Philippine Rabbit vs.

People
G.R. No. 147703 April 14, 2004
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Facts: Napoleon Roman was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence
resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced
to suffer imprisonment and to pay damages. The court further ruled that in the event of the
insolvency of accused, petitioner shall be liable for the civil liabilities of the accused. Evidently,
the judgment against accused had become final and executory.

Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. The CA ruled that the institution of
a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising from the offense. Thus, once
determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employer’s subsidiary civil
liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.

Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-
employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.

Held: No. It is well-established in our jurisdiction that the appellate court may, upon motion
or motu proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. This rule is
based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond.

2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions are deemed instituted in a
criminal prosecution. When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of
civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action
unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.

Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly
instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves
the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the
subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be
enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee.

What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the
crime or delict per se, but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the
criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the
prosecutor -- still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest
therein.

The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly
speaking, they are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. Although
in substance and in effect, they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of
their subsidiary liability. While they may assist their employees to the extent of supplying the
latter’s lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot act independently on their own behalf,
but can only defend the accused.

As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Under Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil liabilities of their
employees in the event of the latter’s insolvency. Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision,
the trial court need not expressly pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer. In the
absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. In effect and implication, the stigma
of a criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.

To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to
amend, nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. By the same token, to
allow them to appeal the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latter’s consent
would also result in improperly amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment. The decision
convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only
with regard to the former’s civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an
employer cannot be separated from that of the employee.

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability
of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable
by reason of his flight, then the former’s subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately
enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly
contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

PACIS v MORALES
Topic: Owners and managers of establishments and enterprises

DOCTRINE: A higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or
under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous
weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has
the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the
ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with
dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care.

FACTS: Alfredo Pacis and Cleopatra Pacis filed a civil case for damages against Jerome
Jovanne Morales. Spouses Paceis are the parents of Alfred, 17 y.o. who died in a shooting
incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store (gun store) in Baguio City.
Morales is the owner.

Alfred died due to a gunshot wound in the head which he sustained while he was at gunstore.
The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a customer of the gun store for
repair. The gun, was left by Morales in a drawer of a table located inside the gun store.

Morales as in Manila at the time. His employee Armando Jarnague, who was the regular
caretaker of the gun store was also not around. Jarnague entrusted to Matibag and Herbolario a
bunch of keys which included the key to the drawer where the gun was kept. It appears that
Matibag and Herbolario later brought out the gun from the drawer and palced it in top of the
table. Attacted by it, Alfred got hold of it. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. Alfred
followed but it went off the bullet hitting Alfred.

The trial court held Morales civilly liable for the death of Alftred under A2180 in relation to
A2176, ruling that the accidental shooting of Alfred which caused his death was partyl due to the
negligence of Morales’ emplyee – Matibag. CA reversed, ruling that there was no employee-
employer relationship because Matibag was not under the control of Morales with respect to the
means and methods in the performance of his worK, thus A2180 cannot apply. And even if
Matibag was an employee, Morales still cannot be held civilly liable because there is no
negligence can be attributed to Morales because he kept the gun.

ISSUE: WON Morales is civilly liable?

RULING: YES. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and
placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. For failing to insure that
the gun was not loaded, Morales himself was negligent.

Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the “Policy on Firearms and Ammunition
Dealership/Repair,” a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and
ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his
License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled.

As a gun store owner, Morales is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and
should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of
harm or injury to others. Morales has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not
loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are
not needed for ready access defensive use.

In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the
defective gun for repair, Morales should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any
untoward accident. Indeed, Morales should never accept a firearm from another person, until the
cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded

Clearly, Morales did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a
family, much less the The bullet which killed Alfred was fired from a gun brought in by a
customer of the gun store for repair.

Choice of claim of petitioners

This case for damages arouse out of the accidental shoting of Alfred. Under A1161 of the Civil
Code petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the
crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for
damages under the Civil Code.
In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against
Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent
whom they alleged was Matibag’s employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under
Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code.

DISPOSITIVE: Morales is civilly liable to petitioners because he was negligent.

Air France vs Rafael Carrascoso

March 4, 2014
Remedial Law – Evidence – Hearsay Rule – Res Gestae – Startling Event

In March 1958, Rafael Carrascoso and several other Filipinos were tourists en route to Rome
from Manila. Carrascoso was issued a first class round trip ticket by Air France. But during a
stop-over in Bangkok, he was asked by the plane manager of Air France to vacate his seat
because a white man allegedly has a “better right” than him. Carrascoso protested but when
things got heated and upon advise of other Filipinos on board, Carrascoso gave up his seat and
was transferred to the plane’s tourist class.

After their tourist trip when Carrascoso was already in the Philippines, he sued Air France for
damages for the embarrassment he suffered during his trip. In court, Carrascoso testified, among
others, that he when he was forced to take the tourist class, he went to the plane’s pantry where
he was approached by a plane purser who told him that he noted in the plane’s journal the
following:

First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain
refused to intervene

The said testimony was admitted in favor of Carrascoso. The trial court eventually awarded
damages in favor of Carrascoso. This was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

Air France is assailing the decision of the trial court and the CA. It avers that the issuance of a
first class ticket to Carrascoso was not an assurance that he will be seated in first class because
allegedly in truth and in fact, that was not the true intent between the parties.

Air France also questioned the admissibility of Carrascoso’s testimony regarding the note made
by the purser because the said note was never presented in court.
ISSUE 1: Whether or not Air France is liable for damages and on what basis.

HELD 1: Yes. It appears that Air France’s liability is based on culpa-contractual and on culpa
aquiliana.

Culpa Contractual

There exists a contract of carriage between Air France and Carrascoso. There was a contract to
furnish Carrasocoso a first class passage; Second, That said contract was breached when Air
France failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith
when Air France’s employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth
“after he was already, seated” and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he
suffered inconvenience, embarrassments and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish,
serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social humiliation, resulting in moral damages.

The Supreme Court did not give credence to Air France’s claim that the issuance of a first class
ticket to a passenger is not an assurance that he will be given a first class seat. Such claim is
simply incredible.

Culpa Aquiliana

Here, the SC ruled, even though there is a contract of carriage between Air France and
Carrascoso, there is also a tortuous act based on culpa aquiliana. Passengers do not contract
merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier’s employees with
kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against
personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is,
that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier. Air France’s contract with Carrascoso is one
attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso’s action is placed upon his wrongful
expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the Air France — a case of quasi-delict. Damages
are proper.
G.R. No. 124354. December 29, 1999.

Ponente: Kapunan

FACTS:
Erlinda Ramos underwent a surgical procedure to remove stone from her gall bladder
(cholecystectomy). They hired Dr. Hosaka, a surgeon, to conduct the surgery at the De Los
Santos Medical Center (DLSMC). Hosaka assured them that he would find a good
anesthesiologist. But the operation did not go as planned, Dr. Hosaka arrived 3 hours late for the
operation, Dra. Gutierrez, the anesthesiologist “botched” the administration of the anesthesia
causing Erlinda to go into a coma and suffer brain damage. The botched operation was witnessed
by Herminda Cruz, sister in law of Erlinda and Dean of College of Nursing of Capitol Medical
Center.

The family of Ramos (petitioners) sued the hospital, the surgeon and the anesthesiologist for
damages. The petitioners showed expert testimony showing that Erlinda's condition was caused
by the anesthesiologist in not exercising reasonable care in “intubating” Erlinda. Eyewitnesses
heard the anesthesiologist saying “Ang hirap ma-intubate nito, mali yata ang pagkakapasok. O
lumalaki ang tiyan.”

Diagnostic tests prior to surgery showed that Erlinda was robust and fit to undergo surgery.

The RTC held that the anesthesiologist ommitted to exercise due care in intubating the patient,
the surgeon was remiss in his obligation to provide a “good anesthesiologist” and for arriving 3
hours late and the hospital is liable for the negligence of the doctors and for not cancelling the
operation after the surgeon failed to arrive on time. The surgeon, anesthesiologist and the
DLSMC were all held jointly and severally liable for damages to petitioners. The CA reversed
the decision of the Trial Court.

ISSUES: Whether or not the private respondents were negligent and thereby caused the
comatose condition of Ramos.

HELD:
Yes, private respondents were all negligent and are solidarily liable for the damages.

RATIO:

Res ipsa loquitur – a procedural or evidentiary rule which means “the thing or the transaction
speaks for itself.” It is a maxim for the rule that the fact of the occurrence of an injury, taken with
the surrounding circumstances, may permit an inference or raise a presumption of negligence, or
make out a plaintiff’s prima facie case, and present a question of fact for defendant to meet with
an explanation, where ordinarily in a medical malpractice case, the complaining party must
present expert testimony to prove that the attending physician was negligent.

This doctrine finds application in this case. On the day of the operation, Erlinda Ramos already
surrendered her person to the private respondents who had complete and exclusive control over
her. Apart from the gallstone problem, she was neurologically sound and fit. Then, after the
procedure, she was comatose and brain damaged—res ipsa loquitur!—the thing speaks for itself!

Negligence – Private respondents were not able to disprove the presumption of negligence on
their part in the care of Erlinda and their negligence was the proximate cause of her condition.
One need not be an anesthesiologist in order to tell whether or not the intubation was a success.
[res ipsa loquitur applies here]. The Supreme Court also found that the anesthesiologist only saw
Erlinda for the first time on the day of the operation which indicates unfamiliarity with the
patient and which is an act of negligence and irresponsibility.

The head surgeon, Dr. Hosaka was also negligent. He failed to exercise the proper authority as
the “captain of the ship” in determining if the anesthesiologist observed the proper protocols.
Also, because he was late, he did not have time to confer with the anesthesiologist regarding the
anesthesia delivery.

The hospital failed to adduce evidence showing that it exercised the diligence of a good father of
the family in hiring and supervision of its doctors (Art. 2180). The hospital was negligent since
they are the one in control of the hiring and firing of their “consultants”. While these consultants
are not employees, hospitals still exert significant controls on the selection and termination of
doctors who work there which is one of the hallmarks of an employer-employee reationship.
Thus, the hospital was allocated a share in the liability.

Damages – temperate damages can and should be awarded on top of actual or compensatory
damages in instances where the injury is chronic and continuing.
CASTILEX INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. VICENTE VASQUEZ, JR.
and LUISA SO
VASQUEZ, and CEBU DOCTORS' HOSPITAL, INC.,respondents.
FACTS:
At around 1:30 to 2:00 in the morning, Romeo So Vasquez (son of respondents Vicente and
Luisa
Vasquez), was driving a Honda motorcycle around Fuente Osmeña Rotunda. He was traveling
counterclockwise,
(the normal flow of traffic in a rotunda) but without any protective helmet or goggles. He
was also only carrying a Student's Permit to Drive at the time.
Benjamin ABAD was a manager of petitioner CASTILEX Industrial Corporation, registered
owner of a
Toyota Hi-Lux Pick-up with plate no. GBW-794. ABAD drove the said company car out of a
parking lot
but instead of going around the Osmeña rotunda he made a short cut against [the] flow of the
traffic in
proceeding to his route to General Maxilom St.
In the process, the motorcycle of Vasquez and the pick-up of ABAD collided with each
other
causing severe injuries to the former. ABAD brought Vasquez to CEBU DOCTORS'
HOSPITAL
where he died.
A Criminal Case was filed against ABAD but which was subsequently dismissed for failure to
prosecute.
An action for damages was then commenced by respondents against ABAD and petitioner
CASTILEX
Trial court ruled in favor of private respondents and ordered ABAD and to pay jointly and
solidarily
respondents
Petitioner CASTILEX and ABAD separately appealed the decision.
Court of Appeals affirmed the ruling of the trial court holding ABAD and petitioner CASTILEX
liable but
held that the liability of the latter is "only vicarious and not solidary" with the former.
Hence, CASTILEX filed the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether an employer may be held vicariously liable for the death resulting from the negligent
operation by a managerial employee of a company-issued vehicle
RULING:
Petitioner contends that the fifth paragraph of Article 2180 of the Civil Code should only
apply to instances where the employer is not engaged in business or industry. Since it is
engaged in the business of manufacturing and selling furniture it is therefore not covered
by said provision. Instead, the fourth paragraph should apply
- SC: Petitioner's interpretation of the fifth paragraph is not accurate. The phrase "even though
the former are not engaged in any business or industry" found in the fifth paragraph should be
interpreted to mean that it is not necessary for the employer to be engaged in any business or
industry to be liable for the negligence of his employee who is acting within the scope of his
assigned task
o DISTINCTION between 4th and 5th paragraph of Art 2180 of CC:
Both provisions apply to employers: the fourth paragraph, to owners and
managers of an establishment or enterprise; and the fifth paragraph, to
employers in general, whether or not engaged in any business or industry.
The fourth paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in
the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while the fifth
paragraph encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the scope
of their assigned task.
The latter is an expansion of the former in both employer coverage and acts
included.
Negligent acts of employees, whether or not the employer is engaged in a
business or industry, are covered so long as they were acting within the scope
of their assigned task, even though committed neither in the service of the
branches nor on the occasion of their functions
o Under the fifth paragraph of Article 2180, whether or not engaged in any business or
industry, an employer is liable for the torts committed by employees within the scope
of his assigned tasks
But it is necessary to establish the employer-employee relationship; once this
is done, the plaintiff must show, to hold the employer liable, that the employee
was acting within the scope of his assigned task when the tort complained of
was committed
Whether the private respondents have sufficiently established that ABAD was acting
within
the scope of his assigned tasks.
- ABAD: testified that at the time of the incident, he was driving a company-issued vehicle,
registered under the name of petitioner. He was then leaving the restaurant where he had
some snacks and had a chat with his friends after having done overtime work for the
petitioner.
- TC and CA: that the driving by a manager of a company-issued vehicle is within the
scope of his assigned tasks regardless of the time and circumstances.
- SC: do not agree with TC and CA. The mere fact that ABAD was using a service vehicle at the
time of the injurious incident is not of itself sufficient to charge petitioner with liability for the
negligent operation of said vehicle unless it appears that he was operating the vehicle within
the course or scope of his employment.
- American Jurisprudence on the employer's liability for the injuries inflicted by the negligence
of
an employee in the use of an employer's motor vehicle:
o It has been held that an employee who uses his employer's vehicle in going from his work to a
place where he intends to eat or in returning to work from a meal is not ordinarily acting within
the scope of his employment in the absence of evidence of some special business benefit to the
employer
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of
some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available
at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment
even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle
o In the same vein, traveling to and from the place of work is ordinarily a personal problem or
concern of the employee, and not a part of his services to his employer. Hence, in the absence of
some special benefit to the employer other than the mere performance of the services available
at the place where he is needed, the employee is not acting within the scope of his employment
even though he uses his employer's motor vehicle
o However, even if the employee be deemed to be acting within the scope of his
employment in going to or from work in his employer's vehicle, the employer is not
liable for his negligence where at the time of the accident, the employee has left the
direct route to his work or back home and is pursuing a personal errand of his own.
o An employer who loans his motor vehicle to an employee for the latter's personal use
outside of regular working hours is generally not liable for the employee's negligent
operation of the vehicle during the period of permissive use
o Even where the employee's personal purpose in using the vehicle has been
accomplished and he has started the return trip to his house where the vehicle is
normally kept, it has been held that he has not resumed his employment, and the
employer is not liable for the employee's negligent operation of the vehicle during the
return trip
- In the case, it is undisputed that ABAD did some overtime work at the petitioner's office. After,
he went to Goldie's Restaurant in Fuente Osmeña, 7km away from petitioner's place of
business. A witness for the private respondents, a sidewalk vendor, testified that
Fuente Osmeña is a "lively place" even at dawn because Goldie's Restaurant and
Back Street were still open and people were drinking thereat. Moreover, prostitutes,
pimps, and drug addicts littered the place.
- At the Goldie's Restaurant, ABAD took some snacks and had a chat with friends. It was when
ABAD was leaving the restaurant that the incident in question occurred
- ABAD was engaged in affairs of his own or was carrying out a personal purpose not
in line with his duties at the time he figured in a vehicular accident. It was then
about 2:00 a.m. of 28 August 1988, way beyond the normal working hours. ABAD's
working day had ended; his overtime work had already been completed. His being
at a place which, as petitioner put it, was known as a "haven for prostitutes, pimps,
and drug pushers and addicts," had no connection to petitioner's business; neither
had it any relation to his duties as a manager. Rather, using his service vehicle even
for personal purposes was a form of a fringe benefit or one of the perks attached to
his position
- Since no evidence that ABAD was acting within the scope of the functions entrusted to him,
petitioner CASTILEX had no duty to show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in providing ABAD with a service vehicle. Thus, petitioner is relieved of vicarious
liability for the consequences of the negligence of ABAD in driving its vehicle