[DISTINCTION BETWEEN DONATION MORTIS CAUSE AND DONATION INTER ○ that the donor changed his intention by donating
t the donor changed his intention by donating inter vivos
VIVOS]
03 SPOUSES AGRIPINO GESTOPA and ISABEL SILARIO GESTOPA V. COURT
OF APPEALS and MERCEDES DANLAG y PILAPIL
October 5, 2000 | Quisumbing, J. |
Facts:
● Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag were the owners of six parcels of
unregistered lands. They executed three (3) deeds of donation mortis causa
in favour of private respondent Merecedes Danlag-Pilapil (Diegos’
illegitimate child). All deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the
donors 910 to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during their lifetime,
and 92) to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the
donor’s lifetime, if deemed necessary.
● Years later, Diego Danlag, with the consent of his wife, catalina Danlag,
executed another deed of donation inter vivos covering the aforementioned
parcels of land and two others in favour of Mercedes containing the two
conditions, that 91) the Danlag spouses shall continue to enjoy the fruits of
the land during their lifetime, and that (2) the done cannot sell or dispose of
the land during the lifetime of the said spouses, without their prior consent
and approval. Thereafter, Mercedes caused the transfer of the parcels’ tax
declarations to her name and paid the taxes on them.
● Subsequently, the spouses Danlag sold 2 parcels to herein petitioners
Spouses Gestopa, and executed a deed of revocation on the donation inter
vivos covering the six parcels of land given to private respondent Mercedes.
● Mercedes filed with the RTC a petition against Danlags and Gestopas for
quieting of title stating the she had already obtained ownership over the six
parcels of land.
● RTC ruled in favour of Dan;ags and Gestopas.
○ It found that the reservation clause in all the deeds of donation
indicated that Diego Danlag did not make any donation; that the
purchase by Mercedes of the two parcels of land covered by the
Deed of Donation Inter Vivos bolstered this conclusion; that
Mercedes failed to rebut the allegations of ingratitude she
committed against Diego Danlag; and that Mercedes committed
fraud and machination in preparing all the deeds of donation
without explaining to Diego Danlag their contents.
● Mercedes appealed to the CA and argued that RTC erred in:
○ Declaring the donation dated January 16, 1973 as mortis causa
and that the same was already revoked on the ground of
ingratitude;
○ Finding that Mercedes purchased from Diego Danlag the two
parcels of land already covered by the above donation and that she
was only able to pay three thousand pesos, out of the total amount
of twenty thousand pesos;
○ Failing to declare that Mercedes was an acknowledged natural
child of Diego Danlag.
● CA reversed.
○ The reservation by the donor of lifetime usufruct indicated that he
transferred to Mercedes the ownership over the donated properties;
○ that the right to sell belonged to the donee, and the donor's right
referred to that of merely giving consent;
properties already donated mortis causa;
○ that the transfer to Mercedes' name of the tax declarations
pertaining to the donated properties implied that the donation was
inter vivos;
○ that Mercedes did not purchase two of the six parcels of land
donated to her.
Issue:
1. W/N the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the properties upon
the execution of the deed.
2. W/N the revocation was valid.
Held:
1. YES. The attending circumstances in the execution of the donation in this
case demonstrated the real intent of the donor to transfer ownership over the
parcels of land upon execution of the deed.
● As may be aptly analyzed form the provisions of the deed:
○ The granting clause shows that Diego donated the properties out of
love and affection for the donee which is a mark of a donation inter
vivos;
○ The reservation of lifetime usufruct indicates that the donor
intended to transfer the naked ownership over the properties;
○ The donor reserved sufficient properties for his maintenance in
accordance with his standing in society, indicating that the donor
intended to part with the 6 parcels;
○ The donee accepted the donation in which in the case of Alejandro
v. Geraldez, it is said that acceptance clause is a mark that a
donation is a donation inter vivos because a donation mortis causa
being in the form of a will does not require an acceptance from the
done during the donor’s lifetime.
○ CA was right that the right to dispose of the properties belonged to
the donee and the donor’s right to give consent was merely
intended to protect his usufructuary rights.
● It is to be noted that prior to the execution of donation inter vivos, Danlag sps
already executed 3 donation mortis causa which means that they were
aware of the difference of the 2 types of donations. If they did not intend to
donate inter vivos, they would not again donate the lots already donated
mortis causa.
● Gestopas aver that Mercedes’ tax declarations in her name cannot be a
basis in determining donor’s intent because it is easy to get tax declarations
and they are not proof of ownership.
○ SC: unless proven otherwise, there is a presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duties and petitioners did NOT overcome
this presumption in the issuance of the tax declarations. And CA
was correct to say that tax declarations were not referred to as
proofs of ownership but ONLY as evidence of the intent by the
donor to transfer ownership.
1. NO.
● A valid donation, once accepted, becomes irrevocable, except on account of
officiousness, failure by the done to comply with the charges imposed in the
donation, or ingratitude.
 ● The donor spouses din not invoke any of these reasons in the deed of
revocation.
● Mercedes allegedly intensely prohibited the donor to gather fruits from the
coconut trees but the SC said that nothing on record showed that Mercedes
indeed prohibited the donor from doing so and assuming that Mercedes
really did, this could hardly be considered an act under Art. 765 of the New
Civil Code which will warrant the revocation of the donation.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision of the
Court of Appeals dated August 31, 1993, is AFFIRMED.