M AIMONIDES ON THE P OSSIBILITY

OF
M ORAL I MPROVEMENT

With special attention to the role of

Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics

Tzvi Langermann
Bar Ilan University
Can we improve our moral character, and
if so, to what extent?

Are there innate constraints on the

capacity of a given individual to achieve
moral perfection?
Maimonides’ answer is, not
surprisingly, complex:
In keeping with the Nicomachean
Ethics (through the mediation of al-
Fārābī), he denies any innate
constraints;
But, in line with medical theory and
the close connection between body and
soul, in fact he recognizes the power of
innate, or ingrained, constraints.
In keeping with the theme of this
conference, this presentation will
focus on the role of the Nicomachean
Ethics in Maimonides’ deliberations
on the problem.
■ The debate of the ancients over this
issue, and the opposing positions of
Aristotle and Plato, were presented al-
Fārābī in his ”Harmonization of the Two
Opinions of the Two Sages”:
■ Al-Fārābī’s “harmonization” of the two views, as summarized by Fauzi Najjar:

■ “According to Farabi, this controversy arises from the fact that in

his Nichomachean Ethics, Aristotle discusses moral habits in
general terms, asserting that they are rooted in the natural
potentialities of an infant, and are dependent upon education and
training. Plato, on the other hand, is concerned in the Republic and
Statesman with political regimes and their importance in shaping
and inculcating the moral habits of the citizens. Farabi recognizes
that a person reared in certain moral habits may find it difficult to
abandon them; ‘but what is difficult is not impossible.’ He seems
to skirt rather than confront the issue. In the final analysis, he
seems to accept the Aristotelian position that moral habits are
conventional features subject to changes in conditions and
circumstances.”
■ Maimonides presents the debate in his own day—or among his targeted
audience—as one between the sages (who hold like Aristotle) and the
astrologers (who hold like Plato):
■ “I have explained all of this to you only so that you do not hold to
be true those fantasies that are invented by the astrologers, that is,
that the nativities of people make them into those who possess
virtues or vices…But you should know, that our Torah and the
Philosophers of Greece both agree that all of a person’s actions are
within his own hands; there is no compulsion, or external agent
that pulls him in the direction of a virtue or a vice. There may be a
temperamental readiness which, as we explained, may make
things more difficult or more easy. However, in no way at all is
anything compelled or denied.” [“Eight Chapters”, beginning of
chapter eight]
■ Maimonides may have accepted al-Farabi’s resolution with regard
to the capacity of ”political” codes to change moral character; he
speaks in the text just cited as an authority on Jewish law, which,
in the context of medieval thought, constitutes a ”political
regime”. Political regimes and legal codes must base themselves
on the general rule that behavior can be modified.
■ Speaking, however, as a religious philosopher, Maimonides has in
mind the philosophical, religious, or ethical ideals of the
individual, indeed, of those few individuals capable and willing to
devote their entire beings to the pursuit of perfection. Here the
question of innate, biological constraints on perfection rears its
head again.
■ Maimonides’ (Guide I, 34) list of five minimal requirements for
initiation into “the divine science” is instructive for our enquiry.
■ Maimonides pays the greatest attention to the fourth requirement,
which is “natural aptitudes”, as Pines’ translates. (Isti‘dād literally
means “readiness”.) In any case, we are certainly speaking here of
innate abilities.
■ Maimonides places a lower bound on these “natural aptitudes”,
which are biological and innate: “There are, moreover, many
people who have received from their first natural disposition [the
preceding three words all render the Arabic fiṭra] a complexion of
temperament [hay’a mizajiyya] with which perfection is in no way
compatible. Such is the case of the one whose heart is naturally
exceedingly hot; for he cannot refrain from anger, even if he
subject his soul to a very stringent training.”
■ We can learn a lot about Maimonides’ position from his theory of
prophecy, which he elaborates at the end of the second part of his
Guide. The philosophers, Maimonides writes (Guide II, 32; trans.
361), aver “that prophecy is a certain perfection in the nature of
man”. This perfection must be actualized by training and
instruction. However, the necessary initial conditions are due to
“nature”.
■ “Now you know that the perfection of the bodily faculties, to
which the imaginative faculty belongs, is consequent upon the best
possible temperament, the best possible size, and the best possible
matter, on the part of the body that is the substratum for the
faculty in question. It is not a thing whose lack could be made
good or whose deficiency could be remedied in any way by a
regimen. For with regard to a part of the body whose
temperament was bad in the original natural disposition (aṣl al-
jibla), the utmost that the corrective regimen can achieve is to keep
it in some sort of health; it cannot restore it to its best possible
condition (afḍal ha’yatihi)”
■ Two chapters later (Guide II, 38) Maimonides draws a clear
analogy between psychic faculties, such as bravery or courage, and
corporeal faculties such as repulsion or expulsion (of bodily
superfluities by sweating and other means). Every person has this
faculty, but its strength varies greatly from one to another. Another
factor is “temperamental preparation in the original natural
disposition (tahayyu’ mizājiy fī aṣl al-jibla)”. Though these capacities
can strengthen or weaken in a given individual, their abundance
or weakness manifest from infancy.
■ The argument from infants and small children is important. Galen,
in his Ethics, finds strong evidence for the innate character of
ethical traits from the very different behaviors of small children.
He goes so far as compare their ethical traits with those of
irrational animals.
■ Returning to Plato, al-Fārābī, and the Nicomachean Ethics: I
believe that Maimonides knew of Plato’s position from al-Fārābī’s
commentary to the Nicomachean Ethics—and he basically agreed
with it.
■ In Guide III, 18 Maimonides supplies us with a precious fragment
from the lost commentary. I present an extended quotation so as to
preserve the context:
■ “The texts that occur with regard to this notion are so numerous
that they cannot be counted; I refer to the notion of providence
watching over human individuals according to the measure of
their perfection and excellence. The philosophers too mention this
notion. Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī] says in the Introduction to his
Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean [Ethics]: Those who have
the capacity of making their soul pass from one moral quality
(khulq) to another are those of whom Plato has said that God’s
providence watches over them to a higher degree.”
■ Maimonides has clearly pulled this quotation out of context. It
seems to me most likely that al-Fārābī makes this point in the
introduction to his commentary in the context of a discussion on
the possibility of ethical improvement. Maimonides seizes upon
the end of the sentence for evidence that “the philosophers” agree
with him that divine providence over individuals is a function of
the perfection of those individuals. Why, then, did Plato mention
divine providence? It seems to me that Plato intended the
following: radical change in character is so difficult, and so rare,
that, when achieved, it is a sign, post facto, of divine providence. It
is almost a miracle in the person who accomplishes it. Plato, as
cited by al-Fārābī and preserved by Maimonides--and as
interpreted by me--holds that such radical improvement is nearly
impossible. Therefore, someone who has achieved it has certainly
been blessed with divine guidance.
■ As far as I know no one has found that precise citation in any
Platonic writing. Shem Tov ben Shem Tov, in his gloss to the
Guide, and his father, Joseph ben Shem Tov, in a comment to his
Hebrew translation to the Nicomachean Ethics, X, end of chapter
nine (see Munk, p. 135, n. 1), both remark that Maimonides could
have found the support he needs in the Ethics [see NE X, 8,
1179a22-32.].
Said Shem Tov: It is utterly stupefying that our teacher [Maimonides]
should cite Abū Naṣr [al-Fārābī], from the beginning of his
commentary to the Ethics, and not instead adduce support from “the
first in the sciences” [Aristotle], who stated in the Ethics that a person
who behaves according to reason … should be loved by God …it may
be the case that he [Maimonides] did not see this treatise [the Ethics],
and the citations that he brings from Aristotle are passages that the
commentators have quoted…
Conclusions
■ The Arabic tradition inherited from the Hellenistic the idea that
one of the major differences of opinion between Plato and Aristotle
concerned the possibility of moral improvement: Aristotle, in the
Nicomachean Ethics, held that a person could change character
freely, whereas Plato maintained that there were inborn traits that
could not be overcome.
■ Maimonides presents essentially the same disagreement as one
between the Greek philosophers (holding like Aristotle) and the
astrologers (holding like Plato).
■ Even if Maimonides accepted al-Fārābī’s resolution, namely that
the two sages agree that people improve their moral character
enough to comply with the norms and laws of society, nonetheless,
this solution need not apply when speaking of the individual in
search of “perfection”.
■ Regarding the individual, especially the one seeking perfection,
Maimonides acknowledges an important role for biology. The
temperament and other biological features of the body have a
significant effect on the soul and the dispositions that the soul
must acquire for moral perfection.
■ In some way, the classical disagreement between Aristotle and
Plato has morphed into a medieval split between Aristotle and
Galen. This is not quite accurate, as Galen has strong evidence that
both Aristotle and Plato maintained that the body has a strong
influence over the soul.
■ The Nicomachean Ethics play a role in Maimonides’ thought mainly
through the mediation of al-Fārābī, in his commentary and his
Aphorisms of the Statesman (al-Fuṣūl al-Madanī). It is not certain that
Maimonides had direct access to the Nicomachean Ethics .
 THANK YOU
FOR

YOUR ATTENTION!