Journal of Pragmatics 8 (1984) 345-365 345

North-Holland

MODIFYING ILLOCUTIONARY FORCE

Janet HOLMES *

Mitigation is an interesting pragmatic concept which has attracted some attention. It can usefully
be considered in relation to the more general communicative strategies for modifying the strength
or force of speech acts, namely, attenuation and boosting. The effects of these strategies on
positively affective and negatively affective speech acts are discussed and exemplified, and reasons
for using them are considered. A range of linguistic devices which may be used to modify the
illocutionary force of speech acts is described and illustrated.

In several articles published over the last few years Bruce Fraser has discussed
the concept of ‘mitigation’ (Fraser 1978, 1980; Fraser and Nolan 1981).
Mitigation is defined as a strategy for softening or reducing the strength of a
speech act whose effects are unwelcome to the hearer (Fraser 1980 : 342). It has
attracted particular attention perhaps because researchers are most familiar
with “negative-politeness cultures” (Brown and Levinson 1978 : 250). It is
clear, however, that it is only one of the strategies available for modifying the
strength or illocutionary force of one particular group of speech acts [l]. In this
paper I will describe the alternative strategy of boosting or emphasizing the
illocutionary force of speech acts, and will consider the effects of both
attenuation (or weakening) and boosting (or emphasizing) on a range of speech
acts. In the later sections of the paper I will exemplify a variety of linguistic
devices which may be used in English to modify the illocutionary force of
different speech acts.

Strategies for modifying illocutionary force

Mitigation involves the weakening rather than the strengthening of the force
with which the illocutionary point of a particular speech act is presented.

[l] The terms ‘illocutionary force’ and ‘illocutionary point’ are sometimes used interchangeably to
describe the function or purpose of a speech act. I have consistently used only ‘illocutionary point’
in this sense. The term ‘illocutionary force’ is used in this paper to refer to the strength with which
the illocutionary point of a speech act is presented (cf. Searle 1976 : 5).
* Author’s address: J. Holmes, Victoria University, Department of English, Private bag, Welling-
ton, New Zealand.

0378.2166/84/$3.00 0 1984, Elsevier Science Publishers B.V. (North-Holland)

Moreover, it does not refer to “cm?, weakening of the force of the act being
performed” but is restricted to speech acts whose effects are “unwelcome” to
the hearer (Fraser 1980 : 342). Thus mitigation is a strategy used to reduce the
anticipated negative effect of a speech act. Implicit in this definition are four
different distinctions. of which mitigation is just one. Figure 1 illustrates the
four categories and the place of mitigation in such a framework.
Mitigation involves softening or reducing the force of speech acts. Fraser
explicitly states that “it is not what occurs when we emphasize the force of our
message” (1980: 342) and admits that he has “no ready name for this type of
effect” (1980 : 343). The fact that English does not provide a ready-made label
for an effect should not deter us from paying it attention. Clearly, emphasizing
or boosting the illocutionary force of a speech act is a complementary strategy
to that of softening or attenuating its force. Compare, for example, (1) (2) and
(3):

Contextual information [2]

(1) You are a fool [One close friend to another]
(2) My god you are such a fool
(3) You are a hit of a fool you know

The italicized lexical items in (2) serve to boost or increase the force of the
criticism whereas those in (3) serve to attenuate or soften its force. Since
criticize is a negatively affective speech act, the effect of the italicized lexical
items in (3) can be described as that of mitigation in Fraser’s terms.

Positively affective speech act, e.g. (5)

Boosting

\Neqatively affective speech act, e.g. (2)

Positively affective speech act, e.g. (6)

Attenuating
<
\Neqatively affective speech act, e.g. (3)
(i.e. Mitigation)

Figure 1. Strategies for modifying illocutionary force.

[2] I have consistently supplied in as economical a form as possible sufficient contextual

information to interpret the illocutionary point and the approximate degree of force of the speech
act. This generally involves information from which the reader can deduce the relative status or
power of the participants, the social distance or degree of solidarity between them, and the cost or
ranking of the imposition represented by the utterance (Brown and Gilman 1960: Leech 1977:
Brown and Levinson 1978).
 Now consider (4), (5) and (6) where the speech act being modified is a
positively affective speech act:

(4) You are pretty [One close friend to another]

(5) Redly you are umazingly pretty
(6) You are kind of pretty in a way

The italicized lexical items in (5) serve to boost the illocutionary force of the
compliment, whereas those in (6) attenuate or decrease its force. Since the
anticipated effect of such a speech act is not an unwelcome one, neither of
these strategies qualify as mitigation.
Modifying the illocutionary force of speech acts involves increasing or
decreasing the strength with which the illocutionary point is presented. One
way of achieving this is by explicit reference to the sincerity conditions
underlying different categories of speech acts. Hence (using Searle’s 1976
categorization) Representative speech acts, for instance, may be boosted or
attenuated by referring explicitly to the extent of the speaker’s belief in or
commitment to the proposition being asserted as (7) and (8) illustrate:

(7) Z guess it’s probably a day-school [Teacher discussing photograph

(8) I’m quite sure it’s a day-school with pupils]

Similarly, speech acts belonging to the category of Expressives, such as

compliments and criticisms, may be modified by linguistic devices expressing
different degrees of feeling, as illustrated in (2) (3) (5) and (6) above.
Modifying the force of speech acts from the category of Directives may be
achieved by explicit reference to the extent of the speaker’s desire or want that
the hearer do something, as in (9):

(9) Z really want you to read this to me [Teacher to pupil]

And Commissive speech acts may be boosted or attenuated by expressions of

the strength of the speaker’s intention to do something, as (10) and (11)
illustrate:

(10) Z solemnly promise I won’t be late home today [Husband to wife]

(11) Z guess I’ll probably ring you later

Hence, modifying the illocutionary force of speech acts from different cate-
gories involves the speaker in expressing degrees of belief, desire, strength of
feelings, and commitment or seriousness of intention. Explicit reference to
these “expressed psychological states” or sincerity conditions (Searle 1976 : 4)
is one linguistic means of modifying illocutionary force. Other means of
achieving the same end will be discussed below.
348 J. Holmes / Modifving illocutionar?, force

To sum up, there are two basic strategies for modifying the illocutionary
force of speech acts: attenuation and boosting. Each may be used to modify
positively and negatively affective speech acts from any of the broad categories
described by theorists such as Searle. It is difficult to explain why mitigation,
which involves the attenuation of negatively affective speech acts, has attracted
particular attention compared to the other categories identified in figure 1
which are theoretically of equal interest. The existence of a distinct label
enabling it to be easily identified may provide a partial explanation. Another
contributory element may be the fact that English-speaking academic speech
communities tend to constitute “negative-politeness cultures” (Brown and
Levinson 1978 : 250) with a consequent fascination for devices which attenuate
negatively affective speech acts.

Reasons for modifying illocutionary force

There are at least two basic reasons why a speaker might wish to modify the
strength or force with which a particular speech act is expressed: firstly, to
convey modal meaning or the speaker’s attitude to the content of the proposi-
tion, and, secondly, to express affective meaning or the speaker’s attitude to
the addressee in the context of utterance [3].
The modal meaning of an utterance involves the speaker’s expressed degree
of certainty concerning the validity or truth of the proposition asserted in the
utterance. The speaker may, for example, be very doubtful about the validity
of the information contained in the proposition. By attenuating the force of the
speech act asserting the proposition, the speaker can express this uncertainty or
unwillingness to take responsibility for its validity. (12) provides an example:

(12) I’m not at all sure Mary’s coming [Guest to hostess concerning
mutual friend who has been ill]

Alternatively, the speaker may be aware that an addressee is doubtful or

hesitant about some proposition, and may use devices to boost the illocution-
ary force of the speech act asserting the proposition, expressing great certainty
or conviction concerning its validity. The exchange in (13) illustrates this
point:

(13) A. Is Jeremy likely to stand then? [Two colleagues discussing

B. Certainly he is - there’ll be an election]
no stopping him.

(31 The distinction between modal and affective meaning is discussed in Kennedy (1979) and
Holmes (1982b).
 J. Holmes / Modifying illocutionq force 349

Linguistic devices, such as those italicized in (12) and (13), which are used to
express the extent of the speaker’s commitment to the truth of a proposition
are generally described as devices for expressing epistemic modality (Lyons
1977 : 793). Such devices may also be used to express affective meaning (see
Holmes 1982b).
The affective meaning of an utterance involves the speaker’s attitude to the
hearer in the context of utterance. Modifying the illocutionary force of a
speech act may serve to express a variety of attitudes to the hearer, ranging
from very positive to very negative attitudes. Hence, one way of analysing the
affective meaning of attenuating and boosting the strength of speech acts is to
examine the contribution of these strategies to the speaker-hearer relationship.
To what extent do they increase or decrease the solidarity or the social distance
between the speaker and the hearer? Figure 2 diagrams the possible relation-
ships between strategies for modifying the illocutionary force of different
speech acts and the affective meaning such strategies may express in terms of
their effect on the speaker-hearer relationship [4].
Attenuation of a negatively affective speech act (i.e. mitigation) can be
regarded in these terms as a strategy likely to contribute to the development or

Affective Strategy Linguistic devices

meaning (some examples)

Increase Positively Strong stress

solidarity affective High volume
speech act Rhetorical question
\ Exclamation
Boosting
Increase Negatively Booster (see fn. 4)
social affective / 4 Illocutionary force-
distance speech act indicating device

Increase Positively
social affective Low volume
distance speech act
\ Attenuating
Increase Negatively Downtoner (see fn. 4)
solidarity affective / Digression signal
speech act

Figure
2.

[4]In figure 2,Boosters and Downtoners are terms used by Holmes (1982b) to describe lexical
items which increase and decrease the illocutionary force of speech acts respectively. They are
exemplified below in the appropriate sections.
maintenance of the speaker-hearer relationship, to decrease the social distance
between the speaker and the hearer. To reduce the force of an ‘unwelcome’
speech act is to express positive feelings towards the hearer which should
increase the solidarity of the relationship. Similarly, boosting the force of a
positively affective speech act can be interpreted as an expression of friendli-
ness or “camaraderie” (Lakoff 1975). Hence, the italicized items in (14) and
(15) can be regarded as having the same affective function, although the
strategies involved are different:

(14) A. What do you think B?

B. Well Z think George is u bit er [Friend expressing opinion on
perhaps foolish addressee’s husband’s behaviour]
(15) That was real/y very kind indeed [Friend expressing thanks for a favour]

On the other hand, the attenuation of a positively affective speech act can be
interpreted as a strategy likely to increase the social distance between the
speaker and the hearer; to ‘cool’ the effects of a positive speech act is likely to
reduce rather than maintain solidarity. Similarly, though in a more extreme
way, to boost a negatively affective speech act can only decrease camaraderie
and increase the social distance between the speaker and the hearer. Conse-
quently, the italicized items in (16) and (17). which involve different strategies
for modifying the illocutionary force of the speech acts in which they occur,
may nevertheless be regarded as expressing the same type of affective meaning:

(16) It’s pretty good I suppose [Friend’s comment on

addressee’s painting]
(17) I’ll bfoody well murder that dog of yours [Neighbour’s threat to
addressee’s dog who has
fouled his garden]

Strategies for boosting and attenuating the illocutionary force of speech acts
are thus part of the complex array of social “accelerators” and “brakes”
which speakers routinely use to increase and decrease social distance in
interaction (Brown and Levinson 1978 : 98, 287). Skilful selection from amongst
the vast range of linguistic and non-linguistic devices which are available to
express affective meaning enables speakers to communicate their attitudes to
their addressees very precisely. In this section I have discussed one aspect of
figure 2. I turn now to a discussion of the second aspect, namely, the linguistic
devices which may be used to realize the strategies of boosting and attenuation
[51.
[5] Gestures, body posture. facial expression, hesitations, pauses and tone of voice are obvious
examples of kinesic and paralinguistic devices which may modify illocutionary force. I have
focused, however, only on linguistic devices.
Linguistic devices for modifying illocutionary force

In his discussion of “conversational mitigation”, Fraser (1980 : 341) describes

what he calls six “strategies used by speakers to indicate their intent to
mitigate the force of an utterance”. These include strategies such as being
indirect and impersonalizing on the one hand, and linguistic devices or forms,
such as parenthetical verbs and tag questions on the other. The distinction
between strategies on the one hand, and forms or devices for realizing or
expressing them on the other, is one which is pragmatically and sociolinguisti-
tally important. Communicative strategies provide an intervening variable
between language and society, as Brown (1980: 133) points out, “allowing us
to relate [them] in a direct and motivated way, rather than simply to correlate
them”. In the sections below I have focussed on the linguistic forms which may
be used to express the strategies of boosting and attenuating the illocutionary
force of speech acts. The examples provided are by no means exhaustive but
are intended to suggest something of the range of linguistic devices which may
be used to modify the illocutionary force of speech acts [6].

Boosting illocutionary force

Prosodic devices

Contrastive pitch (i.e. lower or higher than the speaker’s normal pitch) and
contrastive volume are linguistic devices which may be used to increase the
force of speech acts. Consider, for example, the effect of maximum volume on
an utterance such as (18) in any context:

(18) You idiot! [One friend to another in a private setting]

On the other hand, low pitch and volume may equally serve to strengthen the
illocutionary force of an utterance such as (19)

(19) You are lovely [One friend to another in a private setting]

And (20) provides another prosodic example, illustrating the use of strong
stress, one of the most frequently employed boosting devices. The item in
italics receives the strong stress:

(20) It’s ridiculous [One colleague to another commenting on a third col-

league’s proposal]

[6] There is clearly an infinite number of linguistic devices which may be used to modify
illocutionary force.
Syntactic devices

Three examples of syntactic devices which may be used to boost the illocution-
ary force of a speech act are interrogative structures, exclamations and tag
statements.
Kempson provides an informal pragmatic account of the meaning of
utterances such as (21) and (22) (1975 : 172):

(21) “Isn’t she lovely?”

(22) “Didn’t she sing badly?”

She suggests that the communicative content of such utterances must consist of
a message concerning the strength of the speaker’s commitment to the positive
propositions she is lovely and she sang badly, since their propositional content
is already known to the speaker and the hearer. In other words, the interroga-
tive syntactic frame functions as a boosting device in contexts where question-
ing the content of the proposition is clearly not the main function of the
utterance.
Hudson (1975 : 9) provides a similar account of rhetorical questions, defi-
ning them as interrogative forms with exclamatory force. And Leech and
Svartvik (1975 : 137-8) distinguish between exclamatory questions, which
“ vigorously invite the hearer’s agreement”, and rhetorical questions which are,
they say, like “strong” or “forceful statements”.
In other words, all these constructions are means of expressing the speaker’s
message forcefully. The message may, of course, vary in affective meaning as
(23) and (24) illustrate:

(23) Isn’t that great! [Mother admiring child’s picture]

(24) What a mess you’ve made! [Mother to child after cooking foray]

The tag statement is another syntactic device which boosts illocutionary force.
Quirk et al. (1972 : 971) use this term to describe the italicized tag in utterances
such as (25):

(25) “That was a lark that was.” [Quirk et al.‘s example]

Clearly the tag does not convey propositional content but rather expresses the
extent of the speaker’s commitment to the proposition asserted: i.e. it boosts
the illocutionary force of the assertion.

Lexical devices

There are many lexical items which may be used to boost the illocutionary
force of speech acts. I refer to such items as Boosters and I have discussed
 them in detail elsewhere (Holmes forthcoming). I will provide here examples of
just three semantic sub-categories to suggest the range of such devices. They
are certainly not exhaustive.

(i) Speaker-oriented Boosters

This group of Boosters includes items which refer to the veracity and reliability
of the speaker as the basis for the boost to the illocutionary force of the speech
act. Style disjuncts such as candidly, frankly, honestly, truly, and truthfully come
into this category as do phrases such as in all honesty and in my opinion.
Personalized forms (involving first person pronouns) with “propositional-atti-
tude verbs” (Leech 1980 : 36), or adjectives such as sure and certain, may also
function as speaker-oriented Boosters, e.g.:

I believe, believe me, I assure you, I’m certain.

(26) and (27) exemplify Boosters increasing the force of a boast and a
complaint respectively:

(26) Quitefrank& we’ve moved much [MP to interviewer on radio]

more swiftly than any other
party.
(27) Believe me it was boring [One friend to another describing
former job]

(ii) Hearer-oriented Boosters

Some Boosters appeal to the hearer’s experience or knowledge of the world as

the basis for the boost. Obvious examples here are lexical items such as you
know and you see, as you know and you know what I mean. These items, like
many others, may boost or attenuate the force of a speech act depending on
their position in the utterance, the intonation contour and the context of
utterance. As Boosters they are semantically related to factive adverbs, such as
naturally, and of course, and the semantically opaque construction it goes
without saying, which “deviously” or sneakily strengthen the force of the
proposition asserted by presupposing its truth (see Corum 1975). In other
words, these forms boost illocutionary force by explicitly or implicitly referring
to the hearer’s knowledge, or assumed shared background information. (28)
and (29) illustrate hearer-oriented Boosters which increase the force of a
criticism and a promise respectively.

(28) The film as you know was a failure [Interviewee on radio commenting
on a rival’s film]
(29) Well naturally I’ll be there [Father to son referring to school
concert]

(iii) Content-oriented Boosters

Some Boosters increase the illocutionary force of speech acts by commenting

impersonally on the validity of the proposition asserted, others by boosting a
focal element within the proposition. The first group involves impersonalized
epistemically modal forms which assert the proposition with certainty. e.g.:

certainly, it is certain (that), indubitably and without doubt.

The second group includes all the intensifying adverbs in the language which,
by boosting elements such as verbs, adjectives and adverbs, may thus increase
the force of the speech act as a whole, e.g.:

absolutely, completely, just, quite, totally, very [7].

In (30), content-oriented Boosters increase the force of an agreeing speech act,

while in (31) the italicized item boosts the force of a complaint:

(30) Undoubtedly I think that’s absolutely right [Interviewee to interviewer

responding to formulation
of issue]
(31) You’ve certainly taken long enough [Customer to visiting plumber]

Discoursal devices

There are a number of linguistic forms which can perhaps be described as

intra-textual or metapragmatic devices for boosting the illocutionary force of
utterances (see Fotion 1979; Thomas forthcoming). These include explicit
illocutionary force-indicating devices, such as I ask you, Z tell you, I warn you,

[7] It should be noted that just and quite are examples of items which may function to boost or to
attenuate the force of a speech act depending on their linguistic context: e.g., compare quite in It’s
quite wonderfuland If’s quite good where the occurrence of a following limit vs a scale adjective
determines its interpretation as Booster vs Downtoner (cf. Leech and Svartvik 1975 : 101).
and I beg you. Leech (1980 : 69) comments, for example, that these “are only
used when the speaker wants to lay particular stress on the illocutionary force
of the utterance”.
Closely related are forms such as and I repeat, let me stress, and I would
emphasize. These explicit and self-consciously rhetorical devices may effec-
tively boost the illocutionary force of the speech acts they preface. And
metadiscoursal devices which refer to the contributions of others to the
discourse may function in the same way, e.g.:

as you say, as X just said.

It should also be noted that the repetition itself serves as a rhetorical device to
increase the force of the repeated speech act.
In this section, too, I would include a number of “linking signals” (Leech
and Svartvik 1975 : 157) which may function to reinforce or emphasize the
speech acts they introduce, e.g.:

besides, furthermore, (and) what is more

(see also Crystal and Davy 1975; Halliday and Hasan 1976). (32) and (33)
provide examples of attested utterances illustrating the use of discoursal
devices to boost the illocutionary force of different speech acts.

(32) As you say there are a number of important issues [Interviewee on radio]
(33) I’ll tell you just one more time sit down [Father to child]

Attenuating illocutionary force

Prosodic devices

The fall-rise intonation pattern which is used to express epistemic modality in

English is perhaps the most obvious example of a prosodic device which may
reduce or attenuate the illocutionary force of a speech act (Coates 1980;
Halliday 1970). In (34) this intonation pattern attenuates the force of a
criticism while in (35) a directive speech act is reduced in force from an order
to a request by the use of this intonation pattern:

(34) You are sill ’ ly [Mother to child who is deliberately falling over]
(35) Put the TV\’ on [One flatmate to another]

Weakened stress, low volume and high pitch may also reduce illocutionary
force in appropriate contexts. To tell someone to shut up, for instance, in a
gentle low voice is to express the directive with considerably less force than if it
were uttered with strong stress. In relation to high pitch, Brown and Levinson
(1978) argue for the universal association of high pitch and tentativeness. They
suggest high pitch may derive deferential overtones from its association with
the voice quality of children, and, in discussing how high pitch may attenuate
the force of speech acts in Tzeltal in particular, they say:

“Use of [high pitch] seems to release the speaker from responsibility for believing the truth of what
he utters, so that the presence of this falsetto in an otherwise normal conversation may well mark
the presence of a social lie” (B rown and Levinson 197X : 177).

Clearly, there are many ways in which variation in the use of prosodic devices
such as intonation contour, stress, volume and pitch may reduce or attenuate
the illocutionary force of utterances.

Syntactic devices

In this section I will discuss just two syntactic devices which may attenuate the
force of speech acts: the tag question and a particular variety of double
negative.
The tag question is perhaps the best-known and most-studied syntactic
construction used for this purpose (eg. Lakoff 1972, 1974, 1975; Hudson 1975;
Millar and Brown 1979; Holmes 1982a). Thus, Fraser (1980) naturally includes
tag questions as devices which may be used to attenuate or mitigate the force
of unwelcome speech acts. Fraser’s discussion is, however, somewhat mislead-
ing; he oversimplifies the description of both the form and the function of tag
questions.
In describing the form of tags, for example, Fraser mentions only contras-
tive-polarity tags, and he suggests that such tags function as attenuators only
when characterized by rising intonation. He says:

“Sentences such as ‘You were there weren’t you?’ or ‘I am right aren’t I?’ when uttered with a
rising question intonation are characteristically taken as a softer way of asserting that ‘You were
there’ or ‘I am right’ respectively” (1980: 349).

In a footnote he adds:

“There are at least two common intonation patterns for the tag question being discussed here. One
has a rising final intonation which suggests speaker pleasure with the state of affairs, and implies a
positive response. The other has a falling contour suggesting displeasure, impatience, and implies a
demand for justification as well as requesting confirmation that the claim is true” (1980 : 349, fn.
6: Fraser’s italics).
 J. Holmes / Modiiving illocurionq force 351

There are two points worth making here which expand and develop Fraser’s
comments on the form and function of tags. Firstly, contrastive-polarity tag
questions are not the only type of tag question; there are also same-polarity
tags and invariant tags. Both of these may function to attenuate the illocution-
ary force of speech acts. (36) and (37) illustrate the use of such tags to soften
the force of assertions:

(36) It’s still bubbling away is ’ it? [Husband to wife]

(37) He’s not here ’ huh? [Teacher to pupil]

In my data, same-polarity tag questions (such as huh?, eh?,

tags and invariant
right?, OK?) only occur with rising intonation (Holmes 1982a) [8].
The second point relates to Fraser’s claim that only tags with rising
intonation function as attenuators. He links this to his claim that rising tags
always express speaker pleasure while falling contours suggest displeasure
(Fraser 1980 : 349). In analysing the tag question used in a variety of contexts I
found many examples which refute these claims. A falling contour frequently
characterises tags in speech acts aimed at facilitating interaction by encourag-
ing addressees to contribute to the conversation. In such contexts the tag’s
function is clearly to attenuate the force of an assertion, while expressing only
positive feelings towards the hearer. (38) and (39) provide examples:

(38) The hen’s brown is \ n’t she? [Teacher to child discussing

(39) It was because of the tension
colour differences between
male and female birds]
was ’ n’t it? [Interviewer commenting
sympathetically on inter-
viewee’s nervousness in
previous radio interview]

In each of these examples the speaker’s aim was facilitative, aimed at drawing
out the hearer and encouraging him or her to respond and participate in the
interaction. This interpretation depends, however, not just on a consideration
of the intonation, or even of the intonation in context. It also requires
attention to factors such as volume, speed and tone of voice, which can
significantly alter the affective meaning of a linguistic form. There is evidence,
then, that, uttered unaggressively, tags with a falling intonation contour may,
in attenuating the force of speech acts, express positive feelings such as
encouragement and sympathy towards the hearer.

[g] But see Millar and Brown (1979: 30) for a discussion of tags in Edinburgh Scats where double
negatives occur with falling intonation.
 There is also evidence, contrary to Fraser’s claim, that rising tags do not
always express speaker pleasure. Consider the tag in (40):

(40) That’s my brush is ’ n’t it? [One flatmate to another whom she suspects
of using her hairbrush]

The speech act is an accusation. The tag attenuates its force, requesting
confirmation of the claim, perhaps even demanding justification (functions
which Fraser attributes only to tags with falling contours), but certainly not
expressing the speaker’s pleasure.
It is important in analysing tag questions to avoid confusing the function of
the tag with the function of the speech act in which the tag occurs. The most
general function of tag questions, whether rising or falling, canonical or
invariant, accompanying declarative or imperative main clauses, is to attenuate
or soften the illocutionary force of the speech act they occur in. Obviously they
may occur in a wide variety of speech acts, including positively affective ones
as well as negatively affective ones, as (36)-(40) illustrate. Any adequate
discussion of tags must then take account both of their diversity of form and
their communicative effect in relation to a wide variety of speech acts.
There are other syntactic devices which may in appropriate contexts at-
tenuate the illocutionary force of speech acts. Devices which impersonalize and
create social distance, for instance, may function in this way. The passive
construction, agent deletion, the use of impersonal pronouns such as it and
one, and nominalization are examples of syntactic devices, illustrated briefly in
Fraser (1980 : 347) and in greater detail in Brown and Levinson
(1978 : 195-213), which may be used to attenuate the force of speech acts.
I would like to add another attenuating construction which occurs most
frequently in my observation in more formal discourse. It is the type of
construction which involves a morphologically signalled negative form un-
preceded by not, e.g.:

not unlikely, not unhappy, not unreasonable.

The overall effect of such constructions which, in Grice’s terms, could be

described as redundant and “prolix” (1975), is often to attenuate the force of
the speech act in which they occur compared with the logically equivalent
positive expression of its meaning. Compare, for instance, (41) and (42):

(41) The relationship here is not unproblematic [Lecturer to class]

(42) The relationship is problematic

It seems to me that (41) represents a less forceful statement of the proposition

than that contained in (42). If this is so, the not un- construction can be added
to those syntactic devices which may be used to attenuate illocutionary force.

Lexical devices

In a fuller discussion of the lexical devices which may be used to attenuate

illocutionary force, I have used the term Downtoner to refer to such items
(Holmes forthcoming). Downtoners include both “disclaimers” (Hewitt and
Stokes 1975; Moore 1975; Eakins and Eakins 1978; Fraser 1980) and some of
the items George Lakoff (1972) labels “hedges”. I will provide here examples
from just three semantic sub-categories which parallel those used in the
discussion of Boosters.

(i) Speaker-oriented Downtoners

There are a large number of lexical devices which may be used to express the
speaker’s reservations in relation to a particular speech act. Some of these
devices focus specifically on the speaker’s doubts concerning the validity of the
proposition being asserted. Lexical items using personalized forms to express
epistemic modality fall into this category. Forms such as it seems to me, in my
opinion, and parenthetical forms such as I gather, I guess, I suppose, and I
reckon may all be used in this way, as (43) illustrates [9]:

(43) It’s rather good Z suppose [One friend to another commenting on a cake]

Others focus on the speaker’s reservations concerning his or her warrant for
the speech act which follows. Many of Fraser’s examples of ‘disclaimers’
illustrate this category, since they refer to the possibility that the speaker is
mistaken or inaccurate, e.g.:

if I’m not mistaken, unless I misunderstood you, unless I heard it incorrectly [lo].

[9] I think and I believe are parenthetical verbs which, with different intonation patterns and in
different contexts, may boost or attenuate the force of the utterances they modify. Moreover, the
status of the speaker in the context of utterance is another crucial factor in determining the
pragmatic effect of such personalized forms on the utterances in which they occur. Many
personalized forms may thus function as Boosters or as Downtoners, and their function in a
particular utterance can only be determined in context.
[lo] There is obviously an infinite number of such conditional clauses which may attenuate or
modify the force of any speech act by qualifying speaker-based (or hearer-based) felicity condi-
tions.
(ii) Hearer-oriented Downtoners

Many of the items described in the category of Hearer-oriented Boosters may

also function, with appropriate intonation, and in an appropriate linguistic and
social context, to attenuate the force of a speech act: you know is an obvious
example of such a form (see Crystal and Davy 1975, and (53) below). A
number of Fraser’s examples of ‘disclaimers’ also fall into this category, e.g.:

if you wouldn’t mind, if itS not too much trouble, if you are sure that it’s OK.

Such items typically precede or follow directive speech acts, mitigating their
force, as Fraser (1980: 348) points out. But they may also occur with other
categories of speech act as (44) illustrates:

(44) I’ll call in after lunch ifyou like [One friend to another]

These examples focus on the hearer’s desires and willingness to co-operate with
the speaker as the basis for the attenuation. (45) provides an example where
the hearer’s ability to co-operate is the basis of the device modifying the
illocutionary force.

(45) Perhaps you could open this for me [One colleague to another referring
to a drawer]

(iii) Content or other-oriented Downtoners

There are a number of ways in which content-oriented Downtoners may

attenuate illocutionary force. There are a range of devices for suggesting the
content is dubious or uncertain, for instance, including what Brown (1980 : 128)
calls “deresponsibilizing mechanisms”. Epistemic modals such as could, may
and might, as well as adverbials such as possibly, probably and likely may be
used for this purpose. (46), for example, is an attenuated prediction:

(46) Such a move might anger much of Black Africa [Journalist in report]

Closely related are linguistic devices for implicitly or explicitly assigning

responsibility for the truth of assertions to a third party. Examples include
depersonalized sentential adverbs such as allegedly, reportedly, presumably, and
supposedly, as well as third person subjects with verbs such as argue, claim,
maintain, and suggest, and phrases such as according to X, and X’s view or
opinion (see Holmes forthcoming). (47) and (48) provide examples of such
forms attenuating a compliment and a criticism respectively.

(47) She’s supposedly the best mathematician [Two colleagues discussing

in the department a third]
(48) Critics claim the play is badly directed [One friend to another]

A third group of deresponsibilizing devices focusses on a semantic distinction

between appearance and reality as the basis of the attenuation. Lexical items
such as on the face of it, ostensibly, outwardly, nominally, strictly speaking,
superficially, and theoretically belong in this category, as does technically which
is mentioned by Fraser as an example of a “ mitigating hedge” (1980 : 349).
Such items attenuate illocutionary force by suggesting that the speaker has
reservations concerning the reality (and hence validity) of what is asserted by
the proposition. Consider the following examples:

(49) Theoretically he should have left by now

(50) Technically you’re wrong
(51) Strictly speaking this is my desk not yours
(52) Superficially this is an insect

In each case the ‘hedge’ signals a number of possible conversational impli-

cations depending on the context of utterance.
In this category too belong all those adverbials which, by attenuating
elements occurring within the proposition, may reduce the illocutionary force
of the speech act as a whole, e.g.:

fairly, pretty, quite, rather, and somewhat.

(53) provides an example:

(53) I’m pretty angry about this you know [Teacher to pupil]

And finally it is worth noting how such forms may attenuate directives by
minimizing the task or content of the directive speech act. Note the effect of
just and a bit in (54).

(54) Could you just shove up a bit [Father to son on bench]

Discoursal devices

There are some linking signals or linguistic devices for achieving intra-textual
cohesion which may be used to de-emphasize or play down the importance of
the speech act they introduce. Often this effect is achieved by suggesting that
the content of the speech act is not of major relevance to the discourse as a
whole. Items such as by the way, incidentally, while Z think of it or remember,
and that reminds me may function in this way. They mark what follows as a
topic-change and “perhaps partially apologize for it” (Brown and Levinson
1978 : 174).
Brown and Levinson describe such forms as “relevance hedges” with the
implication that they apologize for what the hearer may legitimately perceive
as a digression [ll]. They may also apologize for, and thus attenuate, the force
of a following directive speech act, by suggesting that it was not the speaker’s
primary reason for engaging in the conversation. Data collected by Newell
(1981), for example, suggests that embedding requests within larger chunks of
talk is an attenuating discourse strategy used by superiors to subordinates they
know well, and with whom they therefore have a personal as well as a
transactional relationship. (55) and (56) provide examples of indirect requests
whose illocutionary force is further attenuated by means of this strategy, and
which are introduced by ‘relevance hedges’.

(55) Hi Ann how’s things (several turns [Staff member to secretary]

follow) by the way have you
had time to type that letter to X yet
(56) Oh you’ve had your hair done - [One friend to another]
it looks great (three turns
intervene) oh that reminds me
are you free to babysit tonight

Thus, devices for boosting and attenuating the illocutionary force of differ-
ent speech acts may be used to foreground some aspects of the discourse and
demote others in relation to what is presented as the main point. A range of
devices which may be used for such purposes is described in detail by Leech
and Svartvik (1975) and Halliday and Hasan (1976).

Conclusion

Mitigation is an interesting and useful pragmatic concept but it needs to be

seen in relation to broader strategies for modifying illocutionary force. Mitiga-

(111 Clync (19X1 : 61) comments on the ‘linearity’ of Anglo-American culture. Footnoting provides
an excellent example of the kinds of linguistic devices writers develop in order to escape from this
linearity at times.
tion is one particular kind of attenuation. Attenuation is one of two strategies
for modifying force; its complement is the strategy of boosting or increasing
the force of speech acts.
These strategies flout Grice’s Maxims (1975) by providing information
which, from the point of view of rational, economical and efficient communi-
cation in a social vacuum, could be described as over-informative, irrelevant,
vague or imprecise. From a pragmatic point of view, however, this information
frequently serves an affective function, expressing the speaker’s attitude to the
addressee. Attenuating the force of negatively affective speech acts and boost-
ing positively affective ones are means of expressing the speaker’s positive
feelings towards the hearer or desire to increase the solidarity of the relation-
ship. Boosting negatively affective speech acts and attenuating positively
affective ones, on the other hand, can only be interpreted as means of
increasing the social distance between the speaker and the hearer.
In describing a range of linguistic devices which may realize these strategies
I have inevitably distorted the total communication process. Any classification
inevitably distorts by failing to reflect the extent to which different devices
work together to convey meaning. Devices may reinforce one another, as when
strong stress, lexical Boosters and repetition co-occur in one utterance. Or they
may subtly modify one another as when an assertion which includes a number
of Boosters is uttered with a tentative intonation contour and much verbal and
non-verbal hesitation. Such sensitive gradations of meaning are the very stuff
of skilful communication. And the patterns which speakers weave by such
means are not confined to single utterances but involve the total discourse in
which they are participating.
Two general points emerging from the description of devices for modifying
illocutionary force are perhaps worth emphasizing in concluding this paper.
Firstly, contrastive form is always communicative, and one of its major
functions is to convey information on the relative strength or force of a speech
act in a particular context. An utterance expressed more loudly or more softly
than the speaker’s normal volume, for example, may be thus boosted or
attenuated. Contrastive syntactic form may function similarly: the choice of
interrogative rather than declarative form to make an assertion may convey
information concerning the strength of the speaker’s commitment to the
proposition, as rhetorical questions and tag questions illustrate.
The second point concerns the crucial nature of contextual information. The
same forms may function in some contexts as attenuating devices, in others as
boosting devices. Determining the effect of many lexical items requires atten-
tion to linguistic factors, such as intonation and syntactic position in accu-
rately defining their form, pragmatic factors, such as the illocutionary point of
the speech act being modified, and social factors, such as the status of the
speaker in relation to the hearer and the topic under discussion. From this
point of view attested data from a diverse corpus of material is an invaluable
resource in pragmatic analysis. Corpus-based research frequently forces the
analyst to take account of facts, and to become aware of problems which may
be conveniently overlooked when ‘intuitive’ data is one’s only resource.
Identifying and describing the linguistic devices which may be used to
modify illocutionary force constitutes a rich research field for those interested
in pragmatics. And for the sociolinguist there is the challenge of investigating
the differential use made of such pragmatic resources by different categories of
speakers, to different kinds of addressees, in different social contexts. It is
tempting to hypothesize, for example, with appropriate hedges of course, that
academics are amongst the greatest attenuators in any speech community.

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Janet Holmes (b. 1947) studied English literature and linguistics at the University of Leeds, where
she obtained her M. Phil. (Linguistics) in 1970. She is presently a senior lecturer in Linguistics at
Victoria University, Wellington. Among her publications are: 1982: ‘Linguistic reflections of
woman’s unassertive nature’ (in: H. Haines, ed., Women’s Studies conference papers, Univ. of
Auckland, pp. 227-242); The functions of tag questions (English Language Research Journal 3);
Expressing doubt and certainty in English (RELC Journal 13, no. 2).