G.R. No.

193038, March 11, 2015

JOSEFINA V. NOBLEZA, Petitioner, v. SHIRLEY B. NUEGA, Respondent.

DECISION

Subject:

The case subject is that if a sale of property within two parties without the consent of another person
with an interest in that subject property would constitute the buyer in good faith.

Facts:

On September 13, 1989, Rogelio A. Nuega, at that time engaged to Respondent Shirley B. Nuega,
purchased the subject house and lot in Marikina for One Hundred Two thousand Pesos (P 102,000.00)
from Rodeanna Realty Corporation.

On September 1, 1990, Shirley and Rogelio got married and lived in the subject property. At June 1992
Shirley filed two cases, one of which is legal separation, against Rodelio. In between the filing of these
cases, Shirley learned that Rogelio had the intention of the selling the subject property. The petitioner
Josefina V. Nobleza, a interested buyer of the subject lot, had been advised by the respondent that she
filed a case against Rogelio and cautioned them against purchasing the property until the case are
closed and terminated. Nonetheless, under a Deed of Absolute Sale dated December 29, 1992, Rogelio
sold the subject property to petitioner without Shirley’s consent in the amount of Three hundred Eighty
Thousand Pesos.

On May 16, 1994, the RTC of Pasig, Branch 70, granted the petition for legal separation and ordered the
dissolution and liquidation of the regime of absolute community of property between Shirley and
Rogelio.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner purchased the subject lot in good faith

Ruling:

The Regional Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Shirley Nuega against defendant Josefina Nobleza. The
defendant is ordered to reconvey said 55.05 square meters representing one half portion of the subject
lot or in the alternative to pay plaintiff the present market value of said 55.05 square meters and to pay
plaintiff attorney’s fee in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos.

The Court of appeals ruled over the appeal as denied. The court pointed out that the buyer is not a
buyer in good faith for the reason that the petitioner has failed to show prudence and due diligence in
the exercise of her rights. The petitioner claims that she is a buyer in good faith of the subject property
which is titled under the name of the seller Rogelio A. Nuega alone as evidenced by TCT No. 171963 and
Tax Declaration Nos. D-012-04723 and D-012-04724. A buyer cannot claim to be an innocent purchaser
for value by merely relying on the TCT of the seller while ignoring all the other surrounding
circumstances relevant to the sale.
 G.R. No. 205271, September 02, 2015

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. BELLE CORPORATION, Respondent.

DECISION

Facts:

The suit started upon a land dispute between the respondent corporation and a certain Bautista
wherein the latter contested that it is the owner of the land being in possession of the respondent
corporation which is involved in the development and creation of leisure and recreational areas in
Tagaytay area such as the Tagaytay Highlands. The respondent filed a suit for quieting of title with TRO
upon receiving a letter from Bautista ordering the respondent to vacate the subject area and stopped its
operation which was made without her consent. During the pendency of the case, the respondent was
informed that Bautista is no longer the registered owner of the disputed area as it was already
foreclosed by the petitioner bank and a new TCT was registered in the bank’ name. Hence, a Motion for
Leave to File Amended Petition impleading petitioner as indispensable party was filed by the respondent
corporation which was granted by the trial court. Apparently, Bautista mortgaged the property to the
bank without informing respondent. However, because of the failure to pay the loan obtained, the
mortgage was foreclosed in favor of the bank. Claiming that it is a mortgagee on good faith, the
petitioner bank contended that observed due diligence and prudence expected of it as a banking
institution. Prior to the approval of the loan application, there as a verification of the status of the
collateral by its representative which then revealed that the subject property was registered in the
name of Bautista and that the same is free and clear of any lien or encumbrance. Further, no adverse
ownership or interest was found upon ocular inspection. Therefore, in the absence of anything to excite
or arouse suspicion, petitioner is legally justified to rely on the mortgagor and what appears on the face
of her certificate of title.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner is a mortgagee in good faith hence not liable for the loss sustained by the
corporation

Ruling: The RTC ruled against the respondents but was reversed and set aside by the CA upon appeal.
The CA ruled that the respondent corporation is the true and registered owner of the disputed area and
that the petitioner is not to be considered a mortgagee in good faith. It made notice that ot once did the
bank made a testimony that it conducted an investigation on the status of the property despite the fact
that it forms part of the ingress and egress of the well-known Tagaytay Highlands since 1990 or several
years before it accepted the property as collateral from Bautista. Since its negligence was the primary,
immediate and overriding reason, petitioner must bear the loss of the disputed property. Hence, this
appeal.
The Court, upon investigation and taking into account of the facts and evidence of the case ruled that the
corporation is the legitimate owner of the disputed area. And in connection with this, the determination
of liability on the part of the petitioner yielded in the positive.

.R. No. 164961, June 30, 2014

HECTOR L. UY, Petitioner, v. VIRGINIA G. FULE; HEIRS OF THE LATE AMADO A. GARCIA, NAMELY:
AIDA C. GARCIA, LOURDES G. SANTAYANA, AMANDO C. GARCIA, JR., MANUEL C. GARCIA, CARLOS
C. GARCIA, AND CRISTINA G. MARALIT; HEIRS OF THE LATE GLORIA GARCIA ENCARNACION,
NAMELY: MARVIC G. ENCARNACION, IBARRA G. ENCARNACION, MORETO G. ENCARNACION, JR.,
AND CARINA G. ENCARNACION; HEIRS OF THE LATE PABLO GARCIA, NAMELY: BERMEDIO
GARCIA, CRISTETA GARCIA, NONORATO GARCIA, VICENTE GARCIA, PABLO GARCIA, JR., AND
TERESITA GARCIA; HEIRS OF THE LATE ELISA G. HEMEDES, NAMELY: ROEL G. HEMEDES, ELISA G.
HEMEDES, ROGELIO G. HEMEDES, ANDORA G. HEMEDES, AND FLORA G. HEMEDES, Respondents.

Facts:
Conrado Garcia (CG) owned a vast tract of land. Upon his death, his heirs entered an extrajudicial
settlement of his estate includingthe land and thereafter caused its registration under their names.
Meanwhile, DAR officials issued a joint certification that said land was an
“Untitled” property owned by CG. As such, it was
Then included in the Operation Land Transfer program pursuant to PD No. 27. The offices issued
Emancipation Patents and Original Certificate of Titles to farmer-beneficiaries like Mariano Ronda (MR).
MR sold his portion to Chisan Uy then Chisan Uy’s
Heirs, sold the said land to Hector Uy. In 1997, the TCT of CG was cancelled and subsequently issued in
the names of the heirs of Garcia under a new TCT. In 1998, DAR Secretary issued the EPs to farmer-ben
Efficacies like MR. However, CG’s TCT as already in the name of Hector Uy. Because of this, the heirs of
CG filed a complaint assailing the certificates of titles issued to purchasers Chisan and Hector Uy. RTC
favored respondents. CA affirmed. SC affirmed CA.
Issue:
WON Hector Uy, who got the land from the heirs of the farmer beneficiary Mariano Ronda, was an
innocent purchaser forvalue who had better rights than the heirs of Conrado Garcia over the disputed
land
Ruling:

The RTC resolved in favor of the respondents of the respondents by finding that no notice of the inclusion
of the disputed land under the operation of P.D> No.27 had been given to them.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Declaring plaintiffs as the owners of the lands covered by TCT No. 30111 and declaring said title as
VALID, BINDING AND EFFECTIVE, against the whole world;

2. Declaring null and void all the proceedings taken by public defendants in the generation of the
certificates of land transfer and emancipation patents, on the bases of which the OCTs mentioned in
paragraphs 2 and 3 of this decision were issued by the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur;
3. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur to cancel all the OCTs and TCTs mentioned in paragraph
2 and 3 of this decision;

4. Ordering defendants whose titles were cancelled to surrender the possession of the lands covered by
their cancelled titles to the plaintiffs and condemning them to PERPETUAL SILENCE in so far as TCT 30111
is concerned.

Republic of The Philippines, represented by the Chief of the Philippine National Police

Thi Thu Thuy T. De Guzman

GR No. 175021

June 15, 2011

Subject: The

Facts:

The respondent is the proprietress of Montaguz General Merchandise (MGM), a contractor accredited
by the PNP for the supply of office and construction materials and equipment, and for the delivery of
various services such as printing and rental, repair of various equipment, and renovation of buildings,
facilities, vehicles, tires and spare parts.

On December 11, 1995, MGM and petitioner, represented by the PNP, through its chief, executed a
Contract of Agreement wherein MGM, for the price of P 2,288,562.60, undertook to procure and deliver
to the PNP the construction materials itemized in the purchase order attached to the Contract.

On November 5, 1997, the respondent, through counsel, sent a letter dated October 20, 1997 to the
PNP, demanding payment for the construction materials MGM procured for the PNP. The PNP replied to
respondents counsel, informing her of the payment made to MGM via Land Bank of The Philippines
check. Respondent denied having ever received a LBP check, personally or through an authorized
person, and it was then the respondent filed a Complaint for Sum of Money against the petitioner.

The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the claim or demand set forth in
respondent’s complaint had already been paid or extinguished as evidenced by LBP check. It was posited
that Receipt No.001, which the petitioner claimed was issued by MGM upon respondent receipt of the
LBP check, was, first, under the business name Montaguz Builders, an entity separate from MGM. The
petitioner further push their argument that the receipt no. 001 was issued April 23, 1996, which is four
days later when the check was issued, and that it was one Edgardo Cruz who signed for the check due to
MGM.

Issue:
Whether or not the evidence held by the petitioner was able to prove that the respondent had been
paid

Ruling:

The Regional Trial Court rendered their judgement in favor of the respondent and against the petitioner.
The RTC declared that while Cruz’s testimony seemed to offer a plausible explanation on how and why
the LBP check ended up with him, but the only issue that should be resolved is whether the respondent
had been paid or not. Since this was the only issue, the RTC states that the documents and documentary
evidence clearly indicated that the check subject of this case was never received by respondent. It was
Edgardo Cruz who received the LBP check and Receipt No.001 submitted by the petitioner was issued by
Montaguz builders, a different entity.

The Court of Appeals decision was to affirm with modification of the RTC ruling, where the CA agreed
with the RTC that the real issue for determination was whether the petitioner was able to discharge its
contractual obligation with the respondent. In order for the obligation to be extinguish, direct payment
must been done to MGM, not to Cruz which represent Highland Enterprise, unless MGM authorized a
third person to accept payment on its behalf.

The petition prayed to the Supreme Court is denied and the decision of the Court appeals is Affirmed
with modification. The court established that the petitioner had failed to establish its case by
preponderance of evidence. The petitioner relies mainly on Cruz’s testimony to support its
allegations. Not only did it not present any other witness to corroborate Cruz, but it also failed to
present any documentation to confirm its story. It is doubtful that the petitioner or the contractors
would enter into any secret agreement involving millions of pesos based purely on verbal
affirmations. Meanwhile, the respondent not only presented all the documentary evidence to prove her
claims, even the petitioner repeatedly admitted that respondent had fully complied with her contractual
obligations.

Vitarich Corporation v. Chona Losin

GR. No. 181560

November 15, 2010

Facts:

Respondent Chona Losin was in the fastfood and catering services business named Glamours Chicken
House, Vitarich, had been ger supplier of poultry meat. In the months of July to November 1996, Losins
orders of dressed chicken and other meat products allegedly amounted to P921,083.10. During this said
period, Losins poultry meat needs for her business were serviced by Rodrigo Directo (Directo) and Allan
Rosa (Rosa), both salesmen and authorized collectors of Vitarich, and Arnold Baybay (Baybay), a
supervisor of said corporation. Unfortunately, it was also during the same period that her account
started to experience problems because of the fact that Directo delivered stocks to her even without
prior booking which is the customary process of doing business with her.

On August 24, 1996, Directos services were terminated by Vitarich without Losins knowledge. He left
without turning over some supporting invoices covering the orders of Losin. Rosa and Baybay, on the
other hand, resigned on November 30, 1996 and December 30, 1996, respectively. Just like Directo, they
did not also turn over pertinent invoices covering Losins account. Vitarich sent demand letters to Losin
covering her alleged unpaid account amounting to P921,083.19. because of the demands, she
discovered that she has an overpayment to Vitarich in the amount of 500,000 and informed Vitarich that
checks were issued and collected by Directo. It appears that Losin had issued three (3) checks amounting
to P288,463.30 which were dishonored either for reasons - Drawn Against Insufficient Funds (DAIF) or
Stop Payment.

Issue:

Whether or not Losin is liable to Vitarich

Ruling:

The Regional Trial court rendered its decision in favor of Vitarich and ordered defendant Chona Losin to
pay the plaintiff.

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision in favor of Losin. The Court stated that the as far as
Losin is concerned, Directo was a duly authorized agent of Vitarich and since the third persons have
been made to believe by the principal that the agent is authorized to deal with them, they have the right
to presume that the representation continues to exist in the absence of notification by the principal.

The court relies on the rule that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his
cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. Vitarich who has the burden of proof must produce
such quantum of evidence, with the former having to rely on the strength of its own evidence and not
on the weakness of the defendant-appellant Losins. The Court find that plaintiff-appellee Vitarich failed
to prove that the goods were ever delivered and received by Losin, said charge sales invoices being
undated and unsigned by Losin being the consignee of the goods. And on the other hand, Losin could
not also prove that she has overpaid Vitarich.

The Supreme Court resolves the issue partly in favor of Vitarich. The court noted that both Vitarich and
Losin failed to make a proper recording and documentation of their transcation. The court ruled that the
burden rests on the debtor to prove payment, rather than on the creditor to prove non-payment. The
debtor has the burden of showing with legal certainty that the obligation has been discharged by
payment. In the examination of evidence present, The court is of the opinion that Losin failed to present
a single official receipt to prove payment. All she presented were copies of the list of checks allegedly
issued to Vitarich through its agent Directo, a Statement of payments made to Vitarich, and apparently
copier of the pertinent history of her checking account with Rizal commercial Bank corp. At best, there
may only serve as documentary records of her business dealings with Vitarich to keep track of the
payments made but these are not enough to prove payment.
Country Bankers Insurance Corporation v. Antonio Lagman

GR. NO. 165487

July 13, 2011

Facts:

Nelson Santos applied for a license with the National Food Authority (NFA) to engage in the business of
storing not more than 30,000 sacks of palay valued at P5, 250,000.00.

Accordingly, Country Bankers Insurance Corporation (Country Bankers) issued Warehouse Bond No.
03304[4] for P1,749,825.00 on 5 November 1989 and Warehouse Bond No. 02355 for P749,925.00 on
13 December 1989 (1989 Bonds) through its agent, Antonio Lagman (Lagman). Santos was the bond
principal, Lagman was the surety and the Republic of the Philippines, through the NFA was the obligee.
In consideration of these issuances, corresponding Indemnity Agreements were executed by Santos, as
bond principal, together with Ban Lee Lim Santos (Ban Lee Lim), Rhosemelita Reguine (Reguine) and
Lagman, as co-signors. The latter bound themselves jointly and severally liable to Country Bankers.

Santos then secured a loan using his warehouse receipts as collateral.[8] When the loan matured, Santos
defaulted in his payment. The sacks of palay covered by the warehouse receipts were no longer found in
the bonded warehouse. By virtue of the surety bonds, Country Bankers was compelled to pay
P1,166,750.37

Consequently, Country Bankers filed a complaint for a sum of money docketed as Civil Case No. 95-
73048 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. In his Answer, Lagman alleged that the 1989
Bonds were valid only for 1 year from the date of their issuance, as evidenced by receipts; that the
bonds were never renewed and revived by payment of premiums; that on 5 November 1990, Country
Bankers issued Warehouse Bond No. 03515 (1990 Bond) which was also valid for one year and that no
Indemnity Agreement was executed for the purpose; and that the 1990 Bond supersedes, cancels, and
renders no force and effect the 1989 Bonds

The bond principals, Santos and Ban Lee Lim, were not served with summons because they could no
longer be found.

Issue:

Whether or not the 1990 bond novates the 1989 bonds

Ruling:

The regional trial court rendered judgment declaring Reguine and Lagman jointly and severally liable to
pay Country Bankers. The trial court rationalized that the bonds remain in force unless cancelled by the
Administrator of the NFA and cannot be unilaterally cancelled by Lagman. The trial court emphasized
that for the failure of Lagman to comply with his obligation under the Indemnity Agreements, he is
likewise liable for damages as a consequence of the breach.

The court of appeals rendered the assailed decision reversing and setting asude the decision of the RTC
and ordering the dismissal of the complaint filed against Lagman. The respondent was also exonerated
by the appellate court from liability because he was not a signatory to the alleged Indemnity Agreement
of 5 November 1990 covering the 1990 Bond. The appellate court rejected the argument of Country
Bankers that the 1989 bonds were continuing, finding, as reason therefor, that the receipts issued for
the bonds indicate that they were effective for only one-year.

The Supreme Court reinstated the decision of the RTC and set aside the decision of CA. The Court
pointed out that the requisites of Novation must concur for it to take place. In this case, only the first
element of novation exists. Indeed, there is a previous valid obligation, i.e., the 1989 Bonds. There is
however neither a valid new contract nor a clear agreement between the parties to a new contract since
the very existence of the 1990 Bond has been rendered dubious. Without the new contract, the old
contract is not extinguished.

Heirs of Servando Franco v Spouses Veronica and Danila Gonzales

GR No. 159709

June 27, 2012

Facts:

Servando and Leticia Medel obtained 3 seperate loans from Veronica R. Gonzales in which later on was
consolidated to a debt amounting to P 500,000 plus interest and penalties, evidenced by the promissory
note created by the spouses Leticia and Rafael Medel.

Upon the finality of the decision in Medel v. Court of Appeals, the respondents moved for execution.
Servando Franco opposed, claiming that he and the respondents had agreed to fix the entire obligation
at P775,000.00. According to Servando, their agreement, which was allegedly embodied in a receipt
dated February 5, 1992, whereby he made an initial payment of P400, 000.00 and promised to pay the
balance of P375, 000.00 on February 29, 1992, superseded the July 23, 1986 promissory note.

Servando was eventually substituted by his heirs, now the petitioners herein, on account of his
intervening death.

The petitioners insist that the RTC could not validly enforce a judgment based on a promissory note that
had been already novated; that the promissory note had been impliedly novated when the principal
obligation of P500,000.00 had been fixed at P750,000.00, and the maturity date had been extended
from August 23, 1986 to February 29, 1992.

Issue:

Was there a novation of the August 23, 1986 promissory note when respondent Veronica Gonzales
issued the February 5, 1992 receipt?

Ruling:

The Supreme court affirms the decision of the Court of Appeals; ORDERS the Regional Trial Court to
proceed with the execution based on its decision rendered on December 9, 1991, deducting the amount
of P400, 000.00 already paid by the late Servando Franco; and DIRECTS the petitioners to pay the costs
of suit. The Court points out that a novation arises when there is a substitution of an obligation by a
subsequent one that extinguishes the first, either by changing the object or the principal conditions, or
by substituting the person of the debtor, or by subrogating a third person in the rights of the creditor.

To be clear, novation is not presumed. This means that the parties to a contract should expressly agree
to abrogate the old contract in favor of a new one. In the absence of the express agreement, the old and
the new obligations must be incompatible on every point.

The issuance of the receipt created no new obligation. Instead, the respondents only thereby recognized
the original obligation by stating in the receipt that the P400, 000.00 was partial payment of loan and by
referring to the promissory note subject of the case in imposing the interest. The loan mentioned in the
receipt was still the same loan involving the P500, 000.00 extended to Servando. Advertence to the
interest stipulated in the promissory note indicated that the contract still subsisted, not replaced and
extinguished, as the petitioners claim.
Forum Shopping

Heirs of Marcelo Sotto, et. Al v. Matilde S. Palicte

GR no. 159691

February 17,2014

Facts:

In June 13, 2013 decision on the case of heirs of marcelo sotto v. Matilde S. Palicte, the court directed
Atty. Mahinay to show cause "why he should not be sanctioned as a member of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines for committing a clear violation of the rule prohibiting forum-shopping by aiding his
clients in asserting the same claims at least twice." That the case is the fifth suit to reach the court
dividing the several heirs of the late Don Filemon Y. Sotto respecting four real properties that had
belonged to Filemon’s estate.

Atty. Mahinay asserts good faith in the filing Civil Case No. CEB-24293 and he posits that such lack of
knowledge of the previous cases shows his good faith, and rules out deliberate forum shopping on his
part and on the part of his law firm.

He also states that his filing of the Motion To Refer Or Consolidate The Instant Case With The
Proceedings In The Intestate Estate Of Filemon Sotto Before RTC Branch XVI In SP Proc. No. 2706-R15
disproved deliberate forum shopping on his part.

And, lastly, Atty. Mahinay argues that his assisting the Administrator of the Estate in filing the Motion to
Require Matilde Palicte To Turn Over And/or Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her Possession,
wherein he disclosed the commencement of Civil Case No. CEB-24293, and extensively quoted the
allegations of the complaint, disproved any forum shopping. He insists that his disclosure of the
pendency of Civil Case No. CEB-24293 proved that forum shopping was not in his mind at all.

Issue:

Whether or not Atty. Mahinay has committed forum shopping

Ruling:

The Supreme Court rules that Atty. Mahinay is guilty of forum shopping. The court stated that the filling
of the civil case with lack of knowledge shows professional irresponsibility rather than good faith. The
Court disagrees at Atty. Mahinay’s filing of the Motion To Refer Or Consolidate The Instant Case With
The Proceedings In The Intestate Estate Of Filemon Sotto Before RTC Branch XVI In SP Proc. No. 2706-R,
it indicated that he relentlessly pursued the goal of taking away the properties from Palicte in disregard
of the rulings in the earlier cases.

The court also pointed that the filing of the Motion to Require Matilde Palicte to turn over and/or
Account Properties Owned by the Estate in Her Possession on June 7, 2000, a day after the trial court
denied his motion for reconsideration in Civil Case No. CEB-24293, was undeniably another attempt of
the petitioners and Atty. Mahinay to obtain a different resolution of the same claim. Needless to
observe, the motion reiterated the allegations in Civil Case No. CEB-24293, and was the subject of the
petition in The Estate of Don Filemon Y. Sotto vs. Palicte.19
Totality of Evidence

G.R. No. 208790 January 21, 2015

GLENN VIÑAS, Petitioner, vs. MARY GRACE PAREL-VIÑAS, Respondent.

Facts:

Glenn and Mary Grace then 25 and 23 years old, respectively, got married in civil rites. Mary Grace was
already pregnant then. The infant, however, died at birth due to weakness and malnourishment.
Sometime in March of 2006, Mary Grace left the home which she shared with Glenn. Glenn
subsequently found out that Mary Grace went to work in Dubai. At the time the instant petition was
filed, Mary Grace had not returned yet.

Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. He alleged that
Mary Grace was insecure, extremely jealous, outgoing and prone to regularly resorting to any pretext to
be able to leave the house.

On the other hand, Dr. Tayag assessed Mary Grace’s personality through the data she had gathered
from Glenn and his cousin, Rodelito Mayo (Rodelito), who knew Mary Graceway back in college. Dr.
Tayag diagnosed Mary Grace to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social
traits. Dr. Tayag concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is not founded on mutual love,
trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. The psychological incapacity of [Mary Grace] is of
a juridical antecedence as it was already in her system even prior to the solemnization of her marriage
with [Glenn]

Issue:

Whether or not sufficient evidence exist to constitute nullity between the marriage of the Glen and
Mary grace

Ruling:

the RTC rendered its Decision declaring the marriage between Glenn and Mary Grace as null and void on
account of the latter’s psychological incapacity. The totality of the evidence presented by [Glenn]
warrants [the] grant of the petition. Reconciliation between the parties under the circumstances is nil.
For the best interest of the parties, it is best that the legal bond between them be severed.

the CA rendered the herein assailed decision reversing the RTC ruling and declaring the marriage
between Glenn and Mary Grace as valid and subsisting for the reasons that the petitioner’s alleged
description of his spouse do not make out a case of psychological incapacity, and the said examination
was conducted only on him and no evidence was shown that the psychological incapacity of was
characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.

The SC denied the petition filed. The court states that the cumulative testimonies of Glenn, Dr. Tayag
and Rodelito, and the documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity
and incurability of Mary Grace’s condition. It was also pointed out that the respondent’s acts and traits
do not necessarily indicate psychological incapacity. In the present case, the respondent’s stubborn
refusal to cohabit with the petitioner was doubtlessly irresponsible, but it was never proven to be
rooted in some psychological illness. The court also noted that Dr. Tayag’s conclusions about the
respondent’s psychological incapacity were based on the information fed to her by only one side – the
petitioner – whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While the Court also commiserates
with Glenn’s marital woes, the totality of the evidence presented provides inadequate basis for the
Court to conclude that Mary Grace is indeed psychologically incapacitated to comply with her
obligations as Glenn’s spouse.
Preventive Suspension

Ma. Socorro Mandapat v ADD FORCE PERSONNEL SERVICES, INC. and COURT OF APPEALS,

GR 180285

July 6, 2010

Facts:

Petitioner Ma. Socorro Mandapat was hired as Sales and Marketing Manager for respondent Add Force
Personnel Services, Inc. As detailed in her appointment letter, her duties include negotiation and
consummation of contracts with clients who wanted to avail of respondents services.

Respondent claims that during her five-month stint as sales manager, petitioner not only failed at
rendering her job effectively, but was also showing habitual neglect of duties, of which the company
decided to put the petitioner on preventive suspension. Respondent insisted that petitioner was not
dismissed, that instead, she tendered her resignation. Hence, the claim for reinstatement had no basis.
Respondent countered that petitioner was properly placed on preventive suspension because of the risk
she posed on the property and business of respondent.

Petitioner alleged that she was constructively dismissed, as indicated by the following actions of
respondent first, she was illegally placed on preventive suspension; second, her access to the internet
was cut off; and third, she was pressured by respondent into resigning in exchange for payment of
separation pay. Petitioner denied that she was negligent and proffered that she faithfully and
painstakingly performed her duties as sales manager.

Issue:

Whether or not petitioner was constructively dismissed

Ruling:

the labor arbiter rendered judgment finding petitioner to have been illegally and constructively
dismissed. The labor arbiter found that petitioner was illegally suspended without basis. The charges of
gross and habitual neglect of duties, as well as the loss of trust and confidence were not substantiated.
Thus, the labor arbiter concluded that petitioner was constructively dismissed by respondent.

The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed with modification the findings of the labor
arbiter. The NLRC deleted the award of moral and exemplary damages for lack of sufficient basis.

The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner was not constructively dismissed but that the latter chose to
resign from her job. Petitioner’s bare allegation that she was coerced into resigning was not given
credence by the appellate court. With respect to the allegation of illegal suspension, the Court of
Appeals upheld the exercise by respondent of its management prerogative in suspending petitioner
pending investigation for a perceived violation of company rules.

The supreme court ruled in favor of the respondent in which the court states that preventive suspension
may be legally imposed against an employee whose alleged violation is the subject of an investigation.
The purpose of his suspension is to prevent him from causing harm or injury to the company as well as
to his fellow employees. The court pointed out that only when the preventive suspension exceeds the
maximum period allowed without reinstating the employee either by actual or payroll reinstatement or
when preventive suspension is for indefinite period, constructive dismissal set in. The acts of
disconnection of computer and internet access privileges is a consequence of the investigation against
her and not for the purpose of harassment. The court also ruled that the requisites for force resignation
was not proven by the petitioner. At most, she was merely given the option to either resign or face
disciplinary investigation, which respondent had every right to conduct in light of the numerous
infractions committed by petitioner. The final decision on whether to resign or face disciplinary action
rests on petitioner alone.
Certiorari

G.R. No. 191215 February 3, 2014

THENAMARIS PHILIPPINES, INC. (Formerly INTERMARE MARITIME AGENCIES, INC.)/ OCEANIC

NAVIGATION LTD. and NICANOR B. ALTARES, Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and AMANDA C.
MENDIGORIN (In behalf of her deceased husband GUILLERMO MENDIGORIN), Respondents.

Facts:

This case stemmed from a complaint for death benefits, unpaid salaries, sickness allowance, refund of
medical expenses, damages and attorney’s fees filed by Amanda C. Mendigorin (private respondent)
against petitioner Thenamaris Philippines, Inc., formerly Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc./Oceanic
Navigation Ltd., (Thenamaris), represented by its general manager, Capt. Nicanor B. Altares (petitioner),
filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA). Private respondent is the widow of seafarer Guillermo M. Mendigorin
(Guillermo) who was employed by Thenamaris for 27 years as an oiler and eventually, as second
engineer in the latter’s vessels. Guillermo was diagnosed with and died of colon cancer during the term
of the employment contract between him and Thenamaris.

On September 22, 2009, private respondent filed her Petition for Certiorari11 before the CA.

On September 8, 2009, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Petition for Certiorari10 before
the CA. Private respondent alleged that she had until September 7, 2009 (as September 6, 2009, the
actual last day for filing, fell on a Sunday) within which to file a petition for certiorari. However, as her
counsel was then saddled and occupied with equally important cases, it would be impossible for him to
file the petition on time, especially since the case involves voluminous documents necessary in the
preparation thereof. Accordingly, private respondent asked for an extension of 15 days from September
7, 2009, or until September 22, 2009, within which to file the petition.

Issue:

Whether or not there is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction WHEN IT
NOTED THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI FILED BY THE PRIVATE RESPONDENT INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT
OUTRIGHT FOR HAVING BEEN FILED BEYOND THE MANDATORY AND JURISDICTIONAL 60-DAY PERIOD

Ruling:

The supreme court ruled that the petition is granted. The assailed Court of Appeals Resolutions dated
November 20, 2009 and February 10, 2010 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The Petition for Certiorari filed by
private respondent is DISMISSED. The court noted that counting 60 days from her counsel’s receipt of
the June 29, 2009 NLRC Resolution on July 8, 2009, private respondent had until September 7, 2009 to
file her petition or a motion for extension, as September 6, 2009, the last day for filing such pleading, fell
on a Sunday. However, the motion was filed only on September 8, 2009.30 It is a fundamental rule of
remedial law that a motion for extension of time must be filed before the expiration of the period
sought to be extended; otherwise, the same is of no effect since there would no longer be any period to
extend, and the assailed judgment or order will have become final and executory. The court do not
approve of the CA’s ruling on the matter because, as the motion for extension should have been denied
outright, it necessarily follows that the Petition for Certiorari is, in the words of petitioners, a "mere
scrap of paper with no remedial value whatsoever."
Quantum Meruit

G.R. No. 158361 April 10, 2013

INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. FRANCISCO B. JOAQUIN, JR. and RAFAEL SUAREZ,
Respondents.