Enrile Vs Sandiganbayan

10/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 767 Copy
G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*

.
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, petitioner, vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of

Innocence; In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.—In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved. The presumption of
innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on
bail, and further binds the court to wait until after trial to
impose any punishment on the accused.
Same; Same; Bail; The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so
required by the trial court.—It is worthy to note that bail is
not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the
required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be
high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so
required, but it should be no higher than is reasonably
calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a
reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s
interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence
at trial.
Same; Same; Same; The general rule is that any person,
before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with
an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.—A
capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense
that, under the law existing at the time of its commission
and the application for admission to bail, may be punished
with death. The general rule is, therefore, that any person,
before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be
bailable, unless he is charged
http://www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/00000166b3f88ebeacd37ece003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/74
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* EN BANC.

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Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)
with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his
guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest,
or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim
the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights,
and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital
offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it
has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right
to bail shall be recognized.
Same; Same; Same; All criminal cases within the competence
of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Municipal Trial Court
(MTC), Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), or Municipal
Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) are bailable as matter of right because
these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.—All
criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or
Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right
because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or
offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to
conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua,
or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong.
Same; Same; Same; The granting of bail is discretionary: (1)
upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of an offense
not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;
or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present.—The
granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of
imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the

circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule
114 is present, as follows: (a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-
recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration; (b) That he has
previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
vio-

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284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c)

That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or
conditional pardon; (d) That the circumstances of his case indicate
the probability of flight if released on bail; or (e) That there is
undue risk that he may commit another crime during the
pendency of the appeal.
Same; Same; Same; For purposes of admission to bail, the
determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court.—For purposes of admission to bail,
the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in
criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable
with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma, 241 SCRA 84 (1995), “such discretion
may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he
should be granted provisional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore,
that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of
discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a
hearing with notice to the Prosecution.
Same; Same; Same; In resolving bail applications of the
accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial
judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes
v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997).—In resolving bail applications of
the accused who is charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial
judge is expected to comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes
v. Catral, 279 SCRA 1 (1997), to wit: 1. In all cases, whether bail
is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the

hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
amended); 2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of
the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra) 3. Decide
whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution; 4. If the guilt of the accused is not

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strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the

bailbond. (Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be denied.
Same; Same; Same; This national commitment to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity
of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a
clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a
flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist
special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.—This
national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as
well as value the worth and dignity of every person has
authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal
proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger
to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political
standing and his having immediately surrendered to the
authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk
of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder,
formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an
earlier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he already
evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial
because he was not seen as a flight risk. With his solid reputation
in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should

be granted bail. The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health
presents another compelling justification for his admission to bail,
but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
Same; Same; Same; Bail for the provisional liberty of the
accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed
independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued
incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to
endanger his life.—Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused,
regardless of the crime charged, should be allowed independently
of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life.
Indeed, denying him bail despite

286

imperiling his health and life would not serve the true
objective of preventive incarceration during the trial.

LEONEN, J., Dissenting Opinion:

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that bail
is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is plunder
and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.—This Petition
for Certiorari should not be granted. The action of the
Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix Bail was proper.
Bail is not a matter of right in cases where the crime charged is
plunder and the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. Neither
was there grave abuse of discretion by the Sandiganbayan when
it failed to release accused on bail for medical or humanitarian
reasons. His release for medical and humanitarian reasons was
not the basis for his prayer in his Motion to Fix Bail filed before
the Sandiganbayan. Neither did he base his prayer for the grant
of bail in this Petition on his medical condition.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of bail, therefore, by
the majority is a special accommodation for petitioner. It is based
on a ground never raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the
pleadings filed before the Supreme Court (SC).—The grant of bail,
therefore, by the majority is a special accommodation for
petitioner. It is based on a ground never raised before the
Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court. The

Sandiganbayan should not be faulted for not shedding their
neutrality and impartiality. It is not the duty of an impartial
court to find what it deems a better argument for the accused at
the expense of the prosecution and the people they represent.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court
nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution.—The
majority’s opinion — other than the invocation of a general
human rights principle — does not provide clear legal basis for
the grant of bail on humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of Court
nor found in any statute or provision of the Constitution. This
case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism of granting a
privilege ad hoc: only for one person — petitioner in this case.

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Same; Same; Same; View that the mandatory bail hearing is

only to determine the amount of bail when it is a matter of right.
On the other hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an
accused is charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
—The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the amount of
bail when it is a matter of right. On the other hand, mandatory
bail hearings are held when an accused is charged with a crime
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not only to
fix the amount of bail but fundamentally to determine whether
the evidence of guilt is strong.
Same; Same; Same; View that petitioner did not ask that bail
be granted because of his medical condition or for humanitarian
reasons; Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant of
bail.—The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to release petitioner on bail for medical
or humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be
granted because of his medical condition or for humanitarian
reasons. Neither petitioner nor the prosecution as respondent
developed their arguments on this point at the Sandiganbayan or
in this court to establish the legal and factual basis for this
special kind of bail in this case. Yet, it now becomes the very basis
for petitioner’s grant of bail.
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Judgments; Dissenting
Opinions; The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (SC) allows
one (1) week for the submission of a dissenting opinion.—The
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one week for the
submission of a dissenting opinion. Thus, in Rule 13, Section 7 of
A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC: SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring
opinion.—A Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its
conclusions, and the disposition of the case may submit to the
Chief Justice or Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion,
setting forth the reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member
who agrees with the result of the case, but based on different
reason or reasons may submit a separate opinion; a concurrence
“in the result” should state the reason for the qualified
concurrence. A Member who agrees with the main opinion, but
opts to express other reasons for concurrence may submit a
concurring opinion. The dissenting, separate, or concurring
opinion must be submitted within one week from the date the
writer of the majority opinion presents the decision for the
signature of the Members. (Em-

288

phasis supplied) But this member endeavored to complete his

draft incorporating the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting
justices within two days from the circulation of the majority
opinion.
Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Bail; View that
nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant of bail
based on judicial notice of a doctor’s certification.—In essence, the
majority now insists on granting bail merely on the basis of the
certification in a Manifestation and Compliance dated August 14,
2014 by Dr. Jose C. Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that
petitioner is suffering from numerous debilitating conditions. This
certification was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation before
this court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of
the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to such
ailments. Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant
of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s certification. In doing
so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by doing away
with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’

findings on petitioner’s health in a hearing whose main purpose is
to determine whether no kind of alternative detention is possible.
Same; Same; Same; View that assuming that the medical
ailments of petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is
now deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that
may rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical
documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process
requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify Dr.
Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is still the condition
that prevails at present.—Petitioner’s medical ailments are not
matters that are of public knowledge or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration. His illness is not a matter of
general notoriety. Assuming that the medical ailments of
petitioner are relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now
deprived of a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may
rebut the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical
documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due process
requires that we remand this matter for a bail hearing to verify
Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that that is still the
condition that prevails at present. That we make factual
determinations ourselves to grant provisional liberty to one who is
obviously politically privileged without the benefit of the
presentation of evidence by both the prosecution and the accused,
without the prosecution being granted the op-

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portunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without

consideration of any rebutting evidence that may have been
presented should a hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our
neutrality and objectivity.
Same; Same; Same; View that the majority has not set specific
bases for finding that the medical condition of petitioner entitles
him to treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder.—It is unclear whether
this privilege would apply to all those who have similar conditions
and are also undergoing trial for plunder. It is unclear whether
petitioner’s incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if
his medical conditions are simply conditions which come with
advanced age. The majority has not set specific bases for finding
that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment

different from all those who are now under detention and
undergoing trial for plunder. There is no showing as to how grave
his conditions are in relation to the facilities that are made
available to him. There is also no showing as to whether any of
his medical ailments is actually aggravating in spite of the best
care available. If his health is deteriorating, there is no showing
that it is his detention that is the most significant factor or cause
for such deterioration. Usually, when there is a medical
emergency that would make detention in the hospital necessary,
courts do not grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the
accused’s detention. There is now no clarity as to when special
bail based on medical conditions and modified arrest should be
imposed.
Same; Same; Same; View that bail is not a matter of right
merely for medical reasons.—Bail is not a matter of right merely
for medical reasons. In People v. Fitzgerald, 505 SCRA 573 (2006):
Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner
needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There
may also be an existing proposition for the “selective
decarceration of older prisoners” based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.
Same; Same; Same; View that before the ink used to write and
print the majority opinion and this dissent has dried, friends,
family, and colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that
he would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates that
the major-

290

ity’s inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating

illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.—Before the
ink used to write and print the majority opinion and this dissent
has dried, friends, family, and colleagues of petitioner already
strongly predict that he would report immediately for work. This
strongly indicates that the majority’s inference as to the existence
of very serious debilitating illnesses may have been too
speculative or premature. Significantly, there is no guidance to
the Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled motu
propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that

motion to cancel bail should be filed before the Sandiganbayan or
before this court.
Same; Same; Same; View that the crime charged in
petitioner’s case is one where the imposable penalty is reclusion
perpetua. The Constitution and our rules require that bail can only
be granted after granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove
that evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to
medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and exceptional.—
The crime charged in petitioner’s case is one where the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution and our rules
require that bail can only be granted after granting the
prosecution the opportunity to prove that evidence of guilt is
strong. The special grant of bail, due to medical conditions, is
unique, extraordinary, and exceptional. To allow petitioner to go
about his other duties would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of
the provisions of the Constitution and our rules. In other words,
there is no rule on whether the grant of provisional liberty on the
basis of humanitarian considerations extends even after the
medical emergency has passed. Again, a case of a decision
especially tailored for petitioner.
Same; Same; Same; View that the more prudent course of
action would have been for the Sandiganbayan, not the Supreme
Court (SC), to exercise its discretion in setting the amount of bail.
—There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of
P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The original proposal of the
member in charge was P100,000.00. This was increased to
P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated on August 14, 2015.
Then, upon the request of one member who voted with the
majority, it was then increased to P1,000,000.00. The rules guide
courts on what to consider when setting the amount of bail. The
majority opinion is sparse on the evidence it considers for setting
this particular amount. Again, the

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more prudent course of action would have been for the

Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in setting
the amount of bail.
Same; Same; Same; Universal Declaration of Human Rights;
View that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon
in the majority opinion, is a general declaration to uphold the

value and dignity of every person. It does not prohibit the arrest of
any accused based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the
detention of any person accused of crimes.—There are no specific
and binding international law provisions that compel this court to
release petitioner given his medical condition. The Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion,
is a general declaration to uphold the value and dignity of every
person. It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused based on
lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of any person
accused of crimes. It only implies that any arrest or detention
must be carried out in a dignified and humane manner.
Same; Same; Same; View that even the Supreme Court (SC) in
Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Hon.
Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007), was wary to grant bail without
evidence presented that the accused was not a flight risk.—In any
case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470 (2007),
was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that the
accused was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded the
case to the trial court instead of applying the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and categorically stating
that based on these principles alone, the accused was entitled to
bail. It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions on
both the respect for human dignity and the protection of human
rights. These rights are applicable to those who, during the dark
days of Martial Law, were illegally detained, tortured, and even
involuntarily disappeared. There is, of course, no reason for these
rights and the invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to
Senators of our Republic.
Same; Same; Same; View that suspending the applicability of
clear legal provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels
this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of how
these provisions violate specific binding human rights norms.—
The mere

292
invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not

shibboleth. It should not be cause for us to be nonchalant about
the existence of other constitutional and statutory provisions and
the norms in our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human
rights does not mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not
a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we want.
Rather, human rights are best entrenched with the Rule of Law.
Suspending the applicability of clear legal provisions upon the
invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more

conscious and rigorous analysis of how these provisions violate
specific binding human rights norms.
Same; Same; Same; View that those that read a decision
which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this
dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result
of obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law.—Those that read a decision
which does not fully respond to the legal issues outlined in this
dissent may be tempted to conclude that the decision is the result
of obvious political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law. This case may benefit one
powerful public official at the cost of weakening our legal
institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts to selective
justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket manner for all other
detainees, then it will weaken the administration of justice
because the judicial standards are not clear.
Same; Same; Same; View that the grant of provisional liberty
to petitioner without any determination of whether the evidence of
guilt is strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution.—The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner
without any determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own
opinions on or predilections for how the balance of fundamental
rights, liberties, and obligations should be. It may be that, as
citizens, such opinions are founded on our wealth of knowledge
and experience.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

Certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

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Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A. Mendoza, Lorenzo G.

Timbol, Ma. Donnabel T. Tan, Marie Krizel P. Malabanan,
Eleazar B. Reyes, Joseph B. Sagandoy, Jr., Edwardson L.
Ong, Erwin G. Matib and Kay Angela R. Peñaflorida for
Juan Ponce Enrile.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

The decision whether to detain or release an accused
before and during trial is ultimately an incident of the
judicial power to hear and determine his criminal case. The
strength of the Prosecution’s case, albeit a good measure of
the accused’s propensity for flight or for causing harm to
the public, is subsidiary to the primary objective of bail,
which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.1

The Case

Before the Court is the petition for certiorari filed by
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to assail and annul the
resolutions dated July 14, 20142 and August 8, 20143
issued by the Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No.
SB-14-CRM-0238, where he has been charged with plunder
along with several others. Enrile insists that the
resolutions, which respectively denied his Motion To Fix
Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
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1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive

Interpretations of the State Constitutional Right to Bail, Fordham Law
Review, Vol. 78, Issue 1, pp. 307-309 (2009).
2 Rollo, pp. 79-88; penned by Associate Justice Amparo M. Cabotaje-
Tang and concurred in by Associate Justices Samuel R. Martires and Alex
L. Quiroz.
3 Id., at pp. 89-102.

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Antecedents

On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged
Enrile and several others with plunder in the
Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported
involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations
under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF).4
On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, Enrile respectively
filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6

praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail
should probable cause be found against him. The motions
were heard by the Sandiganbayan after the Prosecution
filed its Consolidated Opposition.7
On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its
resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the
matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering
that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or
been placed under the custody of the law.8 Accordingly, the
Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile.9
On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was
issued, Enrile voluntarily surrendered to Director
Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and
was later on confined at the Philippine National Police
(PNP) General Hospital following his medical
examination.10
Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the
PNP General Hospital,11 and his Motion to Fix Bail,12 both
dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the
Sandiganbayan on
_______________
4 Id., at pp. 107-108.

5 Id., at pp. 103-157.
6 Id., at pp. 163-192.
7 Id., at pp. 193-221.
8 Id., at pp. 222-241.
9 Id., at p. 241.
10 Id., at pp. 242-243.
11 Id., at pp. 244-247.
12 Id., at pp. 249-256.

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July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued

that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the
Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his
guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder,
the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not
reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his
age and physical condition must further be seriously
considered.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its first
assailed resolution denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail,
disposing thusly:
x x x [I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its
evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court.
In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix
his bail.
x x x x
Accused Enrile next argues that the Court should grant him
bail because while he is charged with plunder, “the maximum
penalty that may be possibly imposed on him is reclusion
temporal, not reclusion perpetua.” He anchors this claim on
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7080, as amended, and on the allegation that
he is over seventy (70) years old and that he voluntarily
surrendered. “Accordingly, it may be said that the crime charged
against Enrile is not punishable by reclusion perpetua, and thus
bailable.”
The argument has no merit.
x x x x
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13 Id., at p. 13.

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x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating

circumstance/s is not taken into consideration. These
circumstances will only be appreciated in the imposition of the
proper penalty after trial should the accused be found guilty of the
offense charged. x x x
x x x x
Lastly, accused Enrile asserts that the Court should already fix
his bail because he is not a flight risk and his physical condition
must also be seriously considered by the Court.
Admittedly, the accused’s age, physical condition and his being
a flight risk are among the factors that are considered in fixing a
reasonable amount of bail. However, as explained above, it is
premature for the Court to fix the amount of bail without an
anterior showing that the evidence of guilt against accused Enrile
is not strong.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Juan Ponce
Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail dated July 7, 2014 is DENIED for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.14

On August 8, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its second
assailed resolution to deny Enrile’s motion for
reconsideration filed vis-à-vis the July 14, 2014
resolution.15
Enrile raises the following grounds in support of his
petition for certiorari, namely:
A. Before judgment of the

Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right.
Enrile may be deemed to fall
within the exception only upon
concurrence of two (2)
circumstances: (i) where the
offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii)
when evidence of guilt is strong.
_______________
14 Id., at pp. 84-88.

15 Id., at pp. 89-102.

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x x x x
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile, if ever he would be
convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;

hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of
right.
x x x x
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and
conclusively that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if
ever) is strong; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail
as a matter of right.
x x x x
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not
a flight risk.16

Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an
accused is entitled to bail as matter of right; that it is the
duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and
conclusively that Enrile comes under the exception and
cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to bail; that the
Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted
of plunder, is punishable by reclusion perpetua considering
the presence of two mitigating circumstances — his age
and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not
come forward with proof showing that his guilt for the
crime of plunder is strong; and that he should not be
considered a flight risk taking into account that he is
already over the age of 90, his medical condition, and his
social standing.
In its Comment,17 the Ombudsman contends that
Enrile’s right to bail is discretionary as he is charged with
a capital offense; that to be granted bail, it is mandatory
that a bail hearing be conducted to determine whether
there is strong evidence of his guilt, or the lack of it; and
that entitlement to
_______________
16 Id., at pp. 16-19.

17 Id., at pp. 526-542.

298

bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the

attendant circumstances.

Ruling of the Court

The petition for certiorari is meritorious.

1.
Bail protects the right of the accused
to due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved.18 The
presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due
process, and is safeguarded by the constitutional right to be
released on bail,19 and further binds the court to wait until
after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.20
It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent
the accused from committing additional crimes.21 The
purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the trial
court. The amount of bail should be high enough to assure
the presence of the accused when so required, but it should
be no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.22 Thus, bail acts as a rec-
_______________
18 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

19 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, G.R. No.
148571, September 24, 2002, 389 SCRA 623, where the Court said that
the constitutional right to bail flows from the presumption of innocence in
favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom
as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved
beyond reasonable doubt; see also Baradaran, Shima, Restoring the
Presumption of Innocence, Ohio State Law Journal, Vol. 72, p. 728 (2011).
20 Baradaran, id., at p. 736.
21 Id., at p. 731.
22 Yap, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141529, June 6, 2001, 358
SCRA 564, 572.

299
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 299

onciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s

interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial,
and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence
at trial.23

2.
Bail may be granted as a matter
of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13,
Article III (Bill of Rights) of the Constitution, viz.:
x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses

punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7,
Rule 11424 of the Rules of Court, as follows:
Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by

reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail
when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution.

A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an
offense that, under the law existing at the time of its
commission and the application for admission to bail, may
be punished with death.25
_______________
23 Leviste v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010, 615
SCRA 619, 628.
24 As amended by A.M. No. 00-5-03-SC, December 1, 2000.
25 Section 6, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

300
The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before

being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable,
unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an
offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is
detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can
claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill
of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is
charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
and the evidence of his guilt is strong.26 Once it has been
established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to
bail shall be recognized.27
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of
the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts
have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment.
Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even
prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of
guilt is not strong.28
_______________
26 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra

note 19 at p. 693.
27 Id.
28 Section 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in custody
shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or
released on recognizance as prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or
after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b)
before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.

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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 301

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary:

(1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment;29 or (2) if
the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated
under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual
delinquent, or has committed the crime aggravated by the
circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal
confinement, evaded sentence, or violated the conditions of
his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation,
parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the
probability of flight if released on bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another
crime during the pendency of the appeal.

3.
Admission to bail in offenses punished
by death, or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua is subject to judicial discretion

For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of
whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases
involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the
discretion of the trial court. But, as the Court has held in
Concerned Citizens v. Elma,30 “such discretion may be
exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the
degree of guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or
not he should be granted provi-
_______________
29 Section 5, paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

30 A.M. No. RTJ-94-1183, February 6, 1995, 241 SCRA 84, 88.

302

sional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot

be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the
part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with
notice to the Prosecution.31 The indispensability of the
hearing with notice has been aptly explained in Aguirre v.
Belmonte, viz.:32
x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this

Court already ruled in People v. Dacudao, etc., et al. that a
hearing is mandatory before bail can be granted to an accused
who is charged with a capital offense, in this wise:
The respondent court acted

irregularly in granting bail in a murder
case without any hearing on the motion
asking for it, without bothering to ask
the prosecution for its conformity or
comment, as it turned out later, over
its strong objections. The court granted
bail on the sole basis of the complaint
and the affidavits of three policemen,
not one of whom apparently witnessed
the killing. Whatever the court
possessed at the time it issued the
questioned ruling was intended only for
prima facie determining whether or not
there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the crime was
committed and pinpointing the persons
who probably committed it. Whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong for
each individual accused still has to be
established unless the prosecution
submits the issue on whatever it has
already presented. To appreciate the
strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must be
consulted or heard. It is equally
entitled as the accused to due process.
x x x x
_______________
31 Gacal v. Infante, A.M. No. RTJ-04-1845 (formerly A.M. No. I.P.I.

No. 03-1831-RTJ), October 5, 2011, 658 SCRA 535, 536.
32 A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052, October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778, 789-790.

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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 303

Certain guidelines in the fixing of a

bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity
for the prosecution to refute it. Among
them are the nature and circumstances
of the crime, character and reputation
of the accused, the weight of the
evidence against him, the probability of
the accused appearing at the trial,
whether or not the accused is a fugitive
from justice, and whether or not the
accused is under bond in other cases.
(Section 6, Rule 114, Rules of Court) It
is highly doubtful if the trial court can
appreciate these guidelines in an ex
parte determination where the Fiscal is
neither present nor heard.

The hearing, which may be either summary or
otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily
determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the
accused is strong. For this purpose, a summary hearing
means —
x x x such brief and speedy method of receiving and

considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent
with the purpose of hearing which is merely to determine the
weight of evidence for purposes of bail. On such hearing, the court
does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to
the weight that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against
the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome of the trial or on
what further evidence may be therein offered or admitted. The
course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which
may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination.33
In resolving bail applications of the accused who is

charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion
_______________
33 Cortes v. Catral, A.M. No. RTJ-97-1387, September 10, 1997, 279

SCRA 1, 11.

304

perpetua or life imprisonment, the trial judge is expected to

comply with the guidelines outlined in Cortes v. Catral,34 to
wit:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or
of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing
of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule
114 of the Rules of Court, as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to
present evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge
the accused upon the approval of the bailbond.
(Section 19, supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.

4.
Enrile’s poor health justifies
his admission to bail

We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to
Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that
should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was
already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission
of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered.35
Enrile’s averment has been mainly uncontested by the
Prosecution, whose Opposition to the Motion to Fix Bail has
only argued that —
_______________
34 Id., at p. 18.
35 Rollo, pp. 252-253.

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VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 305

8. As regards the assertion that the maximum

possible penalty that might be imposed upon
Enrile is only reclusion temporal due to the
presence of two mitigating circumstances,
suffice it to state that the presence or absence of
mitigating circumstances is also not
consideration that the Constitution deemed
worthy. The relevant clause in Section 13 is
“charged with an offense punishable by.” It is,
therefore, the maximum penalty provided
by the offense that has bearing and not the
possibility of mitigating circumstances
being appreciated in the accused’s favor.36

Yet, we do not determine now the question of whether or
not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua,37 simply because the determination, being
primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the
trial court.
Nonetheless, in now granting Enrile’s petition for
certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned
principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the
required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the
Philippines’ responsibility in the international community
arising from the national commitment under the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights to:
_______________
36 Id., at p. 260.
37 Worthy to mention at this juncture is that the Court En Banc, in
People v. Genosa (G.R. No. 135981, January 15, 2004, 419 SCRA 537), a
criminal prosecution for parricide in which the penalty is reclusion
perpetua to death under Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code,
appreciated the concurrence of two mitigating circumstances and no
aggravating circumstance as a privileged mitigating circumstance, and
consequently lowered the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion

temporal in its medium period.

306

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as

value the worth and dignity of every person. This
commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: “The State values the dignity
of every human person and guarantees full respect for
human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right
of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring
that those detained or arrested can participate in
the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide
without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make
available to every person under detention such
remedies which safeguard their fundamental right
to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.38
This national commitment to uphold the fundamental
human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to
those charged in criminal proceedings but also to
extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that
the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian
and compelling circumstances.39
In our view, his social and political standing and his
having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon
his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his
flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His
personal disposition from the onset of his indictment for
plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter
respect for the legal processes of this country. We also do
not ignore that at an ear-
_______________
38 Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia,

Jr., G.R. No. 153675, April 19, 2007, 521 SCRA 470, 482 (bold
underscoring supplied for emphasis).
39 Rodriguez v. Presiding Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 17, G.R. No.
157977, February 27, 2006, 483 SCRA 290, 298.

307
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 307

lier time many years ago when he had been charged with
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder, he
already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for
the legal processes, and was granted bail during the
pendency of his trial because he was not seen as a flight
risk.40 With his solid reputation in both his public and his
private lives, his long years of public service, and history’s
judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.
The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents
another compelling justification for his admission to bail,
but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.
In his testimony in the Sandiganbayan,41 Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales, the Director of the Philippine General Hospital
(PGH), classified Enrile as a geriatric patient who was
found during the medical examinations conducted at the
UP-PGH to be suffering from the following conditions:

(1) Chronic Hypertension with fluctuating blood
pressure levels on multiple drug therapy;
(Annexes 1.1, 1.2, 1.3);
(2) Diffuse atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease
composed of the following:
a. Previous history of cerebrovascular disease
with carotid and vertebral artery disease;
(Annexes 1.4, 4.1)
b. Heavy coronary artery calcifications;
(Annex 1.5)
c. Ankle Brachial Index suggestive of arterial
calcifications. (Annex 1.6)
(3) Atrial and Ventricular Arrhythmia (irregular
heart beat) documented by Holter monitoring;
(Annexes 1.7.1, 1.7.2)
_______________
40 Rollo, pp. 559, 571-576.

41 Id., at pp. 339-340 (TSN of July 14, 2014).

308

(4) Asthma-COPD Overlap Syndrome (ACOS) and

postnasal drip syndrome; (Annexes 2.1, 2.2)
(5) Ophthalmology:
a. Age-related mascular degeneration, neovascular
s/p laser of the Retina, s/p Lucentis intra-ocular
injections; (Annexes 3.0, 3.1, 3.2)
b. S/p Cataract surgery with posterior chamber
intraocular lens. (Annexes 3.1, 3.2)
(6) Historical diagnoses of the following:
a. High blood sugar/diabetes on medications;
b. High cholesterol levels/dyslipidemia;
c. Alpha thalassemia;
d. Gait/balance disorder;
e. Upper gastrointestinal bleeding (etiology
uncertain) in 2014;
f. Benign prostatic hypertrophy (with documented
enlarged prostate on recent ultrasound).42

Dr. Gonzales attested that the following medical
conditions, singly or collectively, could pose significant
risks to the life of Enrile, to wit: (1) uncontrolled
hypertension, because it could lead to brain or heart
complications, including recurrence of stroke; (2)
arrhythmia, because it could lead to fatal or nonfatal
cardiovascular events, especially under stressful
conditions; (3) coronary calcifications associated with
coronary artery disease, because they could indicate a
future risk for heart attack under stressful conditions; and
(4) exacerbations of ACOS, because they could be triggered
by certain circumstances (like excessive heat, humidity,
dust or allergen exposure) which could cause a
deterioration in patients with asthma or COPD.43
_______________
42 Id., at pp. 373-374 (bold underscoring supplied for emphasis).

43 Id., at pp. 334-335, 374-375.

309
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 309

Based on foregoing, there is no question at all that

Enrile’s advanced age and ill health required special
medical attention. His confinement at the PNP General
Hospital, albeit at his own instance,44 was not even
recommended by the officer-in-charge (OIC) and the
internist doctor of that medical facility because of the
limitations in the medical support at that hospital. Their
testimonies ran as follows:
x x x x
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
The question is, do you feel comfortable with the continued
confinement of Senator Enrile at the Philippine National
Police Hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Director, doctor, do you feel comfortable with the
continued confinement of Senator Enrile at the PNP
Hospital?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
No, Your Honor.
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
Why?
PSUPT. JOCSON:
Because during emergency cases, Your Honor, we cannot
give him the best.
x x x x
JUSTICE MARTIRES:
At present, since you are the attending physician of the accused,
Senator Enrile, are you happy or have any fear in your
heart of the present condition of the accused vis-à-vis
the facilities of the hospital?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Yes, Your Honor. I have a fear.

310

JUSTICE MARTIRES:
That you will not be able to address in an emergency
situation?
DR. SERVILLANO:
Your Honor, in case of emergency situation we can
handle it but probably if the condition of the patient
worsen, we have no facilities to do those things, Your
Honor.45
x x x x

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless
of the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger
his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling his
health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not
unprecedented. The Court has already held in Dela Rama
v. The People’s Court:46
x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari,

held the following:
x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the

particular case, the illness of the prisoner, independently
of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which
should, regardless of the charge and the stage of the
proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to
admit the prisoner to bail; x x x47
_______________
45 Id., at pp. 485-488 (TSN of September 4, 2014).

46 77 Phil. 461 (October 2, 1946), in which the pending criminal case
against the petitioner was for treason.
47 Id., at p. 462.

311
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 311
x x x x
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon
Institute to the effect that the petitioner “is actually suffering
from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary tuberculosis, and
chronic, granular pharyngitis,” and that in said institute they
“have seen similar cases, later progressing into advance stages
when the treatment and medicine are no longer of any avail”;
taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition
for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the ground that the
petitioner was suffering from quiescent and not active
tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s Court in
sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical
examination and diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs,
was evidently to verify whether the petitioner is suffering from
active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his
petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s
Court has adopted and applied the well-established doctrine cited
in our above quoted resolution, in several cases, among them, the
cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino
(case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on
bail on the ground that they were ill and their continued
confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to their
health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently
hold that the People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion
in refusing to release the petitioner on bail.48

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty
to Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition
be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only
aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.
On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the
trial to finish before a meaningful consideration of the
appli-
_______________
48 Id., at pp. 465-466.

312

cation for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail,

which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending the trial. There may be circumstances decisive of
the issue of bail — whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice
— that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish.49
The Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting
the interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for
him the guarantees of due process as well as to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Sandiganbayan
arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the
appearance of the accused during the trial; and
unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Enrile. As such, the
Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in denying
Enrile’s Motion To Fix Bail. Grave abuse of discretion, as
the ground for the issuance of the writ of certiorari,
connotes whimsical and capricious exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to excess, or lack of jurisdiction.50 The abuse
must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law as
where the
_______________
49 Bravo, Jr. v. Borja, No. L-65228, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 466,
where the Court observed:
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed would
require a consideration not only of the evidence of the commission of the
crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
There would then be a need for a complete trial, after which the judge
would be just about ready to render a decision in the case. As perceptively
observed by the Solicitor General, such procedure would defeat the
purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty
pending trial.
50 Republic v. Sandiganbayan (Second Division), G.R. No. 129406,
March 6, 2006, 484 SCRA 119, 127; Litton Mills, Inc. v. Galleon Trader,
Inc., No. L-40867, July 26, 1988, 163 SCRA 489, 494.

313
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 313

power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by

reason of passion or hostility.51
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for
certiorari; ISSUES the writ of certiorari ANNULING and
SETTING ASIDE the Resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-
0238 on July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014; ORDERS the
PROVISIONAL RELEASE of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238 upon posting of a cash
bond of P1,000,000.00 in the Sandiganbayan; and
DIRECTS the immediate release of petitioner Juan Ponce
Enrile from custody unless he is being detained for some
other lawful cause.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Brion, Perez and

Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Sereno, CJ., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Carpio, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Peralta, J., For humanitarian reasons.
Del Castillo, J., I concur in the result based on
humanitarian grounds.
Villarama, Jr., J., On Official Leave.
Reyes, J., On Sick Leave.
Perlas-Bernabe, J., I join the Dissent of J. Leonen.
Leonen, J., I dissent. See Separate Opinion.
Jardeleza, J., No part. Prior OSG action.

314

DISSENTING OPINION

LEONEN, J.:
All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable

by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall,
before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall
not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required. —
Const., Art. III, Sec. 13
The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the
poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal
bread. — The Red Lily, Chapter 7 (1894) by Anatole France,
French novelist (1844-1924)

I dissent.
This Petition for Certiorari should not be granted. The
action of the Sandiganbayan in denying the Motion to Fix
Bail was proper. Bail is not a matter of right in cases where
the crime charged is plunder and the imposable penalty is
reclusion perpetua.
Neither was there grave abuse of discretion by the
Sandiganbayan when it failed to release accused on bail for
medical or humanitarian reasons. His release for medical
and humanitarian reasons was not the basis for his prayer
in his Motion to Fix Bail1 filed before the Sandiganbayan.
Neither did he base his prayer for the grant of bail in this
Petition on his medical condition.
The grant of bail, therefore, by the majority is a special
accommodation for petitioner. It is based on a ground never
raised before the Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed
before this court. The Sandiganbayan should not be faulted
for
_______________
1 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I.

315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315

not shedding their neutrality and impartiality. It is not the

duty of an impartial court to find what it deems a better
argument for the accused at the expense of the prosecution
and the people they represent.
The allegation that petitioner suffers from medical

conditions that require very special treatment is a question
of fact. We cannot take judicial notice of the truth
contained in a certification coming from one doctor. This
doctor has to be presented as an expert witness who will be
subjected to both direct and cross-examination so that he
can properly manifest to the court the physical basis for his
inferences as well as the nature of the medical condition of
petitioner. Rebutting evidence that may be presented by
the prosecution should also be considered. All this would be
proper before the Sandiganbayan. Again, none of this was
considered by the Sandiganbayan because petitioner
insisted that he was entitled to bail as a matter of right on
grounds other than his medical condition.
Furthermore, the majority’s opinion — other than the
invocation of a general human rights principle — does not
provide clear legal basis for the grant of bail on
humanitarian grounds. Bail for humanitarian
considerations is neither presently provided in our Rules of
Court nor found in any statute or provision of the
Constitution.
This case leaves this court open to a justifiable criticism
of granting a privilege ad hoc: only for one person —
petitioner in this case.
Worse, it puts pressure on all trial courts and the
Sandiganbayan that will predictably be deluged with
motions to fix bail on the basis of humanitarian
considerations. The lower courts will have to decide,
without guidance, whether bail should be granted because
of advanced age, hypertension, pneumonia, or dreaded
diseases. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to Senators and former Presidents charged
with plunder and not to those accused of drug trafficking,
multiple incestuous rape, serious illegal detention,

315
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 315

and other crimes punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment. They will have to decide whether this is
applicable only to those who are in special detention
facilities and not to the aging or sick detainees in
overcrowded detention facilities all over this country.
Our trial courts and the Sandiganbayan will decide on

the basis of personal discretion causing petitions for
certiorari to be filed before this court. This will usher in an
era of truly selective justice not based on clear legal
provisions, but one that is unpredictable, partial, and solely
grounded on the presence or absence of human compassion
on the day that justices of this court deliberate and vote.
Not only is this contrary to the Rule of Law, it also
undermines the legitimacy and the stability of our entire
judicial system.

I

On June 5, 2014, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile)
was charged with the crime of plunder punishable under
Republic Act No. 7080.2 Section 2 of this law provides:
SEC. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties.—Any

public officer who, by himself or in connivance with members of
his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the
aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall
be punished by reclusion perpetua to death[.] (Emphasis
supplied)

On June 10, 2014, Enrile filed an Omnibus Motion
before the Sandiganbayan, praying that he be allowed to
post bail if
_______________
2 An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder, as Amended

by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993).

317
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 317

the Sandiganbayan should find probable cause against

him.3 On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Omnibus Motion on the ground of prematurity since no
warrant of arrest had been issued at that time. In the same

Resolution, the Sandiganbayan ordered Enrile’s arrest.4
On the same day the warrant of arrest was issued and
served, Enrile proceeded to the Criminal Investigation and
Detection Group of the Philippine National Police in Camp
Crame, Quezon City.5
On July 7, 2014, Enrile filed a Motion to Fix Bail,
arguing that his alleged age and voluntary surrender were
mitigating and extenuating circumstances that would
lower the imposable penalty to reclusion temporal.6 He also
argued that his alleged age and physical condition
indicated that he was not a flight risk.7 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court

allow Enrile to post bail, and forthwith set the amount of bail
pending determination that (a) evidence of guilt is strong; (b)
uncontroverted mitigating circumstances of at least 70 years old
and voluntary surrender will not lower the imposable penalty to
reclusion temporal; and (c) Enrile is a flight risk [sic].8

The Office of the Ombudsman filed its Opposition to the
Motion to Fix Bail9 dated July 9, 2014. Enrile filed a
Reply10 dated July 11, 2014.
_______________
3 Ponencia, p. 294.

4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Petition for Certiorari, Annex I, pp. 4-5.
7 Id., at p. 5.
8 Id., at pp. 6-7.
9 Petition for Certiorari, Annex J.
10 Petition for Certiorari, Annex K.

318

Pending the resolution of his Motion to Fix Bail, Enrile

filed a Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital11
dated July 4, 2014, arguing that “his advanced age and
frail medical condition”12 merit hospital arrest in the
Philippine National Police General Hospital under such

conditions that may be prescribed by the Sandiganbayan.13
He also prayed that in the event of a medical emergency
that cannot be addressed by the Philippine National Police
General Hospital, he may be allowed to access an outside
medical facility.14 His prayer states:
WHEREFORE, accused Enrile prays that the Honorable Court

temporarily place him under hospital confinement at the PNP
General Hospital at Camp Crame, Quezon City, with continuing
authority given to the hospital head or administrator to exercise
his professional medical judgment or discretion to allow Enrile’s
immediate access of, or temporary visit to, another medical
facility outside of Camp Crame, in case of emergency or necessity,
secured with appropriate guards, but after completion of the
appropriate medical treatment or procedure, he be returned
forthwith to the PNP General Hospital.15

After the prosecution’s submission of its Opposition to
the Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, the
Sandiganbayan held a hearing on July 9, 2014 to resolve
this Motion.
On July 9, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order
allowing Enrile to remain at the Philippine National Police
General Hospital for medical examination until further
orders of the court.16
_______________
11 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.

12 Id., at p. 2.
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id., at p. 3.
16 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

319
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 319

This Order regarding his detention at the Philippine

National Police General Hospital is not the subject of this
Petition for Certiorari. Enrile did not ask that this

Order be declared invalid or null and void.
On July 14, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued the
Resolution17 denying Enrile’s Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature,18 stating that:
[I]t is only after the prosecution shall have presented its

evidence and the Court shall have made a determination that the
evidence of guilt is not strong against accused Enrile can he
demand bail as a matter of right. Then and only then will the
Court be duty-bound to fix the amount of his bail.
To be sure, no such determination has been made by the Court.
In fact, accused Enrile has not filed an application for bail.
Necessarily, no bail hearing can even commence. It is thus
exceedingly premature for accused Enrile to ask the Court to fix
his bail.19

Enrile filed a Motion for Reconsideration,20 reiterating
that there were mitigating and extenuating circumstances
that would modify the imposable penalty and that his frail
health proved that he was not a flight risk.21 The
Sandiganbayan, however, denied the Motion on August 8,
2014.22 Hence, this Petition for Certiorari was filed.

II

The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it denied the Motion to Fix Bail for
prematurity. It
_______________
17 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A.

18 Id., at pp. 6 and 10.
19 Id., at p. 6.
20 Petition for Certiorari, Annex L.
21 Id., at pp. 3-5.
22 Petition for Certiorari, Annex B, p. 14.

320

was following entrenched and canonical procedures for bail

based upon the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
A trial court — in this case, the Sandiganbayan —
acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused through
his or her arrest.23 The consequent detention is to ensure
that the accused will appear when required by the Rules
and by order of the court trying the offense.24 The
provisions on bail provide a balance between the accused’s
right to be presumed innocent on one hand and the due
process rights of the state to be able to effect the accused’s
prosecution on the other hand. That balance is not
exclusively judicially determined. The Constitution frames
judicial discretion.
Thus, Article III, Section 13 states:
ARTICLE III
Bill of Rights
....
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong,
shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be
released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to
bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

The doctrine on bail is so canonical that it is clearly
provided in our Rules of Court. The grant of bail is
ordinarily understood as two different concepts: (1) bail as
a matter of right and (2) bail as a matter of discretion.
Thus, Sections 4 and 5 of Rule 114 provide:
_______________
23 See Gimenez v. Nazareno, 243 Phil. 274, 278; 160 SCRA 1, 4 (1988)
[Per J. Gancayco, En Banc].
24 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 3.

321
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 321

SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception.—All persons in

custody shall be admitted to bail as a matter of right, with
sufficient sureties, or released on recognizance as prescribed by
law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan

Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in
Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court, and (b) before conviction
by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment.
SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.—Upon conviction by the
Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon
by the trial court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided
it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court.
However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused
changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable,
the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the
appellate court.
Then in Section 7 of Rule 114:
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion

perpetua or life imprisonment, not bailable.—No person charged
with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the
criminal prosecution. (Emphasis supplied)

The mandatory bail hearing is only to determine the
amount of bail when it is a matter of right. On the other
hand, mandatory bail hearings are held when an accused is
charged with a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not only to fix the amount of bail but
fundamentally to determine whether the evidence of guilt
is strong.
322

The mandatory character of a bail hearing was first

addressed in the 1945 case of Herras Teehankee v. Rovira25
where this court ordered the People’s Court to conduct a
bail hearing despite the accused being charged with a
capital offense.26 This court reasoned that “the hearing is
for the purpose of enabling the People’s Court to exercise
its sound discretion as to whether or not under the
Constitution and laws in force[,] petitioner is entitled to

provisional release under bail.”27
A year later, this court clarified its orders to the People’s
Court and gave the following instructions:
(1) In capital cases like the present, when the prosecutor does
not oppose the petition for release on bail, the court should, as a
general rule, in the proper exercise of its discretion, grant the
release after the approval of the bail which it should fix for the
purpose;
(2) But if the court has reasons to believe that the special
prosecutor’s attitude is not justified, it may ask him questions to
ascertain the strength of the state’s evidence or to judge the
adequacy of the amount of bail;
(3) When, however, the special prosecutor refuses to answer
any particular question on the ground that the answer may
involve a disclosure imperiling the success of the prosecution or
jeopardizing the public interest, the court may not compel him to
do so, if and when he exhibits a statement to that effect of the
Solicitor General, who, as head of the Office of Special
Prosecutors, is vested with the direction and control of the
prosecution, and may not, even at the trial, be ordered by the
court to present evidence which he does not want to introduce —
provided, of course, that such refusal shall not prejudice the
rights of the defendant or detainee.28
_______________
25 75 Phil. 634 (1945) [Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

26 Id., at p. 644.
27 Id.
28 Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, 76 Phil. 756, 774 (1946)
[Per J. Hilado, En Banc].

323
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 323

The ruling in Herras Teehankee was applied in Ocampo

v. Bernabe:29
We have held in Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons, that

all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the
charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The
general rule, therefore, is that all persons, whether charged or not
yet charged, are, before their conviction, entitled to provisional

release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a
capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. At
the hearing of the application for bail, the burden of showing that
the case falls within the exception is on the prosecution, according
to Rule 110, Section 7. The determination of whether or not the
evidence of guilt is strong is, as stated in the Herras Teehankee
case, a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion, by the very
nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence
is submitted to the court at the hearing. Since the discretion is
directed to the weight of evidence and since evidence cannot
properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the
court, it is obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion
requires that the evidence of guilt be submitted to the court, the
petitioner having the right of cross-examination and to introduce
his own evidence in rebuttal. Mere affidavits or recital of their
contents are not sufficient since they are mere hearsay evidence,
unless the petitioner fails to object thereto.30 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)

Herras Teehankee was also applied in Feliciano v.
Pasicolan, etc., et al.31 and Siazon v. Hon. Presiding Judge
of the Circuit Criminal Court, etc., et al.32
_______________
29 77 Phil. 55 (1946) [Per CJ. Moran, En Banc].

30 Id., at p. 58.
31 112 Phil. 781, 782-783; 2 SCRA 888, 889 (1961) [Per J. Natividad,
En Banc].
32 149 Phil. 241, 247; 42 SCRA 184, 186 (1971) [Per J. Makalintal, En
Banc].

324

We have disciplined numerous judges who violated this

court’s instructions on the application of the constitutional
provisions regarding bail.
Basco v. Judge Rapatalo33 outlines these administrative
cases promulgated from 1981 to 1996.34 Unfortunately,
there were still administrative complaints filed against
judges for failing to hold a hearing for bail even after the
promulgation of Basco.
In Cortes v. Judge Catral,35 this court ordered Judge
Catral to pay a fine of P20,000.00 for granting bail to the
ac-
_______________
33 336 Phil. 214; 269 SCRA 220 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second
Division].
34 Id., at pp. 221-227; pp. 227-233, citing People v. Sola, 191 Phil. 21;
103 SCRA 393 (1981) [Per CJ. Fernando, En Banc], People v. San Diego,
135 Phil. 514; 26 SCRA 522 (1968) [Per J. Capistrano, En Banc], People v.
Dacudao, 252 Phil. 507; 170 SCRA 489 (1989) [Per J. Gutierrez, Jr., Third
Division], People v. Calo, Jr., 264 Phil. 1007; 186 SCRA 620 (1990) [Per J.
Bidin, En Banc], Libarios v. Dabalos, A.M. No. RTJ-89-286, July 11, 1991,
199 SCRA 48 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], People v. Nano, G.R. No. 94639,
January 13, 1992, 205 SCRA 155 [Per J. Bidin, Third Division], Pico v.
Combong, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-91-764, November 6, 1992, 215 SCRA 421
[Per Curiam, En Banc], De Guia v. Maglalang, A.M. No. RTJ-89-306,
March 1, 1993, 219 SCRA 153 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Borinaga v. Tamin,
A.M. No. RTJ-93-936, September 10, 1993, 226 SCRA 206, 216 [Per J.
Regalado, En Banc], Aurillo, Jr. v. Francisco, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1097,
August 12, 1994, 235 SCRA 283 [Per J. Padilla, En Banc], Estoya v.
Abraham-Singson, A.M. No. RTJ-91-758, September 26, 1994, 237 SCRA
1 [Per Curiam, En Banc], Aguirre v. Belmonte, A.M. No. RTJ-93-1052,
October 27, 1994, 237 SCRA 778 [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Lardizabal
v. Reyes, A.M. No. MTJ-94-897, December 5, 1994, 238 SCRA 640 [Per J.
Padilla, En Banc], Guillermo v. Reyes, Jr., 310 Phil. 176; 240 SCRA 154
(1995) [Per J. Regalado, Second Division], Santos v. Ofilada, 315 Phil. 11;
245 SCRA 56 (1995) [Per J. Regalado, En Banc], Sule v. Biteng, 313 Phil.
398; 243 SCRA 524 (1995) [Per J. Davide, Jr., En Banc], and Buzon, Jr. v.
Velasco, 323 Phil. 724; 253 SCRA 601 (1996) [Per J. Panganiban, En
Banc].
35 344 Phil. 415; 279 SCRA 1 (1997) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].

325
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 325

cused charged with capital offenses.36 This court could only

lament on the deluge of these administrative cases, stating:
It is indeed surprising, not to say, alarming, that the Court

should be besieged with a number of administrative cases filed
against erring judges involving bail. After all, there is no dearth
of jurisprudence on the basic principles involving bail. As a
matter of fact, the Court itself, through its Philippine Judicial
Academy, has been including lectures on the subject in the
regular seminars conducted for judges. Be that as it may, we
reiterate the following duties of the trial judge in case an
application for bail is filed:
“1. In all cases, whether bail is a

matter of right or of discretion, notify
the prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as
amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of
discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses
to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the
purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion; (Section 7
and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the
summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bailbond (Section 19,
supra) Otherwise petition should be
denied.”
With such succinct but clear rules now incorporated in the

Rules of Court, trial judges are enjoined to study them well and be
guided accordingly. Admittedly, judges cannot be held to account
for an erroneous decision ren-
_______________
36 Id., at pp. 430-431; p. 12.

326

dered in good faith, but this defense is much too frequently cited
even if not applicable. A number of cases on bail having already
been decided, this Court justifiably expects judges to discharge
their duties assiduously. For a judge is called upon to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant with basic
legal principles. Faith in the administration of justice can only be
engendered if litigants are convinced that the members of the
Bench cannot justly be charged with a deficiency in their grasp of
legal principles.37

The guidelines in Cortes fell on deaf ears as
administrative cases continued to be filed against judges
who failed to hold hearings in applications for bail.
In Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas,38 the accused was
charged with murder.39 Judge Bugtas initially denied the
accused’s petition for bail but granted his motion for
reconsideration and set his bail without a hearing.40 As a
result, Judge Bugtas was ordered to pay a fine of
P20,000.0041 for being “grossly ignorant of the rules and
procedures in granting or denying bail[.]”42
In Marzan-Gelacio v. Judge Flores,43 the erring judge
was ordered to pay a fine of P10,000.00 for granting bail to
the accused charged with rape without a hearing.44
_______________
37 Id., citing Basco v. Rapatalo, 336 Phil. 214, 237; 269 SCRA 220,
243-244 (1997) [Per J. Romero, Second Division].
38 448 Phil. 45; 400 SCRA 37 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division].
39 Id., at p. 48; p. 41.
40 Id., at pp. 49-50; p. 46.
41 Id., at pp. 56-57; p. 48.
42 Id., at p. 56; p. 47.
43 389 Phil. 372; 334 SCRA 1 (2000) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First
Division].
44 Id., at pp. 375 and 388; p. 13.

327
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 327

In Chief State Prosecutor Zuño v. Judge Cabebe,45 Judge

Cabebe was fined P20,000.00 for granting bail, without the
requisite hearing, to the accused charged with possession of
illegal drugs.46
A bail hearing is mandatory even if the accused has not
filed an application for bail or the prosecutor already
recommends an amount for bail.
In Atty. Gacal v. Judge Infante:47
Even where there is no petition for bail in a case like Criminal

Case No. 1138-03, a hearing should still be held. This hearing is
separate and distinct from the initial hearing to determine the
existence of probable cause, in which the trial judge ascertains
whether or not there is sufficient ground to engender a well-
founded belief that a crime has been committed and that the
accused is probably guilty of the crime. The Prosecution must be
given a chance to show the strength of its evidence; otherwise, a
violation of due process occurs.
....
Being the trial judge, Judge Infante had to be aware of the
precedents laid down by the Supreme Court regarding the bail
hearing being mandatory and indispensable. He ought to have
remembered, then, that it was only through such hearing that he
could be put in a position to determine whether the evidence for
the Prosecution was weak or strong. Hence, his dispensing with
the hearing manifested a gross ignorance of the law and the
rules.48
_______________
45 486 Phil. 605; 444 SCRA 382 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Third Division].
46 Id., at pp. 611 and 618; p. 385.
47 674 Phil. 324; 658 SCRA 535 (2011) [Per J. Bersamin, First
Division].
48 Id., at pp. 340-341; p. 550, citing Directo v. Bautista, 400 Phil. 1, 5;
346 SCRA 223, 228-229 (2000) [Per J. Melo, Third Division] and Marzan-
Gelacio v. Flores, supra note 43 at p. 381; p. 19.

328

In the present charge of plunder, petitioner now insists

that this court justify that bail be granted without any
hearing before the Sandiganbayan on whether the evidence
of guilt is strong. During the hearing on petitioner’s Motion
to Fix Bail, the prosecution argued that any grant of bail
should be based only on their failure to establish the
strength of the evidence against him.49 The prosecution
had no opportunity to present rebuttal evidence based on
the prematurity of the Motion.
Building on consistent precedent, the Sandiganbayan
correctly denied petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail for being
premature. The denial is neither “capricious, whimsical,
arbitrary [nor] despotic”50 as to amount to grave abuse of
discretion. It was in accord with the clear provisions of the
Constitution, jurisprudence, and long-standing rules of
procedure.
Thus, this could not have been the basis for declaring
that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion
when it denied petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail.

III

The Sandiganbayan did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it failed to release petitioner on bail for
medical or
_______________
49 Petition for Certiorari, Annex A, p. 2.

50 People v. Sandiganbayan, 490 Phil. 105, 116; 467 SCRA 137, 165
(2005) [Per J. Chico-Nazario, Second Division], citing People v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, June 10, 2004, 431 SCRA 610, 616 [Per J.
Callejo, Sr., Second Division], Rodson Philippines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 141857, June 9, 2004, 431 SCRA 469, 480 [Per J. Callejo, Sr.,
Second Division], Matugas v. Commission on Elections, 465 Phil. 299, 313;
420 SCRA 365, 378 (2004) [Per J. Tinga, En Banc], Tomas Claudio
Memorial College, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 467 Phil. 541, 553; 423 SCRA
122, 133 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., Second Division], and Condo Suite
Club Travel, Inc. v. National Labor Relations Commission, 380 Phil. 660,
667; 323 SCRA 679, 686 (2000) [Per J. Quisumbing, Second Division].

329
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 329

humanitarian reasons. Petitioner did not ask that bail be

granted because of his medical condition or for
humanitarian reasons. Neither petitioner nor the
prosecution as respondent developed their arguments on
this point at the Sandiganbayan or in this court to
establish the legal and factual basis for this special kind of
bail in this case.
Yet, it now becomes the very basis for petitioner’s grant
of bail.
In his Petition before this court, petitioner argued that:
A. Before judgment of the Sandiganbayan, Enrile is
bailable as a matter of right. Enrile may be deemed to
fall within the exception only upon concurrence of two
(2) circumstances: (i) where the offense is punishable by
reclusion perpetua, and (ii) when evidence of guilt is
strong.
It is the duty and burden of the prosecution to show

clearly and conclusively that Enrile falls within the
exception and exclusion from the right; and not the
burden of Enrile to show entitlement to his right.
The prosecution failed to establish that Enrile’s case
falls within the exception; hence, denial of his right to
bail by the Sandiganbayan was in grave abuse of
discretion.
B. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively

that Enrile, if ever he would be convicted, is punishable
by reclusion perpetua; hence, Enrile is entitled to bail as
a matter of right.
The Sandiganbayan ignored the fact that the penalty

prescribed by the Anti-Plunder Law itself for the
crime of plunder is not only reclusion perpetua but
also the penalty next lower in degree (or reclusion
temporal) by “consider(ing) the attendance of
mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as
provided by the Revised Penal Code.”

330

Further proceedings to receive evidence of mitigating

circumstances is a needless formality.
C. The prosecution failed to show clearly and conclusively

that evidence of Enrile’s guilt (if ever) is strong; hence,
Enrile is entitled to bail as a matter of right.
Notwithstanding that the prosecution did not assert,

hence failed to raise in issue, in its Opposition to
Enrile’s motion for bail, that evidence of guilt is
strong, in the light of the prosecution’s continuing
muteness to the defense’s repeated challenge for the
prosecution to produce any “single piece of paper
showing that Enrile received even a single peso of
kickback,” the Sandiganbayan nonetheless insisted
that Enrile must first initiate, and formally apply for,
the formal proceedings (“bail hearing”) before the
prosecution may be called upon to discharge its duty
of proving evidence of guilt is strong.
D. At any rate, Enrile may be bailable as he is not a

flight risk.
The exception to, or exclusion from, the right (“shall

be bailable”) does not become a prohibition (“shall not
be bailable”). Indeed, the exception to a mandatory
right (“shall”) is a permissive right (“may”).
A liberal interpretation is consistent with the rights
to presumptive innocence and non-deprivation of
liberty without due process, and the theory behind the
exception to right-to-bail.
Hence, if the theory is clearly shown not to exist as to
Enrile (i.e., Enrile is demonstrated not being a flight
risk), then bail may be granted to him.

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Enrile is definitely not a flight risk, being of old age,

frail physical and medical condition, and having
voluntarily surrendered.
Circumstances of official and social standing shows
that Enrile is not a flight risk.
Other circumstances negating Enrile’s disposition to

become a fugitive from justice are also present.
The following illustrative cases decided by the
Supreme Court show that at this stage of the
proceeding, Enrile is entitled to bail a matter of
right.51
The prayer in his Petition reads:

WHEREFORE, petitioner Enrile respectfully prays that

the Honorable Court:
a. ACT En Banc on the Petition for Certiorari;
b. EXPEDITE the certiorari proceedings;
c. SET the Petition for Certiorari for oral
arguments; and
d. after due proceedings, ANNUL, REVERSE, and
SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s Resolution
dated July 14, 2014, and the Resolution dated
August 8, 2014, and forthwith GRANT BAIL in
favor of Enrile.
Petitioner Enrile prays for such other and further relief
as may be just and equitable.52

IV

This case entailed long, arduous, and spirited discussion
among the justices of this court in and out of formal
deliberations. As provided by our rules and tradition, the
discussion
_______________
51 Petition for Certiorari, pp. 9-12.

52 Id., at p. 64.

332

was triggered by the submission of the member in charge of

a draft early this year. The draft mainly adopted the legal
arguments of the Petition which was centered on this court
taking judicial notice of evidence to establish two generic

mitigating circumstances that would lower the penalty to
be imposed even before trial or a hearing for the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
happened before the Sandiganbayan. Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this member submitted their
reflections on this issue. Refutations and arguments were
vigorously exchanged in writing.
Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe and this
member adopted the common position that there was no
grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, the Petition
should be dismissed. At most, the Motion to Fix Bail could
be treated by the Sandiganbayan as a petition or
application for bail as in all cases where the statutorily
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua, death, or life
imprisonment. Associate Justice Estela Perlas-Bernabe
and this member differed only in the treatment of
mitigating circumstances and the interpretation of Bravo,
Jr., etc. v. Hon. Borja, et al.53
When this case was called again for deliberation during
the En Banc session on August 11, 2015, the member-in-
charge (now the ponente) proposed the idea of dropping all
discussion on the legal points pertaining to whether bail
was a matter of right and focusing the grant of bail on
“humanitarian” grounds. The member-in-charge committed
to circulate a draft for the consideration of all justices. This
member expressed that he was open to listen to all
arguments.
The revised draft that centered on granting bail on the
basis of the medical condition of petitioner was circulated
on August 14, 2015. After considered reflection, this
member responded with a letter addressed to all the
justices, which stated:
_______________
53 219 Phil. 432; 134 SCRA 466 (1985) [Per J. Plana, First Division].

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In my view, there are several new issues occasioned by the

revisions in the proposed ponencia that need to be threshed out
thoroughly so that the Sandiganbayan can be guided if and when

an accused charged with offenses punishable with reclusion
perpetua should be released on bail “for humanitarian reasons.”
Among these are as follows:
First: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it applied the text of the
Constitution, the rules of court, and the present canonical
interpretations of these legal texts?
Second: Are we taking judicial notice of the truth of the
contents of the certification of a certain Dr. Gonzalez? Or are we
suspending our rules on evidence, that is, doing away with cross-
examination and not appreciating rebutting evidence that may be
or have been presented by the prosecution?
Third: Did the Sandiganbayan commit grave abuse of
discretion in appreciating the facts relating to the medical
condition of the accused? Or are we substituting our judgment for
theirs?
Fourth: What happens to the standing order of the
Sandiganbayan which authorizes the accused to be brought to
any hospital immediately if he exhibits symptoms which cannot
be treated by the PNP hospital subject only to reportorial
requirements to the court? Are we also declaring that the
Sandiganbayan’s decisions in relation to their supervision of the
detention of the accused were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion?
Fifth: What, if any, is the legal basis for humanitarian releases
on bail? Or if we are able to hurdle the factual issues and find
that there is actually a medical necessity, should his detention
rather be modified? Do we have clear judicial precedents for
hospital or house arrests for everyone?
Sixth: Without conceding, if the accused is released on bail so
that his medical condition can be attended to,

334

should he be returned to detention when he becomes well?

If he reports for work, does this not nullify the very basis of
the ponencia?
Seventh: What is the basis for P500,000.00 as bail? We
have established rules on what to consider when setting
the amount of bail. In relation to the accused and his
circumstances, what is our basis for setting this amount?
What evidence have we considered? Should this Court

rather than the Sandiganbayan exercise this discretion?
Eighth: What are our specific bases for saying that the
medical condition of the accused entitles him to treatment
different from all those who are now under detention and
undergoing trial for plunder? Is it simply his advanced age?
What qualifies for advanced age? Is it the medical
conditions that come with advanced age? Would this apply
to all those who have similar conditions and are also
undergoing trial for plunder? Is he suffering from a unique
debilitating disease which cannot be accommodated by the
best care provided by our detention facilities or hospital or
house arrest? Are there sufficient evidence and rules to
support our conclusion?
Ninth: Are there more specific and binding international
law provisions, other than the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which specifically compel the release of an
accused in his condition? Or are we now reading the
general tenor of the declaration of human rights to apply
specifically to the condition of this accused? What entitles
the accused in this case to a liberal application of very
general statements on human rights?54
The points in my letter were raised during the
deliberations of August 18, 2015. The member-in-charge,
however, did not agree to wait for a more extensive written
reflection on the points raised. Insisting on a vote, he
thus declared that he was abandoning the August 14,
2015 circulated draft centering on release on bail on
humanitarian \
_______________
54 J. Leonen, Letter to Colleagues dated August 18, 2015.

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grounds for his earlier version premised on the idea

that bail was a matter of right based on judicial
notice and the judicial declaration of the existence of
two mitigating circumstances.
This was the version voted upon at about 11:00 a.m. of
August 18, 2015. The only amendment to the majority
opinion accepted by the member-in-charge was the increase

of the proposed amount of bail to P1,000,000.00.
The vote was 8 to 4 with Associate Justice Lucas P.
Bersamin, who was the member-in-charge, emerging as the
ponente. Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno, Senior
Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio, Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe, and this member dissented.
During the oral arguments on the Torre de Manila case
or at about 3:00 p.m., the ponente passed around a
final copy of the majority opinion which was not the
version voted upon during the morning’s
deliberation. Rather, the copy offered for signature was
substantially the August 14, 2015 circulated version
granting bail on humanitarian grounds.
The current ponencia now does away with petitioner’s
entire argument, stating that:
Yet, we do not now determine the question of whether or
not Enrile’s averment on the presence of the two mitigating
circumstances could entitle him to bail despite the crime
alleged against him being punishable with reclusion
perpetua, simply because the determination, being
primarily factual in context, is ideally to be made by the
trial court.55 (Citation omitted)
Ordinarily, the drafts of the dissents would have been
available to all members of the court at the time that the
case was voted upon. But because the final version for
signing was
_______________
55 Ponencia, p. 305.

336

not the version voted upon, this member had to

substantially revise his dissent. Since the issue of
mitigating circumstances and bail as a matter of right was
no longer the basis of the ponencia, Associate Justice
Estela Perlas-Bernabe decided to graciously offer her
points for the drafting of a single Dissenting Opinion and to
abandon her filing of a Separate Opinion and joining this
member.
The Internal Rules of the Supreme Court allows one

week for the submission of a dissenting opinion. Thus, in
Rule 13, Section 7 of A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC:
SEC. 7. Dissenting, separate or concurring opinion.—A

Member who disagrees with the majority opinion, its conclusions,
and the disposition of the case may submit to the Chief Justice or
Division Chairperson a dissenting opinion, setting forth the
reason or reasons for such dissent. A Member who agrees with the
result of the case, but based on different reason or reasons may
submit a separate opinion; a concurrence “in the result” should
state the reason for the qualified concurrence. A Member who
agrees with the main opinion, but opts to express other reasons
for concurrence may submit a concurring opinion. The dissenting,
separate, or concurring opinion must be submitted within one week
from the date the writer of the majority opinion presents the
decision for the signature of the Members. (Emphasis supplied)

But this member endeavored to complete his draft
incorporating the ideas and suggestions of other dissenting
justices within two days from the circulation of the
majority opinion.
In the meantime, media, through various means, got
wind of the vote and started to speculate on the contents of
the majority opinion. This may have created expectations
on the part of petitioner’s friends, family, and counsel. The
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan, while admitting
that the Decision had as yet not been promulgated and
served, made announcements as to their readiness to
receive the cash bond and process the release of the
accused even if August 19, 2015

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happened to be a holiday in Quezon City, which was the

seat of their court.
This is the context of the apparent delay in the
announcements regarding the vote and the date of
promulgation of this judgment.

V

Despite brushing aside all of petitioner’s arguments, the

majority, instead of denying the Petition for Certiorari,
grants it on some other ground that was not even argued
nor prayed for by petitioner.
In essence, the majority now insists on granting bail
merely on the basis of the certification in a Manifestation
and Compliance dated August 14, 2014 by Dr. Jose C.
Gonzales (Dr. Gonzales) stating that petitioner is suffering
from numerous debilitating conditions.56 This certification
was submitted as an annex to a Manifestation57 before this
court regarding the remoteness of the possibility of flight of
the accused not for the purposes of asking for bail due to
such ailments.
Nowhere in the rules of procedure do we allow the grant
of bail based on judicial notice of a doctor’s certification. In
doing so, we effectively suspend our rules on evidence by
doing away with cross-examination and authentication of
Dr. Gonzales’ findings on petitioner’s health in a hearing
whose main purpose is to determine whether no kind of
alternative detention is possible.
_______________
56 The enumeration of diseases on pages 307-308 of the ponencia is

based on the certification of Dr. Gonzales. There was a hearing but for the
purpose of determining whether hospital arrest can continue. The hearing
was not for the purpose of determining whether bail should be granted on
the basis of his medical condition.
57 Rollo, p. 373.

338

Under Section 2 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules on

Evidence:
SEC. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary.—A court may

take judicial notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or
are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be
known to judges because of their judicial functions.

In State Prosecutors v. Muro:58
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three

material requisites: (1) the matter must be one of common and
general knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled
and not doubtful or uncertain; and (3) it must be known to be
within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court. The principal
guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially
known is that of notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial
notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of
general notoriety.59
Petitioner’s medical ailments are not matters that are of

public knowledge or are capable of unquestionable
demonstration. His illness is not a matter of general
notoriety.
Assuming that the medical ailments of petitioner are
relevant issues for bail, the prosecution is now deprived of
a fair opportunity to present any evidence that may rebut
the findings of Dr. Gonzales or any other medical
documents presented by petitioner in this Court. Due
process requires that we remand this matter for a bail
hearing to verify Dr. Gonzales’ findings and to ensure that
that is still the condition that prevails at present.
_______________
58 A.M. No. RTJ-92-876, September 19, 1994, 236 SCRA 505 [Per
Curiam, En Banc].
59 Id., at pp. 521-522, citing 20 Am. Jur., Evidence, Sec. 17, 48, King v.
Gallun, 109 U.S. 99, 27 L. ed. 870, and 31 C.J.S., Evidence, Secs. 6-7, 823.

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That we make factual determinations ourselves to grant

provisional liberty to one who is obviously politically
privileged without the benefit of the presentation of
evidence by both the prosecution and the accused, without
the prosecution being granted the opportunity to cross-
examine the evidence, and without consideration of any
rebutting evidence that may have been presented should a
hearing be held, casts serious doubt on our neutrality and
objectivity.
The better part of prudence is that we follow strictly our

well-entrenched, long-standing, and canonical procedures
for bail. Doctrinally, the matter to determine is whether
the evidence of guilt is strong. This is to be examined when
a hearing is granted as a mandatory manner after a
petition for bail is filed by the accused. The medical
condition of the accused, if any, should be pleaded and
heard.

VI

Assuming without conceding that petitioner suffers from
illnesses that require immediate medical attention, this
court has not established clear guidelines for such releases.
The closest that the majority opinion reaches for a
standard is:
Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the

crime charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of
the charge, provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown
to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed,
denying him bail despite imperiling his health and life would not
serve the true objective of preventive incarceration during trial.60
(Emphasis in the original)

To see the logical fallacy of the argument we break it
down to its premises:
_______________

340

Premise: There are those whose continued incarceration

is clearly shown to be injurious to their health OR whose
lives are endangered due to incarceration.
Premise: Petitioner is suffering from some ailments.
Therefore: Petitioner should be released.
There are various ways to see the fallacy of the
argument.
It is true that it is the duty of courts to ensure that

detention prisoners are humanely treated. Under A.M. No.
07-3-02-SC,61 judges of lower courts are mandated to
conduct monthly jail visitations in order to “[e]nsure the
promotion and protection of the dignity and well-being”62 of
detention prisoners. Detention prisoners may also be
released to a medical facility on humanitarian grounds “if
their continuous confinement during the pendency of their
case would be injurious to their health or endanger their
life.”63
In many instances, alternative detention — whether
temporary or permanent — is granted upon a clear
showing before the trial court or the Sandiganbayan that
the physical condition of the accused, as proven through
evidence presented in open court, is absolutely requiring
medical attention that could not be accommodated within
the current custodial arrangements. Care should, however,
be taken that such alternative custodial arrangements do
not take place more than the time necessary to address the
medical condition of the accused. Likewise, the
Sandiganbayan should ensure that alternative custodial
arrangements are not borne by the state and, therefore,
should be sensitive to the possibility that these alternatives
are not seen as a privilege given to the wealthy or powerful
detainees.
_______________
61 Re: Guidelines on the Jail Visitation and Inspection. New guidelines
are stated in OCA Circular No. 107-2013.
62 A.M. No. 07-3-02-SC (2008), Sec. 1(3)
63 De la Rama v. People’s Court, 77 Phil. 461, 465 (1946) [Per J. Feria,
En Banc].

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On July 9, 201464 and July 15, 2014,65 the

Sandiganbayan already issued Resolutions allowing
accused to remain at the Philippine National Police
General Hospital and continue medical examinations until
further orders from the court, subject to reportorial
requirements and at accused’s personal expense. In

particular, the Resolution dated July 9, 2014 states:
Pending receipt of [Dr. Jose C. Gonzales’s report], the Court

will hold in abeyance action on accused Enrile’s motion for
detention at the PNP General Hospital. However, he is allowed to
remain thereat until further orders from this Court. The Director
or Administrator of PNP General Hospital is GRANTED
AUTHORITY to allow accused Enrile to access another medical
facility outside Camp Crame only (1) in case of emergency or
necessity, and (2) the medical procedure required to be
administered on accused Enrile is not available at, or cannot be
provided for by the physicians of, the PNP General Hospital, ALL
AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED ENRILE.
After completion of the medical treatment or procedure outside
Camp Crame, accused Enrile shall be returned forthwith to the
PNP General Hospital. The said director or administrator is
DIRECTED to submit a report to the Court on such visit/s
of accused Enrile to another medical facility on the day
following the said visit/s.66 (Emphasis in the original)

The Resolution dated July 15, 2014 states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Dr. Jose C. Gonzales,

and/or any his duly authorized representative/s from the
Philippine General Hospital, is DIRECTED to continue with the
medical examination of accused Juan Ponce Enrile and to submit
a report and recommendation
_______________
64 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O.

65 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P.
66 Petition for Certiorari, Annex O, p. 5.

342

to the Court within thirty (30) days from receipt hereof. The
necessary medical examination/s and/or procedure/s as
determined the said doctor/s shall be undertaken at PGH or any
government hospital, which the medical team may deem to have
the appropriate, suitable and/or modern equipment or medical
apparatus and competent personnel to undertake the procedure/s,

ALL AT THE PERSONAL EXPENSE OF ACCUSED JUAN
PONCE ENRILE. Pending the completion of the aforesaid
medical examination/s and/or procedure/s and submission of the
required report and recommendation, accused Juan Ponce Enrile
is allowed to remain at the Philippine National Police General
Hospital subject to conditions earlier imposed by the Court in its
Resolution dated July 9, 2014.
SO ORDERED.67

These are standing orders of the Sandiganbayan that
authorize accused to be brought to any hospital
immediately if he exhibits symptoms that cannot be treated
at the Philippine National Police General Hospital subject
only to reportorial requirements to the court. In granting
bail to petitioner, we are, in effect, declaring that the
Sandiganbayan’s decisions in relation to its supervision of
the accused’s detention were tainted with grave abuse of
discretion.
However, these orders were not the subject of this
Petition for Certiorari.
To the Sandiganbayan, based upon the facts as
presented to it, accused does not seem to be suffering from
a unique debilitating disease whose treatment cannot be
provided for by our detention facilities and temporary
hospital arrest in accordance with their order. How the
majority arrived at a conclusion different from the
Sandiganbayan has not been thoroughly explained.
Neither did this issue become the subject of intense
discussion by the parties through their pleadings.
_______________
67 Petition for Certiorari, Annex P, pp. 2-3.

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It is unclear whether this privilege would apply to all

those who have similar conditions and are also undergoing
trial for plunder. It is unclear whether petitioner’s
incarceration aggravates his medical conditions or if his
medical conditions are simply conditions which come with

advanced age.
The majority has not set specific bases for finding that
the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to
treatment different from all those who are now under
detention and undergoing trial for plunder. There is no
showing as to how grave his conditions are in relation to
the facilities that are made available to him. There is also
no showing as to whether any of his medical ailments is
actually aggravating in spite of the best care available. If
his health is deteriorating, there is no showing that it is his
detention that is the most significant factor or cause for
such deterioration.
Usually, when there is a medical emergency that would
make detention in the hospital necessary, courts do not
grant bail. They merely modify the conditions for the
accused’s detention. There is now no clarity as to when
special bail based on medical conditions and modified
arrest should be imposed.
Finally, there is no guidance as to whether this special
bail based on medical condition is applicable only to those
of advanced age and whether that advanced age is beyond
90 or 91 years old. There is no guidance as to whether this
is applicable only to cases involving plunder. There is no
guidance in the majority’s opinion as to whether this is
only applicable to the medical conditions or stature or titles
of petitioner.
The majority has perilously set an unstated if not
ambiguous standard for the special grant of bail on the
ground of medical conditions.
Bail is not a matter of right merely for medical reasons.
In People v. Fitzgerald:68
_______________
68 536 Phil. 413; 505 SCRA 573 (2006) [Per J. Austria-Martinez, First
Division].

344

Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee or prisoner

needing medical care outside the prison facility. A mere claim of
illness is not a ground for bail. It may be that the trend now is for
courts to permit bail for prisoners who are seriously sick. There
may also be an existing proposition for the “selective
decarceration of older prisoners” based on findings that recidivism
rates decrease as age increases.69

VII

Neither is there clarity in the majority opinion as to the
conditions for this special kind of bail. Thus, the majority
asserts:
It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to

Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in
his adequate preparation of his defense but, more importantly,
will guarantee his appearance in court for the trial.70

Before the ink used to write and print the majority
opinion and this dissent has dried, friends, family, and
colleagues of petitioner already strongly predict that he
would report immediately for work. This strongly indicates
that the majority’s
_______________
69 Id., at p. 428; pp. 585-586, citing Release of Accused by Judge Muro
in Non-Bailable Offense, 419 Phil. 567, 581; 367 SCRA 285, 299 (2001)
[Per Curiam, En Banc], People v. Gako, Jr., 401 Phil. 514, 541; 348 SCRA
334, 352 (2000) [Per J. Gonzaga-Reyes, Third Division], Pineda, Ernesto,
The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, p. 193 (2003), which in turn
cited De la Rama v. People’s Court, supra note 63, Archer’s case, 6 Gratt
705, Ex parte Smith, 2 Okla. Crim. Rep. 24, 99 Pfc. 893, and Max
Rothman, Burton Dunlop, and Pamela Entzel, Elders, Crime and The
Criminal Justice System, pp. 233-234 (2000).

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inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating

illnesses may have been too speculative or premature.
Significantly, there is no guidance to the
Sandiganbayan as to whether bail then can be cancelled
motu propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to
whether that motion to cancel bail should be filed before
the Sandiganbayan or before this court.
The crime charged in petitioner’s case is one where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua. The Constitution
and our rules require that bail can only be granted after
granting the prosecution the opportunity to prove that
evidence of guilt is strong. The special grant of bail, due to
medical conditions, is unique, extraordinary, and
exceptional. To allow petitioner to go about his other duties
would be to blatantly flaunt a violation of the provisions of
the Constitution and our rules.
In other words, there is no rule on whether the grant of
provisional liberty on the basis of humanitarian
considerations extends even after the medical emergency
has passed. Again, a case of a decision especially tailored
for petitioner.

VIII

There is no evidentiary basis for the determination of
P1,000,000.00 as the amount for bail. The original proposal
of the member in charge was P100,000.00. This was
increased to P500,000.00 in its revised proposal circulated
on August 14, 2015. Then, upon the request of one member
who voted with the majority, it was then increased to
P1,000,000.00.
The rules guide courts on what to consider when setting
the amount of bail.71 The majority opinion is sparse on the
evidence it
_______________
71 See Rev. Rules of Crim. Proc., Rule 114, Sec. 9, which states:
SEC. 9. Amount of bail; guidelines.—The judge who issued the
warrant or granted the application shall fix a reasonable

346

considers for setting this particular amount. Again, the

more prudent course of action would have been for the
Sandiganbayan, not this court, to exercise its discretion in
setting the amount of bail.
IX

There are no specific and binding international law
provisions that compel this court to release petitioner given
his medical condition. The Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, relied upon in the majority opinion, is a general
declaration72 to uphold the value and dignity of every
person.73 It does not prohibit the arrest of any accused
based on lawful causes nor does it prohibit the detention of
any person accused of crimes. It only implies that any
arrest or detention must be carried out in a dignified and
humane manner.
_______________
amount of bail considering primarily, but not limited to, the following
factors:
(a) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;
(b) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(c) Penalty for the offense charged;
(d) Character and reputation of the accused;
(e) Age and health of the accused;
(f) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(g) Probability of the accused appearing at the trial;
(h) Forfeiture of other bail;
(i) The fact that the accused was a fugitive from justice when
arrested; and
(j) Pendency of other cases where the accused is on bail.
Excessive bail shall not be required.
72 In Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 454 Phil. 504, 545; 407 SCRA 10, 57
(2003) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], this court stated: “Although the
signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as a legally binding
document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the
Declaration as part of the generally accepted principles of international
law and binding on the State.”
73 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Art. 1 states that “[a]ll
human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.”

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The majority opinion cites Government of Hong Kong

Special Administrative Region v. Hon. Olalia, Jr.74 as basis
for the grant of bail on humanitarian reasons.75 However,
Government of Hong Kong does not apply to this case
because the issue was on whether bail could apply to
extradition cases. This court stated that because of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, whose principles
are now embodied in the Constitution, bail applies to all
instances where an accused is detained pending trial,
including administrative proceedings such as extradition.
This court, however, does not state that the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights mandates that bail must be
granted in instances where the accused is of advanced age
and frail health.
Petitioner’s remedies under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights that safeguard his fundamental right to
liberty are qualified by the Constitution. Article III, Section
13 of the Constitution clearly states that bail is available to
all persons before conviction “except those charged with
offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of
guilt is strong[.]” Even Article 29(2) of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the same document used by
the majority opinion, provides that:
(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall

be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely
for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the
rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in
a democratic society.

In any case, even this court in Government of Hong Kong
was wary to grant bail without evidence presented that the
accused was not a flight risk. For this reason, it remanded
_______________
74 550 Phil. 63, 72; 521 SCRA 470, 482 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, En Banc].
75 Ponencia, pp. 305-306.

348

the case to the trial court76 instead of applying the

provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and categorically stating that based on these principles
alone, the accused was entitled to bail.
It is true that the Constitution is replete with provisions
on both the respect for human dignity and the protection of
human rights. These rights are applicable to those who,
during the dark days of Martial Law, were illegally
detained, tortured, and even involuntarily disappeared.
There is, of course, no reason for these rights and the
invocation of human dignity not to be applicable to
Senators of our Republic.
However, the mere invocation of the broadest concept of
human rights is not shibboleth. It should not be cause for
us to be nonchalant about the existence of other
constitutional and statutory provisions and the norms in
our Rules of Court. The mere invocation of human rights
does not mean that the Rule of Law is suspended. It is not
a shortcut to arrive at the conclusion or result that we
want. Rather, human rights are best entrenched with the
Rule of Law. Suspending the applicability of clear legal
provisions upon the invocation of human rights compels
this court to do a more conscious and rigorous analysis of
how these provisions violate specific binding human rights
norms.
The majority opinion fails in this respect.
Liberty is indeed a cherished value. It is an intrinsic
part of our humanity to fight for it and ensure that it
allows all of us to lead the kind of lives that we will
consider meaningful.
_______________
76 See Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v.

Olalia, Jr., 550 Phil. 63, 77; 521 SCRA 470, 488 (2007) [Per J. Sandoval-
Gutierrez, En Banc]. The dispositive portion reads: “WHEREFORE, we
DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of
‘clear and convincing evidence.’ If not, the trial court should order the
cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter,
conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.”

349
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 349

This applies to petitioner as accused. Yet it also applies

with equal force to all the individuals in our communities
and in this society.
Our collective liberty, the kind that ensures our
individual and collective meaningful existence, is put at
risk if justice is wanting. Special privileges may be granted
only under clear, transparent, and reasoned circumstances.
Otherwise, we accept that there are just some among us
who are elite. Otherwise, we concede that there are those
among us who are powerful and networked enough to enjoy
privileges not shared by all.
This dissent rages against such a premise. It is filled
with discomfort with the consequences of the majority’s
position. It cannot accept any form of impunity.

X

Plunder is not the only crime statutorily punished with
the imposable penalty of reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment. Under the Revised Penal Code, the
following crimes, among others, carry this as maximum
penalty:
(1) Parricide;77
(2) Murder;78
(3) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention;79
(4) Robbery with homicide;80
(5) Robbery with rape;81

_______________
77 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 246.

78 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 248, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993),
Sec. 6, and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
79 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 267, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659 (1993),
Sec. 8, and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
80 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993), Sec. 9.
81 Id.

350

(6) Robbery with serious physical injuries;82

(7) Attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide;83
(8) Rape;84
(9) Rape of children under 12 years old;85
(10) Sexual assault;86 and
(11) Incestuous rape.87

Under special laws, the following crimes, among others,
carry the maximum penalty of life imprisonment or
reclusion perpetua:
(1) Carnapping with homicide or rape;88
(2) Sale of illegal drugs regardless of quantity and
purity;89
(3) Illegal possession of 10 grams or more of heroin, 10
grams or more of cocaine, 50 grams or more of shabu, 500
grams or more of marijuana, or 10 grams or more of
ecstasy;90
(4) Illegal possession of 10 grams to less than 50 grams
of shabu;91
_______________
82 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 294(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993), Sec. 9.
83 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 297.
84 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A, as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
85 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(1)(d), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
86 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-A(2), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
87 Rev. Pen. Code, Art. 266-B(1), as amended by Rep. Act No. 8353
(1997), Sec. 2.
88 Rep. Act No. 6539 (1972), Sec. 14, as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659
(1993), Sec. 20 and Rep. Act No. 9346 (2006), Sec. 1.
89 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 5.
90 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 1st par. (3)(4)(5)(7)(8).
91 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (1).

351
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 351
(5) Illegal possession of 5 grams to less than 10 grams of

heroin, cocaine, shabu, or ecstasy;92
(6) Child prostitution;93
(7) Child trafficking;94
(8) Forcing a street child or any child to beg or to use
begging as a means of living;95
(9) Forcing a street child or any child to be a conduit in
drug trafficking or pushing;96
(10) Forcing a street child or any child to commit any
illegal activities;97 and
(11) Murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and
serious physical injuries of a child under 12 years old.98

If we are to take judicial notice of anything, then it
should be that there are those accused of murder,
trafficking, sale of dangerous drugs, incestuous rape, rape
of minors, multiple counts of rape, or even serious illegal
detention who languish in overcrowded detention facilities
all over our country. We know this because the members of
this court encounter them through cases appealed on a
daily basis. Many of them suffer from diseases that they
may have contracted because of the conditions of their jails.
But they and their families cannot afford hospitals better
than what government can provide them. After all, they
remain in jail because they may not have the resources to
launch a full-scale legal offensive marked with the
creativity of well-networked defense counsel. After all,
_______________
92 Rep. Act No. 9165 (2002), Sec. 11, 2nd par. (2).
93 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 5.
94 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 7.
95 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(1).
96 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(2).
97 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10(e)(3).
98 Rep. Act No. 7610 (1992), Sec. 10.

352

they may have committed acts driven by the twin evils of

greed or lust on one hand and poverty on the other hand.
For them, there are no special privileges. The
application of the law to them is often brute, banal, and
canonical. Theirs is textbook equal treatment by courts.
Our precedents show that when there are far less
powerful, less fortunate, poorer accused, this court has had
no difficulty denying a motion to fix bail or motion to set
bail where the crime charged carries the imposable penalty
of reclusion perpetua. With less powerful accused, we have
had no difficulty reading the plain meaning of Article III,
Section 13 of the Constitution. With those who are less
fortunate in life, there are no exceptions.
Petitioner in this case is unbelievably more fortunate.
There is a right, just, and legal way to do things for the
right, just, and legal result. In my view, it is not right, just,
and legal to grant bail, even for P1,000,000.00, without
clearly articulating why the Sandiganbayan’s actions were
arbitrary, capricious, and whimsical.
In truth, the Sandiganbayan acted in accordance with
law and with sufficient compassion. It did not gravely
abuse its discretion. Thus, this Petition should be
dismissed.

XI

Those that read a decision which does not fully respond
to the legal issues outlined in this dissent may be tempted
to conclude that the decision is the result of obvious
political accommodation rather than a judicious
consideration of the facts and the law. This case may
benefit one powerful public official at the cost of weakening
our legal institutions. If it is pro hac vice, then it amounts
to selective justice. If it is meant to apply in a blanket
manner for all other detainees, then it will weaken the
administration of justice because the judicial standards are
not clear.

353
VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 353

Without further clarity, our signal to the various

divisions of the Sandiganbayan hearing these complex and
politically laden plunder cases can be misinterpreted.
Rather than apply the Rule of Law without fear or favor,

the sitting justices will become more sensitive to the
demands of those who have political influence. After all, in
their minds, even if they do what is expected of them, this
court may still declare that the Sandiganbayan gravely
abused its discretion.
The granting of bail is a judicial function circumscribed
within the bounds of the Constitution. Our duty is to
ensure the realization of the Rule of Law even in difficult
cases. This case does not really present any kind of legal
complexity if we blind ourselves as to who is involved. It is
complex only because it is political.
The grant of provisional liberty to petitioner without any
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is strong
violates the clear and unambiguous text of the
Constitution. It may be that, as citizens, we have our own
opinions on or predilections for how the balance of
fundamental rights, liberties, and obligations should be. It
may be that, as citizens, such opinions are founded on our
wealth of knowledge and experience.
But, as members of this court, our duty is to enforce the
exact textual formulation of the fundamental document
written and ratified by the sovereign. This fealty to the text
of the Constitution will provide us with a stable anchor
despite the potential political controversies that swirl over
the legal questions that we need to decide. It is also this
fealty to the text of the Constitution that gives this court
the legitimacy as the final bastion and the ultimate
sentinel of the Rule of Law.
As the apex of the judiciary, the very sentinels of the
Rule of Law, the court from whom all other courts — like
the Sandiganbayan — should find inspiration and courage,
we should apply the law squarely and without fear or favor.
We should have collectively carried the burden of doing
justice properly and denied this Petition.

354

Indeed, mercy and compassion temper justice. However,

mercy and compassion should never replace justice. There
is injustice when we, as the court of last resort,
conveniently rid ourselves of the burden of enforcing the
Rule of Law by neglecting to do the kind of rigorous,
deliberate, and conscious analysis of the issues raised by

the parties. There is injustice when we justify the result we
want with ambiguous and unclear standards.
Compassion as an excuse for injustice not only fails us
as justices of this court. It also fails us in our own
humanity.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the Petition. The
Motion to Fix Bail should be treated by the Sandiganbayan
as a petition for bail under Rule 114, Section 5 of the Rules
of Court.
Petition granted, resolutions of Sandiganbayan (Third

Division) annulled and set aside.
Notes.—After a judgment of conviction has been

rendered by the trial court and cancellation of the bail bond
of the accused, his appropriate remedy against the court’s
order cancelling his bond is by filing with the Court of
Appeals a motion to review the said order in the same
regular appeal proceedings, as an incident of his appeal —
the filing of a separate petition via a special civil action or
special proceeding questioning such adverse order before
the appellate court is proscribed. (Chua vs. Court of
Appeals, 520 SCRA 729 [2007])
Under the present rule, the grant of bail is a matter of
discretion upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment; The allowance of bail pending appeal should
be exercised not with laxity but with grave caution and
only for strong reasons, considering that the accused has
been in fact convicted by the trial court. (Qui vs. People,
682 SCRA 94 [2012])

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Enrile Vs Sandiganbayan

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10/27/2018 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 767 Copy

G.R. No. 213847. August 18, 2015.*

Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Presumption of

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 283

with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with

imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the

284 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

lated the conditions of his bail without valid justification; (c)

is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 285

strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of the

service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should

286 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Sandiganbayan or in the pleadings filed before this court. The

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 287

Same; Same; Same; View that the mandatory bail hearing is

288 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

phasis supplied) But this member endeavored to complete his

with cross-examination and authentication of Dr. Gonzales’

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 289

portunity to cross-examine the evidence, and without

that the medical condition of petitioner entitles him to treatment

290 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ity’s inference as to the existence of very serious debilitating

propio or upon motion. There is no guidance as to whether that

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 291

more prudent course of action would have been for the

in the majority opinion, is a general declaration to uphold the

invocation of the broadest concept of human rights is not

invocation of human rights compels this court to do a more

SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 293

Estelito P. Mendoza, Susan A. Mendoza, Lorenzo G.

1 See Lindermayer, Ariana, What the Right Hand Gives: Prohibitive

294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

filed his Omnibus Motion5 and Supplemental Opposition,6

4 Id., at pp. 107-108.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 295

July 8, 2014.13 In support of the motions, Enrile argued

296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

x x x [F]or purposes of bail, the presence of mitigating

A. Before judgment of the

14 Id., at pp. 84-88.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 297

convicted, is punishable by reclusion perpetua;

16 Id., at pp. 16-19.

298 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

bail considers the imposable penalty, regardless of the

18 Section 14(2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 299

onciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s

x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by

300 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Enrile vs. Sandiganbayan (Third Division)

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before

26 Government of the United States of America v. Purganan, supra

VOL. 767, AUGUST 18, 2015 301

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary:

29 Section 5, paragraph 1, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.

302 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

sional liberty.” It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot

x x x Even before its pronouncement in the Lim case, this