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Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN: 2249-8389)

Vol. VIII, No.02, September, 2018

Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal

Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy (ISSN 2249-8389)

Lokāyata: Journal of Positive Philosophy is an online bi-annual interdisciplinary journal of the Center for
Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies (CPPIS). The name Lokāyata can be traced to
Kautilya's Arthashastra, which refers to three ānvīkṣikīs (logical philosophies), Yoga, Samkhya and
Lokāyata. Lokāyata here still refers to logical debate (disputatio, "criticism") in general and not to a
materialist doctrine in particular. The objectives of the journal are to encourage new thinking on concepts
and theoretical frameworks in the disciplines of humanities and social sciences to disseminate such new
ideas and research papers (with strong emphasis on modern implications of philosophy) which have
broad relevance in society in general and man’s life in particular. The Centre publishes two issues of the
journal every year. Each regular issue of the journal contains full-length papers, discussions and
comments, book reviews, information on new books and other relevant academic information. Each
issue contains about 100 Pages.

© Centre for Positive Philosophy and Interdisciplinary Studies, Pehowa (Kurukshetra)

Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Assistant Professor (Philosophy), Smt. Aruna Asaf Ali Govt. P.G. College ,

Kalka (Haryana).

Associate Editor:
Dr. Merina Islam

Editorial Advisory Board:

Prof. K.K. Sharma (Former-Pro-Vice-Chancellor, NEHU, Shillong).
Prof. (Dr.) Sohan Raj Tater, Former Vice Chancellor, Singhania University , Rajasthan).
Dr. Ranjan Kumar Behera (Patkai Christian College (Autonomous), Nagaland).
Dr. Geetesh Nirban (Kamala Nehru College, University of Delhi).
Dr. K. Victor Babu (Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies, Andhra University,
Dr Rasmita Satapathy (Department of Philosophy, Ramnagar College, West Bengal.)
Mr.Pankoj Kanti Sarkar (Department of Philosophy, Debra Thana Sahid Kshudiram Smriti
Mahavidyalaya, Paschim Medinipur, West Bengal).

Declaration: The opinions expressed in the articles of this journal are those of the individual authors, and
not necessary of those of CPPIS or the Chief-Editor

In this issue……………..

Sr. No. Title of the Paper & Author Page No.

1. Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: The Legal and Ethical Issues- 04-09
Bilquees Jan

2. Applied Ethics: A co-relation between Theory and Practice - Dipa 10-15


3. Free Will in Christian Philosophical Theology - Mohd Rashid 16-21

4. Impact of Religious Pluralism on the World; An Analytical 22-28

Approach - Tariq Rafeeq Khan and Mudasir Ahmad Tantray
5. Rejection of the Sambhava, Aitihya and Ceṣṭā as independent 29-36
pramāṇa-s by Vaiśeṣika school - Soma Chakraborty
6. Searching of Truth or Reality: Indian and Western Perspective - 37-42
Sukanta Das

7. Ultimate Goal of Human Soul: A Review after Ibn Sῑnā- Rejina 43-53
8. LalDedh‘s contribution to Philosophy-Tariq Rafeeq Khan & 54-60
Mudasir Ahmad Tantray

9. Philosophy of Life of Sri Guru Gobind Singh Ji -Desh Raj Sirswal 61-66

10. Increasing usage of Social Media and its Influence on Societal 67-72
Behavior - Mani Parti Bharara

11. Consumer Attitude For Buying Organic Food- Anurita Sharma 73-75

12. 21व ॊ सदी भें दर्शनर्ास्त्र की उऩमोगिता- अॊककत चौयससमा 76-82

13. - 83-88

14. - 89-92



Euthanasia and Assisted Suicide: The Legal and Ethical Issues

Bilquees Jan


Euthanasia is one of the issues that have been the subject of extreme debate over time. It has been a
significant issue in human rights dialogue as it also affects ethical and legal issues pertaining to patients
and health care providers. In this paper, the focus will be on legal and ethical debates concerning both
types of euthanasia. It will focus on both the supporter of euthanasia and the opponent of euthanasia.
Several statements for the Euthanasia argument are discussed: a merciful response that alleviates the
pain of patients which is sometimes wrongly perceived to be otherwise unbelievable; the autonomy in
which the patient has the right to make his own choices; the regulation and legislation of existing
practices of euthanasia to protect health care providers and patients. In this heated debate religious,
political, ethical, legal and personal views are also included. Among all these, those who desperately
want to end their lives because they simply cannot go on in any way are the ones who suffer. Every
individual or group has a different viewpoint regarding euthanasia. Euthanasia is considered a practical,
emotional, and religious debate.

Key words: euthanasia, palliative care, type of euthanasia, legal and ethical aspects of euthanasia


Euthanasia is a vigorously contested issue, not only because there are many moral, legal, religious and
ethical dilemmas associated with it, but also in what constitutes its definition. There are
divergent euthanasia laws in various countries. The British House of Lords Select Committee on
Medical Ethics defines Euthanasia as ―a deliberate intervention with the express intention of ending a
life, to relive intractable suffering‖. Euthanasia is a notion used in the medical field which means
painless death or gentle death, and is defined as the deliberate speeding up of the death of an individual
based on terminal medical conditions. Euthanasia reflects one of the current debatable issues and raises
many questions that need to be answered. The purpose of life is to be happy and to make others happy
if possible, to grow old gracefully and to die with dignity.

Euthanasia is categorized in different ways, which include voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary.
Voluntary euthanasia is conducted with the consent of the patient. Active voluntary euthanasia is legal
in Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands. Passive voluntary euthanasia is legal throughout the US
per Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health. When the patient brings about his or her own
death with the assistance of a physician, the term assisted suicide is often used instead. Assisted suicide

is legal in Switzerland and the U.S. states of California, Oregon, Washington, Montana and Vermont.
Non-voluntary euthanasia is conducted when the consent of the patient is unavailable. Examples
include child euthanasia, which is illegal worldwide but decriminalized under certain specific
circumstances in the Netherlands. Involuntary euthanasia is conducted against the will of the patient.

Voluntary, non-voluntary and involuntary types can be further divided into passive or active variants.
Passive euthanasia entails the withholding treatment necessary for the continuance of life. Active
euthanasia entails the use of lethal substances or forces (such as administering a lethal injection), and is
the more controversial.

Case Scenario

The issue of Euthanasia, mercy killing, has wedged legal and public interest in the past in India. India
is one such country which allows euthanasia under specific conditions. And now, the top court of India
has given legal sanction to passive euthanasia. This permits patients to withdraw medical support if
they slip into an irreversible coma. Earlier in 2011, the Supreme Court legalized passive euthanasia by
means of the withdrawal of life support to patients in a permanent vegetative state (PVS). This decision
was made as a part of the verdict in a case involving Mumbai‘s Aruna Shanbaug, who was in a PVS
until her death in 2015.

Aruna Shanbaug was working as a nurse at Mumbai‘s King Edward Memorial Hospital (KEM). In
1973, she was strangled with a chain and sodomized by a sweeper. The attack left her deprived of
oxygen which later left her in a vegetative state till she died. She was treated in KEM since the incident
and kept alive by feeding tube. She remains in coma for over 37 years and her case attracted wide
public attention in India. On behalf of Aruna, her friend Pinki Virani filed a petition arguing the
―continued existence of Aruna is in violation of her right to live in dignity‖. But the top court in 2011
rejected the plea and also issued a set of broad guidelines legalizing passive euthanasia in India.

Different cases of euthanasia used to discuss the different opinions and answer the following questions
in order to understand the concept of euthanasia. Is euthanasia a legal behavior? Does the patient have
the right to request death peacefully? Despite the patient‘s agreement and consent, is participating in
the killing of a patient considered ethical behavior and professional? Is there a long term impact and a
sense of guilt by family and health care providers? Finally, why are some supporting a peaceful death
and why some are against it, with opinion support?

Ethical and Legal Perspectives

In today‘s world, in spite of technological and scientific progress, especially in the field of laws and
regulations related to human health there is still ambiguity and controversy over the concept of
peaceful death (euthanasia). Thus, this ethical dilemma may impose health care providers to legal and
ethical risk.

The ethical and legal aspects of the concept of euthanasia are still widely debated in many countries of
the world. There are several opinions based on the principles of personal morality and religious beliefs.
Thus, scientists and researchers are still looking to reach a general consensus on this ethical dilemma.
The attention to the concept of easy death (euthanasia) is continually growing.

The advancement in medical technology is bringing deaths into hospitals where life, may be prolonged
for a long time. For example, in Britain at any one time there are about two thousand people who have
spent more than six months in a persistent vegetative state from which they will never recover. Many
dread the endless indignity of such a fate. Worldwide there is a need to address the issue of euthanasia
in order to manage and support clients and staff who are in a situation where a request of death is in
place. In Jordan, yet, there are no studies that discuss euthanasia, or end-of-life decisions in any clinical

Euthanasia is a controversial issue and most of the states consider it as illegal. Assisted death is allowed
in four Western European countries: the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg and Switzerland; two
North American countries: Canada and the United States, in the states of Oregon, Washington,
Montana and Vermont; and in South America: in Colombia. Active euthanasia is illegal in most of the
United States. While voluntary, passive euthanasia is considered legal; the patients have the right to
reject medical treatment.

Euthanasia was legalized in Albania in 1999. It was stated that any form of voluntary euthanasia was
legal under the rights of the terminally ill act of 1995. Passive euthanasia is considered legal, should
three or more family members agree to the decision. Albania's euthanasia policy has been controversial
among life groups and the Catholic Church.

Euthanasia and Physician Assisted Suicide are not legal in Israel. "On December 15, 2006 after eight
years of preparation and a year after it was approved by the Knesset, the law relating to dying patients
will take effect, enabling people of all ages to submit forms to the Health Ministry declaring how they
would like to be treated if they became terminally ill. The provisions of the law were approved by
leading clergymen representing all major religions before it was approved. The law, initiated by the
government on the basis of the recommendations of the Steinberg Committee which met for six years
on the sensitive subject was passed on December 1, 2005. The recommendations were prepared by the
59 member public committee comprising physicians, scientists, medical ethicists, social workers,
philosophers, nurses, lawyers, judges and clergymen representing the main religions in Israel. Active
euthanasia will continue to be forbidden. However, individuals will be able to set down in advance that
they do not want to be attached to a respirator when they are dying or that, if a respirator is attached, it
would include a delayed-response timer that can turn itself off automatically at a pre-set time."

The luxembourg parliament passed a bill legalizing euthanasia on 20th February, 2008. On 19th March
2009, the bill passed the reading, making Luxembourg the third European Union country, after the
Netherlands and Belgium, to decriminalize euthanasia. Terminally ill people will be able to have their
lives ended after receiving the approval of two doctors and a panel of experts.

Passive euthanasia is now possible in Sweden because of new medical guidelines which allow doctors
to halt life-extending treatment if a patient asks. Swedish law says that doctors should respect the will
of patients and should not kill them. Doctors had previously interpreted that as banning them from
withholding treatment. But the rules were reassessed after a 35 year old man who had spent years on a
respirator, was unable to persuade doctors to turn off his life-support and travelled to Switzerland to
end his life. The Swedish Society of Medicine now advises doctors to respect the wishes of patients
who are capable of making their own decisions, well informed and aware of all the alternatives.
Swedish doctors are not generally in favor of euthanasia. A recent survey suggested that 84% of them
would never consider helping a patient die, even if the patient asked for it and it was legal.

Arguments For and Against Euthanasia

There are some people who are in favor of euthanasia and also people who are against it. Arguments in
favor of euthanasia based on autonomy and the right of the individual person, compassion and mercy
towards the patient. It also puts forward counter-arguments, arguments against euthanasia, in particular,
that God is the sovereign Lord of life and every individual person does have the right to life, and that
mercy or compassion towards the patient in the case of euthanasia or mercy killing is false mercy.

Every patient has a right to decide about his mode of treatment including when and how they should
die based upon the principles of autonomy and self determination. Autonomy is a concept granting
right to a patient to make decisions relating to their health and life. A patient's own decision taken after
all consideration cannot be argued and challenged. It is his wish either to continue his treatment or
withdraw it, even though the outcome may result into his death. It is argued that as a part of our human
rights, there is a right to make our own decisions and a right to a dignified death.

Beneficence - Advocates of euthanasia expresses the view that the fundamental moral values of
society, compassion and mercy, require that no patient be allowed to suffer unbearably and relieving
patient from their pain and suffering by performing euthanasia will do more good than harm.

According to the proponents of physician assisted suicide, it becomes ethical and justified when the
quality of life of the terminally ill patient becomes so low that death remains the only justifiable means
to relieve suffering. Lack of any justifiable means of recovery and the dying patient himself making the
choice to end his life are conditions which make euthanasia more justifiable. In short, it is the extension
of patient's right of autonomy to determine what treatment to be accepted or refused.

Society and various religions believe in the sanctity of life which must be respected and preserved. The
Christian view sees life as a gift from God, who ought not to be offended by taking of that life.
Similarly the Islamic faith says that "it is the sole prerogative of God to bestow life and to cause death".
The withholding and withdrawing of treatment is permitted when it is futile, as this is seen as allowing
the natural course of death.

Euthanasia is considered as intentionally killing of one human being by another human being which is
equivalent to murder especially active voluntary euthanasia. Critics of euthanasia argue that the
patient's requests for euthanasia are rarely autonomous as most of them suffering from terminally ill
diseases and may not be in sound or rational mind while making such decisions. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights highlights the importance that "Everyone has the right to life", and
euthanasia contravenes the "right to life". Right to life does not include right to die.

Hippocratic Oath and medical profession: Hippocratic Oath which guides the medical profession states,
"I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according to my ability and my judgment and n
ever do any harm to anyone. To please no one will I prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice that may
cause his death". Thus hastening the death of a patient by means of physician assisted suicide is in strict
contradiction of the medical code of ethics. Any attempt to practice euthanasia will completely erode
the trust and confidence built in the doctor-patient relationship. A doctor's role is to save the life of a
patient and not to terminate it. Patients from lower socio economic class maybe coerced or forced to
request euthanasia by the family members to curb financial burden involved in the treatment of such
terminally ill patient.


The issue of euthanasia is a controversial issue. While some believe it is only humane to enable a
human being to end his suffering by means of assisted suicide, others believe that all pain and suffering
endured by human beings is God‘s will, and should be accepted as it has been given by God. Among
all these, those who desperately want to end their lives because they simply cannot go on in any way
are the ones who suffer. Every individual or group has a different viewpoint regarding euthanasia

Death is considered the inevitable end of a human‘s life; it is the Creator who gives and takes away the
human‘s life. We believe that euthanasia is not ethical, and religious in all forms or names. It is strange
in the twenty-first century to find supporters for euthanasia not exploiting the scientific, medical and
technological advances in finding new medical methods to prevent or relieve the disease or its
symptoms. The second reason we understand that euthanasia is opposed to palliative care, supposed to
be encouraged not neglected.

The World Health Organization (WHO) recommends that governments devote more attention to pain
relief and palliative care before considering laws to allow euthanasia. Most patients who request
euthanasia change their minds once satisfactory pain control is established.


1. Murkey, P.N., Konsam, Suken, Singh. (2009). Euthanasia: Mercy Killing. Journal of Indian
Academic Forensic Med. Pp 92.
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3. Priyanka, Vartak. (2018). Euthanasia: Aruna Shanbaug Case. The Free Press Journal
4. Bilal, Badar, Naga, S.H., Majd, Mrayyan. (2013). Legal and Ethical Issues of Euthanasia:
Argumentative Essay. Middle East Journal of Nursing, Vol 7. Pp 31.
5. Kevin, Yuill. (2008). The tragic death of Chantal Sebire. Spiked Ltd. London.
6. Suresh, Bada, Math., Santosh, Chaturvedi, K., (2012). Euthanasia: Right to Life VS Right to
Die. Indian Journal of Medical Research. Pp 899.
7. Bruce, Vodiga. (1974). Euthanasia and Right to Die: Moral, Ethical and Legal perspective. IIT
Chicago-Kent Law, Vol 51. Pp 12.
8. Mariana, Parreiras, Reis, De, Castro., Lucas, Silva, Andrade. (2016). Euthanasia and Assisted
Suicide in Western Countries: A Systematic Review. Pp 357.
9. Robin, Gill. (1995). A Textbook of Christian Ethics. Edinburgh: T and T Clark Ltd. Pp 515.
10. Antony, Lim. (2005). The Right to Die Movement: From Quinlan to Schiavo. Pp 13.
11. Joseph, Pakhu. (2015). Debate on Euthanasia: Pros and Cons. Universidade Catolica
Portuguesa. Pp 16-34.

Applied Ethics: A Co-relation between Theory and Practice

Dipa Goswami


Applied ethics emerges from the conflict of obligation or interest in various sectors of our society.
Basically its intention is to formulate a justified moral reasoning method. The basic feature of applied
ethics may be analysed from two aspects: macro ethics and micro ethics. Macro ethical analysis follows
a deductive logical method, whereas inductive methods are applied to sort out specific micro ethical
problems. In this context, Aristotelian phronesis or prudence plays a pertinent role in micro ethical
analysis. Ethical normative theories play a crucial role in solving moral conflicts. The ethical theories
provide reasons for justified moral violations which is beyond professional codes of conduct. Hence,
theory and practice in applied ethics are two sides of the same coin.

Key words: Applied ethics, phronesis, microethics, macroethics deductive model, inductive model,

Applied ethics critically survey moral conflict from a theoretical background. Ethical controversies
arise from every sphere of life. The most crucial challenge in applied ethics is to apply ethical theories
to concrete situations and formulate a justified decision procedure. It is concerned with the moral issues
which arise in medicine, journalism, environment and also in corporate business sectors. It‘s an integral
part of law and judiciary system. Applied ethics is at times described as prescriptive ethics which is
rigidly concerned with duties. Moral principles or values are generally universal whether it is
teleological or deontological, but it deals with a particular incident, person, situation etc. Moreover,
values and duties are imposed on factual situation. Hence, there is clear distinction between fact and
value based judgement procedure.

If we analyze the term ‗applied ethics‘, then we get two terms, i.e. ‗ethics‘ and ‗applied‘. Ethics or
ethos which means ―custom‖, conduct or usages, preliminary defines the meaning of ―right‖ or
―wrong‖ or the meaning of the word ―ought‖. Apparently the meta ethical analysis of the core concept
of ethics, i.e. ―right‖ or ―wrong‖ is not relevant to applied ethics. .But when we wish to discuss the
specific situation based issues of applied ethics, then the importance of meta ethical analysis is
reflected. Ethics is concerned with moral judgement or it deals with the justification of human
voluntary action. In this regard, it differs from applied physics or applied mathematics. Applied ethics
does not deal with physical objects or numerical figures as because human behaviour differs with
specific demands of situations from time to time. It has two aspects; one is theoretical and the other
offers practical solutions for a crucial problem through philosophical reflection. In fact, theory based
solution is prescribed for human beings who are confined by social, religious and institutional rules.
Alasdair Macintyre said that applied ethics derived ethical judgement from a set of premises. Initially
ethicist have to take factual statement along with its moral claim, secondly moral reflection considers
the social, political, religious and institutional rules about that particular situation. Relying upon first
and second premises, i.e. the meta ethical analysis of the specific factual situation, we analyze it in the
context of socio-economic, political, institutional regulations, following which the ethicist provide
justified moral decision. This way of providing decision procedure is called inductive method. That‘s
why we cannot deny the interdisciplinary aspect of applied ethics. At the same time ethical justification
is incomplete without theoretical justification.

Apparently it means applying ethical theories to practical moral problems. But when we are searching
for a sound, well grounded ethical theory, we need to envisage several problems. On one hand, the
nature and socio-economic background of individual problem is different, each case study differs from
the other, whereas the existing ethical theories are limited. Hence the scope of applications also
remains limited. Meta ethical theories are basically concerned with the analysis of the term ‗right‘ and
‗wrong‘. They are involved with the validity, nature and meaning of ethical judgements. Normative
theories provide directives or formulae to regulate moral life. Various normative theories like
Utilitarian, Kantian or Aristotelian virtue ethics prescribe formulae by which individual action is
justified. Both meta ethical and normative theories are abstracts, on the contrary, applied ethics
confront crucial practical situation. It deals with facts which are judged by values or theories. In this
context, Brend Almond suggested what to do or what not to do in specific scenarios. She endorsed the
theoretical ground of applied ethics. Thus it may be stated that we cannot derive values from just
analysing factual problems, as factual characteristics are justified by moral theories. Petersinger
emphasized upon the philosophical or theoretical basis of applied ethics. He also admitted the
accountability of moral standpoint propagated by Plato, David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Thomas Nagel
and other philosophers of eighteenth and nineteenth century in resolving factual concrete case.
Abraham Edel thought that applied ethics has no distinguished area from meta or normative ethics and
provided the example of Plato‘s Republic or Aristotle‘s Politics. Plato differentiated between ethics and
social policies. He confronted a challenge when Athenian democrative revolution emerged. Aristotle‘s
acquired virtue ethics basically dealt with character principles and virtue of a being. In Nichomachean
Ethics, Aristotle stated about episteme which means ―scientific knowledge‖. Episteme is an universal
knowledge which ―cannot be otherwise than it is‖. Apart from episteme, he admitted ―techne‖ which
means ―a productive state that is truly reasoned‖ and phronesis which indicates ―action with regard to
things that are good or bad for men‖. Techne and phronesis are concerned with specific individual
which is flexible and subject to change. According to him, phronesis represent practical aspect of

human intellect so far as prudence deals with particulars of individual conduct interrelated with specific
circumstances. Hence, Aristotle‘s techne and phronesis played a pertinent role to formulate ideal moral
reasoning to resolve actual conflict. ―Phronesis‖, ―prudence‖ or ―practical wisdom‖ has priority and
accountibilty than ―episteme‖. Aristotle argued that ‗prudence involves not only general rules ,but also
take into account particular facts since it is concerned with practical activities, which always deal with
particular things‘. Radiologists are recognised as ―technicians‖, where technology means
advancement. They can derive accurate pictures of human bodies with the advancement of technology.
Medical practitioners often do not have a predetermined treatment plan. They need to change their
treatment modality or strategy according to the patient‘s conditions or demands of the patients close
relatives. Aristotle differentiated between episteme and prudence in the context of ―locus of certitude‖.
Scientific knowledge or episteme depends on the significance of theoretical principles, whereas
practical issues are the root cause of arising certitude. In this context, Aristotle said ―....that is why
people who lack a grasp of general ideas are sometimes more effective in practice.....since phronesis is
practical, it requires understanding of both kind, knowledge of particular facts even more than a grasp
of generalities‖. Hence he conjoined ethical judgements with practicality or factual situations and
confined them in human beings which is very much different from physical objects or mathematical
equations. Circumstantial evidences of a specific situation is crucial than abstract general theories.

In order to formulate a justified relation between ethical normative theories and its application,
contextualism is one of the rational approach. This theory doesn‘t support ethical theory based
evaluation of moral judgement. The proponent of this theory Earl R. Winkler considered contextualism
as a ‗dominantly case driven model of actual moral reasoning‘. It provides a judgement on the basis of
socio-cultural, religious, political, legal, professional and institutional norms. Contextualists emphasize
upon comparative case analysis. For example, if we consider the judgement given by Supreme Court in
a particular case ( such as that of Aruna Shaunbag) , which is an instance of paradigm theory, we can
evaluate a particular case on the basis of that judgement. Our ultimate intention is to frame or to
eradicate a justified and reasonable conclusion. This paradigm theory upholds empirical situation and
concrete instances rather than application of abstract general principles. The inductive method of moral
theory of justification is only applicable to microethical problematic situation. That is to say, the ethical
judgemental term ‗good‘, itself is a relative word. On one hand it is associated with institution as well
as state whereas on the other hand, it is associated with the particular individual or a specific situation.
Individual has to work within the rules and regulations of the institution and state. Human beings have
two types of obligations—he has duties to his institution as well as he is confined to nation and the
society. Micro ethical analysis began with individual specific problem. Then it got justified within the
realms of contextualism. When a medical practitioner has to make a decision about treatment of a brain

death patient, then the conflict of obligation arises. Individual dilemmas of this kind are to be sought
out within the sphere of institutional policies and laws. Hence institutional policies and regulations
must be changed or must be flexible to cope up with situational dilemmas. Macro ethics must consider
institutional and social welfare along with specific crucial crisis of the individual.

National economic policy, women empowerment programme, land conservation, water supply and
electricity supplies in rural areas are general policies which are executed for the welfare of the state.
Macro ethics basically considers the conflict of general policies. This however does not imply that
macro ethics converts ethical consideration into social ethics. As because man is an integral part of
society, individual morality is automatically included in macro ethics, though it is true that macro
ethics do not discuss individual‘s conflict of obligations at length. Hence macro ethical considerations
must take into account individual dilemmas. Both micro and macro ethics is hence pertinent for applied
ethics. Applied ethics may be considered as a continuous process which needs refinement and
reassessment of ethical theories and considers the multi dimensional aspect of each and every
profession within this changing climate, social values and technologies.

The relation between universally accepted moral theories and its application in moral decision making
procedures still undergoes some problems. The normative theoretical approach, i.e. deductive model is
applicable to general moral problems like euthanasia, abortion, environmental pollution etc. On the
contrary, in specific crucial situations where a lawyer faces conflict of interests owing to retention of
confidentiality of his client, his obligation to his country and nation also persists. In this particular
situation, the simple applications of normative theories are not adequate. Inductive model of moral
reasoning is applicable here. Moral theories throw light upon the practical moral problem and shows
the way by which we derive a justified and well accepted conclusion. Applied ethical model depends
on reason and argument. As because practical moral statements are merely factual statements, it cannot
justify itself until and unless well accepted ethical theories clarify its justification with moral reason
and argument. Applied ethics is not just a transition from abstract general principles to concrete actual
scenario but is a symmetric relationship between theory and practice. A medical practitioner, minister,
judge and a lawyer must take an oath before pursuing their profession. Sometimes institutional rules
and code of conduct may not be sufficient to tackle a crucial situation. In such cases, ethicists prescribe
what mandatorily needs to be done. Philosophers enlighten moral disputes and approach towards an
amicable solution which is acceptable to the individual as well as the society. Applied ethics highlight
the difference between profession and professionalism. Profession indicates persuasion of any job to
accumulate money, but professionalism indicates earning of money along with values and norms over
and above the professional codes and guidelines. For being a responsible and credible professional, one

should be aware about what is ought to be done in a problematic situation. Normative ethical theory
enlightens them about their huge social responsibilities.

From the above discussion, we can summarize that though the decision taken by any corporate house is
a combination of collective opinions, these collective decisions are a result of individual values or
decision. Hence, at this stage, Aristotelian phronesis or prudence, that is related to individual‘s conduct
is a necessary condition for becoming a responsible practitioner or professional. Individual conscience
and value development process is the basic stage of business ethics. In this regard, Albert Camue‘s
opinion was in favour of personal moral development and personal commitment of any professional.
He thought that commitment comes from self respect and respect for others. Individual‘s ethical
upbringing initiates from his or her family, teachers, educational institutions and friends. Then as the
person starts his or her professional life, norms and values are gradually developed in a professional
atmosphere. From this standpoint, ethics or ethical norms are nothing but social, religious, institutional
norm etc. Hence analysis of ethical concepts of media enterprise or any business section is an
interdisciplinary discussion. This enriches both ethics as well as other profession. Abstract normative
theories on one hand have a scope for practical application and modification. Through this process,
general principles of ethics are no longer an abstract, for these principles have a pertinent role to
provide reasons for a specific decision. On the contrary, applied ethics is not just case based analysis
within the realms of socio-economic norms and institutional regulations. Applied ethics is beyond these
norms and regulations, i.e. to say, this justification of morality is based on the principle of
consequence, respect for human beings, the concept of justice, the concept of prima facie duties etc. As
human beings grow physically, intellectually, they become ethically sound or virtuous day by day.
Hence Applied Ethics is a manifestation of continuous process which is doing better or more justified
in latter days. In this context, Tom L. Beauchamp said that ―philosophical ethics provide reasoned and
systematic approaches to moral problems, not finality‖.

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OF APPLIED ETHICS, Routledge & Kegun Paul, New York, 1986

5. McIntyre Alasdair : DOES APPLIED ETHICS REST ON A MISTAKE? The Monist, Vol-67,
No.4, Ethics and the Modern World, (Oct. 1984) pp: 498-513

6. Rosenthal David M. & Shehadi Fadlou: APPLIED ETHICS AND ETHICAL

THEORY;University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City, 1988

7. Singer Peter ( edited) : APPLIED ETHICS, Oxford University Press, 1986

8. Winkler Earl R & Coombs Jerrold R.:APPLIED ETHICS- A READER; Blackwell Pub,
Oxford,UK, Cambridge,USA, 1993

Free Will in Christian Philosophical Theology

Mohd Rashid


The present paper will especially examine the notion of ‗free will‘ in Christian world-view and value-
system as explained in the Sacred Christian Texts. The problem of free will is one of the most
discussed of all philosophical and religious issues particularly in Christian philosophical theology. The
problem is especially poignant in view of the fact that Christian theology deems human salvation
centrally dependent on Divine Grace. However, the problem merits serious consideration, especially
with reference to Augustine and Aquinas. Augustine assumes that, will is free and determines how we
choose good or evil. Aquinas accepts both God‘s Sovereignty and man‘s free will. This paper will try
to address the debate between Augustine and Aquinas with reference to their notion of free will. The
paper will also deal with other Christian doctrines of free will, which postulate man's accountability
and responsibility in his/her, actions throughout life.

Keywords: Free will, Salvation, Divine Grace, life, Christianity, Augustine, Aquinas, Postulate,

Free will is the ability to choose between different possible courses of action. It is closely linked
to the concepts of responsibility, praise, guilt, sin, and other judgements which apply only to actions
that are freely chosen. It is also connected with the concepts of guidance, conversion, negotiation, and
prohibition. Traditionally, only actions that are freely willed are seen as deserving credit or blame.
There are several different concerns about fears to the possibility of free will, fluctuating by how
exactly it is convinced, which is a matter of debate.
According to the Bible, God dignifies us with free will, the power to make decisions of our own
rather than having God or fate predetermine what we do. Consider what the Bible teaches. God created
humans in his image.1 Unlike animals, which act mainly on instinct, we resemble our Creator in our
capacity to display such qualities as love and justice. And like our Creator, we have free will.
But how can man, limited by a sinful nature, ever choose what is good? It is only through the
grace and power of God that free will truly become ―free‖ in the sense of being able to choose
salvation. It is the Holy Spirit who works in and through a person‘s will to regenerate that person and
give him/her a new nature ―created to be like God in true righteousness and holiness.‖ Salvation is
God‘s work. At the same time, our motives, desires, and actions are voluntary, and we are rightly held
responsible for them.2

Our success or failure is not determined by fate. If we want to succeed at an endeavour, we
must work hard. ―All that your hand finds to do,‖ says the Bible, ―do with your very power.‖ It also
says: ―The plans of the diligent one surely make for advantage.‖ Free will is a precious gift from God,
for it lets us love him with our ―whole heart‖ because we want to.3
Free will is, thus, according to Augustine, an intermediate good. Goodness and badness of man
depends upon its use. Freedom of choice is under control of free will. Just as a reason is the source of
all kinds of knowledge and knows by itself and memory is the source of all recollection and remembers
itself, the free will is master of everything else as well as itself. It is our will that inclines us towards
immutable and universal ideas in order to attain joy, possess happy life, which is the supreme end of
human life. But this happiness is not identical with universal happiness. It is the possession of only one
individual. Because the happiness of one person cannot makes another person happy. That is why every
man must have a will, which is personal and free. One has freedom of will and to turn towards absolute
good and get happiness and is also free to turn away from God and turn towards lower good. These two
acts of turning towards good and turning away from good are two free acts.
Now, the question is whether or not, God is also responsible for human evil? Because, if God
has not bestowed free will to man, he would not have chosen evil. This problem of moral evil is very
difficult to solve. A related question is why good and perfect God gave us freedom of choice with
capability to choose evil? Augustine says that free will is good as a number of other things, too, are
good in this world. There are many things in the world which are good and necessary but through their
bad use they become evil. So there is no reason for saying that God should not give us those things
which could be turned into evil. Suppose, if one is deprived of his hand, this will no doubt be a serious
loss to the person. This is so because hands are good and necessary organ of the body. But one has his
hand and through his hand he commits crime, then it would be bad use of his hands. On the contrary, a
person without feet will be called imperfect. But if he has feet and by his feet he injures others, then
again it would be bad use of a good and useful thing.

For same reason, will is good, but through bad use of it, it becomes bad or evil.

―In itself, the will is good, because without it no one could lead an upright life.
It comes to us, therefore, from God, and we should find fault with those who
use it badly, not with Him who gives to us.‖4

Will itself is good but its goodness depends upon its using. If doubt is raised whether or not by
giving a capability of choosing evil deeds God has not given us a dangerous thing, Augustine‘s answer
is that it is true that liberty is dangerous yet, he says, it is necessary condition for attaining the highest

―In itself, free will cannot be an evil; nor is it an absolute good like fortitude,
temperance or justice, things we cannot use for evil without destroying them in
the process. Free will is an intermediate good: its nature is good, but its effect
can be good or bad according to the way man uses it.‖5

For Augustine there is no question that human beings have free will. Man is God‘s creation and
free will is a gift of God. Human beings have been given free will so that they can do what is right.
What this means is that a creature who has the capacity to choose can choose freely, and with that
possibility we have the kind of life which has the moral dimension. But man can, in particular
circumstances, be presented the different options, and can choose to do the right thing, doing so freely,
that is in the light of his moral conviction and, perhaps despite the pressure not to do it, or the
temptation to do something else, he can also choose to do the wrong thing, to do something that is evil.
So with the gift of free will God has given man the capacity not only to do good but also evil. In
thinking of it as a gift of God Augustine is not taking free will for granted but is grateful for it and for
everything which having it presupposes: indeed for human life.6

Will, according to Augustine means ability to decide or act with intention and also to be
responsible for the same. According to him, there is no doubt that man is author of his decisions and

―That is precisely why I said that the reality of free will is to own our
intensions, to be the author of our actions, to be responsible for what we do, so
that we can be praised or blamed, rewarded or punished for what we do.‖7

According to Aristotle, nature of will is determined on the one side by its relation to sensation
and thought and on the other side it is related to desire. Neither sensation nor thought denies or affirms
anything. Sensation merely asserts that there is an object and thought asserts that there is an image of
object. Sensation is simple assertion or simple apprehension by thought.

―Sensation, then,‖ says Aristotle, ―is analogous to simple assertion or to simple

apprehension by thought,‖ and ―to the thinking soul images serve as present
sensation.‖ ―The speculative intellect‖ he says again, ―thinks nothing that is
practical and makes no assertion about what is to be avoided or pursued.‖8

Moreover, Aristotle says that simple assertion of the senses and the intellect is converted into
affirmation and negation through desire. Sensation or imagination determines whether a thing is
pleasant or painful. The practical intellect determines goodness or badness of thing and the speculative
intellect determines whether a thing is true or false. He maintains the distinction between will and

concupiscence. He holds that the rational part of the soul that is practical or speculative intellect and
that determined whether a thing is good or true is called ‗will.‘ The irrational part of the soul that is
sensation and imagination and that determines whether a thing is pleasant or painful is called
concupiscence. The irrational desire is contrasted with will which is rational desires.

St. Thomas Aquinas, who came much later, famously developed his views by combining the
traditional Christian theories with the views of Aristotle. For Aquinas action of human beings and
animals is not only mechanical action. Their actions are for the satisfaction of their desires. Therefore,
if our will is to be getting a particular aim, our desire will also be to get that aim. In this process of
obtaining our aim, we are able to satisfy our desire.

Aquinas holds that man‘s action and animal‘s voluntary action are entirely different from the
actions of non-living things. Animal also has voluntary moving power though it does not have freedom
of choice. For example, when the sheep sees the wolf, it takes immediate decision to run away. Fear is
the cause behind sheep‘s decision. But this power is put in it by God himself.

‗Brutes‘, Aquinas says, ‗do not judge of their own judgments but follow the
judgment imprinted upon them by God;‘ he holds that since they do not cause
their choice, they do not have freedom of choice.‘9

In same situation, however, men and animals react in different manner. A frightened animal
runs away in the face of a danger to its life, but not man. That is so because man has also the capacity
for rational judgment. He exercises his liberty on the basis of this judgment.
―The whole nature of liberty, Aquinas says, depends upon the mode of knowledge.‖10
Aquinas considers human will as ―rational appetite.‖ ―The intellect is the final cause of the
will‘s action,‖11 says he. He also thought that evil will is irrational. No one wants to choose what is
evil. If someone chooses evil, it is only because of an error of judgment. Here Aquinas is entirely
different from Plato and Augustine. Plato‘s conception of moral knowledge is very different from
Aquinas intellectualist conception. Plato holds that merely to know about goodness is not enough. He
said that knowledge of goodness does not belong to the intellect but will. ―For Plato to know goodness
is to love it; thus knowledge‘s question belongs to the will, not to the intellect; evil for him is thus
failure of love, not of intellect.‖12 ―One cannot know evil if one does not love the good.‖13
Aquinas also held the view that we have moral desire and we try to seek it. We can be evil only
because we understand evil will is desirable. Thus, according to Aquinas, man cannot choose evil
knowingly he holds that for human being virtues and vices are voluntary, because it is in man‘s hand
whether he acquires it or keeps away from it.

Man necessarily desires beatitude, but he can freely choose between different forms of it. Free
will is simply this elective power. Infinite good is not visible to the intellect in this life. There are
always some drawbacks and deficiencies in every good presented to us. None of them exhausts our
intellectual capacity of conceiving the good. Consequently, in deliberate volition, not one of them
completely satiates or irresistibly entices our will. But God possesses an infallible knowledge of man‘s
future actions. How is this prevision possible, if man‘s future acts are not necessary? God does not
exist in time. The future and the past are alike ever present to the eternal mind as a man gazing down
from a lofty mountain takes in at one momentary glance all the objects which can be apprehended only
through a lengthy series of successive experiences by travelers along the winding road beneath, in
somewhat similar fashion the intuitive vision of God apprehends simultaneously what is future to us
with all it contains. Further, providence exercises a complete and perfect control over all events that
happen, or will happen, in the universe.
Augustine believed that Free will is inherently ‗Good‘. And since man is wholly responsible for
his own decisions and actions, the effect of free will may vary from being Good to Bad, according to its

And St. Thomas Aquinas believed human will to be a ‗Rational Appetite‘. For him, to acquire
or part with the virtues and vices is man‘s volition. Thus, he cannot choose evil knowingly; for it is an
erroneous judgment occurred because he cannot know the evil, since, he does not love the good.


1. Miller, Calvin. Genesis 1: 26. Review & Expositor, 87(4), 1999, 599-603.
2. Fitzmyer, Joseph A. The Gospel according to Luke: Introduction, translation, and notes (Vol.
28). Anchor Bible, 1981, 188-189.
3. Ibid
4. Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, Random House, New York,
1960, 146
5. Ibid
6. Dilman, Ilham. Free will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction, Rutledge, London &
New York, 1999, 71.
7. Ibid p. 73
8. Wolfson, Harry Austryn. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the latent processes of His
Reasoning, vol. 2, Harvard University Press, 1934, 164-165
9. Dilman, Ilham. Free will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction, Rutledge, London &
New York, 1999, 91.
10. Ibid
11. Ibid p. 97
12. Ibid
13. Ibid


1. Miller, Calvin. Genesis 1: 26. Review & Expositor, 87(4), 1990.

2. Fitzmyer, Joseph A. The Gospel according to Luke: Introduction, translation, and notes. Vol.
28. Anchor Bible, 1981.
3. Gilson, Etienne. The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, Random House, New York,
4. Dilman, Ilham. Free will: An Historical and Philosophical Introduction, Rutledge, London &
New York, 1999.
5. Wolfson, Harry Austryn. The Philosophy of Spinoza: Unfolding the latent processes of His
Reasoning, vol. 2, Harvard University Press, 1934.

Impact of Religious Pluralism on the World; An Analytical Approach

Tariq Rafeeq Khan & Mudasir Ahmad Tantray


Religious pluralism is an important part of cultural diversity. No society can sustain without religious
plurality. The relation between religion and pluralism has never been unambiguous. The interest of
religious pluralism has developed on a larger scale in the last few decades and the positive results
which it has brought in maintaining the harmony of a good relationship among the different religions
across the world. All religious faiths equally provide the pathways of salvation to God, irrespective of
their doctrinal and theological differences. The main focus of the study is an analytical examination of:
(a) to what level the pluralistic view of religious experience helps the man to harmonize and to develop
a good relationship among different religions of a state (b) at what level the epistemology of religious
pluralism provides the rational basis for belief in God while producing a common religious experience.
This work was carried out to study the theories of religious pluralism or what we can consider the
diversity in religions. It studies out how religious pluralism exists on a factual terms and how each
religious faith tolerates some similarities with many other religions in a state. The aim of this work was
to determine the concept of secularism and the process of secularization work at a global level in the
contemporary world. This study systematically considers the dynamics of religious pluralism and
provides methods for dealing with diversity.

Keywords: Religious pluralism; Harmony; religious diversity, religions, values, virtues.

1. To show the need of religious plurality and how there is harmony among different religions.
2. To Discuss religious pluralism as value with reference to social identity of religious groups,
religious pluralism and persistence of shared values among people of various religion and
finally beliefs and rituals.
In today‘s increasingly interdependent and multi-religious world, it is vitally important to
recover a sense of the sacred, to refute those who regard religion itself as inevitably divisive, and to
rediscover the ecumenical and ethical principles that have been taught by all great spiritual teachers.
We live in a world today that is religiously and normally pluralistic. According to the recent surveys,
religious pluralism is ―the view that different belief and behavior could or even should coexist. The

problem with religious pluralism arises when one particular tradition (the mainstream dominate society,
denying the legitimacy of other streams and marginalized them as section phenomenon". In a pluralistic
world, those who embrace a particular position must be enlightened about positions other than their
own. It takes critical and intellectual effort to understand and appreciate the plural reality of truths and
their meaningful coexistence. There are Hindus, Buddhist, Taoist, Confucians, Jewish, Christian and
Islamic religious experiences and religious practices that inform respective truth perception. This
challenges the conviction of "no other name" which has guided Christian theology for centuries. It is a
worthy and serious challenge. It is not simply a matter of respecting religious differences; we have to
recover the practical spiritual wisdom that unites us and makes us human. The Prophet Muhammad
taught that not only all human beings but also ‗‗All creatures of God form the family of God and he is
the best devotee of God who loves His family best‘‘(Mishkat, I, p. 247). His son-in-law Imam ‗Ali
urged the Governor of Egypt to remember that his subjects are ‗‗brothers in humanity before they are
your brothers in religion‘‘ and should be treated with mercy, love, and kindness. As Martin Luther
King said, ‗‗our loyalties must become ecumenical rather than sectional. Every nation must now
develop an overriding loyalty to mankind as a whole in order to preserve the best in their individual
societies‘‘ (King 1967:190). Every great civilization in the past has been based on a religious tradition.
Modern Western civilizations has discarded, or attempted to discard, this solid basis, offering itself as a
model for ‗‗backward societies‘‘ to emulate, even though many of the capitalist or neo-liberal values
upon which it is based, such as individualism, relativism, materialism, sensationalism, the obsession
with security, the expansion of appetites and desires into needs and rights, and the idea of productivity
as an end in itself, are hollow and do not bring real happiness or satisfaction. It is certainly ironic that
the modern West, which now threatens to swallow up all other cultural traditions and world-views, is
deeply divided and insecure, despite its enormous wealth and power; fear, stimulated by the media and
certain interest groups, is causing people to lose faith in the possibility of a free and peaceful multi-
ethnic, multi-cultural, and multi-religious society. If we seek to bolt the doors and close all the
windows, it is obvious that the knocking will only grow louder. Peace cannot be preserved by means of
war because, as Wendell Berry writes, ‗‗One cannot reduce terror by holding over the world the threat
of what one most fears‘ The concept of religious pluralism, in particular the notion that no single
religion can claim a monopoly of the truth, has gained wide currency during the last two decades as
people have become increasingly aware of the need to break down barriers of mutual prejudice by
engaging in interfaith and intercultural dialogue. Now, however, as a result of recent political events,
this concept – and the interpretation of religion and culture that it presupposes – is increasingly under
assault. The language of dialogue is being eroded by the self-fulfilling prophecy of a ‗‗clash of
civilizations‘‘ and the nightmare of ‗‗total war‘‘. Religious scholars generally agree that people are
capable of building their self-identities on the basis of what they hold in common with the ‗‗other‘‘
rather than, as Huntington (1996) would have it, on the basis of differences, fears, and tribal loyalties.
They feel that the tendency to grade civilizations or cultures in a hierarchy according to Western
criteria is obsolete. Instead of thinking of the world in terms of seven or eight civilization groups
defending their selfish and partial interests, ‗‗it would be far better to establish the mental framework
for a world organization serving the interests of the human species as a whole‘‘ (Marti 2001). This is
what religious leaders from around the world sought to do in 1993 when they agreed that, to prevent
global order from degenerating into either chaos or tyranny. It was imperative to formulate a global
ethic, representing the core moral values of the religions of the world, or ‗‗the necessary minimum of
shared ethical values, basic attitudes or standards, to which all regions, nations and interest groups can
Religious pluralism, in this definition, does not posit different religions on diverse paths to the
same truth, as it does in some theological contexts. And the term implies more than the social and
religious diversity explored in much sociological analysis. Religious pluralism is the interaction of
religious actors with one another and with the society and the state around concrete cultural, social,
economic, and political agendas. It denotes a politics that joins diverse communities with overlapping
but distinctive ethics and interests. Such interaction may involve sharp conflict. But religious pluralism,
as defined here, ends where violence begins. This conception of religious pluralism maps best into
national Democratic contexts. Where state institutions guarantee individual freedoms, majority rule,
and constitutional order, the interaction of diverse religious communities is more likely to remain
peaceful. Recourse to the sword to settle disputes is effectively outlawed. Religious conflict can be
fierce and has the potential to erupt into civil disorder that threatens democratic stability. But day to
day, a national democratic and constitutional order provides a framework for peaceful in traction within
and across religious and secular communities. Different patterns of belief go hand in hand with
different kinds of religious practice and association. Religion is lived with and through others. In the
context of globalization and modernity, individuals constitute and reconstitute religious groups on a
more fluid basis. The sociological phenomenon of religious pluralism has acquired new scope in recent
decades, both in Western Europe and the United States. This religious diversity encompasses not only
Christians, Jews and Muslims but also non-Abrahamic religions, such as Hindus, Buddhists, and new
religious movements and of course, a growing number of non believer's. Globalization and migration
play a significant role in the plural inaction of Western societies.

Philosophical pluralism

One of the meanings of pluralism is philosophical also. In liberal political theory, diversity can be
envisaged either as a fact or as an instrumental value. On the one hand, the liberal state must ensure
that diversity does not threaten the stability of the system. When John Rawls speaks about "the fact of
pluralism" he is referring to the sociological phenomenon. He could be speaking about plurality
instead. However, he gives a specific interpretation of pluralism, through the idea of reasonable
pluralism. Reasonable pluralism refers to the irreducible diversity of religious, moral and philosophical
comprehensive doctrines, both incompatible and reasonable. Diversity (including religion diversity) is
envisaged as a natural consequence of the exercise of autonomous reason in a democratic regime. For
Rawls, autonomy and diversity are compatible and complementary. The vaporization of autonomy by
liberalism provides the conditions for diversity to thrive. On the other hand, diversity is instrumentality
valued by some liberals because it benefits individuals and society. John Stuart Mill, for example,
argues that the diversity of opinions and belief serves the quest for truth. In addition, the variety of
ways of life is linked to the development of individuality which is critical to social progress. We have
good instrumental reasons, according to Mill, to value diversity.
There is, however, a factual account and an instrumental defense of diversity. Philosophical pluralism
values diversity intrinsically. Pluralism here is a theory of value pluralism, whose metaphysical
assumptions are contested. This kind of pluralism contracts with minimal; the idea that values can be
harmonized in a unified system or reduced to a common denominator. Pluralism does not take a
theological stance about religion truth, nor does it make a metaphysical claim about the nature of value.
Pluralism is also not to be confused with mere plurality or diversity. Rather, it refers to a political ideal
of peaceful interaction of individuals and groups of different religious traditions and confessions, as
well as non believers. Pluralism portrays a world that has moved ―beyond mere toleration‖ towards the
active engagement with religious difference. Toleration can be understood in many different ways. Let
us define it quote narrowly as an attitude of self restraint when confronted with beliefs or behaviors
judged to be reprehensible. To be tolerant is to refrain from acting to eradicate what is perceived as
wrong. Toleration presupposes some kind of moral judgment, but accepts a resignation in the face of
evil. This kind of tolerance leads, at best to peaceful coexistence. By contrast the pluralistic attitude
points to recognition and promotes the enthusiastic endorsement of difference. Difference should not
be deplored, but celebrated as fact of the inherent diversity of a free society.

Challenges of Religious Pluralism

The absence of a sovereign authority at a global level makes religious pluralism a more fragile
construct. Neither the United Nations nor the United States nor any group of states can impose the
equivalent of a constitutional order or maintain a monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. Al-
Qaeda‘s emergence and survival over the past decade make it clear. The weakness of many states and
the persistence of autocracy across the globe also undermine religious pluralism in world affairs. Failed
states cannot provide effective protection for religious minorities or transnational religious
communities. Nor can they prevent religious differences from spilling over into bloodshed—as is
evident in Iraq, Somalia, and elsewhere. At the same time, non-democracies, while they may keep the
peace and afford minorities some protection, will often favor some religious communities over others
(as in Iran) or marginalize religion in the public sphere (as in China). Political conditions across much
of the globe militate against national religious mobilization or transnational religious activity. Religious
pluralism might therefore appear a limited phenomenon in world politics, localized within established
democracies—and challenged even there. it must be defined carefully. It refers here to the interaction
among religious groups in society and politics. Religion is understood broadly to include not only
individual and shared beliefs but also social practices and institutions that bind groups. Pluralism
denotes group interaction in civil society and state institutions. As deployed throughout the volume, the
term religious pluralism describes a social and political phenomenon and does not imply a variety of
ways to one truth or the superiority of the American polity over other forms of social and political
organization. The new religious pluralism poses difficult challenges to two basic Democratic
principles—minority protection and majority rule. Potential threats to minorities can take two main
forms. First, dominant traditions can respond to diversity by using the state to privilege their own
communities over perceived competitors.

Difficulties in establishing Religious Pluralism

The potential threats that religious pluralism poses to majority rule can also be divided into two
categories. First, clashing religious groups may undermine democratic institutions. Where diverse
religious and cultural communities are sharply divided, it is more difficult to foster shared
identification with and support for central democratic institutions. Religious pluralism is a challenge of
faith for each and every religious tradition, raising the question of how we as people of faith understand
and relate to neighbors of other faiths. Our religious traditions are not all the same, although there is
much common ground. Religious difference can be threatening, and attitudes toward the religious other
can be fraught with demeaning stereotypes. According to Locke‘s political theology, one of the main
functions of government is to preserve God‘s relationship with the people by establishing a government
that does not involve the domination of the people by the state Locke‘s idea was that government
should be formed by the people and for the people to preserve the people‘s natural, inalienable rights,
especially freedom of conscience and its expression. God works through the people as they engage in a
great conversation about religion, morality, and the general welfare. In so doing, they build the good
society by establishing a government based on the ―social contract‖ of the people. Beyond this
however, the people are free to form associations or ―spontaneous societies.‖ These associations are
authentic because their members participate voluntarily. Consequently, these associations or societies,
refers to as ―communities of conscience,‖ benefit from the exercise of the moral agency of their
members. The Civic and Conscientious Public Forums provide only the basic principles that frame a
political system that values liberty and the contributions of the people from the ground up.
Consequently, in order that liberty does not involve into licentiousness, the people‘s duty to participate
requires people to promote a moral vision for society that goes beyond what government can
accomplish. For most, this includes the formation of ―communities of conscience,‖ including religious
communities, or at least an exploration of personal virtue, which may include eclectic spirituality
drawing from many religious and philosophical sources.

Pluralism doesn't deny the existence of strong controversies within religions between religions and
between religions and secular; instead, pluralism poses on ideal of the regulation of conflicts through
peaceful interaction. A sense of history predisposes one to take plurality seriously; for although the
metaphor of diverse paths can suggest a single destination, it can with equal facility, suggest diverse
destinations. To understand the other a sympathetically and seriously as possible, to awaken common
involvement in the struggle for justice are targets which are enough to get on with. The study of
religious can be as disinterested ad we usually think it should be once we have come in this discussion.
The relationship with individuals who prefers different faiths quite clearly cannot be disinterested. If it
is a caring relationship, then the Gulf often experience between the insider and outsider can narrow.

1. Hick, John. God Has Many Names. Philadelphia: Westminster press, 1982.
2. Beckoned, James A. Social Theory and Religion. Cambridge, U. K: Cambridge University
Press, 2003
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economical Studies.
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5. Raz, Joseph. The Morality of Freedom. Oxford: Clarendon press, 1986
6. Panikkar, Raimundo. The Intrareligious Dialogue. New York: Panlist Press, 1978
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Press, 1991
8. Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty and Other Essays, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991.
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Rejection of the Sambhava, Aitihya and Ceṣṭā as independent pramāṇa-s by
Vaiśeṣika School

Soma Chakraborty

In Indian philosophical texts, the term ‗pramāṇa‘ stands for the means (i.e. instrumental cause) of
knowledge. Almost all schools of Indian philosophy (with the exception of the Vaitaṇḍikas) accept
some means of knowledge, although there is some difference of opinion with regard to the number of
such sources of knowledge. Thus, the Cārvāka school considers perception as the only pramāṇa,
whereas the Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika schools admit two pramāṇa-s, viz. perception and inference. The
syncretic schools of Sāṃkhya and Yoga admit three pramāṇa-s—perception, inference and testimony.
Four kinds of pramāṇa-s, viz. perception, inference, comparison and testimony, are admitted by the
Nyāya school. Apart from these four pramāṇa-s, an extra pramāṇa, viz. arthāpatti is admitted by the
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins admit, in addition to these five
pramāṇa-s, abhāva or anupalabdhi as the sixth kind of pramāṇa. Apart from these six kinds of
pramāṇa-s, some thinkers of Indian philosophy admit sambhava, aitihya and ceṣṭā as distinctive means
of knowledge. Now, since the adherents of the Vaiśeṣika school, which is a well-known system of
Indian Philosophy, admit only two pramāṇa-s, so they naturally try to reject the claim that there are
pramāṇa-s that are other than perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). In this paper, I am
going to discuss the arguments of the Vaiśeṣikas, which have been given for rejecting the sambhava,
aitihya and ceṣṭā pramāṇa.

Key words: inclusion; probability; saṃketa ceṣṭā; expansion; contraction

In Indian philosophical texts, the term ‗pramāṇa‘ stands for the means (i.e. instrumental cause) of
knowledge. Almost all schools of Indian philosophy (with the exception of the Vaitaṇḍikas) accept
some means of knowledge, although there is some difference of opinion with regard to the number of
such sources of knowledge. Thus, the Cārvāka school considers perception as the only pramāṇa,
whereas the Bauddha and Vaiśeṣika schools admit two pramāṇa-s, viz. perception and inference. The
syncretic schools of Sāṃkhya and Yoga admit three pramāṇa-s—perception, inference and testimony.
Four kinds of pramāṇa-s, viz. perception, inference, comparison and testimony, are admitted by the
Nyāya school. Apart from these four pramāṇa-s, an extra pramāṇa, viz. arthāpatti is admitted by the
Prābhākara Mīmāṃsakas. Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas and Advaita Vedāntins admit, in addition to these five
pramāṇa-s, abhāva or anupalabdhi as the sixth kind of pramāṇa. Apart from these six kinds of
pramāṇa-s, some thinkers of Indian philosophy admit sambhava, aitihya and ceṣṭā as distinctive means
of knowledge. Now, since the adherents of the Vaiśeṣika school, which is a well-known system of
Indian Philosophy, admit only two pramāṇa-s, so they naturally try to reject the claim that there are
pramāṇa-s that are other than perception (pratyakṣa) and inference (anumāna). In this paper, I am
going to discuss the arguments of the Vaiśeṣikas, which have been given for rejecting the sambhava,
aitihya and ceṣṭā pramāṇa.

Rejection of sambhava pramāṇa (inclusion):

It seems that the Paurāṇikas are the propounders of the view that sambhava (inclusion) is an
independent means of knowledge. The sponsors of such an additional pramāṇa maintain that the
proposition like ‗the number hundred includes the number fifty‘ is a true proposition and the process of
knowing the truth of such a proposition is called sambhava, which is admitted by the Paurāṇikas as an
independent means of knowledge. Sambhava is defined by Śrīvallabha as the uncontradicted cognition
resulting from the cognition of plentiful association.1 In this connection, it should be mentioned here
that no such statement regarding sambhava is found in Vaiśeṣikasūtra of Kaṇāda. Nevertheless, in his
Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra, Śaṅkara Miśra gives some instances of sambhava, which are as follows: the
measure of grain known as khārī includes in itself the measure of grain known as droṇa, the measure
droṇa contains or includes in itself the measure known as āḍhaka. Likewise, the number thousand
includes in itself the number hundred.2 Similar instances have been given by the commentators of
Praśastapāda‘s Padārthadharmasaṃgraha.3

Those who admit the possibility of such a distinctive pramāṇa maintain that in some cases, the term
‗sambhava‘ has been used in the sense of likelihood, possibility or probability; but not in the sense of
inclusion. Thus, e.g. austerity is likely to characterize a Brahmin, braveness is likely to characterize a
Kṣatriya, rain is likely to be produced by cloud etc.4 Thus, the word sambhava can be used in these two
senses.5 According to the sponsors of ‗sambhavapramāṇa‘, it cannot be included in any of the other
pramāṇa-s like perception, inference etc. This requires some elucidation. For such elucidation, let us
consider the instance of the inclusion of number fifty in the number hundred. For the Paurāṇikas, the

1. pracurasāhacaryasaṃvedanāt buddhirabādhitā saṃbhavaḥ. Nyāyalīlāvatī, p. 542.

2. sambhavo‘pyanumānameva, tadudāharaṇaṃ hi—sambhavati khāryyāṃ droṇaḥ, sambhavati droṇe āḍhakam,
sambhavati sahasre śatamityādi. Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra, p. 510.
3. (a) śataṃ sahasre sambhavatīti sambhavākhyāt pramāṇāntarāt sahasreṇa śatajñānamiti kecit.
Nyāyakandalī, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University edn., p.542.
(b) sambhavati śataṃ sahasre, sambhavati puṇyaṃ purāneṣviti. Kiraṇāvalī, Baroda edn., p.218.
4. (a) …sambhavati brāhmaṇe tapaḥ, sambhavati kṣatriye śauryam. Kiraṇāvalī, Baroda edn., p.218.
(b) …sambhavati meghe jalamiti. Nyāyalīlāvatī, p. 542.
5. (a) dvividho hi sambhavo yogyatākāro niścayākāraśca. Kiraṇāvalī, Baroda edn., p.218.
(b) sambhavo dvividho yathā sambhavati brāhmaṇe vidyācārasampat, sambhavati sahasre śatam.
Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa, p. 543.
inclusion of number fifty in the number hundred cannot be a matter for perception, though the number
hundred or fifty can be known through perception. Inclusion of number fifty in the number hundred is
not knowable in inference, too, since there is no invariable concomitance between two facts, viz.
inclusion of number fifty and number hundred, and any inference claiming to be based on such a
relation would not be logically tenable. Moreover, that the number one hundred contains the number
fifty can be ascertained even in the absence of vyāptijñāna, pakṣadharmatājñāna etc. that are required
for inference. In this way, it can be shown that the fact under consideration is not knowable through
either upamāna or śabda or arthāpatti etc., because their jurisdictions are quite different from that of
sambhava. Therefore, sambhava must be considered as an independent means of knowledge. It is a fact
that at times, there arises some erroneous cognition, which has been obtained through sambhava, but
for that reason, one should not maintain the view that sambhava is not at all a pramāṇa. Indeed, such
occasional erroneous cognitions can be produced even by pratyakṣapramāṇa.6

This opinion of the opponents is not acceptable, because as a matter of fact, the resultant cognition of
a pramāṇa must not distort its object in any way—otherwise, it cannot be considered as pramāṇa. It is
true that sometimes a sense-organ causes illusory perceptual cognition due to the presence of some
defect in that sense-organ, but such a perceptual cognition cannot be considered as pratyakṣapramā,
and consequently, such a defective sense-organ cannot also be treated as an instance of
pratyakṣapramāṇa.7 However, the Vaiśeṣikas are not ready to admit sambhava as an independent
source of knowledge. According to them, if the term ‗sambhava‘ is taken in the sense of inclusion, then
the knowledge claimed to be established by sambhava can certainly be accounted for by inference,
because it is based on some invariable concomitance. If we consider the instance of the inclusion of the
number ‗one hundred‘ in the number ‗one thousand‘, then we can say that here, we actually infer the
number ‗one hundred‘ from the number ‗one thousand‘. Here, a collection cannot contain one thousand
members unless it contains hundred members. These two numbers are thus intimately connected, since
one hundred is one-tenth of one thousand, and hence, a part of the latter. Therefore, such sambhava is
nothing but inference, since it depends on the invariable concomitance between the number one
hundred and the number one thousand, the former being pervaded by the latter.8 On the other hand, if

6. taccādhyakṣavat kvacidvyabhicāre‘pi mānāntarameveti cet. Nyāyalīlāvatī, pp. 542-543.

7. (a) na. asyānyūnakoṭiśaïkātmakatvāt. vyabhicāriṇo‘vyabhicārisaṃvedanānupapatteḥ. Nyāyalīlāvatī, p. 543.
(b) nanu sambhavo na mānaṃ vyabhicāribuddhijanakatvādityata āha—tacceti. evaṃ sati indriyamapi
vyabhicārijñānajanakatvānna mānaṃ syādityarthaḥ. Nyāyalīlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa, pp. 542-543.

8. (a) sambhavo‘pyavinābhāvitvādanumānameva. Padārthadharmasaṃgraha,

Sampurnananda Sanskrit University edn., p.542.
(b) yatra hi sahasraṃ tatrāvaśyaṃ [śataṃ] sambhavatītyavinābhāvasya grahaṇāt. tathā ca sahasraṃ
svasamudāyiśatavat sahasratvāt pūrvopalabdhasahasravat. Vyomavatī, Vol-II, p.180.
(c) sahasraṃ śatenāvinābhūtaṃ, tatpūrvakatvāt. tena sahasrācchatajñānamanumānameva. .
Nyāyakandalī, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University edn., p.542.
the term ‗sambhava‘ is taken in the sense of mere possibility or probability, then it cannot at all be
considered as a type of pramāṇa. Indeed, as there is no certainty about the presence of knowledge in all
Brāhmins or the presence of braveness in all Kṣatriyas or water in all clouds etc. Consequently,
cognition claimed to be obtained through sambhava understood in the second sense cannot be
considered as pramājñāna, as it lacks certainty. Accordingly, sambhava cannot at all be considered as
an independent or distinct pramāṇa.9

Rejection of aitihya pramāṇa (tradition):

Aitihya is also an independent source of knowledge accepted by Paurāṇikas. The term ‗aitihya‘ is
produced due to the combination of the following two indeclinable words, viz. ‗iti‘ and ‗ha‘ that belong
to the group of particles (nipāta), to which the secondary suffix ‗ṣyañ‘ is added. By the term ‗aitihya‘ is
meant the description or assertion of something, which has come down traditionally from one
generation to another generation, without any indication of the source from which it has originated. The
reliability of aitihya cannot be thus established on the authority of any particular person, though all
individuals of a community treat it as their collective wisdom, or common heritage. Thus, e.g. suppose
the residents of a village entertain the belief that a certain yakṣa (spirit) lives in a particular banyan tree
in that village. No one knows the source from which such an opinion has been formed, although
everyone in that village keeps on telling others that such is the case, and also behaves in accordance
with such a belief. This would be an instance of aitihya.10
Those who admit aitihya as a distinct pramāṇa also admit that as a pramāṇa, aitihya has some affinity
with śabda, but merely for that reason, it cannot be included in śabda. Indeed, it is well known that
śabda as a pramāṇa is the assertion of a reliable or authoritative person, and it has been already stated
that aitihya is not founded on the trustworthiness of any particular person. As the sources of different
proverbs remain unknown to us, we can say that in case of aitihya, there is indeed doubt about the
authoritativeness of the original speaker, if at all there was such a speaker in the first place. That is why

(d) sahasraṃ hi śatenāvinābhūtaṃ, na hi kāryaṃ kāraṇena vinā bhavatītyanumānameva. .

Kiraṇāvalī, Baroda edn., p.218.
9. (a) yattu sambhavati brāhmaṇe vidyā—sambhavati kṣatriye śauryyamityādi, tatpramāṇameva, na bhavati,
aniścāyakatvāt. Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra, p. 510.
(b) tatra prathamo‘pramāṇameva aniścāyakatvāt. Kiraṇāvalī, Baroda edn., p.218.
[Here, the term ‗prathama‘ indicates that type of sambhava, where this term has been used in the sense of
10. (a) aitihyamavijñātapravaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyyam. iti heti nipātasamudāyaḥ pūravṛtte varttate, tasya
bhāva aitihyam. Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra, p. 511.
(b) atha anirdiṣṭapravaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyaṃ yathā iha vaṭe yakṣaḥ partivasatīti. Vyomavatī, Vol-
II, p.183.
(c) … ‗iti ha‘ iti nipātasamudāya upadeśapāramparye vartate, tatrāyaṃ svārthikaḥ ṣyañpratyayaḥ,
aitihyamiti. Nyāyakandalī, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University edn., p.558.
aitihya can be defined in the following way: ―saṃdigdhāptoktatvapravādapāramparyamaitihyam‖.11
Here, the insertion of the term ‗saṃdigdha‘ prevents the over-coverage of the definition of aitihya to
śabdapramāṇa.12 By now, it is clear that unless proved to be contrary to facts, aitihya should be
considered as an independent source of knowledge.

The Vaiśeṣikas are not ready to consider aitihya as a distinctive source of knowledge. So, they argue
that it is not a fact that in all the cases, such traditionally held beliefs must be true. 13 Now, aitihya can
never be considered as a means of knowledge so long as such views that are based on mere tradition,
and are not verified as true. On the other hand, if a certain proverb based on tradition has been verified
and found to be based on the assertion of a reliable or trustworthy person, then such aitihya will have
be included in śabdapramāṇa or verbal testimony. Now, it has already been stated that the Vaiśeṣikas
include the so-called śabdapramāṇa in anumāna. Therefore, if aitihya is recognized as nothing but
what others consider to be śabdapramāṇa, then it, too, will naturally be included in anumāna.14 Hence,
it is clear that aitihya cannot be considered as a distinctive means of knowledge.
Rejection of ceṣṭā pramāṇa (gesture):

Some thinkers of Indian philosophy admit ceṣṭā as a distinctive means of knowledge. Here, the term
‗ceṣṭā‘ indicates the ‗gesture based on a convention‘ (saṃketa ceṣṭā) although it generally indicates any
movement of the body. This requires some elucidation. For elucidation let us take the instance of the
hand-gesture, namely contraction (ākuñcana) of the fingers towards one‘s own body. Such a sort of
gesture of the person A signifies the act of calling some other person B for going towards A. After

11. Nyāyalīlāvatī, P.543.

12. (a) kathamanyathā vedaḥ pramāṇa(?)miti cet. Nyāyalīlāvatī, pp. 543-544.
(b) kiñca vede‘pi aitihyameva pramāṇamiti paurāṇikāstatrāha— saṃdigdheti. Nyāyalīlāvatī-
kaṇṭhābharaṇa, p. 543.
(c) niścitāptoktatvasya śabda evāntarbhāvādityrthaḥ. Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa, p. 543.
13. (a) pravādamātraṃ ca na mānamiti bhāvaḥ. Nyāyalīlāvatīkaṇṭhābharaṇa, p.544.
(b) pravādamātraṃ ca pramāṇameva na bhāvatīti bhāvaḥ. Nyāyalīlāvatīprakāśa, p. 544.
14. (a) tat yadi bābhitārthaṃ na bhavati tadā śabdāntarniveśādanumānam. yadiha vaṭe yakṣo madhūkatarau
gaurītyādi, tad yadyāptoktaṃ tadā pūrvavat. nāptoktañcettadā na pramāṇam. tadevaṃ
pratyakṣamanumānañceti siddhaṃ dvayameva pramāṇamiti. Vaiśeṣikasūtropaskāra, p. 511.
(b) tathaivaitihyamapyavitathamāptopadeśa eveti. Padārthadharmasaṃgraha, Sampurnananda
Sanskrit University edn., p.558.
(c) asyāpi yadi pramāṇāntareṇa arthatathābhāvapratipattirna āptopadeśāvarthāntaratvamityāha
tathaitihyamavitathamāptopadeśa eva. tathā hi pūrvapramāṇāni nārthāntaram, tathā aitihyamapi avitathaṃ
yathārthamāptopadeśa eva, na pramāṇāntaraṃ. viparyaye tu aprāmāṇyamiti. Vyomavatī, Vol-II, p.183.
(d) vitathamaitihyaṃ tāvat pramāṇameva na bhavati. avitathamāptopadeśa eva. āptopadeśaścā-numānam.
tasyādavitathamaitihyamanumānānna vyatiricyata ityabhiprāyaḥ. Nyāyakandalī, Sampurnananda Sanskrit
University edn., p.558.
(e) loke ca prasiddhamabādhitākāraṃ pravādaparamparayā yadabhisandhāya paṭhanti—―ācārācca smṛtiṃ
jñātvā smṛteśca śrutikalpanamiti‖. etādṛśaṃ cāvitathamevetyāptopadeśa eva. tathā cānumāna evāntarbhavatīti
bhāvaḥ. Kiraṇāvalī, Baroda edn., p.221.
(f) tatpravādapāramparyasyādaraparigrahādevāptoktatvānumānāt. Nyāyalīlāvatī, p. 544.
perceiving such a significant gesture, a knowledgeable person interprets it according to the relevant
convention. Now, the cognitive state produced by such a gesture will be treated as veridical if the
interpretation is correct. Likewise the hand-gesture of A, namely expansion (prasāraṇa) of the fingers
that results in pointing towards a thing that is farther from the body, which indicates that B should go
away from that place. The cognitive state produced by such a gesture will be treated as veridical even
in this case if the interpretation of B after perceiving this gesture of the part of A is correct. Thus, the
gesture of the person A becomes a means of veridical knowledge on the part of B.15 Those who admit
ceṣṭā as a distinct type of pramāṇa are of the opinion that such a sort of veridical cognition cannot be
treated as the result of pratyakṣapramāṇa, since the conventional meaning of a certain gesture is not
knowable through perception, although that gesture is knowable through perception. Since
anumānapramāṇa does not depend on the knowledge of any convention, the veridical cognition under
consideration, which depends on the proper knowledge about certain conventions, cannot also be
treated as the result of anumānapramāṇa. In the same way, it can be shown that ceṣṭā cannot be
included in any other type of pramāṇa, since no pramāṇa other than ceṣṭā depends on certain
conventions that are at the basis of this system of signs. Treatises on dramaturgy like Nāṭyaśāstra of
Bhrata and works on art of dancing like Abhinayadarpaṇa, Hastamuktāvalī etc. deal elaborately with
such gestures that are known as mudrā-s, and also with what such gestures indicate. A good actor or
dancer must have thorough knowledge of such gestures and what is meant by them, and the same is
true of true connoisseurs of these art forms.
Such a contention regarding ceṣṭā is not, however, acceptable to the Vaiśeṣikas. For them, the so-
called ceṣṭā must be included in anumānapramāṇa. According to Praśastapāda, that person alone can
apprehend the meaning after perceiving the gesture of someone else who is aware about the
conventional meaning, which is related with ceṣṭā.16 Indeed, a person B cannot apprehend the
conventional meaning after perceiving the gestures, namely contraction (ākuñcana) of the fingers of
another person A in a particular manner unless he is aware about the fact that such a sort of gesture on
the part of the person A signifies that A is calling some other person B towards himself. In the same
way, after perceiving another gesture, viz. expansion (prasāraṇa) of fingers pointing towards some
place away from one‘s body, one can apprehend the conventional meaning if and only if that person
has prior apprehension of the fact that such a gesture signifies the order to go away from a certain
place. Hence, such sort of cognition that results from the knowledge of a certain gesture is none other

15. hastasyāvāṅmukhākuñcanādāhvānaṃ pratīyate, parāṅmukhotkṣepaṇāccavisarjanapratītirbhavati,

etatpramāṇāntaramicchanti kecit. Nyāyakandalī, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University edn., p. 529.
16. prasiddhābhinayasya ceṣṭayā pratipattidarśanāt tadapyanumānameva. Padārthadharma-saṃgraha,
Sampurnananda Sanskrit University edn., p.529.
than inferential cognition.17 There is indeed an invariable concomitance between certain gesture and its
meaning, though the relation between them is not natural, but is established by some convention.
Depending upon the knowledge of such invariable concomitance that is based upon convention, the
person who has prior apprehension of such convention infers the conventional meaning after perceiving
that gesture.18
Here, it should be pointed out that in his Vyomavatī, Vyomaśiva cites another example to explain the
inclusion of ceṣṭa in anumāna. Let us consider that example. The gesture like the palms being folded or
cupped together and touching the mouth signifies the feeling of being thirsty. There is an invariable
concomitance based on social convention between the gesture like touching the mourth with the palms
of hands that have been folded or cupped together and the expression of the feeling of being thirsty.
The person A, who has prior apprehension of such an invariable concomitance infers the feeling of
thirst in B after perceiving that B is making a gesture by having his palms folded or cupped together
and touching his mouth with those palms. The form of such inference is as follows:
Whoever is perceived as making a gesture by having his palms folded or cupped together that also
touch his mouth actually possesses the feeling of thirst, e.g. Devadatta, who is thirsty has been
perceived as making a gesture by having his palms folded or cupped together and touching his mouth
with them.
B has been perceived as making a gesture by having his palms folded and cupped together, and
touching his mouth with them.
Therefore, B is thirsty.
Here, the first sentence expresses the vyāptijñāna and the second sentence expresses the
pakṣadharmatājñāna. In this way, it can be shown that the so-called ceṣṭa becomes a means of
veridical cognition (pramā) only through anumānapramāṇa. In other words, ceṣṭa cannot be admitted
as an independent source of knowledge.19
From the previous discussion we can conclude that sambhava, aititya and ceṣṭa—these three cannot
be treated as distinct pramāṇa–s.

17. ‗karākuñcanādilakṣaṇo‘bhinayo‘nenābhiprāyeṇa kriyata‘ ityevaṃ yatpuruṣasya prasiddho’bhinayaḥ, tasya

ceṣṭayā karavinyāsenāhṇānavisarjanādipratītirdṛśyate nānyasya, atastadapi ceṣṭayā jñānamanumāmeva.
Nyāyakandalī, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University edn., p.530.
18. prasiddho vyāptyā gṛhito‘bhinayaḥ saṃsthānaviśeṣaḥ saṅketaviśeṣo yena puruṣeṇa tasya ceṣṭayā
kāyikavyāpāreṇa pratipattidarśanāt pratipattidarśanarūpatvāt. tadapi pratipattidarśana-mupalabhyamānaṃ
jñānamanumānameva, anumānaphalamevetyarthaḥ. Kiraṇāvalī, Baroda edn., p.213.
19. prasiddho‘bhinayaśceṣṭā kāyiko vyāpāro‘rthaviśeṣāvinābhūto yasyāsau tathoktaḥ, tasya ceṣṭayā arthaviśeṣe
pratipattiḥ. yathā mukhāñjalisaṃyogād viśiṣṭāt pipāsāpratipattiḥ, tasya tayā pūrvamavinābhāvopalabdheḥ.
tathā ca, ayaṃ pipāsānvitaḥ, viśiṣṭamukhāñjalisaṃyogavattvāt, tadanyaivaṃvidhadevadattavat. ataḥ
pakṣadharmatvādibalena gamakatvād etadapyanumānameveti. evamanyāpi ceṣṭā nāṭyaśāstraprasiddhā
anumāne‘ntarbhāvanīyeti. Vyomavatī, Vol-II, p.175.
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Prakāśikā by Ācārya Dhuṇḍirāja Śāśtrī, Edited by Narayana Misra, Chowkhamba Sanskrit
Series Office, Varanasi, 1969.
2. Pra÷astapàdàcàrya: Padàrthadharmasaügraha, with the commentary Vyomavatã of
Vyoma÷ivàcàrya, Edited by Gaurinath Sastri, Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, Volumes I
and II, Varanasi, 1984.
3. Pra÷astapàdàcàrya: Padàrthadharmasaügraha, with the commentary Nyàyakandalã of
ørãdhara Bhañña, Edited by Durgadhara Jha, Varanasi, 1977.
4. Pra÷astapàdàcàrya: Padàrthadharmasaügraha, with the commentary Kiraõàvalã of
Udayanàcàrya, Edited by Jitendra S. Jetly, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1971.
5. Pra÷astapàdàcàrya: Padàrthadharmasaügraha, with the commentary Nyàyakandalã of
ørãdhara Bhañña, Translated into Bengali and edited by Sri Shyamapada Nyayatarkatirtha and
Dandiswami Damodara Asram, Kolkata, Part-I (1988) and part-II (2000).
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Miśra and Bhagīratha Thakkura, Edited by Harihara Sastri and Dhundhiraja Sastri,
Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, Varanasi, 1934.

Searching of Truth or Reality: Indian and Western Perspective

Sukanta Das


It is known to all that as a human being we always try to find the answers of many questions which are
arisen in our mind. Philosophy is started from this questions- answer method around the life-world.
Here, this paper is attempted to show various answers of different questions viz. is there any truth or
reality behind the life or world? If so, how can we attain that reality or truth? Is there any difference
between Indian and western philosophy regarding the search of truth or reality?

Keywords: Reality, truth, right-knowledge, Brahman, appearance, life-world.

We know that as a rational being to search the truth or reality is our primary aim. When we perceive
anything, want to know its essence. As a scientist finds searches the reality behind his fieldwork, a
philosopher also tries to find the reality behind the world. Here, we see that there are two different
attitudes regarding the truth- one is internal and other is external. According to some, we can know the
reality from our inner sense where the others opine that we can know the reality through the external
senses. As a result, there we find two opposite groups or thinkers or perspectives viz. Indian and
western, orthodox and heterodox, rationalists and empiricists etc. But, the main aim of both is same and
that is the search of truth.

Each and every system of Indian and western philosophy have tried to find the truth though they do not
indicate the truth in same way or same thing. Almost all the systems of Indian Philosophies indicate to
the self as reality or truth. It is only conscious thing. Our duty is to realize it. Of course, their leading
ways are different. Hence, Śāśtra says, ―Know thyself‖. At all we find that it is too difficult to realize it
(self). On the other side, in Western Philosophy, many philosophers have observed that actually we
can‘t know the essence of reality. They have explained the reality in many forms viz. anyone says that
the idea or form is reality, another says that God is reality, again, one observes that reality is unknown
and unknowable etc. This is the problem of philosophy that what is reality or is it possible to know the
reality? Again, if there is reality how can we know it? Here, we shall try to find the answers in the
perspective of Indian and western thought in next chapters.


The main aim and favourite discussing topic of Indian Philosophy is self. All the spiritual systems have
observed that each and every human being should realize the knowledge of self. It can be attained
through intuition. Except the knowledge of self other knowledge are apparent. Hence, it has been stated
in the ‗Kaṭha Upaniṣad‘: ―There is nothing better than puruṣa (self)‖.-1. 3. 11. Buddha says,
―Ātmadīpo bhabaḥ‖. Again, we find in the Nyāya system that the right knowledge of twelve prameyas
leads to attain niḥśreyasa. Self is the first and chief among twelve prameyas. Hence, we should attain
the self-knowledge first. According to the Sāṁkhya-Yoga, only puruṣa is conscious. Our duty is to
attain the different knowledge between puruṣa and prakṛti (vivekajñāna). Puruṣa is devoid of three
ingredients (sattva, rajas and tamas). But, due to aviveka, jīva cannot know its own essence. When it
(puruṣa) knows itself as fully detach from prakṛti through the study of scripture or practice of aṣtāṅga-
yoga, it remains in its own essence (Tadā draṣtuḥ svarūpahabasthānaṁ _Yogasūtra, 1/3.). Hence, this
system also deals us to the knowledge of self.

Another important system of Indian Philosophy Advaita Vedānta also opines that Brahman or the self
is the chief subject-matter in their theories. Saṁkarācārya says that Brahman and self are identical (jīvo
Brahmaiva nāparaḥ). We can realize the Brahman through the study of scripture with the process of
śravaṇa, manana and nididhyāsana. He also opines that only Brahman is reality, the world is
appearance. Brahman cannot be known through sense-organs, speech, mind and śabda etc. In this
context, we may mention a verse from the ‗Sarvavedāntasārasaṁgraha‘ which is in the following:

―Akhaṇdaṁ Sacchidānandamavāṁmanasagocaram,


We find also in the Taittirīya Upaniṣad that Brahman is truth, knowledge and eternity (Satyam jñānam
anantam Brahman).2 Again, it has been mentioned in the ‗Muṇdakopaniṣad‘: ―Yadarcimad
yadaṇbhyohaṇu ca

Yasminllokā nihitā lokinaśca

tadetadakṣaraṁ Brahman sa prāṇastaduvāṅmanaḥ,

Tadetat satyam tadamṛtam tadveddhavyaṁ somya viddhi‖.3 That is to say, It is

Brahman which is enlighten, subtle of subtles, whole universe is situated in which and which is only
consciousness. It is self, mind etc. That Brahman is only truth and only nectar. So, we find here that
there must exist the truth and It is Brahman after the Vedanta.


We find in the western Philosophy that many philosophers have tried to show what the truth is. There
we also find two divisions regarding attaining the knowledge in western philosophy. Here, the term
‗knowledge‘ refers to ‗knowledge of reality‘. Though to find and establish the reality is the chief aim of
each and every philosopher yet they have explained or established the reality according to their own
views. As a result, we find different kinds of doctrines in western philosophy. Here, we shall try to
explain the view of reality according to Plato, Locke, Kant and Bertrand Russell.

The main important and significant theory of Plato is ‗idea‘ or ‗form‘. According to Plato, the idea is a
common thing which is exists in many things of same category. For example, there are many men in
this world and each and everybody is different from others, yet, we call all of them as ‗man‘ because,
there ‗manhood‘ is exist as a common feature in all men. Plato opines that ‗Idea‘ is reality which is
many in number, unique, complete in itself, transcendental etc. Everything of this world is perishable
as particular thing but idea is eternal. ‗Man may come and man may go, but the man-type is eternal‘.4
Again, the concept of ‗idea‘, according to Plato is not dependent in our mind, even, not in God‘s mind.
All the particular things is exist and dependent on ‗ideas‘. In this regard, here we may quote B. Russell:
―Thus Plato is led to a supra-sensible world, more real than the common world of sense, the
unchangeable world of ideas, which alone gives to the world of sense whatever pale reflection of
reality may belong to it. The truly real world, for Plato, is the world of ideas‖.5

A great western philosopher John Locke says that the main aim of Philosophy is to search the truth and
to find the essence of reality. As an empiricist he says that sense perception is the main source of all
kinds of knowledge. Though Locke admits the existence of both cogitative substance and incogitative
substance yet he does not admit the essence of those substances. According to him, we never know the
essence of any substance. We can know only some qualities (primary and secondary). Hence, he says
that substance is that I know not what. As we know all qualities through our sense-data, we have to
guess or assume the substratum of qualities and that is called substance. Hence, we find that according
to Locke, to attain the knowledge of reality is never possible for us. Our knowledge is apparent

According to another great western philosopher Immanuel Kant, when we perceive any matter in the
external world, can know only its appearance. But, it is true that there must any reality behind the
apparent external matter. He observes that as we perceive any matter through a colourful spectacle and
never know the actual colour of matter, similarly when we perceive any matter in the external matter in
the external world through our sense organs with the effect of space and time; never know the real
perception of matter. He also says that everything of this world which is perceivable that is called

‗phenomenon‘ and the thing which we can understand through intellectual intuition is called
‗noumenon‘.6 But, Kant does not explain regarding noumenon. Hence, here it may be stated that though
we can imagine that there must be noumenon behind f phenomenon yet that is invisible and unknown
and unknowable.

Bertrand Russell is a famous contemporary western philosopher. We find his some tremendous works
in western philosophy; ―The Problems of Philosophy‖ is one of the greatest works among those. Here,
we find that he has tried to show how we can realize the knowledge of appearance and reality. The
name of the first chapter of this book is ‗Appearance and Reality‘ where he has arisen a question at first
line of the chapter-‗Is there any knowledge in the world which is so certain that no reasonable man
could doubt it?‘7 Then he has tried to prove that actually what we know through our sense-data, not the
real knowledge of the things. In this regard, we may mention his statements-―Here we have already the
beginning one of the distinction between ‗appearance‘ and ‗reality‘, between what things seem to be
and what they are‖.8 He has given an example of a table to understand the difference between
appearance and reality. He says that when we see a table that is to say, its shape, colour etc. not the real
shape, colour etc; because, there we see differences among different persons from different attitudes
and standpoints. If it would be a real table or real shape, colour etc., there we could not see it as
different. Hence, Russell says, ―All these things are not commonly noticed in looking at a table,
because, experience has taught us to construct the ‗real‘ shape is from the apparent shape, and the ‗real‘
shape is what interests us as practical men. But the ‗real‘ shape is not what we see. And what we see is
constantly changing in shape..........but only about the appearance of the table‖.9 He also in a chapter
namely ―The Nature of Matter‖ of the book ―The Problems of Philosophy‖ that there is anything which
is known by sense-datum, not real and that will be real which is public, not private.


It is known to all that there is a difference between the terms ‗darśan‘ and ‗Philosophy‘. The term
‗darśana‘ has derived from the root ‗dṛś‘ with ‗anat‘ pratyaya which is meant ‗to see‘. But, it does not
mean to perceive anything. Here, the meaning of ‗darśana‘ is realization of truth. On the other side,
the term ‗philosophy‘ is made with two terms ‗philos‘ and ‗sophia‘. So, the meaning of the term
‗philosophy‘ is ‗love of wisdom‘. In Indian perspective, ‗darśana‘ leads us to the way of the truth
which is exist and it is possible to realize the truth through various means. If we see the western
attitude, will find that though their aim also is to search the reality behind the life and the world, yet
they cannot show the way by which we can realize the reality. We have discussed earlier some western
philosopher‘s views where they observed that there exist the reality behind everything in this external
world but our sense-organs are not able to know it. We can know its existence through our intellectual

inference only. Whereas, on the other side, we find in every systems (except the Cārvāka) of Indian
Philosophy leads us to realize the truth through different kinds of means according to the different
systems viz. aṣtāṅgika mārga in the Buddhism, five great vows (pañcamahāvrata) in Jainism, right-
knowledge of twelve kinds of prameyas after the Nyāya system and eight fold-means of yoga (aṣtāṅga-
yoga) has been mentioned in the Yoga Philosophy etc. Hence, a question may be arisen: Is western
philosophy less valuable than Indian Philosophy? In reply, it may be pointed out that though there is no
means stated for the realization of reality by some western philosophers yet they show and speak about
reality and it is realizable through the intellectual knowledge.

Again, we find another difference between them that is- Indian Philosophy is not limited in the theory
only but practical also. It advocates us to practice different paths suggest by them for realizing the
truth. On the other side, western philosophy does not prescribe us any type of practicable path for
realizing the knowledge of reality. In this regard, we can say here that Indian perspective is more
acceptable than western to us who want to realize the truth.

In conclusion, for the above mention discussion it may be pointed out that there is no certain decision
in philosophy. As human being we have a limit but we cannot stop our thinking power. Everything of
this world is mysterious to us and we try to search and find the definite cause of any mystery and this is
the main theme of philosophy. So, it is not important to a philosopher that is he able to find a certain
decision or not? We find in Philosophy many views according to many systems and philosophers. In
this manner, our knowledge and thinking power are enriching. Similarly, here, we can say that both
Indian and western philosophy are valuable and important to us for enriching our knowledge. Hence,
Russell says, ― What it calls knowledge is not a union with the not-self, but a set of prejudices, habits
and desires, making an impenetrable veil between us and the world beyond‖.10

Notes and References:

1. Sadānanda Yogīndra, ―Vedantasāra‖, verse no.1

2. ―Taittirīya Upaniṣad‖, 2/1/3.

3. ―Mundakopaniṣad‖, 2/2/2.

4. F. Thilly, ―A History Philosophy‖, P. 80

5. B. Russell, ―The Problems of Philosophy‖, Oxford University Press, London, P. 53.

6. Rasbehari Das, ―Kanter Darśan‖, Paschimvanga Rajya Pustak parsad, Kolkata-73, P. 125.

7. B. Russell, ―The Problems of Philosophy‖, Oxford University Press, London, P. 1.

8. B. Russell, ―The Problems of Philosophy‖, Oxford University Press, London, P. 2.

9. B. Russell, ―The Problems of Philosophy‖, Oxford University Press, London, P. 3.

10. B. Russell, ―The Problems of Philosophy‖, Oxford University Press, London, P. 93.

Ultimate Goal of Human Soul: A Review after Ibn Sῑnā
Rejina Kabir

This article is expository in nature. The aim of this paper is to expose the nature of soul as well as
human soul after Ibn Sῑnā (980A.D.-1037A.D.). It is also an earnest effort to explain the relation
between the Absolute soul and human soul as represented by him. Ibn Sῑnā holds that soul is a unity.
For him, soul is a single substance and it is the substratum of all experiences. The unifying principle of
experience is the soul itself. The soul organizes the body and gives life to it. In the case of human soul,
in general the first perfection of an organic body, which apprehends universals and acts by deliberation.
In concern to the relation between these two concepts he has taken the middle position between those
who thought that the souls of men join with and are reunited into one common soul, and the religious
belief that they remain separate, moreover, individual retaining their identity after the death of the
body. He claims that souls remain distinct, and in consequence are innumerable, but they may not
retain the identity of the body which they have occupied. In pursuance of the objective of this article it
is designed in three sections namely, The notion of soul as interpreted by Ibn Sῑnā, The notion of
human soul as interpreted by Ibn Sῑnā and Deliverance of rational soul from the sensible realm to the
divine realm.

Keywords: Soul, Human soul, Active Intellect, ma‗rifat Allah.

The aim of this article is to expose and analyse the ultimate goal of human being as explained by Ibn
Sῑnā (980A.D.-1037A.D.). To understand the goal or aim of a Human soul first it is necessary to know
about the concept of soul or especially human soul as interpreted and explained by him. In pursuance of
the article it is divided into three sections. The first section explains the characteristics of soul after Ibn
Sῑnā. The second section exposits the notion of human soul after him. The third section is designed to
explain the deliverance of rational soul from the sensible realm to the divine realm. He has shown that
the ultimate relation between, the human soul and Allah, i.e., Absolute Being, is a state, which some
human souls can ascend and obtain as the ultimate goal of human soul.

The notion of Soul as interpreted by Ibn Sῑnā

It must be pointed out that the term ‗soul‘ (nafs) is used in more than one sense in Islamic philosophy.
The term is used to refer four things. It refers to the plant or vegetative part of a living being.
Sometimes the term ‗soul‘ refers to the animal or sensitive part of a living being. Sometimes it refers to

the rational part of a living being and finally, the term is also used to refer to the totality of all these
three parts of a living being.1 The term ‗Human soul‘ is used only in the sense of this fourth type of
soul. It is only the context which helps one to understand, whether a Muslim philosopher is using ‗soul‘
in the broad sense to mean the human soul (the totality of three parts of the soul), or in the narrow sense
to mean a specific part of the human soul.

In defying the soul Ibn Sῑnā has followed Aristotle and the concept does not differ from that of
Aristotle.2 Like Aristotle, according to him the soul as a single genus may be divided into three species:
a) The vegetable soul, which refers to the first entelechy or realization of potential of a natural
body that can grow, nourish and reproduce.
b) The animal soul is the first entelechy of natural body possessing the organs which are
capable of perceiving individual things and have volitional movement.
c) The human soul is the first entelechy of natural body possessing organs in so far as it
commits acts of rational choice and deduction through opinion and also capable of
perceiving universal matters.3
Like Aristotle, he holds that the soul is the form and the quiddity of the body which controls and gives
it its particular character. But contrary to him asserts that it is a separate substance capable of existing
independently of the body; and moreover, after separation it has its own activities regardless of its
previous connections.4 In defending his view that the soul is an immaterial substance, Ibn Sῑnā invokes
his famous ―man in avoid argument‖. Ibn Sῑnā contends that if we suppose a state where we are
completely unaware of our body even then, we are aware of our existence in a manner that ‗we are‘ or
‗we exist‘.5 In this allegory he holds that let us suppose that one of us is created in an instant and
created perfect. However, his eyes are blindfolded and he is unable to see any external objects. Not
even that he is created floating in the air, or rather in the void, so that the resistance of the air which, he
could feel, does not affect him. His members are separated and therefore, do not meet or touch one
another. In this situation, if he asks himself, about his own existence, whether it is proved or not? Then,
without any hesitation he would reply that ‗he exists‘, although he could not prove the existence of his
own external body parts like hands and feet or of his entrails or heart or brain; but he would
nevertheless affirm that ‗he exists‘, without establishing the fact that he has length, breadth or
thickness.6 For Ibn Sῑnā, the idea of Being appears as the first intuition of the mind confronted with its
proper object. One may question, what does intuition mean? By intuition he means direct perception of
Being by the mind, which is not impossible, for the soul as the form of the body.7 He also holds that the
soul can be aware of itself by intuition because of its spiritual nature.8

Ibn Sῑnā holds that soul is a unity. For him, soul is a single substance and it is the substratum of all
experiences. The unifying principle of experience is the soul itself.9 The soul organizes the body and
gives life to it. It is bound to be such by a natural inclination. It is an internal principle of the organism
and not something apart from the body.10 He further holds that human soul is a substance which is not
corporeal. Human soul is not a matter but a form.11 The question arises how Ibn Sῑnā has defined the
concept of substance? As per him a substance is something which is capable of subsisting
independently. The soul creates its own substratum which cannot exist apart from the soul. Soul is the
very essence of the substratum and it cannot be regarded as an accidental.12 Now the question is what
is the cause of the existence of the human soul? The answer of this question is provided in the next
section with an explanation of the concept of human soul.

The notion of Human Soul as interpreted by Ibn Sῑnā

In this section the notion of human soul has been discussed in details than the other two faculties to
maintain the pursuance of the article. Gutas (one of the commentators of Ibn Sῑnā) in his Ibn Sῑnā and
the Aristotelian Tradition considers that Ibn Sῑnā discloses human souls from three different aspects of
philosophy namely physics, ethics and metaphysics.13 Ibn Sῑnā in discussing the concept of human soul
from the aspects of Physics has adopted Aristotelian tradition. According to Aristotelian tradition, body
as a matter in nature is unable to think and act. Therefore, it is passive in nature on contrary to body,
soul is the power which enables the body to act, and human and animal souls are considered to have
higher qualities, which initiates activities according to the will.14

As per Ibn Sῑnā human being is a compound of intelligence, soul and body. Man possesses both
material and immaterial elements. Body is the material element of a man which is mortal and soul with
an intellect is immaterial element in a man which is immortal or eternal in nature. So, human being is a
compound of mortal as well as immortal elements namely the matter and form correspondingly.15

Human body cannot be the source of the human soul in so far it is a body. A body cannot produce its
own soul because a body does not act as it is corporeal in nature. Moreover, corporeal body cannot be
the cause of the human soul which is incorporeal in nature as per Ibn Sῑnā. The corporeal can never be
the cause of any incorporeal because what stands at a lower level existence cannot be the cause of
anything which stands at a higher level.16 One might argue that the disembodied souls of the past
generation may produce or be the cause of a human soul. However, Ibn Sῑnā rejected this hypothesis
with an argument that disembodied souls as a class cannot produce a human soul because a class of
individuals is divisible, whereas a cause of an indivisible effect cannot be divisible. Not even that it
also could not be assumed that a single random disembodied soul produces a human soul, since what is
random does not act as a cause.17 Even the soul of the celestial spheres cannot be the cause of the
existence of the other souls, because the souls of the spheres operate only through their bodies and a
body cannot serve as an intermediary between one soul and another.18 The First Cause of the universe
also cannot be the cause of the individual human soul since it is a simple being and hence could
produce only a single effect, whereas there are existence of many human souls and intellects.
Incorporeal intelligences do produce the multiplicity of effects, but they do not produce multiplicity
within a single species as the bodies of the celestial sphere are not subject to division. As per Ibn Sῑnā,
among all the incorporeal beings, only the Active Intellect operates on the divisible matter of the
sublunary world, and consequently it alone can produce a multiplicity of things within a single
species.19 Ibn Sῑnā arrives at the conclusion based on the given argument that the Active Intellect and
no other agent must be the cause of the existence of the human soul.20 Question arises what is Active
Intellect? Active Intellect is a crucial concept in Islamic philosophy. Sometimes it is also translated as
the Agent Intellect. Active intellect is an immaterial entity which acts as an intermediary between the
divine mind and the human intellect. The Active Intellect makes the acquired intellect possible. It
transmits the power of the transcendental world to emanate the substratum matter and forms for the
sublunary world.21

According to Ibn Sῑnā, the body functions through three main faculties. They are vegetative soul,
animal soul and rational soul. Vegetative soul governs the growth and nourishment of the body. The
animal soul governs the sensory, imaginative and estimating faculties of a human being. The function
of the rational soul is to lead other two souls and form human knowledge.22 Therefore, the soul for Ibn
Sῑnā, is the power which initiates thinking and reflection in a human being. He holds that one of the
most important features of human soul is the ability to obtain knowledge about the world with its
connection to the divine world.23 From ethical context, Ibn Sῑnā holds that human soul needs to be
delivered from its evil tendency through its connection to the divine realm. Moreover, he also says that
religious laws help human soul to achieve the salvation through knowledge of divine world.24 He holds
that the whole ascent of man towards the knowledge of Absolute Being is a counterpart to the descent
from God to man. It is a natural desire and a natural love which is born in man and present in him with
the same necessity as the whole system of emanation from Absolute Being is not a free creation but a
production and emanation according to a determinate monism of existence of being.25 He added farther
that, each being possess this natural desire by which it is driven to aspire to the higher principal of its
perfection.26 Now the obvious question arises how human soul can actualise the potentiality of the
knowledge of the Supreme Being? Next section is attempted to provide the answer of this question.

Deliverance of rational soul from the sensible realm to the divine realm
Gutas (one of the renowned commentators on Ibn Sῑnā) in his Ibn Sῑnā and the Aristotelian Tradition
considers the concept of human soul in a different manner. He advocates that Ibn Sῑnā discloses human
souls from three different aspects of philosophy namely physics, ethics and metaphysics.27 This article
will discuss in details about the metaphysical aspects of Ibn Sῑnā‘s discloser of soul as here he unveils
the nature of the human soul and its relation to the divine world. For Ibn Sῑnā the soul is the power
which initiates thinking and reflection. He also considers that the most important feature of human soul
is the ability to knowledge about the world around it and also the knowledge about the divine upper and
the superior world.28 Not even that the highest knowledge and beatitude of man is to attain ma‗rifat
Allah that is the highest degree of knowledge of the Supreme Being.30

As per Ibn Sῑnā, human soul is a combination of mortal and immortal, for him the ‗rational soul‘,
which is the immortal part in human soul, can elevate him in the divine realm. The question arises how
the immortal part in human soul, can elevate him in the divine realm? Moreover, how the relation
between Allah and human being is interpreted and explained by Ibn Sῑnā? This section of the article is
attempted to clarify these questions? Now, the question is, if body and soul are composed in the sense
of matter and form then what kind of relation do they have to each other? For him, as Rahman explains,
the soul is ―an immanent principle which organises the body and gives it its specific character and
makes it what it is.‖31 He holds that soul does not die with the death of the body.32 He also contends
that man is unique in the realm of living beings. For him man is nothing but a soul and that soul is
eternal in nature. Body is a cage which is a hindrance to the soul. The soul rests in the cage of the
worldly body temporally.33 In comparison to the heavenly sphere the existence of the body is very short
just as a flash of lightning lasts less than a moment.34 So it is a natural tendency of human soul to know
the Absolute Being.

In this respect we should provide a short account of the knower as recognised by Ibn Sῑnā at the end of
the Ishārāt. There are three classes of knowers, namely, the zāhid, the ‗ābid and the ‗ārif. The zāhid are
those who practice asceticism and are pious. ‗Ābid is clarified as a person who turns his thought to the
sanctity of the Divine while the ‗ārif, who knows through illumination and ecstasy.35 He further claims
that the sole aim of an ‗ārif is to know and to become identified with the Truth.36 However, the
question is how such identification is possible?

In his Ishārāt,37 Ibn Sῑnā portrays the rational soul‘s deliverance from the sensible realm to the Divine
realm. The intellectual seeker, who concentrates his thoughts on the Almighty so the light of God may
dawn upon his inner self, is given the special name of knower ‗ārif or Gnostic. An ‗ārif is one who
seeks the truth not as a means for reaching or achieving another goal, but as an ultimate aim in itself. 38
The first stage in the progressive development to this quest is ‗the will‘ or ‗al-irādā‘.39

Irādā is that through which an ‗ārif strengthens his resolve to demonstrate his convictions. With it he
gains a strong desire to bind himself with the bond of faith, and attaches himself with the Necessary
existent, source of all existence and determination, and thus brings peace to his soul. This desire or will
can be attained either by intellectual perfection or by deep faith in Allah‘s command. 40 For the
eligibility to attain either of the abovementioned paths an ‗ārif has to purify his soul with the help of
certain disciplinary measures in his life.

This stage of self-discipline is recognised as riyāḍa by Ibn Sῑnā. By riyāḍa the seeker should cleanse
him by eschewing bodily desire. He has to subdue his animal faculties and has to be aware of his inner
spiritual insight, and that has to be awakened with the help of subtle contemplation (al-fikr al-latif) and
virtuous love (al-‗ishq al- ‘afif).41 Having attained those two stages a man can experience a slight
conjunction (ittisaal) with God, but the more he practices the whole procedure, the more contacts he
makes with God, like the flashes of lightning. Practice will engage the seeker in continual
contemplation through which he will receive a Divine illumination. Ibn Sῑnā, in this stage, rejects the
identification of man with God. He describes that a man can have natural knowledge of God through
the Active Intellect. It acts as an intermediary between the divine mind and human intellect. As the
result of the contemplation of an enquirer he realises a conjunction (ittisaal) of the rational soul with
the Active Intellect, which is the last heavenly intelligence in the heavenly world. So Active Intellect is
the linking principle between man and God.42 It simply works as a link in the chain of being, linking
man to his Maker and Goal.

In the later part of Ibn Sῑnā‘s life he has introduced some new terms in his book Ishārāt to continue his
discussion in concern to the relation between human being and the Absolute Being. Some
terminologies have been interpreted and explained in a different and new manner in this phase. There
we see introduction of few terms such as ma‗rifa, mu‗ārifa and ma‗rifat Allah. The term ma‗rifa is
interpreted as the state of complete knowledge and the term mu‗ārifa is to understand the willing
acquaintance of an ‗ārif of the highest knowledge.43 The term ma‗rifat Allah is interpreted as the
highest degree of knowledge which consists in an ‗ārif in a manner that he firstly sees in his own soul
as in a mirror the intelligible which are traces of the Divine Truth, and further in the higher stage it
perceives as reflected Object, God‘s truth Itself. Ibn Sῑnā‘s deliberate use and interpretation of these
terms leads us to a relation of union between the human soul and Absolute God.

Once the soul moves freely in this union with the Universal Intellect and meeting which at first last
only for an instant but gradually grow into a state of peaceful possession, it lives from the pure
intelligible and receives by the separated intelligible but the rays come from the First Light, the Truth
itself, God.44 Real ‗ārif is he, who has reached at the highest stage in which he, according to his own
will, can reach this superior knowledge. In the highest stage of ma‗rifat Allah the soul even loses the
sight of the mirror (which is the soul itself) and perceives only the reflected Divine light. In his own
―Then the Gnostic passes on to the stage of contemplating God in Himself: he is
absent, yet present, he is departing, yet abiding. Then he turns to the world of Reality and
his contemplation of God is stable and continuous, and when he passes from striving to
attainment, his inmost soul becomes a polished mirror reflecting the face of God. Then he
passes away from himself and contemplates only the Devine Glory and if he looks upon
himself, it is only as the one contemplating, and when he has come to this, he has attained
complete union with God.‖45
In Ishārāt, Ibn Sῑnā says ‗There is in truth the arrival (al-wuṣūl).‘46 In this conception of ma‗rifat Allah
we can perceive the word ‗union‘ or wuṣūl in respect to the relation of man and God. This realisation,
according to Ibn Sῑnā, is the ‗highest delight‘ possible to the soul who has already purified his soul by
mortification and detachment. He also claimed that each and every human soul has the power to purify
his soul and potentiality to prepare him as an achiever of highest knowledge. He himself recognises the
concept of ma‗rifat Allah as the ‗immediate knowledge of Him‘ because the essence of the First Truth
is light. Not only that also the source of light. So ma‗rifat Allah is a notion understood as the light of
the Soul itself in a participation of the light of God.47 Therefore, as soon as a soul purified itself the
First Being reflect Himself in this soul. Ibn Sῑnā says ‗He (God) is hidden only from those who are
veiled by short-comings and weaknesses and defects.‘48

According to Ibn Sῑnā, soul is a single immaterial substance and it is the substratum of all experiences.
The unifying principle of experience is the soul itself. The soul organizes the body and gives life to it.
The term ‗Human soul‘ used to refer to the totality of all the three parts of a living being, i.e. vegetable
soul, animal soul and rational soul. As per Ibn Sῑnā, human soul is a combination of mortal and
immortal. He claims that each being possess a natural desire by which it is driven to aspire to the higher
principal of its perfection. The rational soul which is the immortal part in human soul, can elevate him
in the divine realm through self-discipline and contemplation.

1. Frank N. Magill (Ed.), Masterpieces of Worlds Philosophy, (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1990), 165.
2. Soheil M. Afnan, Avicenna His Life and Works, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958),
3. Ibid.,136.
4. Soheil M. Afnan, Avicenna His Life and Works, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958),
5. Ibid., 115.
6. Ibn Sinā, Shifā‘, I, 281, cf. A.M. Goichon, ‗The Philosopher of Being‘, Avicenna
Commemoration Volume, (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956), 108.
7. Amelie Marie Goichon, ‗The Philosopher of Being‘, Avicenna Commemoration Volume,
(Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956), 110.
8. Ibid.
9. Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna‘s Psychology, Geoffrey Cumberlege, (London: Oxford University
Press, 1952), 64, 110.
10. Ibid., 4.
11. Ibid., 11-12.
12. Amelie Marie Goichon, ‗The Philosopher of Being‘, Avicenna Commemoration Volume,
(Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956), 183.
13. Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth, God and Human in Islamic Thought ‗Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn Sῑnā and al-
Ghazālῑ‘, Culture and Civilization in the Middle East, Series Ed., Ian R Netton, (London and
New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 90.
14. Ibid., 91.
15. Ibid., 90.
16. Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories
of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect, (New York: Oxford University
Press,1992), 81.
17. Ibid.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 80.
21. Oliver Leaman, Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy, (London & New York: Routledge,
Taylore and Francis Group, 1999), 4.

22. Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth, God and Human in Islamic Thought ‗Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn Sῑnā and al-
Ghazālῑ‘, Culture and Civilization in the Middle East, Series Ed., Ian R Netton, (London and
New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 91.
23. Ibid., 90.
24. Ibid.
25. Jean Joseph Houben, ‗Avicenna and Mysticism‘, Avicenna Commemoration Volume, (Calcutta:
Iran Society, 1956), 216.
26. Ibid.
27. Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth, God and Human in Islamic Thought ‗Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn Sῑnā and al-
Ghazālῑs‘, Culture and Civilization in the Middle East, Series Ed., Ian R Netton, (London and
New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 90.
28. Ibid.
29. Jean Joseph Houben, ‗Avicenna and Mysticism‘, Avicenna Commemoration Volume, (Calcutta:
Iran Society, 1956), 219.
30. Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna‘s Psychology, Oxford University Press, (London: Geoffrey
Cumberlege, 1952), 75.
31. Ibid., 58.
32. Meheren, Traites mystiques d‘ Avicenna, pp.42-48, Cf. Majid Fakhry, A history of Islamic
Philosophy, 2nd Ed., (London: Longman, New York: Columbia University Press, 1983), 157.
33. Majid Fakhry, A history of Islamic Philosophy, 2nd Ed., (London: Longman, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983), 158.
34. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, (Great Britain:
Thames and Hudson, 1978), 264.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibn Sῑnā, Ishārāt, p.199, Cf. Avicenna His Life and Works, Soheil M. Afnan, (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), 109.
37. Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth, God and Human in Islamic Thought‗Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn Sῑnā and al-
Ghazālῑ‘, Culture and Civilization in the Middle East, Series Ed., Ian R Netton, (London and
New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006), 109.
38. Loc cit., 191.
39. Ibid.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibn Sῑnā, Ishārāt, p. 203, Cf. Avicenna His Life and Works, Soheil M. Afnan, (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), 193.
42. Ibid.
43. Smith, Readings from the Mystics of Islam, pp. 48-49 Cf. Avicenna Commemoration Volume,
(Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956), 219.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibn Sῑnā, Ishārāt, p. 204, Cf. Soheil M. Afnan, Avicenna His Life and Works, (London: George
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958), 194.
47. Commentary on the ‗Theologia Aristotelis‘, Rev. Thomiste, July, 1951, Cf. Avicenna
Commemoration Volume, (Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956), 220.
48. Smith, Readings from the Mystics of Islam, p. 47, Avicenna Commemoration Volume, (Calcutta:
Iran Society, 1956), 220.

 Abul Ela Affifi, ‗The rational and Mystical Interpretations of Islam‘, Islam the Straight Path,
Islam Interpreted by Muslims, K.W. Morgan, ed., (Delhi: Motilal Banersidass Publisers Pvt.
Ltd., 1987, Rpt. Delhi: 1998).
 Amelie Marie Goichon, ‗The Philosopher of Being‘, Avicenna Commemoration Volume,
(Calcutta: Iran Society, 1956).
 Arthur J. Arberry, Avicenna on Theology, (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, 1951).
 Fazlur Rahman, Avicenna‘s Psychology, Oxford University Press, (London: Geoffrey
Cumberlege, 1952).
 Frank N. Magill (Ed.), Masterpieces of Worlds Philosophy, (New York: HarperCollins
Publishers, 1990).
 Frederick Charles Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume II: Medieval Philosophy, (New
York, London, Toronto, Sydney, Auckland: Image Books, Doubleday,1993).
 Herbert Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna and Averroes on Intellect: Their Cosmologies, Theories
of the Active Intellect, and Theories of Human Intellect, (New York: Oxford University Press,
 Jean Joseph Houben, ‗Avicenna and Mysticism‘, Avicenna Commemoration Volume, (Calcutta:
Iran Society, 1956).
 Jon McGinnis, et al, (Reisman, D.C., Brill, E.J.), ed., ‗Interpreting Avicenna: Science and
Philosophy in Medieval Islam‘-Proceedings of the Second Conference of the Avicenna Study
Group, (Boston: Leiden, 2004).
 Lenn E. Goodman, Islamic Humanism, (New Work: Oxford University Press, 2003).

 Maha Elkaisy-Friemuth, God and Human in Islamic Thought ‗Abd al-Jabbār, Ibn Sῑnā and al-
Ghazālῑ‘, Culture and Civilization in the Middle East, Series, Ian R Netton, ed., (London and
New York: Routledge Taylor and Francis Group, 2006).
 Majid Fakhry, A history of Islamic Philosophy, 2nd Ed., (London: Longman, New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983).
 Malise Ruthven, Islam Avery Short Introduction, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012).
 Oliver Leaman, Key Concepts in Eastern Philosophy, (London & New York: Routledge,
Taylore and Francis Group, 1999).
 Parviz Morewedge, The Metaphysica of Avicenna (ibn Sῑnā) A critical translation –
commentary and analysis of fundamental arguments in Avicenna‘s Metaphysica in Dānish
Nāma – i ‗alā‘ῑ (The Book of Scientific Knowledge), (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
 Paul Edwards, Editor in Chief, The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, Vol.III, (New York:
Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., & The Free Press, 1967, London: Collier Macmillan
Publishers, 1967, Rpt.1972).
 Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, (Great Britain:
Thames and Hudson, 1978).
 Soheil M. Afnan, Avicenna His Life and Works, (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1958).
 Ted Honderich, ed.,The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, (New York: Oxford University
Press, Oxford University Press Inc., 2005).

LalDedh’s contribution to Philosophy

Tariq Rafeeq Khan & Mudasir Ahmad Tantray


This paper examines only the philosophical approach of her poetry. Nevertheless her poetry is vast in
wisdom and knowledge. It took years to explain its philosophical nature. I have taken some vaakhs and
will try my best to explain lal as a great metaphysician and logician like western philosophers and
Indian philosophers. Lalleshuri is a great interpreter of the divine AUM. She extensively explains the
validity of AUM in achieving higher stages in yoga through PRANAYAMA and advancement of self
by mastering efficiently the recitation of AUM. She says one who is able to master the recitation of this
divine word with the rhythm of his breath without any digression of thought can form an easy bridge
between him and the universal consciousness. Lal was a mystic and wonderer in the nature. She loved
nature, her poetry signifies a solitude and ill will towards worldly pleasure . one of her vakh quotes
like this it seems to me that she compared life with water ocean with world and soft piece of thread
(aum pan with karmas bad karmas leads to pap good karmas leads to svarge or puniyaylal prays to god
utters that um in this world u created me, my karmas boat is sustained in ocean. Bestow me with right
path to savarga or goodness she prays to god please show me my destiny this vakh connotes intensive
meaning. Lalwants to go her real home that is life after death vidhimukhti.In this paper I tried my best
to investigate the explanation of only those notable vakhs which shows the inception for metaphysics,
epistemology and logic. Though lal was a literary figure her vakhs contains diverse knowledge related
to different fields. In some verses she describes her own empirical experience and observation.

Keywords: Philosophy, LalDedh, Vaakhs, Shaivism, mysticism, Sadhana, self realization, God, man
and world.


Lal dad was born in the second decade of fourteenth century. Lalded was most powerful symbol of
kashmir's civilization. Lalded started her spiritual journey as a tormented soul, but attained a stage
where self_realization and self_awarness gave her tremendous inner strength and the confidence that
derived from that strength. Lalded is highly spiritual because she is gifted with an extraordinary poetic
sensibility. Her vaakhs bears testimony of laala's genius as a saint and poet in one. The vaakhs she
uttered are direct outpourings from her heart rather than a consciously wrought poetic composition, her
vaakhs made a tremendous impact on the collective psyche of both Muslims as well as on hindus. Her

vaakhs convey a message of peace and harmony and one can see that she owes it as much to her
educational background in a Shaivite Kashmiri Brahman family as to her spiritual enlightenment based
on her Sadhana. In her vaakhs there is a state of awareness and of an outlook far transcending cults. A
voice which set off a resonance heard with clear tone till today. She was genius both as a saint and as a
poet. Reading her vaakhs, we get the notion that lalla aimed at achieving a fusion or synthesis of
vedantic philosophy and Islamic sufism.

Lal’sVakh’s and Her Philosophical wisdom

Lal led was a great philosopher, poet,mystic of Kashmir valley. Who lived an ascetic and pious life.In
spite of this she was a shavite who firmly believed in the doctrines and the authority of shaivism as
indicated in the verses of her poetry. Many Muslim scholars mentioned in their historical works that
she met Shahi Hamdan. It also seems that she had accepted Islam and has been called by the Muslims
lad. Laldedh is comparedwith other great female saints like dedhmooj andHabakhatoon.In her poetry,
there are two types laldedh is known by her many epithets like lalishwari, lalarifa , and so on.
Laldedhsungs the poetry known as vaakhs, derived from the word vak.Abhinavagupta defines Van as
Vimarsaor ―reflective awareness of the self‖.A Sanskrit word which means speech (seaerly on speech
act) or argumentation. This speech is not a ordinary speech. In philosophy speech is technical term
which is known for its dialectic or philosophical method. She wrote none like Socrates though her
poetry is full of philosophical thought.

What gave her poetry it's distinctive flavour, it's power and punch was the vigone and vitality of her
idiom, the effect being reinforced by her use of imaginary taken from everyday life. The non dual
Shavism of kashmir, it must be noted, sought to internalize the forest rather than asking one to one
renounce the world and enjoined upon spiritual aspirants to carry on their meditative practices in the
midst of the daily flow of life. It was perhaps because of this that the images evoked her verses"Sung"
on ordinary people's consciousness and became an aesthetic delight for them even though the
speculative and esoteric content must have eluded the grasp of many. What Lal dad's Vaks really did
was to provide them a spiritual vision and moral strength with which they could arm their souls to meet
the tremendous challenges that the times pored for them, Lal dad was not a mere itinerant woman
poetsaint of the 14th century, but a symbol of the continuity of five thousand years of kashmir's
civilization ethos. In her poetry, there are two types of verses which interprets two different realms one
is that she addresses to monotheism of Islam and another for the monotheism of shavites. Laldedh was
a great metaphysician, logician and linguist. I think, in order to know the poetry of laldedh one should
be competent in philosophy and shaivism if not competent, one should have knowledge of them. It

seems to me that she sung a―philosophical poetry. Hervakhs denote the relation between man (nara)
God (shiva) and world (shakti).

Itlooks to me that last two lines elaborates terms likejivanmukhti and vide-mukhti. In a very popular
VakhLalleshuri describes her journey through her life. She says she is towing the boat of her life
through murky waters of the sea of the life pulling at the frail untwisted cotton thread praying
constantly to her lord to help across. Her life is like an unbaked earthen pot with water gradually
seeping through ready to fall apart, but she is still aspiring to get liberated from the agony of life and
reach her real home, the house of her Lord.

In first two lines Lal wants to cross the sea with her past karmas in the world navv/boat with her
consciousness, I think oum pan is actually the reason which creates doubt in the minds of believers.

Lal was a pious women and good believer of one God. She believes in monotheism. Following two
vakhs indicated her belief on one God (monotheism) lalilaila and shivteshakhti from these vakhs it is
apparent that she had a good faith in oneness of God. And also she was in deep connection with the
Islam and Shaivism.

We are studying Laldedh and her vakh within the reigns of philosophical wisdom and reflection.
Philosophical assumptions and logical teach us to study the objectivity, definiteness, truth holism of the
poetry not the subjectivity and authority. Some of her vakhs which express philosophical sense are:

 goorasprechamsaassilatay

Keh yes dapaantasskyachenaww


Keh ne manzkehtayandraww

 Wuchanbuchassaerseyandher




Wuchan, I see;bachassaerseyandar, I see my lord in everything around ; wuchumprazlaansaerseymenz,

there is not a single thing with his dazzling presence ; boozithtiroozithwoochharas , you can
concentrate on His divine grace and experience His presence as the whole universe is the abode of the
Grahchuitasunduybokuselall, with Him only the ultimate truth and everything else trivial without any
standing , who am I lall .

Lo! I am lost in wonder, love and praise; now where is lall ? So lall is realizing the highest state of bliss
and ecstasy, where she has absorbed and has become one with the lord . She experiences ones with

She experiences the generously glaring lord Shiva everywhere and not a single object without His
gracious presence. Strangely enough lalleshuri was no where seen as her existence had reduced to
nothingness this is a situation that is experienced by the awakened souls

 Vadnehsaeti gash ho mari


Man karsaaftaizeriakimeeli


 Tulkturshishar–gaanth sheen sharanitamani




The ice cover, icicle, snow, snow storm and icebergs are different solids states of water. These
apparently appear five forms of water in solid state, but in reality is one ‗water‘.So ,lalded intends to
give us and understandings that the universe is like ice , icicle , snow and the lord is the water . With
one sun rise all solid forms melt into one ‗water‘. She is speaking of ones of God, and attributes to Him
unity of essence, and unity of acts. There is only God without any second and all the manifestation
appearing to be diverse and countless are centered in that ones only.

 Shrantidyankyasanakari




 paraanparaanzeiv tall phojim



manachiduieemaali cha jimnazanh

paraanparaan equal to reading and learning ;zeiv equal to tongue; tall equal to plate; phojimequal to
worn out; sumranphiraan equal to doing sadhna to get desired results, telling beads;
nethtaongajhgajim equal to worn thin my fingeres and thumb; manchi equal to of mine;duiee equal to
uncertainty, unsureness, doubt; chajimnazanh equal to have no been able to put off the instinct. Lalded
in this vakh admits;

My tongue bruised with my continuous reading this sacred scripture. I read them aloud I could not
perform the desired worship worthy of my loud. My thumb and fingers got worn out with continuous
telling of rosary beads but I remained still attached with the worldly affairs and could not dismiss the
duality from my mind.

Lalded had shattered her patience and worn out her plate and tongue. She had an admission in her looks
that she had neither been able to learn the desired feat, not had acquired the desired end of her sadhna,
so that she could become one with the lord and experience ones with him. She had worn her thin
fingers and thumb with the tiresome job of telling beads even then, she had not been able to put off the
instinct of the duality and consent from her mind.Lalleshuri gives a very beautiful description of her
journey towards her liberation. Comparing her birth to the bloom of a cotton flower she says that she
came to this world as a cotton flower, which is a symbol of purity and innocence. Soon the weaver took
her control and gave her knocks and beating to make the thread out of it capable to be taken to the loom
for weaving a coarse cloth.

The description is the assessment of people who spend a lot of time and money in doing formal
worships in temples as well as in their homes.They read the Holy Scriptures, arrange formal worships,
visit holy places and take dips in the holy waters at pilgrimage spots and engage themselves in holy
Mantras but unfortunately experience no changes in there respective hearts. All this becomes merely a
routine. For spiritual development purity of mind and detachment from the temptation of the world are


The Vaakhs of lalded are ultimate andas such endowed with wisdom on which her great popularity as a
mystical poet largely rests. Lalded has explained some truths in her vaakhs as well the divine message.
Truth is eternal and more appropriate to the modern world. Lal dad's spiritual philosophy is bond to

create a new cosmic vision for mankind. Lal dad provides on her vaakhs an inspiration to be a house
holder, lal_vak forms the foundation not only the contemporary kashmiri literature but also of kashmiri
culture as a whole. Lal dad is the most significant historical bridge that connects the shores of the gulf
very effectively. She was the product of the spiritual creed that had been evolving in kashmir for
centuries and her immediate predecessors were saints and scholars. Lal gave a new lease of life to
kashmirisaivistic spiritual. Lal dad's vision of reality as the manifestation of one indivisible
consciousness pervading everything.Lal dad is also remembered today for her unique poetic idiom
which derives it's power and charm from the image of everyday life.


1. Lalavakyani: RajanakaBhaskaya
2. The word of lalla : Sir Richard temple .C.U.P.,1924
3. Jayalalkaul (ed) lad dedsahityaAkademi , new delhi, 1973 p.no.134
4. Sisirkumar D (2004) the idea of literary history.
5. Dehlvi, sadia.‖ The Rishis of Kashmir POREG- policy Research Group
6. Koul, R.N. key to understanding lad ded pt.1and pt.2‖Patrika kashmiri overseas Association
7. Muktananda, swami lalleshwari: spiritual poems by a great siddhayogini SYDA foundation
8. Kalamakai, Mishra. Kashmir shaivism: the central philosophy of Tantra, Indice Books, 2011.
9. Khanna. Madhu. Yantra: The Tantric symbol of Cosmic unity . Inner Traditions 2003,
10. Laskmkanjoo. VijnanaBhairavaTantra. Indica Books, India, 2007
11. Laskmanjoo. Kashmir Saivism: The Secret Supreme. Universal Shaiva Fellowship, 2007,
12. Serbaeva, olga. Yoginis in the SaivaPuranas and Tantras.
13. Samuel. Geoffrey. The Origins of Yoga and tantra: indic Religions to the 13th century.
Cambridge University Press, NY,2008.
14. Shantanada, Swami. The Splendor of Recognition: An Exploration of the Pratyabhijnagrdayam,
a Text on the Ancient Science of the Soul. SYDA Foundation,
15. The Ascent of Self: Prof B. N. Parimoo, MotilalBanarasiDass, Delhi, second Ed;1987
16. A History of kashmir. P. N.K. Bamzai, Metropolitan Book Co., 1962
17. A History of Muslim Rule in kashmir. R.K. Parmu, People's Publishing House, New Delhi,
18. Kashmiri Sahitya ka Itihas :ShashiShekarToshkhani, jammu and Kashmir Academy of Art,
Culture and Language, 1985

19. Triadic Mysticism : Paul E. Murphy :MotilalBanarasiDass, Delhi, 1999
20. Walter R Lawerence, The valley of kashmir, first published 1895_1996 ed... Jammu P. 289
21. Kotru, N. K, Sivastotavali of Utpaldeva, (MotilalBanarasidas : Delhi) 1985

Philosophy of Life of Sri Guru Gobind Singh Ji
Desh Raj Sirswal

Sikhism is a monotheistic religion founded during the 15th century in the Punjab region, by Guru
Nanak Dev and continued to progress with ten successive Sikh gurus (the last teaching being the holy
scripture Gurū Granth Sāhib Ji). It is the fifth-largest organized religion in the world, with over 30
million Sikhs and one of the most steadily growing. This system of religious philosophy and expression
has been traditionally known as the Gurmat (literally 'of the gurus'). The Sikh Scriptures outline the
ways in which one can bring their own thinking in line with the Hukam. If one engages in the service
of God's creation, this is the best way of working in harmony with the Divine Will. Further, by
remembering Waheguru one becomes aware of "God desires" and "Divine essence" within the person
is realised. By following these "Divine Values" that benefit His Creation, one ends the cycle of Karma
and Transmigration. The objective of this paper is to study the basic life values taught by Sri Guru
Gobind Singh ji.

Indian Philosophy and Sikhism

Philosophy in its widest etymological sense means ‗love of wisdom‘. It tries to know things that
immediately and remotely concern man. In ancient Indian literature philosophy aims at knowledge of
truth or ‗the vision of truth‘ (darshana). Every Indian school holds, in its own way, that there can be a
direct realisation of truth (tattva darsana). A man of realisation becomes free; one who lacks it is
entangled in the world. Indian philosophy discusses the different problems of metaphysics,
epistemology, ethics, logic and psychology but generally it does not discuss them separately. Indian
philosophy denotes the philosophical speculations of all Indian thinkers, ancient or modern, Hindus or
non-Hindus, theists or atheists.1 In this list we also include materialists like Charvaka and unorthodox
thinkers like Buddhist and the Jains, along with all medieval bhakti movements and teachings of saints
and gurus. In this line Sikhism itself fall under the domain of Indian philosophy.

Basics of Sikhism

Sikkhism has a very sound philosophical attitude and the way of life. It gives true freedom to man for
spiritual development. ―The idea of Sikhs following a different path true to their moral and character is
found in the earliest writings of Guru Nanak. In Siree Rag, Guru Nanak said, ―Jin khin pal naam na
visrey, te jan virley sansar‖ Or those who always remember God‘s name, act with a righteous
conviction that sets them apart from the rest of the world. 200 years before the Sikhs were united as the
Khalsa brotherhood, Guru Nanak had also said, ―Jau tau prem khelan ka chao, sir dhar tali gali meri
It marag pair dhareejai, sir deejai kaan na keejai.‖ (Guru Granth Sahib, p. 1412) Translated, it
means, if you wish to play the game of love,
 you should be ready to sacrifice your heart. For on this
path, even the first step should mean that
 you will not hesitate to lay down your life to uphold
righteousness and justice. Guru Gobind extended such thoughts and gave the Sikhs a very visible
physical identity. The Sikhs responded enthusiastically to embrace this identity and pledged to uphold
the virtues associated with it.‖2

Guru Gobind Singh was the last and the Tenth Guru of the Sikhs. The Sikhs believe that after his death
'Guru Granth Sahib' was given the status of the Guru by Guru Gobind Singh himself. The Sikhs firmly
believe in the teachings enshrined in Shri Guru Granth Sahib and did not tolerate any dissent group.
Contribution of Guru Gobind Singh to Sikh Panth is an unparalleled in the history of human kind. He
sacrificed his four sons, father and mother for the sake of Sikh religion. He fought a number of battles
against the Mughals and several rulers of the hill States. In 1699 A.D. He founded the Khalsa Panth. 3
―Guru Gobind played a pro active role in shaping the Sikh society as we know it today. He took
concrete and positive steps in formulating new structures and strategies to promote the cause of the
Sikhs. He was the architect of the Khalsa, the Sikh society, which was a model deeply rooted in the
concepts of equality, freedom and justice first proposed by Guru Nanak almost 200 years before him.
During his lifetime, Guru Gobind Singh could not free the Indian society of bondage and slavery.
However, he filled the minds of his followers with love for freedom and democratic ideals. He had
dispelled the fear of authority and dispelled the fear of the Mughals. Guru Gobind had the satisfaction
of knowing that he had sown the seeds for creating a just society against the tyranny and atrocities of
the Mughal empire. He was sure that he was leaving behind in the Khalsa, an army of free, brave,
selfless and sacrificing soldiers who would support the weak and innocent, and fight against

Dharma in Sikhism

The word Dharma is commonly used in Indian religions. Religion is the Indian context means spiritual
experiences, philosophy o life, man‘s duties to himself and to the community, and the practice of moral
values. In Hinduism and Sikhism, Dharma has the following meanings, depending on the context:
i. Duty: There is emphaiss on duties and obligations, rather than rights.
ii. Justice: Man‘s conscience is the judge of good or evil actions.
iii. Truth: Its quest and perception.
iv. Moral order of the universe.
v. Ideal of life or spirtiual goal.
vi. Humanism: This inclueds charity, noble deeds, social service, caring of and helping others.
The need of Dharma ariss from the realisation of the imperfect and sad condition of humanity.5
Sikhism is a religion distinct from Hinduism with itw own founder, scriptures, holy places, theology
and philosophy of life.6

Preet Mohan S. Ahluwalia discussed about the balance in life which is achieved by subduing our
egocentric propensities under God-oriented endeavour in Sikhism. Living in the world, yet not being of
the world is the kind of balance to be achieved - overcoming haumai by such pursuits as:

(1) "Kirat Kamavana" - Earning one's livelihood through honest labour.

(2) "Vand ke Chakna" - Sharing one's earnings with others

(3) "Sewa" - Service of mankind

(4) "Simran" - Remembering God

Through such pursuits the wall of haumai that creates separation of man from God begins to dwindle
and eventually the human soul awakens in God i.e, the atma merges[unites] into parmatma. Human life
is the one opportunity of attaining the Lord. There is no other season suitable for achieving union with

"Now hath come Kali-yuga, Sow you the Name of the Lord No other season you need wait for Be not
lost in delusion." (SGGS: 1185:6)

Through "Naam-simran" or practice of the presence of God, one is imbued with a great spiritual
confidence ("Chaardhi-kala") and feels as Guru Nanak declared:

"God does not die so I fear not death,

Indestructable is He, so I fret not.

He is not poor, nor am I in want.

He isn't grief, nor am I in trouble.

Except Him none can destroy." (SGGS: 391:1)

It is only when man attains this oneness with God that he escapes the throes of the cycle of births and
deaths. Until then he is tossed from one form to another till he attains salvation. Even salvation,
however, is not the 'summum bonum' for the Sikhs. Only love of God is. The Guru says: "I covet
neither sovereignity nor salvation, My love is for the lotus feet of the Lord."

However, even when he attains salvation, he works for the salvation of others. "Liberated himself,
liberation to the whole world he brings, To such a one, sayeth Nanak, I ever bow in reverence."7 After
a review of this basic philosophy of Sikhism we will move to the study of philosophy of Sri Guru
Gobind Singh ji.

Philosophy of Guru Gobind Singh ji:

Guru Gobind Singh and his role in giving a final shape to the Sikh beliefs and ethics. ―Guru Gobind
Singh was formally installed Guru on the Baisakhi day of 1733 Bk/29 March 1676. In the midst of his
engagement with the concerns of the community, he gave attention to the mastery of physical skills and
literary accomplishment. He had grown into a comely youth spare, lithe of limb and energetic. He had a
natural genius for poetic composition and his early years were assiduously given to this pursuit. The
Var Sri Bhagauti Ji Ki, popularly called Chandi di Var. written in 1684, was his first composition and
his only major work in the Punjabi language. The poem depicted the legendary contest between the
gods and the demons as described in the Markandeya Purana . The choice of a warlike theme for this
and a number of his later compositions such as the two Chandi Charitras, mostly in Braj, was made to
infuse martial spirit among his followers to prepare them to stand up against injustice and tyranny.‖ 8
There are some important points of Guru Gobind Singh‘s ethics:
 Path of truth and enlightenment: Guru Gobind Singh carried the torch of truth on his voyages
and enlightened people who were suffering out of hatred, falsehood, greed and hypocrisy. He
travelled and taught through practice and precept.9
 Concept of social responsibility: Guru Gobind Singh asserted the importance of helping the
needy and the poor. He himself always helped the poor and he served food to them. Guru
asserted that helping the destitute by activities like feeding the hungry and providing clothes to
the naked makes the donor a recipient of God‘s grace, and emphasized that such donations
should be made out of one‘s honest earnings.10
 Equality of mankind: Guru Gobind Singh gave the message of equality of mankind. He taught
that God has created the universe and he is everywhere and in every being. So, one cannot
discriminate people on the basis of caste and creed etc. when God has created them as equals.
He introduced the practice of community kitchen where people from all castes and creeds sat
together to eat without any distinction of social hierarchy. 11
 Cultivation of inner strength: Guru Gobind Singh accentuated the value of virtues of the
human character and advised control of vices. The vices like ego, anger, greed, lust and vanity

can be conquered through self-examination and self-realization. He said, "See the brotherhood
of all mankind as the highest order of Yogis; conquer your own mind, and conquer the world".12
 Dharmayuddha or Righteous War: The Sikhs expressed in the form of devotional poetry,
enunciating truths of the spirit, while lifting man into the sphere of transcends experience and
confirming in him certain attitude, particularly those called vairag and bhakti, is also by virtue
of idealism a great guide to conduct. But Guru Gobind Singhji flamed faith waging in
Dharmayuddha or Righteous war. The reverences are to the devotional pieces of his
composition. He said, ―He cherishes the humble, protects the righteous and destroys evil-


Sikhism believes that the world is not illusionary, unreal or a mirage. It is a manifestation of the real.
Guru Gobind Singh was in a time when there was communal disharmony and rulers and emperors
repressed and exploited the common people, Guru Gobind Singh came with a mission to disseminate
the spirit of universal brotherhood. He envisioned a classless and casteless society and planned to
introduce an independent and distinct spiritual system. Guru Gobind Singh never ignored or out-casted
people who did not possess good personalities but worked to reform and re-engineer them and was able
to transform them into fine individuals. He was a real Guru in several manners and will guide future


1. Datta & Chatterjee: An Introduction to Indian Philosophy, University of Calcutta, 1984.

2. ―The Life and Times of Guru Gobind Singh‖, Sikh History: A History of the Sikhs ( 1469 to
Present) , December 8, 2014. Citation: http://sikhhistory.haraman.org/life-times-guru-gobind-
3. Comprehensive Bibliography on Guru Gobind Singh (Books in English, Punjabi, Hindi &
4. ―The Life and Times of Guru Gobind Singh‖, Sikh History: A History of the Sikhs ( 1469 to
Present) , December 8, 2014. Citation: http://sikhhistory.haraman.org/life-times-guru-gobind-
5. J.P. Suda, Religions in India: A Study of their Essential Unity, Sterling Publishers Pvt. Ltd.,
New Delhi, 1978, p.267
6. Ramesh Chander Dogra and Gobind Singh Mansukhani, Encyclopaedia of Sikh Religion and
Culture, Vikas Publishing House Pvt. Ltd, New Delhi, 2001, p.127.
7. Dr. J. S. Neki, ―The Concept of Man According to Sikhism‖, SikhNet, Friday, 4/09/1999,
Citation: http://fateh.sikhnet.com//sikhnet/ discussion. nsf/3d8d6eacce83bad887256428
0070c2b3/ d894a8cc 83d430b 0872567 4e 007 4ed78!OpenDocument
8. Prof. (Dr.) Markanday Ahuja, Ms. Jaspreet Bajaj, ―Guru Gobind Singh Ji: A Great CEO‖ in
IOSR Journal of Business and Management (IOSR-JBM) e-ISSN: 2278-487X, p-ISSN: 2319-
7668. Volume 18, Issue 9 .Ver. IV (September. 2016), pp. 30-34.
9. ibid.
10. ibid.
11. ibid.
12. ibid.
13. Fauja Singh & Others, Ethical Thought in Sikhism, Punjabi University, Patiala, 1969, p.120.

Increasing usage of Social Media and its Influence on Societal Behaviour

Mani Parti Bharara


In this modern and ever changing world, media has a very important role to play. It acts as a mediator
between the society and its changing social, political and economic environment. The easy and most
convenient way to reach to the masses is the social media; What's app, Face book, Twitter, Linkedin ,
Snapchat, Instagram,Telegram, Imo, Periscope and various other internet services to name a few.
Professionals and Adolescents are the ones who are mostly using these social media sites and fulfilling
most of their daily needs be it socialising, publicising their products or services or highlighting any
important events in the local areas. However this increased use of social media also poses them to
certain dangers like disclosing their personal information to hackers or giving an edge to reach their
bank accounts and do transactions. Also it gives behavioural implications as they want to show off their
personalities to the outside world in a glamorous form. Thus this paper tends to focus on the increasing
use of social media and its influence on societal behaviour.


Since I.T. revolution, social networking has created a niche in the area of e - marketing and
socialising. The increasing use of social media networks like What's app, Face book, Twitter,
Linkedin , Snapchat, Instagram,Telegram, Imo, Periscope and various other applicat ions have
laid both positive and negative implications on the society. It has revolutionised the way in
which one wants to interact with the outside world. People are using social media to glamorise
their actual self and pose a different personality in front of their friends and links on social
media sites. It is being used as a medium not only for socialising or networking or self -
expression or expanding the friend circle across the globe but also it is being used as an
extensive medium to advertise and popularise ones products or services being offered by them

It acts as a great medium to promote work of various NGO‘s or collect charities or funds for
social causes. Also small and medium enterprises see it as a lucrative medium to sell their
products across borders and since it is more accessible and less costly than traditional media it
can help in brand promotion and fostering brand loyalty easily. When we talk about self
expression, individuals use this medium to share their views or raise th eir voice on certain
social topics using personal blogs.
The improvements in technology have increased the speed of communication and reaching
distant places and across cultures. Now information can reach the targeted with just the blink of
an eye. Androids and latest apps on mobile phones have changed the pace of spreading
information. Across the globe, for social media usage, the total minutes spent online are found
out and use of internet on mobile phones has added to this time spent alongwith connectin g
anywhere, anytime and with anyone.

Objectives of the study

The main objectives of the study are:

i) To identify the reasons, why social media is used by the people at large.

ii) To study the positive impact of increased social media usage on the society.

iii) To study the negative impact of increased social media usage on the society.


The objectives of the paper have been discussed one by one:

I) Reasons why social media is used across the globe:

Going through different research papers it was found out that various reasons why
social media is gaining popularity across the masses are as follows:

i) People are using social media to glamorise their actual self and pose a different
personality in front of their friends and links on social media sites.

ii) They are using it as a medium to advertise and popularise their products or services
being offered across the globe.

iii) People use social media to collect charities or funds for social causes or national

iv) They share their views or raise their voice on certain social topics using this medium.

II) Positive impact of use of social media on the society:

Social media has brought changes majorly in the areas of business, innovation, politics and
education and careers. In this research paper an attempt has been made to anal yse the
positive impact of social media on society through each of these heads mentioned above.

1. Social media and business: The first positive impact of Social media can be seen
through its increased use by the business houses both small and large firms to provide
valuable information to their customers about their products and services being offered by
them. It acts as an important medium to share important and relevant information with the
people at large, in very short span of time and at very less cost.

Business houses have realized that they can use social media to give customers an insight
on the products being offered by them, stimulate demand, and generate targeted profits.
Thus, it is an important medium in the world of e-commerce in comparison to traditional
brick-and-motor businesses and their business methods.

Many studies suggested that social media was being used as an innovative method to
popularise the Brand of the business houses and save on advertising costs. Also specialised
knowledge can be spread easily and strengthen knowledge sharing leading to professional
bonding between the employees and removing workplace boundaries. Nurturing of valuable
relationships in the organisations was thus possible easily through social media.

2. Social media and Innovation: The second positive impact of Social media can be
provision of innovative or new ideas to people to offer something new to the society may be
in terms of new product or new service. Many have earned profits only through large
customer recommendations made by their friends and existing customers.
3. Also easy accessibility and minimal costs add to the benefit. E.g. Promotion of first
copy of famous brands at almost half price of the products is wavering the social media.
Huge demand is there from brand conscious people who earlier were not buying the product
due to its high price. With easy availability of first copy of same product at low price and at
your doorstep leads to increased use of social media as a platform to generate sales. Thus,
leading to growth of innovative business ideas.

4. Social media and Politics: Research has shown that nearly 65% of people get their
news updates from social media. Majority in this group are I.T. professionals or youngsters
who are mostly busy with their work on computers or are working in big MNC‘s where they
have less time to watch television or watch news channels.

The second influence of social media on politics can be seen from the political campaigns
of different leaders on different websites or social groups like

Twitter or Facebook. Moreover, followers of political leaders can communicate amongst

themselves or with their leaders or their assistants more freely and in multiple groups.

Thus, social media has revolutionised the way in which people can approach their leaders or
convey their message to their leaders in short time frame.

5. Social media and Education and Careers: Social media has created a deep impact on
education methods. Using Educational sites young children are learning through both audio
visual methods. Also the changing trends can be seen in methods of recruitment and
selection of employees. Around 20 percent of HR managers make their hiring decisions
based on information found on social media whereas around 50 percent of employers use
social networking sites to search for the potential candidates. In 2013 a survey was
undertaken by Pearson Learning Solutions ltd. Who reported a significant increase in the
use of social media in learning and nearly 50 percent of educators consulted agree d with the
increasing use of social media in selection of candidates. Blogs, LinkedIn, Twitter,
Facebook, Podcasts are now common tools for learning and development of employees.

III) Negative impact of use of social media on the society:

Social media has numerous benefits both to society and corporates. However with this
change, many negative effects too have emerged. People, especially young adults are
getting hooked on to this change and using it as a sole medium to stay connected to their
friends and families. It leads to severe health problems like aggression and lack of focus on
important tasks. Teenagers are facing problems of anxiety and depression. Also constant
concern about the posts, updates and likes on pictures or posts of teenagers has increased
the number of patients facing obsessive-compulsive disorder.
People only put up the good things in life for e.g. Instagram or Twitter or Facebook updates
and it may not be an accurate representation of their whole. Thus, teenagers or even adults
should remember this aspect of social media and not always envy others or think to consider
other important means of communication with friends and family and not only social media.
―The more likes I get, the better I feel about myself‖ should not be their life‘s ma ntra.

Thus, the negative impact of social media can be summarised as below:

1. Cyberbullying: Cyberbullying may be defined as the bullying of individuals on various

social sites using various digital devices like cell phones, computers, and tablets, etc.
Cyberbullying is done by using offensive language or putting offensive or abusive pictures
of someone through SMS, Text, and apps, or online in social media, forums, or gaming
where people can view, participate in, or share content. It is harmful as it damage s the
identity of oneself and often causes embarrassment or humiliation. At times cyberbullying
is considered unlawful or an activity of criminal nature. Cyberbullying mostly is undertaken

 Social Media like Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, etc.
 SMS (Short Message Service) also known as Text Message sent through devices.
 Instant Messages using various apps, and social media messaging features.
 Personal Email id‘s.

Michael Hamm, a researcher from the University of Alberta , in his study showed the
effects of social media on bullying and found out that every year nearly 23% of teenagers
report being targeted and 15 percent bullied someone on social media. Thus, this
percentage may increase in the times to come adding to the worries. Teenagers also misuse
social media platforms to show off about their possessions or spread rumours, share vulgar
videos or bully others. All this leads to harmful effects on the society.

2. Lack of confidentiality: Often the users of social media complain lack of secret
information. Misuse of personal information by hackers is very common. Identity thefts are
also heard off. By the time information reaches the actual person it is too late and creates
harm to the personality of the user.

3. Artificial relationships: Social media tends to build artificial relationships between

people. Youngsters are fascinated by the number of friends made and number of likes they
get on their photographs or posts. This indulges them in making more and more friends
whether known to them personally in real life or not. It also lacks in face to face
interactions and building communication skills which may harm their future developments.

4. Decreased Productivity: This is the problem with people working in big corporates or
I.T. companies who use digital techniques to socialise. Since they are mostly on computers
and have easy access to social websites in break times, it makes them addicted to social
networking sites and causes distraction from work. This decreases their productivity on
job. Also they may get distracted by what their friends are posting or which places are they
visiting, wasting their energies on irrelevant tasks.


In this research paper an attempt was made to study the impact of use of social media on the
society at large. Three objectives were laid down to identify why people use social media,
whether social media has positive effects on the societal behaviour or has any negative effects
on the society as a whole. Thus it was found out that Social media has positive outcom es which
outweigh its negative effects mentioned in the study. It may help not only individuals to
socialise but also to get educated from it and it is the choice of the individuals to use social
media in a positive way and benefit from it in their lives instead of misusing it.


 Byrd, A. (2013, November 21). Micro Mappers lets anyone become a digital humanitarian.
Retrieved from http://www.fastcompany.com/3021961/reverse-engineered/micromappers-lets-

 Cetin, M. (2013, November 7). The Beginner's Guide to TweetDeck. Retrieved from

 Donnelly, C. (2013, July). Asiana: the (tragic) sound of silence #CrisisPR #SMEM. Retrieved
from http://storify.com/columdonnelly/asiana-the-tragic-sound-of-silence-crisispr-

 Ellis, E. (2013, September 17). Gnip Blog – Social Data and Data Science Blog – Gnip.
Retrieved from http://blog.gnip.com/how-social-media-is-used-in-natural-disasters/

 Fema. (2013, June 18). IS-42: Social Media in Emergency Management – Lesson 2: The
Business Case for Using Social Media for Emergency Management. Retrieved from

 Fox, Z. (2013, May 21). Why Social Media is the Front Line of Disaster Response. Retrieved
from http://mashable.com/2013/05/21/social-media-disaster-response/

 Griggs, B. (2012, October 30). Sandy is the year‘s No. 2 topic on Facebook. Retrieved from

Consumer Attitude For Buying Organic Food
Anurita Sharma

Health and food safety in this stressful lifestyle compels the consumer to go for organic foods.
Organic foods are produced without using any chemicals. They do not have impurities or any pollutants
and hence do not cause any health hazard to human life. Since no chemical fertilizers are used to grow
them, they are not a threat to environmental safety either. The overall attitude of the people towards the
organic foods is changing towards the positive side.

Key Words: Organic foods, health, environmental safety.

In today‘s world many consumers are not aware about their rights. The marketers misuse this
ignorance of the consumers. Due to this the movement of consumerism is gaining momentum. "A
Consumer is the most important visitor on our premises. He is not dependent on us we are on him. He
is not an interruption to our work; he is the purpose of it. We are not doing a favour to a consumer by
giving him an opportunity. He is doing us a favour by giving an opportunity to serve him." This is a
popular quote given by Mahatma Gandhi. But the consumers are not actually treated that way. They are
not given their due importance. Consumer awareness is relatively low and still in its infancy in our
country. Most of the consumers are not aware of their rights. They have little information on the
product quality, price, protection against unsafe products, consumer education etc. The providers of
goods are reluctant to give due consideration to consumer interest protection.
Consumerism is a process through which the consumers seek redress, restitution and remedy for
their dissatisfaction and frustration with the help of their efforts and activities. Consumerism is infact a
social movement seeking to protect the rights of consumer in relation to the provider of goods and
services. Enhancing consumer satisfaction will in turn make society a better place to live in.
The awareness on the harmful effects of chemicals present in food is increasing among the
consumers. The trend towards purchasing organic food is growing among people. It is important to
identify what actually induces consumers to turn towards organic food. Some of the prominent
motivating factors to purchase organic foods include environmental concern, health concern and
lifestyle, product quality and subjective norms.The purchase intention of consumers is based on the
influences of factors like environmental concern, health concern and lifestyle, product quality and
subjective norms on the attitude towards organic foods. The quality of products, environmental
concern, health concern and lifestyle are the most commonly stated motives for purchasing organic
The organic foods are the food products which are not treated with chemical fertilizers or
pesticides during their production, processing and storage. The ill effect of these chemicals is being
realised by the people. There is a growing awareness among the consumer about the harmful effects of
these chemical pollutants.
Organic products are those made entirely from natural substances , grown without the use of
chemicals, inorganic fertilizers and pesticides. It is well defined as the products which do not carry any
pollutants or impurities to degenerate the environment, human or natural resources which can be
recycled ( Paul et. al., 2015; Shamdasani et. al., 1993).
Today‘s consumer is health conscious. The consumer is trying to find healthy food and to
follow healthy lifestyle in this competitive and demanding world. So the consumers attitude towards
organic food and his willingness to pay a high price for this is increasing day by day. Still the higher
price tag and the genuineness of organic food raises some doubts in his mind. This is one of the main
barriers of his purchase behaviour for organic food.
Though the concept of organic food products has originated in the developed countries like US,
UK and European countries, Asian consumers are also accepting the notion of ―Go Organic‖, which is
the result of increasing awareness about the pressing environmental issues and their alarming effects in
the health and immunity of people ( Laorche et. al.,2001).
With the growth of health consciousness and environmental awareness, organic products have
become a popular choice over inorganic or synthetic products. There is abundance in choices for the
consumer and the concept of organic products is still in its infant stage to be completely adapted to the
lifestyle of the Indian consumer. Most of the studies suggest that the consumers are not yet convinced
to change their purchasing pattern. There is confusion between organic and natural products because of
the lack of certification and labelling of the products which will give assurance of usage safety and its
nutritional value ( Mukherjee, B., 2017).
The overall awareness and the attitude of the people towards organic foods is changing towards
the positive side. The consumers are ready to buy organic foods for varied reasons . The main
motivations are their health concerns in this present stressful lifestyle and environmental concern.
People nowadays are also concerned about the environment they live in. So the consumer behaviour is
changing towards the purchase of many environment friendly organic products including food.

 Baisakhi Mukherjee 2017. IJCBM e-ISSN: 2319-2828 vol. 6, No. 1, Jan 2017.
 Justin Paul, Aswin Modi, Jayesh Patel, 2015 ―Predicting green product consumption using
theory of planned behaviour and reasoned action.‖Journal of retailing and consumer services-
 Michel Laroche, 2001. Targeting consumer who are willing to pay more for environment
friendly products. Journal of consumer marketing. Vol 18 Issue 6 pp. 503-520.
 Shamdasani, P., Chon-Lin, G.O.& Richmond, D. 1993. Advances in consumer research. Vol 20
: 488-493.

21व ीं सदी में दर्शनर्ास्त्र की उऩयोगिता
(The Relevance of Philosophy for the 21st Century)

अींककत चौरससया


दर्शनर्ास्त्र मा कपरोसोपी, सम्ऩण

ू श ब्रह्भाण्ड को आरोचनात्भक ढॊ ि से जानने औय सभझने का एक प्रमास हैं।

कपरोसोपी कोई ऐसा ननश्चचत ववषम(Discipline) नहीॊ हैं मह तो प्रत्मेक ववषम के सरए एक आरोचनात्भक

ववचाय(Critical thinking) दे ने की प्रकिमा भें अऩना मोिदान दे त हैं। मह तो ऐसा सभश्टिित र्ब्द हैं जो कई

ससद्ाॊतो को हभायी दृश्टि भें राता हैं क्मोंकक मह ससद्ाॊतो से ऩव

ू श सोच हैI इस सम्ऩण
ू श र्ोध-ऩर भें भैंने कपरोसपी

के भहत्व को २१ व र्ताब्दी भें सभझने औय जानने का प्रमास ककमा हैंI इसके अॊतिशत बायत म-दर्शन, ऩाचचात्म-

दर्शन, ऻानभ भाॊसा, तत्त्वभ भाॊसा, तकशर्ास्त्र, न नतर्ास्त्र, बाषा-दर्शन, योफोि-िे क्नोरोज भें ननहहत दार्शननक ववचायो

(Philosophical reflections) को असबव्मक्त कयने का प्रमास ककमा हैंI

ु मऩद (Keywords)- ऻानभ भाॊसा, तत्त्वभ भाॊसा, तकशर्ास्त्र, न नतर्ास्त्र, जैन-दर्शन, फौद्-दर्शन, अद्वैत-वेदाॊत,

ववऻान एवॊ प्राद्मौगिकी, THERAPEUTIC METHOD, र्ब्द-ब्रह्भ औय स्त्पोि ससद्ाॊत I

कपऱोसोपी क्या हैं?

सवशप्रथभ हभ मह जानने का प्रमास कयते हैं कक आखिय कपरोसोपी क्मा होत हैं औय साथ ही मह प्रमोि भें

कैसे राम जा सकत हैं। कुछ ववद्वानों के अनस

ु ाय कपरोसोपी को रव ऑव ववजडभ कहा िमा हैं। कुछ रोिो

का भानना हैं कक आत्भा का साऺात्काय कयना ही कपरोसोपी हैं। कपरोसोपी के हहॊदी अनव
ु ाद दर्शनर्ास्त्र को

महद हभ सभझे तो दर्शनर्ास्त्र भें र्ब्द ‘दर्शन’ दृर् धातु से व्मत्ु ऩन्न हुआ हैं श्जसका अथश हैं दे िना। रेककन

महाॉ दे िने का अथश कोई साधायण ढॊ ि से दे िना नहीॊ हैं फश्कक दे िने के साथ उसका आरोचनात्भक ऩयीऺण

कयना ब इसभें सश्म्भसरत हैं। इसप्रकाय दर्शनर्ास्त्र मा कपरॉसपी की इस तयह ऩरयबाषा उबयकय आत हैं कक हैं

दर्शनर्ास्त्र मा कपरोसोपी, सम्ऩण

ू श ब्रह्भाण्ड को आरोचनात्भक ढॊ ि से जानने औय सभझने का एक प्रमास हैं।

ू ये स्त्तय ऩय कपरोसोपी कोई ऐसा ननश्चचत ववषम(Discipline) नहीॊ हैं मह तो प्रत्मेक ववषम के सरए एक

आरोचनात्भक ववचाय(Critical thinking) दे ने की प्रकिमा भें अऩना मोिदान दे त हैं। मह तो ऐसा सभश्टिित र्ब्द

हैं जो कई ससद्ाॊतो को हभायी दृश्टि भें राता हैं क्मोंकक मह ससद्ाॊतो से ऩव

ू श सोच । मही ऩय कपरोसोपी अऩना

कामश प्रायम्ब कय दे त हैं। मही कायण हैं कपरोसोपी का अब ब उतना ही भहत्त्व हैं श्जतना आयॊ सबक कारो भें

यहा होिा। इसके साथ ही कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व तफ तक यहे िा जफ तक भानव यहे िा क्मोंकक भानव एक

ताककशक प्राण हैं इससरए भानव द्वाया ही कपरोसोपी का प्रमोि ककमा जा सकता है ।

कपऱोसोपी का २१ व र्ताब्दी में भ महत्तत्तव क्यों हैं ?

अफ हभ सफसे ऩहरे कपरोसोपी की र्ािाओ का ववचरेषण कयें ि,े कपरोसोपी के अॊतिशत भख्
ु म रूऩ से चाय

र्ािाओ को भहत्त्वऩण
ू श भाना िमा हैं –

1) ऻानभ भाॊसा(EPISTEMOLOGY)

2) तत्त्वभ भाॊसा(METAPHYSICS)

3) तकशर्ास्त्र(LOGIC)

4) न नतर्ास्त्र(ETHICS)

ऻानम माींसा(EPISTEMOLOGY)

ऻानभ भाॊसा भें ऻान के ववषम ,ऻान का स्त्वरुऩ ,ऻान की प्रभाखणकता- अप्राभाखणकता औय ऻान प्राश्तत के

साधनो का सब ऩव
ू ाशग्रहों से यहहत यहते हुए अध्धमन ककमा जाता हैं। वास्त्तव भें ऻानभ भाॊसा की वववेचना

भानव के ऻान प्राश्तत के साधनो के सरए की जात है अथाशत ऐसे कौन से साधन है श्जससे भानव ऻान प्रातत

कयता है औय एक दस
ू ये से व्मव्हाय स्त्थावऩत कय ऩाता हैं। मही कायण हैं कक कपरोसोपी की र्ािा ऻानभ भाॊसा

का आज २१ सेंचुयी भें ब इतना भहत्त्व इस कायण से हैं क्मोंकक भानव औय जित, भानव-भानव के भध्म

व्मव्हाय स्त्थावऩत कयने भें भहत्त्ऩण

ू श हैं।

तत्तत्तवम माींसा(METAPHYSICS)

कपरोसोपी की इस र्ािा के अॊतिशत भर

ू तत्त्वों की सॊख्मा ,उनका स्त्वरुऩ आहद का अध्धमन ककमा जाता हैं।

इसके साथ इस र्ािा भें मह जानने का प्रमास ककमा जाता हैं कक जित ककन तत्त्वों औय ककतने तत्त्वों से

सभरकय फना हैं औय इसका भर

ू कायण क्मा हैं। इसका भहत्त्व इस प्रकाय दे िा जाता हैं कक जफ कब भानव

यात्रर के सभम आकार् भें रफारफ बये ससतायों की औय ननहायता हैं तो उसके अॊतभशन भें मह प्रचन जरूय आता हैं

कक ऐस कौन स च ज हैं श्जससे भेया औय इस जित का ननभाशण हुआ हैं।


कपरोसोपी की इस र्ािा के अॊतिशत ऻात तथ्मों की सहामता से ऻान की तकों के भाध्मभ से सत्म औय

असत्मता का ननधाशयण ककमा जाता हैं। अथाशत इसभें ऻात तथ्मों के भाध्मभ से ककस अऻात वस्त्त-ु ववषम का

ऻान प्रातत ककमा जाता हैं। तकशर्ास्त्र का सफसे भहत्त्ऩण

ू श तथ्म मह है कक मह भानव को व्मावहारयक ज वन भें

सत्मता, असत्मता का ऻान प्रदान कयता हैं अथाशत क्मा सही है औय क्मा िरत हैं इनभे बेद कयता हैं क्मोंकक

जो अनब
ु व ऻान औय तकश ऩय आधारयत नहीॊ यहते हैं वे मा तो ऐश्छछक होते हैं मा अऻानजन्म।

न ततर्ास्त्र(ETHICS)

कपरोसोपी की इस र्ािा के अॊतिशत वववेकर् र भानव के उगचत -अनगु चत किमाकराऩों का ननधाशयण,नैनतक

ससद्ाॊतो मा आदर्ो के तहत ककमा जाता हैं। इसभें चाहहए का सॊदबश होता हैं। अथाशत भानव को क्मा कयना

चाहहए औय क्मा नहीॊ कयना चाहहए का वववेचन ननहहत होता हैं जैसा कक व्मावहारयक ज वन भें दे िा जाता है

कक भानव कई सभस्त्माओ से निया हुआ होता हैं औय वह मह ननणशम नहीॊ कय ऩाता है कक उसे क्मा कयना हैं मा

उसे क्मा चुनना चाहहए। न नतर्ास्त्र का भहत्त्व इस फात भें है कक मह भानव को ककॊ कतशव्मववभढ़
ू की श्स्त्थनत से

फाहय राकय सही ननणशम के चुनाव भें भहत्त्वऩण

ू श बसू भका प्रदान कयता हैं।

अफ हभ इस भद्द
ु े ऩय आते हैं कक २१ व र्ताब्दी भें कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व कभ हो यहा हैं मा हदनोहदन फढ़ यहा

हैं ? मा इसका भहत्त्व ही नहीॊ यह िमा ?? तो भेया भानना हैं कक वतशभान सभम भें कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व ऩहरे

से औय व्माऩक होता जा यहा हैं तथा बववटम भें मह औय ब अगधक होिा। हभ इसकी व्माऩकता को भख्
ु मता

त न ववषमो के तहत दे िेंिे जो की ननम्नसरखित हैं -

१- ववऻान एवॊ प्राद्मौगिकी भें भहत्त्व

२- साभाश्जक भहत्त्व

सफसे ऩहरे हभ वतशभान के सफसे प्रभि

ु व उऩमोि ववषम ववऻान भें कपरोसोपी को िोजने का प्रमास कयते हैं।

ववऻान का केंद्रीम उद्देचम तो भानव के र्ायीरयक ववकास से हैं जफकक कपरोसोपी भानव के सम्ऩण
ू श ववकास

ु तमा आॊतरयक ववकास भें भहत्त्वऩण
ू श होत हैं। अत् हभ दे ि सकते है कक कपरोसोपी का ऺेर ववऻान से

कही अगधक व्माऩक हैं। आिे हभ दे िते हैं कक प्राच न कार भें जफ ववऻान के ससद्ाॊतो का अश्स्त्तत्व नहीॊ था

तफ ब भानव म ववचाय(कपरोसोकपकर थॉट्स) ज ववत थे औय बववटम भें ब ववऻान के साथ दार्शननक ववचाय

अश्स्त्तत्व भें यहें िे श्जसका कायण मह है कक वैऻाननक ससद्ाॊतो, िोजो,आत्रफटकायो आहद के भर

ू भें दार्शननक

ववचाय ही होते हैं अथाशत ककस ब वैऻाननक ससद्ाॊत का फ ज एक दार्शननक ववचाय द्वाया ही फोमा जाता हैं।

श्जसके उदाहयण ननम्नसरखित हैं -

१-ववऻान का आधायबत
ू ससद्ाॊत ,प्रत्मेक कामश का कोई न कोई कायण अवचम ही होता हैं जो कक दर्शन का एक

ु ससद्ाॊत हैं। मह ससद्ाॊत कपरोसोपी भें दार्शननको की ववषम-वस्त्तु तफ से फना हुआ जफ कक ववऻान के

ससद्ाॊतो का वास्त्तववक अश्स्त्तत्व ही नहीॊ था।

२- वतशभान भें वैऻाननक ववसबन्न प्रमोिो द्वाया मह जानने का प्रमास कय यहे हैं कक इस ब्रह्भाण्ड की उत्ऩश्त्त

औय ववकास कैसे हुआ जो कक कपरोसोपी का ववषम आहदकार से फना हुआ हैं। साथ ही आधुननक वैऻाननक ब

दार्शननको द्वाया हदए िए ब्रह्भाण्ड की उत्ऩश्त्त औय ववकास के ससद्ाॊतो का सॊदबश रेते हुए अऩने वैऻाननक

प्रमोिो द्वाया उन्हें सत्मावऩत कयने का प्रमास कय यहे हैं।

३- श्जस प्रकाय ववऻान भें भानव औय जित के ववकास के सन्दबश भें अनेक ससद्ाॊत प्रस्त्तत
ु ककमे िए हैं उस

प्रकाय कपरोसोपी भें ब ववकास के अनेक ससद्ाॊत प्रस्त्तत

ु ककमे िए हैं।

इस प्रकाय हभ दे िते है कक कपरोसोपी का ऺेर ववऻान से कही अगधक व्माऩक हैं। महाॉ तक कक वैऻाननको का

ब भानना हैं कक कपरोसोपी आहदकार भें तफ ब ज ववत थ जफ ववऻान नाभ से कोई तत्त्व ही ववधभान नहीॊ

था औय बववटम भें ब ववऻान के साथ ववधभान यहेि क्मोंकक ववऻान का कामश व्मश्क्त को आयाभदामक ज वन

प्रदान कयना हैं जफकक कपरोसोपी का कामश व्मश्क्त को प्राभाखणक ज वन प्रदान कयना हैं।

अफ हभ कपरोसोपी का साभाश्जक भहत्त्व दे िने का प्रमास कयते हैं। वतशभान भें प्राद्मौगिकी ववकास ने श्जस

प्रकाय सम्ऩण
ू श जित को एकसर
ू भें फाॊधने का प्रमास ककमा हैं उस प्रकाय कपरोसोपी की र्ािा तत्त्वभ भाॊसा

ू श जित को एक रूऩ भें दे िते हुए उसको जानने का प्रमास कयते हैं।

1-वतशभान भें वैऻाननक श्जस ज वन भत्ृ मु के बेद को सर

ु झाने का प्रमास कय यहे हैं वह कपरोसोपी का एक

ु ववषम आहदकार से यहा हैं।
2-वतशभान भें मही ब दे िा जाता हैं श्जस प्रकाय ववऻान भें ईथय द्वाया र्ब्दों भाना िमा हैं उस प्रकाय

कपरोसोपी भें आहदकार से ही र्ब्द-ब्रह्भ औय स्त्पोि ससद्ाॊत को वववेगचत ककमा जाता यहा हैं। इसके साथ ही

र्ब्द औय अथश औय इनके फ च सॊफध

ॊ की वववेचना ब की जात यही हैं। स्त्पोि के भाध्मभ से बाषा को ब

सभझने का ब प्रमास ककमा जाता यहा हैं। महाॉ ध्वनन की ववर्द व्माख्मा औय र्ब्द को आकार् का िण
ु भाना

िमा हैं।

3-न्मयू ोसाइॊस वतशभान भें मह जानने का प्रमास कय यहा हैं कक भन व र्यीय भें कोई सम्फन्ध हैं मा नहीॊ ,अिय

कोई सॊफध
ॊ हैं तो वह ककस प्रकाय का हैं ?? जोकक कपरोसोपी भें वववेचन का एक प्रभि
ु ववषम यहा हैं।

4-वतशभान भें भानव का एक भहत्त्वऩण

ू श आमाभ धभश एवॊ यीनतरयवाज हैं जोकक भानव को भानव से भानव को

प्रकृनत से तथा प्रकृनत को प्रकृनत से जोडने का प्रभि

ु आधाय हैं। इस प्रभि
ु आधाय को कपरोसोपी अऩन

ऻानभ भाॊस म औय तत्त्वभ भाॊस म ससद्ाॊतो द्वाया स्त्ऩटि से ऩरयस्त्ऩटि कयने का एक औय एकभार भहत्त्वऩण
ू श

प्रमास कयता हैं।

5-कपरोसोपी ऻान को प्रातत कयने औय सभझने भें ताककशक प्रकिमा का अनस

ु यण कयत हैं। इस आधाय ऩय जैन

दर्शन ने अऩन कपरोसोपी भें सम्ऩण

ू श सभाज को ऐसा सभन्वमवादी ससद्ाॊत प्रदान ककमा हैं जो वतशभान भें ब

कई सभस्त्माओ को सर
ु झाने भें कायिय होता यहा हैं। इस ससद्ाॊत का नाभ है स्त्माद्वाद,श्जसके अॊतिशत भाना

जाता हैं कक सत्म ननयऩेऺ नहीॊ हो सकता हैं वयन सत्म साऩेऺ होता हैं। इसका तात्ऩमश मह हैं कक सभाज भें

अनेक भानव अऩन हठधसभशता औय अन्धववचवास के कायण कहते यहते हैं कक जो उनका भत हैं केवर औय

केवर वही सत्म हैं। इसप्रकाय की सभस्त्माओ को सर

ु झाने के सरए स्त्माद्वाद कहता हैं अऩने अनस
ु ाय सब के

भत साऩेऺत् सत्म हो सकते हैं। कहने का तात्ऩमश मह हैं कक कोई ब भत अकाट्म सत्म नहीॊ होता हैं। मही

सभन्वमवादी दृश्टिकोण सभाज को सभयसता के सर

ू भें फाॊधने का प्रमास कयता हैं। वही दस
ू यी औय बिवान फद्

सभाज को भाध्मभ भािश को फताते हैं चाय आमश सत्म के भाध्मभ से फॊधन भें ऩड़े योि को ननदानात्भक भािश

प्रर्स्त्त कयते हैं श्जसे ‘THERAPEUTIC METHOD’ कहा जाता हैं। जोकक कक २१ व र्ताब्दी भें ही नहीॊ अनॊत कार

तक ज ववत यहे िा।

6- साभान्मतमा सभाज भें सन

ु ा जाता हैं कक वतशभान भें भक
ू मों का ऩतन होता जा यहा हैं। इसका सफसे प्रभि

कायण मह हैं कक र्रू

ु आत दौय से ही भानवो से कपरोसोपी को अवित न कयाना। भेया तो सझ
ु ाव महाॉ तक हैं

कक स्त्कूरों भें ब कपरोसोपी के कुछ ऩाठ को रिामा जामे ताकक जड़ ही भक

ू मों को रेकय उऩजे। जैसा की दे िा
जाता हैं कक सड़क भें ट्रे कपक ये ड राइि होते हुए ब कुछ ससग्नर तोड़ते हुए ननकर जाते हैं। इसका सफसे फड़ा

कायण हैं भक
ू मों से अनसबऻ होना। उन्हें ऩता ही नहीॊ हैं क्मा सही है औय क्मा िरत। इसके सरए कपरोसोपी

की र्ािा न नतर्ास्त्र औय स्त्वमॊ कपरोसोपी अवित कया सकत हैं। मही कायण हैं २१ व र्ताब्दी भें कपरोसोपी

के भहत्त्व को औय व्माऩक रूऩ भें दे िा जा यहा हैं।

8- २१ व र्ताब्दी के आते आते प्राकृनतक आऩदाओॊ को व्माऩक रूऩ से दे िा िमा हैं। इन प्राकृनतक आऩदाओॊ के

न रुकने के कायण भानव भश्स्त्तटक इनका सभाधान धभश भें िोजने रिता हैं औय अन्धववचवास की ओय उन्भि

होने रिता हैं रेककन कपरोसोपी भानवो को इस अॊधये ऻान से प्रकार् की औय रे जात हैं औय सभाधानों को

िोजने भें प्रमास ब कयत हैं।

7- आज के हदनों भें ब कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व इससरए ब हैं क्मोंकक सक

ु यात श्जन्होंने 'KNOW THYSELF', दे कातश

‘I THINK THEREFORE I AM’ , अद्वैत वेदाॊत श्जसभे आत्भा के ववकससत रूऩ औय ज वन से सॊफध
ॊ कई ऐस

व्मावहारयक सभस्त्माओ को सर
ु झाने का प्रमास ककमा िमा हैं भानो ऐसा रिता हैं कक अद्वैत वेदाॊत को सभझने

के फाद कक ऻान भें स्त्नान कय सरमा हो।

उऩयोक्त वववेचन के तत्ऩचचात हभ ऩाते हैं कक २१ व र्ताब्दी भें कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व स सभत होने के स्त्थान

ऩय औय ही व्माऩक रूऩ से होता जा यहा हैं। वास्त्तव भें कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व चाहे वो २१ व र्ताब्दी हो मा

२५ व र्ताब्दी अथाशत बववटम भें कब ब कभ नहीॊ हो सकता हैं क्मोंकक जफ तक भानव इस जित भें

अश्स्त्तत्ववान हैं तफतक कपरोसोपी ब अश्स्त्तत्ववान यहे ि हैं। दस

ू ये स्त्थान हभने उऩयोक्त वववेचन भें ऩामा कक

कपरोसोपी वैऻाननक ससद्ाॊतो से ब ऩव

ू श हैं औय कपरोसोपी के कई ससद्ाॊतो को वैऻाननक आज ब सर
ु झाने भें

रिे हुए हैं। २१ व र्ताब्दी के आते-आते कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व इससरए ब फढ़ता जा यहा हैं क्मोंकक मह

िे क्नोरॉज भें ब प्रमक्

ु त हो यही हैं उदाहयणस्त्वरूऩ योफोि िे क्नोरॉज आहद। इसके साथ ही साथ वतशभान सभम

भें भक
ू मों के ऩश्ु टऩत औय ऩश्ककवत होने के सरए ब कपरोसोपी औय न नतर्ास्त्र भहत्त्वऩण
ू श हैं। आज कर फड़ा

प्रचसरत हैं कक ‘आज कर के रोि ये र्नर होने रिे हैं’ तो ये र्नर होने का कायण हैं कक वो अॊधववचवासों से दयू

होते जा यहे हैं। इसका सफसे फड़ा प्रबाव कही न कपरोसोपी का ही हैं क्मोंकक तकश से सरऩिी सोच कपरोसोपी भें

ही ननहहत हैं। जैसा काॊत ने कोऩननशकन िाॊनत के प्रबाव भें आकय कहा था कक फवु द् प्रकृनत का ननभाशण कयत

हैं।(Reason makes nature) मही कायण तकश सही रूऩ भें कपरोसोपी के भर
ू भें ही नछऩा हुआ हैं श्जसे जानने

औय ऩहचानने की आवचमकता भार हैं। अॊनतभ रूऩ भें सम्ऩण

ू श ववचरेषण से मही कहा जा सकता हैं कक २१ व

र्ताब्दी भें कपरोसोपी का भहत्त्व व्माऩक रूऩ से हभाये सभऺ हैं औय दे िा िमा हैं औय बववटम भें औय व्माऩक

होिा। कपरोसोपी एक ऐसा प्रकार् हैं जो अनाहदकार से प्रज्वसरत हो यहा हैं। २१ व र्ताब्दी भें ब प्रकार् दे

यहा हैं औय बववटम भें ब प्रकार् दे िा।

सन्दभश सच
ू -

 दासितु त,सयु े न्द्रनाथ. बायत म दर्शन का इनतहास(प्रथभ बाि). हहॊदी अन-ु करानाथ र्ास्त्र एवॊ सध
ु य

कुभाय. चतथ
ु श सॊस्त्कयण. जमऩयु : याजस्त्थान हहॊदी ग्रन्थ अकादभ , २०११.

 वभाश, सत्मकाभ. बाषातत्त्व औय वाक्मऩदीम. हदकरी: बायत म प्रकार्न, १९६८.

 अवस्त्थ , फछचूरार ”ऻान”. बायत म-दर्शन-ब्रह्त्कोर्. प्रथभ सॊ. हदकरी: र्ायदा ऩश्ब्रसर्ॊि हाउस, २०१२.

 चट्टोऩाध्माम,दे व प्रसाद.दर्शनर्ास्त्र के स्त्रोत. हहॊदी अनव

ु ाद-सर्
ु रा डोबार.याजकभर प्रकार्न, १९९२.

 र्भाश,चॊद्रधय. ऩाचचात्म दर्शन.हदकरी. भोत रार फनायस दास प्रकार्न,१९९२.

 नतवायी,अववनार्. तकशर्ास्त्र के ससद्ाॊत. सयस्त्वत प्रकार्न, २०११.

izkphu Hkkjrh; uhfrdkjksa us vusd fo|kvksa dh foospuk dh gSA mlh izdkj izFker% vkUohf{kdh] =;h]
okrkZ ,oa n.Muhfr bu pkj fo|kvksa dks jk"Vª dh j{kk ds fy, vko';d ekuk x;k gSA blh rdZ ds vk/kkj ij
pkokZd us Hkh vFkZ dks loksZRÑ"B ekuk gSA vFkZ ds O;ofLFkr lapkyu gsrq n.M dh vko';drk gksrh gSA fdUrq
n.M fo/kku ,d fopkj.kh; iz'u gS\ vkfndky ls n.Muhfr fpUru dk fo"k; jgk gSA ml le; Hkh n.Muhfr
dh O;oLFkk jgh gSA ftl izdkj ls vkt n.M fof/k gSA bl fof/k O;oLFkk ds vuqlkj fd;s x;s vijk/k dk
n.M fn;k tkrk gSA ftldk fØ;kUo;u U;k;ky; djrh gSA iz—fr us ekuo dks n.Muhfr iznku fd;k gSA dksbZ
Hkh n.M uhfr lEer gksuk pkfg,A blls lkekftd O;oLFkk lqpk: :i ls pyrh gSA ;fn uhfr lEer n.M
ugha gqvkA ,slh n'kk esa lkekftd <+kpk mxz :i ys ysrk gSA ftlds erHksn dks lekIr djus esa lfn;k¡ chr
tkrh gSA n.Muhfr izkphu dky ls U;k;fiz; gksus ds dkj.k vkSfpR;iw.kZ ekuk tkrk jgk gSA blds lEcU/k esa
czá oSKkfudksa dk ekuuk gS fd vijk/kh O;fDr;ksa dks ltk nsuk uSfrd vkSj /kkfeZd drO;Z gSA bl /kkfeZd
drZO; ds fy, n.Muhfr vko';d gSA n.Muhfr dk vkSfpR; ladYi dh LorU=rk ls gSA tgk¡ vusdksa uSfrdrk
ls Hkjs iz'u mRiUu gksrs gSA ,slh n'kk esa pkokZd us vFkZ vkSj n.Muhfr dh iz klafxdrk dks vko';d ekurs gSaA
Þyksd ;k=k dh] lqO;oLFkk ds fy, n.M&fo/kku vko';d gSAÞ1 tcfd pkokZd pkj Hkwrksa dks gh Lohdkj djrs
gSA bUgha pkj Hkwrksa ds vk/kkj ij vFkZuhfr vkSj n.Muhfr dk lapkyu djrs gSA ;s pkj rRo bl izdkj gSa %&
i`Foh] ty] vfXu] ok;q bUgha pkj rRoksa dk izR;{k gksrk gSA vkdk'k rRo dk izR;{k ugha gksrk gSA blfy, ik¡p
Hkwrksa dks pkokZd ugha Lohdkj djrs gSaA izR;{k dks gh ,d izek.k ekuus okys pkokZd us osnksa dh izekf.kdrk dks
vLohdkj djrk gSaA

osnksa ds fojks/k esa pkokZd dgrs gSa fd vfXugks= rhuksa osnksa dks Lohdkj djus okys f=n.M/kkjh 'kjhj esa
HkLe ysiu djus vkfn dh fof/k fo/kku dk iq:"kkFkZ ghu fudEes yksxksa ds thfodk dk lk/ku gSA blfy, ;g
lc O;FkZ dh ckrs gSaA pkokZd dh n`f"V eas fuÑ"Bksa ds fy, txg ugha gksuh pkfg,A budk lS)kfUrd i{k ;g
dgrk gS fd ;fn O;fDr nks"kh gSA mls Hkh n.M feyuk pkfg,A ;g deZdk.M ,oa Kkudk.M lapkyd vkpk;ksZa
¼ia.M+k&iqtkfj;ks½a dks fuf'pr 'kqYd ls T;knk ysrs gS mUgsa Hkh n.M fn;k tkuk pkfg,A D;ksafd dj iz.kkyh ls
jk"Vª ds vk; ds L=ksr dks c<+k;k tk ldrk gSA izR;sd lkslk;Vh] QeZ] laLFkku] ij VsDl yxk;k x;k gSaA D;ksa
u iwtk&vpZuk ds uke ij ,df=r /ku ij Hkh dj dh dVkSrh dh tkuh pkfg,A ftlls jk"Vª dh vkfFkZd
L=ksrksa ls csjkstxkjks leqfpr jkstxkj nsdj csjkstxkjh nwj dh tk ldrh gSA

pkokZd dgrs gSa fd /keksZa dk vkpj.k djuk fu"Qy gS] izR;{k rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij /kekZpj.k ds l|%
Qyksa dh izkfIr Hkfo"; esa n`f"Vxkspu ugha gksrhA /kekZpj.k ij pkokZd rdZ nsrs gS fd /kekZpj.k ugha djuk
pkfg,A ftlesa izR;{k dk ifj.kke yf{kr u gks ml ij le; u"V djus dh D;k vko';drk gSA blh dkj.k
/kkfeZd deZdk.Mksa ij gksus okyh bl vkfFkZd L=ksrksa dks uqd'kku djus okys O;fDRk dks n.M fn;k tkuk
uSfrdrk gSA fdUrq mudh ifjfLFkfr;ksa ds vk/kkj ij dj O;oLFkk dk fu/kkZj.k gksuk pkfg,A O;fDr ds xyr
dk;ksZa ds ifj.kke dh iq"Vh gksus ij mls n.M fn;k tkuk pkfg,A bldh lR;rk dk Kku ml O;fDr dks j[kuk
iMs+xkA tks bl izdj.k dk fu.kkZ;d gSA izR;sd O;fDr esa Lora= bPNk 'kfDr gksrh gSA blds uSfrd fu;eksa ds
mÙkjnkf;Roksa dks iw.kZ djrk gSA fdUrq uSfrdrk ds igyw dks tkurs gq, vogsyuk djuk n.M dk Hkkxh ekuk
tkrk gSA bldk rkRi;Z gS fd n.Muhfr ds vk/kkj ij vijk/kh dks n.M nsuk vko';d gksrk gSA O;fDr dks
ln~deZ ds fy, iqj"dkj vkSj fuÑ"Brk ds fy, n.M ikuk vfuok;Z gSA ftl izdkj ls vkt uSfrd ewY;ksa dk
gkL; gksrk tk jgk gSA orZeku esa Hkkjr gh ugha cfYd lEiw.kZ fo'o dh fojkV leL;k ds :i esa mHkj dj
lkeus vk jgk gSA bldk jkSnz :i ekuo ds fy, [krjukd gSA ftudk dksbZ vkSfpR; ugha gSA ekuo esa mis{kk]
vlarks"k vkfn dkj.kksa dk ifj.kke O;fDr eas fpM+fpM+kiu] vgadkj] bZ";kZ] }s"kq dh Hkkouk O;fDr dks vijk/k dh
vksj ys tkrh gSA jk"Vª ds vaUnj vijk/kksa dks iuius dk dkj.k tkrh; O;oLFkk] lkekftd] /kkfeZd mUekn vkSj
HkkbZpkjkokn vkfn dkj.kk gSA

pkokZd us dke dks gh iq:"kkFkZ ds :i esa Lohdkj djrs gSaA tcfd osnksa dh izekf.kdrk dks Lohdkj
djus okys /keZ] vFkZ] dke vkSj eks{k dks iq:"kkFkZ ekurs gSaA blh iq:"kkFkZ ds uke ij lkekftd O;oLFkk
tkfrokn dk x<+ cu xbZ gSA ;fn Å¡p&uhp ugha gksxAsa ogk¡ bl iq:"kFkZ ls vkfFkZd L=ksr ugha izkIr gksxkA
dke ds nks :i gS igyk fu"Bk ls esgur djus okyk O;fDr ¼Jfed] ukSdj] iz'kkld] Ñ"kd] m|ksxifr½ vkfn
viuh bZekunkjh vkSj esgur ls mUufr djus dh Js"Brk dks iq:"kkFkZ dgk tk ldrk gSA nwljk okluk] ftlls
lUrku mRifÙk dh dYiuk dh xbZ gSA mlesa O;lu ;k Mwcus dh ckr ugha dh xbZA okluk esa Mwcuk ekuo ds
var dk ewy dkj.k gSA pkgs jktk gks ;k lk/kq&lar ftlus Mwcus dh dksf'kl dh gSA mlus jk"Vª dh xfjek u"V
fd;k gSA ftlds fy, n.M ije vko';d gSA
lkekftd&/kkfeZd ,oa tkrh; O;oLFkk ds izfr vlarks"k ls mxrk gqvk vijk/k] ftldk mnkgj.k
v[kckjksa dh [kcjksa esa gksrk gSA bldks ns[kk tk; rks okLro es ;g vfr 'kks"k.k ØIV O;fDr ;k iz'kklu
tkfrokn] vf/kdkjksa dk guu vkfn ls fonzkgs mRiUu gksrk gSA ;gh lcls cM+k dkj.k vlarks"k dk gSA ftldk
lek/kku u fd;k tk, rks fnuks&
a fnu Hk;adj :i ysrk tk jgk gSA O;fDr Lo;a ds vlarks"k dks ugha ns[k ikrk
gSA fonzkgs djus dks rS;kj gks tkrk gSA dkj.k ds fcuk ifj.kke dks ugha Mw<+k tk ldrk gSA blh dkj.k orZeku
;qx oSpkfjd la?k"kZ ls tw> jgk gSA ftlds vk/kkj ij vkt pkokZd ds n.Muhfr dh vko';drk gSA fonzkgs dks
fu"izHkkoh vkSj fu;af=r djus dh vko';drk gSA Þfpjvrhrdky ,oa nwj fn'kk dh vksj nk'kZfud n`f"V ds fu{ksi
djus ij ge ikrs gSa fd vHkkjrh; nk'kZfud lEiznk; ij Hkh izkphu dky ls gh yksdk;frd tM+okn dk izHkko
jgk gSAÞ5 vkpk;Z pkokZd dk ekuuk gS fd fonzksg LoFkZ ds fy, vius izeq[k mÌs';ksa dh iwfrZ djus dh lqxfBr
;kstuk gSA bls gh vijk/k dh Js.kh esa j[kk tk ldrk gSA Hkkjr lcls T;knk vijk/k dh pisV essa gSA bldk
ewy dkj.k lÙkk esa LFkkfir ih<+h ;ksX; dks ekSdk nsuk ugha pkgrh gSA blls vlarq"V oxZ pkgs og
lkekftd&/kkfeZd ;k tkrh; {ks= gks lHkh esa fojks/k dh Hkkouk mRiUu gksuk LoHkkfod gSA blls /kkfeZd Vdjko
tkfrokn] vkSj vkfFkZd fo"kerk dks c<+kok feyrk gS] ftlds dkj.k O;fDr esa fonzkgs mRiUu gksrk gSA

bl “kks/k&i= esa lS)kfUrd rF;ksa dks ,df=r fd;k x;k gSA vr% “kks/k leL;k ij xgu fpUru vkSj
euu fd;k x;k gSA bl fpUru dh iqf"V gsrq f}rh;d L=ksrksa dk v/;;u fd;k x;k gSA pkokZd ds n'kZu esa
n.Muhfr dh vo/kkj.kkß fo"k; ij orZeku rF;ks dks ns[kus ls irk pyrk gS fd ;g fo"k; nk'kZfud n`f"V ls
mi;qDr yxrk gSA izR;sd O;fDr dk;Z rdZ ;k ckSf)d dlkSVh ds vk/kkj ij fu"d"kZ fudyk x;k gSA blls ;g
lkfcr gksrk gS fd n.Muhfr vko';d gSA

izÑfr }kjk iznÙk lq[k vkSj nq%[k ,d leku gSA ftls euq"; us /keZ dks Lohdkj djus ls lq[k vkSj
v/keZ ls nq%[k gksrk gSA bl izdkj ds rdksZa ds lEcU/k esa pkokZd dgrs gSa fd ;g lq[k vkSj nq%[k uked dYiuk
fujFkZd gSA euq"; LoHkko ls gh lq[k vkSj nq%[kh gSA blds vfrfjDr /keZ dk cks> ykn nsuk dksbZ vU; dkj.k
curk gSA blls lq[k dh izkfIr gksus okyh ugha gSA ftl izdkj ls e;wjksa dks izÑfr us lkSUn;Z iznku fd;k gSA
bldk dksbZ vU; fpf=r ugha djrk gSA mlh izdkj dksfdyksa dks e/kqj Loj dksbZ iznku ugha djrk gSA ;g rks
mldk izkÑfrd LoHkko ds vfrfjDr dqN Hkh ugha gSA bl e/kqjrk ds Loj dks lqudj mlds LoHkko dks vyx
Hkh ugha fd;k tkrk gSA
lekt es 'kkfUr vkSj O;oLFkk dk;e j[kuk jkT; dk ewy mÌs'; gSA jkT; vkius bl drZO; dk fuoZgu
vijk/kksa ds fuokj.k :iksa esa fd;k tkrk gSA vijk/kksa ij fu;a=.k djus gsrq Hkkjrh; lafo/kku esa Hkh izko/kku fd;k
x;k gSA ekuo lH;rk ds fodkl esa n.M dh O;oLFkk dk dk izpyu FkkA ftldk ewy ml lewg dk eqf[k;k
gksrk FkkA tks vijk/k vkSj n.M ij fu;a=.k djrk FkkA blhfy, n.Muhfr ekuo&lekt dh lokZHkkSfed izfØ;k
gSA vkfFkZd leL;k,sa izR;sd ekuo lekt esa gSA ekuo&lekt ds 'kq:vkrh nkSj es tc dkuwu vkSj U;k; iz.kkyh
dk izpyu ugh FkkA rc yksx vijk/kh O;fDr dks i'kqvksa ds leku vkpj.k djrs FksaA ml dky dh n.M
O;oLFk uhfr lEer ugha FkhA og vR;Ur vekuoh; :iksa esa dBksj ls dBksj n.M fn;k tkrk FkkA lekt dk
tSls&tSls fodkl gksrk gSA og mlh rjg ls fodkl dh fn'kk esa dne j[krk tkrk gSA mlh dk ifj.kke jgk
fd vkt vf/kdkjksa dk iz;ksx gksus yxkA pkokZd tSls nk'kZfudksa us vf/kdkjksa ds fy, Kkudk.M vkSj deZdk.M
dk [k.Mu fd;k gSA mlh dk ifj.kke fd vkt vf/kdkjksa vkSj drZO;ksa ds izfr O;fDr tkx:d gSA jkT;
vfLrRo esa vkrs gh lkekftd O;oLFkk 'kkld vkSj 'kkflr esa foHkkftr gks tkrk gSA tgk¡ ij foHkktu gksrk gS
ogha ls la?k"kZ dh lq:vkr Hkh gksrh gSA bldk vkxs urhtk gksrk gS fd 'kkld }kjk vius pgsrksa dks 'kklu
O;oLFkk dk xqyke cuk;kA ;g xqykeh rc rd pyrh jgh tc rd bu xqykeksa dk isV ugha Hkj x;kA tSls isV
Hkjk oSls gh fonzkgs mRiUu gks x;kA vf/kdre O;fDr;ksa ds vf/kd lqfo/kkvksa ds uke ij 'kkld }kjk vfu;af=r
ykHk nsdj dqN yksxksa dks c<+kus dh izo`fÙk us ekuo&ekuo ds chp erHksn mRiUu dj fn;kA n.Muhfr esa ,d
rkfdZd i{k dks ns[kk tk; rks fujks/kkRed fl)kUr mRiUu gksrk gSA ftldk vFkZ gS fu"ks/k djuk ;k jksdukA
bldk eryc gS fd ,slk n.M fn;k tkuk ftlls nwljk O;fDr ml izdkj dk vijk/k u djsA n.Muhfr dk
eryc gS fd vijk/k dks jksdukA ftlls dksbZ O;fDr vijk/k u djsA bl gsrq n.M fn;k tkrk gSA fu.kZ;d
}kjk ,d O;fDr dks n.M fn;k tkrk gSA mlls ;g dgk tkrk gS fd rqEgs n.M blfy, fn;k tk jgk fd dksbZ
nwljk O;fDr vijk/k djus dh dksf'kl u djsA fujks/kkRed n.Muhfr dk rkRi;Z gS fd fdlh dks Hkh vijk/k
djus ls jksdukA
n.Muhfr dh O;oLFkk ds }kjk nwljs O;fDr;ksa dks psrkouh nh tkrh gSA n.M dh O;oLFkk rks
vukfndky ls gSA ysfdu vijk/k vkt Hkh gks jgs gSaA lR; pkgs tks Hkh fdUrq vijk/kksa es fnuksa&fnu c<+ksÙkjh gks
jgh gSA Hk; ls vijk/k dks ugha jksdk tk ldrk gSA O;fDr vijk/k tkudj ugha djrs gSa] ysfdu Hk; ls dHkh
Hkh vijk/k dks jksdk ugha tk ldrk gSA ijUrq vijk/kksa dk lh/kk lECkU/k euq"; ds eu ls gksrk gSA vr% vijk/kksa
ds fuokj.k ds fy, O;fDr dh nq"izo`fÙk;ksa ij fu;a=.k djuk vko';d gSA vijkf/k;ksa dks n.M nsdj lekIr
djus dh ea'kk xyr gSA vijkf/k;ksa ds lewg dks lekIr djus ds fy, n.M vko';d gSA fQj iz'u ;g mRiUu
gksrk gS fd vijk/kh dksbZ Hkh O;fDr tUetkr ugha gksrk gSA O;fDr dks vijk/kh rks ifjfLFkfr;k¡ cuk nsrh gSA
vkt rd ,slk dksbZ mnkgj.k ugha gS] fd ,d ifjokj ds lHkh lnL; ,d leku vijk/k djrs gksAa blds
foijhr vusdksa mnkgj.k gSA tgk¡ firk vijk/kh rks iq= lnkpkjh jgk gS] vFkok firk vkn'kZ O;fDr rks iq=
vijk/kh jgk gSA ;gk¡ rd dh ekrk dh eerk us iq= dh yksd yTtk ls gR;k djuh iM+h ;k mls Qsduk iM+kA
bls D;k dgk tk ldrk gS ftl izdkj ls dqUrh iq= d.kZ blls cM+k ikfjfLFkfrd mnkgj.k D;k gks ldrk gSA
vr% vijk/kksa ds fuokj.k ds fy, bu ifjfLFkfr;ksa esa lq/kkj ykuk vko';d gSA vkt orZeku ifjos'k es ;g
ns[kus dks fey jgk gS fd vijk/k dksbZ nwljk O;fDr djrk gS ijUrq mldh ltk v'kDr ,oa fujhg O;fDr;ksa
dks feyrk gSA iqfyl }kjk mu osxqukgksa dks idM+ dj yk;k tkrk gS] vkSj muls eupkgs txg ij gLrk{kj ,oa
vxw¡Bk yxok dj mudh etcwjh vkSj vKkurk dk ykHk mBk djA mudksa nwljksa ds tqeZ dk tqehZ cuk fn;k
tkrk gSA ;g izR;{k :i ls ns[kus dks feyrk gSA lEizs{k.k xzgksa esa Hkh vusdksa mnkgj.k gSA ftudk Hkfo";
vU/kdkj e; gks tkrk gSA og vius Hkfo"; dks lksprk gS rks muds eu es fopkj mRiUu gksrs gaSA og fonzksg
vkSj vkUnksyu dk ewy Lo:Ik dks ysdj [kM+k gks tkrk gSA bl iz'u ds mÙkj esa pkokZd dgrs gS fd
ÞckY;koLFkk dk 'kjhj r:.kkoLFkk ls fHkUu vki fdl vk/kkj ij ekurs gSaA dsoy vo;oksa esa o`f) gks xbZ
blhfy, vkius iwoZ 'kjhj dk uk'k vkSj u, 'kjh dh mRifÙk ekudj iwokZoLFkk ds Lej.k ds fy, vkRek dk
vyx dj MkyhAÞ7 mldk fonzkgs leku O;oLFkk dk;e djuh gSA vFkkZr~ lekurk] Lora=rk] ,oa cU/kqRo dh
LFkkiuk ds fy, la?k’kZ djuk gSA tgk¡ u dksbZ NksVk u cM+k] tgk¡ u dksbZ vehj vkSj u xjhc] u dksbZ
tehunkj vkSj u dksbZ Hkwfeghu gksxk] u tkfrokn gksxk u NqvkNwr dk Hksn] u dksbZ “kks’kd gksxk u dksbZ “kksf’kr]
tgk¡ ij lHkh ,d leku gksxsa lHkh ds ekulEeku dk [k¸;ky gksxkA tgk¡ lHkh O;fDr;ksa dks vius ekulEeku
ds izfr o vkius gd ,oa vf/kdkjksa ds izfr yM+us yxrk gSA pkokZd dh n.Muhfr ls ;g ckr Li"V gks tkrh gS
fd fdlh O;fDr ij vijk/k cks> ugha cuk;k tk ldrk gSA vijk/k dh xEHkhjrk dks ns[kdj fu.kkZ;d }kjk
n.M nsuk pkfg,A ;gk¡ rd fd ;fn NksVk lk vijk/k gSA mlesa n.M fn;k tkrk gSA rc ;g ckr Li"V gks
tkrh gS fd vU; cM+s vijk/kksa ds fy, fdlh Hkh O;fDr dks gtkjksa ckj lkspus ds fy, etcwj gksuk iM+x
s kA nks"kh
dks fu.kkZ;d }kjk dBksj vkSj tfVy n.M fn;k tkuk mlds vijk/k ij fuHkZj djrk gSA n.Muhfr ds
lq/kkjkRed fl)kUrksa ij fopkj djrs gq,A ;g dgk tkrk gS fd mls mnkj n.M ls nf.Mr fd;k tkuk pkfg,A
ijUrq fdlh Hkh n'kk es n.M vijk/k dh rqyuk eas gh gksuk pkfg,A n.Muhfr lekt ds yksxksa dks fo'okl
fnykus dk ,d ek/;e gSA mlls lekt esa psruk dk izokg gksrk gSA Hkz"Vkpkj vkt ds le; dh lcls cM+h
chekjh gSA ftlls dksbZ Hkh jk"Vª vkSj lekt ml chekjh ls nwj ugh gSA cgqr gh de yksx ,sls feyxs tks bl
chekjh ds f'kdkj u gq, gksA ;g vkt ds ;qx dk cgqr gh cM+k izcU/ku cu x;k gSA igys lekt ,oa tula[;k
ds ;qx esa O;fDr dk O;ogkj cgqr gh lqxe vkSj ljy FkkA yksx viuh laLÑfr vkSj bZ'oj dh vkLFkk ds dkj.k
Mjrs FkaAs D;ksafd izR;sd fonzksg dk ifj.kke bZ'oj t:j nsrk gSA fdUrq pkokZd dh bZ'oj vkSj deZdk.M dh
izekf.kdrk us csn[ky dj fn;k gSA bu ekU;rkvksa dks udkjrs gq, u tkus fdrus vijk/k gksrs gSaA iki djus
dk n.M ujd es Hkksxuk iMrk gSSA lR;] U;k; vkSj /keZ dh ydhj ij pydj vkxs vkus okys le; esa lQyrk
gkfly dh tk ldrh gSA ijUrq vkt ds bl u;s eksM+ esa izR;sd jkLrs gh cny x;s gSaA csjkstxkjh] egxkbZ]
foKku vkSj rduhdh dk fodkl vkS|ksxhdj.k ds dkj.k egxkbZ vkdk'k Nw jgh gSSA xjhc&xjhc vkSj
vehj&vehj gksrk tk jgk gSA 'kks"kd&'kksf"kr dk HksnHkko Hkh viuh pje lhek ij vk jgk gSA miHkksDrkoknh
ekuo us HkkSfrd vko';drvksa dh c<+ksÙkjh ds dkj.k Hkksx foykl dks vkiuh vko';drk cuk fy;kA ftldk
egRoiw.kZ dkj.k 'kks"k.k vkSj vR;kpkj ds dkj.k gj pkSjkgs ij fonzksg vkSj vkrad fn[kkbZ ns jgk gSA budk u
dksbZ /keZ gS vkSj u gh dksbZ etgc bues lcls cM+k vkØksl csjkstxkjh vkSj tkrh; vkrad gSA

fu"d"kZr% pkokZd ds n'kZu esa vFkZ ,oa n.Muhfr ekuoh; thou dk vk/kkj gSA ftlds fcuk 'kklu
O;oLFkk pykuk eqf'dy gSA ;fn vijk/kh dks mlds vijk/k dk n.M ugha fn;k tkrkA rHkh lekt esa ,d
nwljk O;fDr dRysvke dksgjke epk nsrk gSA vkt nwljksa dks n.M nsuk vijk/k dks de djus ds fy, gksuk
pkfg,A blh fopkj/kkjk ds vk/kkj ij gh n.M fn;k tkrk gSA ftlls lkekftd O;oLFkk dks lq/kkj fd;k tk
ldsA mldks mlh ds deZ Qy dk ifj.kke n.Muhfr nsrh gSA Hkkjrh; laL—fr esa Hkh dgk x;k gSA ;g ugh
Hkwwyuk pkfg, dh bu ifjfLFkfr;ksa vkSj foo'krkvksa dk /;ku ugha j[kk tkrk ftuds dkj.k mlus vijk/k fd;k
gSA eu tc ifjfLFkfrtU; vijk/k djrk gSA ogk¡ ls vusdksa vijk/k dks de djus ds fy, n.M O;oLFkk dh
tkrh gSA fdUrq n.M O;oLFkk esas HkkbZpkjkokn gksus ij nwljk i{k vØked gks tkrk gSA ,sls ifjfLFkfrtU;

vijk/k dh Js.kh esa vkrs gSaA bu vijk/kksa ij n.Muhfr dks lqfprkiw.kZ gksuk pkfg,A ftlls vlarks"k ugha O;fDr
dks larks"k izkIr gksA ;gha n.Muhfr dk ewy fl)kUr gSA

1. vkpk;Z vkuUn >k] mÙkj izns'k fgUnh laLFkku] y[kuÅ 2005] i`"B 11
2. MkW- uUn fd'kksj nsojkt] mÙkjizns'k fgUnh laLFkku] y[kuÅ] 2002] i`"B 144
3. MkW- lokZuUn ikBd] pkS[kEck fo|kHkou] okjk.klh&1] 1965] i`"B
4. MkW- lokZuUn ikBd] pkS[kEck fo|kHkou] okjk.klh&1] 1965] i`"B
5. MkW- lokZuUn ikBd] pkS[kEck fo|kHkou] okjk.klh&1] 1965] i`"B
6. MkW- lokZuUn ikBd] pkS[kEck fo|kHkou] okjk.klh&1] 1965] i`"B

7. Jh f'konÙk 'kekZ prqosZnh] fd'kksj fo|k fudsru] HknSuh] okjk.klh] 1980]

i`"B 8

ekDlZoknh fopkj/kkjk ges'a kk 'kksf"kr ihfM+r etnwjksa ds gd fnykus ds i{k/kj jgh gSA bl fopkj/kkjk esa
lekt'kkL=h] jktuhfrK] bfrgkldkj] Økafrdkjh vkSj i=dkj vkfn lekt lq/kkjd ds :i esa lkE;oknh
fopkj/kkjk ls tqM+s jgsaA blhfy, dkyZekDlZ dks lcls cM+k jktuhfrd ØkfUrdkjh lekt lq/kkjd dgk tkrk gSA
lekt esa gksus okys vusd 'kks"k.k tSlh ?kVukvksa dks izdk'k esa ykus dk iz;kl djrs jgsaA ;gk¡ rd lekt dk
,d fgLlk ekuo thou dh vusd ?kVukvksa dk ifj.kke <w<+us yxrk gS fd ,slh D;k n'kk mRiUu gqbZ tgk¡
vkykspukRed igyw mRiUu gksus yxsA ml le; oSKkfud izxfrokn dks c<+kok feyus yxrk gSA ftl izdkj ls
vuwiiqj ftys esa vkS|ksfxd fodkl rks fd;k gSA fdUrq mu etnwjksa ij gksus okys vR;kpkj dk tckonkj dkSu gS
;g fopkj.kh; iz'u gS\ vkS|ksfxd fodkl us ekuo ds vlyh :i dks 'kks"k.k djds T;knk&ls&T;knk iSlk
dekuk pkgk gSA bu QSfDVª;ksa ds }kjk mu etnwjksa ls izfrfnu pkj xquk vkenuh dk dk;Z djok;k tkrk gSaA
mUgsa muds ifjJfed dk ,d fgLlk Hkh ugha fn;k tkrk gSA ,slh fLFkfr esa 'kks"k.k ds fo:) vkokt mBkuk
ykteh gSA blh dkj.k ekDlZoknh fopkj/kkjk esa iw¡thoknh O;oLFkk ds :i esa nks oxZ mRiUu gksrs gSaA igyk
cqtqZvk oxZ nwljk loZgkjk oxZ gSA bu rF;ksa ds vk/kkj ij igyk cqtZqvk oxZ loZgkjk oxZ ls fd;s x;s dk;ksZa dk
iwjk /ku gM+i ysrk gSA ;gh iw¡thifr oxZ ges'kk loZgkjk oxZ dk 'kks"k.k djrk gSA ;gh iw¡thifr yksx lkekftd]
vkfFkZd vkSj dkuwuh :iksa esa lÙkk gfFk;kus ds fy, vfu;af=r 'kks"k.k djrs gaSA ftlls etnwj&etnwj gksrk
tkrk gS vkSj iw¡thifr&iw¡thifr gksrk tkrk gSA ,slh folaxfr;ksa ds dkj.k oxZla?k"kZ 'kq: gks tkrk gSA blhfy,
dkyZekDlZ dgrsa gS fd iw¡thoknh O;oLFkk dks dsoy ØkfUr ds ne ij gh fxjk;k tk ldrk gSA ;fn lQy
gqvk rks ogk¡ oxZfoghu lekt dk fuekZ.k gksxkA blls rkuk'kkgh [kRe gksxhA lekt esa lerk dk;e gksxhA

bl 'kks/k i= ds 'kh"kZd vuwiiqj ftys dk HkkSxksfyd v/;;u lkE;oknh fopkj/kkjk ds lUnHkZ esa f}rh;
'kks/k lkekxzh ds }kjk v/;;u fd;k x;k gSA bl gsrq iqLrdksa i=&if=dkvksa ds ek/;e ls Hkh v/;;u dk
vk/kkj cuk;k x;k gSA

 lkE;oknh fopkj/kkjk ij iM+us okys 'kks"kdksa ds izHkko dk v/;;uA

 'kks"k.k ds fo:) fu;eksa dk v/;;uA
 dEifu;kas ds vUrxZr etnwjksa dh lqj{kk dk v/;;uA
mijksDr v/;;uksa dk vk/kkj dkyZ ekDlZ dks fy, x;k gSA dkyZ ekDlZ ds vuqlkj & vk/kqfud]
iwthoknh O;oLFkk dks flQZ Økafr ls gh lekIr fd;k tk ldrk gSA bl izdkj dE;wfuLV ikVhZ og ikVhZ gS]

tks lkE;okn ds lkekftd ,oa vkfFkZd fl)kUrksa ij Hkjkslk j[krh gS ,oa mu y{;ksa dks izkIr djusa dk iz;kl
djrh gSA
lu~ 1917 dh :lh Økafrdkjh vfHk;ku us ekuo eas vlhe ifjorZu dh ygj iSnk dj fn;kA tgk¡ ij
:l dh cksy lsfcd ikVhZ dh fo'o Hkj esa mldh xfrfof/k;ksa dks viukus dh dksf'kl dh xbZA tgk¡ ij
dE;wfuLV ikfVZ;ksa ds chp esa vkilh rkyesy j[kus ds fy, ekpZ 1919 esa ekLdksa ds dE;wfuLV
International ¼dkfeuVeZ½ ikVhZ dh LFkkiuk dh tkrh gSA
dkyZ ekDlZ ds lkE;oknh fopkj/kkjk us varjkZ"Vªh; dE;wfuLV laxBu ds }kjk iw¡thoknh O;oLFkk dks
viuk fgLlk izkIr djus ds fy, miyC/k lk/kuksa ¼esa 'kL= cy lfgr½ yM+dj iwt
a hifr oxZ dks m[kkMdj+
Qsduk FkkA blhfy, dkfeuVuZ ds laxBudÙkkvksa us ;g ?kks"k.kk djrs gS fd fo'o ds lkjs lkE;oknh nyksa dks
,dtqV gksus dh vko';drk gSA tgk¡ lHkh ds lkFk ,d leku fopkj/kkjk dk ifj.kke fudkyk tk ldsaA blds
cy ij ekuoh; laons ukvksa dk ifj.kke gh ,d jk"Vªh; Lrj dk ifj.kke gSA
dE;wfuLV varjjk"Vªh; ¼1919 ls 1943½ dks gh la{ksi esa dkfeuVuZ ds uke ls lEcksf/kr fd;k x;kA
ftldh 'kq:vkr ekpZ 1919 ds ekWLdks esa gqbZ FkhA lu~ 1919 ls 1935 ds chp dE;wfuLV varjkZ"Vªh; lHkkvksa dh
izfr;ksfxrk dk ifj.kke gh fn[kkbZ nsrk gSA tgk¡ ij ekuo dk O;ogkj gh bZLVkfyu ds }kjk Hkax gksus okyh
dE;wfuLV bUVjus'kuy ds y{; dks izkIr djus ds fy, ;g ;kstuk dks Lohdkj fd;k x;k gSA
lu~ 1943 esa bZLVkfyu }kjk bl izLrko dks Hkax dj fn;k x;kA tgk¡ dE;wfuLV baVjys'kuy dk y{;
dks Hksnus ds fy, vUrjkZVªh; iwt
a hoknh oxZ dks m[kkM+ Qsdus ds fy, lHkh izdkj ds Jfedksa dks ,df=r djus
dk iz;kl djuk 'kq: dj fn;kA ftlds ek/;e ls ,d vfM+x vkUnksyu pyus yxrk gSA ogk¡ iwt
a hoknh laxBu
dk iru izkjEHk gks x;kA blh dkj.k bldksa ekuoh; vk/kkj ij gksus okys gh thou dh vusd dfBukbZ;ksa dks
ifj.kke dks thou dk vk/kkj ifj.kke gksuk lEHko gksrk gSA dkyZ ekDlZ ds vuqlkj ÞvU;k;] vuSfrdrk 'kks"k.k
lc vkfFkZd fo"kerk ls tUes gSa] tks vfrfjDr ewY; ds fl)kar vkSj mRiknu ds oxZ ;qx ls iSnk gq, gSaAÞ1
vk/kqfud lkE;oknh vkUnksyu dh fo'ks"krk 'kks"k.k eqDr djus dh jgh gSA blh dkj.k dkyZ ekDlZ dh
fopkj/kkjk ekuo lekt dks leku volj nsus ds i{k eaas ,d ØkfUrdkjh dne gSA tgk¡ xjhc vkSj etnwjksa dks
muds leku vf/kdkj dks iznku djus ds i{k esa ekDlZ dk fl)kUr vkt Hkh lgk;d fl) gks jgk gSA ekDlZokn
,d fopkj/kkjk ftldk ewy ekDlZ ,oa ,xsYe tSls nk'kZfudkas us ys[ku dk vf/kdkfjd :Ik ls tkx:d djus
dk iz;kl fd;k gSA ekDlZoknh n'kZu ds us oxZ la?k"kZ ds fy, vUnksfyr djrs gSA ;g la?k"kZ vf/kdkj izkIr djus
ds i{k esa FksA ftldk ekSfyd :i ls ,d oxZ dk foHkktu gks tkrk gSA ftlesa ,d oxZ iw¡thifr gksrk gSA
nwljk iw¡th ls oafpr oxZ gSA lekt esa nks oxZ foHkftr gksdj laifÙk dks cjkcj&cjkcj ckVus ds i{k eas ,d
rF; LFkkfir dj nsrs gSA tgk¡ laLFkk dk ,d ifj.kke ;g Hkh lkeus vkrk gSA tks iw¡thifr gS og Jfedksa ds
'kks"k.k dh dekbZ dks futh lEifÙk ekurk gSA ekuo lH;rk ds bfrgkl us nks oxZ jgs dk gh mnk; gqvk gSA
,d mRiknu ds lk/kuksa dk Lokeh ¼vehj½ nwljk bu mRikfnr oLrqvksa dk Jfed tks mu mRinku dh oLrqvksa
ls oafpr Jfed gSA2 mRiknu ds lk/ku ds Lokeh tks vU; oxksZ dk 'kks"k.k djrs gSaA vk/kqfud le; esa mRiknu

ds lk/ku ds Lokeh dksa iwathifr dgk tkrk jgk gSA ftldksa gh ekDlZoknh fl)kUr us vk/kqfud iw¡thoknh
O;oLFkk esa nks gh oxksZa dks tUe fn;k gSA igyk cqtqZvk oxZ nwljk loZgkjk oxZA
a hifr Je'kfDr ds }kjk cukbZ xbZ vf/kdkf/kd jkf'k ij viuk dCtk djuk pkgrk gSA ftlls etnwj
vkSj etnwj gksrk tk jgk gSA iw¡thifr vkSj iw¡thifr gksrk tk jgk gSA
lkE;okn dk fl)kUr bl fopkj ij vk/kkfjr gS] fd nqfu;k esa etnwjksa dk 'kks"k.k gks
jgk gSA vehjh xjhch dh [kkbZ c<+rh tk jgh gSA 'kks"k.k djrs gSa vkSj os tu ekul ds xqyke gksrs tk jgs gSA
;g xjhch dk lcls cM+k ifj.kke ekuk tkrk gSA ;gh dkj.k gS fd iw¡thifr vfu;af=r :Ik ls dk;Z djckrk
gSA tgk¡ ekuo dk thou ;kiu gh nwHkj gksrk tk jgk gSA ftlds fy, ekuoh; thou dk vkSfpR; gh lekIr
gks x;k gSA3
dkyZ ekDlZ 'kks"k.k 'kCn dk iz;ksx fd;k gS] fd xjhcksa ls vf/kd dk;Z djokdj mUgsa muds ifjJfed
dk iwjk ifjJfed u nsdj vk/kk&v/kwjk nsus dh izo`fÙk 'kks"k.kdkjh vkSj neudkjh jgh gSA vkt Hkh futh laifÙk
ij iw¡thifr dk dCtk gSA ftls lekIr dj lEiw.kZ etnwjkas es forfjr fd;k tkuk pkfg,A fdlh Hkh O;fDr ds
ikl futh laifÙk ugha gksuh pkfg, D;ksafd futh lEifr dk ekfyd gh Jfedk }kjk mRikfnr oLrqvksa dh foØ;
ewY; ugha fey ikrk gSA tgk¡ muds }kjk mRikfnd oLrqvksa dks gM+Ik ysrk gSA4 bu iw¡thifr;ksa dk tokc gS] fd
,d ek= ekfyd jkT; gksuk pkfg,A bUgha dkj.kksa ls ekDlZ us iw¡thoknh fl)kUr dh vkykspyuk djrk gSA ;g
Jfedksa dks vf/kdkj ugha feyrk mlsa Nhu dj ysuk pkfg,A fdUrq loZgkjk oxZ dh rkuk'kkgh bu Jfedksa dks
etcwj dj nsrh gSA ogk¡ ij 'kklu iz'kklu Hkh mUgha iw¡thifr;ksa dks /;ku nsrh gSA blds fy, ljdkj dks
dne mBkuk pkfg,A

loZgkjk dh rkuk'kkgh dk vk'k; vfu;af=r iw¡th dks ,df=r djukA blh dkj.k dkyZ ekDlZ dh
fopkj/kkjk bl vijk/k ls jksdus dk dk;Z djrh gSA tgk¡ ekDlZ ds ewY;ksa dk mn; gksrk gSA ekuo thou esa
rhu phtksa dh vko';drk gksrh gS & jksVh] diM+k] vkSj edkuA vr% bUgha rhuksa dh vko';drk dh iwfrZ gsrq
lkjk thou O;rhr gks tkrk gSA bl dk;Z dks djus ds fy, eq[; :i esa nks gh oxZ egRoiw.kZ gksrs gSA igyk
a hifr oxZ] nwljk etnwj oxZ vFkkZr~ ,d ekfyd gS] rks nwljk budk nkl gSA fdlh Hkh {ks= esa dk;Z djus ds
fy, /ku vkSj Je dh vko';drk iM+rh gSA blls ekuo vkt Hkh ugha mcj ik jgk gSA blds fy, u;s fopkj]
ubZ lksp] u;s vuqla/kku dh vko';drk eglw'k gksrh gSA ml fl)kUr dks ewfrZ:i nsus dk vk/kkj 'kks"k.k foghu
lekt dh LFkkiuk djuk gSA bldks djus ds fy, Je oxZ Hkh vge Hkwfedk fuHkkrk gSaA ,d oxZ laiUu rks
nwljk oxZ foiUurk] nfjnzrk fy, gq, thou thus dks etcwj djrk gSA lekt vkt Hkh viuh Lora=rk dks
<w<+rk fQj jgk gSA fdUrq yxrk gS fd og vius thou dks gh lekIr dj ysrk gSA mls lqdwu ugha fey ikrk
gSA vkt ds nkSj esa thou ds fy, la?k"kZ djuk cgqr gh dfBu gS fdUrq mls ljy cukus ds fy, mls dfBu
ifjJe dh vko';drk vkSj la?k"KZ dh gSA D;ksafd tula[;k dh yxkrkj o`f) euq";ksa dks euq"; ls la?k"kZ ds
fy, ck/; djrh gSA dh blh otg ls balku jkr&fnu dk;Z djrk jgrk gSA ysfdu viuh lHkh t:jrs iwfrZ
ugha dj ikrk gSA D;ksafd gekjk Jfed leqnk; dHkh ;s lksp gh ugha ikrk gS] fd Je gesa dc] dgka] fdrus
?k.Vs djuk pkfg,A dc vkjke djuk pkfg,A ekuo dks e'khu dh rjg iw¡thifr isjuk pkgrk gSA Je ls
thou dks ,d fnu vkjke dh Hkh vko';d gSA euq"; ds lkeus cgqr cM+h fcM+Ecuk gS] fd thou dks dSls bu
a hifr O;fDr ds chp jgdj Lora= :i ls dk;Z djsA D;ksafd m|ksxifr ges'kk vR;kf/kd yksHk ds fy,
Jfedksa dk 'kks"k.k djrk gSA ml Jfed ls T;knk Je djokus dh ykylk esa ges'kk jgrk gSA5 O;fDr dk
'kjhj ges'kk ekufld ,oa lkekftd ihM+k ls Hkjk jgrk gSA tgk¡ 'kks"k.k foghu lekt dh dh LFkkiuk ls gh
lEHko gSA vusd oxksZ ds fy, ,d cM+k iSekuk fu/kkZfjr djuk iM+rk gSA tgk¡ budk 'kks"k.k u gks ,slh n'kk esa
ekuo thou dk vk/kkj gh [kRe gks tkrk gSA
fu"d"kZ %&
,d O;kikjh ls ysdj vkS|ksfxd ¼iw¡thifr½ }kjk Hkh laLFkkvksa Hkh Jfed oxZ ds ykHk dk vf/kd dekrk
gSA mls ykHk dks ,d Hkh fgLlk nsus ds i{k esa ugha gSA tgk¡ thou vkSj e`R;q ds chp og Jfed la?k"kZ djrk
jgrk gSA tgk¡ ekuoh; thou dh vusd ?kVukvksa dk ifj.kke etnwjksa dks Hkqxruk iM+rk gSaA bldk ykHk
vkS|ksfxd laLFkk,sa mBkrh gSA ,d Jfed viuk lkjk thou ukSdj'kkgh esa O;krhr dj nsrk gSA ftl dkj.k
mldk vkfFkZd] 'kSf{kd] lkekftd] jktuSfrd] /kkfeZd thou gh leL;kvksa ls Hkjk gksrk gSaA og lq[k vkSj pSu
ugha izkIr dj ikrk gSA tgk¡ ekuo thou dk uSfrd iru rks ugha lkekftd vkSj vkfFkZd ifj.kke gh ekuo dh
leL;k,sa ugha [kRe gksrh gSA ;gk¡ Hkw[ksa isV dke djds cPpksa dk isV ikyu djrk gSA mldh vkfFkZd folaxfr;ksa
dk dke Hkh ekuoh; thou dk vk/kkj gh iw¡th vkSj vkfFkZd fLFkfr gh ekuo dks o<+kck nsrh gSA

1- ih-Mh- 'kekZ] ,fFkDl] t;iqj] 2015] i`"B 169

2- ,u-,u- vks>k] Øk¡fudy ifCyds‖kUl izk- fy- uks,Mk] fnYyh] 2008] i`"B 60

th-,l- ?kqfj;s] ] v- 12

4- MkW0 xksfoUn izlkn “kekZ] e/;izns‖k fgUnh xzUFk

vdkneh] Hkksiky] laLdj.k 2009] i`"B 80
5- MkW0 Mh-,l- c?ksy] ” e/;izns‖k fgUnh xzUFk vdkneh] Hkksiky]
laLdj.k 2004] i`"B 75


Link to the Lecture:



 Mr. Ankit Chaurasiya, PhD Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, University of Delhi, Delhi.
 Dr. Anurita Sharma, Department of Botany, Post Graduate Govt. College for Girls, Sector-11
 Ms. Bilquees Jan, Research Scholar, Dept. of Philosophy, Punjabi University Patiala, Punjab, India.
 Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal, Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Smt. Aruna Asaf Ali Govt.
P.G.College, Chandigarh.
 Mr. Devdas Saket, Research Scholar, Department of Philosophy, Vikram University, Ujjain (M.P.).
 Dr. Dipa Goswami, Assistant Professor, Dept. Of Philosophy, Chandernagore Govt. College, Strand
Road, Chandernagore, Hooghly : 712136, W.Bengal.
 Dr. Heeralal Choudhary, Guest Faculty, Unique College of Technology, Amarpatan, Distt. Satna (M.P.).
 Dr. Mani Parti Bharara, Assistant professor, Department of Commerce and Management, GGDSD
College,Sector -32, Chandigarh.
 Mohd Rashid, Research Scholar,Department of Philosophy, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh.
 Mr.Tariq Rafeeq Khan, Department of Philosophy, Maharani LaxmiBai Govt College of Excellence,
Gwalior (M.P.)-India.
 Mr. Mudasir Ahmad Tantray, Department of Post Graduate and research in Philosophy, RDVV Jabalpur,
 Dr. Rejina Kabir , Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Sarojini Naidu College for Women, Kolkata.
 Dr. Soma Chakraborty, Assistant Professor , Department of Philosophy, East Calcutta Girls’ College,
Lake Town, Kolkata.
 Dr. Sukanta Das, Govt. Approved PTT, Department of Philosophy, Garhbeta College, Garhbeta, Paschim
Medinipur, West Bengal.

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specific philosophical problems, but to become sensitively aware of what it is when we philosophise.”
- Dr. Desh Raj Sirswal