constituted by President
Marcos in his Proclamation No. 2 (1966)
(3) No adjournment of the Congress as contemplated in the Constitution because the aforesaid special session was
suspended by the House
· The respondents:
(1) Petitioner's ad interim appointment lapsed when Congress adjourned its last special session called under
Proclamation No. 2 of President Marcos
(2)An ad interim appointment ceases to be valid after each term of Congress and so petitioner's appointment must
have lapsed as early as December 30, 1965
(3) Petitioner's ad interim appointment as well as others made under similar conditions, is contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy, and hence null and void; and (4) petitioner's appointment is void in the light of the
doctrine laid down in Rodriguez, Jr. vs. Quirino

ISSUE: Whether or not the ad interim appointment is valid?

RULING: SC DECISION: DENIED

RATIO: NO. Article VII, Section 10 states “The President shall have the power to make appointments
during the recess of the Congress, but such appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by
the Commission on Appointments or until the next adjournment of the Congress”
The provision reveals it’s clear intent of the framers of our Constitution to make a recess appointment
effective only (a) until disapproval by the Commission on Appointments (b) until the next adjournment
of Congress, and never a day longer regardless of the nature of the session adjourned. And this is to
considerthe plain language of the provision which is free from any ambiguity in lined of the well-settled
rule of statutory construction that "when the intention of the legislature is so apparent from the face of
the statute that there can be no question as to its meaning there is no room for construction". Hence,
the provision contemplates only two modes of termination of an ad interim appointment, or of one
made during the recess of Congress, which are completely separate from, and independent of, each
other. If the framers of the Constitution had intended to make the operation of the second clause
dependent upon the prior constitution of the Commission on Appointments they should have so stated
in clear terms considering that the first clause implies a positive act of the Commission, while the
second an entirely separate and independent act of Congress.

DOCTRINE:
 CASE:

FACTS:
Yu Cong Eng vs
Trinidad; GR No.
20479; February 6, ISSUE:
1925

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE: Bruno Aparri contested that he shall continue as General Manager of NARRA (National Resettlement and
Rehabilitation Administration) until he vacates the office. Private respondents in response said that they have the
right to remove him from appointment because his term has already expired and that the respondents (Members of
the Board of Directors) was given a power by the Chairman of the Board to fix the term of office of the incumbent
General Manager of the NARRA.

FACTS:
On January 15, 1960, private respondents (as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National
Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration created under Republic Act No. 1160, approved June 18, 1954 —
Aparri vs The Court of
NARRA) approved the resolution no. 13
Appeals; GR No.
appointing Mr. Bruno O. Aparri as General Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration
30057; January 31,
(NARRA).
1984
On March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved the resolution no., 24 whereas, the Chairman of the
(MAKASIAR, J. )
Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors, to fix the term of office of the incumbent General Manager of the
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration.

Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the then Court of First Instance of Manila on
March 29, 1962. The petition prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA Board dated March 15, 1962, to
command the Board to allow petitioner to continue in office as General Manager until he vacates said office in
accordance with law and to sentence the private respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner actual
damages in the sum of P95,000.00, plus costs.
 On August 8, 1963, when the case was still pending decision in the lower court, Republic Act No. 3844, otherwise
known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, abolished the NARRA (Sec. 73, R.A. 3844) and transferred its
functions and powers to the Land Authority.

On October 21, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, finding "that this case has
become academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural Land Reform Code (Republic Act No. 3844) and
thereby dismissing the instant petition without pronouncement as to costs" (p. 5, rec.)

ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution no. 24 (series of 1962) was a removal or dismissal of the petitioner without cause

RULING: Affirmed. The term office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.

RATIO:
It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "Term" with the purview of the statutes so as to effectuate the
statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination. In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is rested in the Board of Directors (Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160)
subject to the recommendation of the office of economic coordination and the approval of the president of the
Philippines. Resolution No. 24 speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the petitioner.

The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and phrases of a statute are
not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language
employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction. The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words. The reason for the rule is that the
legislature must be presumed to know the meaning of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed
its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute.

SC DECISION: The decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. WITHOUT COSTS.

DOCTRINE:
For where there is no ambiguity in the words of a statute, there is no room for construction.
CASE:
Ong vs Parel; GR No.
76710; December 21,
FACTS:
1987

(Ponente) ISSUE:
 RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE: Petitioners seek for certiorari and mandamus for motion for bail and hospital confinement

FACTS:
- Petitioners are husband and wife who owned and formerly resided at No. 13 Isidro St., Skyline Village.
Catalunan Grande, Davao City.
- When petitioner Leopoldo Veroy was promoted to the position of Assistant Administrator of the Social
Security System sometime in June, 1988, he and his family transferred to 130 K-8th St., East Kamias,
Quezon City, where they are presently residing.
- The care and upkeep of their residence in Davao City was left to two (2) houseboys, Jimmy Favia and Eric
Burgos, who had their assigned quarters at a portion of the premises.
- While the Veroys had the keys to the interior of the house, only the key to the kitchen, where the circuit
breakers were located, was entrusted to Edna Soguilon to give her access in case of an emergency.
- On April 12, 1990, their house was raided on information that it was being used as a safehouse for rebel
Veroy vs Loyague;
soldiers.
Supra
- Petitioner Ma. Luisa was contacted for permission and replied that she will only allow if it is conducted in the
presence of Major Ernesto Macaset.
(Ponente)
- In their search, they found a .45 caliber handgun containing 7 live bullets.
- A search of the children's recreation and study area revealed a big travelling bag containing assorted polo
shirts, men's brief, two (2) pieces polo barong and short sleeve striped gray polo. sweat shirt, two (2) pairs
men's socks, a towel made in U.S.A., one blanket, a small black bag, Gandhi brand, containing a book
entitled "Islamic Revolution Future Path of the Nation", a road map of the Philippines, a telescope, a plastic
bag containing assorted medicines and religious pamphlets was found in the master's bedroom.
- Fiscal ponferrada filed an information against petitioners for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions
in furtherance of rebellion, and no bail was recommended.
- Petitioners filed a motion for bail but was denied.
- Petitioners were admitted to St. Luke’s Hospital due to stress and anxiety.
- On August 20, 1990 the trial court was informed of the petitioners’ voluntary surrender.
- On September 21, 1990, respondent Judge required the CIS to produce the bodies of herein petitioners on
October 1. Upon their arraignment, herein Petitioners entered a plea of not guilty and filed an "Urgent Motion
for Hospital Confinement", which was denied.
 - The petitioners were transferred to Camp Crame.
- On November 2, 1990, respondent Judge issued an order denying petitioners' Motion for Bail.
- Acting on the Supplemental Petition filed by Petitioners and taking into consideration several factors such as:
a) that the possibility that they will flee or evade the processes of the court is fairly remote; b) their poor
medical condition; and c) the matters in their Second Supplemental Petition especially since the
prosecution's evidence refers to constructive possession of the disputed firearms in Davao City through the
two (2) caretakers while petitioners lived in Manila since 1988, this Court, on November 20, 1990, granted
petitioners' provisional liberty and set the bail bond at P20,000.00 each.
- As submitted by the respondents, and accepted by petitioners, the petition for mandamus to compel
respondent Judge to resolve petitioners' Motion for Bail, and the petition for certiorari to review the order of
respondent judge initially denying their Motion for Hospital Confinement, were rendered moot and academic
by the resolutions of this Court dated November 20, 1990 and October 25, 1990, respectively.

ISSUE: Whether or not Presidential Decree No. 1866 has been repealed by Republic Act No. 6968.

RULING: No.

RATIO: Likewise, petitioners' contention that Republic Act 6968 has repealed Presidential Decree No. 1866 is bereft
of merit. It is a cardinal rule of statutory construction that where the words and phrases of a statute are not obscure
or ambiguous. Its meaning and the intention of the legislature must be determined from the language employed, and
where there is no ambiguity in the words, there is no room for construction (Provincial Board of Cebu v. Presiding
Judge of Cebu, CFI, Br. IV, G.R. No. 34695, March 7, 1989 [171 SCRA 1]). A perusal of the aforementioned laws
would reveal that the legislature provided for two (2) distinct offenses: (1) illegal possession of firearms under
Presidential Decree No. 1866; and (2) rebellion, coup d' etat, sedition and disloyalty under Republic Act 6968;
evidently involving different subjects which were not clearly shown to have eliminated the others.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
Daoang vs The
Municipal Judge, San
Nicolas, Ilocos Norte; FACTS: On 1971, the respondent spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy filed a petition with the Municipal Court of
GR No. 34568; March San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte, seeking the adoption of the minors Quirino Bonilla and Wilson Marcos. The petition was
28, 1988 set for hearing on 24 April 1971. The petitioners herein, filed an opposition to the aforementioned petition for
adoption, claiming that the spouses Antero and Amanda Agonoy had a legitimate daughter named Estrella Agonoy,
(Ponente) oppositors' mother, who died on 1 March 1971, and therefore, said spouses were disqualified to adopt under Art. 335
of the Civil Code. The MTC granted the petition for adoption. Hence, the instant petition
 ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses are qualified to adopt pursuant to Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

RULING: Yes, they are qualified to adopt pursuant to Art. 335 of the Civil Code.

The respondent judge held that "to add grandchild or grandchildren in this article where no grandchild is included
would violate to (sic) the legal maxim that what is expressly included would naturally exclude what is not included

We find, that the words used in paragraph (1) of Art. 335 of the Civil Code, in enumerating the persons who cannot
adopt, are clear and unambiguous. The children mentioned therein have a clearly defined meaning in law and, as
pointed out by the respondent judge, do not include grandchildren.

Well known is the rule of statutory construction to the effect that a statute clear and unambiguous on its face need
not be interpreted; stated otherwise, the rule is that only statutes with an ambiguous or doubtful meaning may be the
subject of statutory construction.

Adoption used to be for the benefit of the adoptor. It was intended to afford to persons who have no child of their own
the consolation of having one, by creating through legal fiction, the relation of paternity and filiation where none
exists by blood relationship. The present tendency, however, is geared more towards the promotion of the welfare of
the child and the enhancement of his opportunities for a useful and happy life, and every intendment is sustained to
promote that objective. Under the law now in force, having legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural children, or
children by legal fiction, is no longer a ground for disqualification to adopt.

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation
vs Intermediate FACTS: On September 28, 1984, BF Homes filed a "Petition for Rehabilitation and for Declaration of Suspension of
Appellate Court; GR
Payments with the Securities and Exchange Commission. RCBC, one of the creditors, requested the Provincial
No. 74851; December
Sheriff of Rizal to extra-judicially foreclose its real estate mortgage on some properties of BF Homes. A notice of
9, 1999
extra-judicial foreclosure sale was issued by the Sheriff. On motion of BF Homes, the SEC issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining RCBC and the sheriff from proceeding with the public auction sale. The SEC ordered the
(Ponente) issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction upon petitioner's filing of a bond. However, petitioner did not file a bond
until the very day of the auction sale, so no writ of preliminary injunction was issued by the SEC. Presumably,
unaware of the filing of the bond, the sheriffs proceeded with the public auction sale in which RCBC was the highest
bidder for the properties auctioned. BF Homes filed in the SEC a consolidated motion to annul the auction sale and
filed an original complaint praying for the annulment of the judgment, premised on the fact that even before RCBC
asked the sheriff to extra-judicially foreclose its mortgage on petitioner's properties, the SEC had already assumed
exclusive jurisdiction over those assets.

ISSUE: (1) Whether or not the issue on preferred creditors of distressed corporations stand on equal footing with all
other creditors gains relevance and materiality only upon the appointment of a management committee, rehabilitation
receiver, board, or body in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A.
(2) Whether or not RCBC has rightfully moved for the extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 902-A.

RULING: YES

RATIO: (1) Yes. The Court held that whenever a distressed corporation asks the SEC for rehabilitation and
suspension of payments, preferred creditors may no longer assert such preference, but stand on equal footing with
other creditors. Foreclosure shall be disallowed so as not to prejudice other creditors, or cause discrimination among
them. The holding that suspension of actions for claims against a corporation under rehabilitation takes effect as
soon as the application or a petition for rehabilitation is filed with the SEC — may, to some, be more logical and wise
but unfortunately, such is incongruent with the clear language of the law. To insist on such ruling, no matter how
practical and noble, would be to encroach upon legislative prerogative to define the wisdom of the law — plainly
judicial legislation. In other words, once a management committee, rehabilitation receiver, board or body is appointed
pursuant to P.D. 902-A, all actions for claims against a distressed corporation pending before any court, tribunal,
board or body shall be suspended accordingly.

Only when the law is ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent. Ambiguity
is a condition of admitting two or more meanings, of being understood in more than one way, or of referring to two or
more things at the same time. A statute is ambiguous if it is admissible of two or more possible meanings, in which
case, the Court is called upon to exercise one of its judicial functions, which is to interpret the law according to its
true intent.

(2) Yes. Insofar as petitioner RCBC is concerned, the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 902-A are not yet
applicable and it may still be allowed to assert its preferred status because it foreclosed on the mortgage prior to the
appointment of the management committee. Suspension of claims against a corporation under rehabilitation is
 counted or figured up only upon the appointment of a management committee or a rehabilitation receiver. As
relevantly pointed out, a petition for rehabilitation does not always result in the appointment of a receiver or the
creation of a management committee. Petitioner RCBC, therefore, could have rightfully, as it did, moved for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of its mortgage on October 26, 1984 because a management committee was not appointed
by the SEC until March 18, 1985

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
· PAGCOR is a government owned and controlled corporation organized and existing under PD No. 1869
· Pursuant to Sec 1 and 10 of PD No. 1869, PAGCOR requested for legal advice from the Secretary of Justice as to
whether or not authorized by its charter to operate and manage jai-alai frontons in the country.
· In Opinion No. 67, the Secretary of Justice stated that PAGCOR has the authority to operate and maintain games
extended to jai-alai also known as game of Basque pelota,
· . It was also affirmed by the Office of the Solicitor General
· Thus, PAGCOR started the operation of jai-alai frontons.
Del Mar vs Philippine · On May 6, 1999, petitioner Raoul B. del Mar filed a Petition for Prohibition to prevent respondent PAGCOR from
Amusement and managing and/or operating the jai-alai on the ground that it is patently illegal and devoid of any basis either from the
Gaming Corporation;
Constitution or PAGCOR’s own Charter.
GR No. 138298;
· On June 17, 1999, respondent PAGCOR entered into an Agreement Belle Jai Alai Corporation and Filipinas Gaming
November 29, 2000
Entertainment Totalizator Corporation wherein it was agreed that BELLE will make available to PAGCOR the required
(Ponente) infrastructure facilities and funding for jai-alai while PAGCOR handles the actual management and operation of jai-alai
· Petitioners Raoul B. del Mar, Federico S. Sandoval II, Michael T. Defensor, and intervenor Juan Miguel Zubiri, are suing
as taxpayers.

ISSUE:
Whether or not PAGCOR has a franchise to operate jai-alai?

RULING:
No. The SC held that the charter of PAGCOR does not give it any franchise to operate and manage jai-alai.

We hold that PAGCOR cannot maintain that Section 10 of P.D. No. 1869 grants it a franchise to operate jai-alai as provided in
 Section 10:

“SEC. 10. Nature and term of franchise.—Subject to the terms and conditions established in this Decree, the Corporation is
hereby granted for a period of twenty-five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years, the rights, privilege and
authority to operate and maintain gambling casinos, clubs, and other recreation or amusement places, sports, gaming pools,
i.e.,basketball, football, lotteries, etc., whether on land or sea, within the territorial jurisdiction of the Republic of the
Philippines.”

In the case, the term “jai-alai” was never used and is nowhere to be found in the law. The conclusion that it is included in the
franchise granted to PAGCOR cannot be based on a mere cursory perusal of and a blind reliance on the ordinary and plain
meaning of the statutory terms used such as “gaming pools” and “lotteries.”

A statute, which legalizes a gambling activity or business, should be strictly construed and every reasonable doubt must be
resolved to limit the powers and rights claimed under its authority.

In applying a literal interpretation of the provision under Section 11 of P.D. 1869, The court rejects this simplistic reading of the
law considering the social, moral and public policy implications embedded. The plain meaning rule should be used when there
is no ambiguity or obscurity in the language of the law. The fact, however, that the statute admits of different interpretations
is the best evidence that the statute is vague and ambiguous. It is widely acknowledged that a statute is ambiguous when it is
capable of being understood by reasonably well-informed persons in either of two or more senses.

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

Morales vs Subido; GR FACTS:

No. 29658; November
29, 1968
ISSUE:
(Ponente)

RULING:
 RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
- During the period from December 1963 to July 1964, Republic Flour Mills exported pollard (darak) and bran
(ipa).
- Commission of Customs assessed Republic Flour Mills by way of wharfage dues in the sum of Php 7,
948.00. Republic Flour Mills paid under protest.
- Republic Flour Mills would want the court to construe the words “Products of the Philippines.” They state that
the bran and pollard that they are merely wastes from the production of flour.
- The COmmision of Customs held that Republic Flour Mills was lliable for wharfage dues.

ISSUE: W/N the collection of wharfage dues was in accordance to law

Republic Flour Mills,
Inc vs The
Commissioner of RULING: YES
Customs; Supra

(Ponente) RATIO: -
- Section 2802 of the Tariff and Custom Code states that "There shall be levied,collected and paid on all
articles imported or brought into the Philippines, and on products of the Philippines exported from the
Philippines, a charge of two pesos per gross metric ton as a fee for wharfage." appears to be quite precise.
Section 2802 refers to what is imported and exported
- On the question of the meaning of product of the Philippines, the court states, “Even if there be doubt as to
the meaning of the language employed, the interpretation should not be at war with the end sought to
be attained. No undue reflection is needed to show that if through an ingenious argument, the scope of a
statute may be contracted, the probability that other exceptions may be thought of is not remote. If petitioner
were to prevail, subsequent pleas motivated by the same desire to be excluded from the operation of the
Tariff and Customs Code would likewise be entitled to sympathetic consideration.”
- Sec 2802 of the Tarrif and Custom Code states all products imported and exported. As long as they export
pollard and bran, even they are wastes, they are still product of the Philippines.
DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
People vs Garcia; GR
No. 2873; February 28,
ISSUE:
1950

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
● The case pertains to the petition of Jose O. Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero to allow them
to occupy their seats in the senate because a resolution was approved that barred them from being
sworn in nor seated as members of the chamber.

FACTS:
● The Commission of Elections submitted a report in May of 1946 to the President and the Congress of
Vera vs Avelino; GR the Philippines regarding the national elections. The report contained certain specified acts of
No. 543; August 31, terrorism and violence in certain provinces (Pampanga, Nueva Ecija, Bulacan, and Tarlac) which
1946 resulted to the inaccurate results of the elections in the region.
● A resolution known as Pendatum was approved which pertained to the report that orders the Jose O.
(Ponente) Vera, Ramon Diokno, and Jose E. Romero among sixteen (16) other senators be barred from being
sworn in nor seated as members of the chamber, pending the termination of the protest filed against
them.
● Jose O. Vera et al. proceeded to file an action that will compel Avelino et al. to permit them to occupy
their positions, as well as to exercise their powers as senators.

ISSUE: Does the Supreme Court as part of the Judiciary Branch of the government have jurisdiction over the
case?
 RULING:
● The case was dismissed because the case was not in the jurisdiction of the Supreme Cour.

RATIO:
● It is stated in the case our form of Government, the Judiciary has no power to revise even the most
arbitrary and unfair action of the legislative department, or of either house thereof, taken in
pursuance of the power committed exclusively to that department by the constitution. Even if the
case of Vera had merit, for example the respondent acting beyond the power they have, the petition
should be denied all the same since the Judiciary cannot order one branch to reinstate a member
thereof.
DOCTRINE:
● Limitations
○ Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes
○ Courts not to be influenced by questions of wisdom.
CASE:

FACTS:
Baking vs The Director
of Prisons; GR No.
ISSUE:
30364; July 28, 1969

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

Ichong vs Hernandez;
Supra FACTS:
● Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities,
(LABRADOR, J) particularly in the retail business.
● For some time, he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a “monopoly” in the local market in Pasay.
Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act – the purpose
 of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business.
● Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties
concluded by the Republic of the Philippines which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause.
● He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the
income generation of the country, he should be given equal opportunity.
● Ichong also argued that the subject of the Act is not expressed in the title and that the act violates
international and treaty obligations.

ISSUE: If the said act may invalidate/supersede generally accepted principles

RULING: Yes

RATIO:
● In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with RA 1180. The
equal protection of the law clause “does not demand absolute equality amongst residents; it merely requires
that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced”; and, that the equal protection clause “is not infringed by legislation which
applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such
class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such class and
those who do not.”
● For the sake of argument, even if it would be assumed that a treaty would be in conflict with a statute then
the statute must be upheld because it represented an exercise of the police power which, being inherent
could not be bargained away or surrendered through the medium of a treaty. Hence, Ichong can no longer
assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
Palanca vs The City of
Manila; GR No. 15819;
FACTS:
October 27, 1920

(Ponente) ISSUE:
 RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
· On May 12, 1908, defendant HSBC and presented to the paying teller an instrument in the form of a check, purporting to be drawn by a
paymaster of the U.S. Navy, in favor of Peters, for the sum of $3,000 United States currency and requested that the amount thereof be paid to him
by the said banking corporation.
· The bank refused to pay to him the sum of money named in said instrument, and he went away from the bank, returning in a short time with
the defendant Hawkes.
· Peters then placed his name upon the back of the instrument and the defendant Hawkes did likewise, writing his name below that of Peters.
Neither of the defendants placed a date upon the endorsement made by him.Thereupon payment was made in one form or another by the bank to
Peters of the sum named in the instrument.
The Hongkong and · On the presentation by the bank, payment of the instrument was refused by the drawee, upon the ground that the name of the paymaster of
Shanghai Banking the U.S. Navy upon said instrument had been forged.
Corporation vs Peters; · This action was brought by the plaintiff against both Peters and Hawkes to recover the $3,000 paid by the plaintiff upon said instrument.
GR No. 5066; April 6,
RTC rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant Peters for the full amount paid by it, less the amount theretofore realized
1910
from the property of Peters, and dismissed the complaint as to Hawkes, absolving him from liability in connection with the check.
(MORELAND, J.)
ISSUE:

If the defendant’s acts under article 462 of the Code of Commerce of the Phililppine Islands constitute an endorsement, because of his failure to
date said endorsement as provided by division 4 of the article?

RULING:

It will be seen by a glance at article 461 that article 462 is expressly limited in its application to bills of exchange. If such article is applicable to
checks, then the provision making it applicable must be found elsewhere than in these articles. The contention of the defendant is that such
provision is found in article 533 of said code. A single glance at said article shows clearly and conclusively that this contention cannot be
sustained. Article 533 is one of the articles found under Title XI of the Commercial Code.

We cannot permit such admission to influence our decision, for the reason that we believe he is wrong in the grounds upon which that admission
is made. Article 542 follows:
 ART. 542. The provisions contained in this code relating to the several liability of the maker and endorsers, and to protests, as well as to the
exercise of the actions arising from bills of exchange, shall be applicable to these instruments.

It is evident that this article in no way affects the question before us. It in no way refers to or touches the form or the essential requisites of an
indorsement. It has no affirmative requirements in it. It does not provide that anything shall or shall not be, or shall not be done. It simply makes
applicable principles of liability already laid down to a state of things already existing. It has nothing to do with the establishment of those
principles of liability; neither has it anything to do with the creation of the state of things to which it applies those principles. They both come to it
ready made. The article simply says in effect that if a check has been drawn, and if it has been indorsed, then certain principles of liability shall be
applied to the parties to the check. But it does not say what form such indorsement shall take or what requisites it shall have. As it has nothing to
do with the form of the check or with the questions of what are its requisites, so it has nothing to do with the form of the indorsement. The question
is, "Is it an indorsement?" without regard to whether it has one form or another, that is, without regard as to whether it is made in red ink, blue ink,
or black ink. If there is an indorsement, then this article applies certain principles to the responsibility of the parties no matter whether the
indorsement is in red, blue, or black ink. In short, this article does not pretend to regulate the incidental form or special features of the
indorsement. The Commercial Code recognizes as valid and legal at least two kinds of indorsement, namely, the indorsement of a bill of
exchange, which bill, because of its special nature, requires a special features in the indorsement (art. 462), and the common law indorsement, so
called, recognized by the law merchant the world over, admittedly the indorsement which is required by the Commercial Code as to bottom and
respondentia bonds (art. 722) and bills of lading (art. 708). These latter instruments, being of a nature quite different from a bill of exchange, do
not require, as does said bill, any special features in their indorsement.

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
People vs Nazario; GR
No. 44143; August 31,
ISSUE:
1988

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
United States vs Ang
 Tang Ho; supra FACTS:

(Ponente)
ISSUE:

RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
De Los Santos vs
Mallare; GR No. 3881;
ISSUE:
August 31, 1950

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

Republic vs Go Bon CASE:

Lee; GR No. 10520;
February 28, 1957
FACTS:
 (Ponente)

ISSUE: WON Go can keep her certificate of naturalization

RULING: No.

RATIO:
A decision or order granting citizenship to the applicant does not really become executory and a naturalization proceeding
not being a judicial adversary proceeding, the decision rendered therein is no res judicata as to any of the reasons or
matters which would support a judgment cancelling the certificate of naturalization for illegal or fraudulent procurement.
As a matter of fact, it is settled in this jurisdiction that a certificate of naturalization may be cancelled upon grounds or
conditions subsequent to the granting of the certificate of naturalization.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:
Tanada vs Cuenco; GR
No. 10520; February
FACTS:
28, 1957

(Ponente) ISSUE:
 RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE: Construction: Judicial construction: Limitations

Courts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes • Courts are not authorized to insert into the law what they think should be in it or to supply what they
the legislature would have supplied if its intention had been called to the omission. • They should not by construction, revise even the most
arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform to what they think should be the law. • Neither should the courts construe
statutes which are perfectly vague for it violates due process o Failure to accord persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid o Leave law enforcers
unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions • 2 leading stars on judicial construction o Good faith o commonsense • an utterly vague act on
its face cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by construction Courts not to be influenced by questions of wisdom • Courts do not sit to
resolve the merit of conflicting theories • Courts do not pass upon question of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation, for it’s not within their
province to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of common sense.
CASE:
In the elections of September 1935, Jose Angara, Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates
voted for the position of member of the National Assembly in the first district of Tayabas. The petitioner was
proclaimed member-elect for the said district for receiving the most number of votes and thereafter took his oath in
office. A Motion of Protest was filed by Ynsua against the election of the petitioner. The petitioner countered this with
a Motion to Dismiss the Protest which was denied by the Electoral Commission

FACTS:
Jose Angara and Pedro Ynsua, Miguel Castillo and Dionisio Mayor were candidates voted for the position of member
Angara vs The
of the National Assembly for the 1st district of Tayabas province.
Electoral Commission;
On Oct 17 1935, the provincial board of canvassers proclaimed Angara as member-elect of the Nat'l Assembly for
GR No. 45081; July 15,
garnering the most number of votes. He then took his oath of office on Nov 15th. On Dec 3rd, Nat'l Assembly passed
1936
Res. No 8 which declared with finality the victory of Angara. On Dec 8, Ynsua filed before the Electoral Commission
a motion of protest against the election of Angara, that he be declared elected member of the Nat'l Assembly.
(LAUREL, J.)
Electoral Commission passed a resolution in Dec 9th as the last day for the filing of the protests against the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. On Dec 20, Angara filed before the Elec.
Commission a motion to dismiss the protest that the protest in question was filed out of the prescribed period. The
Elec. Commission denied Angara's petition.
Angara prayed for the issuance of writ of prohibition to restrain and prohibit the Electoral Commission taking further
cognizance of Ynsua's protest. He contended that the Constitution confers exclusive jurisdiction upon the said
Electoral Commissions as regards the merits of contested elections to the Nat'l Assembly and the Supreme Court
therefore has no jurisdiction to hear the case.
ISSUE:
Did the Electoral Commission act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the protest filed
against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election by resolution of the
National Assembly?
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral Commission and the subject matter of the
controversy.

RULING:
NO, the Electoral Commission did not act without or in excess of its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of the
protest filed against the election of the petitioner notwithstanding the previous confirmation of such election
by resolution of the National Assembly.
The Judiciary, in turn, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter effectively checks the other departments in
the exercise of its power to determine the law, and hence to declare executive and legislative acts void if
violative of the Constitution. This power of has been stated in Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution.

RATIO:
Section 4, Article VI of the Constitution provides that The Electoral Commission shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly.” In view of the
deliberations of the framers of the Constitution, it is held that the Electoral Commission was acting within the
legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take cognizance of the protest filed by the
respondent Ynsua. The petition of writ of prohibition against the Electoral Commission is hereby denied.

The Electoral Commission acted within the legitimate exercise of its constitutional prerogative in assuming to take
cognizance of the protest filed by the respondent Ynsua against the election of the petitioner Angara, and that the
earlier resolution of the National Assembly cannot in any manner toll the time for filing election protests against
members of the National Assembly, nor prevent the filing of a protest within such time as the rules of the Electoral
Commission might prescribe.

The grant of power to the Electoral Commission to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of the National Assembly, is intended to be as complete and unimpaired as if it had
remained originally in the legislature. The express lodging of that power in the Electoral Commission is an implied
denial of the exercise of that power by the National Assembly.
 The creation of the Electoral Commission carried with it ex necesitate rei the power regulative in character to limit the
time with which protests intrusted to its cognizance should be filed. [W]here a general power is conferred or duty
enjoined, every particular power necessary for the exercise of the one or the performance of the other is also
conferred. In the absence of any further constitutional provision relating to the procedure to be followed in filing
protests before the Electoral Commission, therefore, the incidental power to promulgate such rules necessary for the
proper exercise of its exclusive power to judge all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of
members of the National Assembly, must be deemed by necessary implication to have been lodged also in the
Electoral Commission.

DOCTRINE: Courts may not enlarge or restrict statutes (Limitation)

CASE:

FACTS:
● PEOPLE'S COURT ACT — The People's Court was intended to be a full and complete scheme with its own
machinery for the indictment, trial and judgment of treason cases
● The appellant Apolonio Carlos was found guilty of treason by the People’s Court, sentenced to reclusion
perpetua and to pay a fine of P 7000.
● A truck pulled up in front of a house in Constancia St., Sampaloc Manila where a certain Martin Mateo lived.
Carlos together with Japanese military alighted together broke into Martin Mateo’s house then later to
People vs Carlos;
Fermin Javier’s house.
supra
● Martin mateo, Ladislao Mateo and Fermin Javier were captured by biding hands, they were put inside the
truck and were brought to Fort Santiago, tortured and released after 6 days.
(TUASON, J.)
● Reason: they refused to talk about the whereabouts of Marcelino Mateo, a guerrilla that was able to escape
the Japanese. Fermin Javier on the other hand was also arrested because he was a suspected/ confirmed
by Carlos as a guerrilla.
● Accused contends PCA to be unconstitutional because the lower Court cannot be convicted of treason
because there is a settled principle in international law when a territory is under the governance of an
enemy, all political laws of the previous government are suspended.

ISSUE: W/N the operation of the People’s Court is for a limited time only
 RULING: Yes. SC affirmed decision of lower court

RATIO:
● The People's Court is a court of special and restricted jurisdiction created under the stress of an emergency
and national security. It was devised to operate for a limited period only, a limitation imposed by economic
necessity and other factors of public policy. Obviously, the main concerning the creation of a special court
was the trial and and disposition of the cases, numbering over 6,000, of accused who were being held by the
United States military authorities and who were to be turned over to the Commonwealth Government.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS: · That on December 1945, Jose Quintos was appointed as patrol in the Manila Police Department;
· December 1947 he was then promoted to a detective in the same department;
· He then qualified and assumed office successively for two posts;
· That on July 1952, Mayos Lacson dismissed five detectives among with Quintos;
· Quintos then filed a complaint (CFI of Manila) for injunction against Mayor Lacson and Chief of Police
Ojeda. CFI favored Quintos;
· The petitioners now then appealed stating that they have valid grounds for dismissal and urges the
Quintos vs Lacson; Court to review such ruling.
GR No. 8062; July 18,
1955
ISSUE: WON the Court should review previous ruling.
(Ponente)

RULING:

RATIO: No, because

If the said laws are deemed unwise and detrimental to the discipline and efficiency of detectives in Manila
and other chartered cities, proper representations and requests may be made to the Legislature. As long as
law do not violate any Constitutional provision, the Courts merely interpret and apply them regardless of
whether or not they are wise or salutary.
DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
Morte vs Mutuc; GR
No. 20387; January 31,
ISSUE:
1968

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
People vs Limaco; GR
No. 3090; January 9,
ISSUE:
1951

(Ponente) RULING:

RATIO:

DOCTRINE:
 CASE:

FACTS: Under the provisions of Section 1058 of the Administrative Code, Angel Lorenzo (petitioner) was
confined in San Lazaro Hospital in Manila due to leprosy. Petitioner filed for habeas corpus to CFI-Manila,
alleging that his constitutional rights has been violated alleging that leprosy was curable. However, CFI
denied his petition. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Section 1058 of the Administrative Code violates Lorenzo’s constitutional rights.
Lorenzo vs The
Director of Health; GR
No. 27484; September RULING: No
1, 1927

(Ponente) RATIO: The Supreme Court held that Section 1058 of the Administrative Code was enacted by the legislature
in the legitimate exercise of the police power which extends to the preservation of the public health. It was
place on the statute books in recognition of leprosy as a grave health problem. The methods provided for
the control of leprosy plainly constitute due process of law. Judicial notice will be taken of the fact that
leprosy is commonly believed to be an infectious disease tending to cause one afflicted with it to be
shunned and excluded from society, and that compulsory segregation of lepers as a means of preventing
the spread of the disease of supported by high scientific authority. Upon this view, laws for the segregation
of lepers have been provided the world over. Similarly, the local legislature has regarded leprosy as a
contagious disease and has authorized measures to control the dread scourge. To that forum must the
petitioner go to reopen the question.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

FACTS:
Lacson vs Roque; · Aresnio H. Lacson, then Mayor of the City of Manila broadcasted some allegedly defamatory and libelous
supra utterances against a certain judge (Judge Montesa).
· He allegedly said, “I have nothing but contempt for certain courts of justice. . . . I tell you one thing (answering
(Ponente) an interrogator), if I have the power to fire Judge Montesa, I will fire him for being incompetent, for being an
arrogant . . . an ignoramus."
· Montesa then filed a libel case against Lacson.
· A special prosecutor was assigned to the case. The special prosecutor recommended the suspension of Lacson
to the President. The President, through acting Executive Secretary Mariano Roque, issued a suspension order
 against Lacson.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Mayor may be suspended by the president from his post.

RULING: NO

RATIO: The contention that the President has inherent power to remove or suspend municipal officers is without
doubt not well taken. Removal and suspension of Public officers are always controlled by the particular law
applicable and its proper construction subject to constitutional limitations. So it has been declared that the President
can only remove where the power is expressly given or arises by necessary implication under the Constitution or
statutes.

There is neither statutory nor constitutional provision granting the President sweeping authority to remove municipal
officials. It is true that the President “shall . . . exercise general supervision over all local governments,” but
supervision does not contemplate control.

The power of the President to remove officials from office as provided for in section 64 (b) of the Revised
Administrative Code must be done “conformably to law;” and only for disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines
he “may at any time remove a person from any position of trust or authority under the Government of the
Philippines.” Again, this power of removal must be exercised conformably to law, in this case, the alleged libelous
act of Lacson cannot be considered as disloyalty.

DOCTRINE:

CASE:

Magtajas vs Pryce
Properties FACTS:
Corporation, Inc, GR · PAGCOR decided to expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City.
No. 111097; July 20, · To this end, it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce Proportions Corporation, Inc., renovated and
1994 equipped the same, and prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the Christmas season
· Civic organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious elements echoed the objection and so did the
(Ponente: Cruz, J. ) women's groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the mayor and the city legislators. The media
trumpeted the protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of the city.
· The contention of the petitioners is that, it is violative of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City
 Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos.
· On the other hand, the respondents invoke P.D. 1869 which created PAGCOR to help centralize and regulate
all games of chance, including casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines. The
Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. Hence, the petition for review.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Ordinance No. 3353 and Ordinance No. 3375-93 are valid
RULING:
No

RATIO:
· Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purposes indicated in the Local Government Code. It is expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in Section 16 as follows:
o Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or
incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the
promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government
units shall ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture,
promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage
and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological
capabilities, improve republic morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve the comfort and
convenience of their inhabitants.
· There is a requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute. Municipal governments are only agents of the
national government. Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national
lawmaking body. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have derived their power in
the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute

DOCTRINE: