1.

GLOBE MACKAY CABLE vs CA

August 25, 1989

Facts: Restituto Tobias, a purchasing agent and administrative assistant to the

engineering operations manager, discovered fictitious purchases and other fraudulent
transactions, which caused Globe Mackay Cable and Radio Corp loss of several
thousands of pesos. He reported it to his immediate superior Eduardo T. Ferraren and
to the Executive Vice President and General Manager Herbert Hendry. A day after the
report, Hendry told Tobias that he was number one suspect and ordered him one week
forced leave. When Tobias returned to work after said leave, Hendry called him a
“crook” and a “swindler”, ordered him to take a lie detector test, and to submit specimen
of his handwriting, signature and initials for police investigation. Moreover, petitioners
hired a private investigator. Private investigation was still incomplete; the lie detector
tests yielded negative results; reports from Manila police investigators and from the
Metro Manila Police Chief Document Examiner are in favor of Tobias. Petitioners filed
with the Fiscal’s Office of Manila a total of six (6) criminal cases against private
respondent Tobias, but were dismissed.

Tobias received a notice of termination of his employment from petitioners in January

1973, effective December 1972. He sought employment with the Republic Telephone
Company (RETELCO); but Hendry wrote a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was
dismissed by Globe Mackay due to dishonesty. Tobias, then, filed a civil case for
damages anchored on alleged unlawful, malicious, oppressive, and abusive acts of
petitioners. The Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch IX, through Judge Manuel T.
Reyes rendered judgment in favor of private respondent, ordering petitioners to pay him
eighty thousand pesos (P80,000.00) as actual damages, two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) as moral damages, twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as exemplary
damages, thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) as attorney’s fees, and costs; hence, this
petition for review on certiorari.

Issue: Whether petitioners are liable for damages to private respondent.

Held: Yes. The Court, after examining the record and considering certain significant
circumstances, finds that all petitioners have indeed abused the right that they invoke,
causing damage to private respondent and for which the latter must now be
indemnified: when Hendry told Tobias to just confess or else the company would file a
hundred more cases against him until he landed in jail; his (Hendry) scornful remarks
about Filipinos (“You Filipinos cannot be trusted.”) as well as against Tobias (“crook”,
and “swindler”); the writing of a letter to RETELCO stating that Tobias was dismissed by
Globe Mackay due to dishonesty; and the filing of six criminal cases by petitioners
against private respondent. All these reveal that petitioners are motivated by malicious
and unlawful intent to harass, oppress, and cause damage to private respondent. The
imputation of guilt without basis and the pattern of harassment during the investigations
of Tobias transgress the standards of human conduct set forth in Article 19 of the Civil
Code.

The Court has already ruled that the right of the employer to dismiss an employee
should not be confused with the manner in which the right is exercised and the effects
flowing therefrom. If the dismissal is done abusively, then the employer is liable for
damages to the employee. Under the circumstances of the instant case, the petitioners
clearly failed to exercise in a legitimate manner their right to dismiss Tobias, giving the
latter the right to recover damages under Article 19 in relation to Article 21 of the Civil
Code.
2. EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., &
VEGAFRIA

EULOGIO OCCENA vs. HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, PEOPLE OF THE PHILS., &
VEGAFRIA
G.R. NO. 82146 January 22, 1990. (Kinds of Damages)
PETITION for review on certiorari seeking to annul the decision of the RTC
FERNAN, C.J.:

Facts: Petitioner Occena filed a criminal complaint for Grave Oral Defamation against
private respondent Cristina Vegrafia for allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously
uttering the following insulting words and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay
Captain, montisco, traidor, malugus, Hudas." Private respondent as accused therein
entered a plea of not guilty. After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense
of Slight Oral Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No damages were
awarded to petitioner.

Issue: WON petitioner is entitled to an award of damages arising from the remarks
uttered by private respondent and found by the trial court to be defamatory.

Ruling: PETITION GRANTED. The decision of the RTC is MODIFIED and private
respondent is ordered to pay petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and
another P5,000.00 as exemplary damages.
What gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to
make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether
done intentionally or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. The offense of
which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil
liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a
private person.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of
libel, slander or any other form of defamation. This provision of law establishes the right
of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party
damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed
to recover punitive or exemplary damages.

3. Pe vs. Pe

FACTS: Alfonso Pe, the defendant, was a married man, agent of La Perla Cigar and
Cigarette Factory in Gasan Marinduque who was treated like a son by Cecilio Pe, one
of the petitioners. Cecilio introduced Alfonso to his children and was given access to
visit their house. Alfonso got fond of Lolita, 24 year old single, daughter of Cecilio. The
defendant frequented the house of Lolita sometime in 1952 on the pretext that he
wanted her to teach him how to pray the rosary. Eventually they fell in love with each
other. Plaintiff brought action before lower court of Manila and failed to prove Alfonso
deliberately and in bad faith tried to win Lolita’s affection. The case on moral damages
was dismissed.

ISSUE: Whether or not defendant is liable to Lolita’s family on the ground of moral,
good custom and public policy due to their illicit affair.

HELD: Alfonso committed an injury to Lolita’s family in a manner contrary to morals,

good customs and public policy contemplated in Article 20 of the civil code. The
defendant took advantage of the trust of Cecilio and even used the praying of rosary as
a reason to get close with Lolita. The wrong caused by Alfonso is immeasurable
considering the fact that he is a married man.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is reversed. Defendant is hereby sentenced
to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P5,000.00 as damages and P2,000.00 as attorney's fees
and expenses of litigations. Costs against appellee.

4. Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals

160 SCRA 449 GR No. L-54598 April 15, 1988

Nature of Action:

This is a petition to reverse the decision of Court of Appeals subjecting the

petitioner liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code for failure to graduate a
student with honors.

Facts:

The late Violeta Delmo was then elected as the treasurer of an organization named
Student Leadership Club in West Visayas College. In her capacity, Delmo extended
loans from the funds of the club to some of the students of the school.

The petitioner claimed that her actions were against school regulations and therefore
dropped Delmo from the membership of the club and stripped her off of any awards or
citation she’s entitled from the school.

April 13, 1966, the Director of the Bureau of Public Schools rendered a decision that
directs Ledesma to give the honors to Delmo. On April 27, 1966, Ledesma received the
mail carrying the decision and all the records of the case but he mailed it back on April
28, 1966. And then he sent a night letter on April 29, 1966 to Director Bernandino
informing that he had returned the decision, four days before the graduation day.

On May 5, 1966, Ledesma wrote the Director asking for reconsideration to the decision
but the Director denied the request.

On July 12, 1966, the petitioner finally instructed the Registrar of the School to enter
into the scholastic records of Delmo the honor, “Magna Cum Laude”.

On July 30, 1966, Delmo filed an action for damages against the petitioner. However,
she passed away during the pendency of the case. Her parents being her sole and only
heirs filed an amended and supplemental complaint.

The trial court awarded Php 20,000 to the estate of Violeta Delmo and Php 10,000 to
her parents for moral damages; Php 5,000 for nominal damages; Php 10,000 for
exemplary damages and Php 2,000 attorney’s fees. On appeal, the Court of Appeals
affirmed this decision.

Issue:

Whether or Not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial
court’s finding that petitioner is liable for damages under Article 27 of the Civil Code

Held:

No. The Court found no reason to reverse the decision of both trial and appellate
court. It was cleared that Violeta Delmo suffered from the petitioner’s negligence and
abuse of power. Thus, under Article 27 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which
provides that any person suffering from material or moral loss because of a public
servant or employee refuses or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty
may file an action for damages and other relief against the latter, without prejudice to
any disciplinary administrative action that may be taken, it is only proper that the
petitioner be held liable for moral damages.

However, the court found the amount of Php 10,000 to be awarded to spouses
Delmo inappropriate because they are already entitled to what will be given to late
Violeta as her sole heirs. The court modified the decision insofar as moral damages are
awarded to the spouses in their own behalf. The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

5. Urbano v. IAC

Facts:

On October 23, 1980, petitioner Filomeno Urbano was on his way to his ricefield. He
found the place where he stored palay flooded with water coming from the irrigation
canal. Urbano went to the elevated portion to see what happened, and there he saw
Marcelino Javier and Emilio Efre cutting grass. Javier admitted that he was the one who
opened the canal. A quarrel ensued, and Urbano hit Javier on the right palm with his
bolo, and again on the leg with the back of the bolo. On October 27, 1980, Urbano and
Javier had an amicable settlement. Urbano paid P700 for the medical expenses of
Javier. On November 14, 1980, Urbano was rushed to the hospital where he had
lockjaw and convulsions. The doctor found the condition to be caused by tetanus toxin
which infected the healing wound in his palm. He died the following day. Urbano was
charged with homicide and was found guilty both by the trial court and on appeal by the
Court of Appeals. Urbano filed a motion for new trial based on the affidavit of the
Barangay Captain who stated that he saw the deceased catching fish in the shallow
irrigation canals on November 5. The motion was denied; hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether the wound inflicted by Urbano to Javier was the proximate cause of the latter’s
death

Held:

A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is... "that cause, which, in natural and
continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury,
and without which the result would not have occurred."And more comprehensively, "the
proximate legal cause is that acting first and producing the injury, either immediately or
by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final
event in the chain immediately effecting the injury as a natural and probable result of the
cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for the
first event should, as an ordinarily prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable
ground to expect at the moment of his act or default that an injury to some person might
probably result therefrom."

If the wound of Javier inflicted by the appellant was already infected by tetanus germs at
the time, it is more medically probable that Javier should have been infected with only a
mild cause of tetanus because the symptoms of tetanus appeared on the 22nd
dayafter the hacking incident or more than 14 days after the infliction of the wound.
Therefore, the onset time should have been more than six days. Javier, however, died
on the second day from theonset time. The more credible conclusion is that at the time
Javier's wound was inflicted by the appellant, the severe form of tetanus that killed him
was not yet present. Consequently, Javier's wound could have been infected with
tetanus after the hacking incident. Considering the circumstance surrounding Javier's
death, his wound could have been infected by tetanus 2 or 3 or a few but not 20 to 22
days before he died.

The rule is that the death of the victim must be the direct, natural, and logical
consequence of the wounds inflicted upon him by the accused. And since we are
dealing with a criminal conviction, the proof that the accused caused the victim's death
must convince a rational mind beyond reasonable doubt. The medical findings,
however, lead us to a distinct possibility that the infection of the wound by tetanus was
an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Javier was wounded to the time
of his death. The infection was, therefore, distinct and foreign to the crime.

There is a likelihood that the wound was but the remote cause and its subsequent
infection, for failure to take necessary precautions, with tetanus may have been
the proximate cause of Javier's death with which the petitioner had nothing to do. "A
prior and remote cause cannot be made the be of an action if such remote cause did
nothing more than furnish the condition or give rise to the occasion by which the injury
was made possible, if there intervened between such prior or remote cause and the
injury a distinct, successive, unrelated, and efficient cause of the injury, even though
such injury would not have happened but for such condition or occasion. If no danger
existed in the condition except because of the independent cause, such condition was
not the proximate cause. And if an independent negligent act or defective condition sets
into operation the instances which result in injury because of the prior defective
condition, such subsequent act or condition is the proximate cause."

6. ABERCA v. VER

FACTS

Task Force Makabansa (TFM) was ordered by General Fabian Ver to conduct pre-
emptive strikes against Communist- Terrorist underground houses. TFM raided several
houses, employing in most cases defectively judicial search warrants, arrested people
without warrant of arrest, denied visitation rights, and interrogated them with the use of
threats and tortures. A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, stating that 1)
plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry about their detention because the writ of
habeas corpus was suspended; 2) defendants are immune from liability for acts done in
their official duties; 3) there was no cause of action. On Nov 8, 1983,
Judge Fortun granted the motion to dismiss, which prompted plaintiffs to file a MR on
Nov 18, 1983. He later inhibited himself and was replaced Judge Lising, who denied the
MR for being filed out of time. Another MR was filed, and was only modified to include
Maj. Aguinaldo and MSgt. Balaba for officers accountable in the said complaint.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not immunity from suit may be invoked?

2. Whether petitioners have the right to question the alleged violation of their rights in
the constitution?

3. Whether the superior officers who gave the orders are liable?

HELD

1. NO, Article 32 of the Civil Code provides a sanction to rights and freedom enshrined
in the constitution. These rights cannot be violated just because of an order given by a
superior. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Even though they just
followed the orders of their superior, these do not authorize them to disregard the rights
of the petitioners, and therefore cannot be considered “acts done in their official duties”.
Article 32 speaks of any public officer or private individual, and violation of these
constitutional rights does not exempt them from responsibility.
2. YES, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus does not prevent petitioners from
claiming damages for the illegal arrest and detention in violation of their constitutional
rights by seeking judicial authority. What the writ suspends is merely the right of an
individual to seek release from detention as a speedy means of obtaining liberty. It
cannot suspend their rights and cause of action for injuries suffered due to violation of
their rights.
3. YES, Article 32 speaks of the liabilities of people who are in direct violation of the
rights stated, as well as people who are indirectly responsible for such acts. In the case
at hand, the superior officers are the ones who gave the order, and can be considered
indirectly responsible. It was also stated in the complaint who were the ones who
directly and indirectly participated in those acts. By filing a motion to dismiss, they
admitted all the facts stated in the complaint.

7. Padua vs. Robles 66 SCRA 485

digested by LLB 1-4 College of Law, Polytechnic University of the Philippines

Facts: The citation of the case was a negligent act, homicide through reckless
imprudence filed to driver Romeo Punzalan and defendants - appellees as subsidiary
liable, which give rise to two separate liabilities, namely (1) the civil liability arising from
crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or so called
culpa aquiliana.

Issue:Whether or not that negligent act of Punzalan gives rise to the two separate and
independent liabilities.

Held: It is by now settled beyond all cavil as to dispense with the citation of
jurisprudence, that a negligent act such as that committed by Punzalan gives rise to at
least two separate and independent kinds of liabilities, (1) the civil liability arising from
crime or culpa criminal and (2) the liability arising from civil negligence or the so-called
culpa aquiliana. These two concepts of fault are so distinct from each other that
exoneration from one does not result in exoneration from the other. Adjectively and
substantively, they can be prosecuted separately and independently of each other,
although Article 2177 of the Civil Code precludes recovery of damages twice for the
same negligent act or omission, which means that should there be varying amounts
awarded in two separate cases, the plaintiff may recover, in effect, only the bigger
amount. That is to say, if the plaintiff has already been ordered paid an amount in one
case and in the other case the amount adjudged is bigger, he shall be entitled in the
second case only to the excess over the one fixed in the first case, but if he has already
been paid a bigger amount in the first case, he may not recover anymore in the second
case. Thus, in the case at bar, inasmuch as Punzalan had already been sentenced to
pay the herein petitioners the amounts above-stated, in the subsequent criminal case,
he could not be adjudged to pay a higher amount.

8. LANDICHO V. RELOVA

Facts: On February 27, 1963, petitioner was charged before the Court of First Instance
of Batangas, Branch I, presided over by respondent Judge, with the offense, of bigamy.
It was alleged in the information that petitioner "being then lawfully married to Elvira
Makatangay, which marriage has not been legally dissolved, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously contract a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia." On
March 15, 1963, an action was filed before the Court of First Instance of Batangas,
likewise presided plaintiff respondent Judge Fe Lourdes Pasia, seeking to declare her
marriage to petitioner as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed by petitioner and because of its allegedly
bigamous character. On June 15, 1963, petitioner as defendant in said case, filed a
third-party complaint, against the third-party defendant
Elvira Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that his marriage with the said third-party
defendant be declared null and void, on the ground that by means of threats, force and
intimidation, she compelled him to appear and contract marriage with her before the
Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.

Issue: Whether or not the civil case filed is a prejudicial question.

Ruling: Where the first wife filed a criminal action for bigamy against the husband, and
later the second wife filed a civil case for annulment of the marriage on the ground of
force and intimidation, and the husband later files a civil case for annulment of marriage
against the first wife, the civil cases are not prejudicial questions in the determination of
his criminal liability for bigamy, since his consent to the second marriage is not in issue.
"The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by accused in
a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in
civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused, it must be shown that petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the
one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in
the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for
the crime of bigamy.

The situation in the present case is markedly different. At the time the petitioner was
indicted for bigamy, the fact that two marriage ceremonies had been contracted
appeared to be indisputable. And it was the second spouse, not the petitioner who filed
the action for nullity on the ground of force, threats and intimidation. And it was only
later that petitioner as defendant in the civil action, filed a third party complaint against
the first spouse alleging that his marriage with her should be declared null and void on
the ground of force, threats and intimidation. Assuming the first marriage was null and
void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to the outcome
of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for
themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of a competent
court and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and
so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage exists.

Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity
of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy."

9. Donato vs. Luna

CITATION: GR No. 53642, April 15, 1988

FACTS: An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on
January 23, 1979 with the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of
private respondent Paz Abayan. Before the petitioner’s arraignment on September 28,
1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Manila, a civil action for
declaration of nullity of her marriage with petitioner contracted on September 26, 1978.
Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into the
marriage which was Donato’s second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato
was already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato
defensed that his second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage
license and that force, violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by
private respondent to obtain petitioner's consent to the marriage. Prior to the
solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived together as husband
and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint affidavit executed
by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage license was
dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live with
Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already
previously married.

ISSUE: Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be
suspended in view of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile
and domestic relations court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question.

HELD: Petitioner Leonilo Donato can’t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for
annulment of marriage can only be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy
case against the accused if it was proved that petitioners consent to such marriage and
was obtained by means of duress violence and intimidation to show that his act in the
second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued
by the respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit. We make no pronouncement as to costs.

10. QUIAMBAO v. OSORIO

GR No. L-48157 March 16, 1988

FACTS:

Ejectment Case. Private Respondent claims to own the land and Petitioner through
force, intimidation, strategy and stealth entered their property. Petitioner raised in his
affirmative defense and as a ground for dismissing the case that an administrative case
is pending before the Office of Land Authority between the same parties and involving
the same piece of land.

In the administrative case Petitioner dispute the right of the Private Respondent over the
property for default in payments for the purchase of the lot. Petitioner argue that the
administrative case was determinative of private respondents right toe eject petitioner
from the from the lot in question; hence a prejudicial question which bars a judicial
action until after its termination.

The Municipal Court denied the Motion to Dismiss contained in the Petitioner’s
affirmative defenses. Petitioner appealed to the Court of First Instance. Private
Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss arguing there is no Prejudicial Question.

The Land Authority filed and Urgent Motion for Leave to Intervene in the CFI praying
that the Petition for Certiorari be granted and the ejectment case be dismissed and the
Office of the Land Authority be allowed to decide the matter exclusively.

The Petition was denied by the CFI finding the issue involved in the ejectment case to
be one of prior possession and Motion to Intervene was denied for lack of merit.

Petitioner and Intervenor raised the case to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: WHETHER THE ADMINISTRATIVE CASE BETWEEN THE PRIVATE

PARTIES INVOLVING THE LOT SUBJECT MATTER OF THE EJECTMENT CASE
CONSTITUTES A PREJUDICIAL QUESTION WHICH WOULD OPERATE AS A BAR
TO SAID EJECTMENT CASE.

DECISION: PETITION IS GRANTED. CIVIL CASE No. 2526 of the then MUNICIPAL
COURT OF MALABON RIZAL IS HEREBY ORDERED DISMISSED. No Costs.

Technically, No prejudicial question.

11. Umali v IAC GR No. 63198 June 21, 1990

FACTS: Petitioners are the officers of the Orosea Development Corporation (OROSEA).
On September 4,1979, petitioners purchased from the spouses Honorio and
SolinaEdano, Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, Bo. Casay, Mulanay,
Province of Quezon, covered by TCT No. RT-(T-36471), in the name of spouses Edano,
for the sum of P1,036,500.00 payable in four installments. The first check for
P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment.By arrangement of the petitioners with
the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale was executed by the vendors. In the first
deferment petitioners issued a check that matured on June 30, 1980 to replace the
check that matured on March 31, 1980. On the second deferment petitioners issued
another check dated July 31, 1980 to replace the check dated June 30, 1980.This
second renewal check was presented with the bank but it was dishonored due to lack of
funds. So were the checks postdated September 30, 1980 and March 31, 1981. They
were also dishonored upon their presentment for lack of funds. On May 21, 1981the
Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 1423-I,as a consequence of the dishonor of the checks. On October 14, 1981,
OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the Edano
spouses, docketed as Civil Case No. 8769,for the annulment/rescission of the Contract
of Sale executed on September 4, 1979 by and between OROSEA and the Edano
spouses covering Lot No. 49 of the Cadastral Survey of Mulanay, and for which the
petitioners issued the checks.

ISSUE: Whether CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question?

RULING: At the time the acts complained of in CR No. 1423-I were committed, the deed
of sale sought to be later annulled in CV No. 8769 was binding upon the parties thereto,
including the petitioners. The two (2) essential elements for a prejudicial question to
exist are: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue
raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue in the civil action
determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed.Given the nature of a
prejudicial question, and considering the issues raised in CV No. 8769 and CR No.
1423-I, we agree with the ruling of the respondent Court of Appeals that the resolution
of the issues in CV No. 8769 is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the
petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I, hence, no prejudicial question is involved
between the said two (2) cases.What private respondents complained of in CR No.
1423-I is that the checks issued by petitioners in their favor were dishonored for lack of
funds upon due presentment to the drawee bank. Undeniably, at the time of said
dishonor, petitioners' obligation to pay private respondents pursuant to the deed of sale,
continued to subsist. And because petitioners' checks were dishonored for lack of funds,
petitioners are answerable under the law for the consequences of their said acts. And
even if CV No. 8769 were to be finally adjudged to the effect that the said deed of sale
should be annulled, such declararion would be of no material importance in the
determination of the guilt or innocence of petitioners-accused in CR No. 1423-I. The
petition for review on certiorari is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.