G.R. No.
L-30389 December 27, 1972 order of award of the Director of Lands the Undersecretary of Agriculture and Natural
PEDRO LEE HONG HOK, SIMEON LEE HONG HOK, ROSITA LEE HONG HOK and LEONCIO LEE
HONG HOK, petitioners,
vs.
ANIANO DAVID, THE HON. SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Augusto A. Pardalis for petitioners.
Luis General, Jr. for respondent Aniano David.
Office of the Solicitor General for other respondents.
FERNANDO, J.:p
Petitioners 1 in this appeal by certiorari would have us reverse a decision of respondent
Court of Appeals affirming a lower court judgment dismissing their complaint to have the
Torrens Title 2 of respondent Aniano David declared null and void. What makes the task for
petitioners quite difficult is that their factual support for their pretension to ownership of
such disputed lot through accretion was rejected by respondent Court of Appeals. Without
such underpinning, they must perforce rely on a legal theory, which, to put it mildly, is
distinguished by unorthodoxy and is therefore far from persuasive. A grant by the
government through the appropriate public officials 3 exercising the competence duly
vested in them by law is not to be set at naught on the premise, unexpressed but implied,
that land not otherwise passing into private ownership may not be disposed of by the state.
Such an assumption is at war with settled principles of constitutional law. It cannot receive
our assent. We affirm.
The decision of respondent Court of Appeals following that of the lower court makes clear
that there is no legal justification for nullifying the right of respondent Aniano David to the
disputed lot arising from the grant made in his favor by respondent officials. As noted in the
decision under review, he "acquired lawful title thereby pursuant to his miscellaneous sales
application in accordance with which an order of award and for issuance of a sales patent
was made by the Director of Lands on June 18, 1958, covering Lot 2892 containing an area of
226 square meters, which is a portion of Lot 2863 of the Naga Cadastre. On the basis of the
Resources issued on August 26, 1959, Miscellaneous Sales Patent No. V-1209 pursuant to
which OCT No. 510 was issued by the Register of Deeds of Naga City to defendant-appellee
Aniano David on October 21, 1959. According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of
the sales application of Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said
application, up to the actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the plaintiffs-appellants
did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to them because after
the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of title based on a
public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under the operation of
Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein.... Under Section 38 of Act
496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on fraud should be
raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent. Thereafter the certificate
of title based thereon becomes indefeasible.... In this case the land in question is not a
private property as the Director of Lands and the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources have always sustained the public character thereof for having been formed by
reclamation.... The only remedy therefore, available to the appellants is an action for
reconveyance on the ground of fraud. In this case we do not see any fraud committed by
defendant-appellant Aniano David in applying for the purchase of the land involved through
his Miscellaneous Sales Application No. MSA-V-26747, entered in the records of the Bureau
of Lands [Miscellaneous Sales] Entry No. V-9033, because everything was done in the open.
The notices regarding the auction sale of the land were published, the actual sale and award
thereof to Aniano David were not clandestine but open and public official acts of an officer
of the Government. The application was merely a renewal of his deceased wife's application,
and the said deceased occupied the land since 1938." 4
On such finding of facts, the attempt of petitioners to elicit a different conclusion is likely to
be attended with frustration. The first error assigned predicated an accretion having taken
place, notwithstanding its rejection by respondent Court of Appeals, would seek to disregard
what was accepted by respondent Court as to how the disputed lot came into being, namely
by reclamation. It does not therefore call for any further consideration. Neither of the other
two errors imputed to respondent Court, as to its holding that authoritative doctrines
preclude a party other than the government to dispute the validity of a grant and the
recognition of the indefeasible character of a public land patent after one year, is possessed
of merit. Consequently, as set forth at the outset, there is no justification for reversal.
1. More specifically, the shaft of criticism was let loose by petitioner aimed at this legal
proposition set forth in the exhaustive opinion of then Justice Salvador Esguerra of the Court
of Appeals, now a member of this Court: "There is, furthermore, a fatal defect of parties to
this action. Only the Government, represented by the Director of Lands, or the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, can bring an action to cancel a void certificate of title
issued pursuant to a void patent (Lucas vs. Durian, 102 Phil. 1157; Director of Lands vs. Heirs
of Ciriaco Carlo, G.R. No. L-12485, July 31, 1959). This was not done by said officers but by
private parties like the plaintiffs, who cannot claim that the patent and title issued for the
land involved are void since they are not the registered owners thereof nor had they been
declared as owners in the cadastral proceedings of Naga Cadastre after claiming it as their
private property. The cases cited by appellants are not in point as they refer to private
registered lands or public lands over which vested rights have been acquired but
notwithstanding such fact the Land Department subsequently granted patents to public land
applicants."5 Petitioner ought to have known better. The above excerpt is invulnerable to
attack. It is a restatement of a principle that dates back to Maninang v. Consolacion, 6 a 1908
decision. As was there categorically stated: "The fact that the grant was made by the
government is undisputed. Whether the grant was in conformity with the law or not is a
question which the government may raise, but until it is raised by the government and set
aside, the defendant can not question it. The legality of the grant is a question between the
grantee and the government."7 The above citation was repeated ipsissimis verbis in Salazar
v. Court of Appeals.8 Bereft as petitioners were of the right of ownership in accordance with
the findings of the Court of Appeals, they cannot, in the language of Reyes v.
Rodriguez, 9 "question the [title] legally issued." 10 The second assignment of error is thus
disposed of.
2. As there are overtones indicative of skepticism, if not of outright rejection, of the well-
known distinction in public law between the government authority possessed by the state
which is appropriately embraced in the concept of sovereignty, and its capacity to own or
acquire property, it is not inappropriate to pursue the matter further. The former comes
under the heading of imperium and the latter of dominium. The use of this term is
appropriate with reference to lands held by the state in its proprietary character. In such
capacity, it may provide for the exploitation and use of lands and other natural resources,
including their disposition, except as limited by the Constitution. Dean Pound did speak of
the confusion that existed during the medieval era between such two concepts, but did note
the existence of res publicae as a corollary to dominium." 11 As far as the Philippines was
concerned, there was a recognition by Justice Holmes in Cariño v. Insular Government, 12 a
case of Philippine origin, that "Spain in its earlier decrees embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown...." 13That was a manifestation of the
concept of jura regalia, 14 which was adopted by the present Constitution, ownership
however being vested in the state as such rather than the head thereof. What was stated by
Holmes served to confirm a much more extensive discussion of the matter in the leading
case of Valenton v. Murciano, 15 decided in 1904. One of the royal decrees cited was
incorporated in the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias 16 in these words: "We having
acquired full sovereignty over the Indies and all lands, territories, and possessions not
heretofore ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to
the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands which are held without proper and
true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys audiences, and governors may seem
necessary for public squares, ways, pastures, and commons in those places which are
peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but also their future and
their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for
tillage and pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of
as we may wish." 17
It could therefore be affirmed in Montano v. Insular Government" 18 that "as to the
unappropriated public lands constituting the public domain the sole power of legislation is
vested in Congress, ..." 19 They continue to possess that character until severed therefrom
by state grant. 20 Where, as in this case, it was found by the Court of Appeals that the
disputed lot was the result of reclamation, its being correctly categorized as public land is
undeniable. 21 What was held in Heirs of Datu Pendatun v. Director of Lands 22 finds
application. Thus: "There being no evidence whatever that the property in question was ever
acquired by the applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
Government or by possessory information title or by any other means for the acquisition of
public lands, the property must be held to be public domain." 23 For it is well-settled "that
no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied,
from the government." 24 It is indispensable then that there be a showing of a title from the
state or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law. 25 The most recent restatement of
the doctrine, found in an opinion of Justice J.B.L. Reyes, follows: 26 "The applicant, having
failed to establish his right or title over the northern portion of Lot No. 463 involved in the
present controversy, and there being no showing that the same has been acquired by any
private person from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, the property is and
remains part of the public domain." 27 To repeat, the second assignment of error is devoid
of merit.
3. The last error assigned would take issue with this portion of the opinion of Justice
Esguerra: "According to the Stipulation of Facts, since the filing of the sales application of
Aniano David and during all the proceedings in connection with said application, up to the
actual issuance of the sales patent in his favor, the
plaintiffs-appellants did not put up any opposition or adverse claim thereto. This is fatal to
them because after the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate
of title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically comes under
the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards provided therein ... Under
Section 38 of Act 496 any question concerning the validity of the certificate of title based on
fraud should be raised within one year from the date of the issuance of the patent.
Thereafter the certificate of title based thereon becomes indefeasible ..." 28 Petitioners
cannot reconcile themselves to the view that respondent David's title is impressed with the
quality of indefeasibility. In thus manifesting such an attitude, they railed to accord
deference to controlling precedents. As far back as 1919, in Aquino v. Director of
Lands, 29 Justice Malcolm, speaking for the Court, stated: "The proceedings under the Land
Registration Law and under the provisions of Chapter VI of the Public Land Law are the same
in that both are against the whole world, both take the nature of judicial proceedings, and
for both the decree of registration issued is conclusive and final." 30 Such a view has been
followed since then. 31 The latest case in point is Cabacug v. Lao. 32 There is this revealing
excerpt appearing in that decision: "It is said, and with reason, that a holder of a land
acquired under a free patent is more favorably situated than that of an owner of registered
property. Not only does a free patent have a force and effect of a Torrens Title, but in
addition the person to whom it is granted has likewise in his favor the right to repurchase
within a period of five years." 33 It is quite apparent, therefore, that petitioners' stand is
legally indefensible.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals of January 31, 1969 and its
resolution of March 14, 1969 are affirmed. With costs against petitioners-appellants.
Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Teehankee Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio and
Esguerra, JJ., concur.
[G. R. No. 107764. October 4, 2002]
EDNA COLLADO, BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO C. TORRES, JOSE AMO, SERGIO L.
MONTEALEGRE, VICENTE C. TORRES, JOSEPH L. NUEZ, GLORIA SERRANO, DANILO
FABREGAS, FERNANDO T. TORRES, LUZ G. TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD T. TUTANA,
JOSE C. TORRES, JR., IMELDA CAYLALUAD, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS,
MYRNA M. LANCION, NORBERTO CAMILOTE, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO
BRIONES, REMEDIOS BANTIGUE, DANTE L. MONTEALEGRE, AIDA T. GADON,
ARMANDO T. TORRES and FIDELITO ECO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru the Director of Lands, respondents,
BOCKASANJO ISF AWARDEES ASSOCIATION, INC., LITA MENDOZA, MORADO PREFIDIGNO,
TERESITA CRUZ and CALOMA MOISES, respondents/intervernors.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This Petition[1] seeks to set aside the Decision of the Court of Appeals, [2] dated June 22,
1992, in CA-G.R. SP No. 25597, which declared null and void the Decision [3] dated January 30,
1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No.
N-59179, confirming the imperfect title of petitioners over a parcel of land.
The Facts
On April 25, 1985, petitioner Edna T. Collado filed with the land registration court an
application for registration of a parcel of land with an approximate area of 1,200,766 square
meters or 120.0766 hectares (Lot for brevity). The Lot is situated in Barangay San Isidro
(formerly known as Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal, and covered by Survey Plan Psu-
162620. Attached to the application was the technical description of the Lot as Lot Psu-
162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division, Bureau of
Lands, which stated, [t]his survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed. On March 24, 1986,
petitioner Edna T. Collado filed an Amended Application to include additional co-applicants.
[4]
Subsequently, more applicants joined (collectively referred to as petitioners for brevity). [5]
The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, and the Municipality of
Antipolo, through its Municipal Attorney and the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, filed oppositions
to petitioners application. In due course, the land registration court issued an order of
general default against the whole world with the exception of the oppositors.
Petitioners alleged that they have occupied the Lot since time immemorial. Their
possession has been open, public, notorious and in the concept of owners. The Lot was
surveyed in the name of Sesinando Leyva, one of their predecessors-in-interest, as early as
March 22, 1902.Petitioners declared the Lot for taxation purposes and paid all the
corresponding real estate taxes. According to them, there are now twenty-five co-owners in
pro-indiviso shares of five hectares each. During the hearings, petitioners submitted
evidence to prove that there have been nine transfers of rights among them and their
predecessors-in-interest, as follows:
1. SESINANDO LEYVA was the earliest known predecessor-in-interest of the
Applicants who was in actual, open, notorious and continuous possession of
the property in the concept of owner. He had the property surveyed in his
name on 22 March 1902 (Exhibit W and W-1 testimonies of J. Torres on 16
December 1987 and Mariano Leyva on 29 December 1987).
2. DIOSDADO LEYVA, is the son of Sesinando Leyva, who inherited the
property. He had the property resurveyed in his name on May 21-28,
1928 (Exhibit X and X-1; testimony of Mariano Leyva, a son of Diosdado Leyva).
3. GREGORIO CAMANTIQUE bought the property from Diosdado Leyva before the
Japanese Occupation of the Philippines during World War II.He owned
and possessed the property until 1958. He declared the property for tax
purposes, the latest of which was under Tax Declaration No. 7182 issued on 3
February 1957 (Exhibit I and testimony of Mariano Leyva, supra).
4. ANGELINA REYNOSO, bought the property from Gregorio Camantique by virtue
of a Deed of Sale on 3 February 1958 (Exhibit H). During the ownership of the
property by Angelina Reynoso, Mariano Leyva the grandson of Sesinando
Leyva, the previous owner, attended to the farm. (Testimony of Mariano Leyva,
supra). Angelina Reynoso declared the property in her name under Tax
Declaration No. 7189 in 4 February 1958, under Tax Declaration No. 8775 on 3
August 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 16945 on 15 December 1975, and
under Tax Declaration No. 03-06145 on 25 June 1978.
5. MYRNA TORRES bought the property from Angelina Reynoso on 16 October
1982 through a Deed of Sale (Exhibit G).
6. EDNA COLLADO bought the property from Myrna Torres in a Deed of
Sale dated 28 April 1984 (Exhibit P-1 to P-3).
7. Additional owners BERNARDINA TAWAS, JORETO TORRES, JOSE AMO, VICENTE
TORRES and SERGIO MONTEALEGRE who bought portions of
the property from Edna Collado through a Deed of Sale on 6 November
1985 (Exhibit Q to Q-3).
8. And more additional Owners JOSEPH NUNEZ, DIOSDADO ARENOS, DANILO
FABREGAS, FERNANDO TORRES, LUZ TUBUNGBANUA, CARIDAD TUTANA, JOSE
TORRES JR., RODRIGO TUTANA, ROSALIE TUTANA, NORMA ASTORIAS, MYRNA
LANCION, CHONA MARCIANO, CECILIA MACARANAS, PEDRO BRIONES,
REMEDIOS BANTIQUE, DANTE MONTEALEGRE, ARMANDO TORRES, AIDA
GADON and AMELIA M. MALAPAD bought portions of the property in a Deed of
Sale on 12 May 1986 (Exhibit S to S-3).
9. Co-owners DIOSDADO ARENOS, RODRIGO TUTANA, CHONA MARCIANO and
AMELIA MALAPAD jointly sold their shares to new OWNERS GLORIA R.
SERRANO, IMELDA CAYLALUAD, NORBERTO CAMILOTE and FIDELITO ECO
through a Deed of Sale dated 18 January 1987 (Exhibit T to T-9). [6]
During the hearing on January 9, 1991, only the assistant provincial prosecutor
appeared without the Solicitor General. For failure of the oppositors to present their
evidence, the land registration court issued an order considering the case submitted for
decision based on the evidence of the petitioners. The court later set aside the order and
reset the hearing to January 14, 1991 for the presentation of the evidence of the
oppositors. On this date, counsel for oppositors failed to appear again despite due
notice. Hence, the court again issued an order submitting the case for decision based on the
evidence of the petitioners.
The Trial Courts Ruling
After appraisal of the evidence submitted by petitioners, the land registration court
held that petitioners had adduced sufficient evidence to establish their registrable rights
over the Lot. Accordingly, the court rendered a decision confirming the imperfect title of
petitioners. We quote the pertinent portions of the courts decision, as follows:
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that from the testimony of the witnesses
presented by the Applicants, the property applied for is in actual, open, public and notorious
possession by the applicants and their predecessor-in-interest since time immemorial and
said possession had been testified to by witnesses Jimmy Torres, Mariano Leyva, Sergio
Montealegre, Jose Amo and one Chona who were all cross-examined by Counsel for
Oppositor Republic of the Philippines.
Evidence was likewise presented that said property was declared for taxation purposes in
the names of the previous owners and the corresponding taxes were paid by the Applicants
and the previous owners and said property was planted to fruit bearing trees; portions to
palay and portions used for grazing purposes.
To the mind of the Court, Applicants have presented sufficient evidence to establish
registrable title over said property applied for by them.
On the claim that the property applied for is within the Marikina Watershed, the Court can
only add that all Presidential Proclamations like the Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed are subject to private rights.
In the case of Municipality of Santiago vs. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 734, 1983 private
rights is proof of acquisition through (sic) among means of acquisition of public lands.
In the case of Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 193-195, by private rights means that
applicant should show clear and convincing evidence that the property in question was
acquired by applicants or their ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish
government or by Possessory Information title, or any other means for the acquisition of
public lands xxx (underscoring supplied).
The Court believes that from the evidence presented as above stated, Applicants have
acquired private rights to which the Presidential Proclamation setting aside the Marikina
Watershed should be subject to such private rights.
At any rate, the Court notes that evidence was presented by the applicants that as per
Certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1980, the area
applied for was verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of the Marikina
Watershed Lands Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation No. 1283
promulgated on June 21, 1974 which established the Boso-boso Town Site Reservation,
amended by Proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as the Lungsod Silangan
Townsite Reservation. (Exhibit K).[7]
In a motion dated April 5, 1991, received by the Solicitor General on April 6, 1991,
petitioners alleged that the decision dated January 30, 1991 confirming their title had
become final after the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on February 18,
1991. Petitioners prayed that the land registration court order the Land Registration
Authority to issue the necessary decree in their favor over the Lot.
On April 11, 1991, the Solicitor General inquired from the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal
whether the land registration court had already rendered a decision and if so, whether the
Provincial Prosecutor would recommend an appeal. However, the Provincial Prosecutor
failed to answer the query.
According to the Solicitor General, he received on April 23, 1991 a copy of the land
registration courts decision dated January 30, 1991, and not on February 18, 1991 as alleged
by petitioners in their motion.
In the meantime, on May 7, 1991, the land registration court issued an order directing
the Land Regulation Authority to issue the corresponding decree of registration in favor of
the petitioners.
On August 6, 1991, the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for
Annulment of Judgment pursuant to Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 on the ground that there
had been no clear showing that the Lot had been previously classified as alienable and
disposable making it subject to private appropriation.
On November 29, 1991, Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of
holders of certificates of stewardship issued by the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR for brevity) under its Integrated Social Forestry Program (ISF for brevity),
filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Petition-In-
Intervention. They likewise opposed the registration and asserted that the Lot, which is
situated inside the Marikina Watershed Reservation, is inalienable. They claimed that they
are the actual occupants of the Lot pursuant to the certificates of stewardship issued by the
DENR under the ISF for tree planting purposes.
The Court of Appeals granted the motion to intervene verbally during the preliminary
conference held on April 6, 1992. During the preliminary conference, all the parties as
represented by their respective counsels agreed that the only issue for resolution was
whether the Lot in question is part of the public domain. [8]
The Court of Appeals Ruling
In a decision dated June 22, 1992, the Court of Appeals granted the petition and
declared null and void the decision dated January 30, 1991 of the land registration court.
The Court of Appeals explained thus:
Under the Regalian Doctrine, which is enshrined in the 1935 (Art. XIII, Sec. 1), 1973 (Art. XIV,
Sec. 8), and 1987 Constitution (Art. XII, Sec. 2), all lands of the public domain belong to the
State. An applicant, like the private respondents herein, for registration of a parcel of land
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the land sought to be registered
forms part of the public domain (Director of Lands vs. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296).
A positive Act of government is needed to declassify a public land and to convert it into
alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes (Republic vs. Bacas, 176 SCRA
376).
In the case at bar, the private respondents failed to present any evidence whatsoever that
the land applied for as described in Psu-162620 has been segregated from the bulk of the
public domain and declared by competent authority to be alienable and disposable. Worse,
the technical description of Psu-162620 signed by Robert C. Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge,
Survey Division, Bureau of Lands, which was attached to the application of private
respondents, categorically stated that "This survey is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed."
That the land in question is within the Marikina Watershed Reservation is confirmed by the
Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds in a Report, dated March 2, 1988,
submitted to the respondent Court in LR Case No. 269-A. These documents readily and
effectively negate the allegation in private respondent Collados application that said parcel
of land known as Psu-162620 is not covered by any form of title, nor any public land
application and are not within any government reservation (Par. 8, Application; Emphasis
supplied). The respondent court could not have missed the import of these vital documents
which are binding upon the courts inasmuch as it is the exclusive prerogative of the
Executive Department to classify public lands. They should have forewarned the respondent
judge from assuming jurisdiction over the case.
x x x inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part of the public domain,
it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same (subject to the
approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not the courts. x x x
Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties surveyed even before the same
was declared to be part of the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so
converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that this action must
fail. Forest lands are inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert
the same into private property. And courts are without jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within
the forest zone. (Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals. 172 SCRA 563; Emphasis supplied).
Needless to say, a final judgment may be annulled on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, fraud
or that it is contrary to law (Panlilio vs. Garcia, 119 SCRA 387, 391) and a decision rendered
without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time (Suarez vs. Court of
Appeals, 186 SCRA 339).[9]
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioners are restated as follows:
I
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REVERSING THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT GRANTING THE APPLICATION OF THE
PETITIONERS FOR CONFIRMATION OF TITLE;
II
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT FILED BY THE REPUBLIC
LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL;
III
WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED OR GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN GIVING
DUE COURSE TO THE INTERVENORS PETITION FOR INTERVENTION WHICH WAS FILED OUT
OF TIME OR LONG AFTER THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT HAD BECOME FINAL.
The Courts Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
First Issue: whether petitioners have registrable title over the Lot.
There is no dispute that Executive Order No. 33 (EO 33 for brevity) dated July 26,
1904[10] established the Marikina Watershed Reservation (MWR for brevity) situated in the
Municipality of Antipolo, Rizal. Petitioners even concede that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-
162620, is inside the technical, literal description of the MWR. However, the main thrust of
petitioners claim over the Lot is that all Presidential proclamations like the proclamation
setting aside the Marikina Watershed Reservation are subject to private rights. They point
out that EO 33 contains a saving clause that the reservations are subject to existing private
rights, if any there be. Petitioners contend that their claim of ownership goes all the way
back to 1902, when their known predecessor-in-interest, Sesinando Leyva, laid claim and
ownership over the Lot. They claim that the presumption of law then prevailing under the
Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926 was that the land possessed and claimed
by individuals as their own are agricultural lands and therefore alienable and
disposable. They conclude that private rights were vested on Sesinando Leyva before the
issuance of EO 33, thus excluding the Lot from the Marikina Watershed Reservation.
 Petitioners arguments find no basis in law.
The Regalian Doctrine: An Overview
Under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. [11] The Spaniards first introduced the
doctrine to the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas,
specifically, Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las
Indias[12] which laid the foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the
Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain. [13] Upon the
Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in the
Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. [14]
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law
of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and
deeds as well as possessory claims. The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law partly
amended the Mortgage Law as well as the Law of the Indies. The Maura Law was the last
Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines. It required the adjustment or registration
of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands would revert to the state. [15]
Four years later, Spain ceded to the government of the United States all rights, interests
and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands through the Treaty of Paris of
December 10, 1898. In 1903, the United States colonial government, through the Philippine
Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, which was described as follows:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the
Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It
prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable
persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act
operated on the assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in
the government; and that the governments title to public land sprung from the Treaty of
Parisand other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term public
land referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government
and are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands. [16]
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Public
Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private individuals of lands creates the legal
presumption that the lands are alienable and disposable.
Act 2874, the second Public Land Act, superseded Act No. 926 in 1919. After the
passage of the 1935 Constitution, Commonwealth Act No. 141 (CA 141 for brevity) amended
Act 2874 in 1936. CA 141, as amended, remains to this day as the existing general law
governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than timber
and mineral lands.[17]
In the meantime, in order to establish a system of registration by which recorded title
becomes absolute, indefeasible and imprescriptible, the legislature passed Act 496,
otherwise known as the Land Registration Act, which took effect on February 1, 1903. Act
496 placed all registered lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. [18] The Torrens
system requires the government to issue a certificate of title stating that the person named
in the title is the owner of the property described therein, subject to liens and
encumbrances annotated on the title or reserved by law. The certificate of title is
indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are quieted upon
issuance of the certificate.[19] PD 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree enacted
on June 11, 1978,[20] amended and updated Act 496.
The 1935, 1973, 1987 Philippine Constitutions
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting,
however, the state, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain.[21] Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion in Cruz vs. Secretary of
Environment and Natural Resources,[22] explained thus:
One of the fixed and dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the
nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the country. There was an
overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state ownership of
natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural
resources was seen as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the states power to
control their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization. The delegates to the
Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State ownership of land and
natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether
it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Thus, Section 1, Article XIII[23] of the 1935 Constitution, on Conservation and Utilization
of Natural Resources barred the alienation of all natural resources except public agricultural
lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. The 1973
Constitutionreiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV [24] on the National
Economy and the Patrimony of the Nation. The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian
doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII[25] on National Economy and Patrimony.
Both the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions prohibited the alienation of all natural resources
except agricultural lands of the public domain. The 1987 Constitution readopted this
policy. Indeed, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated in
the Philippine Constitution belong to the State.
Watershed Reservation is a Natural Resource
The term natural resource includes not only timber, gas, oil coal, minerals, lakes, and
submerged lands, but also, features which supply a human need and contribute to the
health, welfare, and benefit of a community, and are essential to the well-being thereof and
proper enjoyment of property devoted to park and recreational purposes. [26]
In Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, et al .,[27] the Court had
occasion to discourse on watershed areas. The Court resolved the issue of whether the
parcel of land which the Department of Environment and Natural Resources had assessed to
be a watershed area is exempt from the coverage of RA No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL for brevity). [28] The Court defined watershed as an area drained
by a river and its tributaries and enclosed by a boundary or divide which separates it from
adjacent watersheds. However, the Court also recognized that:
The definition does not exactly depict the complexities of a watershed. The most important
product of a watershed is water which is one of the most important human
necessit(ies). The protection of watershed ensures an adequate supply of water for future
generations and the control of flashfloods that not only damage property but also cause loss
of lives. Protection of watersheds is an intergenerational responsibility that needs to be
answered now.
Article 67 of the Water Code of the Philippines (PD 1067) provides:
Art. 67. Any watershed or any area of land adjacent to any surface water or overlying any
ground water may be declared by the Department of Natural Resources as a protected
area. Rules and Regulations may be promulgated by such Department to prohibit or control
such activities by the owners or occupants thereof within the protected area which may
damage or cause the deterioration of the surface water or ground water or interfere with
the investigation, use, control, protection, management or administration of such waters.
The Court in Sta. Rosa Realty also recognized the need to protect watershed areas and
took note of the report of the Ecosystems Research and Development Bureau (ERDB), a
research arm of the DENR, regarding the environmental assessment of the Casile and
Kabanga-an river watersheds involved in that case. That report concluded as follows:
The Casile barangay covered by CLOA in question is situated in the heartland of both
watersheds. Considering the barangays proximity to the Matangtubig waterworks, the
activities of the farmers which are in conflict with proper soil and water conservation
practices jeopardize and endanger the vital waterworks. Degradation of the land would have
double edge detrimental effects. On the Casile side this would mean direct siltation of the
Mangumit river which drains to the water impounding reservoir below. On the Kabanga-an
side, this would mean destruction of forest covers which acts as recharged areas of the
Matangtubig springs. Considering that the people have little if no direct interest in the
protection of the Matangtubig structures they couldnt care less even if it would be
destroyed.
The Casile and Kabanga-an watersheds can be considered a most vital life support system to
thousands of inhabitants directly and indirectly affected by it.From these watersheds come
the natural God-given precious resource water. x x x
Clearing and tilling of the lands are totally inconsistent with sound watershed
management. More so, the introduction of earth disturbing activities like road building and
erection of permanent infrastructures. Unless the pernicious agricultural activities of the
Casile farmers are immediately stopped, it would not be long before these watersheds
would cease to be of value. The impact of watershed degradation threatens the livelihood of
thousands of people dependent upon it. Toward this, we hope that an acceptable
comprehensive watershed development policy and program be immediately formulated and
implemented before the irreversible damage finally happens.
The Court remanded the case to the Department of Agriculture and Adjudication Board or
DARAB to re-evaluate and determine the nature of the parcels of land involved in order to
resolve the issue of its coverage by the CARL.
Sta. Rosa Realty gives us a glimpse of the dangers posed by the misuse of natural
resources such as watershed reservations which are akin to forest zones. Population growth
and industrialization have taken a heavy toll on the environment. Environmental degradation
from unchecked human activities could wreak havoc on the lives of present and future
generations. Hence, by constitutional fiat, natural resources remain to this day inalienable
properties of the State.
 Viewed under this legal and factual backdrop, did petitioners acquire, as they vigorously Petitioners do not claim to have documentary title over the Lot. Their right to register the
argue, private rights over the parcel of land prior to the issuance of EO 33 segregating the Lot is predicated mainly upon continuous possession since 1902.
same as a watershed reservation?
Clearly, petitioners were unable to acquire a valid and enforceable right or title because
The answer is in the negative. of the failure to complete the required period of possession, whether under the original
Section 48 (b) of CA 141 prior to the issuance of EO 33, or under the amendment by RA 1942
First. An applicant for confirmation of imperfect title bears the burden of proving that
and PD 1073.
he meets the requirements of Section 48 of CA 141, as amended. He must overcome the
presumption that the land he is applying for is part of the public domain and that he has an There is no proof that prior to the issuance of EO 33 in 1904, petitioners had acquired
interest therein sufficient to warrant registration in his name arising from an imperfect ownership or title to the Lot either by deed or by any other mode of acquisition from the
title. An imperfect title may have been derived from old Spanish grants such as a titulo State, as for instance by acquisitive prescription. As of 1904, Sesinando Leyva had only been
real or royal grant, a concession especial or special grant, a composicion con el estado or in possession for two years. Verily, petitioners have not possessed the parcel of land in the
adjustment title, or a titulo de compra or title through purchase. [29] Or, that he has had manner and for the number of years required by law for the confirmation of imperfect title.
continuous, open and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
Second, assuming that the Lot was alienable and disposable land prior to the issuance
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least thirty years preceding the
of EO 33 in 1904, EO 33 reserved the Lot as a watershed. Since then, the Lot became non-
filing of his application as provided by Section 48 (b) CA 141.
disposable and inalienable public land. At the time petitioners filed their application on April
Originally, Section 48(b) of CA 141 provided for possession and occupation of lands of 25, 1985, the Lot has been reserved as a watershed under EO 33 for 81 years prior to the
the public domain since July 26, 1894. This was superseded by RA 1942 which provided for a filing of petitioners application.
simple thirty-year prescriptive period of occupation by an applicant for judicial confirmation
The period of occupancy after the issuance of EO 33 in 1904 could no longer be counted
of an imperfect title. The same, however, has already been amended by Presidential Decree
because as a watershed reservation, the Lot was no longer susceptible of occupancy,
No. 1073, approved on January 25, 1977, the law prevailing at the time petitioners
disposition, conveyance or alienation. Section 48 (b) of CA 141, as amended, applies
application for registration was filed on April 25, 1985. [30] As amended, Section 48 (b) now
exclusively to alienable and disposable public agricultural land. Forest lands, including
reads:
watershed reservations, are excluded. It is axiomatic that the possession of forest lands or
other inalienable public lands cannot ripen into private ownership. In Municipality of
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
Santiago, Isabela vs. Court of Appeals,[32] the Court declared that inalienable public lands -
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty
x x x cannot be acquired by acquisitive prescription. Prescription, both acquisitive and
years immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title, except
extinctive, does not run against the State.
when prevented by wars or force majeure. Those shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
The possession of public land, however long the period may have extended, never confers
certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter.
title thereto upon the possessor because the statute of limitations with regard to public land
does not operate against the State, unless the occupant can prove possession and
Interpreting Section 48 (b) of CA 141, the Court stated that the Public Land Act requires
occupation of the same under claim of ownership for the required number of years to
that the applicant must prove the following:
constitute a grant from the State.
(a) that the land is alienable public land and (b) that his open, continuous, exclusive and
Third, Gordula vs. Court of Appeals[33] is in point. In Gordula, petitioners did not contest
notorious possession and occupation of the same must either be since time immemorial or
the nature of the land. They admitted that the land lies in the heart of the Caliraya-Lumot
for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set by law are
River Forest Reserve, which Proclamation No. 573 classified as inalienable. The petitioners
complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right to a grant, a
in Gordula contended, however, that Proclamation No. 573 itself recognizes private rights of
government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. [31]
landowners prior to the reservation. They claim to have established their private rights to Next, petitioners argue that assuming no private rights had attached to the Lot prior to
the subject land. The Court ruled: EO 33 in 1904, the President of the Philippines had subsequently segregated the Lot from
the public domain and made the Lot alienable and disposable when he issued Proclamation
We do not agree. No public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, No. 1283 on June 21, 1974. Petitioners contend that Proclamation No. 1283 expressly
express or implied from the government; it is indispensable that there be a showing of a title excluded an area of 3,780 hectares from the MWR and made the area part of the Boso-boso
from the state. The facts show that petitioner Gordula did not acquire title to the subject Townsite Reservation. Petitioners assert that Lot Psu-162620 is a small part of this excluded
land prior to its reservation under Proclamation No. 573. He filed his application for free town site area. Petitioners further contend that town sites are considered alienable and
patent only in January, 1973, more than three (3) years after the issuance of Proclamation disposable under CA 141.
No. 573 in June, 1969. At that time, the land, as part of the Caliraya-Lumot River Forest
Proclamation No. 1283 reads thus:
Reserve, was no longer open to private ownership as it has been classified as public forest
reserve for the public good.
PROCLAMATION NO. 1283
Nonetheless, petitioners insist that the term, private rights, in Proclamation No. 573, should
EXCLUDING FROM THE OPERATION EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904, AS
not be interpreted as requiring a title. They opine that it suffices if the claimant had
AMENDED BY EXECUTIVE ORDERS NOS. 14 AND 16, BOTH SERIES OF 1915, WHICH
occupied and cultivated the property for so many number of years, declared the land for
ESTABLISHED THE WATERSHED RESERVATION SITUATED IN THE MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
taxation purposes, [paid] the corresponding real estate taxes [which are] accepted by the
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON, A CERTAIN PORTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED
government, and [his] occupancy and possession [is] continuous, open and unmolested and
THEREIN AND RESERVING THESAME, TOGETHER WITH THE ADJACENT PARCEL OF LAND OF
recognized by the government. Prescinding from this premise, petitioners urge that the 25-
THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, FOR TOWNSITE PURPOSES UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF CHAPTER XI
year possession by petitioner Gordula from 1944 to 1969, albeit five (5) years short of the
OF THE PUBLIC LAND ACT.
30-year possession required under Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 141, as amended, is
enough to vest upon petitioner Gordula the private rights recognized and respected in
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and pursuant
Proclamation No. 573.
to the authority vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines,
do hereby, exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904, as
The case law does not support this submission. In Director of Lands vs. Reyes, we held that a
amended by Executive Orders Nos. 14 and 16, both series of 1915, which established the
settler claiming the protection of private rights to exclude his land from a military or forest
Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of
reservation must show x x x by clear and convincing evidence that the property in question
Luzon, certain portions of land embraced therein and reserve the same, together with the
was acquired by [any] x x x means for the acquisition of public lands.
adjacent parcel of land of the public domain, for townsite purposes under the provisions of
Chapter XI of the Public Land Act, subject to private rights, if any there be, and to future
In fine, one claiming private rights must prove that he has complied with C.A. No. 141, as
subdivision survey in accordance with the development plan to be prepared and approved
amended, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, which prescribes the substantive as well
by the Department of Local Government and Community Development, which parcels are
as the procedural requirements for acquisition of public lands. This law requires at least
more particularly described as follows:
thirty (30) years of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and possession of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition, immediately
Lot A (Part of Watershed Reservation)
preceding the filing of the application for free patent. The rationale for the 30-year period
lies in the presumption that the land applied for pertains to the State, and that the
A parcel of land (Lot A of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of the Marikina
occupants and/or possessors claim an interest therein only by virtue of their imperfect title
Watershed, IN-2), situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, Island of Luzon,
or continuous, open and notorious possession.
beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan, being N-74-30 E, 8480.00 meters more or less,
from BLLM 1, Antipolo, Rizal; thence N 33 28 W 1575.00 m. to point 2; thence N 40 26 W
1538.50 m. to point 3; thence N 30 50W 503.17 m. to point 4; thence N 75 02 W 704.33 m.
to point 5; thence N 14 18 W 1399.39 m. to point 6; thence N 43 25 W 477.04 m. to point 7; President
thence N 71 38 W 458.36 m. to point 8; thence N 31 05 W 1025.00 m. to point 9; thence Due Republic of the Philippines
North 490.38 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1075.00 m. to point 11; thence Due East
Proclamation No. 1283 has since been amended by Proclamation No. 1637 issued on
1000.00 m. to point 12; thenceDue East 1000.00 m. to point 13; thence Due East 1000.00 m.
April 18, 1977. Proclamation No. 1637 revised thearea and location of the proposed
to point 14; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 15; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point
townsite. According to then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637
16; thence Due East 1000.00 m. to point 17; thence Due East 1075.00 m. to point 18; thence
excluded Lot A (of which the Lot claimed by petitioners is part) for townsite purposes and
Due South 1000.00 m. to point 19; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 20; thence Due
reverted it to MWR coverage.[34] Proclamation No. 1637 reads:
South 1000.00 m. to point 21; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 22; thence Due South
1000.00 m. to point 23; thence Due South 1000.00 m. to point 24; thence Due South
PROCLAMATION NO. 1637
1075.00 m. to point 25; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 26; thence Due West 1000.00
m. to point 27; thence Due West 636.56 m. to point of beginning. Containing an area of
three thousand seven hundred eighty (3,780) Hectares, more or less. AMENDING PROCLAMATION NO. 1283, DATED JUNE 21, 1974, WHICH ESTABLISHED THE
TOWNSITE RESERVATION IN THE MUNICIPALITIES OF ANTIPOLO AND SAN MATEO, PROVINCE
OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON BY INCREASING THE AREA AND REVISING THE TECHNICAL
Lot B (Alienable and Disposable Land)
DESCRIPTION OF THE LAND EMBRACED THEREIN, AND REVOKING PROCLAMATION NO. 765
DATED OCTOBER 26, 1970 THAT RESERVED PORTIONS OF THE AREA AS RESETTLEMENT SITE.
A parcel of land (Lot B of Proposed Poor Mans Baguio, being a portion of alienable and
disposable portion of public domain) situated in the municipality of Antipolo, Province of
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Natural Resources and pursuant to the authority
Rizal, Island of Luzon. Beginning at a point marked 1 on sketch plan being N 74 30 E.,
vested in me by law, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, do hereby
8430.00 m., more or less, from BLLM 1.Antipolo, Rizal; thence Due West 363.44 m. to point
amend Proclamation No. 1283, dated June 21, 1974 which established the townsite
2; thence Due West 1000.00 m. to point 3; thence Due West 100.00 m. to point 4; thence
reservation in the municipalities of Antipolo and San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Island of
Due West 1000.00 m. to point 5; thence Due West 1075.00 m. to point 6; thence Due North
Luzon, by increasing the area and revising the technical descriptions of the land embraced
1000.00 m. to point 7; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 8; thence Due North 1000.00
therein, subject to private rights, if any there be, which parcel of land is more particularly
m. to point 9; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to point 10; thence Due North 1000.00 m. to
described as follows:
point 11; thence Due North 509.62 m. to point 12; thence S. 31 05 E 1025.00 m. to point 13;
thence S 71 38 E 458.36 m. to point 14; thence S 43 25 E 477.04 m. to point 15; thence S 14
18 E 1399.39 m. to point 16; thence S 75 02 E 704.33 m. to point 17; thence S. 30 50 E (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite)
503.17 m. to point 18; thence S 40 26 E 1538.50 m. to point 19; thence s 33 23 e 1575.00 m
to point of beginning. Containing an area of one thousand two hundred twenty five (1,225) A PARCEL OF LAND (Proposed Lungsod Silangan Townsite Reservation amending the area
Hectares, more or less. under SWO-41762 establishing the Bagong Silangan Townsite Reservation) situated in the
Municipalities of Antipolo, San Mateo, and Montalban, Province of Rizal, Island of
Note: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey. Luzon. Bounded on the E., along lines 1-2-3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10-11-12-13-14-15-16-17-18-19-20-
21-22-23 by the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12); on the S., along lines 23-24-25 by
the portion of Antipolo; on the W., along lines 25-26-27-28-29-30 by the Municipalities of
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I Have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of
Montalban, San Mateo; and on the N., along lines 30-31-32-33-34-35-36-37-38-39-40-41-42-
the Philippines to be affixed.
43-44 by the Angat Watershed Reservation. Beginning at a point marked 1 on
the Topographic Maps with the Scale of 1:50,000 which is the identical corner 38 IN-12,
Done in the City of Manila, this 21 st day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
Marikina Watershed Reservation.
and seventy-four.
xxx xxx xxx
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
NOTE: All data are approximate and subject to change based on future survey. verified to be within the area excluded from the operation of Marikina Watershed
Reservation established under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 26, 1904 per Proclamation
Proclamation No. 765 dated October 26, 1970, which covered areas entirely within the No. 1283, promulgated on June 21, 1974, which established the Boso-Boso Townsite
herein Lungsod Silangan Townsite, is hereby revoked accordingly. Reservation, amended by proclamation No. 1637 dated April 18, 1977 known as Lungsod
Silangan Townsite Reservation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of
the Philippines to be affixed. Subject area also falls within the bounds of Bagong Lipunan Site under P.D. 1396 dated June
2, 1978 under the sole jurisdiction of the Ministry of Human Settlements, to the exclusion of
Done in the City of Manila, this 18th day of April, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred any other government agencies.
and seventy-seven.
This verification is made upon the request of the Chief, Legal Staff, R-4 as contained in his
(Sgd.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS internal memorandum dated March 18, 1986.
President of the Philippines
Verified by:
A positive act (e.g., an official proclamation) of the Executive Department is needed to
declassify land which had been earlier classified as a watershed reservation and to convert it
(Sgd) ROMEO C. PASCUBILLO
into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes. [35] Unless and until the
Cartographer II
land classified as such is released in an official proclamation so that it may form part of the
disposable agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
Checked by:
title do not apply.[36]
The principal document presented by petitioners to prove the private character of the (Sgd) ARMENDO R. CRUZ
Lot is the Certification of the Bureau of Forest Development dated March 18, 1986 that the Supervising Cartographer
Lot is excluded from the Marikina Watershed (Exh. R). The Certification reads:
ATTESTED:
Republic of the Philippines
Ministry of Natural Resources
(Sgd) LUIS G. DACANAY
BUREAU OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT
Chief, Forest Engineering &
REGION IV
Infrastructure Section
EL AL Building
100 Quezon Avenue, Quezon City The above certification on which petitioners rely that a reclassification had occurred,
and that the Lot is covered by the reclassification, is contradicted by several documents
MAR 18 1986 submitted by the Solicitor General before the land registration court.

VERIFICATION ON THE STATUS OF LAND: The Solicitor General submitted to the land registration court a Report [37] dated March
2, 1988, signed by Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the then National Land Titles and
Deeds Registration Administration, confirming that the Lot described in Psu-162620 forms
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
part of the MWR. He thus recommended the dismissal of the application for
registration. The Report states:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Barangay San Isidro, Antipolo, Rizal,
containing an area of 1,269,766 square meters, as shown and described on the reverse side
hereof, surveyed by Geodetic Engineer Telesforo Cabading for Angelina C. Reynoso, is
COMES NOW the Administrator of the National Land Titles and Deeds Registration
Commission and to this Honorable Court respectfully reports that:
1. A parcel of land described in plan Psu-162620 situated in the Barrio of San
Isidro, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, is applied for registration of
title in the case at bar.
2. After plotting plan Psu-162620 in our Municipal Index Map it was found that a
portion of the SW, described as Lot 3 in plan Psu-173790 was previously the
subject of registration in Land Reg. Case No. N-9578, LRC Record No. N-55948
and was issued Decree No. N-191242 on April 4, 1986 in the name of Apolonia
Garcia, et al., pursuant to the Decision and Order for Issuance of the Decree
dated February 8, 1984 and March 6, 1984, respectively, and the remaining
portion of plan Psu-162620 is inside IN-12, Marikina Watershed. x x x
WHEREFORE, this matter is respectfully submitted to the Honorable Court
for its information and guidance with the recommendation that the application
in the instant proceedings be dismissed, after due hearing (Underlining
supplied).
Likewise, in a letter[38] dated November 11, 1991, the Deputy Land Inspector, DENR,
Region IV, Community Environment and Natural Resources Office, Antipolo, Rizal, similarly
confirmed that the Lot is within the MWR. The letter states:
That the land sought to be registered is situated at San Isidro (Boso-boso), Antipolo, Rizal,
with an area of ONE HUNDRED TWENTY SIX POINT ZERO SEVEN SIXTY SIX (126.0766)
hectares, more particularly described in Psu-162620, which is within the Marikina
Watershed Reservation under Executive Order No. 33 dated July 2, 1904 which established
the Marikina Watershed Reservation (IN-12) x x x.
xxx
That the land sought to be registered is not a private property of the Registration
Applicant but part of the public domain, not subjected to disposition and is covered by
Proclamation No. 585 for Integrated Social Forestry Program hence, L.R.C. No. 269-A is
recommended for rejection (Underlining supplied).Copy of the letter is attached herewith as
Annex 3 and made an integral part hereof.
Lastly, the Solicitor General pointed out that attached to petitioner Edna T. Collados [as
original applicant] application is the technical description [39] of the Lot signed by Robert C.
Pangyarihan, Officer-in-Charge of the Survey Division of the Bureau of Lands. This technical
description categorically stated that the Lot is inside IN-12 Mariquina Watershed.
The evidence of record thus appears unsatisfactory and insufficient to show clearly and
positively that the Lot had been officially released from the Marikina Watershed Reservation
to form part of the alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. We hold that once a
parcel of land is included within a watershed reservation duly established by Executive
Proclamation, as in the instant case, a presumption arises that the land continues to be part
of such Reservation until clear and convincing evidence of subsequent declassification is
shown.
It is obvious, based on the facts on record that neither petitioners nor their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the Lot for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title. Even if they submitted sufficient proof that the Lot had
been excluded from the MWR upon the issuance of Proclamation No. 1283 on June 21,
1974, petitioners possession as of the filing of their application on April 25, 1985 would have
been only eleven years counted from the issuance of the proclamation in 1974. The result
will not change even if we tack in the two years Sesinando Leyva allegedly possessed the Lot
from 1902 until the issuance of EO 33 in 1904. Petitioners case falters even more because of
the issuance of Proclamation No. 1637 on April 18, 1977. According to then DENR Secretary
Victor Ramos, Proclamation No. 1637 reverted Lot A or the townsite reservation, where
petitioners' Lot is supposedly situated, back to the MWR.
Finally, it is of no moment if the areas of the MWR are now fairly populated and vibrant
communities as claimed by petitioners. The following ruling may be applied to this case by
analogy:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms and other trees growing
in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply. [40]
Second Issue: Whether the petition for annulment of judgment
 should have been given due course.
Petitioners fault the Court of Appeals for giving due course to the Republics petition for
annulment of judgment which was filed long after the decision of the land registration court
had allegedly become final and executory. The land registration court rendered its decision
on January 30, 1991 and the Solicitor General received a copy of the decision on April 23,
1991.[41] Petitioners point out that the Solicitor General filed with the Court of Appeals the
petition for annulment of judgment invoking Section 9(2) of BP Blg. 129 [42] only on August 6,
1991, after the decision had supposedly become final and executory. Moreover, petitioners
further point out that the Solicitor General filed the petition for annulment after the land
registration court issued its order of May 6, 1991 directing the Land Registration Authority to
issue the corresponding decree of registration.
The Solicitor General sought the annulment of the decision on the ground that the land
registration court had no jurisdiction over the case, specifically, over the Lot which was not
alienable and disposable. The Solicitor General maintained that the decision was null and
void.
Petitioners argue that the remedy of annulment of judgment is no longer available
because it is barred by the principle of res judicata.They insist that the land registration court
had jurisdiction over the case which involves private land. They also argue that the Republic
is estopped from questioning the land registration courts jurisdiction considering that the
Republic participated in the proceedings before the court.
It is now established that the Lot, being a watershed reservation, is not alienable and
disposable public land. The evidence of the petitioners do not clearly and convincingly show
that the Lot, described as Lot Psu-162620, ceased to be a portion of the area classified as a
watershed reservation of the public domain. Any title to the Lot is void ab initio. In view of
this, the alleged procedural infirmities attending the filing of the petition for annulment of
judgment are immaterial since the land registration court never acquired jurisdiction over
the Lot. All proceedings of the land registration court involving the Lot are therefore null and
void.
We apply our ruling in Martinez vs. Court of Appeals,[43] as follows:
The Land Registration Court has no jurisdiction over non-registrable properties, such as
public navigable rivers which are parts of the public domain, and cannot validly adjudge the
registration of title in favor of private applicant. Hence, the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Pampanga as regards the Lot No. 2 of certificate of Title No. 15856 in the name
of petitioners may be attacked at any time, either directly or collaterally, by the State which
is not bound by any prescriptive period provided for by the Statute of Limitations.
We also hold that environmental consequences in this case override concerns over
technicalities and rules of procedure.
In Republic vs. De los Angeles,[44] which involved the registration of public lands,
specifically parts of the sea, the Court rejected the principle of res judicata and estoppel to
silence the Republics claim over public lands. The Court said:
It should be noted further that the doctrine of estoppel or laches does not apply when the
Government sues as a sovereign or asserts governmental rights, nor does estoppel or laches
validate an act that contravenes law or public policy, and that res judicata is to be
disregarded if its application would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality.
The Court further held that the right of reversion or reconveyance to the State of the public
properties registered and which are not capable of private appropriation or private
acquisition does not prescribe.
Third issue: Whether the petition-in-intervention is proper.
The Bockasanjo ISF Awardees Association, Inc., an association of holders of certificates
of stewardship issued by the DENR under its Integrated Social Forestry Program, filed with
the Court of Appeals on November 29, 1991 a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit
Petition-In-Intervention.
According to intervenors, they are the actual occupants of the Lot which petitioners
sought to register. Aware that the parcels of land which their forefathers had occupied,
developed and tilled belong to the Government, they filed a petition with then President
Corazon C. Aquino and then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, to award the parcels of
land to them.
Secretary Factoran directed the Director of Forest Management Bureau to take steps for
the segregation of the aforementioned area from the MWR for development under the
DENRs ISF Programs. Subsequently, then President Aquino issued Proclamation No. 585
dated June 5, 1990 excluding 1,430 hectares from the operation of EO 33 and placed the
same under the DENRs Integrated Social Forestry Program. Proclamation No. 585 reads:
PROCLAMATION NO. 585
AMENDING FURTHER EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 33, DATED JULY 26, 1904 WHICH ESTABLISHED
THE MARIKINA WATERSHED RESERVATION (IN-12) AS AMENDED, BY EXCLUDING CERTAIN
PORTIONS OF LANDS EMBRACED THEREIN SITUATED AT SITIOS BOSOBOSO, KILINGAN,
VETERANS, BARANGAYS SAN JOSEPH AND PAENAAN, MUNICIPALITY OF ANTIPOLO,
PROVINCE OF RIZAL, ISLAND OF LUZON.
Upon recommendation of the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources and pursuant
to the authority vested in me by law, I, CORAZON C. AQUINO, President of the Philippines,
do hereby exclude from the operation of Executive Order No. 33, which established the
Marikina Watershed Reservation, certain parcel of land of the public domain embraced
therein situated in Sitios Bosoboso, Veterans, Kilingan and Barangay San Joseph and
Paenaan, Municipality of Antipolo, Province of Rizal and place the same under the Integrated
Social Forestry Program of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources in
accordance with existing laws, rules and regulations, which parcel of land is more
particularly described as follows:
A PARCEL OF LAND, within the Marikina Watershed Reservation situated in the Municipality
of Antipolo, Province of Rizal, beginning at point 1 on plan, being identical to corner 1 of
Marikina Watershed Reservation; thence
xxx xxx xxx
Containing an area of One Thousand Four Hundred Thirty (1,430) Hectares.
All other lands covered and embraced under Executive Order No. 33 as amended, not
otherwise affected by this Proclamation, shall remain in force and effect.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Republic of
the Philippines to be affixed.
Done in the City of Manila, this 5 th day of June, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and ninety.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
President of the Philippines
Pursuant to Proclamation No. 585, the chief of the ISF Unit, acting through the Regional
Executive Director of the DENR (Region IV), issued sometime between the years 1989 to
1991 certificates of stewardship contracts to bona fide residents of the barangays mentioned
in the proclamation as qualified recipients of the ISF programs. Among those awarded were
intervenors. The certificates of stewardship are actually contracts of lease granted by the
DENR to actual occupants of parcels of land under its ISF programs for a period of twenty-
five (25) years, renewable for another twenty-five (25) years. [45] The DENR awarded contracts
of stewardship to ISF participants in Barangay San Isidro (or Boso-boso) and the other
barangays based on the Inventory of Forest Occupants the DENR had conducted. [46]
According to intervenors, they learned only on July 31, 1991 about the pendency of LRC
Case No. 269-A before the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. On August 8, 1991, they
filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and to Admit Opposition in Intervention before the
land registration court to assert their rights and to protect their interests.
However, shortly after the filing of their opposition, intervenors learned that the land
registration court had already rendered a decision on January 30, 1991 confirming
petitioners imperfect title. Intervenors counsel received a copy of the decision on August 9,
1991.
On August 14, 1991, intervenors filed a motion to vacate judgment and for new trial
before the land registration court. According to intervenors, the land registration court could
not act on its motions due to the restraining order issued by the Court of Appeals on August
8, 1991, enjoining the land registration court from executing its decision, as prayed for by
the Solicitor General in its petition for annulment of judgment. The intervenors were thus
constrained to file a petition for intervention before the Court of Appeals which allowed the
same.
Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure [47] provides in pertinent parts:
Section 1. Who may intervene. A person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or
in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be
adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the
court, or an officer thereof may, with leave of court, be allowed to intervene in the
action. The Court shall consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or
prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original parties, and whether or not the
inertvenors rights may be fully protected in a separate proceeding.
Sec. 2. Time to intervene. The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to
the motion and served on the original parties.
As a rule, intervention is allowed before rendition of judgment by the trial court, as
Section 2, Rule 19 expressly provides. However, the Court has recognized exceptions to this
rule in the interest of substantial justice. Mago vs. Court of Appeals[48] reiterated the ruling
in Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, where the Court allowed the motions for
intervention even when the case had already reached this Court. Thus, in Mago the Court
held that:
It is quite clear and patent that the motions for intervention filed by the movants at this
stage of the proceedings where trial had already been concluded x x x and on appeal x x x
the same affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the instant petition for certiorari to review
said judgment is already submitted for decision by the Supreme Court, are obviously and,
manifestly late, beyond the period prescribed under x x x Section 2, Rule 12 of the rules of
Court.
But Rule 12 of the Rules of Court, like all other Rules therein promulgated, is simply a rule of
procedure, the whole purpose and object of which is to make the powers of the Court fully
and completely available for justice. The purpose of procedure is not to thwart justice. Its
proper aim is to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending
parties. It was created not to hinder and delay but to facilitate and promote the
administration of justice. It does not constitute the thing itself which courts are always
striving to secure to litigants. It is designed as the means best adopted to obtain that
thing. In other words, it is a means to an end.
To be sure, the Court of Appeals did not pass upon the actual status of intervenors in
relation to the Lot as this was not in issue. Neither was the validity of the certificates of
stewardship contracts which intervenors allegedly possessed inquired into considering this
too was not in issue. In fact, intervenors did not specifically seek any relief apart from a
declaration that the Lot in question remains inalienable land of the public domain. We
cannot fault the Court of Appeals for allowing the intervention, if only to provide the rival
groups a peaceful venue for ventilating their sides. This case has already claimed at least five
lives due to the raging dispute between the rival camps of the petitioners on one side and
those of the DENR awardees on the other. It also spawned a number of criminal cases
between the two rival groups including malicious mischief, robbery and arson. A strict
application of the rules would blur this bigger, far more important picture.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated June
22, 1992 declaring null and void the Decision dated January 30, 1991 of Branch 71, Regional
Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal, in LRC No. 269-A, LRC Rec. No. N-59179 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 129682. March 21, 2002]
NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAAGAS-PAGKATIPUNAN, petitioners, vs. THE
COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision [1] of the Court of Appeals nullifying the
decision of the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon [2]which confirmed petitioners title
over the lots subject of the instant petition. Petitioners further seek to annul and set aside
the resolutions[3] of the Court of Appeals denying their urgent motion to recall the judgment
entered[4] in the land registration case.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Sometime in November 1960, petitioners predecessors-in-interest, spouses Getulio
Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon
an application for judicial confirmation and registration of their title to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan
Psu-174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located in San Narciso, Quezon. [5]
On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order of default against the
whole world, except spouses Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo Medenilla who were given ten
(10) days to file their written opposition as regards Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406. Upon
motion of petitioners predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406 was removed from the
coverage of the application. The remaining parcel of land covered by Lot No. 1 has an area of
3,804.261 square meters.
On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance promulgated a decision confirming
petitioners title to the property. On October 23, 1967, OCT No. O-12665 was issued in the
name of petitioners.
Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the Republic of the
Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court an action to declare the proceedings
in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 before the Court of First Instance of Gumaca,
Quezon null and void, and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12665 and titles
derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of deeds to annul said certificates
of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of the public domain. [6]
The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land registration case and of
rendition of the decision on June 15, 1967, the subject land was classified as timberland
under LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180; hence
inalienable and not subject to registration. Moreover, petitioners title thereto can not be
confirmed for lack of showing of possession and occupation of the land in the manner and
for the length of time required by Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended. Neither did petitioners have any fee simple title which may be registered under
Act No. 496, as amended. Consequently, the Court of First Instance did not acquire
jurisdiction over the res and any proceedings had therein were null and void.[7]
On the other hand, petitioners raised the special defenses of indefeasibility of title
and res judicata. They argued that due to the lapse of a considerable length of time, the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Quezon in the land registration case has become
final and conclusive against the Republic.Moreover, the action for reversion of the land to
the public domain is barred by prior judgment. [8]
In a decision promulgated on June 27, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate Court held that
the land in question was forestral land; hence not registrable.There was no evidence on
record to show that the land was actually and officially delimited and classified as alienable
or disposable land of the public domain. Therefore, the Court of First Instance did not
acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for registration and to decide the
same.Consequently, the action to declare null and void the June 15, 1967 decision for lack of
jurisdiction did not prescribe. The dispositive portion of the appellate courts decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondents, and as
prayed for:
(a) The Decision dated June 15, 1967 in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record No. N-19930 is
hereby declared null and void, and accordingly set aside;
(b) Original Certificate of Title No. O-12665, and Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-84439, T-
93857 and T-117618 deriving therefrom, as well as any other derivative titles, are declared
null and void;
(c) The respondent Register of Deeds for Quezon Province is ordered to cancel said titles;
and
(d) The parcels of land covered thereby are ordered reverted to the State.
Without pronouncement as to costs.[9]
On July 16, 1986, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the afore-cited
decision[10] reiterating that the land in question was agricultural because it was possessed
and cultivated as such long before its classification as timberland by the Bureau of Forestry
in 1955. Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of said land for agricultural and cattle raising
purposes as far back as the Spanish regime. Following the doctrine in Oracoy v. Director of
Lands,[11] private interest had intervened and petitioners acquired vested rights which can no
longer be impaired by the subsequent classification of the land as timberland by the Director
of Forestry.
On August 20, 1986, the appellate court denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit.[12] On December 12, 1986, the decision of June 27, 1986 attained finality and
judgment was entered in the book of entries of judgments. [13]
On April 2, 1987, petitioners filed an urgent motion to set aside entry of judgment on
the ground that Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila, petitioners counsel of record, was not furnished a
copy of the resolution denying the motion for reconsideration. [14] In the absence of such
notice, the decision of the appellate court did not become final and executory.
On October 22, 1987, the Court of Appeals set aside and lifted the entry of judgment in
CA-G. R. SP No. 07115 and directed the clerk of court to furnish petitioners counsel a copy of
the August 20, 1986 resolution.[15]
For petitioners inaction despite service of the August 20, 1986 resolution, the June 27,
1986 decision became final and executory. On March 2, 1988, entry of judgment was again
made in the land registration case.
On September 4, 1995, Atty. Doronila withdrew his appearance as counsel for
petitioners.[16]
On April 1, 1996, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. George I. Howard, filed
with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion to recall the entry of judgment, [17] which was
denied by the appellate court on December 16, 1996. [18]
The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that it raised
arguments already discussed and resolved in the urgent motion to recall entry of judgment.
[19]
Hence, the instant petition for review.[20]
Petitioners claim that their title to the land became incontrovertible and indefeasible
one (1) year after issuance of the decree of registration. Hence, the Republics cause of action
was barred by prescription and res judicata, proceedings having been initiated only after
about 18 years from the time the decree of registration was made. Contrary to the appellate
courts findings, the land is agricultural and the inclusion and classification thereof by the
Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as timberland can not impair the vested rights acquired by
petitioners predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public
possession of the land in question since time immemorial and for more than thirty (30) years
prior to the filing of the application for registration in 1960. Hence, the Court of Appeals
committed grave error when it denied their motion to set aside entry of judgment in the
land registration case.
The petition lacks merit.
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a private person by
the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain.Occupation thereof in the concept
of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. [21]
Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the application for land
registration and issuance of the certificate of title over the disputed land in the name of
petitioners, the same was timberland and formed part of the public domain, as per
certification issued by the Bureau of Forest Development on April 1, 1985, thus:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Vigo Cantidang, San Narciso, Quezon,
containing an area of 3,804.261 square meters as described in Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-117618 x x x registered in the name of Spouses Nestor E. Pagkatipunan and Rosalina
Magas is verified to be within the Timberland Block -B, Project No. 15-B of San Narciso,
Quezon, certified and declared as such on August 25, 1955 per BFD Map LC-1880. The land
is, therefore, within the administrative jurisdiction and control of the Bureau of Forest
Development, and not subject to disposition under the Public Land Law.
[Sgd.]ARMANDO CRUZ
Supervising Cartographer[22]
This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the proceedings before the court a
quo on March 10, 1986, when they confirmed that the land has been classified as forming
part of forest land, albeit only on August 25, 1955.[23] Since no imperfect title can be
confirmed over lands not yet classified as disposable or alienable, the title issued to herein
petitioners is considered void ab initio.[24]
Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the State, and the
State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in land and charged with the
conservation of such patrimony. This same doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise
appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. [25] To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant that
the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. [26]
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has been reclassified as
disposable or alienable. Before any land may be declassified from the forest group and
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be
a positive act from the government.Even rules on the confirmation of imperfect titles do not
apply unless and until the land classified as forest land is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain.[27] Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of Government. [28] It
cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor deemed waived. [29] It calls for proof.[30]
The court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners based on the Republics
failure to show that the land is more valuable as forest land than for agricultural purposes, a
finding which is based on a wrong concept of what is forest land.
There is a big difference between forest as defined in the dictionary and forest or
timber land as a classification of land of the public domain in the Constitution. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
legal purposes. The forest land started out as a forest or vast tracts of wooded land with
dense growths of trees and underbrush. However, the cutting down of trees and the
disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the land of the public domain
from forest or timber land to alienable agricultural land. [31]
The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive of its legal
nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. [32] A
person cannot enter into forest land and by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that
land, earn credits towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government must
first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable agricultural land before the year
of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an
imperfect title.[33]
As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of Forestry:[34]
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not lose such classification
simply because loggers or settlers may have stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land
classified as forest land may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
cultivators or other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing
in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is descriptive
of its legal nature or status and does not have to be descriptive of what the land actually
looks like. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation
to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
 Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public Land Act, which
took effect on December 1, 1936, expressly provided that only agricultural land of the public
domain are subject to acquisitive prescription, to wit:

Section 48. x x x U.S. Supreme Court

(a) x x x Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, Cariño v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the No. 72
Government, since July twenty-six, eighteen hundred and ninety-four, except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed Argued January 13, 1909
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis supplied) Decided February 23, 1909

Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open, continuous, exclusive 212 U.S. 449
and notorious possession and occupation of the land either since time immemorial or for
the period prescribed therein, but most importantly, he must prove that the land is alienable Syllabus
public land.[35] In the case at bar, petitioners failed to do so.
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this
Petitioners contention that the Republic is now barred from questioning the validity of
Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to
the certificate of title issued to them considering that it took the government almost
bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of
eighteen (18) years to assail the same is erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription
the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.
does not run against the State.[36] The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioners
cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial property of the
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and indisposable. [37]
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one
In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it set aside the June 15, who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of
1967 decision of the court a quo and ordered that the subject lot be reverted back to the 1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.
public domain. Since the land in question is unregistrable, the land registration court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or judgment rendered therein is While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a
void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid judgment. question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it
will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it will
Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners motion to set aside the
recognize actual facts.
judgment rendered on December 12, 1986, in the land registration case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June Page 212 U. S. 450
27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by
Without pronouncement as to costs.
the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing
that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who
actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with
certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish
law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years,
and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with
provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine
Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the
Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the
continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
U.S. Supreme Court
Cariño v. Insular Government, 212 U.S. 449 (1909)
Cariño v. Insular Government of the Philippine Islands
No. 72
Argued January 13, 1909
Decided February 23, 1909
212 U.S. 449
ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
Syllabus
Writ of error is the general, and appeal the exceptional, method of bringing Cases to this
Court. The latter method is in the main confined to equity cases, and the former is proper to
bring up a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirming a judgment of
the Court of Land Registration dismissing an application for registration of land.
Although a province may be excepted from the operation of Act No. 926 of 1903 of the
Philippine Commission which provides for the registration and perfecting of new titles, one
who actually owns property in such province is entitled to registration under Act No. 496 of
1902, which applies to the whole archipelago.
While, in legal theory and as against foreign nations, sovereignty is absolute, practically it is a
question of strength and of varying degree, and it is for a new sovereign to decide how far it
will insist upon theoretical relations of the subject to the former sovereign and how far it will
recognize actual facts.
Page 212 U. S. 450
The acquisition of the Philippines was not for the purpose of acquiring the lands occupied by
the inhabitants, and under the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, 32 Stat. 691, providing
that property rights are to be administered for the benefit of the inhabitants, one who
actually owned land for many years cannot be deprived of it for failure to comply with
certain ceremonies prescribed either by the acts of the Philippine Commission or by Spanish
law.
The Organic Act of the Philippines made a bill of rights embodying safeguards of the
Constitution, and, like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all.
Every presumption of ownership is in favor of one actually occupying land for many years,
and against the government which seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with
provisions of a subsequently enacted registration act.
Title by prescription against the crown existed under Spanish law in force in the Philippine
Islands prior to their acquisition by the United States, and one occupying land in the
Province of Benguet for more than fifty years before the Treaty of Paris is entitled to the
continued possession thereof.
7 Phil. 132 reversed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 212 U. S. 455
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an application to the Philippine Court of Land Registration for the registration of
certain land. The application was granted by the court on March 4, 1904. An appeal was
taken to the Court of First Instance of the Province of Benguet on behalf of the government
of the Philippines, and also on behalf of the United States, those governments having taken
possession of the property for public and military purposes. The Court of First Instance
found the facts and dismissed the application upon grounds of law. This judgment was
affirmed by the supreme court, 7 Phil. 132, and the case then was brought here by writ of
error.
The material facts found are very few. The applicant and plaintiff in error is an Igorot of the
Province of Benguet, where the land lies. For more than fifty years before the Treaty of
Page 212 U. S. 456
Paris, April 11, 1899, as far back as the findings go, the plaintiff and his ancestors had held
the land as owners. His grandfather had lived upon it, and had maintained fences sufficient
for the holding of cattle, according to the custom of the country, some of the fences, it
seems, having been of much earlier date. His father had cultivated parts and had used parts
for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized
as owners by the Igorots, and he had inherited or received the land from his father in
accordance with Igorot custom. No document of title, however, had issued from the Spanish
Crown, and although, in 1893-1894 and again in 1896-1897, he made application for one
under the royal decrees then in force, nothing seems to have come of it, unless, perhaps,
information that lands in Benguet could not be conceded until those to be occupied for a
sanatorium, etc., had been designated -- a purpose that has been carried out by the
Philippine government and the United States. In 1901, the plaintiff filed a petition, alleging
ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands were registered to him, that process,
however, establishing only a possessory title, it is said.
Before we deal with the merits, we must dispose of a technical point. The government has
spent some energy in maintaining that this case should have been brought up by appeal, and
not by writ of error. We are of opinion, however, that the mode adopted was right. The
proceeding for registration is likened to bills in equity to quiet title, but it is different in
principle. It is a proceeding in rem under a statute of the type of the Torrens Act, such as was
discussed in Tyler v. Court of Registration, 175 Mass. 71. It is nearer to law than to equity,
and is an assertion of legal title; but we think it unnecessary to put it into either pigeon hole.
A writ of error is the general method of bringing cases to this Court, an appeal the exception,
confined to equity in the main. There is no reason for not applying the general rule to this
case. Ormsby v. Webb, 134 U. S. 47, 134 U. S. 65; Campbell v. Porter, 162 U. S.
478; Metropolitan R. Co. v. District of Columbia, 195 U. S. 322.
Page 212 U. S. 457
Another preliminary matter may as well be disposed of here. It is suggested that, even if the
applicant have title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine Commission's Act
No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others from its operation. But that
act deals with the acquisition of new titles by homestead entries, purchase, etc., and the
perfecting of titles begun under the Spanish law. The applicant's claim is that he now owns
the land, and is entitled to registration under the Philippine Commission's Act No. 496, of
1902, which established a court for that purpose with jurisdiction "throughout the Philippine
Archipelago," § 2, and authorized in general terms applications to be made by persons
claiming to own the legal estate in fee simple, as the applicant does. He is entitled to
registration if his claim of ownership can be maintained.
We come, then, to the question on which the case was decided below -- namely, whether
the plaintiff owns the land. The position of the government, shortly stated, is that Spain
assumed, asserted, and had title to all the land in the Philippines except so far as it saw fit to
permit private titles to be acquired; that there was no prescription against the Crown, and
that, if there was, a decree of June 25, 1880, required registration within a limited time to
make the title good; that the plaintiff's land was not registered, and therefore became, if it
was not always, public land; that the United States succeeded to the title of Spain, and so
that the plaintiff has no rights that the Philippine government is bound to respect.
If we suppose for the moment that the government's contention is so far correct that the
Crown of Spain in form asserted a title to this land at the date of the Treaty of Paris, to which
the United States succeeded, it is not to be assumed without argument that the plaintiff's
case is at an end. It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal
theory that all lands were held from the Crown, and perhaps the general attitude of
conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded to
those
Page 212 U. S. 458
in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true also that, in legal theory,
sovereignty is absolute, and that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as
Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow that, as against the inhabitants of the
Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain had such power. When theory is left on one
side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a new sovereign
shall insist upon the theoretical relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far
it shall recognize actual facts, are matters for it to decide.
The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor General, in his argument,
characterized as a savage tribe that never was brought under the civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain, that the Spanish officials
would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the
plaintiff was entitled by the Spanish laws, and which would have made his title beyond
question good. Whatever may have been the technical position of Spain, it does not follow
that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a mere trespasser when
the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a
denial of native titles throughout an important part of the island of Luzon, at least, for the
want of ceremonies which the Spaniards would not have permitted and had not the power
to enforce.
The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United
States. Whatever consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the
dominant purpose of the whites in America was to occupy the land. It is obvious that,
however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in
the internal administration of the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their
country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902, c. 1369, § 12, 32 Stat. 691, all the
property and rights acquired there by the
Page 212 U. S. 459
United States are to be administered "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof." It is
reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by the United States with regard to
what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its own.
The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and,
like the Constitution, extends those safeguards to all. It provides that
"no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of
the laws."
§ 5. In the light of the declaration that we have quoted from § 12, it is hard to believe that
the United States was ready to declare in the next breath that "any person" did not embrace
the inhabitants of Benguet, or that it meant by "property" only that which had become such
by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the inhabitants never had heard, and
that it proposed to treat as public land what they, by native custom and by long association
-- one of the profoundest factors in human thought -- regarded as their own.
It is true that, by § 14, the government of the Philippines is empowered to enact rules and
prescribe terms for perfecting titles to public lands where some, but not all, Spanish
conditions had been fulfilled, and to issue patents to natives for not more than sixteen
hectares of public lands actually occupied by the native or his ancestors before August 13,
1898. But this section perhaps might be satisfied if confined to cases where the occupation
was of land admitted to be public land, and had not continued for such a length of time and
under such circumstances as to give rise to the understanding that the occupants were
owners at that date. We hesitate to suppose that it was intended to declare every native
who had not a paper title a trespasser, and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. It
is true again that there is excepted from the provision that we have quoted as to the
administration of the property and rights acquired by the United States such land and
property as shall be designated by the President for military or other reservations,
Page 212 U. S. 460
as this land since has been. But there still remains the question what property and rights the
United States asserted itself to have acquired.
Whatever the law upon these points may be, and we mean to go no further than the
necessities of decision demand, every presumption is and ought to be against the
government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that
when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under
a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from
before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land. Certainly, in a case like
this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give the applicant the
benefit of the doubt. Whether justice to the natives and the import of the organic act ought
not to carry us beyond a subtle examination of ancient texts, or perhaps even beyond the
attitude of Spanish law, humane though it was, it is unnecessary to decide. If, in a tacit way,
it was assumed that the wild tribes of the Philippines were to be dealt with as the power and
inclination of the conqueror might dictate, Congress has not yet sanctioned the same course
as the proper one "for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof."
If the applicant's case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof
that it was bad by that law as to satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the
older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in error seem to indicate pretty
clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal
grant. In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native inhabitants of the
Philippines into trespassers, or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, Title 12, Law
14 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, while it commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call
for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who hold by good grants or justa
prescripcion. It is true that it
Page 212 U. S. 461
begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and the origin of all titles in the
King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles were
admitted to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their
books.
Prescription is mentioned again in the royal cedula of October 15, 1754, cited in 3 Phil. 546:
"Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they
shall show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription."
It may be that this means possession from before 1700; but, at all events, the principle is
admitted. As prescription, even against Crown lands, was recognized by the laws of Spain,
we see no sufficient reason for hesitating to admit that it was recognized in the Philippines in
regard to lands over which Spain had only a paper sovereignty.
The question comes, however, on the decree of June 25, 1880, for the adjustment of royal
lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. This begins with
the usual theoretic assertion that, for private ownership, there must have been a grant by
competent authority; but instantly descends to fact by providing that, for all legal effects,
those who have been in possession for certain times shall be deemed owners. For cultivated
land, twenty years, uninterrupted, is enough. For uncultivated, thirty. Art. 5. So that, when
this decree went into effect, the applicant's father was owner of the land by the very terms
of the decree. But, it is said, the object of this law was to require the adjustment or
registration proceedings that it described, and in that way to require everyone to get a
document of title or lose his land. That purpose may have been entertained, but it does not
appear clearly to have been applicable to all. The regulations purport to have been made
"for the adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals." (We follow
the translation in the government's brief.) It does not appear that this land ever was royal
land or wrongfully occupied. In Article 6, it is provided that
"interested parties not included within the two preceding
Page 212 U. S. 462
articles [the articles recognizing prescription of twenty and thirty years] may legalize their
possession, and thereby acquire the full ownership of the said lands, by means of
adjustment proceedings, to be conducted in the following manner."
This seems, by its very terms, not to apply to those declared already to be owners by lapse
of time. Article 8 provides for the case of parties not asking an adjustment of the lands of
which they are unlawfully enjoying the possession, within one year, and threatens that the
treasury "will reassert the ownership of the state over the lands," and will sell at auction
such part as it does not reserve. The applicant's possession was not unlawful, and no
attempt at any such proceedings against him or his father ever was made. Finally, it should
be noted that the natural construction of the decree is confirmed by the report of the
council of state. That report puts forward as a reason for the regulations that, in view of the
condition of almost all property in the Philippines, it is important to fix its status by general
rules on the principle that the lapse of a fixed period legalizes completely all possession,
recommends in two articles twenty and thirty years, as adopted in the decree, and then
suggests that interested parties not included in those articles may legalize their possession
and acquire ownership by adjustment at a certain price.
It is true that the language of Articles 4 and 5 attributes title to those "who may prove"
possession for the necessary time, and we do not overlook the argument that this means
may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words "may prove" (acrediten), as well, or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost.
Page 212 U. S. 463

The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law. The royal decree of February 13, 1894,
declaring forfeited titles that were capable of adjustment under the decree of 1880, for
which adjustment had not been sought, should not be construed as a confiscation, but as
the withdrawal of a privilege. As a matter of fact, the applicant never was disturbed. This
same decree is quoted by the Court of Land Registration for another recognition of the
common law prescription of thirty years as still running against alienable Crown land.

It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem
not without difficulties for courts of a different legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on
that account to notice the possible effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of
Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed. Upon a consideration
of the whole case, we are of opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should
be granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief of
those among whom he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost
forgotten law of Spain.

Judgment reversed.

fRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner, vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY and AMARI COASTAL BAY
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
This is an original Petition for Mandamus with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and a temporary restraining order. The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Authority
(PEA for brevity) to disclose all facts on PEAs then on-going renegotiations with Amari
Coastal Bay and Development Corporation (AMARI for brevity) to reclaim portions of Manila
Bay. The petition further seeks to enjoin PEA from signing a new agreement with AMARI
involving such reclamation.
The Facts
On November 20, 1973, the government, through the Commissioner of Public
Highways, signed a contract with the Construction and Development Corporation of the
Philippines (CDCP for brevity) to reclaim certain foreshore and offshore areas of Manila
Bay. The contract also included the construction of Phases I and II of the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road. CDCP obligated itself to carry out all the works in consideration of fifty percent
of the total reclaimed land.
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1084 creating PEA. PD No. 1084 tasked PEA to reclaim land, including foreshore and
submerged areas, and to develop, improve, acquire, x x x lease and sell any and all kinds of
lands.[1]On the same date, then President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1085
transferring to PEA the lands reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore of the Manila
Bay[2] under the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP).
On December 29, 1981, then President Marcos issued a memorandum directing PEA to
amend its contract with CDCP, so that [A]ll future works in MCCRRP x x x shall be funded and
owned by PEA. Accordingly, PEA and CDCP executed a Memorandum of Agreement dated
December 29, 1981, which stated:
(i) CDCP shall undertake all reclamation, construction, and such other works in the
MCC
(ii) RRP as may be agreed upon by the parties, to be paid according to progress of works
on a unit price/lump sum basis for items of work to be agreed upon, subject to price
escalation, retention and other terms and conditions provided for in Presidential
Decree No. 1594. All the financing required for such works shall be provided by PEA.
xxx
(iii) x x x CDCP shall give up all its development rights and hereby agrees to cede and transfer
in favor of PEA, all of the rights, title, interest and participation of CDCP in and to all the
areas of land reclaimed by CDCP in the MCCRRP as of December 30, 1981 which have not yet
been sold, transferred or otherwise disposed of by CDCP as of said date, which areas consist
of approximately Ninety-Nine Thousand Four Hundred Seventy Three (99,473) square
meters in the Financial Center Area covered by land pledge No. 5 and approximately Three
Million Three Hundred Eighty Two Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty Eight (3,382,888) square
meters of reclaimed areas at varying elevations above Mean Low Water Level located
outside the Financial Center Area and the First Neighborhood Unit. [3]
On January 19, 1988, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517,
granting and transferring to PEA the parcels of land so reclaimed under the Manila-Cavite
Coastal Road and Reclamation Project (MCCRRP) containing a total area of one million nine
hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters.
Subsequently, on April 9, 1988, the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of Paraaque issued
Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 7309, 7311, and 7312, in the name of PEA, covering the
three reclaimed islands known as the Freedom Islands located at the southern portion of the
Manila-Cavite Coastal Road, Paraaque City. The Freedom Islands have a total land area of
One Million Five Hundred Seventy Eight Thousand Four Hundred and Forty One (1,578,441)
square meters or 157.841 hectares.
On April 25, 1995, PEA entered into a Joint Venture Agreement (JVA for brevity) with
AMARI, a private corporation, to develop the Freedom Islands. The JVA also required the
reclamation of an additional 250 hectares of submerged areas surrounding these islands to
complete the configuration in the Master Development Plan of the Southern Reclamation
Project-MCCRRP. PEA and AMARI entered into the JVA through negotiation without public
bidding.[4] On April 28, 1995, the Board of Directors of PEA, in its Resolution No. 1245,
confirmed the JVA. [5] On June 8, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos, through then Executive
Secretary Ruben Torres, approved the JVA.[6]
On November 29, 1996, then Senate President Ernesto Maceda delivered a privilege
speech in the Senate and denounced the JVA as the grandmother of all scams. As a result,
the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises, and the
Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, conducted a joint
investigation. The Senate Committees reported the results of their investigation in Senate
Committee Report No. 560 dated September 16, 1997. [7] Among the conclusions of their
report are: (1) the reclaimed lands PEA seeks to transfer to AMARI under the JVA are lands of
the public domain which the government has not classified as alienable lands and therefore
PEA cannot alienate these lands; (2) the certificates of title covering the Freedom Islands are
thus void, and (3) the JVA itself is illegal.
On December 5, 1997, then President Fidel V. Ramos issued Presidential Administrative
Order No. 365 creating a Legal Task Force to conduct a study on the legality of the JVA in
view of Senate Committee Report No. 560. The members of the Legal Task Force were the
Secretary of Justice,[8] the Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,[9] and the Government Corporate
Counsel.[10] The Legal Task Force upheld the legality of the JVA, contrary to the conclusions
reached by the Senate Committees.[11]
On April 4 and 5, 1998, the Philippine Daily Inquirer and Today published reports that
there were on-going renegotiations between PEA and AMARI under an order issued by then
President Fidel V. Ramos. According to these reports, PEA Director Nestor Kalaw, PEA
Chairman Arsenio Yulo and retired Navy Officer Sergio Cruz composed the negotiating panel
of PEA.
On April 13, 1998, Antonio M. Zulueta filed before the Court a Petition for Prohibition
with Application for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction docketed as G.R. No. 132994 seeking to nullify the JVA. The Court dismissed the
petition for unwarranted disregard of judicial hierarchy, without prejudice to the refiling of
the case before the proper court.[12]
On April 27, 1998, petitioner Frank I. Chavez (Petitioner for brevity) as a taxpayer, filed
the instant Petition for Mandamus with Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. Petitioner contends the government stands to
lose billions of pesos in the sale by PEA of the reclaimed lands to AMARI. Petitioner prays
that PEA publicly disclose the terms of any renegotiation of the JVA, invoking Section 28,
Article II, and Section 7, Article III, of the 1987 Constitution on the right of the people to
information on matters of public concern. Petitioner assails the sale to AMARI of lands of the
public domain as a blatant violation of Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting the sale of alienable lands of the public domain to private corporations. Finally,
petitioner asserts that he seeks to enjoin the loss of billions of pesos in properties of the
State that are of public dominion.
After several motions for extension of time, [13] PEA and AMARI filed their Comments on
October 19, 1998 and June 25, 1998, respectively. Meanwhile, on December 28, 1998,
petitioner filed an Omnibus Motion: (a) to require PEA to submit the terms of the
renegotiated PEA-AMARI contract; (b) for issuance of a temporary restraining order; and (c)
to set the case for hearing on oral argument.Petitioner filed a Reiterative Motion for
Issuance of a TRO dated May 26, 1999, which the Court denied in a Resolution dated June
22, 1999.
In a Resolution dated March 23, 1999, the Court gave due course to the petition and
required the parties to file their respective memoranda.
On March 30, 1999, PEA and AMARI signed the Amended Joint Venture Agreement
(Amended JVA, for brevity). On May 28, 1999, the Office of the President under the
administration of then President Joseph E. Estrada approved the Amended JVA.
Due to the approval of the Amended JVA by the Office of the President, petitioner now
prays that on constitutional and statutory grounds the renegotiated contract be declared
null and void.[14]
The Issues
The issues raised by petitioner, PEA[15] and AMARI[16] are as follows:
I. WHETHER THE PRINCIPAL RELIEFS PRAYED FOR IN THE PETITION ARE MOOT AND
ACADEMIC BECAUSE OF SUBSEQUENT EVENTS;
II. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR FAILING TO OBSERVE THE
PRINCIPLE GOVERNING THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS;
III. WHETHER THE PETITION MERITS DISMISSAL FOR NON-EXHAUSTION OF
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES;
IV. WHETHER PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO BRING THIS SUIT;
V. WHETHER THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO INFORMATION INCLUDES OFFICIAL
INFORMATION ON ON-GOING NEGOTIATIONS BEFORE A FINAL AGREEMENT;
VI. WHETHER THE STIPULATIONS IN THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT
FOR THE TRANSFER TO AMARI OF CERTAIN LANDS, RECLAIMED AND STILL TO
BE RECLAIMED, VIOLATE THE 1987 CONSTITUTION; AND
VII. WHETHER THE COURT IS THE PROPER FORUM FOR RAISING THE ISSUE OF
WHETHER THE AMENDED JOINT VENTURE AGREEMENT IS GROSSLY
DISADVANTAGEOUS TO THE GOVERNMENT.
 The Courts Ruling
First issue: whether the principal reliefs prayed for in the petition are moot and academic
because of subsequent events.
The petition prays that PEA publicly disclose the terms and conditions of the on-going
negotiations for a new agreement. The petition also prays that the Court enjoin PEA from
privately entering into, perfecting and/or executing any new agreement with AMARI.
PEA and AMARI claim the petition is now moot and academic because AMARI furnished
petitioner on June 21, 1999 a copy of the signed Amended JVA containing the terms and
conditions agreed upon in the renegotiations. Thus, PEA has satisfied petitioners prayer for a
public disclosure of the renegotiations. Likewise, petitioners prayer to enjoin the signing of
the Amended JVA is now moot because PEA and AMARI have already signed the Amended
JVA on March 30, 1999. Moreover, the Office of the President has approved the Amended
JVA on May 28, 1999.
Petitioner counters that PEA and AMARI cannot avoid the constitutional issue by simply
fast-tracking the signing and approval of the Amended JVA before the Court could act on the
issue. Presidential approval does not resolve the constitutional issue or remove it from the
ambit of judicial review.
We rule that the signing of the Amended JVA by PEA and AMARI and its approval by the
President cannot operate to moot the petition and divest the Court of its jurisdiction. PEA
and AMARI have still to implement the Amended JVA. The prayer to enjoin the signing of the
Amended JVA on constitutional grounds necessarily includes preventing its implementation
if in the meantime PEA and AMARI have signed one in violation of the
Constitution. Petitioners principal basis in assailing the renegotiation of the JVA is its
violation of Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, which prohibits the government from
alienating lands of the public domain to private corporations. If the Amended JVA indeed
violates the Constitution, it is the duty of the Court to enjoin its implementation, and if
already implemented, to annul the effects of such unconstitutional contract.
The Amended JVA is not an ordinary commercial contract but one which seeks
to transfer title and ownership to 367.5 hectares of reclaimed lands and submerged areas
of Manila Bay to a single private corporation. It now becomes more compelling for the
Court to resolve the issue to insure the government itself does not violate a provision of the
Constitution intended to safeguard the national patrimony.Supervening events, whether
intended or accidental, cannot prevent the Court from rendering a decision if there is a grave
violation of the Constitution. In the instant case, if the Amended JVA runs counter to the
Constitution, the Court can still prevent the transfer of title and ownership of alienable lands
of the public domain in the name of AMARI. Even in cases where supervening events had
made the cases moot, the Court did not hesitate to resolve the legal or constitutional issues
raised to formulate controlling principles to guide the bench, bar, and the public. [17]
Also, the instant petition is a case of first impression. All previous decisions of the Court
involving Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, or its counterpart provision in the
1973 Constitution,[18] covered agricultural lands sold to private corporations which acquired
the lands from private parties. The transferors of the private corporations claimed or could
claim the right to judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles[19] under Title II of
Commonwealth Act. 141 (CA No. 141 for brevity). In the instant case, AMARI seeks to
acquire from PEA, a public corporation, reclaimed lands and submerged areas for non-
agricultural purposes by purchase under PD No. 1084 (charter of PEA) and Title III of CA No.
141. Certain undertakings by AMARI under the Amended JVA constitute the consideration
for the purchase. Neither AMARI nor PEA can claim judicial confirmation of their titles
because the lands covered by the Amended JVA are newly reclaimed or still to be
reclaimed. Judicial confirmation of imperfect title requires open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain for at least thirty years since
June 12, 1945 or earlier. Besides, the deadline for filing applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect title expired on December 31, 1987. [20]
Lastly, there is a need to resolve immediately the constitutional issue raised in this
petition because of the possible transfer at any time by PEA to AMARI of title and ownership
to portions of the reclaimed lands. Under the Amended JVA, PEA is obligated to transfer to
AMARI the latters seventy percent proportionate share in the reclaimed areas as the
reclamation progresses. The Amended JVA even allows AMARI to mortgage at any time
the entire reclaimed area to raise financing for the reclamation project. [21]
Second issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for failing to observe the principle
governing the hierarchy of courts.
PEA and AMARI claim petitioner ignored the judicial hierarchy by seeking relief directly
from the Court. The principle of hierarchy of courts applies generally to cases involving
factual questions. As it is not a trier of facts, the Court cannot entertain cases involving
factual issues. The instant case, however, raises constitutional issues of transcendental
importance to the public. [22] The Court can resolve this case without determining any factual
issue related to the case. Also, the instant case is a petition for mandamus which falls under
the originaljurisdiction of the Court under Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution. We
resolve to exercise primary jurisdiction over the instant case.
 Third issue: whether the petition merits dismissal for non-exhaustion of administrative
remedies.
PEA faults petitioner for seeking judicial intervention in compelling PEA to disclose
publicly certain information without first asking PEA the needed information. PEA claims
petitioners direct resort to the Court violates the principle of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. It also violates the rule that mandamus may issue only if there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
PEA distinguishes the instant case from Taada v. Tuvera[23] where the Court granted the
petition for mandamus even if the petitioners there did not initially demand from the Office
of the President the publication of the presidential decrees. PEA points out that in Taada,
the Executive Department had an affirmative statutory duty under Article 2 of the Civil
Code[24] and Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 638 [25]to publish the presidential decrees.
There was, therefore, no need for the petitioners in Taada to make an initial demand from
the Office of the President. In the instant case, PEA claims it has no affirmative statutory
duty to disclose publicly information about its renegotiation of the JVA. Thus, PEA asserts
that the Court must apply the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies to the
instant case in view of the failure of petitioner here to demand initially from PEA the needed
information.
The original JVA sought to dispose to AMARI public lands held by PEA, a government
corporation. Under Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code, [26]2 the disposition of
government lands to private parties requires public bidding. PEA was under a positive legal
duty to disclose to the public the terms and conditions for the sale of its lands. The law
obligated PEA to make this public disclosure even without demand from petitioner or from
anyone. PEA failed to make this public disclosure because the original JVA, like the Amended
JVA, was the result of a negotiated contract, not of a public bidding. Considering that PEA
had an affirmative statutory duty to make the public disclosure, and was even in breach of
this legal duty, petitioner had the right to seek direct judicial intervention.
Moreover, and this alone is determinative of this issue, the principle of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply when the issue involved is a purely legal or
constitutional question.[27] The principal issue in the instant case is the capacity of AMARI to
acquire lands held by PEA in view of the constitutional ban prohibiting the alienation of
lands of the public domain to private corporations. We rule that the principle of exhaustion
of administrative remedies does not apply in the instant case.
Fourth issue: whether petitioner has locus standi to bring this suit
PEA argues that petitioner has no standing to institute mandamus proceedings to
enforce his constitutional right to information without a showing that PEA refused to
perform an affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the Constitution. PEA also claims that
petitioner has not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury because of the signing or
implementation of the Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy requiring the
exercise of the power of judicial review.
The petitioner has standing to bring this taxpayers suit because the petition seeks to
compel PEA to comply with its constitutional duties.There are two constitutional issues
involved here. First is the right of citizens to information on matters of public
concern. Second is the application of a constitutional provision intended to insure the
equitable distribution of alienable lands of the public domain among Filipino citizens. The
thrust of the first issue is to compel PEA to disclose publicly information on the sale of
government lands worth billions of pesos, information which the Constitution and statutory
law mandate PEA to disclose. The thrust of the second issue is to prevent PEA from
alienating hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the public domain in violation of the
Constitution, compelling PEA to comply with a constitutional duty to the nation.
Moreover, the petition raises matters of transcendental importance to the
public. In Chavez v. PCGG,[28] the Court upheld the right of a citizen to bring a taxpayers suit
on matters of transcendental importance to the public, thus -
Besides, petitioner emphasizes, the matter of recovering the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses is an issue of transcendental importance to the public. He asserts that ordinary
taxpayers have a right to initiate and prosecute actions questioning the validity of acts or
orders of government agencies or instrumentalities, if the issues raised are of paramount
public interest, and if they immediately affect the social, economic and moral well being of
the people.
Moreover, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of personal interest,
when the proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, such as in this case. He invokes
several decisions of this Court which have set aside the procedural matter of locus standi,
when the subject of the case involved public interest.
xxx
In Taada v. Tuvera, the Court asserted that when the issue concerns a public right and the
object of mandamus is to obtain the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded
as the real parties in interest; and because it is sufficient that petitioner is a citizen and as
such is interested in the execution of the laws, he need not show that he has any legal or
special interest in the result of the action. In the aforesaid case, the petitioners sought to
enforce their right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right then recognized in
Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, in connection with the rule that laws in order
to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively
promulgated. In ruling for the petitioners' legal standing, the Court declared that the right
they sought to be enforced is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law
of the land.
Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission, while reiterating Taada, further declared that when a
mandamus proceeding involves the assertion of a public right, the requirement of personal
interest is satisfied by the mere fact that petitioner is a citizen and, therefore, part of the
general 'public' which possesses the right.
Further, in Albano v. Reyes, we said that while expenditure of public funds may not have
been involved under the questioned contract for the development, management and
operation of the Manila International Container Terminal, public interest [was] definitely
involved considering the important role [of the subject contract] . . . in the economic
development of the country and the magnitude of the financial consideration involved. We
concluded that, as a consequence, the disclosure provision in the Constitution would
constitute sufficient authority for upholding the petitioner's standing.
Similarly, the instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and
access to official records, documents and papers a right guaranteed under Section 7, Article
III of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner, a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen. Because
of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down by decisional law to sustain
petitioner's legal standing, i.e. (1) the enforcement of a public right (2) espoused by a
Filipino citizen, we rule that the petition at bar should be allowed.
We rule that since the instant petition, brought by a citizen, involves the enforcement of
constitutional rights - to information and to the equitable diffusion of natural
resources - matters of transcendental public importance, the petitioner has the
requisite locus standi.
Fifth issue: whether the constitutional right to information includes official information on
on-going negotiations before a final agreement.
Section 7, Article III of the Constitution explains the peoples right to information on
matters of public concern in this manner:
Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official
acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for
policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)
The State policy of full transparency in all transactions involving public interest reinforces the
peoples right to information on matters of public concern. This State policy is expressed in
Section 28, Article II of the Constitution, thus:
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and
implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
(Emphasis supplied)
These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-
making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient
information to exercise effectively other constitutional rights. These twin provisions are
essential to the exercise of freedom of expression. If the government does not disclose its
official acts, transactions and decisions to citizens, whatever citizens say, even if expressed
without any restraint, will be speculative and amount to nothing. These twin provisions are
also essential to hold public officials at all times x x x accountable to the people, [29] for unless
citizens have the proper information, they cannot hold public officials accountable for
anything. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions
leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. An
informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy. As
explained by the Court in Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.[30]
An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of
communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State
that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government
may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective
only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have
access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
PEA asserts, citing Chavez v. PCGG,[31] that in cases of on-going negotiations the right to
information is limited to definite propositions of the government. PEA maintains the right
does not include access to intra-agency or inter-agency recommendations or
communications during the stage when common assertions are still in the process of being
formulated or are in the exploratory stage.
Also, AMARI contends that petitioner cannot invoke the right at the pre-decisional stage
or before the closing of the transaction. To support its contention, AMARI cites the following
discussion in the 1986 Constitutional Commission:
Mr. Suarez. And when we say transactions which should be distinguished from contracts,
agreements, or treaties or whatever, does the Gentleman refer to the steps leading to the
consummation of the contract, or does he refer to the contract itself?
Mr. Ople: The transactions used here, I suppose is generic and therefore, it can cover both
steps leading to a contract and already a consummated contract, Mr. Presiding Officer.
Mr. Suarez: This contemplates inclusion of negotiations leading to the consummation of
the transaction.
Mr. Ople: Yes, subject only to reasonable safeguards on the national interest.
Mr. Suarez: Thank you.[32] (Emphasis supplied)
AMARI argues there must first be a consummated contract before petitioner can invoke the
right. Requiring government officials to reveal their deliberations at the pre-decisional stage
will degrade the quality of decision-making in government agencies. Government officials
will hesitate to express their real sentiments during deliberations if there is immediate public
dissemination of their discussions, putting them under all kinds of pressure before they
decide.
We must first distinguish between information the law on public bidding requires PEA
to disclose publicly, and information the constitutional right to information requires PEA to
release to the public. Before the consummation of the contract, PEA must, on its own and
without demand from anyone, disclose to the public matters relating to the disposition of its
property. These include the size, location, technical description and nature of the property
being disposed of, the terms and conditions of the disposition, the parties qualified to bid,
the minimum price and similar information. PEA must prepare all these data and disclose
them to the public at the start of the disposition process, long before the consummation of
the contract, because the Government Auditing Code requires public bidding. If PEA fails to
make this disclosure, any citizen can demand from PEA this information at any time during
the bidding process.
Information, however, on on-going evaluation or review of bids or proposals being
undertaken by the bidding or review committee is not immediately accessible under the
right to information. While the evaluation or review is still on-going, there are no official
acts, transactions, or decisions on the bids or proposals. However, once the committee
makes its official recommendation, there arises a definite proposition on the part of the
government. From this moment, the publics right to information attaches, and any citizen
can access all the non-proprietary information leading to such definite
proposition. In Chavez v. PCGG,[33] the Court ruled as follows:
Considering the intent of the framers of the Constitution, we believe that it is incumbent
upon the PCGG and its officers, as well as other government representatives, to disclose
sufficient public information on any proposed settlement they have decided to take up with
the ostensible owners and holders of ill-gotten wealth. Such information, though, must
pertain to definite propositions of the government, not necessarily to intra-agency or inter-
agency recommendations or communications during the stage when common assertions are
still in the process of being formulated or are in the exploratory stage. There is need, of
course, to observe the same restrictions on disclosure of information in general, as discussed
earlier such as on matters involving national security, diplomatic or foreign relations,
intelligence and other classified information. (Emphasis supplied)
Contrary to AMARIs contention, the commissioners of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission understood that the right to information contemplates inclusion of
negotiations leading to the consummation of the transaction. Certainly, a consummated
contract is not a requirement for the exercise of the right to information. Otherwise, the
people can never exercise the right if no contract is consummated, and if one is
consummated, it may be too late for the public to expose its defects.
Requiring a consummated contract will keep the public in the dark until the contract,
which may be grossly disadvantageous to the government or even illegal, becomes a fait
accompli. This negates the State policy of full transparency on matters of public concern, a
situation which the framers of the Constitution could not have intended. Such a requirement
will prevent the citizenry from participating in the public discussion of
any proposed contract, effectively truncating a basic right enshrined in the Bill of Rights. We
can allow neither an emasculation of a constitutional right, nor a retreat by the State of its
avowed policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.
The right covers three categories of information which are matters of public concern,
namely: (1) official records; (2) documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions
and decisions; and (3) government research data used in formulating policies. The first
category refers to any document that is part of the public records in the custody of
government agencies or officials. The second category refers to documents and papers
recording, evidencing, establishing, confirming, supporting, justifying or explaining official
acts, transactions or decisions of government agencies or officials. The third category refers
to research data, whether raw, collated or processed, owned by the government and used in
formulating government policies.
The information that petitioner may access on the renegotiation of the JVA includes
evaluation reports, recommendations, legal and expert opinions, minutes of meetings, terms
of reference and other documents attached to such reports or minutes, all relating to the
JVA.However, the right to information does not compel PEA to prepare lists, abstracts,
summaries and the like relating to the renegotiation of the JVA. [34] The right only affords
access to records, documents and papers, which means the opportunity to inspect and copy
them. One who exercises the right must copy the records, documents and papers at his
expense. The exercise of the right is also subject to reasonable regulations to protect the
integrity of the public records and to minimize disruption to government operations, like
rules specifying when and how to conduct the inspection and copying. [35]
The right to information, however, does not extend to matters recognized as privileged
information under the separation of powers. [36] The right does not also apply to information
on military and diplomatic secrets, information affecting national security, and information
on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the prosecution of the
accused, which courts have long recognized as confidential. [37] The right may also be subject
to other limitations that Congress may impose by law.
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged
information rooted in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential
conversations, correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which,
like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive
sessions of either house of Congress, [38] are recognized as confidential. This kind of
information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank exchange of
exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those
tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. [39] This is not the situation in
the instant case.
We rule, therefore, that the constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract. The information, however,
must constitute definite propositions by the government and should not cover recognized
exceptions like privileged information, military and diplomatic secrets and similar matters
affecting national security and public order. [40] Congress has also prescribed other limitations
on the right to information in several legislations. [41]
Sixth issue: whether stipulations in the Amended JVA for the transfer to AMARI of lands,
reclaimed or to be reclaimed, violate the Constitution.
The Regalian Doctrine
The ownership of lands reclaimed from foreshore and submerged areas is rooted in the
Regalian doctrine which holds that the State owns all lands and waters of the public
domain. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and
possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. [42] The King, as the sovereign
ruler and representative of the people, acquired and owned all lands and territories in the
Philippines except those he disposed of by grant or sale to private individuals.
The 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions adopted the Regalian doctrine substituting,
however, the State, in lieu of the King, as the owner of all lands and waters of the public
domain. The Regalian doctrine is the foundation of the time-honored principle of land
ownership that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or
by grant, belong to the public domain. [43] Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889, which is now
Article 420 of the Civil Code of 1950, incorporated the Regalian doctrine.
Ownership and Disposition of Reclaimed Lands
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 was the first statutory law governing the ownership
and disposition of reclaimed lands in the Philippines. On May 18, 1907, the Philippine
Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which provided for the lease, but not the sale, of
reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. Later, on November 29,
1919, the Philippine Legislature approved Act No. 2874, the Public Land Act, which
authorized the lease, but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to
corporations and individuals. On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly passed
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, which authorized the lease,
but not the sale, of reclaimed lands of the government to corporations and individuals. CA
No. 141 continues to this day as the general law governing the classification and disposition
of lands of the public domain.
The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 and the Civil Code of 1889
Under the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, the shores, bays, coves, inlets and all waters
within the maritime zone of the Spanish territory belonged to the public domain for public
use.[44] The Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 allowed the reclamation of the sea under Article
5, which provided as follows:
Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or
by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of
the grant of authority.
Under the Spanish Law of Waters, land reclaimed from the sea belonged to the party
undertaking the reclamation, provided the government issued the necessary permit and did
not reserve ownership of the reclaimed land to the State.
Article 339 of the Civil Code of 1889 defined property of public dominion as follows:
Art. 339. Property of public dominion is
1. That devoted to public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, riverbanks, shores, roadsteads, and that of a
similar character;
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public
use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the national
wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the
territory, and mines, until granted to private individuals.
Property devoted to public use referred to property open for use by the public. In contrast,
property devoted to public service referred to property used for some specific public service
and open only to those authorized to use the property.
Property of public dominion referred not only to property devoted to public use, but
also to property not so used but employed to develop the national wealth. This class of
property constituted property of public dominion although employed for some economic or
commercial activity to increase the national wealth.
Article 341 of the Civil Code of 1889 governed the re-classification of property of public
dominion into private property, to wit:
Art. 341. Property of public dominion, when no longer devoted to public use or to the
defense of the territory, shall become a part of the private property of the State.
This provision, however, was not self-executing. The legislature, or the executive department
pursuant to law, must declare the property no longer needed for public use or territorial
defense before the government could lease or alienate the property to private parties. [45]
Act No. 1654 of the Philippine Commission
On May 8, 1907, the Philippine Commission enacted Act No. 1654 which regulated the
lease of reclaimed and foreshore lands. The salient provisions of this law were as follows:
Section 1. The control and disposition of the foreshore as defined in existing law, and
the title to all Government or public lands made or reclaimed by the Government by
dredging or filling or otherwise throughout the Philippine Islands, shall be retained by the
Government without prejudice to vested rights and without prejudice to rights conceded to
the City of Manila in the Luneta Extension.
Section 2. (a) The Secretary of the Interior shall cause all Government or public lands made
or reclaimed by the Government by dredging or filling or otherwise to be divided into lots or
blocks, with the necessary streets and alleyways located thereon, and shall cause plats and
plans of such surveys to be prepared and filed with the Bureau of Lands.
(b) Upon completion of such plats and plans the Governor-General shall give notice to the
public that such parts of the lands so made or reclaimed as are not needed for public
purposes will be leased for commercial and business purposes, x x x.
xxx
(e) The leases above provided for shall be disposed of to the highest and best
bidder therefore, subject to such regulations and safeguards as the Governor-General may
by executive order prescribe. (Emphasis supplied)
Act No. 1654 mandated that the government should retain title to all lands reclaimed
by the government. The Act also vested in the government control and disposition of
foreshore lands. Private parties could lease lands reclaimed by the government only if these
lands were no longer needed for public purpose. Act No. 1654 mandated public bidding in
the lease of government reclaimed lands. Act No. 1654 made government reclaimed
lands sui generis in that unlike other public lands which the government could sell to private
parties, these reclaimed lands were available only for lease to private parties.
Act No. 1654, however, did not repeal Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866. Act No. 1654 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea under
Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters. Lands reclaimed from the sea by private parties with
government permission remained private lands.
Act No. 2874 of the Philippine Legislature
On November 29, 1919, the Philippine Legislature enacted Act No. 2874, the Public
Land Act.[46] The salient provisions of Act No. 2874, on reclaimed lands, were as follows:
Sec. 6. The Governor-General, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
 (a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands, x x x.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the government and disposition of alienable or disposable public
lands, the Governor-General, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited or classified x x x.
xxx
Sec. 55. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral land,
shall be classified as suitable for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural purposes, and shall be open to disposition or
concession, shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter, and not otherwise.
Sec. 56. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
x x x.
Sec. 58. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-six shall be disposed
of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the Governor-General,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources,shall declare
that the same are not necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under
this chapter. The lands included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the
provisions of this Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 6 of Act No. 2874 authorized the Governor-General to classify lands of the
public domain into x x x alienable or disposable [47]lands. Section 7 of the Act empowered the
Governor-General to declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. Section 8 of
the Act limited alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially
delimited and classified.
Section 56 of Act No. 2874 stated that lands disposable under this title [48] shall be
classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands, as well as other lands. All
these lands, however, must be suitable for residential, commercial, industrial or other
productive non-agricultural purposes. These provisions vested upon the Governor-General
the power to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into disposable lands of the
public domain. These provisions also empowered the Governor-General to classify further
such disposable lands of the public domain into government reclaimed, foreshore or marshy
lands of the public domain, as well as other non-agricultural lands.
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that disposable lands of the public
domain classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands shall be disposed
of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise. The Governor-General, before
allowing the lease of these lands to private parties, must formally declare that the lands
were not necessary for the public service. Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease
and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain, a
policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No. 1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain that the government could not sell to private parties.
The rationale behind this State policy is obvious. Government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy public lands for non-agricultural purposes retain their inherent potential as areas for
public service. This is the reason the government prohibited the sale, and only allowed the
lease, of these lands to private parties. The State always reserved these lands for some
future public service.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of government reclaimed, foreshore
and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under
Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes the government could sell
to private parties. Thus, under Act No. 2874, the government could not sell government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature passed a
law allowing their sale.[49]
Act No. 2874 did not prohibit private parties from reclaiming parts of the sea pursuant
to Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.Lands reclaimed from the sea by private
parties with government permission remained private lands.
Dispositions under the 1935 Constitution
On May 14, 1935, the 1935 Constitution took effect upon its ratification by the Filipino
people. The 1935 Constitution, in adopting the Regalian doctrine, declared in Section 1,
Article XIII, that
Section 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals,
coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural
resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens,
subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of
the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception
of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted
for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as
to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of
the grant.(Emphasis supplied)
The 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural resources except public
agricultural lands, which were the only natural resources the State could alienate. Thus,
foreshore lands, considered part of the States natural resources, became inalienable by
constitutional fiat, available only for lease for 25 years, renewable for another 25 years. The
government could alienate foreshore lands only after these lands were reclaimed and
classified as alienable agricultural lands of the public domain. Government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain, being neither timber nor mineral lands, fell under the
classification of public agricultural lands. [50] However, government reclaimed and marshy
lands, although subject to classification as disposable public agricultural lands, could only be
leased and not sold to private parties because of Act No. 2874.
The prohibition on private parties from acquiring ownership of government reclaimed
and marshy lands of the public domain was only a statutory prohibition and the legislature
could therefore remove such prohibition. The 1935 Constitution did not prohibit individuals
and corporations from acquiring government reclaimed and marshy lands of the public
domain that were classified as agricultural lands under existing public land laws. Section 2,
Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution provided as follows:
Section 2. No private corporation or association may acquire, lease, or hold public
agricultural lands in excess of one thousand and twenty four hectares, nor may any
individual acquire such lands by purchase in excess of one hundred and forty hectares, or
by lease in excess of one thousand and twenty-four hectares, or by homestead in excess of
twenty-four hectares. Lands adapted to grazing, not exceeding two thousand hectares, may
be leased to an individual, private corporation, or association. (Emphasis supplied)
Still, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, the legislature did not repeal Section 58 of
Act No. 2874 to open for sale to private parties government reclaimed and marshy lands of
the public domain. On the contrary, the legislature continued the long established State
policy of retaining for the government title and ownership of government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the public domain.
Commonwealth Act No. 141 of the Philippine National Assembly
On November 7, 1936, the National Assembly approved Commonwealth Act No. 141,
also known as the Public Land Act, which compiled the then existing laws on lands of the
public domain. CA No. 141, as amended, remains to this day the existing general
law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands.[51]
Section 6 of CA No. 141 empowers the President to classify lands of the public domain
into alienable or disposable[52] lands of the public domain, which prior to such classification
are inalienable and outside the commerce of man. Section 7 of CA No. 141 authorizes the
President to declare what lands are open to disposition or concession. Section 8 of CA No.
141 states that the government can declare open for disposition or concession only lands
that are officially delimited and classified. Sections 6, 7 and 8 of CA No. 141 read as follows:
Sec. 6. The President, upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time classify the lands of the public domain into
(a) Alienable or disposable,
(b) Timber, and
(c) Mineral lands,
and may at any time and in like manner transfer such lands from one class to another, [53] for
the purpose of their administration and disposition.
Sec. 7. For the purposes of the administration and disposition of alienable or disposable
public lands, the President, upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, shall from time to time declare what lands are open to disposition or
concession under this Act.
Sec. 8. Only those lands shall be declared open to disposition or concession which have
been officially delimited and classifiedand, when practicable, surveyed, and which have not
been reserved for public or quasi-public uses, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in
any manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and
recognized by this Act or any other valid law may be claimed, or which, having been reserved
or appropriated, have ceased to be so. x x x.
Thus, before the government could alienate or dispose of lands of the public domain, the
President must first officially classify these lands as alienable or disposable, and then declare
them open to disposition or concession. There must be no law reserving these lands for
public or quasi-public uses.
The salient provisions of CA No. 141, on government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
lands of the public domain, are as follows:
Sec. 58. Any tract of land of the public domain which, being neither timber nor mineral
land, is intended to be used for residential purposes or for commercial, industrial, or other
productive purposes other than agricultural, and is open to disposition or concession, shall
be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the Government by dredging, filling, or other means;
(b) Foreshore;
(c) Marshy lands or lands covered with water bordering upon the shores or banks
of navigable lakes or rivers;
(d) Lands not included in any of the foregoing classes.
Sec. 60. Any tract of land comprised under this title may be leased or sold, as the case may
be, to any person, corporation, or association authorized to purchase or lease public lands
for agricultural purposes. x x x.
Sec. 61. The lands comprised in classes (a), (b), and (c) of section fifty-nine shall be
disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise, as soon as the President,
upon recommendation by the Secretary of Agriculture, shall declare that the same are not
necessary for the public service and are open to disposition under this chapter. The lands
included in class (d) may be disposed of by sale or lease under the provisions of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 61 of CA No. 141 readopted, after the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution,
Section 58 of Act No. 2874 prohibiting the sale of government reclaimed, foreshore and
marshy disposable lands of the public domain. All these lands are intended for residential,
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural purposes. As before, Section 61 allowed
only the lease of such lands to private parties. The government could sell to private parties
only lands falling under Section 59 (d) of CA No. 141, or those lands for non-agricultural
purposes not classified as government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands of
the public domain. Foreshore lands, however, became inalienable under the 1935
Constitution which only allowed the lease of these lands to qualified private parties.
Section 58 of CA No. 141 expressly states that disposable lands of the public domain
intended for residential, commercial, industrial or other productive purposes other than
agricultural shall be disposed of under the provisions of this chapter and not otherwise.
Under Section 10 of CA No. 141, the term disposition includes lease of the land. Any
disposition of government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy disposable lands for non-
agricultural purposes must comply with Chapter IX, Title III of CA No. 141, [54] unless a
subsequent law amended or repealed these provisions.
In his concurring opinion in the landmark case of Republic Real Estate Corporation v.
Court of Appeals,[55] Justice Reynato S. Puno summarized succinctly the law on this matter, as
follows:
Foreshore lands are lands of public dominion intended for public use. So too are lands
reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other means. Act 1654 mandated that
the control and disposition of the foreshore and lands under water remained in the national
government. Said law allowed only the leasing of reclaimed land. The Public Land Acts of
1919 and 1936 also declared that the foreshore and lands reclaimed by the government
were to be disposed of to private parties by lease only and not otherwise. Before leasing,
however, the Governor-General, upon recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, had first to determine that the land reclaimed was not necessary for the
public service. This requisite must have been met before the land could be disposed of. But
even then, the foreshore and lands under water were not to be alienated and sold to
private parties. The disposition of the reclaimed land was only by lease. The land
remained property of the State. (Emphasis supplied)
As observed by Justice Puno in his concurring opinion, Commonwealth Act No. 141 has
remained in effect at present.
The State policy prohibiting the sale to private parties of government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain, first implemented in 1907 was
thus reaffirmed in CA No. 141 after the 1935 Constitution took effect. The prohibition on the
sale of foreshore lands, however, became a constitutional edict under the 1935 Constitution.
Foreshore lands became inalienable as natural resources of the State, unless reclaimed by
the government and classified as agricultural lands of the public domain, in which case they
would fall under the classification of government reclaimed lands.
After the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution, government reclaimed and marshy
disposable lands of the public domain continued to be only leased and not sold to private
parties.[56] These lands remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain the government could not sell to private parties.
 Since then and until now, the only way the government can sell to private parties
government reclaimed and marshy disposable lands of the public domain is for the
legislature to pass a law authorizing such sale. CA No. 141 does not authorize the President
to reclassify government reclaimed and marshy lands into other non-agricultural lands under
Section 59 (d). Lands classified under Section 59 (d) are the only alienable or disposable
lands for non-agricultural purposes that the government could sell to private parties.
Moreover, Section 60 of CA No. 141 expressly requires congressional authority before
lands under Section 59 that the government previously transferred to government units or
entities could be sold to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141 declares that
Sec. 60. x x x The area so leased or sold shall be such as shall, in the judgment of the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, be reasonably necessary for the purposes
for which such sale or lease is requested, and shall not exceed one hundred and forty-four
hectares: Provided, however, That this limitation shall not apply to grants, donations, or
transfers made to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the Government for
the purposes deemed by said entities conducive to the public interest; but the land so
granted, donated, or transferred to a province, municipality or branch or subdivision of the
Government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The congressional authority required in Section 60 of CA No. 141 mirrors the legislative
authority required in Section 56 of Act No. 2874.
One reason for the congressional authority is that Section 60 of CA No. 141 exempted
government units and entities from the maximum area of public lands that could be
acquired from the State. These government units and entities should not just turn around
and sell these lands to private parties in violation of constitutional or statutory
limitations. Otherwise, the transfer of lands for non-agricultural purposes to government
units and entities could be used to circumvent constitutional limitations on ownership of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In the same manner, such transfers could
also be used to evade the statutory prohibition in CA No. 141 on the sale of government
reclaimed and marshy lands of the public domain to private parties. Section 60 of CA No. 141
constitutes by operation of law a lien on these lands. [57]
In case of sale or lease of disposable lands of the public domain falling under Section 59
of CA No. 141, Sections 63 and 67 require a public bidding. Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141
provide as follows:
Sec. 63. Whenever it is decided that lands covered by this chapter are not needed for public
purposes, the Director of Lands shall ask the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce (now
the Secretary of Natural Resources) for authority to dispose of the same. Upon receipt of
such authority, the Director of Lands shall give notice by public advertisement in the same
manner as in the case of leases or sales of agricultural public land, x x x.
Sec. 67. The lease or sale shall be made by oral bidding; and adjudication shall be made to
the highest bidder. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, CA No. 141 mandates the Government to put to public auction all leases or sales of
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. [58]
Like Act No. 1654 and Act No. 2874 before it, CA No. 141 did not repeal Section 5 of the
Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. Private parties could still reclaim portions of the sea with
government permission. However, the reclaimed land could become private land only if
classified as alienable agricultural land of the public domain open to disposition under CA
No. 141. The 1935 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
public agricultural lands.
The Civil Code of 1950
The Civil Code of 1950 readopted substantially the definition of property of public
dominion found in the Civil Code of 1889. Articles 420 and 422 of the Civil Code of 1950
state that
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and
bridges constructed by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of
similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth.
x x x.
Art. 422. Property of public dominion, when no longer intended for public use or for public
service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State.
Again, the government must formally declare that the property of public dominion is no
longer needed for public use or public service, before the same could be classified as
patrimonial property of the State.[59] In the case of government reclaimed and marshy lands
of the public domain, the declaration of their being disposable, as well as the manner of
their disposition, is governed by the applicable provisions of CA No. 141.
 Like the Civil Code of 1889, the Civil Code of 1950 included as property of public
dominion those properties of the State which, without being for public use, are intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, government reclaimed and
marshy lands of the State, even if not employed for public use or public service, if developed
to enhance the national wealth, are classified as property of public dominion.
Dispositions under the 1973 Constitution
The 1973 Constitution, which took effect on January 17, 1973, likewise adopted the
Regalian doctrine. Section 8, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution stated that
Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the
Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or
commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources
shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration,
development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for
a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except
as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the
development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may be the measure and the
limit of the grant. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1973 Constitution prohibited the alienation of all natural resources with the
exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the
public domain. In contrast, the 1935 Constitution barred the alienation of all natural
resources except public agricultural lands. However, the term public agricultural lands in the
1935 Constitution encompassed industrial, commercial, residential and resettlement lands
of the public domain. [60] If the land of public domain were neither timber nor mineral land, it
would fall under the classification of agricultural land of the public domain. Both the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions, therefore, prohibited the alienation of all natural resources except
agricultural lands of the public domain.
The 1973 Constitution, however, limited the alienation of lands of the public domain to
individuals who were citizens of the Philippines.Private corporations, even if wholly owned
by Philippine citizens, were no longer allowed to acquire alienable lands of the public
domain unlike in the 1935 Constitution. Section 11, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution
declared that
Sec. 11. The Batasang Pambansa, taking into account conservation, ecological, and
development requirements of the natural resources, shall determine by law the size of land
of the public domain which may be developed, held or acquired by, or leased to, any
qualified individual, corporation, or association, and the conditions therefor. No private
corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public domain except by
lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area nor may any citizen hold such lands by
lease in excess of five hundred hectares or acquire by purchase, homestead or grant, in
excess of twenty-four hectares. No private corporation or association may hold by lease,
concession, license or permit, timber or forest lands and other timber or forest resources in
excess of one hundred thousand hectares. However, such area may be increased by the
Batasang Pambansa upon recommendation of the National Economic and Development
Authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, under the 1973 Constitution, private corporations could hold alienable lands of
the public domain only through lease. Only individuals could now acquire alienable lands of
the public domain, and private corporations became absolutely barred from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. The constitutional ban extended to all kinds of
alienable lands of the public domain, while the statutory ban under CA No. 141 applied only
to government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy alienable lands of the public domain.
PD No. 1084 Creating the Public Estates Authority
On February 4, 1977, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Presidential Decree No.
1084 creating PEA, a wholly government owned and controlled corporation with a special
charter. Sections 4 and 8 of PD No. 1084, vests PEA with the following purposes and powers:
Sec. 4. Purpose. The Authority is hereby created for the following purposes:
(a) To reclaim land, including foreshore and submerged areas, by dredging, filling
or other means, or to acquire reclaimed land;
(b) To develop, improve, acquire, administer, deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and
sell any and all kinds of lands, buildings, estates and other forms of real property,
owned, managed, controlled and/or operated by the government;
(c) To provide for, operate or administer such service as may be necessary for the efficient,
economical and beneficial utilization of the above properties.
Sec. 5. Powers and functions of the Authority. The Authority shall, in carrying out the
purposes for which it is created, have the following powers and functions:
(a)To prescribe its by-laws.
 xxx
(i) To hold lands of the public domain in excess of the area permitted to private
corporations by statute.
(j) To reclaim lands and to construct work across, or otherwise, any stream,
watercourse, canal, ditch, flume x x x.
xxx
(o) To perform such acts and exercise such functions as may be necessary for the attainment
of the purposes and objectives herein specified. (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1084 authorizes PEA to reclaim both foreshore and submerged areas of the
public domain. Foreshore areas are those covered and uncovered by the ebb and flow of the
tide.[61] Submerged areas are those permanently under water regardless of the ebb and flow
of the tide.[62] Foreshore and submerged areas indisputably belong to the public
domain[63] and are inalienable unless reclaimed, classified as alienable lands open to
disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service.
The ban in the 1973 Constitution on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands
of the public domain did not apply to PEA since it was then, and until today, a fully owned
government corporation. The constitutional ban applied then, as it still applies now, only to
private corporations and associations. PD No. 1084 expressly empowers PEA to hold lands of
the public domain even in excess of the area permitted to private corporations by
statute. Thus, PEA can hold title to private lands, as well as title to lands of the public
domain.
In order for PEA to sell its reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the
public domain, there must be legislative authority empowering PEA to sell these lands. This
legislative authority is necessary in view of Section 60 of CA No.141, which states
Sec. 60. x x x; but the land so granted, donated or transferred to a province, municipality, or
branch or subdivision of the Government shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
Without such legislative authority, PEA could not sell but only lease its reclaimed foreshore
and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Nevertheless, any legislative authority
granted to PEA to sell its reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain would be subject to
the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public
domain. Hence, such legislative authority could only benefit private individuals.
Dispositions under the 1987 Constitution
The 1987 Constitution, like the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions before it, has adopted the
Regalian doctrine. The 1987 Constitution declares that all natural resources are owned by
the State, and except for alienable agricultural lands of the public domain, natural resources
cannot be alienated. Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution state that
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration,
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and
supervision of the State. x x x.
Section 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber,
mineral lands, and national parks. Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further
classified by law according to the uses which they may be devoted. Alienable lands of the
public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not
exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to
exceed one thousand hectares in area. Citizens of the Philippines may lease not more than
five hundred hectares, or acquire not more than twelve hectares thereof by purchase,
homestead, or grant.
Taking into account the requirements of conservation, ecology, and development, and
subject to the requirements of agrarian reform, the Congress shall determine, by law, the
size of lands of the public domain which may be acquired, developed, held, or leased and
the conditions therefor. (Emphasis supplied)
The 1987 Constitution continues the State policy in the 1973 Constitution banning
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. Like
the 1973 Constitution, the 1987 Constitution allows private corporations to hold alienable
lands of the public domain only through lease. As in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, the
general law governing the lease to private corporations of reclaimed, foreshore and marshy
alienable lands of the public domain is still CA No. 141.
The Rationale behind the Constitutional Ban
 The rationale behind the constitutional ban on corporations from acquiring, except
through lease, alienable lands of the public domain is not well understood. During the
deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the commissioners probed the
rationale behind this ban, thus:
FR. BERNAS: Mr. Vice-President, my questions have reference to page 3, line 5 which says:
`No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, not to exceed one thousand hectares in area.
If we recall, this provision did not exist under the 1935 Constitution, but this was introduced
in the 1973 Constitution. In effect, it prohibits private corporations from acquiring alienable
public lands. But it has not been very clear in jurisprudence what the reason for this is. In
some of the cases decided in 1982 and 1983, it was indicated that the purpose of this is to
prevent large landholdings. Is that the intent of this provision?
MR. VILLEGAS: I think that is the spirit of the provision.
FR. BERNAS: In existing decisions involving the Iglesia ni Cristo, there were instances where
the Iglesia ni Cristo was not allowed to acquire a mere 313-square meter land where a
chapel stood because the Supreme Court said it would be in violation of this. (Emphasis
supplied)
In Ayog v. Cusi,[64] the Court explained the rationale behind this constitutional ban in
this way:
Indeed, one purpose of the constitutional prohibition against purchases of public
agricultural lands by private corporations is to equitably diffuse land ownership or to
encourage owner-cultivatorship and the economic family-size farm and to prevent a
recurrence of cases like the instant case. Huge landholdings by corporations or private
persons had spawned social unrest.
However, if the constitutional intent is to prevent huge landholdings, the Constitution could
have simply limited the size of alienable lands of the public domain that corporations could
acquire. The Constitution could have followed the limitations on individuals, who could
acquire not more than 24 hectares of alienable lands of the public domain under the 1973
Constitution, and not more than 12 hectares under the 1987 Constitution.
If the constitutional intent is to encourage economic family-size farms, placing the land
in the name of a corporation would be more effective in preventing the break-up of
farmlands. If the farmland is registered in the name of a corporation, upon the death of the
owner, his heirs would inherit shares in the corporation instead of subdivided parcels of the
farmland. This would prevent the continuing break-up of farmlands into smaller and smaller
plots from one generation to the next.
In actual practice, the constitutional ban strengthens the constitutional limitation on
individuals from acquiring more than the allowed area of alienable lands of the public
domain. Without the constitutional ban, individuals who already acquired the maximum
area of alienable lands of the public domain could easily set up corporations to acquire more
alienable public lands. An individual could own as many corporations as his means would
allow him. An individual could even hide his ownership of a corporation by putting his
nominees as stockholders of the corporation. The corporation is a convenient vehicle to
circumvent the constitutional limitation on acquisition by individuals of alienable lands of
the public domain.
The constitutional intent, under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, is to transfer
ownership of only a limited area of alienable land of the public domain to a qualified
individual. This constitutional intent is safeguarded by the provision prohibiting corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain, since the vehicle to circumvent the
constitutional intent is removed. The available alienable public lands are gradually
decreasing in the face of an ever-growing population. The most effective way to insure
faithful adherence to this constitutional intent is to grant or sell alienable lands of the public
domain only to individuals. This, it would seem, is the practical benefit arising from the
constitutional ban.
The Amended Joint Venture Agreement
The subject matter of the Amended JVA, as stated in its second Whereas clause,
consists of three properties, namely:
1. [T]hree partially reclaimed and substantially eroded islands along Emilio
Aguinaldo Boulevard in Paranaque and Las Pinas, Metro Manila, with a
combined titled area of 1,578,441 square meters;
2. [A]nother area of 2,421,559 square meters contiguous to the three islands; and
3. [A]t AMARIs option as approved by PEA, an additional 350 hectares more or less
to regularize the configuration of the reclaimed area. [65]
PEA confirms that the Amended JVA involves the development of the Freedom Islands and
further reclamation of about 250 hectares x x x, plus an option granted to AMARI to
subsequently reclaim another 350 hectares x x x. [66]
 In short, the Amended JVA covers a reclamation area of 750 hectares. Only 157.84
hectares of the 750-hectare reclamation project have been reclaimed, and the rest of the
592.15 hectares are still submerged areas forming part of Manila Bay.
Under the Amended JVA, AMARI will reimburse PEA the sum of P1,894,129,200.00 for
PEAs actual cost in partially reclaiming the Freedom Islands. AMARI will also complete, at its
own expense, the reclamation of the Freedom Islands. AMARI will further shoulder all the
reclamation costs of all the other areas, totaling 592.15 hectares, still to be
reclaimed. AMARI and PEA will share, in the proportion of 70 percent and 30 percent,
respectively, the total net usable area which is defined in the Amended JVA as the total
reclaimed area less 30 percent earmarked for common areas. Title to AMARIs share in the
net usable area, totaling 367.5 hectares, will be issued in the name of AMARI. Section 5.2 (c)
of the Amended JVA provides that
x x x, PEA shall have the duty to execute without delay the necessary deed of transfer or
conveyance of the title pertaining to AMARIs Land share based on the Land Allocation
Plan. PEA, when requested in writing by AMARI, shall then cause the issuance and delivery
of the proper certificates of title covering AMARIs Land Share in the name of AMARI, x x x;
provided, that if more than seventy percent (70%) of the titled area at any given time
pertains to AMARI, PEA shall deliver to AMARI only seventy percent (70%) of the titles
pertaining to AMARI, until such time when a corresponding proportionate area of additional
land pertaining to PEA has been titled. (Emphasis supplied)
Indisputably, under the Amended JVA AMARI will acquire and own a maximum of 367.5
hectares of reclaimed land which will be titled in its name.
To implement the Amended JVA, PEA delegated to the unincorporated PEA-AMARI joint
venture PEAs statutory authority, rights and privileges to reclaim foreshore and submerged
areas in Manila Bay. Section 3.2.a of the Amended JVA states that
PEA hereby contributes to the joint venture its rights and privileges to perform Rawland
Reclamation and Horizontal Development as well as own the Reclamation Area, thereby
granting the Joint Venture the full and exclusive right, authority and privilege to undertake
the Project in accordance with the Master Development Plan.
The Amended JVA is the product of a renegotiation of the original JVA dated April 25, 1995
and its supplemental agreement dated August 9, 1995.
The Threshold Issue
The threshold issue is whether AMARI, a private corporation, can acquire and own
under the Amended JVA 367.5 hectares of reclaimed foreshore and submerged areas in
Manila Bay in view of Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which state that:
Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of
agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. x x x.
xxx
Section 3. x x x Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural
lands. Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease, x x x.(Emphasis supplied)
Classification of Reclaimed Foreshore and Submerged Areas
PEA readily concedes that lands reclaimed from foreshore or submerged areas of
Manila Bay are alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. In its Memorandum,
[67]
PEA admits that
Under the Public Land Act (CA 141, as amended), reclaimed lands are classified as
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain:
Sec. 59. The lands disposable under this title shall be classified as follows:
(a) Lands reclaimed by the government by dredging, filling, or other
means;
x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Likewise, the Legal Task Force [68] constituted under Presidential Administrative Order
No. 365 admitted in its Report and Recommendation to then President Fidel V.
Ramos, [R]eclaimed lands are classified as alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain.[69] The Legal Task Force concluded that
D. Conclusion
Reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain. However, by statutory authority, the rights
of ownership and disposition over reclaimed lands have been transferred to PEA, by virtue of
which PEA, as owner, may validly convey the same to any qualified person without violating
the Constitution or any statute.
The constitutional provision prohibiting private corporations from holding public land,
except by lease (Sec. 3, Art. XVII,[70] 1987 Constitution), does not apply to reclaimed lands
whose ownership has passed on to PEA by statutory grant.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the foreshore and submerged
areas of Manila Bay are part of the lands of the public domain, waters x x x and other natural
resources and consequently owned by the State. As such, foreshore and submerged areas
shall not be alienated, unless they are classified as agricultural lands of the public
domain. The mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these inalienable
natural resources of the State into alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. There
must be a law or presidential proclamation officially classifying these reclaimed lands as
alienable or disposable and open to disposition or concession.Moreover, these reclaimed
lands cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has reserved them for some
public or quasi-public use.[71]
Section 8 of CA No. 141 provides that only those lands shall be declared open to
disposition or concession which have been officially delimited and classified.[72] The
President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of the public domain into alienable
or disposable lands of the public domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. In Laurel vs.
Garcia,[73] the Executive Department attempted to sell the Roppongi property in Tokyo,
Japan, which was acquired by the Philippine Government for use as the Chancery of the
Philippine Embassy.Although the Chancery had transferred to another location thirteen
years earlier, the Court still ruled that, under Article 422 [74] of the Civil Code, a property of
public dominion retains such character until formally declared otherwise. The Court ruled
that
The fact that the Roppongi site has not been used for a long time for actual Embassy service
does not automatically convert it to patrimonial property. Any such conversion happens only
if the property is withdrawn from public use (Cebu Oxygen and Acetylene Co. v. Bercilles, 66
SCRA 481 [1975]. A property continues to be part of the public domain, not available for
private appropriation or ownership until there is a formal declaration on the part of the
government to withdraw it from being such (Ignacio v. Director of Lands, 108 Phil. 335
[1960]. (Emphasis supplied)
PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, authorized the issuance of special land
patents for lands reclaimed by PEA from the foreshore or submerged areas of Manila Bay. On
January 19, 1988 then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517 in the
name of PEA for the 157.84 hectares comprising the partially reclaimed Freedom
Islands. Subsequently, on April 9, 1999 the Register of Deeds of the Municipality of
Paranaque issued TCT Nos. 7309, 7311 and 7312 in the name of PEA pursuant to Section 103
of PD No. 1529 authorizing the issuance of certificates of title corresponding to land patents.
To this day, these certificates of title are still in the name of PEA.
PD No. 1085, coupled with President Aquinos actual issuance of a special patent
covering the Freedom Islands, is equivalent to an official proclamation classifying the
Freedom Islands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. PD No. 1085 and
President Aquinos issuance of a land patent also constitute a declaration that the Freedom
Islands are no longer needed for public service. The Freedom Islands are thus alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain, open to disposition or concession to qualified
parties.
At the time then President Aquino issued Special Patent No. 3517, PEA had already
reclaimed the Freedom Islands although subsequently there were partial erosions on some
areas. The government had also completed the necessary surveys on these islands. Thus, the
Freedom Islands were no longer part of Manila Bay but part of the land mass. Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Being neither timber, mineral, nor
national park lands, the reclaimed Freedom Islands necessarily fall under the classification of
agricultural lands of the public domain. Under the 1987 Constitution, agricultural lands of
the public domain are the only natural resources that the State may alienate to qualified
private parties. All other natural resources, such as the seas or bays, are waters x x x owned
by the State forming part of the public domain, and are inalienable pursuant to Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
AMARI claims that the Freedom Islands are private lands because CDCP, then a private
corporation, reclaimed the islands under a contract dated November 20, 1973 with the
Commissioner of Public Highways. AMARI, citing Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of
1866, argues that if the ownership of reclaimed lands may be given to the party constructing
the works, then it cannot be said that reclaimed lands are lands of the public domain which
the State may not alienate.[75] Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters reads as follows:
Article 5. Lands reclaimed from the sea in consequence of works constructed by the State, or
by the provinces, pueblos or private persons, with proper permission, shall become the
property of the party constructing such works, unless otherwise provided by the terms of
the grant of authority. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866, private parties could reclaim from
the sea only with proper permission from the State. Private parties could own the reclaimed
land only if not otherwise provided by the terms of the grant of authority. This clearly meant
that no one could reclaim from the sea without permission from the State because the sea is
property of public dominion. It also meant that the State could grant or withhold ownership
of the reclaimed land because any reclaimed land, like the sea from which it emerged,
belonged to the State. Thus, a private person reclaiming from the sea without permission
from the State could not acquire ownership of the reclaimed land which would remain
property of public dominion like the sea it replaced. [76] Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters
of 1866 adopted the time-honored principle of land ownership that all lands that were not
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
[77]
Article 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters must be read together with laws subsequently
enacted on the disposition of public lands. In particular, CA No. 141 requires that lands of
the public domain must first be classified as alienable or disposable before the government
can alienate them. These lands must not be reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.
[78]
Moreover, the contract between CDCP and the government was executed after the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution which barred private corporations from acquiring any
kind of alienable land of the public domain. This contract could not have converted the
Freedom Islands into private lands of a private corporation.
Presidential Decree No. 3-A, issued on January 11, 1973, revoked all laws authorizing
the reclamation of areas under water and revested solely in the National Government the
power to reclaim lands. Section 1 of PD No. 3-A declared that
The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the reclamation of areas under
water, whether foreshore or inland, shall be limited to the National Government or any
person authorized by it under a proper contract. (Emphasis supplied)
x x x.
PD No. 3-A repealed Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866 because reclamation of
areas under water could now be undertaken only by the National Government or by a
person contracted by the National Government. Private parties may reclaim from the sea
only under a contract with the National Government, and no longer by grant or permission
as provided in Section 5 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866.
Executive Order No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, designated PEA as the National
Governments implementing arm to undertake all reclamation projects of the government,
which shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any
person or entity. Under such contract, a private party receives compensation for reclamation
services rendered to PEA. Payment to the contractor may be in cash, or in kind consisting of
portions of the reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain. The reclaimed land can be used as
payment in kind only if the reclaimed land is first classified as alienable or disposable land
open to disposition, and then declared no longer needed for public service.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but also an additional 592.15
hectares which are still submerged and forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or
Presidential act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable lands of the
public domain open to disposition. These submerged areas are not covered by any patent or
certificate of title. There can be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the
public domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the commerce of
man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged areas are, under the Constitution,
waters x x x owned by the State, forming part of the public domain and consequently
inalienable. Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged areas be
classified as public agricultural lands, which under the Constitution are the only natural
resources that the State may alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public
agricultural lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition.Thereafter, the government may declare these lands no
longer needed for public service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the commerce of man.
The classification of PEAs reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands into alienable or
disposable lands open to disposition is necessary because PEA is tasked under its charter to
undertake public services that require the use of lands of the public domain. Under Section 5
of PD No. 1084, the functions of PEA include the following: [T]o own or operate railroads,
tramways and other kinds of land transportation, x x x; [T]o construct, maintain and operate
such systems of sanitary sewers as may be necessary; [T]o construct, maintain and operate
such storm drains as may be necessary. PEA is empowered to issue rules and regulations as
may be necessary for the proper use by private parties of any or all of the highways, roads,
utilities, buildings and/or any of its properties and to impose or collect fees or tolls for their
use.Thus, part of the reclaimed foreshore and submerged lands held by the PEA would
actually be needed for public use or service since many of the functions imposed on PEA by
its charter constitute essential public services.
Moreover, Section 1 of Executive Order No. 525 provides that PEA shall be primarily
responsible for integrating, directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on
behalf of the National Government. The same section also states that [A]ll reclamation
projects shall be approved by the President upon recommendation of the PEA, and shall be
undertaken by the PEA or through a proper contract executed by it with any person or
entity; x x x. Thus, under EO No. 525, in relation to PD No. 3-A and PD No.1084, PEA became
the primary implementing agency of the National Government to reclaim foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain. EO No. 525 recognized PEA as the government entity
to undertake the reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum utilization in promoting
public welfare and interests.[79] Since large portions of these reclaimed lands would
obviously be needed for public service, there must be a formal declaration segregating
reclaimed lands no longer needed for public service from those still needed for public
service.
Section 3 of EO No. 525, by declaring that all lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or
be owned by the PEA, could not automatically operate to classify inalienable lands into
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain. Otherwise, reclaimed foreshore and
submerged lands of the public domain would automatically become alienable once
reclaimed by PEA, whether or not classified as alienable or disposable.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987, a later law than either PD No. 1084 or EO No.
525, vests in the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR for brevity) the
following powers and functions:
Sec. 4. Powers and Functions. The Department shall:
(1) x x x
xxx
(4) Exercise supervision and control over forest lands, alienable and disposable public
lands, mineral resources and, in the process of exercising such control, impose appropriate
taxes, fees, charges, rentals and any such form of levy and collect such revenues for the
exploration, development, utilization or gathering of such resources;
xxx
(14) Promulgate rules, regulations and guidelines on the issuance of licenses, permits,
concessions, lease agreements and such other privileges concerning the development,
exploration and utilization of the countrys marine, freshwater, and brackish water and
over all aquatic resources of the country and shall continue to oversee, supervise and
police our natural resources; cancel or cause to cancel such privileges upon failure, non-
compliance or violations of any regulation, order, and for all other causes which are in
furtherance of the conservation of natural resources and supportive of the national interest;
(15) Exercise exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the
public domain and serve as the sole agency responsible for classification, sub-classification,
surveying and titling of lands in consultation with appropriate agencies. [80](Emphasis
supplied)
As manager, conservator and overseer of the natural resources of the State, DENR
exercises supervision and control over alienable and disposable public lands. DENR also
exercises exclusive jurisdiction on the management and disposition of all lands of the public
domain.Thus, DENR decides whether areas under water, like foreshore or submerged areas
of Manila Bay, should be reclaimed or not. This means that PEA needs authorization from
DENR before PEA can undertake reclamation projects in Manila Bay, or in any part of the
country.
DENR also exercises exclusive jurisdiction over the disposition of all lands of the public
domain. Hence, DENR decides whether reclaimed lands of PEA should be classified as
alienable under Sections 6[81] and 7[82] of CA No. 141. Once DENR decides that the reclaimed
lands should be so classified, it then recommends to the President the issuance of a
proclamation classifying the lands as alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
open to disposition. We note that then DENR Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr.
countersigned Special Patent No. 3517 in compliance with the Revised Administrative Code
and Sections 6 and 7 of CA No. 141.
In short, DENR is vested with the power to authorize the reclamation of areas under
water, while PEA is vested with the power to undertake the physical reclamation of areas
under water, whether directly or through private contractors. DENR is also empowered to
classify lands of the public domain into alienable or disposable lands subject to the approval
of the President. On the other hand, PEA is tasked to develop, sell or lease the reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain.
Clearly, the mere physical act of reclamation by PEA of foreshore or submerged areas
does not make the reclaimed lands alienable or disposable lands of the public domain, much
less patrimonial lands of PEA. Likewise, the mere transfer by the National Government of
lands of the public domain to PEA does not make the lands alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain, much less patrimonial lands of PEA.
Absent two official acts a classification that these lands are alienable or disposable and
open to disposition and a declaration that these lands are not needed for public service,
lands reclaimed by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such an official
classification and formal declaration can convert reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and Title
III[83] of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws. [84]
PEAs Authority to Sell Reclaimed Lands
 PEA, like the Legal Task Force, argues that as alienable or disposable lands of the public In consideration of the foregoing transfer and assignment, the Public Estates Authority shall
domain, the reclaimed lands shall be disposed of in accordance with CA No. 141, the Public issue in favor of the Republic of the Philippines the corresponding shares of stock in said
Land Act. PEA, citing Section 60 of CA No. 141, admits that reclaimed lands transferred to a entity with an issued value of said shares of stock (which) shall be deemed fully paid and
branch or subdivision of the government shall not be alienated, encumbered, or otherwise non-assessable.
disposed of in a manner affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress: x x x.
[85]
(Emphasis by PEA) The Secretary of Public Highways and the General Manager of the Public Estates Authority
shall execute such contracts or agreements, including appropriate agreements with the
In Laurel vs. Garcia,[86] the Court cited Section 48 of the Revised Administrative Code of
Construction and Development Corporation of the Philippines, as may be necessary to
1987, which states that
implement the above.
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Special land patent/patents shall be issued by the Secretary of Natural Resources in favor
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed
of the Public Estates Authority without prejudice to the subsequent transfer to the
in behalf of the government by the following: x x x.
contractor or his assignees of such portion or portions of the land reclaimed or to be
reclaimed as provided for in the above-mentioned contract. On the basis of such patents,
Thus, the Court concluded that a law is needed to convey any real property belonging to the
the Land Registration Commission shall issue the corresponding certificate of title.
Government. The Court declared that -
(Emphasis supplied)
It is not for the President to convey real property of the government on his or her own sole
On the other hand, Section 3 of EO No. 525, issued on February 14, 1979, provides that
will. Any such conveyance must be authorized and approved by a law enacted by the
-
Congress. It requires executive and legislative concurrence. (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 3. All lands reclaimed by PEA shall belong to or be owned by the PEA which shall be
PEA contends that PD No. 1085 and EO No. 525 constitute the legislative authority
responsible for its administration, development, utilization or disposition in accordance with
allowing PEA to sell its reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085, issued on February 4, 1977, provides
the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084. Any and all income that the PEA may derive
that
from the sale, lease or use of reclaimed lands shall be used in accordance with the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084.
The land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore area of Manila Bay pursuant to the
contract for the reclamation and construction of the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road Project
There is no express authority under either PD No. 1085 or EO No. 525 for PEA to sell its
between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and Development Corporation
reclaimed lands. PD No. 1085 merely transferred ownership and administration of lands
of the Philippines dated November 20, 1973 and/or any other contract or reclamation
reclaimed from Manila Bay to PEA, while EO No. 525 declared that lands reclaimed by PEA
covering the same area is hereby transferred, conveyed and assigned to the ownership and
shall belong to or be owned by PEA. EO No. 525 expressly states that PEA should dispose of
administration of the Public Estates Authority established pursuant to PD No.
its reclaimed lands in accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, the
1084; Provided, however, That the rights and interests of the Construction and Development
charter of PEA.
Corporation of the Philippines pursuant to the aforesaid contract shall be recognized and
respected. PEAs charter, however, expressly tasks PEA to develop, improve, acquire, administer,
deal in, subdivide, dispose, lease and sell any and all kinds of lands x x x owned, managed,
Henceforth, the Public Estates Authority shall exercise the rights and assume the obligations controlled and/or operated by the government. [87] (Emphasis supplied) There is, therefore,
of the Republic of the Philippines (Department of Public Highways) arising from, or incident legislative authority granted to PEA to sell its lands, whether patrimonial or alienable
to, the aforesaid contract between the Republic of the Philippines and the Construction and lands of the public domain. PEA may sell to private parties its patrimonial properties in
Development Corporation of the Philippines. accordance with the PEA charter free from constitutional limitations. The constitutional ban
on private corporations from acquiring alienable lands of the public domain does not apply
to the sale of PEAs patrimonial lands.
PEA may also sell its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
individuals since, with the legislative authority, there is no longer any statutory prohibition
against such sales and the constitutional ban does not apply to individuals. PEA, however,
cannot sell any of its alienable or disposable lands of the public domain to private
corporations since Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expressly prohibits such
sales. The legislative authority benefits only individuals. Private corporations remain barred
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain, including government
reclaimed lands.
The provision in PD No. 1085 stating that portions of the reclaimed lands could be
transferred by PEA to the contractor or his assignees (Emphasis supplied) would not apply to
private corporations but only to individuals because of the constitutional ban. Otherwise,
the provisions of PD No. 1085 would violate both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
The requirement of public auction in the sale of reclaimed lands
Assuming the reclaimed lands of PEA are classified as alienable or disposable lands
open to disposition, and further declared no longer needed for public service, PEA would
have to conduct a public bidding in selling or leasing these lands. PEA must observe the
provisions of Sections 63 and 67 of CA No. 141 requiring public auction, in the absence of a
law exempting PEA from holding a public auction. [88] Special Patent No. 3517 expressly states
that the patent is issued by authority of the Constitution and PD No. 1084, supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. This is an acknowledgment that the provisions of
CA No. 141 apply to the disposition of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain unless
otherwise provided by law. Executive Order No. 654,[89] which authorizes PEA to determine
the kind and manner of payment for the transfer of its assets and properties, does not
exempt PEA from the requirement of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to
decide the mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not authorize PEA
to dispense with public auction.
Moreover, under Section 79 of PD No. 1445, otherwise known as the Government
Auditing Code, the government is required to sell valuable government property through
public bidding. Section 79 of PD No. 1445 mandates that
Section 79. When government property has become unserviceable for any cause, or is no
longer needed, it shall, upon application of the officer accountable therefor, be inspected by
the head of the agency or his duly authorized representative in the presence of the auditor
concerned and, if found to be valueless or unsaleable, it may be destroyed in their
presence. If found to be valuable, it may be sold at public auction to the highest
bidder under the supervision of the proper committee on award or similar body in the
presence of the auditor concerned or other authorized representative of the
Commission, after advertising by printed notice in the Official Gazette, or for not less than
three consecutive days in any newspaper of general circulation, or where the value of the
property does not warrant the expense of publication, by notices posted for a like period in
at least three public places in the locality where the property is to be sold. In the event that
the public auction fails, the property may be sold at a private sale at such price as may be
fixed by the same committee or body concerned and approved by the Commission.
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is allowed, in which case the
Commission on Audit must approve the selling price. [90] The Commission on Audit
implements Section 79 of the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-
296[91] dated January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets must be
disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated sale can be resorted to only in
case of failure of public auction.
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified to bid for PEAs reclaimed
foreshore and submerged alienable lands of the public domain. Private corporations are
barred from bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
PEA originally scheduled a public bidding for the Freedom Islands on December 10,
1991. PEA imposed a condition that the winning bidder should reclaim another 250 hectares
of submerged areas to regularize the shape of the Freedom Islands, under a 60-40 sharing of
the additional reclaimed areas in favor of the winning bidder. [92] No one, however, submitted
a bid. On December 23, 1994, the Government Corporate Counsel advised PEA it could sell
the Freedom Islands through negotiation, without need of another public bidding, because
of the failure of the public bidding on December 10, 1991. [93]
However, the original JVA dated April 25, 1995 covered not only the Freedom Islands
and the additional 250 hectares still to be reclaimed, it also granted an option to AMARI to
reclaim another 350 hectares. The original JVA, a negotiated contract, enlarged the
reclamation area to 750 hectares.[94] The failure of public bidding on December 10, 1991,
involving only 407.84 hectares,[95] is not a valid justification for a negotiated sale of 750
hectares, almost double the area publicly auctioned. Besides, the failure of public bidding
happened on December 10, 1991, more than three years before the signing of the original
JVA on April 25, 1995. The economic situation in the country had greatly improved during
the intervening period.
Reclamation under the BOT Law and the Local Government Code
The constitutional prohibition in Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution is
absolute and clear: Private corporations or associations may not hold such alienable lands of
the public domain except by lease, x x x. Even Republic Act No. 6957 (BOT Law, for brevity),
cited by PEA and AMARI as legislative authority to sell reclaimed lands to private parties,
recognizes the constitutional ban. Section 6 of RA No. 6957 states
Sec. 6. Repayment Scheme. - For the financing, construction, operation and maintenance of
any infrastructure projects undertaken through the build-operate-and-transfer arrangement
or any of its variations pursuant to the provisions of this Act, the project proponent x x x may
likewise be repaid in the form of a share in the revenue of the project or other non-
monetary payments, such as, but not limited to, the grant of a portion or percentage of the
reclaimed land, subject to the constitutional requirements with respect to the ownership of
the land: x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
A private corporation, even one that undertakes the physical reclamation of a government
BOT project, cannot acquire reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain in view of the
constitutional ban.
Section 302 of the Local Government Code, also mentioned by PEA and AMARI,
authorizes local governments in land reclamation projects to pay the contractor or developer
in kind consisting of a percentage of the reclaimed land, to wit:
Section 302. Financing, Construction, Maintenance, Operation, and Management of
Infrastructure Projects by the Private Sector. x x x
xxx
In case of land reclamation or construction of industrial estates, the repayment plan may
consist of the grant of a portion or percentage of the reclaimed land or the industrial estate
constructed.
Although Section 302 of the Local Government Code does not contain a proviso similar to
that of the BOT Law, the constitutional restrictions on land ownership automatically apply
even though not expressly mentioned in the Local Government Code.
Thus, under either the BOT Law or the Local Government Code, the contractor or
developer, if a corporate entity, can only be paid with leaseholds on portions of the
reclaimed land. If the contractor or developer is an individual, portions of the reclaimed
land, not exceeding 12 hectares [96] of non-agricultural lands, may be conveyed to him in
ownership in view of the legislative authority allowing such conveyance. This is the only way
these provisions of the BOT Law and the Local Government Code can avoid a direct collision
with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Registration of lands of the public domain
Finally, PEA theorizes that the act of conveying the ownership of the reclaimed lands to
public respondent PEA transformed such lands of the public domain to private lands. This
theory is echoed by AMARI which maintains that the issuance of the special patent leading
to the eventual issuance of title takes the subject land away from the land of public domain
and converts the property into patrimonial or private property. In short, PEA and AMARI
contend that with the issuance of Special Patent No. 3517 and the corresponding certificates
of titles, the 157.84 hectares comprising the Freedom Islands have become private lands of
PEA. In support of their theory, PEA and AMARI cite the following rulings of the Court:
1. Sumail v. Judge of CFI of Cotabato,[97] where the Court held
Once the patent was granted and the corresponding certificate of title was
issued, the land ceased to be part of the public domain and became private
property over which the Director of Lands has neither control nor jurisdiction.
2. Lee Hong Hok v. David,[98] where the Court declared -
After the registration and issuance of the certificate and duplicate certificate of
title based on a public land patent, the land covered thereby automatically
comes under the operation of Republic Act 496 subject to all the safeguards
provided therein.
3. Heirs of Gregorio Tengco v. Heirs of Jose Aliwalas,[99] where the Court ruled -
While the Director of Lands has the power to review homestead patents, he
may do so only so long as the land remains part of the public domain and
continues to be under his exclusive control; but once the patent is registered
and a certificate of title is issued, the land ceases to be part of the public
domain and becomes private property over which the Director of Lands has
neither control nor jurisdiction.
4. Manalo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,[100] where the Court held
When the lots in dispute were certified as disposable on May 19, 1971, and free
patents were issued covering the same in favor of the private respondents, the
said lots ceased to be part of the public domain and, therefore, the Director of
Lands lost jurisdiction over the same.
 5.Republic v. Court of Appeals,[101] where the Court stated
Proclamation No. 350, dated October 9, 1956, of President Magsaysay legally
effected a land grant to the Mindanao Medical Center, Bureau of Medical
Services, Department of Health, of the whole lot, validly sufficient for initial
registration under the Land Registration Act. Such land grant is constitutive of a
fee simple title or absolute title in favor of petitioner Mindanao Medical
Center. Thus, Section 122 of the Act, which governs the registration of grants or
patents involving public lands, provides that Whenever public lands in the
Philippine Islands belonging to the Government of the United States or to the
Government of the Philippines are alienated, granted or conveyed to persons or
to public or private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Act (Land Registration Act, Act 496) and shall become
registered lands.
The first four cases cited involve petitions to cancel the land patents and the
corresponding certificates of titles issued to private parties. These four cases uniformly hold
that the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over private lands or that upon issuance of the
certificate of title the land automatically comes under the Torrens System. The fifth case
cited involves the registration under the Torrens System of a 12.8-hectare public land
granted by the National Government to Mindanao Medical Center, a government unit under
the Department of Health.The National Government transferred the 12.8-hectare public land
to serve as the site for the hospital buildings and other facilities of Mindanao Medical
Center, which performed a public service. The Court affirmed the registration of the 12.8-
hectare public land in the name of Mindanao Medical Center under Section 122 of Act No.
496. This fifth case is an example of a public land being registered under Act No. 496 without
the land losing its character as a property of public dominion.
In the instant case, the only patent and certificates of title issued are those in the name
of PEA, a wholly government owned corporation performing public as well as proprietary
functions. No patent or certificate of title has been issued to any private party. No one is
asking the Director of Lands to cancel PEAs patent or certificates of title. In fact, the thrust of
the instant petition is that PEAs certificates of title should remain with PEA, and the land
covered by these certificates, being alienable lands of the public domain, should not be sold
to a private corporation.
Registration of land under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 does not vest in the registrant
private or public ownership of the land. Registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership
but is merely evidence of ownership previously conferred by any of the recognized modes of
acquiring ownership. Registration does not give the registrant a better right than what the
registrant had prior to the registration. [102] The registration of lands of the public domain
under the Torrens system, by itself, cannot convert public lands into private lands. [103]
Jurisprudence holding that upon the grant of the patent or issuance of the certificate of
title the alienable land of the public domain automatically becomes private land cannot
apply to government units and entities like PEA. The transfer of the Freedom Islands to PEA
was made subject to the provisions of CA No. 141 as expressly stated in Special Patent No.
3517 issued by then President Aquino, to wit:
NOW, THEREFORE, KNOW YE, that by authority of the Constitution of the Philippines and in
conformity with the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1084, supplemented by
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, there are hereby granted and conveyed unto the
Public Estates Authority the aforesaid tracts of land containing a total area of one million
nine hundred fifteen thousand eight hundred ninety four (1,915,894) square meters; the
technical description of which are hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, the provisions of CA No. 141 apply to the Freedom Islands on matters not covered
by PD No. 1084. Section 60 of CA No. 141 prohibits, except when authorized by Congress,
the sale of alienable lands of the public domain that are transferred to government units or
entities. Section 60 of CA No. 141 constitutes, under Section 44 of PD No. 1529, a statutory
lien affecting title of the registered land even if not annotated on the certificate of title.
[104]
Alienable lands of the public domain held by government entities under Section 60 of CA
No. 141 remain public lands because they cannot be alienated or encumbered unless
Congress passes a law authorizing their disposition. Congress, however, cannot authorize the
sale to private corporations of reclaimed alienable lands of the public domain because of the
constitutional ban. Only individuals can benefit from such law.
The grant of legislative authority to sell public lands in accordance with Section 60 of CA
No. 141 does not automatically convert alienable lands of the public domain into private or
patrimonial lands. The alienable lands of the public domain must be transferred to qualified
private parties, or to government entities not tasked to dispose of public lands, before these
lands can become private or patrimonial lands. Otherwise, the constitutional ban will
become illusory if Congress can declare lands of the public domain as private or patrimonial
lands in the hands of a government agency tasked to dispose of public lands. This will allow
private corporations to acquire directly from government agencies limitless areas of lands
which, prior to such law, are concededly public lands.
Under EO No. 525, PEA became the central implementing agency of the National
Government to reclaim foreshore and submerged areas of the public domain. Thus, EO No.
525 declares that
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 525
 Designating the Public Estates Authority as the Agency Primarily Responsible for all
Reclamation Projects
Whereas, there are several reclamation projects which are ongoing or being proposed to be
undertaken in various parts of the country which need to be evaluated for consistency with
national programs;
Whereas, there is a need to give further institutional support to the Governments declared
policy to provide for a coordinated, economical and efficient reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 3-A requires that all reclamation of areas shall be limited
to the National Government or any person authorized by it under proper contract;
Whereas, a central authority is needed to act on behalf of the National Government which
shall ensure a coordinated and integrated approach in the reclamation of lands;
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1084 creates the Public Estates Authority as a
government corporation to undertake reclamation of lands and ensure their maximum
utilization in promoting public welfare and interests; and
Whereas, Presidential Decree No. 1416 provides the President with continuing authority to
reorganize the national government including the transfer, abolition, or merger of functions
and offices.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the
powers vested in me by the Constitution and pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1416, do
hereby order and direct the following:
Section 1. The Public Estates Authority (PEA) shall be primarily responsible for integrating,
directing, and coordinating all reclamation projects for and on behalf of the National
Government. All reclamation projects shall be approved by the President upon
recommendation of the PEA, and shall be undertaken by the PEA or through a proper
contract executed by it with any person or entity; Provided, that, reclamation projects of any
national government agency or entity authorized under its charter shall be undertaken in
consultation with the PEA upon approval of the President.
xxx.
As the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects
nationwide, with authority to sell reclaimed lands, PEA took the place of DENR as the
government agency charged with leasing or selling reclaimed lands of the public
domain. The reclaimed lands being leased or sold by PEA are not private lands, in the same
manner that DENR, when it disposes of other alienable lands, does not dispose of private
lands but alienable lands of the public domain. Only when qualified private parties acquire
these lands will the lands become private lands. In the hands of the government agency
tasked and authorized to dispose of alienable of disposable lands of the public domain,
these lands are still public, not private lands.
Furthermore, PEAs charter expressly states that PEA shall hold lands of the public
domain as well as any and all kinds of lands. PEA can hold both lands of the public domain
and private lands. Thus, the mere fact that alienable lands of the public domain like the
Freedom Islands are transferred to PEA and issued land patents or certificates of title in PEAs
name does not automatically make such lands private.
To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as
private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations
from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. PEA will simply turn
around, as PEA has now done under the Amended JVA, and transfer several hundreds of
hectares of these reclaimed and still to be reclaimed lands to a single private corporation in
only one transaction. This scheme will effectively nullify the constitutional ban in Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which was intended to diffuse equitably the ownership of
alienable lands of the public domain among Filipinos, now numbering over 80 million strong.
This scheme, if allowed, can even be applied to alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain since PEA can acquire x x x any and all kinds of lands. This will open the floodgates to
corporations and even individuals acquiring hundreds of hectares of alienable lands of the
public domain under the guise that in the hands of PEA these lands are private lands. This
will result in corporations amassing huge landholdings never before seen in this country -
creating the very evil that the constitutional ban was designed to prevent. This will
completely reverse the clear direction of constitutional development in this country. The
1935 Constitution allowed private corporations to acquire not more than 1,024 hectares of
public lands.[105] The 1973 Constitution prohibited private corporations from acquiring any
kind of public land, and the 1987 Constitution has unequivocally reiterated this prohibition.
The contention of PEA and AMARI that public lands, once registered under Act No. 496
or PD No. 1529, automatically become private lands is contrary to existing laws. Several laws
authorize lands of the public domain to be registered under the Torrens System or Act No.
496, now PD No. 1529, without losing their character as public lands. Section 122 of Act No.
496, and Section 103 of PD No. 1529, respectively, provide as follows:
Act No. 496
Sec. 122. Whenever public lands in the Philippine Islands belonging to the x x x Government
of the Philippine Islands are alienated, granted, or conveyed to persons or the public or
private corporations, the same shall be brought forthwith under the operation of this Act
and shall become registered lands.
PD No. 1529
Sec. 103. Certificate of Title to Patents. Whenever public land is by the Government
alienated, granted or conveyed to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under
the operation of this Decree. (Emphasis supplied)
Based on its legislative history, the phrase conveyed to any person in Section 103 of PD No.
1529 includes conveyances of public lands to public corporations.
Alienable lands of the public domain granted, donated, or transferred to a province,
municipality, or branch or subdivision of the Government, as provided in Section 60 of CA
No. 141, may be registered under the Torrens System pursuant to Section 103 of PD No.
1529.Such registration, however, is expressly subject to the condition in Section 60 of CA No.
141 that the land shall not be alienated, encumbered or otherwise disposed of in a manner
affecting its title, except when authorized by Congress. This provision refers to government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands of the public domain that have been titled but still
cannot be alienated or encumbered unless expressly authorized by Congress. The need for
legislative authority prevents the registered land of the public domain from becoming
private land that can be disposed of to qualified private parties.
The Revised Administrative Code of 1987 also recognizes that lands of the public
domain may be registered under the Torrens System.Section 48, Chapter 12, Book I of the
Code states
Sec. 48. Official Authorized to Convey Real Property. Whenever real property of the
Government is authorized by law to be conveyed, the deed of conveyance shall be executed
in behalf of the government by the following:
(1) x x x
(2) For property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, but titled in the name of any
political subdivision or of any corporate agency or instrumentality, by the executive head of
the agency or instrumentality. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of a public
wharf may be titled in the name of a government corporation regulating port operations in
the country. Private property purchased by the National Government for expansion of an
airport may also be titled in the name of the government agency tasked to administer the
airport. Private property donated to a municipality for use as a town plaza or public school
site may likewise be titled in the name of the municipality. [106] All these properties become
properties of the public domain, and if already registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529,
remain registered land. There is no requirement or provision in any existing law for the de-
registration of land from the Torrens System.
Private lands taken by the Government for public use under its power of eminent
domain become unquestionably part of the public domain. Nevertheless, Section 85 of PD
No. 1529 authorizes the Register of Deeds to issue in the name of the National Government
new certificates of title covering such expropriated lands. Section 85 of PD No. 1529 states
Sec. 85. Land taken by eminent domain. Whenever any registered land, or interest therein, is
expropriated or taken by eminent domain, the National Government, province, city or
municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising such right shall file for
registration in the proper Registry a certified copy of the judgment which shall state
definitely by an adequate description, the particular property or interest expropriated, the
number of the certificate of title, and the nature of the public use. A memorandum of the
right or interest taken shall be made on each certificate of title by the Register of Deeds, and
where the fee simple is taken, a new certificate shall be issued in favor of the National
Government, province, city, municipality, or any other agency or instrumentality exercising
such right for the land so taken. The legal expenses incident to the memorandum of
registration or issuance of a new certificate of title shall be for the account of the authority
taking the land or interest therein. (Emphasis supplied)
Consequently, lands registered under Act No. 496 or PD No. 1529 are not exclusively private
or patrimonial lands. Lands of the public domain may also be registered pursuant to existing
laws.
AMARI makes a parting shot that the Amended JVA is not a sale to AMARI of the
Freedom Islands or of the lands to be reclaimed from submerged areas of Manila Bay. In the
words of AMARI, the Amended JVA is not a sale but a joint venture with a stipulation for
reimbursement of the original cost incurred by PEA for the earlier reclamation and
construction works performed by the CDCP under its 1973 contract with the
Republic. Whether the Amended JVA is a sale or a joint venture, the fact remains that the
Amended JVA requires PEA to cause the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title
conveying AMARIs Land Share in the name of AMARI. [107]
 This stipulation still contravenes Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which
provides that private corporations shall not hold such alienable lands of the public domain
except by lease. The transfer of title and ownership to AMARI clearly means that AMARI will
hold the reclaimed lands other than by lease. The transfer of title and ownership is a
disposition of the reclaimed lands, a transaction considered a sale or alienation under CA
No. 141,[108] the Government Auditing Code,[109] and Section 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
The Regalian doctrine is deeply implanted in our legal system. Foreshore and
submerged areas form part of the public domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from
foreshore and submerged areas also form part of the public domain and are also inalienable,
unless converted pursuant to law into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain. Historically, lands reclaimed by the government are sui generis, not available for
sale to private parties unlike other alienable public lands. Reclaimed lands retain their
inherent potential as areas for public use or public service. Alienable lands of the public
domain, increasingly becoming scarce natural resources, are to be distributed equitably
among our ever-growing population. To insure such equitable distribution, the 1973 and
1987 Constitutions have barred private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable
land of the public domain. Those who attempt to dispose of inalienable natural resources of
the State, or seek to circumvent the constitutional ban on alienation of lands of the public
domain to private corporations, do so at their own risk.
We can now summarize our conclusions as follows:
1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands comprising the Freedom Islands, now
covered by certificates of title in the name of PEA, are alienable lands of the
public domain. PEA may lease these lands to private corporations but may not
sell or transfer ownership of these lands to private corporations. PEA may only
sell these lands to Philippine citizens, subject to the ownership limitations in the
1987 Constitution and existing laws.
2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay remain inalienable
natural resources of the public domain until classified as alienable or disposable
lands open to disposition and declared no longer needed for public service. The
government can make such classification and declaration only after PEA has
reclaimed these submerged areas. Only then can these lands qualify as
agricultural lands of the public domain, which are the only natural resources
the government can alienate. In their present state, the 592.15 hectares of
submerged areas are inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer to AMARI, a private corporation,
ownership of 77.34 hectares[110] of the Freedom Islands, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public
domain.
4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares[111] of still submerged areas of Manila Bay, such transfer is void for
being contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits
the alienation of natural resources other than agricultural lands of the public
domain. PEA may reclaim these submerged areas. Thereafter, the government
can classify the reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable, and further declare
them no longer needed for public service. Still, the transfer of such reclaimed
alienable lands of the public domain to AMARI will be void in view of Section 3,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution which prohibits private corporations from
acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain.
Clearly, the Amended JVA violates glaringly Sections 2 and 3, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Under Article 1409[112] of the Civil Code, contracts whose object or purpose is
contrary to law, or whose object is outside the commerce of men, are inexistent and void
from the beginning. The Court must perform its duty to defend and uphold the Constitution,
and therefore declares the Amended JVA null and void ab initio.
Seventh issue: whether the Court is the proper forum to raise the issue of whether the
Amended JVA is grossly disadvantageous to the government.
Considering that the Amended JVA is null and void ab initio, there is no necessity to rule
on this last issue. Besides, the Court is not a trier of facts, and this last issue involves a
determination of factual matters.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Public Estates Authority and Amari Coastal
Bay Development Corporation are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from implementing the
Amended Joint Venture Agreement which is hereby declared NULL and VOID ab initio.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Austria-Martinez, and Corona, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
 Supreme Court THE LANDOWNERS OF
Manila BORACAY SIMILARLY
SITUATED NAMED IN A LIST,
EN BANC ANNEX A OF THIS PETITION,
Petitioners,

THE SECRETARY OF THE G.R. No. 167707

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT - versus -
AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
REGIONAL EXECUTIVE Present: THE SECRETARY OF THE
DIRECTOR, DENR-REGION VI, DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT
REGIONAL TECHNICAL PUNO, C.J., AND NATURAL RESOURCES, THE
DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, QUISUMBING, REGIONAL TECHNICAL
LANDS MANAGEMENT BUREAU, YNARES-SANTIAGO, DIRECTOR FOR LANDS, LANDS
REGION VI PROVINCIAL CARPIO, MANAGEMENT BUREAU,
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, REGION VI, PROVINCIAL
RESOURCES OFFICER OF KALIBO, CORONA,* ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
AKLAN, REGISTER OF DEEDS, CARPIO MORALES, RESOURCES OFFICER, KALIBO,
DIRECTOR OF LAND AZCUNA, AKLAN,
REGISTRATION AUTHORITY, TINGA, Respondents.
DEPARTMENT OF TOURISM CHICO-NAZARIO,
SECRETARY, DIRECTOR OF VELASCO, JR., x--------------------------------------------------x
PHILIPPINE TOURISM NACHURA,**
AUTHORITY, REYES, DECISION
Petitioners, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.
- versus - REYES, R.T., J.:

MAYOR JOSE S. YAP, LIBERTAD AT stake in these consolidated cases is the right of the present occupants
TALAPIAN, MILA Y. SUMNDAD, and
of Boracay Island to secure titles over their occupied lands.
ANICETO YAP, in their behalf and Promulgated:
in behalf of all those similarly situated,
Respondents. October 8, 2008 There are two consolidated petitions. The first is G.R. No. 167707, a petition for
review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming that [2] of the
x--------------------------------------------------x
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo, Aklan, which granted the petition for declaratory relief
DR. ORLANDO SACAY and G.R. No. 173775 filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap, et al. and ordered the survey of Boracay for
WILFREDO GELITO, joined by
titling purposes. The second is G.R. No. 173775, a petition for prohibition, mandamus, and
nullification of Proclamation No. 1064 [3] issued by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
classifying Boracay into reserved forest and agricultural land.
The Antecedents
G.R. No. 167707
Boracay Island in the Municipality of Malay, Aklan, with its powdery white sand
beaches and warm crystalline waters, is reputedly a premier Philippine tourist
destination. The island is also home to 12,003 inhabitants [4] who live in the bone-shaped
[5]
islands three barangays.
On April 14, 1976, the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR)
approved the National Reservation Survey of Boracay
[6] [7]
Island, which identified several lots as being occupied or claimed by named persons.
On November 10, 1978, then President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation
No. 1801[8] declaring Boracay Island, among other islands, caves and peninsulas in
the Philippines, as tourist zones and marine reserves under the administration of the
Philippine Tourism Authority (PTA). President Marcos later approved the issuance
[9]
of PTA Circular 3-82 dated September 3, 1982, to implement Proclamation No. 1801.
Claiming that Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No 3-82 precluded them from
filing an application for judicial confirmation of imperfect title or survey of land for titling
purposes, respondents-claimants
Mayor Jose S. Yap, Jr., Libertad Talapian, Mila Y. Sumndad, and Aniceto Yap filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.
In their petition, respondents-claimants alleged that Proclamation No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 raised doubts on their right to secure titles over their occupied
lands. They declared that they themselves, or through their predecessors-in-interest, had
been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation in Boracay
since June 12, 1945, or earlier since time immemorial. They declared their lands for tax
purposes and paid realty taxes on them. [10]
Respondents-claimants posited that Proclamation No. 1801 and its implementing
Circular did not place Boracay beyond the commerce of man. Since the Island was classified
as a tourist zone, it was susceptible of private ownership. Under Section 48(b) of
Commonwealth Act (CA) No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act, they had the
right to have the lots registered in their names through judicial confirmation of imperfect
titles.
The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), opposed the petition
for declaratory relief. The OSGcountered that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the
public domain. It formed part of the mass of lands classified as public forest, which was not
available for disposition pursuant to Section 3(a) of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 705 or the
Revised Forestry Code,[11] as amended.
The OSG maintained that respondents-claimants reliance on PD No. 1801
and PTA Circular No. 3-82 was misplaced. Their right to judicial confirmation of title was
governed by CA No. 141 and PD No. 705. Since Boracay Island had not been classified as
alienable and disposable, whatever possession they had cannot ripen into ownership.
During pre-trial, respondents-claimants and the OSG stipulated on the following
facts: (1) respondents-claimants were presently in possession of parcels of land in Boracay
Island; (2) these parcels of land were planted with coconut trees and other natural growing
trees; (3) the coconut trees had heights of more or less twenty (20) meters and were planted
more or less fifty (50) years ago; and (4) respondents-claimants declared the land they were
occupying for tax purposes.[12]
 The parties also agreed that the principal issue for resolution was purely legal:
whether Proclamation No. 1801 posed any legal hindrance or impediment to the titling of
the lands in Boracay. They decided to forego with the trial and to submit the case for
resolution upon submission of their respective memoranda. [13]
The RTC took judicial notice[14] that certain parcels of land in Boracay Island, more
particularly Lots 1 and 30, Plan PSU-5344, were covered by Original Certificate of Title No.
19502 (RO 2222) in the name of the Heirs of Ciriaco S. Tirol. These lots were involved in Civil
[15]
Case Nos. 5222 and 5262 filed before the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan. The titles were issued on
August 7, 1933.[16]
RTC and CA Dispositions
in Boracay and that only those forested areas in public lands were declared as part of the
forest reserve.[22]
The OSG moved for reconsideration but its motion was denied. [23] The Republic then
appealed to the CA.
On December 9, 2004, the appellate court affirmed in toto the RTC decision,
disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby
rendered by us DENYING the appeal filed in this case and AFFIRMING the
decision of the lower court.[24]

On July 14, 1999, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondents-claimants, The CA held that respondents-claimants could not be prejudiced by a declaration
with a fallo reading: that the lands they occupied since time immemorial were part of a forest reserve.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court declares that

Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular No. 3-82 pose no legal obstacle to Again, the OSG sought reconsideration but it was similarly denied. [25] Hence, the
the petitioners and those similarly situated to acquire title to their lands in present petition under Rule 45.
Boracay, in accordance with the applicable laws and in the manner
prescribed therein; and to have their lands surveyed and approved by
respondent Regional Technical Director of Lands as the approved survey G.R. No. 173775
does not in itself constitute a title to the land.
On May 22, 2006, during the pendency of G.R. No. 167707, President Gloria Macapagal-
SO ORDERED.[17]
Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 1064[26]classifying Boracay Island into four hundred (400)
hectares of reserved forest land (protection purposes) and six hundred twenty-eight and
The RTC upheld respondents-claimants right to have their occupied lands titled in
96/100 (628.96) hectares of agricultural land (alienable and disposable). The Proclamation
their name. It ruled that neither Proclamation No. 1801 nor PTA Circular No. 3-82 mentioned
likewise provided for a fifteen-meter buffer zone on each side of the centerline of roads and
that lands in Boracay were inalienable or could not be the subject of disposition. [18]The
trails, reserved for right-of-way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land
Circular itself recognized private ownership of lands. [19] The trial court cited Sections
protection purposes.
87[20] and 53[21] of the Public Land Act as basis for acknowledging private ownership of lands
 On August 10, 2006, petitioners-claimants Dr. Orlando Sacay, [27] Wilfredo Gelito, The OSG raises the lone issue of whether Proclamation No. 1801 and PTA Circular
[28]
and other landowners[29] in Boracay filed with this Court an original petition for No. 3-82 pose any legal obstacle for respondents, and all those similarly situated, to acquire
[30]
prohibition, mandamus, and nullification of Proclamation No. 1064. They allege that the title to their occupied lands in Boracay Island.[34]
Proclamation infringed on their prior vested rights over portions of Boracay. They have been
in continued possession of their respective lots in Boracay since time immemorial. They have
also invested billions of pesos in developing their lands and building internationally
renowned first class resorts on their lots.[31] G.R. No. 173775

Petitioners-claimants hoist five (5) issues, namely:

Petitioners-claimants contended that there is no need for a proclamation
reclassifying Boracay into agricultural land. Being classified as neither mineral nor timber I.
AT THE TIME OF THE ESTABLISHED POSSESSION OF PETITIONERS IN
land, the island is deemed agricultural pursuant to the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. CONCEPT OF OWNER OVER THEIR RESPECTIVE AREAS IN BORACAY, SINCE
926, known as the first Public Land Act. [32] Thus, their possession in the concept of owner for TIME IMMEMORIAL OR AT THE LATEST SINCE 30 YRS. PRIOR TO THE FILING
the required period entitled them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. OF THE PETITION FOR DECLARATORY RELIEF ON NOV. 19, 1997, WERE THE
AREAS OCCUPIED BY THEM PUBLIC AGRICULTURAL LANDS AS DEFINED
BY LAWS THEN ON JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLES OR
Opposing the petition, the OSG argued that petitioners-claimants do not have a PUBLIC FOREST AS DEFINED BY SEC. 3a, PD 705?
vested right over their occupied portions in the island. Boracay is an unclassified public
II.
forest land pursuant to Section 3(a) of PD No. 705. Being public forest, the claimed portions HAVE PETITIONERS OCCUPANTS ACQUIRED PRIOR VESTED RIGHT OF
of the island are inalienable and cannot be the subject of judicial confirmation of imperfect PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OVER THEIR OCCUPIED PORTIONS OF BORACAY LAND,
title. It is only the executive department, not the courts, which has authority to reclassify DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEY HAVE NOT APPLIED YET FOR JUDICIAL
CONFIRMATION OF IMPERFECT TITLE?
lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable lands. There is a need for a positive
government act in order to release the lots for disposition. III.
IS THE EXECUTIVE DECLARATION OF THEIR AREAS AS
ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE UNDER SEC 6, CA 141 [AN]
On November 21, 2006, this Court ordered the consolidation of the two petitions as INDISPENSABLE PRE-REQUISITE FOR PETITIONERS TO OBTAIN TITLE UNDER
they principally involve the same issues on the land classification of Boracay Island.[33] THE TORRENS SYSTEM?

IV.
Issues IS THE ISSUANCE OF PROCLAMATION 1064 ON MAY 22, 2006, VIOLATIVE OF
THE PRIOR VESTED RIGHTS TO PRIVATE OWNERSHIP OF PETITIONERS OVER
THEIR LANDS IN BORACAY, PROTECTED BY THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
G.R. No. 167707
 CONSTITUTION OR IS PROCLAMATION 1064 CONTRARY TO SEC. 8, CA 141,
OR SEC. 4(a) OF RA 6657.
V.
CAN RESPONDENTS BE COMPELLED BY MANDAMUS TO ALLOW THE
SURVEY AND TO APPROVE THE SURVEY PLANSFOR PURPOSES OF THE
APPLICATION FOR TITLING OF THE LANDS OF PETITIONERS IN BORACAY?
[35]
(Underscoring supplied)
In capsule, the main issue is whether private claimants (respondents-claimants in
G.R. No. 167707 and petitioners-claimants in G.R. No. 173775) have a right to secure titles
over their occupied portions in Boracay. The twin petitions pertain to their right, if any, to
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under CA No. 141, as amended. They do not involve
their right to secure title under other pertinent laws.
Our Ruling
Regalian Doctrine and power of the executive
to reclassify lands of the public domain
Private claimants rely on three (3) laws and executive acts in their bid for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title, namely: (a) Philippine Bill of 1902 [36] in relation to Act No.
926, later amended and/or superseded by Act No. 2874 and CA No. 141; [37] (b) Proclamation
No. 1801[38] issued by then President Marcos; and (c) Proclamation No. 1064 [39] issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. We shall proceed to determine their rights to apply for
judicial confirmation of imperfect title under these laws and executive acts.
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify
lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest
or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973 Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural,
industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral, timber or forest and grazing
lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law, [41] giving the government great
leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution
classification with one addition: national parks.[43] Of these, onlyagricultural lands may be
alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006, Boracay Island had never been
expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was an
unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and charged
with the conservation of such patrimony. [45] The doctrine has been consistently adopted
under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions. [46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. [47] Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the inalienable
public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain
will be disposed of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is
possessed of the plenary power as the persona in law to determine who shall be the favored
recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted such privilege,
not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would
be ordinary acts of ownership. [49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish
conquest of the Philippines, ownership of all lands, territories and possessions in
the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown. [50] The Regalian doctrine was first introduced in
the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the
foundation that all lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase
or by grant, belong to the public domain. [51]
 The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of
1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds
as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish
Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It established possessory information as the
method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions which were
[54]
set forth in said decree. Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or
[55]
possessory information title, when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted
into a title of ownership only after the lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted
possession which must be actual, public, and adverse, [56] from the date of its inscription.
[57]
However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the
promulgation of the Maura Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to
[58]
the State.
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be
founded on royal concessions which took various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant;
(2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado or adjustment title;
(4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory
[59]
information title.
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under
American rule was embodied in the Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public
domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3) grand divisions, to wit:
agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands. [61] The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease
(leasehold system).[62] It also provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.
[63]
Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court
[64]
declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act
No. 926 means those public lands acquired from Spainwhich are not
timber or mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise
known as the Land Registration Act. The act established a system of registration by which
recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This is known as
the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926,
which was the first Public Land Act. The Act introduced the homestead system and made
provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles and for the sale or
lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons
owning the controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain. [67] Under the
Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural
lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was sufficient for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise
known as the second Public Land Act. This new, more comprehensive law limited the
exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries
which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and
occupation en concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874
on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No. 141, as amended, remains as the existing general
law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public domain other than
timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to the State. [71]
 Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of
possession and occupation of lands of the public domain since time immemorial or since July
[72]
26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act (RA) No. 1942, which
provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect
[73]
title. The provision was last amended by PD No. 1073, which now provides for possession
and occupation of the land applied for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish
titles as evidence in land registration proceedings. [76] Under the decree, all holders of Spanish
titles or grants should apply for registration of their lands under Act No. 496 within six (6)
months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the recording of
all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as
the Property Registration Decree. It was enacted to codify the various laws relative to
registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the Torrens system as well
as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages. [79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping
with the presumption of State ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized that
there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
[80]
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.[81] In fact, Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those
lands which have been officially delimited and classified. [82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands
of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who
[83]
must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or disposable. To overcome
this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. [84] There must still be a positive act declaring
land of the public domain as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an
application for registration is alienable, the applicant must establish the existence of a
positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an
administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that
the land claimed to have been possessed for the required number of years is alienable and
disposable.[86]
In the case at bar, no such proclamation, executive order, administrative action,
report, statute, or certification was presented to the Court. The records are bereft of
evidence showing that, prior to 2006, the portions of Boracay occupied by private claimants
were subject of a government proclamation that the land is alienable and disposable. Absent
such well-nigh incontrovertible evidence, the Court cannot accept the submission that lands
occupied by private claimants were already open to disposition before 2006. Matters of land
classification or reclassification cannot be assumed. They call for proof.[87]
Ankron and De Aldecoa did not make the whole of Boracay Island, or portions of
it, agricultural lands. Private claimants posit that Boracay was already an agricultural land
pursuant to the old cases Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands (1919)[88] and De
Aldecoa v. The Insular Government (1909).[89] These cases were decided under the provisions
of the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926. There is a statement in these old cases that in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands
until the contrary is shown.[90]
Private claimants reliance on Ankron and De Aldecoa is misplaced. These cases did
not have the effect of converting the whole of Boracay Island or portions of it into
agricultural lands. It should be stressed that the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No. 926
merely provided the manner through which land registration courts would classify lands of
the public domain. Whether the land would be classified as timber, mineral, or agricultural
depended on proof presented in each case.
Ankron and De Aldecoa were decided at a time when the President of the
Philippines had no power to classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber, and
agricultural. At that time, the courts were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending upon the
preponderance of the evidence. [91] This was the Courts ruling in Heirs of the Late Spouses
[92]
Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols Vda. De Palanca v. Republic, in which it stated,
through Justice Adolfo Azcuna, viz.:
x x x Petitioners furthermore insist that a particular land need not be
formally released by an act of the Executive before it can be deemed open
to private ownership, citing the cases of Ramos v. Director of
Lands and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.
xxxx
Petitioners reliance upon Ramos v. Director of Lands and Ankron v.
Government is misplaced. These cases were decided under the Philippine
Bill of 1902 and the first Public Land Act No. 926 enacted by the Philippine
Commission on October 7, 1926, under which there was no legal provision
vesting in the Chief Executive or President of the Philippines the power to
classify lands of the public domain into mineral, timber and agricultural so
that the courts then were free to make corresponding classifications in
justiciable cases, or were vested with implicit power to do so, depending
upon the preponderance of the evidence. [93]
To aid the courts in resolving land registration cases under Act No. 926, it was then
necessary to devise a presumption on land classification. Thus evolved the dictum
in Ankron that the courts have a right to presume, in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, that in each case the lands are agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. [94]
But We cannot unduly expand the presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa to an
argument that all lands of the public domain had been automatically reclassified as
disposable and alienable agricultural lands. By no stretch of imagination did the presumption
convert all lands of the public domain into agricultural lands.
If We accept the position of private claimants, the Philippine Bill of 1902 and Act No.
926 would have automatically made all lands in the Philippines, except those already
classified as timber or mineral land, alienable and disposable lands. That would take these
lands out of State ownership and worse, would be utterly inconsistent with and totally
repugnant to the long-entrenched Regalian doctrine.
The presumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa attaches only to land registration cases
brought under the provisions of Act No. 926, or more specifically those cases dealing with
judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect titles. The presumption applies to an
applicant for judicial or administrative conformation of imperfect title under Act No. 926. It
certainly cannot apply to landowners, such as private claimants or their predecessors-in-
interest, who failed to avail themselves of the benefits of Act No. 926. As to them, their land
remained unclassified and, by virtue of the Regalian doctrine, continued to be owned by the
State.
In any case, the assumption in Ankron and De Aldecoa was not absolute. Land
classification was, in the end, dependent on proof. If there was proof that the land was
better suited for non-agricultural uses, the courts could adjudge it as a mineral or timber
land despite the presumption. In Ankron, this Court stated:
In the case of Jocson vs. Director of Forestry (supra), the Attorney-
General admitted in effect that whether the particular land in question
belongs to one class or another is a question of fact. The mere fact that a
tract of land has trees upon it or has mineral within it is not of itself
sufficient to declare that one is forestry land and the other, mineral
 land. There must be some proof of the extent and present or future value of Department, through the President, the exclusive prerogative to classify or reclassify public
the forestry and of the minerals. While, as we have just said, many
definitions have been given for agriculture, forestry, and mineral lands, and lands into alienable or disposable, mineral or forest. 96-a Since then, courts no longer had the
that in each case it is a question of fact, we think it is safe to say that in authority, whether express or implied, to determine the classification of lands of the public
order to be forestry or mineral land the proof must show that it is more domain.[97]
valuable for the forestry or the mineral which it contains than it is for
agricultural purposes. (Sec. 7, Act No. 1148.) It is not sufficient to show that
there exists some trees upon the land or that it bears some mineral. Land Here, private claimants, unlike the Heirs of Ciriaco Tirol who were issued their title in
may be classified as forestry or mineral today, and, by reason of the 1933, [98]
did not present a justiciable case for determination by the land registration court of
exhaustion of the timber or mineral, be classified as agricultural land
tomorrow. And vice-versa, by reason of the rapid growth of timber or the the propertys land classification. Simply put, there was no opportunity for the courts then to
discovery of valuable minerals, lands classified as agricultural today may be resolve if the land the Boracay occupants are now claiming were agricultural lands. When
differently classified tomorrow. Each case must be decided upon the proof Act No. 926 was supplanted by Act No. 2874 in 1919, without an application for judicial
in that particular case, having regard for its present or future value for one
or the other purposes. We believe, however, considering the fact that it is a confirmation having been filed by private claimants or their predecessors-in-interest, the
matter of public knowledge that a majority of the lands in the Philippine courts were no longer authorized to determine the propertys land classification. Hence,
Islands are agricultural lands that the courts have a right to presume, in the private claimants cannot bank on Act No. 926.
absence of evidence to the contrary, that in each case the lands are
agricultural lands until the contrary is shown. Whatever the land involved in
a particular land registration case is forestry or mineral land must, We note that the RTC decision[99] in G.R. No. 167707 mentioned Krivenko v. Register
therefore, be a matter of proof. Its superior value for one purpose or the
of Deeds of Manila,[100] which was decided in 1947 when CA No. 141, vesting the Executive
other is a question of fact to be settled by the proof in each particular
case. The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient with the sole power to classify lands of the public domain was already in
for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral land. It effect. Krivenko cited the old cases Mapa v. Insular Government,[101] De Aldecoa v. The Insular
may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land. The
Government,[102] and Ankron v. Government of the Philippine Islands.[103]
Government, in the first instance, under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before Krivenko, however, is not controlling here because it involved a totally different
such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is agricultural,
issue. The pertinent issue in Krivenko was whether residential lots were included in the
forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private interests have
intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said Act (No. 1148), general classification of agricultural lands; and if so, whether an alien could acquire a
may decide for itself what portions of the public domain shall be set aside residential lot. This Court ruled that as an alien, Krivenko was prohibited by the 1935
and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs. Director of Lands, 39
Constitution[104] from acquiring agricultural land, which included residential lots. Here, the
Phil. 175; Jocson vs. Director of Forestry, supra)[95] (Emphasis ours)
issue is whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed
Since 1919, courts were no longer free to determine the classification of lands from agricultural.
the facts of each case, except those that have already became private lands. [96] Act No. 2874,
promulgated in 1919 and reproduced in Section 6 of CA No. 141, gave the Executive
 Notably, the definition of agricultural public lands mentioned in Krivenko relied on
the old cases decided prior to the enactment of Act No. 2874, including Ankron and De
Aldecoa.[105] As We have already stated, those cases cannot apply here, since they were
decided when the Executive did not have the authority to classify lands as agricultural,
timber, or mineral.
Private claimants continued possession under Act No. 926 does not create a
presumption that the land is alienable. Private claimants also contend that their continued
possession of portions of Boracay Island for the requisite period of ten (10) years under Act
[106]
No. 926 ipso facto converted the island into private ownership. Hence, they may apply for
a title in their name.
A similar argument was squarely rejected by the Court in Collado v. Court of
Appeals.[107] Collado, citing the separate opinion of now Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno in Cruz
v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,107-a ruled:
Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in
pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public
domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling and leasing of portions of the public
domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms
and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the issuance
of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands, for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for
the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation
or confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in
the Islands. In short, the Public Land Act operated on the
assumption that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands
remained in the government; and that the governments title
to public land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other
subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States.
The term public land referred to all lands of the public
domain whose title still remained in the government and
are thrown open to private appropriation and settlement,
and excluded the patrimonial property of the government
and the friar lands.
Thus, it is plain error for petitioners to argue that under the Philippine Bill
of 1902 and Public Land Act No. 926, mere possession by private
individuals of lands creates the legal presumption that the lands are
alienable and disposable.[108] (Emphasis Ours)
Except for lands already covered by existing titles, Boracay was an unclassified
land of the public domain prior to Proclamation No. 1064. Such unclassified lands are
considered public forest under PD No. 705. The DENR[109] and the National Mapping and
Resource Information Authority[110] certify that Boracay Island is an unclassified land of the
public domain.
PD No. 705 issued by President Marcos categorized all unclassified lands of the
public domain as public forest. Section 3(a) of PD No. 705 defines a public forest as a mass of
lands of the public domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for the determination of which lands are needed for forest purpose and which
are not. Applying PD No. 705, all unclassified lands, including those in Boracay Island,
are ipso facto considered public forests. PD No. 705, however, respects titles already existing
prior to its effectivity.
The Court notes that the classification of Boracay as a forest land under PD No. 705
may seem to be out of touch with the present realities in the island. Boracay, no doubt, has
been partly stripped of its forest cover to pave the way for commercial developments. As a
premier tourist destination for local and foreign tourists, Boracay appears more of a
commercial island resort, rather than a forest land.
Nevertheless, that the occupants of Boracay have built multi-million peso beach
resorts on the island;[111] that the island has already been stripped of its forest cover; or that
the implementation of Proclamation No. 1064 will destroy the islands tourism industry,
do not negate its character as public forest.
Forests, in the context of both the Public Land Act and the Constitution [112] classifying
lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks, do not necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses covered by dense
[113]
growths of trees and underbrushes. The discussion in Heirs of Amunategui v. Director of
Forestry[114] is particularly instructive:
A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does
not lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land may
actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingincultivators or
other farmers. Forest lands do not have to be on mountains or in out of the
way places. Swampy areas covered by mangrove trees, nipa palms, and
other trees growing in brackish or sea water may also be classified as forest
land. The classification is descriptive of its legal nature or status and does
not have to be descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and
until the land classified as forest is released in an official proclamation to
that effect so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the
public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.
[115]
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a big difference between forest as defined in a dictionary and forest or timber land
as a classification of lands of the public domain as appearing in our statutes. One is
descriptive of what appears on the land while the other is a legal status, a classification for
legal purposes.[116] At any rate, the Court is tasked to determine the legal status
of Boracay Island, and not look into its physical layout. Hence, even if its forest cover has
been replaced by beach resorts, restaurants and other commercial establishments, it has not
been automatically converted from public forest to alienable agricultural land.
Private claimants cannot rely on Proclamation No. 1801 as basis for judicial
confirmation of imperfect title. The proclamation did not convert Boracay into an
agricultural land. However, private claimants argue that Proclamation No. 1801 issued by
then President Marcos in 1978 entitles them to judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
Proclamation classified Boracay, among other islands, as a tourist zone. Private claimants
assert that, as a tourist spot, the island is susceptible of private ownership.
Proclamation No. 1801 or PTA Circular No. 3-82 did not convert the whole of Boracay
into an agricultural land. There is nothing in the law or the Circular which
made Boracay Island an agricultural land. The reference in Circular No. 3-82 to private
lands[117] and areas declared as alienable and disposable [118] does not by itself classify the
entire island as agricultural. Notably, Circular No. 3-82 makes reference not only to private
lands and areas but also to public forested lands. Rule VIII, Section 3 provides:
No trees in forested private lands may be cut without prior authority
from the PTA. All forested areas in public lands are declared forest
reserves. (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, the reference in the Circular to both private and public lands merely
recognizes that the island can be classified by the Executive department pursuant to its
powers under CA No. 141. In fact, Section 5 of the Circular recognizes the then Bureau of
Forest Developments authority to declare areas in the island as alienable and disposable
when it provides:
Subsistence farming, in areas declared as alienable and disposable
by the Bureau of Forest Development.
Therefore, Proclamation No. 1801 cannot be deemed the positive act needed to
classify Boracay Island as alienable and disposable land. If President Marcos intended to
classify the island as alienable and disposable or forest, or both, he would have identified
the specific limits of each, as President Arroyo did in Proclamation No. 1064. This was not
done in Proclamation No. 1801.
 The Whereas clauses of Proclamation No. 1801 also explain the rationale behind the
declaration of Boracay Island, together with other islands, caves and peninsulas in the
Philippines, as a tourist zone and marine reserve to be administered by the PTA to ensure
the concentrated efforts of the public and private sectors in the development of the areas
tourism potential with due regard for ecological balance in the marine environment. Simply
put, the proclamation is aimed at administering the islands for tourism and ecological
[119]
purposes. It does not address the areas alienability.
More importantly, Proclamation No. 1801 covers not only Boracay Island, but sixty-
four (64) other islands, coves, and peninsulas in the Philippines, such as Fortune and Verde
Islands in Batangas, Port Galera in Oriental Mindoro, Panglao and Balicasag Islands in Bohol,
Coron Island, Puerto Princesa and surrounding areas in Palawan, Camiguin Island in Cagayan
de Oro, and Misamis Oriental, to name a few. If the designation of Boracay Island as tourist
zone makes it alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 1801, all the other
areas mentioned would likewise be declared wide open for private disposition. That could
not have been, and is clearly beyond, the intent of the proclamation.
It was Proclamation No. 1064 of 2006 which positively declared part of Boracay as
alienable and opened the same to private ownership. Sections 6 and 7 of CA No.
141[120] provide that it is only the President, upon the recommendation of the proper
department head, who has the authority to classify the lands of the public domain into
alienable or disposable, timber and mineral lands. [121]
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo merely
exercised the authority granted to her to classify lands of the public domain, presumably
subject to existing vested rights. Classification of public lands is the exclusive prerogative of
the Executive Department, through the Office of the President. Courts have no authority to
do so.[122] Absent such classification, the land remains unclassified until released and
rendered open to disposition.[123]
Proclamation No. 1064 classifies Boracay into 400 hectares of reserved forest land
and 628.96 hectares of agricultural land. The Proclamation likewise provides for a 15-meter
buffer zone on each side of the center line of roads and trails, which are reserved for right of
way and which shall form part of the area reserved for forest land protection purposes.
Contrary to private claimants argument, there was nothing invalid or irregular, much
less unconstitutional, about the classification of Boracay Island made by the President
through Proclamation No. 1064. It was within her authority to make such classification,
subject to existing vested rights.
Proclamation No. 1064 does not violate the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law. Private claimants further assert that Proclamation No. 1064 violates the provision of
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) or RA No. 6657 barring conversion of public
forests into agricultural lands. They claim that since Boracay is a public forest under PD No.
705, President Arroyo can no longer convert it into an agricultural land without running afoul
of Section 4(a) of RA No. 6657, thus:
SEC. 4. Scope. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988
shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all
public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131
and Executive Order No. 229, including other lands of the public domain
suitable for agriculture.
More specifically, the following lands are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:
(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain
devoted to or suitable for
agriculture. No reclassification of forest or mineral
lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the
approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account
ecological, developmental and equity considerations,
shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the
public domain.
 That Boracay Island was classified as a public forest under PD No. 705 did not bar the
Executive from later converting it into agricultural land. Boracay Island still remained an
unclassified land of the public domain despite PD No. 705.
In Heirs of the Late Spouses Pedro S. Palanca and Soterranea Rafols v. Republic,
[124]
the Court stated that unclassified lands are public forests.
While it is true that the land classification map does not
categorically state that the islands are public forests, the fact that they
were unclassified lands leads to the same result. In the absence of the
classification as mineral or timber land, the land remains unclassified land
until released and rendered open to disposition. [125] (Emphasis supplied)
Moreover, the prohibition under the CARL applies only to a reclassification of land. If
the land had never been previously classified, as in the case of Boracay, there can be no
prohibited reclassification under the agrarian law. We agree with the opinion of the
Department of Justice[126] on this point:
Indeed, the key word to the correct application of the prohibition in
Section 4(a) is the word reclassification. Where there has been no previous
classification of public forest [referring, we repeat, to the mass of the public
domain which has not been the subject of the present system of
classification for purposes of determining which are needed for forest
purposes and which are not] into permanent forest or forest reserves or
some other forest uses under the Revised Forestry Code, there can be no
reclassification of forest lands to speak of within the meaning of Section
4(a).
Thus, obviously, the prohibition in Section 4(a) of the CARL against
the reclassification of forest lands to agricultural lands without a prior law
delimiting the limits of the public domain, does not, and cannot, apply to
those lands of the public domain, denominated as public forest under the
Revised Forestry Code, which have not been previously determined, or
classified, as needed for forest purposes in accordance with the provisions
of the Revised Forestry Code.[127]
Private claimants are not entitled to apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect
title under CA No. 141. Neither do they have vested rights over the occupied lands under
the said law. There are two requisites for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title under CA No. 141, namely: (1) open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession
and occupation of the subject land by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest under
a bona fide claim of ownership since time immemorial or from June 12, 1945; and (2) the
classification of the land as alienable and disposable land of the public domain. [128]
As discussed, the Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801 did
not convert portions of Boracay Islandinto an agricultural land. The island remained an
unclassified land of the public domain and, applying the Regalian doctrine, is considered
State property.
Private claimants bid for judicial confirmation of imperfect title, relying on the
Philippine Bill of 1902, Act No. 926, and Proclamation No. 1801, must fail because of the
absence of the second element of alienable and disposable land. Their entitlement to a
government grant under our present Public Land Act presupposes that the land possessed
and applied for is already alienable and disposable. This is clear from the wording of the law
itself.[129] Where the land is not alienable and disposable, possession of the land, no matter
how long, cannot confer ownership or possessory rights. [130]
Neither may private claimants apply for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under
Proclamation No. 1064, with respect to those lands which were classified as agricultural
lands. Private claimants failed to prove the first element of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession of their lands in Boracay since June 12, 1945.
 We cannot sustain the CA and RTC conclusion in the petition for declaratory relief
that private claimants complied with the requisite period of possession.
The tax declarations in the name of private claimants are insufficient to prove the
first element of possession. We note that the earliest of the tax declarations in the name of
private claimants were issued in 1993. Being of recent dates, the tax declarations are not
sufficient to convince this Court that the period of possession and occupation commenced
on June 12, 1945.
Private claimants insist that they have a vested right in Boracay, having been in
possession of the island for a long time. They have invested millions of pesos in developing
the island into a tourist spot. They say their continued possession and investments give them
a vested right which cannot be unilaterally rescinded by Proclamation No. 1064.
The continued possession and considerable investment of private claimants do not
automatically give them a vested right in Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply for
a title to the land they are presently occupying. This Court is constitutionally bound to
decide cases based on the evidence presented and the laws applicable. As the law and
jurisprudence stand, private claimants are ineligible to apply for a judicial confirmation of
title over their occupied portions in Boracay even with their continued possession and
considerable investment in the island.
One Last Note
The Court is aware that millions of pesos have been invested for the development
of Boracay Island, making it a by-word in the local and international tourism industry. The
Court also notes that for a number of years, thousands of people have called the island their
home. While the Court commiserates with private claimants plight, We are bound to apply
the law strictly and judiciously.This is the law and it should prevail. Ito ang batas at ito ang
dapat umiral.
All is not lost, however, for private claimants. While they may not be eligible to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of CA No. 141, as amended,
this does not denote their automatic ouster from the residential, commercial, and other
areas they possess now classified as agricultural. Neither will this mean the loss of their
substantial investments on their occupied alienable lands. Lack of title does not necessarily
mean lack of right to possess.
For one thing, those with lawful possession may claim good faith as builders of
improvements. They can take steps to preserve or protect their possession. For another, they
may look into other modes of applying for original registration of title, such as by
homestead[131] or sales patent,[132] subject to the conditions imposed by law.
More realistically, Congress may enact a law to entitle private claimants to acquire
title to their occupied lots or to exempt them from certain requirements under the present
land laws. There is one such bill[133] now pending in the House of Representatives. Whether
that bill or a similar bill will become a law is for Congress to decide.
In issuing Proclamation No. 1064, the government has taken the step necessary to
open up the island to private ownership. This gesture may not be sufficient to appease some
sectors which view the classification of the island partially into a forest reserve as
absurd. That the island is no longer overrun by trees, however, does not becloud the vision
to protect its remaining forest cover and to strike a healthy balance between progress and
ecology. Ecological conservation is as important as economic progress.
To be sure, forest lands are fundamental to our nations survival. Their promotion
and protection are not just fancy rhetoric for politicians and activists. These are needs that
become more urgent as destruction of our environment gets prevalent and difficult to
control. As aptly observed by Justice Conrado Sanchez in 1968 in Director of Forestry v.
Munoz:[134]
 The view this Court takes of the cases at bar is but in adherence to
public policy that should be followed with respect to forest lands. Many
have written much, and many more have spoken, and quite often, about the
pressing need for forest preservation, conservation, protection,
development and reforestation. Not without justification. For, forests
constitute a vital segment of any country's natural resources. It is of
common knowledge by now that absence of the necessary green cover on
our lands produces a number of adverse or ill effects of serious
proportions. Without the trees, watersheds dry up; rivers and lakes which
they supply are emptied of their contents. The fish disappear. Denuded
areas become dust bowls. As waterfalls cease to function, so will
hydroelectric plants. With the rains, the fertile topsoil is washed away;
geological erosion results. With erosion come the dreaded floods that wreak
havoc and destruction to property crops, livestock, houses, and highways
not to mention precious human lives. Indeed, the foregoing observations
should be written down in a lumbermans decalogue. [135]