Whether Dissent Equals Defection in Indian Parlaiment?: Jeet Chaudhuri

WHETHER DISSENT EQUALS
DEFECTION IN INDIAN
PARLAIMENT?
JEET CHAUDHURI*
This paper is in response to a Private Member’s Bill filed recently in the Lok Sabha by
Congress MP Manish Tiwari. It seeks to justify why such an amendment to the Tenth
Schedule, as put forth by Mr. Tiwari is required. The present article also investigates why a
member despite there being no right to dissent does not contest elections as an Independent.
It concludes that, Section 2(b) of the Tenth Schedule, puts the Member of Parliament into the
straight jacket of obedience to the despotic dictates of the party whips which undermines the
democratic spirit. It also violates the principle of representative democracy by empowering
the party, and undermining the relationship between elected representatives and their
constituents. The anti defection law makes a mockery of parliamentary democracy by
marginalizing debates, as the legislators are not allowed to dissent, without being
disqualified by the House. Disruptions, rather than substantive debate, become the only form
of opposition possible. Parliamentary debate has thereby become largely redundant. Without
letting Indian politics degenerate like this, the author supports the proposed amendment so
that our politicians can be allowed to publicly and legitimately debate political ideology,
negotiate electoral prospect and be persuaded by ideas.
*Currently a Second Year Student of The West Bengal National University Of Juridical Sciences, Kolkata.
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I. INTRODUCTION
According to Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, defection may be

defined as abandonment of loyalty, duty or principle or of one's leader or cause.1 In
parliamentary political life, the term has come to connote change of any party affiliation, or
allegiance by a member of a legislature. The traditional term for the latter has however been
‘floor crossing’2 which had its origins in the British House of Commons where a legislator
was supposed to have changed his party allegiance when he crossed the floor and moved
from the government to the Opposition side.3
In January 2001, a consultation paper on India’s electoral law discussed the problem of party
defections, noting that defections had “haunted the Indian polity” for more than 30 years.4
The numbers given for defections were staggering: between 1967 and 1972, nearly 2000 of
the roughly 4000 members of the Lok Sabha and Legislative Assemblies in the States and
Union Territories defected and counter-defected.5
A significant development took place when the Constitution was amended to include the
Tenth Schedule. The Tenth Schedule was purported to curb the malaise of political defections
in national life. A Constitution Bill was introduced in the Lok Sabha on 24th Jan 1985 which
stated:
“The evil of political defections has been a matter of national concern. If it is not combated it
is likely to undermine the very foundations of our democracy and the principles which sustain
it.”6
The Constitution Fifty Second Amendment Act changed four Articles of the Constitution, viz
101(3)(a), 102(2), 190(3)(a) ,191(2), and added the Tenth Schedule. The Tenth Schedule is
1
The Free Dictionary, available at www.legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/defection
2
Crossing the Floor, available at www.en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crossing_the_floor [Last accessed on 25th
May,2010]
3
Subhash C. Kashyap, Anti Defection Law and Parliamentary Privileges, Pg 2, N.M. Tripathi Limited, 2nd
Edition, 2003
4
Advisory Panel on Electoral Reform; Standards in Political Life, p 23, January 8th, 2001, available at
www.lawmin.nic.in/ncrwc/finalreport/v2b1-9.htm [Last accessed on 26th May,2010]
5
Ibid pp 23-24. The Report noted that:
By the end of March, 1971 approximately 50% of the legislators had changed their party affiliations and several
of them did it more than once – some of them as many as five times. One MLA was found to have defected five
times to be a minister for only five days.
6
Statement of Objects and Reasons, 52nd Amendment (1985) to the Constitution of India
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often referred to as the anti-defection law. This legislation contains eight paragraphs - the
first one deals with definitions, the second states the provisions which disqualifies members
from the membership of Parliament or State Legislatures,7 the fourth states that
disqualification is not going to apply in cases of merger, the fifth sets out certain exemptions,
the sixth and seventh states the person who would be deciding the disputes regarding
defections and barring jurisdiction of the Courts in respect of questions on disqualification
and the last paragraph contains provisions for the Speaker and the Chairman to make rules in
order to give effect to the provisions contained in the schedule.8
Paragraph 2(1) (a) and (b) provides the disqualifications incurred by a member. It gives effect
to this principle and sentiment by imposing a disqualification on a Member who votes or
abstains from voting contrary to "any directions" issued by the political party. This provision
also recognises two exceptions; one, when the member obtains from the political party prior
permission to vote or abstain from voting, and the other, when the Member has voted but his
action has been condoned by the political party. Under Paragraph 2(1)(b) “dissent becomes
defection”.9 It deals with a member who expresses his dissent from the stand of the political
party to which he belongs by voting or abstaining from voting in the House, contrary to the
direction issued by the political party. Under the Tenth Schedule, the member can be
penalised with disqualification. There have been quite a few instances of disqualification
from the Parliament, under this law- in 1991, eight Janata Dal MPs for siding with the
Chandra Shekhar government; in 1993, four MPs from a faction of the Janata Dal for backing
the Narasimha Rao government; and, more recently, three Bahujan Samaj Party MPs for
defecting to the Samajwadi Party.10
Political dissent refers to any expression which conveys dissatisfaction with, or opposition to,
the policies of a body of government.11 The expression may take the form of violence or non
violence –including vocal disagreement, civil disobedience, demonstration, lobbying and use
of violence. Peaceful dissent is a mark of an open society where freedoms are protected.12
7
The third paragraph was deleted by the 91st Amendment of 2003. It dealt with the split in a party.
8
Jenna Narayan, Defect-Shun: Understanding Schedule X to the Constitution of India, available at
www.indialawjournal.com/volume3/issue_1/article_by_jenna.html [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
9
Paragraph 6 of Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors AIR 1993 SC 412
10
Barun Mitra, Anti- Defection: A Law Endangering Democracy, Mint, August 21st, 2008, available at
www.miracleofdemocracy.org/story.aspx?id=1890&pubid=2038 [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
11
What is Political Dissent?, available at www.politics.nuvvo.com/lesson/4681-what-is-political-dissent [Last
accessed on 25th May,2010]
12
Id.
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In this paper, the researcher seeks to discuss three major areas- first, the position of the Court
regarding the Member of Parliament’s Right to Dissent from the Party line. Second, the role
of party whips in today’s parties which have an undemocratic internal structure. Third, the
benefits of party membership, due to which, a politician seldom leaves the party and fights an
election as an Independent.
II. COURT’S POSITION
13
In Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu & Ors , it was contended that the provisions of the Tenth
Schedule constitute a ‘flagrant violation’ of those fundamental principles and values which
are basic to the sustenance of the Parliamentary democracy. It negates the freedom of speech,
right to dissent and freedom of conscience of our parliamentarians.14 They also contended
that the Tenth Schedule impinges upon the rights or immunities under Article 105(2). The
court said “there are certain side effects and fall out which might affect and hurt even honest
dissenters and conscientious objectors, but these are the usual plus and minus of all areas of
experimental legislation. In these areas, the distinction between what is constitutionally
permissible and what is outside it is marked by a ‘hazy gray line’ and it is the Court’s duty to
identify, ‘darken and deepen’ the demarcating line of constitutionality…”15
By a 3:2 majority, the Court held that the provisions of the Tenth Schedule were not violative
of the freedom of speech, vote and conscience of the members.16 Such provisions in the view
of the Court are intended to strengthen the fabric of Indian Parliamentary democracy by
curbing unprincipled and unethical political defections.17 It said that the freedom of speech of
a Member is not an absolute freedom.18 The freedom is subject to the provisions of the
Constitution and the rules and standing orders regulating the Procedure of the House [Article
105(1) and Article 194(1)].19
13
AIR 1993 SC 412
14
Supra note 13 paragraph 7
15
16
17
supra note 13 paragraph 18
18
Ibid
19
4|Page
Secondly, the parliamentary privileges as guaranteed under Article 10520 are not violated, as
the provisions in the Tenth Schedule do not result in any proceeding in any Court, thus
safeguarding the guaranteed immunities. The aim of such strict interpretation of what
constitutes a defection, by the Court, may be to prevent a politician from staying with a party
while continually opposing its decisions.21 But then this might have a serious consequence of
curtailing a politician’s freedom to exercise her or his judgement and act against party
policies and procedures.22
Some believe that dissent within a party on the floor of the Legislature, shows lack of party
discipline.23 Parties cannot achieve their goals if politicians continually choose to pursue their
independent goals. 24A party where the members do not put up a united front in the
Legislature may appear to the electorate as a fractious and divided party. They may choose to
refrain from voting for the party.25 Thus dissent from the party line may damage the party’s
reputation with voters.
Academics Shawn Bowler, David Farrell and Richard Katz stress the importance of party
cohesion to parliamentary systems, arguing that:
“Cohesion and discipline matter in the daily running of parliaments. The maintenance of a
cohesive voting bloc inside a legislative body is a crucially important feature of
parliamentary life. Without the existence of a readily identifiable bloc of governing
politicians, the accountability of the executive to both legislatures and voters falls flat. It can
then be seen, then, as a necessary condition for the existence of a responsible government.”26
In a party comprised of a number of individuals, each has their own independent view and
different sets of priorities, which may differ from that of the party. This makes it difficult to
20
Article 105(2) of the Constitution provides:
No member of the Parliament shall be liable to any proceedings in any court in respect of anything said or any
vote given by him in Parliament or any committee thereof, and no person shall be so liable in respect of the
publication by or under the authority of either House of Parliament of any report, paper, votes or proceedings.
21
Sarah Miskin, Politician Overboard: Jumping the Party Ship, Information and Research Services, Research
Paper No. 4,2002-03, available at www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2002-03/03RP04.pdf [Last accessed on 25th
May,2010]
22
Ibid 10.
23
Scott Ashworth, Ethan Bueno de Mesquita, Party Discipline with Electoral and Institutional Variation,
Institute of Governmental Studies, UC Berkeley, available at www.escholarship.org/uc/item/3z37g7md [Last
24
Id.
25
Id.
26
Shaun Bowler, David Farrell and Richard Katz, 'Party Cohesion, Party Discipline, and Parliaments', Ohio
State University Press, Columbus, 1999, p. 6. As cited in Sarah Miskin, Politician Overboard: Jumping the
Party Ship, Information and Research Services, Research Paper No. 4,2002-03, available at
www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2002-03/03RP04.pdf [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
5|Page
maintain cohesion in parties. One way the political parties maintain cohesion is through party
discipline.27 In India the members of a particular party are bound to follow the direction of
their party whips or face disqualification.28
III. MAINTAINING PARTY DISCIPLINE:ROLE OF PARTY WHIPS
The term “party whip” dates back to fox hunting and was used to refer to minders who kept
the dogs, used for hunting, on the pursuit of the foxes.29 The whip upholds the party
directives in the House as the authorised voice of the party.30The party whip’s role is to
inform members of the House about the matters which are going to be tabled in the house and
to request their presence during the voting of important matters.31 The whips also find out the
views of the members of the party, on issues which are going to be tabled in Parliament and
report it back to the party High Command.32 But this role of the party whip, from trying to
understand the individual views of its party members has been completely reversed to
dictating the party leadership’s view upon them. If the Member of Parliament dissents from
the party view, and the party has not condoned it, then it sends the petition of the alleged
defection to the Chairman or the Speaker of the House, for their disqualification.33 The
member can continue to keep his seat till the Speaker or the chairman of the House gives a
final decision on their disqualification from the House, after a proper enquiry on the basis of
the petition filed by the party whip.34 The proceedings in relation to any question on
disqualification of a Member of a House are deemed to be proceedings in Parliament or in
Legislature of a State. No Court has any jurisdiction.35
27
May,2010]
28
Jenna Narayan,Defect-Shun: Understanding Schedule X to the Constitution of India, available at
www.indialawjournal.com/volume3/issue_1/article_by_jenna.html [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
29
Party Whips, as available at www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Party_Whips.htm [Last
30
Krishnadas Rajagopal, Anti-Defection Law, Indian Express, July 24th, 2008, available at
www.indianexpress.com/news/antidefection-law/339606/0 [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
31
Harsh Gupta, Defecting From Anti Defection, available online at
www.livemint.com/articles/2009/.../Defecting-from-antidefection.html [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
32
Id.
33
Vicky Nanjappa, Cross-Voting has Parties, Poll Pundits Guessing, Rediff News, July 21st, 2008, available at
www.rediff.com/news/2008/jul/21upavote5.htm [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
34
Id.
35
Krishnadas Rajagopal, Anti-Defection Law, Indian Express, July 24th, 2008, available at
www.indianexpress.com/news/antidefection-law/339606/0 [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
6|Page
IV. UNDEMOCRATIC PARTY STRUCTURES
In India, the party and not the individual legislator have become the central organisational
pillar.36 The practice of democratic elections has not been accompanied by the development
of democratic practices within political parties.37The Anti Defection Act entrusted the
enforcement of discipline to party command structures. But the question of whether party
organizations were rooted in democratic legitimacy was left in the unregulated sphere, as it
was difficult to monitor it beyond procedural propriety.38
Party leadership across the spectrum of Indian politics tend to be self-perpetuating

oligarchies, which in many cases are also family dynasties.39 Key party decisions, strategy
and nomination of members for elections tend to be centralized.40
Let us analyse the practices within the three major national parties in India. The Congress, the
oldest party in India has evolved over the past 60 years. Earlier the Working Committee was
the high command from where all the important decisions flowed.41 This has now been
replaced by a culture where none dare speak his mind without first finding out which way the
leadership is inclined, for fear of being accused of lack of loyalty.42 Factions on the basis of
ideological differences lead to coteries being formed around the different political
personalities.43 Factionalism to some extent is an indicator of difference of opinion but these
coteries only promote undemocratic ways of managing disagreement.44 The Bharitya Janata
Party is often controlled by an independent and often militant cadre the Rashtriya
Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), with which it has strong umbilical links. The Communist Party
of India (Marxists), comparatively has a better structured consultative process, by which they
36
37
Balveer Arora, Can Democracy Flourish with Undemocratic Parties?, The Tribune, August 15th, 2007,
available at www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070815/independence/main3.htm [Last accessed on 25th
May,2010]
38
Ibid.
39
E. Sridharan, Party System Fragmentation, Intra Party Democracy, and Opaque Political Finance, India in
Transition, May 4th, 2009, available at www.asi.ssc.upenn.edu/iit/esridharan [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
40
Id.
41
Balveer Arora, Can Democracy Flourish with Undemocratic Parties?, The Tribune, August 15th, 2007,
available at www.tribuneindia.com/2007/20070815/independence/main3.htm [Last accessed on 25th
May,2010]
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
7|Page
arrive at important decisions through democratic centralisation which also ensures that the
decisions arrived at are binding.45
Thus looking at the current practices in the different political parties, it is more than evident
that legislators should be allowed freedom to express their opinion, which may differ from
the party line.
V. BENEFITS OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP
In the recent debate over the Women’s Reservation Bill in the Rajya Sabha, held on March
10th 2010, Ejaz Ali was suspended for his vehement protest.46 He agreed that he couldn’t
have been so vocal about the issue, if he was a member of a party, which had issued a whip to
vote in favour of the Bill.47 Ejaz Ali said that he was speaking for the majority of the
members of Parliament who were against the Bill but were bound by their party whips.48 He
said that it was his “independent status” that allowed him to speak his mind.49
A legislator having a view different from his party line, can either leave his party and join
another which shares his views, or contest the election and get elected as an independent. But
in most cases, legislators do not want to leave their party. The reason can be divided into two
main sections:
1. The Role and Strength of Parties50
Like mentioned earlier, political parties today have emerged as the central organisational
pillar of today’s democracies. Direct democracies have been replaced in large countries by
representative democracies. In the latter, voters elect representatives, who in turn make
political decisions on their behalf. Parties thus arise out of this system.51 Parties are devices
that organise collectively to place their representatives in the legislature and thus achieve
45
Ibid 41.
46
Barun S. Mitra, The Political Fallout of the Battle of Sexes, Pragati: The Indian National Interest Review,
April 2010, available at http://pragati.nationalinterest.in/2010/04/the-political-fallout-of-the-battle-of-the-sexes
[Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
47
V. Kumara Swamy, Agree to Disagree, The Telegraph, April 21, 2010, available at
www.telegraphindia.com/1100421/jsp/opinion/story_12362774.jsp [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
May,2010]
51
Id.
8|Page
their particular policy goals.52 While in some countries they are institutionalised in their
constitutions like France others do not, for example Australia.53 Thus more and more
legislators do not want to fight election as an independent because parties, not individuals, are
the organising focus of a democratic electoral system.
2. Advantages of Party Membership54
Politicians get many tangible benefits from a party membership like electoral, collective,
institutional and distributive.
A. Electoral Benefits
It is more likely that a candidate will be elected if he or she is from a political party.55 People
know the ideals and beliefs of political parties and it is easier for them to identify themselves
with the candidate.56 Parties also provide the politicians with practical assistance, giving them
money for their campaigns, supplying them with other party volunteers to help him
campaign, resources to organize voters and general advice.57
B. Collective Benefits
Political scientists Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle also argue that politicians submit to
party discipline because it creates ‘more powerful bargaining units’ that are able to achieve
policy goals that are close to the ‘ideal points’ of those submitting to the discipline.58
Legislators realise that they are more likely to achieve their goals if they work in a group
rather by themselves.
C. Institutional Benefits
Parties also hold the keys to a politician’s career, as they have a considerable amount of
control over institutional factors that govern the career opportunities available once a
52
Ibid 50.
53
Id.
54
May,2010]
55
Id
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Michael Laver and Kenneth Shepsle, How Political Parties Emerged from the Primeval Slime: Party
Cohesion, Party Discipline, and the Formation of Governments, p. 24. As cited in Sarah Miskin, Politician
Overboard: Jumping the Party Ship, Information and Research Services, Research Paper No. 4,2002-03,
available at www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rp/2002-03/03RP04.pdf [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
9|Page
politician gets elected.59 If the member is from the ruling party then he or she may get to head
or be a part of various assignments and leadership posts.60 This will be good for the
politician’s career, within and amongst his electorate. If the member is not from the ruling
party then he or she, instead of getting external posts might get internal promotions, so that
when his party comes to power he will be rewarded for being loyal.61
D. Distributive Benefits
Parties in power may also help its members who have been elected, access to government
resources, including such things as building factories which helps to increase employment,
building roads, hospitals, electricity supply units, dams etc.62 Such resources allow politicians
to deliver promised policy outcomes.
It is for the above mentioned benefits that a legislator chooses to stay aligned to his party,
rather than fight the election as an independent.
VI.PRACTICE IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES
In India, unlike other democracies in the world, the vote of each legislator in the House is not
important. For example, in Israel when Prime Minister Ariel Sharon wanted a legislative
approval to pull Israeli troops out of the Gaza strip, he was supported by members from the
Opposition Party, while a few members of his own party dissented. Even in the UK when
Prime Minister Tony Blair wanted Great Britain to join the war in Iraq, more than 150
members of his party voted against him. He had to take the support of members of the
Conservative party to put the legislation through.63 Such difference of opinion between
members of the same party is allowed in other democracies. Members of the Labour Party in
the UK did not have to leave their party, just because they did not agree with the party line.
They just made their preference known and continued to stay on in the party.64In India the
members of a particular party are bound to follow the direction of their party whips or face
59
Ibid 54.
60
S W Desposato, Parties for Rent? Ambition, Ideology, and Party Switching in Brazil's Chamber of Deputies,
American Journal of Political Science, available at www.escholarship.org/uc/item/0hw445d0 [Last accessed on
25th May,2010]
61
May,2010]
62
Id.
63
Subramaniam Vincent, Dissent isn’t Defection available online at www.indiatogether.org/2005/apr/edt-
dissent.htm [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
64
Ashwin Mahesh, Democracy without Dissent? Available online at www.rediff.com/news/2003/jul/29ash.htm
[Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
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disqualification. Thus debates become a mere formality. The anti defection law makes a
mockery of parliamentary democracy by marginalizing debates, as the legislators are not
allowed to dissent, without being disqualified by the House.65 Disruptions, rather than
substantive debate, become the only form of opposition possible. Without letting Indian
politics degenerate like this, we must allow our politicians to publicly and legitimately debate
political ideology, negotiate electoral prospect and be persuaded by ideas.66
While one agrees that dissidence within a party can disrupt the functioning of the
Government, and prove counter-productive, but it will be going against the spirit of
democracy to provide for coterie rule through binding character of the whip backed by the
threat of disqualification. 67 In the absence of stable parties, or a party system, the convention
that has made whips binding in Britain, has failed to take root in our country.68 However, to
put members into the straight jacket of obedience to the despotic dictates of the party whips
would only undermine the democratic spirit.69
VII. CALL FOR AMENDMENT
Recently Manish Tewari, a Lok Sabha MP and Spokesman of the Congress party, moved a
Private Member’s Bill in the Lok Sabha seeking amendment in the Tenth Schedule.70 He said
that the Anti Defection Law, while trying to curb the evil of defection worked in practice
against individual freedom and creative thinking.71 According to him, party whips compelled
a member to toe the party line.72 Mr. Tewari’s version of the law will free legislators from the
whip-imposed fear of losing their membership in all cases except where the life of the
Government is seen to be threatened by a no-confidence motion, a Money Bill or some
crucial financial matters.73
65
Harsh Gupta, Defecting From Anti Defection, available online at
www.livemint.com/articles/2009/.../Defecting-from-antidefection.html [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
66
67
Attar Chand, The Long March: Profile of Prime Minister Chandra Shekhar, Pg 119, Mittal Publications,
New Delhi, First Edition, 1991
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Vidya Subramanium, From Roaring Lion to Timid House, The Hindu, February 26, 2010 available at
www.beta.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/article113668.ece [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
71
Id.
72
Id.
73
Id. Also see Venkatachaliah J.’s judgement on Paragraph 49 of the Kihoto Hollohan case.
11 | P a g e
According to Tewari, if his suggestion is accepted, it would free legislators from following
the party’s line on every issue.74 A party whip acts as a disincentive to a member and by
doing away with it; the legislator can research on the laws and come up with creative
suggestions without fear.75 This, he says, would also lessen the “bureaucracy’s grip” when it
comes to drafting laws.76
The Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms(1990), recommended that

disqualifications should be limited to cases where (a) a member voluntarily gives up the
membership of the political party, (b) a member abstains from voting, or votes contrary to the
party whip in a motion of vote of confidence or motion of no confidence. 77 The 170th Law
Commission Report (1999), agreed with the above and said that political parties should limit
issuances of whips to instances only when the Government is in danger.78
This proposal of Mr. Tiwari has already found a powerful backer in the Vice-President of
India, Hamid Ansari.79 In a November 2009 public address, Mr. Ansari asked for restricting
the use of whip in order to allow greater “room for political and policy experiment.”80 The
Bill has also found supporters in other political parties.81 Shivanand Tiwary, Rajya Sabha MP
and spokesperson for the Janata Dal United, agreed that the individual freedom of the
Member of Parliament has been compromised by the law.82 According to Mr. Tiwary, the
anti-defection law has led to “party dictatorship” over legislators, especially in parties like
the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and the Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD).83 He said that the change
in the anti-defection law will be welcomed, as it will provide freedom to the legislator. The
legislator will no longer have to toe the party line, even when they do not agree, for fear of
invoking the provisions of the Tenth Schedule.84
74
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
The Anti-Defection Law- Intent and Impact, PRS Legislative Research, available at
www.prsindia.org/uploads/media/Note%20on%20Anti-Defection.pdf [Last accessed on 25th May,2010]
78
Id.
79
Vidya Subramanium, From Roaring Lion to Timid House, The Hindu, February 26, 2010 available at
80
Id.
81
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
The Anti-Defection Law was created to try and stop our Members of Parliament from
switching loyalties at the drop of a hat, and to stabilize the polity. Stress on political
discipline through party whips was established. But this came at a cost of parliamentary
democracy. Elected representatives are obligated to represent all in their constituency, and are
responsible to them. But in the present scenario, will a member be disqualified if he followed
the will of his voters, who may disagree with a specific national party? Is dissent acceptable
in the present case?
Members of the Legislature carry multiple responsibilities, being responsible to their voters,
their party, the greater good and their own consciences.85 They are generally able to balance
the oft-competing demands that may arise from these different responsibilities.86 However,
sometimes one of these areas may outweigh the others, and when that occurs, a politician
may defect to another party or to independence.87
But less and less politicians want to defect to independence. The reason for this is the
considerable tangible and intangible benefits to party membership, as mentioned earlier. The
politicians must pay for these advantages by relinquishing some of their freedom to make
independent choices on policy issues. In most cases, they must obey the view of the party
high command in the legislature.
The Anti-Defection Law violates one of the basic features of the Constitution - democracy.88
Parliamentary debate has thereby become largely redundant.89 It also violates the principle of
representative democracy by empowering the party, and undermining the relationship
between elected representatives and their constituents.90
Therefore it is very important that the Tenth Schedule be amended to state that “A member
shall incur loss of his membership only when he votes or abstains from voting in the House
with regard to a Confidence Motion, No-confidence Motion, Adjournment Motion, Money
85
May,2010]
86
Id.
87
Id.
88
89
Id.
90
Id.
13 | P a g e
Bill or financial matters contrary to any direction issued in this behalf by the party to which
he belongs to, and in no other case.”91
Should Manish Tiwary succeed, Members of Parliament will be spared the torture of
changing from roaring lion, when not in voting capacity, to timid mouse, when called upon to
vote.92
91
Private Member’s Bill introduced by Manish Tiwari In Lok Sabha recently, available at
92
Vidya Subramanium, From Roaring Lion to Timid Mouse, The Hindu, February 26, 2010 available at
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Whether Dissent Equals Defection in Indian Parlaiment?: Jeet Chaudhuri

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Whether Dissent Equals Defection in Indian Parlaiment?: Jeet Chaudhuri

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WHETHER DISSENT EQUALS

According to Burton’s Legal Thesaurus, defection may be

II. COURT’S POSITION

III. MAINTAINING PARTY DISCIPLINE:ROLE OF PARTY WHIPS

Party leadership across the spectrum of Indian politics tend to be self-perpetuating

V. BENEFITS OF PARTY MEMBERSHIP

1. The Role and Strength of Parties50

2. Advantages of Party Membership54

VI.PRACTICE IN OTHER DEMOCRACIES

VII. CALL FOR AMENDMENT

The Dinesh Goswami Committee on Electoral Reforms(1990), recommended that

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