Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-39248 May 7, 1976

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DIRECTOR OF LANDS,

plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LUISA VILLA ABRILLE, defendant-appellant, LAND REGISTRATION
COMMISSIONER and THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF DAVAO CITY, defendants.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Octavio R. Ramirez

and Atty. Baltazar Llamas plaintiff-appellee.

Jose R. Madrazo, Jr. for defendant-appellant.

Gregorio Bilog, Jr. for defendant Land Registration Commissioner.

ESGUERRA, J.:

This case was originally appealed to the Court of Appeals where it was docketed as CA-
G.R. No. 47438-R. The Court of Appeals certified it to this Court for final consideration
and resolution of the pure question of law involved.

The factual background of the case is as follows:

On May 9, 1969, a Complaint for Annulment of Certificate of Title was filed by the
Republic of the Philippines (represented by the Director of Lands), with the Court of
First Instance of Davao, Branch 1, alleging, among others, the following:

3. That defendant Commissioner of Land Registration and defendant

Register of Deeds of Davao City whose Offices are at España Extension,
Quezon City and Davao City, respectively. "(are included in this complaint,
the first being the public Official charged under the law with the approval
)." subdivision surveys of private lands while the second is the Official
vested with the authority to issue certificates of titles, pursuant to the
provisions of Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;

4. That defendant Estate of Luisa Villa Abrille (now Heirs of Luisa Villa
Abrille) is the owner of a parcel of land in the City of Davao containing an
area of FIVE HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
FIFTY TWO SQUARE METERS (525.652), more or less, under Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-1439 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City,
issued in her name;

5. That deceased Luisa Villa Abrille during her lifetime caused the
subdivision of the aforesaid parcel of land into two lots designated as Lots
Nos. 379-B-2-B-1 and 379-B-2-B-2 under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
69322 which was approved by the Land Registration Commissioner on
March 17,1967;

6. That under Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, Lot No. 379- B-2-B-1
contains an area of 30,100 Square Meters while Lot No. 379-B-2B-2
contains an area of 577,679 Square Meters or a total area of 607,779
Square Meters, which is 82,127 Square Meters more than the original
area covered in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439 in the name of said
defendant Luisa Villa Abrille;

7. That on March 27, 1967 or ten days after the approval by the Land
Registration Commissioner, said Luisa Villa Abrille was able to secure an
order from the Court of First Instance of Davao in LRC (GLRO) Doc. No.
9969, directing the Register of Deeds for the City of Davao and Province
of Davao, to correct the area of Certificate of Title No. T-1439 and
thereafter to cancel the same and issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886
and T-18887;

8. That on March 30, 1967, the Register of Deeds concerned registered

Lot 379-B-2-B-1 and issued TCT No. 18886 therefor, in the name of Luisa
Villa Abrille and on the same date registered Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 and
issued TCT No. 18887 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille;

9. That the registration of Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2, which includes the

aforementioned excess area of 82,127 Square Meters, was not in
accordance with law for lack of the required notice and publication as
prescribed in Act 496, as amended, otherwise known as the Land
Registration Law;

10. That the excess or enlarged area of 82,127 Square Meters as a result
of the approval of the subdivision survey (LRC) Psd-69322 was formerly a
portion of the Davao River which dried up by reason of the change of
course of the said Davao River; hence a land belonging to the public
domain; and

11. That as a consequence thereof, Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18887

which covers Lot No. 379-B-2-B-2 of Subdivision Survey (LRC) Psd-
 69322, wherein the excess area of land belong to the public domain (not
private land) is null and void ab initio.

On June 10, 1969, defendant Register of Deeds of Davao- City filed her answer
averring that she, "in the performance of her ministerial duty, honestly and in good faith
effected the registration of Subdivision Lot No. 379-B-2-B-1 and Lot No. 379B-2-B-2 and
the issuance of corresponding TCT No. 18886 and TCT No. 18887 therefor,
respectively, in view of the approval of the Land Registration Commissioner of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322, and in view of the Order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao to correct the area in Certificate of Title No. T-1439, to cancel the
same and to issue in lieu thereof TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887".

On July 2, 1969, herein defendant-appellants filed their answer admitting the allegations
contained in paragraphs 1, 3, 4, 5 and 7 of the complaint; that they admit the increase in
area of the land of their predecessor but that the increase in area of the land was
acceded to and concurred in by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, and
the same was duly noted and approved by the Court of First Instance of Davao; that
they admit the issuance of TCT Nos. T-18886 and T-18887 out of Certificate of Title No.
T- 1439 in the name of their predecessor-in-interest Luisa Villa Abrille but that TCT No.
T-18886 had been cancelled and in lieu thereof, TCT No. T-19077 was issued in favor
of Gaudencio Consunji, and, TCT No. T-18887 had likewise been cancelled and several
Transfer Certificates of Title were issued thereunder; that the subject increase of area
was made in accordance with law and existing jurisprudence; and that Luisa Villa
Abrille, predecessor-in-interest of herein defendant-appellant, as riparian owner was
entitled under the law to claim, as she did, the increase or excess in area of her original
land as her own.

On August 12, 1969, defendant Commissioner of Land Registration prays for a

judgment on the pleadings and avers in his answer that he has no knowledge of the
subject matter of the complaint since the subdivision plan involved therein was
approved by the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas; and that on
February 19, 1968, the then Commissioner of Land Registration, Antonio Noblejas,
issued LRC Circular No. 167 directing the Register of Deeds throughout the Philippines
to, among others, deny the registration of subdivision plans with increased or expanded
areas and to withhold the issuance of the corresponding titles, or if the plans have
already been registered and the titles issued, to recall the titles and to take appropriate
steps for their cancellation.

Some private persons, as actual possessors and occupants, tried to intervene in the
case as movant-intervenors but they were denied standing in court by the trial court in
its order of August 16,1969.

On January 6, 1970, the parties litigants submitted in court their "Agreed Stipulation of
Facts" and pray that judgment be rendered by the trial court on their case based on their
stipulation of facts. The "Agreed Stipulation of Facts" of the parties reads as follows:
COME NOW the parties assisted by their respective attorneys, and unto
the Honorable Court, most respectfully submit the following stipulation of
facts and allege:

1. That Lot 379-B-2-B was originally registered on June 28, 1916 in the
Registry Book of the Register of Deeds of Zamboanga as Vol. A27, Page
40 under Original Certificate of Title No. 5609, Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Rec.
No. 317, in the name of Francisco Villa Abrille Lim Juna, father of Luisa
Villa Abrille;

2. That upon the death of the original owner, the said property was
inherited by Luisa Villa Abrille and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1439
was issued in the name of said Luisa Villa Abrille;

3. That subsequently, by virtue of an approved subdivision plan Psd-

69322 by the defendant, Land Registration Commissioner, Transfer
Certificate of Title Nos. T-18886 and 18887 were issued by the defendant,
Register of Deeds of Davao, copy of which subdivision plan is hereto
attached as Annex "A", and made integral part hereof;

4. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18886 was subsequently

cancelled by virtue of deed of sale, and Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
19077 was issued in the name of Gaudencio Consunji a purchaser in
good faith and for value;

5. That the said subdivision plan Annex "A" was also approved by the
Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch IV, through an Order dated
March 27, 1967, copy of which order is hereto attached as Annex "B" and
made part hereof;

6. That the said Order Annex "B" was issued by the Court of First Instance
of Davao, Branch IV, on the strength of the Report of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner, copy of which report is hereto attached as
Annex "C" and made integral part hereof;

7. That much later on, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-18887 was by
virtue of an Order of the Court of First Instance, Branch 1, in Special
Proceedings No. 1357, entitled: In the Matter of the Testate Estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille, approving a project of partition cancelled, and in lieu
thereof, the following Transfer Certificates of Title were issued to the
following named persons, to wit:

(a) T-20690 - Huang Siu Sin;

(b) T-20692 - Huang Siu Sin;

 (c) T-20701 - Josefino Huang;

(d) T-20702 - Josefino Huang;

(e) T-20703 - Josefino Huang;

(f) T-20732 Huang Siu Sin, et al.;

(g) T-20733 - Huang Siu Sin, et al.;

(h) T-20713 - Miguel Huang;

(i) T-23015 - Miguel Huang;

(j) T-20725 - Milagros Huang;

(k) T-20726 - Milagros Huang;

which certificates of title were issued on the basis of a subdivision plan

LRC Psd-71236 duly approved by the defendant, Land Registration
Commissioner, copy of which subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236 is hereto
attached as Annex "D" and made integral part hereof;

8. That the parties admit that there was an increase in the area of Lot 379-
B-2-B, but the same was with the knowledge of the defendant, Land
Registration Commissioner and the court of First Instance of Davao,
Branch IV;

9. That the parties admit that no registered owner has been affected or
prejudiced in the increase in area as only Luisa Villa Abrille as the
registered owner holds property adjacent to the parcel of land in question;

10. That the portion of land subject of the increase adjoins Lot 379-B-2-B
and abuts the Davao River;

11. That the parcel of land subject of the increase is fully planted with
coconuts, bananas and other seasonal crops by the defendants, through
their predecessor-in-interest;

12. That the increase in area could have taken place very long time ago
as the coconuts planted thereon had long been fruit bearing;

13. That Transfer Certificate of Title No. 18886 does not contain any
portion of the increase in area;
14. That of the certificates of title issued based under subdivision plan
(LRC) Psd-71236, only Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T- 20725; T-
20701; T-20713; and T-20690 contain the increase in area; while all the
other certificates of title issued under subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-71236
do not contain any increase in area;

15. That the parties agree that the issuance of the Order Annex "B" was
without notice to the Director of Lands.

The trial court thereafter rendered its decision dated January 27, 1970,
which reads as follows:

This is an ordinary civil action for annulment of certificate of title instituted

by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands,
against the Estate of Luisa Abrille, represented by Huang Siu Sin,
Administrator, the Land Registration Commissioner and the Register of
Deeds of the City of Davao. Because the residue of the intestate estate of
Luisa Villa Abrille had been divided among Huang Siu Sin, Josefino
Huang, Milagros Huang, Miguel Huang and lap Tong Ha, heirs, they were
directed to appear and to substitute for the intestate estate and they did.

The parties submitted the following stipulation of facts:

xxx xxx xxx

The increase in area of the land covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
5609 of the Register of Deeds of Davao in the name of Francisco Villa
Abrille Lim Juna and subsequently by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T.
1439 in the name of Luisa Villa Abrille and finally, based on subdivision
plan (LRC) Psd-71236, by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725 in
the name of Milagros Huang, T20701 in the name of Josefino Huang, T-
20713 in the name of Miguel Huang and T-20690 in the name of Huang
Siu Sin, is from 525,652 square meters to 607,779 square meters, or
82,127 square meters.

The remedy sought by defendant heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille in order to

include the increase in area was a petition for approval of Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-79322 recommended by the Commissioner of Land
Registration in his Report, and for issuance of new title under Section 44,
Act 496, as amended, filed with this court, which was assigned to Branch
IV.

Even pursuant to Section 44 of Act 496 under which the aforesaid remedy
was sought, notice before the hearing is required. The parties admit that
there was no notice to the persons interested, including the Director of
Lands, before the petition was heard.
 Worse, the increase in area could not have been included in Transfer
Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 even
assuming arguendo that the same belonged to the owner of the land to
which it is adjacent by the simple expediency of a petition for approval of
subdivision plan and issuance of new titles, because a subdivision of a
registered land under Section 44 of Act 496 does not authorize the
inclusion of land or area not embraced in the titled or in excess of what is
stated in the title. And the approval by the Court of such subdivision plan
does not lend validity to it. The subdivision must be limited to the area
stated in the title. Neither amendment of the title under Section 112 of Act
496 would be a valid remedy 1.

The heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille.. owners of the adjacent estate, might have
acquired a registrable title to the land in question but to bring it under the
operation of the Land Registration Act, a petition for registration under Act
496 should have been filed. More so when the title acquired is by
continuous possession for at least 30 years under a claim of ownership
And even assuming that the land is an accretion, the fact that the riparian
estate is registered does not bring ipso facto effect its accretion thereto
under the operation of the Land Registration Act. No decree of registration
of the land based upon final judgment promulgated by a court of
competent jurisdiction after due publication, notice and hearing, has been
issued by the Commissioner of Land Registration and transcribed by the
Register of Deeds of Davao in the registry, for the reason that no initial or
original registration proceedings have been instituted by the owner. And
the only way by which a title to the land in question can be issued for the
first time is for the Land Registration Commissioner to issue a decree of
registration based upon final judgment rendered by a court of competent
jurisdiction after trial.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered cancelling Transfer

Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 and
directing the Register of Deeds of Davao to issue new certificates of title in
lieu thereof after the portions consisting of 82,127 square meters, the land
involved, shall have been segregated therefrom in accordance with law.

Not satisfied with the judgment of the trial court, defendant Heirs of Luisa Villa Abrille
brought the case on appeal to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals, however, in
its Resolution dated July 22, 1974, certified the case (CA-G.R. No. 47438-R) to this
Court for consideration and final disposition.

Defendant-appellant maintains that the lower court erred in holding the approval of
Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 of no legal effect merely on ground of lack of notice
to interested persons, and in ordering the cancellation of Certificates of Title Nos. T-
20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690. It is the contention of the defendant-appellant
that since the government agencies having to do with lands know all the time the
increase in area in subdivision plan Psd-69322, and the government agencies
concerned tolerated if not abetted the ultimate inclusion of the involved increase in area,
defendant-appellant should not be made to suffer the effect of the allegedly wrong
procedure or step taken in the approval of the aforementioned subdivision plan.
Besides, defendant-appellant claims that it is their honest belief that the legal remedy
taken by them in seeking the approval of their subdivision plan concerned was well
within the law, particularly the provision of Section 44 of Act 496, as amended.

Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, maintains that the approval of the subdivision plan,
with the increase in area, by the defendant-appellant Land Registration Commission
does not lend validity to the said subdivision plan; and that the issuance of the four
transfer certificates of title (Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690) over the
increased area in question is improper and invalid notwithstanding the conformity of the
Land Registration Commissioner and the subsequent order of the Court of First
Instance of Davao, Branch IV, approving the subdivision plan concerned, as the
required giving of notice to all parties interested in defendant-appellant's petition for
approval of subdivision plan was not at all followed,

Before Us, therefore, for consideration and final resolution, in order to arrive at a
judicious disposition of the case at bar, is whether or not the lower court erred in
ordering the cancellation of Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-
20713 and T-20690 which cover the increased area in question totalling 82,127 square
meters.

After a careful and thorough deliberation of the matter in controversy, We are of the
opinion and so hold that the lower court acted correctly in ordering the cancellation of
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-20725, T-20701, T-20713 and T-20690 which
admittedly covered the increased area of 82,127 square meters under Subdivision Plan
(LRC) Psd-71236 (and formerly under Psd-69322) for the City of Davao.

Certainly, the step taken by defendant-appellant in petitioning the court for the approval
of their Subdivision Plan (LRC) Psd-69322 and then Psd-71236 to include the
questioned increased area of 82,127 square meters is, to say the least, unwarranted
and irregular. This is so, for the increased area in question, which is not a registered
land but formerly a river bed, is so big as to give allowance for a mere mistake in area of
the original registration of the tracts of land of the defendant-appellant formerly
belonging to and registered in the name of their grandfather, Francisco Villa Abrille Lim
Juna. In order to bring this increase in area, which the parties admitted to have been a
former river bed of the Davao River, under the operation and coverage of the Land
Registration Law, Act 496, proceedings in registrations of land title should have been
filed Instead of an ordinary approval of subdivision plan.

It should be remembered that recourse under Section 44 of Act 496, which the
predecessor-in-interest (Luisa Villa Abrille) of the herein defendant-appellant took, is
good only insofar as it covers previously registered lands. In the instant case, part of the
tracts of land, particularly the area of 82,127 square meters, has not yet been brought
under the operation of the Torrens System. Worse still, the approval of Subdivision
Plans (LRC) Psd-69322 and Psd-71236 was without notice to all parties in interest,
more particularly the Director of Lands. For an applicant to have his imperfect or
incomplete title or claim to a land to be originally registered under Act 496, the following
requisites should all be satisfied:

1. Survey of land by the Bureau of Lands or a duly licensed private

surveyor;

2. Filing of application for registration by the applicant;

3. Setting of the date for the initial hearing of the application by the Court;

4. Transmittal of the application and the date of initial hearing together

with all the documents or other evidences attached thereto by the Clerk of
Court to the Land Registration Commission;

5. Publication of a notice of the filing of the application and date and place
of the hearing in the Official Gazette;

6. Service of notice upon contiguous owners, occupants and those known

to have interests in the property by the sheriff;

7. Filing of answer to the application by any person whether named in the

notice or not;

8. Hearing of the case by the Court;

9. Promulgation of judgment by the Court;

10. Issuance of the decree by the Court declaring the decision final and
instructing the Land Registration Commission to issue a decree of
confirmation and registration;

11. Entry of the decree of registration in the Land Registration

Commission;

12. Sending of copy of the decree of registration to the corresponding

Register of Deeds, and

13. Transcription of the decree of registration in the registration book and

the issuance of the owner's duplicate original certificate of title to the
applicant by the Register of Deeds, upon payment of the prescribed fees.

Hence, with the foregoing requisites not having been complied with, the lower court
committed no error in its appealed decision dated January 27, 1970.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby affirmed in toto.

No special pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925

VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.

Acting Attorney-General Reyes for appellant.

Monico R. Mercado for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

This action was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga by a complaint filed by
Valentin Susi against Angela Razon and the Director of Lands, praying for judgment: (a)
Declaring plaintiff the sole and absolute owner of the parcel of land described in the second
paragraph of the complaint; (b) annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of
Angela Razon, on the ground that the land is a private property; (c) ordering the cancellation of
the certificate of title issued to said Angela Razon; and (d) sentencing the latter to pay plaintiff
the sum of P500 as damages, with the costs.

For his answer to the complaint, the Director of Lands denied each and every allegation
contained therein and, as special defense, alleged that the land in question was a property of the
Government of the United States under the administration and control of the Philippine Islands
before its sale to Angela Razon, which was made in accordance with law.

After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of First Instance of
Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the plaintiff entitled to the possession of the land,
annulling the sale made by the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against Angela Razon. From
this judgment the Director of Lands took this appeal, assigning thereto the following errors, to
wit: (1) The holding that the judgment rendered in a prior case between the plaintiff and
defendant Angela Razon on the parcel of land in question is controlling in this action; (2) the
holding that plaintiff is entitled to recover the possession of said parcel of land; the annulment of
the sale made by the Director of Lands to Angela Razon; and the ordering that the certificate of
title issued by the register of deeds of the Province of Pampanga to Angela Razon by virtue of
said sale be cancelled; and (3) the denial of the motion for new trial filed by the Director of
Lands.

The evidence shows that on December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question, then a
fish pond, tho Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase the same (Exhibit B). After having been in possession thereof for about eight years,
and the fish pond having been destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September
5, 1899, sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to repurchase it (Exhibit
A). Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had already paid its price and sown
"bacawan" on said land, availing himself of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of
the sale of which he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of the
land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and then by Valentin Susi has
been open, continuous, adverse and public, without any interruption, except during the
revolution, or disturbance, except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the possession of said land (Exhibit
C), wherein after considering the evidence introduced at the trial, the court rendered judgment in
favor of Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon, dismissing the complaint (Exhibit E). Having
failed in her attempt to obtain possession of the land in question through the court, Angela Razon
applied to the Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914 (Exhibit C). Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on December 6, 1915,
asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five years (Exhibit P). After making the proper
administrative investigation, the Director of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and
sold the land to Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga, on
August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon. Armed with said
document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to vacate the land in question, and as he refused
to do so, she brought and action for forcible entry and detainer in the justice of the peace court of
Guagua, Pampanga, which was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the case being one of title to
real property (Exhibit F and M). Valentin Susi then brought this action.

With these facts in view, we shall proceed to consider the questions raised by the appellant in his
assignments of error.lawphi1.net

It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been in possession of the land in
question openly, continuously, adversely, and publicly, personally and through his predecessors,
since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga against Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the
Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and rebuts her claim that she had been
in possession thereof. When on August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said
land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof personally and through his
predecessors for thirty-four years. And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already
made said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be estimated
when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time being so long that it is beyond the
reach of memory. These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the
United States in the case of Cariño vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1), is
applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure
established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the
necessary requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land
of the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary
that certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had
already ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in
selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over
which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being of the public domain, the
plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an action to recover possession thereof.lawphi1.net

If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in dispute, had already become, by
operation of law, private property of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his
title, Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover possession thereof and hold it.

For the foregoing, and no error having been found in the judgment appealed from, the same is
hereby affirmed in all its parts, without special pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Malcolm, Street, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns, and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986

THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.

D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.

NARVASA, J.:

The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the
Intermediate Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of
Isabela, which ordered registration in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five
parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters, more or less, acquired by it from
Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.

The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of

Commonwealth Act No. 141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed
judgment sums up the findings of the trial court in said proceedings in this wise:

1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is
a corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the
Philippines and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on
December 23, 1959;

2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario
can acquire real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of
Incorporation particularly on the provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph
(9), Exhibit 'M-l');

3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally
acquired by Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel, both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such
are cultural minorities;

4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as

the sale took place on October 29, 1962;

5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered
by Magellan as the ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the
land from generation to generation until the same came into the possession of
Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;

6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is
continuous, adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the
possession of the Infiels who were granted from whom the applicant bought said
 land on October 29, 1962, hence the possession is already considered from time
immemorial.

7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the

provisions of Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of
the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands,
whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain;

8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than
Forty-Five Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said
improvements were seen by the Court during its ocular investigation of the land
sought to be registered on September 18, 1982;

9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the
applicant was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela, have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme
Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., and this negotiation came to reality when the Board
of Directors of the Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the
land bought by the Company from the Infiels for the townsite of Maconacon
Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation was accepted by
the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their special
session on November 22, 1979.

The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the
applicability of the 1935 Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts
that, the registration proceedings have been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long
after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the latter is the correctly applicable law;
and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations or associations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962
when Acme purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to
decree registration in favor of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but
whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have

been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or
 ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.

(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through

their predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for
at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof.

The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the
trial court which were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no
longer controvert before this Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom
Acme purchased the lands in question on October 29, 1962, are members of the
national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through their progenitors,
possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right
granted in Section 48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is
there any pretension that Acme, as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified
to acquire and register ownership of said lands under any provisions of the 1973
Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred to.

Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the
Infiels had transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in
proceedings instituted by it in 1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect,
having in mind the prohibition therein against private corporations holding lands of the
public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.

The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of
institution of the registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public
domain, it must be answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations obviously does not apply.

In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-
Bartolome, et al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a
domestic corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in
1947 two lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors
and, before them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the
Pacific War in 1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch, for confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed
the application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this Court
upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
 ..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of the
certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still public
land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration under
section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be dismissed.

Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between (on
the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an imperfect title
and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an occupant has on
imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.

Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may be
secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the land is
public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).

The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2 thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period prescribed
by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite period ipso jure and
without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and becomes private property.
That said dissent expressed what is the better — and, indeed, the correct, view-becomes evident from a
consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,

The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:

It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove' possession
for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means may prove in
registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have recommended an
application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated to convey to the mind of
an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every
word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better, in view of the other provisions,
might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications that
registration was expected from all but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership
actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. ...

That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language, in
Susi:

.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established in
paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual and
physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of the
public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a right to a
certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when
Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by operation
of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a
certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal
fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of
Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in
 question of Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer
any title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right. 6

Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina
vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar,
supra, by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.

11
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative:

.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court held to
be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and cultivation for
more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-in-interest, title over the land
has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the mass of public land. Thereafter, it is
no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by free patent. ....

xxx xxx xxx

As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision are
complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant,
a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land, therefore,
ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon
the strength of said patent. 12

Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation proceedings
would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether the possession
claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder would not confer title,
but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the land from
public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already affected by operation of law from the
moment the required period of possession became complete. As was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here
are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title,
but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect later)
prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.

Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial possession
of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in appropriate proceedings
under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to acquire the land at the time
it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be construed to prohibit corporations
from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the vendor had already acquired that type of
so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not
acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares. The purely accidental
circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which
forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain cannot defeat a right already vested before
that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already
held, in analogous circumstances, that the Constitution cannot impair vested rights.

We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to the
land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.

That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution. Section
2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public agricultural
lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner' prohibition action is
barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.

xxx xxx xxx

The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair vested
rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a municipal
ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate exercise of the
police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).

xxx xxx xxx

In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution the right
of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and established and was no
longer open to doubt or controversy.

Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had the
effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to obtain a
patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without due process
(Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<äre||anº•1àw> 15

The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must be
regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than procedural
and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be confirmed in said
proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is unquestionable that in the
light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973 Constitution, could have had
title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to the letter of the law would deny
the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid conveyance which violates no constitutional
mandate.

The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco
must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as enunciated in
the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor, personally or
through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the prescribed statutory
period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis of the undisputed facts,
the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired from the Infiels by
Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical person, Acme is not
qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is technical,
rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:

6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public
Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation
 of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of court actions. Assuming
that there was a technical error not having filed the application for registration in the name of the
Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is conceded that there is no
prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco and neither is there any
prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original
owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being
granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the
conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor. It should not be necessary to go through
all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now.
(See Francisco vs. City of Davao)

The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original
persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that
they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified
to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private
lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.

There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their names,
deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades, whereas the
same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a liberal
application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent in Meralco.

While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense, it
breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of which
has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth noting
that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and Justice Abad
Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical person, was
disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11, was only tangential
limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be considered as essentially
obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.

WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.

SO ORDERED.

Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore,
dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in

the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld,
"expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the
landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to
the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and
public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision
in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of
Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual
personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land
ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by
reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and
precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent
past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree
and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation of
law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of the
public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by qualified
corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring
title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.

It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962
under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding
public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it
donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of
title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate
that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles
to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and
cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private
property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline
for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was
successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December
31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is
properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications
for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to
the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands)
and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line
from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize
such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural
persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed
by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and
possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable
jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice
Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented
from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which
are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired
by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove
their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking
on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical
persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the
natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-
cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation
as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the
private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The
law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the
private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons
file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by lease not to exceed
one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from directly applying to the Courts for the
issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799;
Republic vs. Villanueva, 114 SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva Ecija,
Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.

The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:

(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the case.

(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.

(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus
avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to
ACME.

The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA
799, 823 [1982]).

To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the Public Land Act allows only citizens of the
Philippines who are natural persons to apply for confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to
multiplicity of court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application for registration in the name
of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,

still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco

and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive effect in the name of the original owners
and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable
acquisition of ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their favor.

It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such applications in their names and adding to the
overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)

The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural persons) can apply for certificates of title
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from
acquiring title to lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be justified. "A construction
adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v.
Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507; United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p.
351).

It has also been said that:

In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the
legislature is not to be presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the
courts should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being construed, so as to give it efficient
operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being
construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered
insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible of two constructions, one of which will give
effect to the act, while the other will defeat it, the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so
as to render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule against the enlargement of
extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and
words or phrases may be altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity. Wherever the
provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos
vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d 456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)

The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for the Court to take is to promote in the
fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a construction which would alter or defeat that policy.

In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

Separate Opinions

GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:

I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June, 1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1
which
is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and indeed the correct view." My dissent was
anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the 1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of
cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is established doctrine....... that an open,
continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public domain for the period provided in the
Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894 in Susi under the old law [this period
was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of
title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141, equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ])
by a private individual personally and through his predecessors confers an effective title on said
possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the public domain and becomes private property." I
hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-
cited established doctrine and precedents and discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which
departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my
views and ratio decidendi.

Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively presumed to
have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter. "

The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the rightful
possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right
to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should be issued an
order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient . . . . If by a
legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi,
beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to sell to any other person]. " 6

The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the decree
and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view of the
other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are indications
that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually
gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer title, but simply to
establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated).<äre||anº•1àw> We reaffirm
the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure
or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure
ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and
acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the
application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of
the title.")

Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of such
conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or acquiring
title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason that no
public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16, 1962
under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations holding
public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed an
absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite the
Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it
donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of
title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.

In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for judicial
confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands expressly reiterate
that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement, adjudication and quieting of titles
to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands publicly and notoriously occupied and
cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership have ipso jure been converted into private
property and grant the possessors the opportunity to establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline
for the filing of such application which would have originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was
successively extended to December 31, 1941, then extended to December 31, 1957, then to December
31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976 and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7

The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is
properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications
for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the original persons
who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title that they had
acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to
the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands)
and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or
exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise dissented along the same line
from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion of the Court would characterize
such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical person rather than the natural
persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as an insurmountable obstacle to the
relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be distinguished, the approach followed
by us in Francisco v. City of Davao, where the legal question raised, instead of being deferred and
possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the exercise of our equitable
jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if the application under
Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such disability." 9 Justice
Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result, likewise, in effect dissented
from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated his opinion that "the lots which
are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public domain at the time they were acquired
by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the
constitutional provision that no private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain is inapplicable. " 10

To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may prove
their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year period, tacking
on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the exclusion of juridical
persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public lands for the required
statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is obvious. But when the
natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the Act confers on them a
legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the law that they file the
applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred their title to the land. But
such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the law, as stressed in the above-
cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because of acquisitive prescription by the
corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to consider the application for confirmation
as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance with the evidence, confirm their title to the
private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully transferred by them to the corporation. The
law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and sale of the private land to the corporation. It
should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and have the corporation reassign its rights to the
private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia
ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on paper with the technicality of having natural persons
file the application for confirmation of title to the private land.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:

Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:

SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the
Land Registration Act, to wit:

(a) ...

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or
force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed are the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions
of this chapter.

(c) ...

Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:

SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen hold such
lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....

It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation from
directly applying to the C

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 144057. January 17, 2005]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF

APPEALS and CORAZON NAGUIT, respondents.
DECISION

TINGA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
seeking to review the Decision[1] of the Sixth Division of the Court of Appeals dated July 12,
2000 in CA-G.R. SP No. 51921. The appellate court affirmed the decisions of both the Regional
Trial Court (RTC),[2] Branch 8, of Kalibo, Aklan dated February 26, 1999, and the 7th Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC)[3] of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan dated February 18, 1998, which granted
the application for registration of a parcel of land of Corazon Naguit (Naguit), the respondent
herein.

The facts are as follows:

On January 5, 1993, Naguit, a Filipino citizen, of legal age and married to Manolito S. Naguit,
filed with the MCTC of Ibajay-Nabas, Aklan, a petition for registration of title of a parcel of land
situated in Brgy. Union, Nabas, Aklan. The parcel of land is designated as Lot No. 10049, Cad.
758-D, Nabas Cadastre, AP 060414-014779, and contains an area of 31,374 square meters. The
application seeks judicial confirmation of respondents imperfect title over the aforesaid land.

On February 20, 1995, the court held initial hearing on the application. The public prosecutor,
appearing for the government, and Jose Angeles, representing the heirs of Rustico Angeles,
opposed the petition. On a later date, however, the heirs of Rustico Angeles filed a formal
opposition to the petition. Also on February 20, 1995, the court issued an order of general default
against the whole world except as to the heirs of Rustico Angeles and the government.

The evidence on record reveals that the subject parcel of land was originally declared for
taxation purposes in the name of Ramon Urbano (Urbano) in 1945 under Tax Declaration No.
3888 until 1991.[4] On July 9, 1992, Urbano executed a Deed of Quitclaim in favor of the heirs of
Honorato Maming (Maming), wherein he renounced all his rights to the subject property and
confirmed the sale made by his father to Maming sometime in 1955 or 1956.[5] Subsequently, the
heirs of Maming executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of respondent Naguit who thereupon
started occupying the same. She constituted Manuel Blanco, Jr. as her attorney-in-fact and
administrator. The administrator introduced improvements, planted trees, such as mahogany,
coconut and gemelina trees in addition to existing coconut trees which were then 50 to 60 years
old, and paid the corresponding taxes due on the subject land. At present, there are parcels of
land surrounding the subject land which have been issued titles by virtue of judicial decrees.
Naguit and her predecessors-in-interest have occupied the land openly and in the concept of
owner without any objection from any private person or even the government until she filed her
application for registration.

After the presentation of evidence for Naguit, the public prosecutor manifested that the
government did not intend to present any evidence while oppositor Jose Angeles, as
representative of the heirs of Rustico Angeles, failed to appear during the trial despite notice. On
September 27, 1997, the MCTC rendered a decision ordering that the subject parcel be brought
under the operation of the Property Registration Decree or Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529
and that the title thereto registered and confirmed in the name of Naguit.[6]

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), thru the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed
a motion for reconsideration. The OSG stressed that the land applied for was declared alienable
and disposable only on October 15, 1980, per the certification from Regional Executive Director
Raoul T. Geollegue of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Region VI.[7]
However, the court denied the motion for reconsideration in an order dated February 18, 1998.[8]

Thereafter, the Republic appealed the decision and the order of the MCTC to the RTC, Kalibo,
Aklan, Branch 8. On February 26, 1999, the RTC rendered its decision, dismissing the appeal.[9]

Undaunted, the Republic elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure. On July 12, 2000, the appellate court rendered a decision dismissing the
petition filed by the Republic and affirmed in toto the assailed decision of the RTC.

Hence, the present petition for review raising a pure question of law was filed by the Republic on
September 4, 2000.[10]

The OSG assails the decision of the Court of Appeals contending that the appellate court gravely
erred in holding that there is no need for the governments prior release of the subject lot from the
public domain before it can be considered alienable or disposable within the meaning of P.D. No.
1529, and that Naguit had been in possession of Lot No. 10049 in the concept of owner for the
required period.[11]

Hence, the central question for resolution is whether is necessary under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree that the subject land be first classified as alienable and disposable
before the applicants possession under a bona fide claim of ownership could even start.

The OSG invokes our holding in Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court[12] in arguing
that the property which is in open, continuous and exclusive possession must first be alienable.
Since the subject land was declared alienable only on October 15, 1980, Naguit could not have
maintained a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, as required by Section 14 of the
Property Registration Decree, since prior to 1980, the land was not alienable or disposable, the
OSG argues.

Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, governing original registration proceedings,

bears close examination. It expressly provides:

SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First
Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly
authorized representatives:

(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in

open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
 alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws.

....

There are three obvious requisites for the filing of an application for registration of title under
Section 14(1) that the property in question is alienable and disposable land of the public domain;
that the applicants by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation, and; that such possession is
under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain
meaning of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent
phrase under a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or
modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those
distantly or remotely located.[13] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur
sentencia.

Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners position.
Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of the
public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not
be susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the
occupant. Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even
precludes the government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural
lands as alienable and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be
aggravated considering that before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an
independent state.

Instead, the more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property
sought to be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it
proper to release the property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the
government is still reserving the right to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its
ownership in the State irrespective of the length of adverse possession even if in good faith.
However, if the property has already been classified as alienable and disposable, as it is in this
case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State to abdicate its exclusive
prerogative over the property.

This reading aligns conformably with our holding in Republic v. Court of Appeals.[14] Therein,
the Court noted that to prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
an applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a
presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action; investigation reports of
Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.[15] In that case, the subject land
had been certified by the DENR as alienable and disposable in 1980, thus the Court concluded
that the alienable status of the land, compounded by the established fact that therein respondents
had occupied the land even before 1927, sufficed to allow the application for registration of the
said property. In the case at bar, even the petitioner admits that the subject property was released
and certified as within alienable and disposable zone in 1980 by the DENR.[16]

This case is distinguishable from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals,[17] wherein the Court noted that
while the claimant had been in possession since 1908, it was only in 1972 that the lands in
question were classified as alienable and disposable. Thus, the bid at registration therein did not
succeed. In Bracewell, the claimant had filed his application in 1963, or nine (9) years before the
property was declared alienable and disposable. Thus, in this case, where the application was
made years after the property had been certified as alienable and disposable, the Bracewell ruling
does not apply.

A different rule obtains for forest lands,[18] such as those which form part of a reservation for
provincial park purposes[19] the possession of which cannot ripen into ownership.[20] It is
elementary in the law governing natural resources that forest land cannot be owned by private
persons. As held in Palomo v. Court of Appeals,[21] forest land is not registrable and possession
thereof, no matter how lengthy, cannot convert it into private property, unless such lands are
reclassified and considered disposable and alienable.[22] In the case at bar, the property in
question was undisputedly classified as disposable and alienable; hence, the ruling in Palomo is
inapplicable, as correctly held by the Court of Appeals.[23]

It must be noted that the present case was decided by the lower courts on the basis of Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, which pertains to original registration through
ordinary registration proceedings. The right to file the application for registration derives from a
bona fide claim of ownership going back to June 12, 1945 or earlier, by reason of the claimants
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain.

A similar right is given under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:

Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but those titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all
the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under
the provisions of this chapter.

When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed
necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain
commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which
provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then
in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073,
which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new starting point is concordant with
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the Public Land Act does
refer to agricultural lands of the public domain, while the Property Registration Decree uses the
term alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. It must be noted though that the
Constitution declares that alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands.[24] Clearly, the subject lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree are of the same type.

Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073
preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over
which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property
Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired
ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.

Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[25] There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted
into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty
(30) years.[26] With such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of
private lands under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have
acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land
commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such possession being been open, continuous
and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right to register the land by virtue of Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.

The land in question was found to be cocal in nature, it having been planted with coconut trees
now over fifty years old.[27] The inherent nature of the land but confirms its certification in 1980
as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the application of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree, as correctly accomplished by the lower courts.

The OSG posits that the Court of Appeals erred in holding that Naguit had been in possession in
the concept of owner for the required period. The argument begs the question. It is again hinged
on the assertionshown earlier to be unfoundedthat there could have been no bona fide claim of
ownership prior to 1980, when the subject land was declared alienable or disposable.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals that
Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by her and her
predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. The basis of such conclusion is primarily factual,
and the Court generally respects the factual findings made by lower courts. Notably, possession
since 1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945. Although
tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership,
nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of owner for no one in his
right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive
possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones
sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property and announces his adverse claim against
the State and all other interested parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to
the Government. Such an act strengthens ones bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.[28]

Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be traced
back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for almost fifty (50)
years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title thereto which may be
properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That she has been in possession of
the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous, peaceful and without any opposition from
any private person and the government itself makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and
deserving of protection under the law.

WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 12, 2000 is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ., concur.

THIRD DIVISION

FLORENCIA G. DIAZ, G.R. No. 181502

Petitioner,

Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

 -versus- CARPIO,

VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA and

PERALTA, JJ.

REPUBLIC of the PHILIPPINES,

Respondent.

Promulgated:

February 2, 2010

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

RESOLUTION

CORONA, J.:
 This is a letter-motion praying for reconsideration (for the third time) of the

June 16, 2008 resolution of this Court denying the petition for review filed by

petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.

Petitioners late mother, Flora Garcia (Garcia), filed an application for

registration of a vast tract of land1[1] located in Laur, Nueva Ecija and Palayan

City in the then Court of First Instance (CFI), Branch 1, Nueva Ecija on August 12,

1976.2[2] She alleged that she possessed the land as owner and worked, developed

and harvested the agricultural products and benefits of the same continuously,

publicly and adversely for more or less 26 years.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Solicitor

General (OSG), opposed the application because the land in question was within

the Fort Magsaysay Military Reservation (FMMR), established by virtue of

Proclamation No. 237 (Proclamation 237)3[3] in 1955. Thus, it was inalienable as

it formed part of the public domain.

Significantly, on November 28, 1975, this Court already ruled in Director of

Lands v. Reyes4[4] that the property subject of Garcias application was inalienable

as it formed part of a military reservation. Moreover, the existence of Possessory

Information Title No. 216 (allegedly registered in the name of a certain Melecio

Padilla on March 5, 1895), on which therein respondent Paraaque Investment and

Development Corporation anchored its claim on the land, was not proven.

Accordingly, the decree of registration issued in its favor was declared null and

void.

Reyes notwithstanding, the CFI ruled in Garcias favor in a decision5[5]

dated July 1, 1981.

 The Republic eventually appealed the decision of the CFI to the Court of

Appeals (CA). In its decision6[6] dated February 26, 1992, penned by Justice

Vicente V. Mendoza (Mendoza decision),7[7] the appellate court reversed and set

aside the decision of the CFI. The CA found that Reyes was applicable to

petitioners case as it involved the same property.

The CA observed that Garcia also traced her ownership of the land in

question to Possessory Information Title No. 216. As Garcias right to the property

was largely dependent on the existence and validity of the possessory information

title the probative value of which had already been passed upon by this Court in

Reyes, and inasmuch as the land was situated inside a military reservation, the CA

concluded that she did not validly acquire title thereto.

During the pendency of the case in the CA, Garcia passed away and was

substituted by her heirs, one of whom was petitioner Florencia G. Diaz.8[8]

 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the Mendoza decision. While

the motion was pending in the CA, petitioner also filed a motion for recall of the

records from the former CFI. Without acting on the motion for reconsideration, the

appellate court, with Justice Mendoza as ponente, issued a resolution9[9]

upholding petitioners right to recall the records of the case.

Subsequently, however, the CA encouraged the parties to reach an amicable

settlement on the matter and even gave the parties sufficient time to draft and

finalize the same.

The parties ultimately entered into a compromise agreement with the

Republic withdrawing its claim on the more or less 4,689 hectares supposedly

outside the FMMR. For her part, petitioner withdrew her application for the

portion of the property inside the military reservation. They filed a motion for

approval of the amicable settlement in the CA.10[10]

 On June 30, 1999, the appellate court approved the compromise

agreement.11[11] On January 12, 2000, it directed the Land Registration

Administration to issue the corresponding decree of registration in petitioners

favor.12[12]

However, acting on a letter written by a certain Atty. Restituto S. Lazaro, the

OSG filed a motion for reconsideration of the CA resolution ordering the issuance

of the decree of registration. The OSG informed the appellate court that the tract of

land subject of the amicable settlement was still within the military reservation.

On April 16, 2007, the CA issued an amended resolution (amended

resolution)13[13] annulling the compromise agreement entered into between the

parties. The relevant part of the dispositive portion of the resolution read:
 ACCORDINGLY, the Court resolves to:
(1) x x x x x x
(2) x x x x x x

(3) x x x x x x

(4) x x x x x x

(5) x x x x x x

(6) REVERSE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 of this Court approving the
Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999 executed between the Office of the
Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz[;]
(7) ANNUL and SET ASIDE the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
executed between the Office of the Solicitor General and Florencia Garcia Diaz;
the said Amicable Settlement is hereby DECLARED to be without force and
effect;
(8) GRANT the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor
General and, consequently, SET ASIDE the Resolution dated January 12, 2000
which ordered, among other matters, that a certificate of title be issued in the
name of plaintiff-appellee Florencia Garcia Diaz over the portion of the subject
property in consonance with the Amicable Settlement dated May 18, 1999
approved by the Court in its Resolution dated June 30, 1999;
(9) SET ASIDE the Resolution dated June 30, 1999 approving the May 18, 1999
Amicable Settlement and the Resolution dated September 20, 1999 amending
the aforesaid June 30, 1999 Resolution; and
(10) REINSTATE the Decision dated February 26, 1992 dismissing applicant-
appellee Diaz registration herein.

SO ORDERED.

(Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for reconsideration. For the first time, she assailed the

validity of the Mendoza decision the February 26, 1992 decision adverted to in the

CAs amended resolution. She alleged that Justice Mendoza was the assistant

solicitor general during the initial stages of the land registration proceedings in the
trial court and therefore should have inhibited himself when the case reached the

CA. His failure to do so, she laments, worked an injustice against her constitutional

right to due process. Thus, the Mendoza decision should be declared null and void.

The motion was denied.14[14]

Thereafter, petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari15[15] in this

Court. It was denied for raising factual issues.16[16] She moved for

reconsideration.17[17] This motion was denied with finality on the ground that

there was no substantial argument warranting a modification of the Courts

resolution. The Court then ordered that no further pleadings would be entertained.

Accordingly, we ordered entry of judgment to be made in due course.18[18]

 Petitioner, however, insisted on filing a motion to lift entry of judgment and

motion for leave to file a second motion for reconsideration and to refer the case to

the Supreme Court en banc.19[19] The Court denied20[20] it considering that a

second motion for reconsideration is a prohibited pleading.21[21] Furthermore, the

motion to refer the case to the banc was likewise denied as the banc is not an

appellate court to which decisions or resolutions of the divisions may be

appealed.22[22] We reiterated our directive that no further pleadings would be

entertained and that entry of judgment be made in due course.

Not one to be easily deterred, petitioner wrote identical letters, first

addressed to Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing (then Acting Chief Justice) and then

to Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno himself.23[23] The body of the letter,

undoubtedly in the nature of a third motion for reconsideration, is hereby

reproduced in its entirety:

This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence, that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and
my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the implementation
of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice
so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the
Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready
reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves
the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza
in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render impartial
justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals
Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he,
as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the
Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which
he lost.

In other words, he discharged the duties of prosecutor and judge in the

very same case.

In the case of the Alabang Boys[,] the public was outraged by the actions
of Atty. Verano who admitted having prepared a simple resolution to be signed by
the Secretary of Justice.

In my case, the act complained of is the worst kind of violation of my

constitutional right. It is simply immoral, illegal and unconstitutional, for the
 prosecutor to eventually act as the judge, and reverse the very decision in which
he had lost.

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite
from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light. I must confess that I was
tempted to pursue such course of action. I however believe that such an action
will do more harm than good, and even destroy the good name of Hon. Justice
Mendoza.

I fully support your call for moral force that will slowly and eventually
lead our country to redirect its destiny and escape from this moral decadence, in
which we all find ourselves.

I am content with the fact that at least, the Chief Justice continues to fight
the dark forces that surround us everyday.

I only ask that the Supreme Court endeavor to ensure that cases such as
mine do not happen again, so that the next person who seeks justice will not
experience the pain and frustration that I suffered under our judicial system.

Thank you, and more power to you, SIR. (Emphasis in the original).

The language of petitioners letter/motion is unmistakable. It is a thinly

veiled threat precisely worded and calculated to intimidate this Court into giving in

to her demands to honor an otherwise legally infirm compromise agreement, at the

risk of being vilified in the media and by the public.

This Court will not be cowed into submission. We deny petitioners

letter/third motion for reconsideration.

APPLICABILITY

OF REYES

The Court agrees with the Republics position that Reyes is applicable to this

case.

To constitute res judicata, the following elements must concur:

(1) the former judgment or order must be final;

(2) the judgment or order must be on the merits;
(3) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the
subject matter and parties; and
(4) there must be between the first and second actions, identity of
parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action. 24[24]

The first three requisites have undoubtedly been complied with. However,

petitioner takes exception to the fourth requisite, particularly on the issue of

identity of parties. In her petition for review filed in this Court, she contends that
since the applicants in the two cases are different, the merits of the two cases

should, accordingly, be determined independently of each other.25[25]

This contention is erroneous.

The facts obtaining in this case closely resemble those in Aquino v. Director

of Lands.26[26] In that case, Quintin Taedo endeavored to secure title to a

considerable tract of land by virtue of his possession thereof under CA 141. When

the case eventually reached this Court, we affirmed the trial courts decision to

dismiss the proceedings as the property in question was part of the public domain.

Quintins successor-in-interest, Florencia Taedo, who despite knowledge of the

proceedings did not participate therein, thereafter sold the same property to

Benigno S. Aquino. The latter sought to have it registered in his name. The

question in that case, as well as in this one, was whether our decision in the case in

which another person was the applicant constituted res judicata as against his

successors-in-interest.
 We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the

provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete

and imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and

declaring the land as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only

against the adverse claimant, but also against all persons.27[27]

We also declared in Aquino that:

From another point of view, the decision in the first action has become the
law of the case or at least falls within the rule of stare decisis. That adjudication
should be followed unless manifestly erroneous. It was taken and should be taken
as the authoritative view of the highest tribunal in the Philippines. It is
indispensable to the due administration of justice especially by a court of last
resort that a question once deliberately examined and decided should be
considered as settled and closed to further argument. x x x28[28]

Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its

decision in favor of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made
an earlier ruling on November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as

it formed part of a military reservation. Thus, petitioners argument that the findings

of fact of the trial court on her registrable title are binding on us on the principle

that findings of fact of lower courts are accorded great respect and bind even this

Court is untenable. Rather, it was incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this

Courts ruling in Reyes, and not the other way around.

However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes

(which should have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial

court still insisted on its divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in

Reyes, declaring the subject land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus

outside the commerce of man.

By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the

decision of this Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion.29[29]
Notably, a judgment rendered with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not

exist in legal contemplation.30[30]

All lower courts, especially the trial court concerned in this case, ought to be

reminded that it is their duty to obey the decisions of the Supreme Court. A

conduct becoming of inferior courts demands a conscious awareness of the

position they occupy in the interrelation and operation of our judicial system. As

eloquently declared by Justice J.B. L. Reyes, "There is only one Supreme Court

from whose decision all other courts should take their bearings."31[31]

ACQUISITION OF

PRIVATE RIGHTS

Petitioner, however, argues that Proclamation 237 itself recognizes that its

effectivity is subject to private rights, if any there be.

 By way of a background, we recognized in Reyes that the property where the

military reservation is situated is forest land. Thus:

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is

inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of
the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of public forest. x x x (Emphasis supplied)32[32]

Concomitantly, we stated therein, and we remind petitioner now, that forest

lands are not registrable under CA 141.

[E]ven more important, Section 48[b] of CA No. 141, as amended, applies

exclusively to public agricultural land. Forest lands or area covered with forest are
excluded. It is well-settled that forest land is incapable of registration; and its
inclusion in a title, whether such title be one issued using the Spanish
sovereignty or under the present Torrens system of registration, nullifies the
title. (Emphasis supplied).33[33]
 However, it is true that forest lands may be registered when they have been

reclassified as alienable by the President in a clear and categorical manner (upon

the recommendation of the proper department head who has the authority to

classify the lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable, timber and

mineral lands)34[34] coupled with possession by the claimant as well as that of her

predecessors-in-interest. Unfortunately for petitioner, she was not able to produce

such evidence. Accordingly, her occupation thereof, and that of her predecessors-

in-interest, could not have ripened into ownership of the subject land. This is

because prior to the conversion of forest land as alienable land, any occupation or

possession thereof cannot be counted in reckoning compliance with the thirty-year

possession requirement under Commonwealth Act 141 (CA 141) or the Public

Land Act.35[35] This was our ruling in Almeda v. CA.36[36] The rules on the

confirmation of imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as

forest land is released through an official proclamation to that effect. Then and
only then will it form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public

domain.37[37]

Coming now to petitioners contention that her private rights to the property,

meaning her and her predecessors possession thereof prior to the establishment of

the FMMR, must be respected, the same is untenable. As earlier stated, we had

already recognized the same land to be public forest even before the FMMR was

established. To reiterate:

Before the military reservation was established, the evidence is

inconclusive as to possession, for it is shown by the evidence that the land
involved is largely mountainous and forested. As a matter of fact, at the time of
the hearing, it was conceded that approximately 13,957 hectares of said land
consist of public forest. x x x

Therefore, even if possession was for more than 30 years, it could never ripen to

ownership.
 But even assuming that the land in question was alienable land before it was

established as a military reservation, there was nevertheless still a dearth of

evidence with respect to its occupation by petitioner and her predecessors-in-

interest for more than 30 years. In Reyes, we noted:

Evidently, Melecio Padilla, having died on February 9, 1900, barely five

(5) years after the inscription of the informacion possessoria, could not have
converted the same into a record of ownership twenty (20) years after such
inscription, pursuant to Article 393 of the Spanish Mortgage Law.

x x x

During the lifetime of Melecio Padilla, only a small portion thereof was
cleared and cultivated under the kaingin system, while some portions were used
as grazing land. After his death, his daughter, Maria Padilla, caused the planting
of vegetables and had about forty (40) tenants for the purpose. During the
Japanese occupation, Maria Padilla died. x x x

x x x

A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the
raising thereon of cattle, do not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In
that sense, possession is not exclusive and notorious as to give rise to a
presumptive grant from the State. While grazing livestock over land is of course
to be considered with other acts of dominion to show possession, the mere
occupancy of land by grazing livestock upon it, without substantial inclosures, or
other permanent improvements, is not sufficient to support a claim of title thru
acquisitive prescription. The possession of public land, however long the period
may have extended, never confers title thereto upon the possessor because the
statute of limitations with regard to public land does not operate against the State
unless the occupant can prove possession and occupation of the same under claim
of ownership for the required number of years to constitute a grant from the
State.38[38]
 x x x

Furthermore, the fact that the possessory information title on which

petitioner also bases her claim of ownership was found to be inexistent in

Reyes,39[39] thus rendering its probative value suspect, further militates against

granting her application for registration.

NULLITY OF COMPROMISE

AGREEMENT

On the compromise agreement between the parties, we agree with the CA

that the same was null and void.

 An amicable settlement or a compromise agreement is in the nature of a

contract and must necessarily comply with the provisions of Article 1318 of the

New Civil Code which provides:

Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established.

Petitioner was not able to provide any proof that the consent of the Republic,

through the appropriate government agencies, i.e. the Department of Environment

and Natural Resources, Land Management Bureau, Land Registration Authority,

and the Office of the President, was secured by the OSG when it executed the

agreement with her.40[40] The lack of authority on the part of the OSG rendered

the compromise agreement between the parties null and void because although it is

the duty of the OSG to represent the State in cases involving land registration

proceedings, it must do so only within the scope of the authority granted to it by its

principal, the Republic of the Philippines.41[41]

 In this case, although the OSG was authorized to appear as counsel for

respondent, it was never given the specific or special authority to enter into a

compromise agreement with petitioner. This is in violation of the provisions of

Rule 138 Section 23, of the Rules of Court which requires special authority for

attorneys to bind their clients.

Section 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. Attorneys have authority

to bind their clients in any case by any agreement in relation thereto made in
writing, and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial procedure.
But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their clients
litigation, or receive anything in discharge of a clients claim but the full amount
in cash. (Emphasis supplied).

Moreover, the land in question could not have been a valid subject matter of

a contract because, being forest land, it was inalienable. Article 1347 of the Civil

Code provides:

Art. 1347. All things which are not outside the commerce of men,
including future things, may be the object of a contract. All rights which are
not intransmissible may also be the object of contracts.
No contract may be entered into upon future inheritance except in cases expressly
authorized by law.
 All services which are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy may likewise be the object of a contract. (Emphasis supplied)

Finally, the Court finds the cause or consideration of the obligation contrary

to law and against public policy. The agreement provided that, in consideration of

petitioners withdrawal of her application for registration of title from that portion

of the property located within the military reservation, respondent was

withdrawing its claim on that part of the land situated outside said reservation. The

Republic could not validly enter into such undertaking as the subject matter of the

agreement was outside the commerce of man.

PETITIONERS CONTEMPT

OF COURT

This Court, being the very institution that dispenses justice, cannot

reasonably be expected to just sit by and do nothing when it comes under attack.
 That petitioners letter-motion constitutes an attack against the integrity of

this Court cannot be denied. Petitioner started her letter innocently enough by

stating:

This is in response to your call for Moral Forces in order to redirect the
destiny of our country which is suffering from moral decadence, that to your
mind, is the problem which confronts us. (Inquirer, January 15, 2009, page 1)[.]

It, however, quickly progressed into a barely concealed resentment for what

she perceived as this Courts failure to exercise utmost prudence in rendering

impartial justice in deciding her case. Petitioner recounted:

I recently lost my case with the Supreme Court, G.R. N[o]. 181502, and
my lawyer has done all that is humanly possible to convince the court to take a
second look at the miscarriage of justice that will result from the
implementation of the DISMISSAL in a MINUTE RESOLUTION of our
Petition for Review.

Pending before your Division (First Division) is a last plea for justice
so that the case may be elevated to the Supreme Court en banc. I hope the
Court exercises utmost prudence in resolving the last plea. For ready
reference, a copy of the Motion is hereto attached as Annex A.

The issue that was brought before the Honorable Supreme Court involves
the Decision of then Justice Vicente Mendoza of the Court of Appeals, which is
NULL and VOID, ab initio.

It is null and void because destiny placed Hon. Justice Vicente Mendoza
in a position in which it became possible for him to discharge the minimum
 requirement of due process, [i.e.] the ability of the court to render impartial
justice, because Mr. Justice Mendoza became the ponente of the Court of Appeals
Decision, reversing the findings of the trial court, notwithstanding the fact that he,
as Assistant Solicitor General, was the very person who appeared on behalf of the
Republic, as the oppositor in the very same land registration proceedings in which
he lost. (Emphasis supplied).

Petitioner then indirectly hints that, when push comes to shove, she has no

choice but to expose the irregularity concerning the Mendoza decision to the

media. This is evident in her arrogant declaration that:

If leaked to the tri-media[,] my case will certainly evoke even greater spite
from the public, and put the Supreme Court in bad light.

But she hastens to add in the same breath that:

I must confess that I was tempted to pursue such course of action. I

however believe that such an action will do more harm than good, and even
destroy the good name of Hon. Justice Mendoza.

Petitioner ends her letter by taking this Court to task:

. . . endeavor to ensure that cases such as mine do not happen again, so that the
next person who seeks justice will not experience the pain and frustration that I
suffered under our judicial system.
 When required to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for

her baseless charges and veiled threats, petitioner answered:

xxx

The Letter of January 26, 2009 is not a veiled threat[.] It was written in response
to the call of the Chief Justice for a moral revolution. Juxtaposed against the factual
backdrop of the Alabang Boys case and the Meralco [c]ase, involving Mr. Justice Jose L.
Sabio which also enjoyed wide publicity over the tri-media, petitioner felt that the facts
of the said cases pale in comparison to the facts of her case where the lawyer of her
opponent eventually became justice of the appellate court and ended up reversing the
very decision in which he lost, in clear violation of her [c]onstitutional [r]ight to
fundamental fair play for no contestant in any litigation can ever serve as a judge without
transgression of the due process clause. This is basic.

Petitioner confesses that she may have been emotional in the delivery of her
piece, because correctly or incorrectly[,] she believes they are irrefutable. If in the course
of that emotional delivery, she has offended your honors sensibilities, she is ready for the
punishment, and only prays that his Court temper its strike with compassion as her letter
to the Chief Justice was never written with a view of threatening the Court.

xxx

Petitioner wrote the Chief Justice in order to obtain redress and correction of the
inequity bestowed upon her by destiny. It was never meant as a threat.

The Court now puts an end to petitioners irresponsible insinuations and

threats of going public with this case. We are not blind to petitioners clever and

foxy interplay of threats alternating with false concern for the reputation of this

Court.
 It is well to remind petitioner that the Court has consistently rendered justice

with neither fear nor favor. The disposition in this case was arrived at after a

careful and thorough deliberation of the facts of this case and all the matters

pertaining thereto. The records of the case, in fact, show that all the pertinent issues

raised by petitioner were passed upon and sufficiently addressed by the appellate

court and this Court in their respective resolutions.

As to petitioners complaint regarding this Courts denial of her petition

through a mere minute resolution (which allegedly deprived her of due process as

the Court did not issue a full-blown decision stating the facts and applicable

jurisprudence), suffice it to say that the Court is not duty-bound to issue decisions

or resolutions signed by the justices all the time. It has ample discretion to

formulate ponencias, extended resolutions or even minute resolutions issued by or

upon its authority, depending on its evaluation of a case, as long as a legal basis

exists. When a minute resolution (signed by the Clerk of Court upon orders of the

Court) denies or dismisses a petition or motion for reconsideration for lack of

merit, it is understood that the assailed decision or order, together with all its

findings of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained.42[42]

 Furthermore, petitioner has doggedly pursued her case in this Court by filing

three successive motions for reconsideration, including the letter-motion subject of

this resolution. This, despite our repeated warnings that no further pleadings shall

be entertained in this case. Her unreasonable persistence constitutes utter defiance

of this Courts orders and an abuse of the rules of procedure. This, alongside her

thinly veiled threats to leak her case to the media to gain public sympathy although

the tone of petitioners compliance with our show-cause resolution was decidedly

subdued compared to her earlier letters constitutes contempt of court.

In Republic v. Unimex,43[43] we held:

A statement of this Court that no further pleadings would be entertained is

a declaration that the Court has already considered all issues presented by the
parties and that it has adjudicated the case with finality. It is a directive to the
parties to desist from filing any further pleadings or motions. Like all orders of
this Court, it must be strictly observed by the parties. It should not be
circumvented by filing motions ill-disguised as requests for clarification.
A FEW OBSERVATIONS

If petitioner was, as she adamantly insists, only guarding her constitutional

right to due process, then why did she question the validity of the Mendoza

decision late in the proceedings, that is, only after her motion for reconsideration in

the CA (for its subsequent annulment of the compromise agreement) was denied?

It is obvious that it was only when her case became hopeless that her present

counsel frantically searched for some ground, any ground to resuscitate his clients

lost cause, subsequently raising the issue. This is evident from a statement in her

petition to this Court that:

It is this fresh discovery by the undersigned counsel of the nullity of

the proceedings of the Court of Appeals that places in doubt the entire
proceedings it previously conducted, which led to the rendition of the February
26, 1992 Decision, a fact that escaped the scrutiny of applicant for
registration Flora L. Garcia, as well as her lawyer, Atty. Cayetano Dante
Diaz, who died in 1993, and the late Justice Fernando A. Santiago, who stood
as counsel for Flora L. Garcias successor-in-interest, herein petitioner,
Florencia G. Garcia.44[44] (Emphasis supplied).

The above cited statement does not help petitioners cause at all. If anything,

it only proves how desperate the case has become for petitioner and her counsel.
 WHEREFORE, the letter-motion dated January 26, 2009 of petitioner is

NOTED and is hereby treated as a third motion for reconsideration. The motion is

DENIED considering that a third motion for reconsideration is a prohibited

pleading and the plea utterly lacks merit.

Petitioner is found GUILTY of contempt of court. Accordingly, a FINE of

Five Thousand Pesos is hereby imposed on her, payable within ten days from

receipt of this resolution. She is hereby WARNED that any repetition hereof shall

be dealt with more severely.

Treble costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 173423 March 5, 2014

SPS. ANTONIO FORTUNA and ERLINDA FORTUNA, Petitioners,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 filed by the petitioners, spouses Antonio
and Erlinda Fortuna, assailing the decision dated May 16, 20052 and the resolution dated June
27, 20063 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143. The CA reversed and set
aside the decision dated May 7, 20014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La
Union, Branch 66, in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. 2372.

THE BACKGROUND FACTS

In December 1994, the spouses Fortuna filed an application for registration of a 2,597-square
meter land identified as Lot No. 4457, situated in Bo. Canaoay, San Fernando, La Union. The
application was filed with the RTC and docketed as LRC No. 2372.

The spouses Fortuna stated that Lot No. 4457 was originally owned by Pastora Vendiola, upon
whose death was succeeded by her children, Clemente and Emeteria Nones. Through an affidavit
of adjudication dated August 3, 1972, Emeteria renounced all her interest in Lot No. 4457 in
favor of Clemente. Clemente later sold the lot in favor of Rodolfo Cuenca on May 23, 1975.
Rodolfo sold the same lot to the spouses Fortuna through a deed of absolute sale dated May 4,
1984.

The spouses Fortuna claimed that they, through themselves and their predecessors-in-interest,
have been in quiet, peaceful, adverse and uninterrupted possession of Lot No. 4457 for more than
50 years, and submitted as evidence the lot’s survey plan, technical description, and certificate of
assessment.

Although the respondent, Republic of the Philippines (Republic), opposed the application,5 it did
not present any evidence in support of its opposition. Since no private opposition to the
registration was filed, the RTC issued an order of general default on November 11, 1996 against
the whole world, except the Republic.6

In its Decision dated May 7, 2001,7 the RTC granted the application for registration in favor of
the spouses Fortuna. The RTC declared that "[the spouses Fortuna] have established [their]
possession, including that of their predecessors-in-interest of the land sought to be registered, has
been open, continuous, peaceful, adverse against the whole world and in the concept of an owner
since 1948, or for a period of over fifty (50) years."8

The Republic appealed the RTC decision with the CA, arguing that the spouses Fortuna did not
present an official proclamation from the government that the lot has been classified as alienable
and disposable agricultural land. It also claimed that the spouses Fortuna’s evidence – Tax
Declaration No. 8366 – showed that possession over the lot dates back only to 1948, thus, failing
to meet the June 12, 1945 cut-off period provided under Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree (PRD).

In its decision dated May 16, 2005,9 the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision. Although
it found that the spouses Fortuna were able to establish the alienable and disposable nature of the
land,10 they failed to show that they complied with the length of possession that the law
requires, i.e., since June 12, 1945. It agreed with the Republic’s argument that Tax Declaration
No. 8366 only showed that the spouses Fortuna’s predecessor-in-interest, Pastora, proved that
she had been in possession of the land only since 1948.

The CA denied the spouses Fortuna’s motion for reconsideration of its decision in its resolution
dated June 27, 2006.11

THE PARTIES’ ARGUMENTS

Through the present petition, the spouses Fortuna seek a review of the CA rulings.

They contend that the applicable law is Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 or the
Public Land Act (PLA), as amended by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942. RA No. 1942 amended the
PLA by requiring 30 years of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession to acquire
imperfect title over an agricultural land of the public domain. This 30-year period, however, was
removed by PD No. 1073 and instead required that the possession should be since June 12, 1945.
The amendment introduced by PD No. 1073 was carried in Section 14(1) of the PRD.12

The spouses Fortuna point out that PD No. 1073 was issued on January 25, 1977 and published
on May 9, 1977; and the PRD was issued on June 11, 1978 and published on January 2, 1979.
On the basis of the Court’s ruling in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.,13 they allege that
PD No. 1073 and the PRD should be deemed effective only on May 24, 1977 and January 17,
1979, respectively. By these dates, they claim to have already satisfied the 30-year requirement
under the RA No. 1942 amendment because Pastora’s possession dates back, at the latest, to
1947.

They allege that although Tax Declaration No. 8366 was made in 1948, this does not contradict
that fact that Pastora possessed Lot No. 4457 before 1948. The failure to present documentary
evidence proving possession earlier than 1948 was explained by Filma Salazar, Records Officer
of the Provincial Assessor’s Office, who testified that the records were lost beyond recovery due
to the outbreak of World War II.

Notwithstanding the absence of documents executed earlier than 1948, the spouses Fortuna
contend that evidence exists indicating that Pastora possessed the lot even before 1948. First, Tax
Declaration No. 8366 does not contain a statement that it is a new tax declaration. Second, the
annotation found at the back of Tax Declaration No. 8366 states that "this declaration cancels
Tax Nos. 10543[.]"14 Since Tax Declaration No. 8366 was issued in 1948, the cancelled Tax
Declaration No. 10543 was issued, at the latest, in 1947, indicating that there was already an
owner and possessor of the lot before 1948. Third, they rely on the testimony of one Macaria
Flores in LRC No. 2373. LRC No. 2373 was also commenced by the spouses Fortuna to register
Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098,15 which were also originally owned by Pastora and are
adjacent to the subject Lot No. 4457. Macaria testified that she was born in 1926 and resided in a
place a few meters from the three lots. She stated that she regularly passed by these lots on her
way to school since 1938. She knew the property was owned by Pastora because the latter’s
family had constructed a house and planted fruit-bearing trees thereon; they also cleaned the
area. On the basis of Macaria’s testimony and the other evidence presented in LRC No. 2373, the
RTC granted the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and
27098 in its decision of January 3, 2005.16 The RTC’s decision has lapsed into finality
unappealed.

The spouses Fortuna claim that Macaria’s testimony in LRC No. 2373 should be considered to
prove Pastora’s possession prior to 1948. Although LRC No. 2373 is a separate registration
proceeding, it pertained to lots adjacent to the subject property, Lot No. 4457, and belonged to
the same predecessor-in-interest. Explaining their failure to present Macaria in the proceedings
before the RTC in LRC No. 2372, the spouses Fortuna said "it was only after the reception of
evidence x x x that [they] were able to trace and establish the identity and competency of
Macaria[.]"17

Commenting on the spouses Fortuna’s petition, the Republic relied mostly on the CA’s ruling
which denied the registration of title and prayed for the dismissal of the petition.

THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the petition for failure of the spouses Fortuna to sufficiently prove their compliance
with the requisites for the acquisition of title to alienable lands of the public domain.

The nature of Lot No. 4457 as alienable and

disposable public land has not been sufficiently
established

The Constitution declares that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State.18 Of the
four classes of public land, i.e., agricultural lands, forest or timber lands, mineral lands, and
national parks, only agricultural lands may be alienated.19 Public land that has not been
classified as alienable agricultural land remains part of the inalienable public domain. Thus, it is
essential for any applicant for registration of title to land derived through a public grant to
establish foremost the alienable and disposable nature of the land. The PLA provisions on the
grant and disposition of alienable public lands, specifically, Sections 11 and 48(b), will find
application only from the time that a public land has been classified as agricultural and declared
as alienable and disposable.

Under Section 6 of the PLA,20 the classification and the reclassification of public lands are the
prerogative of the Executive Department. The President, through a presidential proclamation or
executive order, can classify or reclassify a land to be included or excluded from the public
domain. The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Secretary is likewise
empowered by law to approve a land classification and declare such land as alienable and
disposable.21

Accordingly, jurisprudence has required that an applicant for registration of title acquired
through a public land grant must present incontrovertible evidence that the land subject of the
application is alienable or disposable by establishing the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative action;
investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.

In this case, the CA declared that the alienable nature of the land was established by the notation
in the survey plan,22 which states:

This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 13 L.C. Map No. 1395
certified August 7, 1940. It is outside any civil or military reservation.23

It also relied on the Certification dated July 19, 1999 from the DENR Community Environment
and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) that "there is, per record, neither any public land
application filed nor title previously issued for the subject parcel[.]"24 However, we find that
neither of the above documents is evidence of a positive act from the government reclassifying
the lot as alienable and disposable agricultural land of the public domain.

Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered properties’
alienable and disposable character.25 These notations, at the very least, only establish that the
land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved alienable and disposable
area per verification through survey by the proper government office. The applicant, however,
must also present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable and disposable
land, as declared by the DENR Secretary or as proclaimed by the President.26 In Republic v.
Heirs of Juan Fabio,27 the Court ruled that [t]he applicant for land registration must prove that
the DENR Secretary had approved the land classification and released the land of the public
domain as alienable and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration
falls within the approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO28 or CENRO. In
addition, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification of the land into alienable
and disposable, as declared by the DENR Secretary, or as proclaimed by the President.

The survey plan and the DENR-CENRO certification are not proof that the President or the
DENR Secretary has reclassified and released the public land as alienable and disposable. The
offices that prepared these documents are not the official repositories or legal custodian of the
issuances of the President or the DENR Secretary declaring the public land as alienable and
disposable.29

For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive
Department, the spouses Fortuna’s claim of title through a public land grant under the PLA
should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect
or incomplete title, the period of
possession should commence, at the
latest, as of May 9, 1947

Although the above finding that the spouses Fortuna failed to establish the alienable and
disposable character of Lot No. 4457 serves as sufficient ground to deny the petition and
terminate the case, we deem it proper to continue to address the other important legal issues
raised in the petition.

As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable agricultural
lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain may be disposed of,
among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title. This mode of acquisition
of title is governed by Section 48(b) of the PLA, the original version of which states:

Sec. 48. The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been
perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land
is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under
the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in- interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-sixth, eighteen hundred and ninety- four, except when prevented
by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this chapter. [emphasis supplied]

On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of
possession under RA No. 1942. Section 48(b) of the PLA, as amended by RA No. 1942, read:

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public
domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately
preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or
force majeure. [emphasis and underscore ours]

On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year period of possession by requiring
possession since June 12, 1945. Section 4 of PD No. 1073 reads:

SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act
are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions shall apply only to alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain which have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation by the applicant himself or thru his predecessor-in-interest,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945. [emphasis supplied]

Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years – from 1945 up to its
enactment in 1977 – is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of applicants who had
complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No. 1942 amendment, but whose
possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June 12, 1945 was established by the PD
No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa30 that "Filipino
citizens who by themselves or their predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of
P.D. 1073 on January 25, 1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48(b) of the [PLA]." January 24,
1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30 years counted backward from
January 25, 1977 – the effectivity date of PD No. 1073.

It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted; based on the
certification from the National Printing Office,31 PD No. 1073 was published in Vol. 73, No. 19
of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted
fact materially affects the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete
title under Section 48(b) of the PLA.

Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al.32 that the
publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes, including
those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature."33 Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should be understood to mean that the
decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9, 1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-
off date for applications for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title under Section
48(b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In other words, applicants must prove that they have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at
least since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna were unable to prove

that they possessed Lot No. 4457 since May 8, 1947

Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural land of
the public domain, the spouses Fortuna’s application for registration of title would still not
prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8, 1947.

The spouses Fortuna’s allegation that: (1) the absence of a notation that Tax Declaration No.
8366 was a new tax declaration and (2) the notation stating that Tax Declaration No. 8366
cancels the earlier Tax Declaration No. 10543 both indicate that Pastora possessed the land prior
to 1948 or, at the earliest, in 1947. We also observe that Tax Declaration No. 8366 contains a
sworn statement of the owner that was subscribed on October 23, 1947.34 While these
circumstances may indeed indicate possession as of 1947, none proves that it commenced as of
the cut-off date of May 8, 1947. Even if the tax declaration indicates possession since 1947, it
does not show the nature of Pastora’s possession. Notably, Section 48(b) of the PLA speaks of
possession and occupation. "Since these words are separated by the conjunction and, the clear
intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the other. Possession is broader than
occupation because it includes constructive possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word
occupation, it seeks to delimit the all encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken
together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to
highlight the fact that for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere fiction."35
Nothing in Tax Declaration No. 8366 shows that Pastora exercised acts of possession and
occupation such as cultivation of or fencing off the land. Indeed, the lot was described as
"cogonal."36

The spouses Fortuna seeks to remedy the defects of Tax Declaration No. 8366 by relying on
Macaria’s testimony in a separate land registration proceeding, LRC No. 2373. Macaria alleged
that she passed by Pastora’s lots on her way to school, and she saw Pastora’s family construct a
house, plant fruit-bearing trees, and clean the area. However, the Court is not convinced that
Macaria’s testimony constituted as the "well-nigh incontrovertible evidence" required in cases of
this nature.

The records disclose that the spouses Fortuna acquired adjoining parcels of land, all of which are
claimed to have previously belonged to Pastora. These parcels of land were covered by three
separate applications for registration, to wit:

a. LRC No. N-1278, involving Lot Nos. 1 and 2, with a total area of 2,961 sq. m.,
commenced by Emeteria;

b. LRC No. 2373, involving Lot Nos. 4462, 27066, and 27098, with a total area of 4,006
sq. m., commenced by the spouses Fortuna; and

c. LRC No. 2372 (the subject case), involving Lot No. 4457, with a total area of 2,597 sq.
m.

As these cases involved different but adjoining lots that belonged to the same predecessor-in-
interest, the spouses Fortuna alleged that the final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373,37
upholding Pastora’s ownership, be taken into account in resolving the present case.

Notably, the total land area of the adjoining lots that are claimed to have previously belonged to
Pastora is 9,564 sq. m. This is too big an area for the Court to consider that Pastora’s claimed
acts of possession and occupation (as testified to by Macaria) encompassed the entirety of the
lots. Given the size of the lots, it is unlikely that Macaria (age 21 in 1947) could competently
assess and declare that its entirety belonged to Pastora because she saw acts of possession and
occupation in what must have been but a limited area. As mentioned, Tax Declaration No. 8366
described Lot No. 4457 as "cogonal," thus, Macaria could not have also been referring to Lot No.
4457 when she said that Pastora planted fruit-bearing trees on her properties.
The lower courts' final rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373, upholding Pastora's possession, do
not tie this Court's hands into ruling in favor of the spouses Fortuna. Much to our dismay, the
rulings in LRC Nos. N-1278 and 2373 do not even show that the lots have been officially
reclassified as alienable lands of the public domain or that the nature and duration of Pastora's
occupation met the requirements of the PLA, thus, failing to convince us to either disregard the
rules of evidence or consider their merits. In this regard, we reiterate our directive in Santiago v.
De las Santos:38

Both under the 193 5 and the present Constitutions, the conservation no less than the utilization
of the natural resources is ordained. There would be a failure to abide by its command if the
judiciary does not scrutinize with care applications to private ownership of real estate. To be
granted, they must be grounded in well-nigh incontrovertible evidence. Where, as in this case, no
such proof would be forthcoming, there is no justification for viewing such claim with favor. It is
a basic assumption of our polity that lands of whatever classification belong to the state. Unless
alienated in accordance with law, it retains its rights over the same as do minus.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision dated May 16, 2005 and the resolution
dated June 27, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 71143 are AFFIRMED insofar
as these dismissed the spouses Antonio and Erlinda Fortuna's application of registration of title
on the basis of the grounds discussed above. Costs against the spouses Fortuna.

SO ORDERED.

ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR: