Sil Study Report: Na Capital Program Management

Saudi Aramco 2616-ENG (03/99)
THIS DRAWING AND THE INFORMATION CONTAINED HEREIN ARE THE SOLE PROPERTY OF SAUDI ARAMCO. NO REPRODUCTION IN FULL OR IN PART SHALL BE OBTAINED FROM THIS DOCUMENT WITHOUT THE WRITTEN CONSENT OF ITS OWNER.
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SAUDI ARABIAN OIL COMPANY
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MUK
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
NA CAPITAL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT
BI-10-05237
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM QATIF

NO. DATE
REV
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
SIL STUDY REPORT
MUK
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED
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04104/13
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
08/13/18
DATE: Prepared by
OPERATIONS
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
AUG 2018
REVISIONCERTIFICATION
APPROVAL/CERTIFICATION REQUIREMENTS,
THIS INDICATES THAT REV. NO.__________
CERTIFICATE
OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL
BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
SIL STUDY REPORT DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX DRAWING NO. SHT.NO. REV.NO.
REVISION
-001
UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM DOC Q01/Q0

A SIL-XXX1 1
FACILITY
QATIF GOSP-1, QATIF GOSP-2 & PIPELINE QT-2B 2/Q06 OF A
QATIF EAST WEST PIPELINE SAUDI ARABIA JO / EWO:
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
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1 INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................................. 3
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2 SCOPE ................................................................................................................................ 3
3 OBJECTIVES ...................................................................................................................... 3
4 SIL STUDY TEAM ............................................................................................................... 4
5 DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS .................................................................................... 5
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
6 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .............................................................................................. 8

DESCRIPTION
6.1 PROJECT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS............................................................................. 8

6.2 GENERAL REFERENCE DOCUMENTS....................................................................... 9
7 PROJECT DESCRIPTION ................................................................................................ 10
8 SIL ASSIGNMENT METHODOLOGY ............................................................................... 13
9 SIL ASSIGNMENT: ........................................................................................................... 13
10 LOPA WORKSHOP ASSUMPTIONS & CONVENTIONS ................................................. 16
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08/13/18 10-01936
11 RESULTS & FINDINGS .................................................................................................... 17

11.1 WORKSHEET .............................................................................................................. 17
DATE
11.2 LOPA SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 17

12 RECOMMENDATIONS & ACTIONS ................................................................................. 18
NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE 13 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 20

ENGINEER
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14 APPENDICES ................................................................................................................... 20
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18
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08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 2
FACILITY
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1 INTRODUCTION
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SIL study session was conducted related to Project BI-10-05237-001 “UPGRADATION OF

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WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM QATIF”

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The SIL was facilitated by SNC Lavalin Fayez Engineering and attended by engineers
from Saudi Aramco and SLFE.
The SIL assessment session was conducted at SLFE office in Al-Khobar on 9th August
2018.
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
The purpose of the SIL review within this study is to assign safety integrity levels to each
Safety Instrumented Function (SIF) in accordance with Saudi Aramco standards (SAEP-
250 Published 21 January 2018) to demonstrate that the Safety Instrumented Functions
(SIFs) proposed provide adequate levels of risk reduction and meets the Risk Target
Frequencies identified by Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA).
Findings from the study session were recorded in LOPA worksheets (provided by Saudi
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Aramco P&CSD) as per Saudi Aramco standards.

DATE
2 SCOPE
The scope of SIL assessment consists of facilitating and chairing SIL workshop,
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REV
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performing SIL assessment using Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) methodology in
ENGINEER
MUK accordance with the guidelines provided in the Saudi Aramco Engineering Procedure,
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
SAEP-250 (21 January 2018) & IEC-61511.
ENGINEER
MUK
The purpose of this study is to access the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) so that
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED the Design of Safety Integrated Systems is adequate to protect personnel, environment
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08/13/18
and assets against potentially hazardous situation. The SIL assignment study included all
DATE: 10/25/
2016
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AGENCY
high-risk areas, which were developed during the HAZOP study undertaken on original
TBD
design basis.
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
The team identified 22 SIF loops within the scope of the project. SIL Study was conducted
TBD
08/13/18 for risk scenarios (identified during HAZOP) and recommended SIFs (identified in HAZOP
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
& listed in C&E) were evaluated for SIL Assignment.

VERIFICATION
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3 OBJECTIVES
DATE:
BY:
The objective of this SIL study is to systematically identify SIF required to prevent or
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mitigate a hazardous event and to determine its Safety Integrity Level (SIL) required for

B A
the intended SIF.

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REVISION
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The SIL determination study covers all the Safety Instrumented Functions (SIFs) as
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identified in the referenced C&E diagrams.

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Safety Integrity Level determination study is the part of overall safety studies, which
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concentrates on risks associated with hazardous event and identification of independent

protection layers to mitigate that specific hazardous event. Establishing the necessary risk
reduction requirement and the corresponding SIL of SIFs is the purpose of SIL
assessment.
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
SIL assessment/determination is the phase 2 activity of the overall Safety Lifecycle (SLC)
of the SIS (Figure 7 of IEC 61511-1:2016). This Phase 2 activity in IEC 61511- 1:2016 is
referred as “Allocation of the Safety Functions to Protection Layers”.
Safety Life Cycle Phase 1, i.e.” Hazard & Risk Assessment”, is required to be undertaken
before the commencement of Phase 2. Results of Phase 1 are required to be available
before the start of Phase 2.
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4 SIL STUDY TEAM

The team performing the SIL analysis comprised of
DATE
• SIL Facilitator
NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE
• SLFE Instrumentation Engineer
ENGINEER
MUK • SLFE Process Engineer
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
• SLFE Project Management
ENGINEER
MUK • Saudi Aramco Loss Prevention Department
08/13/18
DATE:
CERTIFIED
• Saudi Aramco Proponent/ operations representative(s)
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• Saudi Aramco Project Management team
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DATE: 10/25/
2016
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Refer to Appendix A of this report for list of attendees.
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

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REVISION
-001

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5 DEFINITIONS & ABBREVIATIONS
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ABBREVIATION
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ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable

BPCS Basic Process Control System
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CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety

C&E Cause and Effect
E/E/PES Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Systems
ESD Emergency Shutdown
FCV Flow Control Valve
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
HAZOP Hazard and Operability

DESCRIPTION
IEC International Electro technical Commission

IPL Independent Protection Layer
ISO International Standard Organization
LALL Level Alarm Low Low
LAHH Level Alarm High High
LCV Level Control Valve
NA Not Applicable
PALL Pressure Alarm Low Low
PAHH Pressure Alarm High High
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PFD Probability of Failure on Demand

P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Diagram
RRF Risk Reduction Factor
DATE
SDV Shutdown Valve

SIF Safety Instrumented Function
NO.
REV
SIL Safety Integrity Level

A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
SIS Safety Instrumented System
MUK TAHH Temperature Alarm High High
DATE: 08/13/18 ZV Remote Shut-Off Valve (or Emergency Isolation Valve)
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18 DEFINITIONS
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MTTR Mean Time to Restoration
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DATE: 10/25/ Mean Time to Restoration consists of mean time to repair logistical delay
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY time and administrative delay time. Mean Time to Restoration is the total
TBD downtime used in availability calculations
08/13/18
DATE: Availability The probability that a device is operating successfully at a given moment
OPERATIONS
in time. This is a measure of the uptime and is defined in units of percent.
TBD
β Factor Beta Factor, Indicating Common cause susceptibility. The fraction of total
08/13/18
DATE: failure rate that is attributed to a single cause in common with other units
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in the group. A common cause failure will result in all units with the group
VERIFICATION
failing simultaneously.
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BPCS Basic Process Control System. IEC-61508 term used to describe the
DATE:
regulatory control system.

BY:
Diagnostic A measure of system’s ability to detect failures. This is a ratio between the
Coverage failure rates for detected failures to the failure rate for the all the failures in
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B A
the system.
(DCC) NO. _____________________
ESD Emergency Shut Down, a name used to describe a safety Instrumented

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system.
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Fault Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the

TBD
Tolerance presence of faults or errors.

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FE Final Element, This term included all the devices required for the purposes
of acting to remove of hazards.
The frequency of the hazard outcome after IPL’s have been considered
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Intermediate
Event but before any further protective function has been added. It is the
Frequency demand rate made on any additional safety functions required as a result
of analysis. Sometimes referred to unmitigated frequency.
IPF Instrumented Protective Function, A function comprising one or more
initiators, logic solver and one or more final element whose purposes is to
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
prevent mitigate hazardous situations.

DESCRIPTION
IPL Independent Protection Layer. This refers to various other methods of risk
reduction possible for a process. Examples include items such as rupture
disks and relief valves, which will independently reduce the likelihood of
the hazard escalating into a full accident with harmful outcome.
LOPA Layer of Protection Analysis. A modified event tree where only the single
hazard outcome and resulting occurrence of the consequence are of
interest. An initiating event cause is analyzed together with all effective
IPL’s. The resulting frequency is called the intermediate Event Frequency,
(for the single event cause).
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PFDavg Average Probability of Failure on Demand, This is the probability that a

system will fail dangerously and not be able to perform its safety function
when required. IEC 61508/61511 uses PFDavg as the the system metric
DATE
upon which the SIL is defined.

PST Process Safety Time: This is the time within which the Safety
Instrumented Function (SIF) must, upon detection of hazard, act to
NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE prevent the occurrence of the consequence. The term is related to the
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MUK Fault Tolerant Time of the Process.
DATE: 08/13/18
Proof Test The periodic testing of the equipment, (usually SIF components and sub
PROJECT systems) to detect and correct any otherwise undetectable hardware
ENGINEER
MUK failures that would prevent the equipment form successfully operating on
08/13/18 demand.
DATE:
CERTIFIED PTC Proof Test Coverage: The percentage failures that are detected during the
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servicing of the equipment. IEC-61508 allows people to assume that when
04104/13
DATE:
08/13/18
10/25/ a proof test is performed any errors in the systems are detected and
2016
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corrected (100% proof test coverage); in practice, this is usually not the
TBD case.
DATE:
08/13/18 PTI Proof Test Interval: The time interval between servicing of the equipment.
OPERATIONS
TBD Redundancy Use of multiple elements or systems to perform the same function.
DATE:
08/13/18 Redundancy can be implemented by identical elements or diverse
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elements. Redundancy is primarily used to improve reliability or

VERIFICATION
availability.
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RRF Risk Reduction Factor: The inverse of PFDavg, so RRF=1/PFDavg

DATE:
BY:
SFF Safe Failure Fraction: The fraction of the overall failure rate of a device
that results in either a safe fault or diagnosed (detected) unsafe fault. The
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A
safe failure fraction includes the detectable dangerous failures when those
B
(DCC) NO. _____________________
failures are annunciated and procedures for repair or shutdown are in

10-01936-0001-001
place.
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SIF Safety Instrumented Function: A set of equipment intended to reduce the

TBD
risk due to a specific hazard (a safety loop).

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SIL Safety Integrity Level: A quantitative target for measuring the level of
safety in a process. Defining a target SIL level for the process should be
based on the assessment of the likelihood that an incident will occur and
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the consequence of the incident.
SIL PFDavg RRF

4 ≥10-5 to <10-4 >10,000 to ≤100,000
3 ≥10-4 to <10-3 >1,000 to ≤10,000
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
2 ≥10-3 to <10-2 >100 to ≤1,000

DESCRIPTION
1 ≥10-2 to <10-1 >10 to ≤100

SIS Safety Instrumented System: Implementation of one or more Safety
Instrumented Functions. A SIS is composed of any combination of
Sensor(s), Logic Solver(s), and final elements(s).
Spurious These unnecessary trips result from safe failures of sensors, logic solvers,
Trips and final shutdown elements. The STR value is used to quantify the
expected frequency of these trips.
STR Spurious Trip rate: This is the average frequency of safe process trips
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caused by failure within the safety Instrumented Function (SIF).

TI Test Interval: same as Proof Test interval (PTI)
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DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED
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08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

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REVISION
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6 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS
TBD
6.1 PROJECT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS

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MUK
Sr. # Document number Description

1 RA-380525.009 C& E Diagrams

ISSUED FOR REVIEW

DESCRIPTION
5 RA-495031.001 P&IDs
6 RA-495049.001 P&IDs
7 RA-495050.001 P&IDs
8 RA-380425.001 P&IDs
9 RA-495035.001 P&IDs
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10 RA-495037.001 P&IDs
11 RA-495031.001 P&IDs
DATE
12 RA-495040.002 P&IDs
NO.
REV
13 RA-495039.001 P&IDs
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER 14 RA-495044.001 P&IDs
MUK
DATE: 08/13/18 15 RA-495037.001/ P&IDs

PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK 16 RA-495039.001 P&IDs
DATE:
08/13/18
17 RA-495045.001 P&IDs
CERTIFIED
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18 RA-495046.001 P&IDs
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION 19 RA-495047.001 P&IDs
AGENCY
TBD
08/13/18
20 RA-495038.001 P&IDs
DATE:
OPERATIONS
21 RA-495042.002 P&IDs
TBD
08/13/18 22 RA-495042.001 P&IDs
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
23 RA-495048.001 P&IDs
EDSD
BI 10-05237-001 HAZOP REPORT

24 HAZOP REPORT
DOCUMENT U1825-R01
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

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(DCC) NO. _____________________

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REVISION
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6.2 GENERAL REFERENCE DOCUMENTS
TBD
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Sr. Document number Description

#
MUK
1 SAEP-250 (21 January 2018) Safety Integrity Level Assignment and Verification
Functional Safety of
2 IEC-61508;2010 Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic
Safety Related Systems
Functional Safety- Safety Instrumented Systems for
3 IEC-61511:2016
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
Process industry sector

DESCRIPTION
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
NO. DATE
REV
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED
RDD
04104/13
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

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7 PROJECT DESCRIPTION
TBD
Qatif field is unique for producing three different grades of crude oil, Arab Extra Light
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(AXL) crude from Light Lower Fadhili formation, Arab Light (AL) crude from Arab D
MUK
formation and Arab Medium (AM) crude from Arab C formation. Both AXL and AM crude
are blended at Qatif GOSP-1 and 2 to produce AL Crude at a rate of 500 MBCD. Abu
Safah field is located offshore. The field produces 300 MBCD of AM oil crude.
The Qatif and Abu Safah processing facility consists of;

ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
• Qatif GOSP-1
• Qatif GOSP-2
• Abu Safah GOSP
• Gas Gathering Facility
• Water Oil Separation Plant

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08/13/18 10-01936
• Water Injection Pumps (WIP)
• Utilities Plant
DATE
GOSP-1 and GOSP-2 facilities process crude from the Qatif reservoirs to produce an AL
NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE blend while the Abu Safah facilities process AM crude fed from offshore wells via a
ENGINEER
MUK
pipeline.
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER Associated gas from all the GOSPs is compressed and treated in the Gas Gathering Plant
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18 before being routed to Berri Gas Plant. Produced water from all the facilities is treated in
CERTIFIED
RDD the Water Oil Separation Plant (WOSEP) before injection into disposal wells drilled in the
04104/13
DATE: 10/25/ 08/13/18 Sulay Aquifer. Wasia Water is currently used to maintain pressure in the reservoir and it is
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
2016 injected via Water Injection Pumps (WIP).
TBD
08/13/18
DATE: The production forecast indicates that the total produced water will exceed the current
OPERATIONS
TBD installed water handling capacity by 2021. Both Qatif and Abu Safah reservoirs are
08/13/18
DATE: progressively increasing in water cut, which results in a continuous increase in the amount
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
of produced water received in the facility. In order to meet the Qatif and Abu Safah
EDSD
facilities MSC, it is essential to ensure that the water handling facility has sufficient
DATE:
BY:
capacity to process the forecasted amount of produced water. The production forecast
also indicates that the required water injection rate at Qatif north field which is being fed
CERTIFICATE

B A
from the WIP at GOSP-1 is increasing and will exceed the installed capacity of the WIP.
(DCC) NO. _____________________
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Hence, the WIP capacity has to be upgraded to meet the water injection requirements.
TBD
In addition, in order to increase the quality of the crude oil from Ju’aymah Terminal, the
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crude storage tanks are dewatered to meet the required specifications of the exported oil.
MUK
The resulting effluent water needs to be treated and safely disposed. This effluent water is
proposed to be sent to Qatif GOSP-1 for treatment and disposal.
The project will upgrade the water handling and WIP at Qatif GOSP-1 to handle the
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
forecasted produced water, wash water and expected amount of water rates from
DESCRIPTION
Juaymah Terminal.
The following systems shall be installed under this BI:
a) Install one (1) additional Water Oil Separation (WOSEP) vessel in parallel to two
(2) existing WOSEPS of the same size with capacity equal or higher than existing
WOSEP vessel handing capacity shall be used. Latest technology internals shall
be used to maximize the water-oil separation.
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
b) Install two (2) LPDT Water Draw Off Pumps in parallel to three (3) existing pumps
DATE
(5 pumps, 4 running + 1 spare).

NO.
REV
c) Install one (1) Water Injection Pump in parallel to five (5) existing pumps.
A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MUK d) Install four (4) Salt Water Disposal Pumps in parallel to the five (5) pumps; four (4)
DATE: 08/13/18
existing pumps and one (1) pump will be installed under BI-10-01936 scope. After
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK the addition of the four pumps, there would be nine (9) pumps in total (one pump
08/13/18
DATE: will remain as spare).
CERTIFIED
RDD
04104/13
08/13/18
e) Install an underground pipeline (10”) to pump oily water from JTF to Qatif GOSP-1
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
WOSEPs.
TBD
DATE:
08/13/18 f) Install one (1) Diesel driven fire water pump of 454.2 m3/h (2,000 GPM) capacity,
OPERATIONS
and having the same pressure characteristics with the existing fire pumps.
TBD
08/13/18
DATE: g) Provide Chlorination skid to chlorinate the Fire water.
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
h) Provide / Upgrade all Instrumentation & Control systems required for the new
EDSD
equipment under this BI.

DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

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EDSD REV
REVISION
CERTIFICATE VERIFICATION NO. DATE JO/EWO DESCRIPTION ENGG CERT PMT OPRNS
A B
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
DATE:
A 08/13/18 10-01936 ISSUED FOR REVIEW MUK RDD TBD TBD
CONTROL NUMBER
RDD
TBD
TBD
MUK
MUK
AGENCY
BY:
PROJECT
2016
ENGINEER
ENGINEER
DISCIPLINE
CERTIFIED
08/13/18
04104/13
08/13/18
08/13/18
10/25/
08/13/18
DATE: 08/13/18
OPERATIONS
CONSTRUCTION
(DCC) NO. _____________________
10-01936-0001-001 DATE:
-001
QATIF
QATIF GOSP-1, QATIF

SIL STUDY REPORT
FACILITY
EAST WEST PIPELINE
UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM
GOSP-2 & PIPELINE QT-2B
DOC
SAUDI ARABIA
2/Q06
Q01/Q0
JO / EWO:
A
DWG.TYPE PLANT NO. INDEX
10-05237-001
SIL-XXX1
DRAWING NO.
OF
20
12
SHT.NO.
A
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
REV.NO.
PMT OPRNS
TBD
8 SIL ASSIGNMENT METHODOLOGY

TBD
ENGG CERT
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Safety life cycle approach as per IEC-61511 and Saudi Aramco Engineering Procedure
identified in SAEP-250 is used for the SIL assignment of the Safety instrumented function
MUK
under this project.
9 SIL ASSIGNMENT:
The SIL assessment comprises an assessment of the plant process equipment and
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
systems to be protected by Safety Instrumented System, to identify potential hazards and

DESCRIPTION
to assess the risk that is present for persons and the environment and assets.
This assessment is made on the basis that no protective systems are in place so that a
basic level of risk can be established for the equipment under control (EUC) or Process as
per IEC-61508 & IEC-61511 terminology.
Essentially the SIL derived rating is a measure of the performance availability that is
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
required to be achieved by the safety–related control system, in order that the residual risk
level is within acceptable limits, or, is as low as reasonably practical (ALARP) as defined in
DATE
SAEP-250 in terms of target frequency.

NO.
REV
SIL assignment report contents follow the requirements of SAEP-250

A
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MUK The SIL rating shall be considered for the entire Safety integrated function i.e. from
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
initiating devices through the logic solvers / controllers to the final actuating elements in
ENGINEER
MUK order that the system will adequately meet the design intent.
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED SAEP-250 is used as the main data source (for initiating cause frequency/PFD of
RDD
04104/13
08/13/18 protection layers etc.)
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY As per requirements of SAEP-250, LOPA methodology shall be used for SIL assessment.
TBD
DATE:
08/13/18 SIL Assignment will be carried out based on LOPA based on following steps
OPERATIONS
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
9.1.1 Identification of Hazardous Scenario
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
HAZOP report, Cause and Effect shall be used for the identification/development of
DATE:
hazardous scenario, additional scenarios can be listed through brain storming during SIL
BY:
session. Each scenario must have a unique initiating event/consequence pair. LOPA is
CERTIFICATE

B A
limited to evaluating a single cause-consequence pair as scenario.

(DCC) NO. _____________________
10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 13
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
TBD
9.1.2 Quantitative Risk Target Frequency
TBD
Quantitative risk target frequency shall be assigned for the hazardous event identified that
ENGG CERT
RDD
is protected by identified SIF. Appendix-H of Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250 shall be

MUK
used as guideline for “Quantitative Risk Target Frequency” against each hazardous event/
risk.
The consequences against each of the following category will be identified for each
hazard/risk and a target frequency will be assigned against each consequence as
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
identified below.
DESCRIPTION
a- Personnel Safety
b- Environment safety
c- Asset Safety
d- Reputation
Note: SIL assignment is carried out against lowest “risk target frequency” as this will lead
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
to worst case scenario covering all the other categories.
Refer to Appendix-C of this report for Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250.

DATE
9.1.3 Initiating Event Frequency

NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE For LOPA, each scenario has a single initiating event. The frequency of the initiating
ENGINEER
MUK
event, causing the hazard, will be identified. Appendix-I (PART A) of Saudi Aramco
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
Standard SAEP-250 shall be used as guideline for calculating initiating event frequencies.
MUK
Expert judgment/operation experience and OREDA database will also be referred to
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED identify the failure rate of some of the equipment that will be part of initiating cause of that
RDD
04104/13
08/13/18 hazard.
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
Refer to Appendix-C of this report for referring Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD 9.1.4 IPLs
DATE:
08/13/18 One by one, all the IPLs (excluding SIF under evaluation) available were identified which
CONTROL NUMBER
are present to mitigate the consequences or reduce the frequency of the hazard event
VERIFICATION
EDSD
An IPL is a device, system or action that is capable of preventing/mitigating a scenario

DATE:
BY:
from proceeding to its undesired consequence independent of the initiating event or the
CERTIFICATE
action of any other layer of protection associated with the scenario. Independent

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________
Protection Layers (IPL) , when applied to mitigate the hazard shall reduce the
10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 14
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
TBD
Identified risk by a factor of 10 or more, shall be specific, independent, dependable and
TBD
auditable.
ENGG CERT
RDD
IPL risk reduction values shall be taken based on conservative approach from Appendix I
MUK
(PART B) of Saudi Aramco standard SAEP-250
9.1.5 Mitigated Event Frequency (MEF)

The risk reduction credit against each existing safeguard (protection layer) will be
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
assigned as per Appendix-I of SAEP-250. The mitigated event frequency is calculated by

DESCRIPTION
multiplying the initiating event frequency by probabilities of all the IPLs failing to do their
intended function. Conditional modifiers/Enabling conditions are also multiplied along with
other IPLs to calculate the final MEF values.
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
NO. DATE
REV
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED
RDD
9.1.6 RRF CALCULATION
04104/13
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
2016 Risk Target Frequency for the SIF will be calculated by dividing the mitigated risk with the
TBD
DATE:
08/13/18 target Risk (identified in step c) to identify the Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) required by the
OPERATIONS
SIF loop.
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
9.1.7 SIL/PFD CALCULATION
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
Inverse of RRF (i.e. 1/RRF) will lead to PFD of the SIF, against which SIL will be assigned
EDSD
for the SIF.

DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 15
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
TBD
10 LOPA WORKSHOP ASSUMPTIONS & CONVENTIONS

TBD
ENGG CERT
RDD
 SIL study is conducted based on

MUK
a- the HAZOP findings and risk ranking ranked high in the HAZOP recommendations
&
b- the Safety instrumented functions listed in Cause & Effect diagram.
 The facility has been designed and engineered properly based on the Saudi Aramco
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
design/engineering codes, industry standards and good engineering practices.
 SIL study has been conducted for the SIFs which are covered under the scope of this
project BI-10-05237-001.
 Permissive & Maintenance Bypasses are not covered in the SIL assessment.
 All equipment will be well maintained.

JO/EWO

08/13/18 10-01936
The SIFs with hand switches and push button (PB) as initiators are considered SIL 1
by default and are not studied during the SIL workshop (in accordance with SAEP-
DATE
250). Such manual initiators in a SIF require operator action that is used for both
prevention and mitigation of hazardous events, like total plant shutdown, unit
NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE shutdown, equipment isolation and equipment protection systems shutdown.

ENGINEER
MUK
DATE: 08/13/18
 Alarms are considered as an IPL with a PFD of 0.1 provided the operator has clearly
PROJECT
ENGINEER understood the alarm, Operator has more than specified time (15 minutes for control
MUK
08/13/18 room alarm ; 30 minutes for field alarms) to respond in order to prevent the demand
DATE:
CERTIFIED
RDD occurring on the SIF. Also, this credit shall only be given if the operator is trained and
04104/13
DATE: 10/25/ 08/13/18 regularly completes action as drilled exercise, has access to clear written procedures
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
2016 and performs actions according to the appropriate procedures and operating.
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:  CCPS “Approach A’ is followed, i.e., where BPCS is an Initiating Event (IE) for a
OPERATIONS
TBD scenario, no credit for protection layer in the BPCS is taken.
08/13/18
DATE:
 Independence between BPCS protection and initiating cause is taken in accordance
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
with the requirement of IEC-61511-2 section 9.4.2.

EDSD

DATE:
For Safety Related Consequences ; Occupancy Rate was calculated based on

BY:
 Two (02) manhours operations per day(covering all shifts)

CERTIFICATE

B A
 Plus, Two ( 02) manhours for maintenance per month.

(DCC) NO. _____________________
10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 16
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
TBD
 Team identified low low WOSEP may create dual hazard scenario (fire and toxic) due
TBD
to gas blow by to the pumps . Hence SIF-005 were analyzed separately for toxic
ENGG CERT
RDD
release and fire hazard scenarios. LOPA identified SIF-005 to be SIL-a for fire case
MUK
where as SIL-2 for toxic scenario. Hence based on this SIF-005 was assigned SIL-2
(higher rating among both scenarios).
 Team identified dissolved H2S concentration is 500PPM at Draw off pumps and Salt
Water Disposal pumps
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
 SAEP-250 Appendix-M was utilized to identify the Probability of ignition in case of fire.
11 RESULTS & FINDINGS

11.1 WORKSHEET
The SIL workshop results are depicted in the LOPA Worksheets attached in Appendix D
with this report.

JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
11.2 LOPA SUMMARY

DATE
The results of the SIL determination /assessment workshop are summarized below:
The following is the list of target SILs for the SIF tags;
NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER SIF No. Description Target P&ID No. C&E No.
MUK
SIL
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
SIF_001 Suction Low Low Pressure PALL- SIL-a RA-495031.001/RA-495049.001/RA-
MUK 0103 Shutdown Pump Q01-G- RA-71419.001
495050.001/RA-380425.001
08/13/18
XXX1A
DATE: SIF_002 Discharge High High Pressure SIL-a
CERTIFIED RA-495031.001/RA-495049.001/RA-
PAHH-0105 Shutdown Pump Q01- RA-71419.001
RDD 495050.001/RA-380425.001
04104/13
G-XXX1A
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/ SIF_003 Suction Low Low Pressure PALL- SIL-a RA-495031.001/RA-495049.001/RA-
2016
CONSTRUCTION 0108 Shutdown Pump Q01-G- RA-71419.001
AGENCY 495050.001/RA-380425.001
TBD XXX1B
SIF_004 Discharge High High Pressure SIL-a RA-495031.001/RA-495049.001/RA-
08/13/18
DATE: PAHH-0110 Shutdown Pump Q01- RA-71419.001
OPERATIONS 495050.001/RA-380425.001
G-XXX1B
TBD SIF_005 Low Low Level LALL-0205 In D- SIL-2 RA-495035.001/RA-495037.001/RA- RA-372976.001
08/13/18 XXX1 Shutdown Salt Water 495031.001/RA-495040.002/RA-
DATE:
Disposal Pumps 495039.001
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
SIF_006 Hi Hi Level LAHH-205 Shutoffs SIL-1 RA-495035.001/ 495037.001/ RA-372976.001

Draw Off Pumps (04) & ZV-0401
EDSD
495031.001/495040.002/ 495039.001
SIF_007 PALL-0212 Shutdown Pump Q02- SIL-1 RA-495044.001/RA-495037.001/RA- RA-372976.008
DATE:
BY:
G-XXX1A 495039.001
SIF_008 PAHH-0213 Shutoffs Pump Q02-G- SIL-1 RA-495044.001/RA-495037.001/RA- RA-372976.008

CERTIFICATE

A
XXX1A 495039.001
B
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 17
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
TBD
SIF_009 Low Low Flow FALL-0205 SIL-1 RA-495044.001/RA-495037.001/RA- RA-372976.008
TBD
Shutdowns Pump Q02-G-XXX1A 495039.001

ENGG CERT
RDD

G-XXX1B 495039.001
MUK

XXX1B 495039.001

Shutdowns Pump Q02-G-XXX1B 495039.001

ISSUED FOR REVIEW
G-XXX1C 495039.001
DESCRIPTION

XXX1C 495039.001

Shutdowns Pump Q02-G-XXX1C 495039.001
SIF_016 PALL-0227 Shutdowns Pump Q02- SIL-1 RA-495047.001/RA-495038.001/RA- RA-372976.008

G-XXX1D 495039.001
SIF_017 PAHH-0228 Shutdown Pump Q02- SIL-1 RA-495047.001/RA-495038.001/RA- RA-372976.008

JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
G-XXX1D 495039.001

Shutdowns Pump Q02-G-XXX1D 495039.001
DATE
SIF_019 Low Low Suction Pressure PALL- SIL-1 RA-495042.002/RA-495042.001/RA- RA-380525.009

0603 Shutdowns Pump Q06-G- 495048.001
NO.
REV
XXX1
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
SIF_020 Hi Hi Discharge Pressure PAHH- SIL-a RA-495042.002/RA-495042.001/RA- RA-380525.009
MUK 0604 Shutdown Pump Q06-G-XXX1 495048.001
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
SIF_021 FALL-0601 Shutoffs Pump Q06-G- SIL-a RA-495042.002/RA-495042.001/RA- RA-380525.009
ENGINEER XXX1 495048.001
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18 SIF_022 TAHH-0601 Shutoffs Pump Q06-G- SIL-1 RA-495042.002/RA-495042.001/RA- RA-380525.009
CERTIFIED XXX1 495048.001
RDD
04104/13
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
Table 1: SIF tags SIL assignment
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD Note: As the team developed LOPA scenarios, for some SIF tags there was no protection layer except the SIF
DATE:
08/13/18 being studied, hence a PFD value ‘1’ was entered in the IPL column for the LOPA calculation.
OPERATIONS
TBD
DATE:
08/13/18 12 RECOMMENDATIONS & ACTIONS
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
GENERAL
EDSD
1. During SIL Verification ; Beta factor shall be considered for VMS shutdown and ESD
DATE:
BY:
SIF to cater for common cause of failures between the two systems.
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 18
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
TBD
2. As per IEC-61511 section 11.2.10; A device used to perform part of a safety
TBD
instrumented function shall not be used for basic process control purposes.
ENGG CERT
RDD
3. As per ISA-TR84.00.02 ;Frequently, multiple safety functions are included in a single

MUK
ESD logic solver. Generally, the safety function case with the highest SIL requirement
will be the case that determines whether the logic solver meets performance
requirements.
4. System architecture for each SIF shall be designed in accordance with the
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
requirements of standards identified in section 6.2 of this document.
REQUIRED RISK REDUCTION GREATER THAN 1 BUT SMALLER THAN 10
1. When the required risk reduction factor on LOPA is above 1 but below or equal to
10 for Environment or Economic loss then the interlock may be implemented in
the BPCS. This would necessitate the use of independent sensor, output relay
and separate I/O module from the original BPCS indication and alarm channel
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
used. Hence while maintaining the above independency requirements SIF-

001/002/003/004/020/021 can be implemented in the BPCS system. However, it
DATE
should be noted that when interlock is implemented in BPCS system for risk
reduction required b/w 1 to 10 then IEC61511 Part 2, Clause 9.4 mentions that
NO.
REV
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
“Any claim for risk reduction should be justified by the consideration of the integrity
ENGINEER
MUK of the BPCS (determined by reliability analysis or performance data) and the
08/13/18
DATE: procedures used for configuration, modification and operation and maintenance.
CERTIFIED
RDD
When allocating risk reduction to functions in the BPCS, it is important to ensure
04104/13
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
that access security and change management are provided”
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
2. When the required risk reduction factor on LOPA is above 1 but below or equal to 10
TBD
DATE:
08/13/18 and for the safety consequence then SIL-1 in accordance with SAES-J-601/SAEP-48
CONTROL NUMBER
requirements.
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 19
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc
PMT OPRNS
TBD
13 .CONCLUSIONS
TBD
ENGG CERT
RDD
Safety instrumented functions designed for the safety of personal; assets /equipment
& environment are sufficient with the assigned SIL level to meet the required risk
MUK
target. Recommendations shall be implemented as per section 12 of this document.
14 APPENDICES
ISSUED FOR REVIEW
DESCRIPTION
Appendix A: Attendance Sheet

Appendix B: Process & Instrumentation Diagrams.
Appendix C : SAEP-250
Appendix D: LOPA Worksheets
Appendix E: Cause & Effect
JO/EWO
08/13/18 10-01936
NO. DATE
REV
DISCIPLINE
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE: 08/13/18
PROJECT
ENGINEER
MUK
DATE:
08/13/18
CERTIFIED
RDD
04104/13
08/13/18
DATE: 10/25/
2016
CONSTRUCTION
AGENCY
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
OPERATIONS
TBD
08/13/18
DATE:
CONTROL NUMBER
VERIFICATION
EDSD
DATE:
BY:
CERTIFICATE

B A
(DCC) NO. _____________________

10-01936-0001-001
REVISION
-001

A SIL-XXX1 20
FACILITY
10-05237-001 20
EDSD/2616-0399.doc

Sil Study Report: Na Capital Program Management

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NA CAPITAL PROGRAM MANAGEMENT

UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM QATIF

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________

UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM DOC Q01/Q0

6 APPLICABLE DOCUMENTS .............................................................................................. 8

6.1 PROJECT SPECIFIC DOCUMENTS............................................................................. 8

11 RESULTS & FINDINGS .................................................................................................... 17

11.2 LOPA SUMMARY ........................................................................................................ 17

DISCIPLINE 13 CONCLUSIONS ................................................................................................................ 20

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________

UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM DOC Q01/Q0

SIL study session was conducted related to Project BI-10-05237-001 “UPGRADATION OF

WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM QATIF”

Aramco P&CSD) as per Saudi Aramco standards.

& listed in C&E) were evaluated for SIL Assignment.

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

the intended SIF.

UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM DOC Q01/Q0

identified in the referenced C&E diagrams.

concentrates on risks associated with hazardous event and identification of independent

4 SIL STUDY TEAM

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________

UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM DOC Q01/Q0

ALARP As Low as Reasonably Practicable

CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety

HAZOP Hazard and Operability

IEC International Electro technical Commission

PFD Probability of Failure on Demand

SDV Shutdown Valve

SIL Safety Integrity Level

regulatory control system.

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

ESD Emergency Shut Down, a name used to describe a safety Instrumented

UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM DOC Q01/Q0

Fault Ability of a functional unit to continue to perform a required function in the

Tolerance presence of faults or errors.

prevent mitigate hazardous situations.

PFDavg Average Probability of Failure on Demand, This is the probability that a

upon which the SIL is defined.

elements. Redundancy is primarily used to improve reliability or

RRF Risk Reduction Factor: The inverse of PFDavg, so RRF=1/PFDavg

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE

(DCC) NO. _____________________

failures are annunciated and procedures for repair or shutdown are in

UPGRADATION OF WATER DISPOSAL SYSTEM DOC Q01/Q0

SIF Safety Instrumented Function: A set of equipment intended to reduce the

risk due to a specific hazard (a safety loop).

the consequence of the incident.

SIL PFDavg RRF

2 ≥10-3 to <10-2 >100 to ≤1,000

1 ≥10-2 to <10-1 >10 to ≤100

caused by failure within the safety Instrumented Function (SIF).

OF THIS DRAWING IS COVERED, FOR ALL

BY DRAWING COMPLETION CERTIFICATE