SOCIAL JUSTICE v.

DRUGS BOARD
In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
Manila
of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public
EN BANC
office, students of secondary and tertiary schools, officers and employees of
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS), G.R. No. 157870 public and private offices, and persons charged before the prosecutors office
Petitioner,
- versus - with certain offenses, among other personalities, is put in issue.
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT
AGENCY (PDEA), As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads as follows:
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug
ATTY. MANUEL J. LASERNA, JR., G.R. No. 158633 testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories
Petitioner, or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and
monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
- versus -
results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two
DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine
PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the
AGENCY, confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test. x
Respondents.
x-----------------------------------------------x
x x The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., G.R. No. 161658
Petitioner, xxxx
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary
YNARES-SANTIAGO, schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall,
CARPIO, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as contained in
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, the schools student handbook and with notice to the parents,
- versus - CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
AZCUNA,
TINGA, (d) Officers and employees of public and private
CHICO-NAZARIO, offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo
REYES, a random drug test as contained in the companys work rules
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
BRION, JJ. workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated:
dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which
Respondent. shall be a ground for suspension or termination, subject to the
November 3, 2008 provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x provisions of the Civil Service Law;
DECISION
xxxx

VELASCO, JR., J.:

1
 (f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office
with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day
shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both
in the national or local government shall undergo a mandatory
drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those
found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall be subject
to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued
Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the rules and regulations on the mandatory
drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10,
2004 synchronized national and local elections. The pertinent portions of the
said resolution read as follows:
WHEREAS, Section 36 (g) of Republic Act No. 9165 provides:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.x x x
xxxx
(g) All candidates for public office x x x both in the national or
local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
WHEREAS, Section 1, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution
provides that public officers and employees must at all times
be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency;
WHEREAS, by requiring candidates to undergo mandatory
drug test, the public will know the quality of candidates they
are electing and they will be assured that only those who can
serve with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency would be elected x x x.
NOW THEREFORE, The [COMELEC], pursuant to the
authority vested in it under the Constitution, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code), [RA] 9165 and other
election laws, RESOLVED to promulgate, as it hereby
promulgates, the following rules and regulations on the
conduct of mandatory drug testing to candidates for public
office[:]
SECTION 1. Coverage.All candidates for public office,
both national and local, in the May 10, 2004 Synchronized
National and Local Elections shall undergo mandatory drug
test in government forensic laboratories or any drug testing
laboratories monitored and accredited by the Department of
Health.
SEC. 3. x x x
On March 25, 2004, in addition to the drug certificates filed
with their respective offices, the Comelec Offices and
employees concerned shall submit to the Law Department two
(2) separate lists of candidates. The first list shall consist of
those candidates who complied with the mandatory drug test
while the second list shall consist of those candidates who
failed to comply x x x.
SEC. 4. Preparation and publication of names of
candidates.Before the start of the campaign period, the
[COMELEC] shall prepare two separate lists of candidates.
The first list shall consist of those candidates who complied
with the mandatory drug test while the second list shall consist
of those candidates who failed to comply with said drug test.
xxx
SEC. 5. Effect of failure to undergo mandatory drug test and
file drug test certificate.No person elected to any public office
shall enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone
mandatory drug test and filed with the offices enumerated
under Section 2 hereof the drug test certificate herein
required. (Emphasis supplied.)
2
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate
for re-election in the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being
unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates for senators
in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
Pimentel invokes as legal basis for his petition Sec. 3, Article VI of the
Constitution, which states:
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and, on the day of
the election, is at least thirty-five years of age, able to read
and write, a registered voter, and a resident of the Philippines
for not less than two years immediately preceding the day of
the election.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5)
qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the
Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via RA
9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates,
to undergo a mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all
candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there
is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to
expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society
(SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground
that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute undue
delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools
and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the
provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as they can be used
to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a
persons constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached
by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in
his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f),
and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the
constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the
due process and equal protection guarantees.
The Issue on Locus Standi
First off, we shall address the justiciability of the cases at bench and
the matter of the standing of petitioners SJS and Laserna to sue. As
respondents DDB and PDEA assert, SJS and Laserna failed to allege any
incident amounting to a violation of the constitutional rights mentioned in their
separate petitions.[2]
3

It is basic that the power of judicial review can only be exercised in
connection with a bona fide controversy which involves the statute sought to
be reviewed.[3] But even with the presence of an actual case or controversy,
the Court may refuse to exercise judicial review unless the constitutional
question is brought before it by a party having the requisite standing to
challenge it.[4] To have standing, one must establish that he or she has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the allegedly illegal
conduct of the government; the injury is fairly traceable to the challenged
action; and the injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action. [5]
The rule on standing, however, is a matter of procedure; hence, it can be
relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs, like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and
legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overarching significance to society, or of
paramount public interest.[6] There is no doubt that Pimentel, as senator of
the Philippines and candidate for the May 10, 2004 elections, possesses the
requisite standing since he has substantial interests in the subject matter of
the petition, among other preliminary considerations. Regarding SJS and
Laserna, this Court is wont to relax the rule on locus standi owing primarily to
the transcendental importance and the paramount public interest involved in
the enforcement of Sec. 36 of RA 9165.
The Consolidated Issues
The principal issues before us are as follows:
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution? and
(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do
they constitute undue delegation of legislative power?
Pimentel Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486)
In essence, Pimentel claims that Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and
COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose an additional qualification on
candidates for senator. He points out that, subject to the provisions on
nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator needs only to meet the
qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution, to wit: (1)
citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age, and (5)
residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements, candidates for
senator need not possess any other qualification to run for senator and be
voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The Congress cannot
validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification standards, as it cannot
disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a constitutional mandate,[7] or alter or
enlarge the Constitution.
4

Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA
9165 should be, as it is hereby declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if
a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the Constitution, that
issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law
to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the
Constitution.[8] In the discharge of their defined functions, the three
departments of government have no choice but to yield obedience to the
commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be observed.[9]
Congress inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are
subject to certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the
Court has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the
following wise:
Someone has said that the powers of the legislative
department of the Government, like the boundaries of the
ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional governments, however,
as well as governments acting under delegated authority, the
powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter,
and each department can only exercise such powers as are
necessarily implied from the given powers. The Constitution
is the shore of legislative authority against which the waves of
legislative enactment may dash, but over which it cannot
leap.[10]
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject
to substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. [11] The
substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of
Rights[12] and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution
prescribing the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to implement
Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator in addition
to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a candidate for
senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to be sure, is
also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic process of
election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.[13]
Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution. As couched, said Sec.
36(g) unmistakably requires a candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug
clean, obviously as a pre-condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy
for senator or, with like effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and,
if proper, be proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes
the chain with the proviso that [n]o person elected to any public office shall
enter upon the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug
test. Viewed, therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the
implementing COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what
the 1987 Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to
be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with the
drug-testing requirement.
5
 It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of
RA 9165, that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with
the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or would work to nullify a
certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug
test requirement is optional. But the particular section of the law, without
exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory, necessarily
suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse
consequences for not adhering to the statutory command. And since the
provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the
adverse consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the
election and the assumption of public office of the candidates. Any other
construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a
pure jargon without meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for by its terms, it was intended
to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates
running in that electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court
deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules, on its validity as an
implementing issuance.
It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the
unconstitutionality of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed
the constitutional provision defining the qualification or eligibility requirements
for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.
SJS Petition
(Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165)
The drug test prescribed under Sec. 36(c), (d), and (f) of RA 9165 for
secondary and tertiary level students and public and private employees, while
mandatory, is a random and suspicionless arrangement. The objective is to
stamp out illegal drug and safeguard in the process the well being of [the]
citizenry, particularly the youth, from the harmful effects of dangerous
drugs. This statutory purpose, per the policy-declaration portion of the law, can
be achieved via the pursuit by the state of an intensive and unrelenting
campaign against the trafficking and use of dangerous drugs x x x through an
integrated system of planning, implementation and enforcement of anti-drug
abuse policies, programs and projects.[14] The primary legislative intent is not
criminal prosecution, as those found positive for illegal drug use as a result of
this random testing are not necessarily treated as criminals. They may even
be exempt from criminal liability should the illegal drug user consent to undergo
rehabilitation. Secs. 54 and 55 of RA 9165 are clear on this point:
Sec. 54. Voluntary Submission of a Drug Dependent
to Confinement, Treatment and Rehabilitation.A drug
dependent or any person who violates Section 15 of this Act
may, by himself/herself or through his/her parent, [close
relatives] x x x apply to the Board x x x for treatment and
rehabilitation of the drug dependency. Upon such application,
the Board shall bring forth the matter to the Court which shall
order that the applicant be examined for drug dependency. If
the examination x x x results in the certification that the
applicant is a drug dependent, he/she shall be ordered by the
Court to undergo treatment and rehabilitation in a Center
designated by the Board x x x.
xxxx
Sec. 55. Exemption from the Criminal Liability Under
the Voluntary Submission Program.A drug dependent under
the voluntary submission program, who is finally discharged
from confinement, shall be exempt from the criminal liability
under Section 15 of this Act subject to the following conditions:
6
 xxxx of frequent drug use by school athletes. After consultation with the parents,
they required random urinalysis drug testing for the schools athletes. James
Acton, a high school student, was denied participation in the football program
School children, the US Supreme Court noted, are most vulnerable to
after he refused to undertake the urinalysis drug testing. Acton forthwith sued,
the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs. Maturing nervous
claiming that the schools drug testing policy violated, inter alia, the Fourth
systems of the young are more critically impaired by intoxicants and are more
Amendment[19] of the US Constitution.
inclined to drug dependency. Their recovery is also at a depressingly low
rate.[15]
The US Supreme Court, in fashioning a solution to the issues raised
in Vernonia, considered the following: (1) schools stand in loco parentis over
The right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction
their students; (2) school children, while not shedding their constitutional rights
as a facet of the right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable search
at the school gate, have less privacy rights; (3) athletes have less privacy rights
and seizure[16] under Sec. 2, Art. III[17] of the Constitution. But while the right to
than non-athletes since the former observe communal undress before and
privacy has long come into its own, this case appears to be the first time that
after sports events; (4) by joining the sports activity, the athletes voluntarily
the validity of a state-decreed search or intrusion through the medium of
subjected themselves to a higher degree of school supervision and regulation;
mandatory random drug testing among students and employees is, in this
(5) requiring urine samples does not invade a students privacy since a student
jurisdiction, made the focal point. Thus, the issue tendered in these
need not undress for this kind of drug testing; and (6) there is need for the drug
proceedings is veritably one of first impression.
testing because of the dangerous effects of illegal drugs on the young. The US
Supreme Court held that the policy constituted reasonable search under the
US jurisprudence is, however, a rich source of persuasive
Fourth[20] and 14th Amendments and declared the random drug-testing policy
jurisprudence. With respect to random drug testing among school children, we
constitutional.
turn to the teachings of VernoniaSchool District 47J v. Acton (Vernonia)
and Board of Education of Independent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie
In Board of Education, the Board of Education of a school
County, et al. v. Earls, et al. (Board of Education),[18]both fairly pertinent US
in Tecumseh, Oklahoma required a drug test for high school students desiring
Supreme Court-decided cases involving the constitutionality of governmental
to join extra-curricular activities.Lindsay Earls, a member of the show choir,
search.
marching band, and academic team declined to undergo a drug test and
averred that the drug-testing policy made to apply to non-athletes violated the
In Vernonia, school administrators in Vernonia, Oregon wanted to
Fourth and 14th Amendments. As Earls argued, unlike athletes who routinely
address the drug menace in their respective institutions following the discovery

7
undergo physical examinations and undress before their peers in locker
rooms, non-athletes are entitled to more privacy.
The US Supreme Court, citing Vernonia, upheld the constitutionality
of drug testing even among non-athletes on the basis of the schools custodial
responsibility and authority. In so ruling, said court made no distinction
between a non-athlete and an athlete. It ratiocinated that schools and teachers
act in place of the parents with a similar interest and duty of safeguarding the
health of the students. And in holding that the school could implement its
random drug-testing policy, the Court hinted that such a test was a kind of
search in which even a reasonable parent might need to engage.
In sum, what can reasonably be deduced from the above two cases and
applied to this jurisdiction are: (1) schools and their administrators stand in loco
parentis with respect to their students; (2) minor students have contextually
fewer rights than an adult, and are subject to the custody and supervision of
their parents, guardians, and schools; (3) schools, acting in loco parentis, have
a duty to safeguard the health and well-being of their students and may adopt
such measures as may reasonably be necessary to discharge such duty; and
(4) schools have the right to impose conditions on applicants for admission
that are fair, just, and non-discriminatory.
Guided by Vernonia and Board of Education, the Court is of the view and so
holds that the provisions of RA 9165 requiring mandatory, random, and
suspicionless drug testing of students are constitutional. Indeed, it is within the
prerogative of educational institutions to require, as a condition for admission,
compliance with reasonable school rules and regulations and policies. To be
sure, the right to enroll is not absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and
equitable requirements.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited
drugs in the country that threatens the well-being of the people,[21] particularly
the youth and school children who usually end up as victims. Accordingly, and
until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in motion, a random
drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student
population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be
promoted and protected. To borrow from Vernonia, [d]eterring drug use by our
Nations schoolchildren is as important as enhancing efficient enforcement of
the Nations laws against the importation of drugs; the necessity for the State
to act is magnified by the fact that the effects of a drug-infested school are
visited not just upon the users, but upon the entire student body and
faculty.[22] Needless to stress, the random testing scheme provided under the
law argues against the idea that the testing aims to incriminate unsuspecting
individual students.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the
mandatory but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers
and employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for
the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable
cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,[23] has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1 and
2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic,
8
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration. Consider students for that matterunder RA 9165 is in the nature of administrative search
what he wrote without elaboration: needing what was referred to in Vernonia as swift and informal disciplinary
procedures, the probable-cause standard is not required or even practicable.
The US Supreme Court and US Circuit Courts of
Appeals have made various rulings on the constitutionality of Be that as it may, the review should focus on the reasonableness of the
mandatory drug tests in the school and the workplaces. challenged administrative search in question.
The US courts have been consistent in their rulings that the
mandatory drug tests violate a citizens constitutional right to
privacy and right against unreasonable search and seizure. The first factor to consider in the matter of reasonableness is the
They are quoted extensively hereinbelow.[25]
nature of the privacy interest upon which the drug testing, which effects a
search within the meaning of Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution, intrudes. In this
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. [26] In context, the
case, the office or workplace serves as the backdrop for the analysis of the
right to privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of
privacy expectation of the employees and the reasonableness of drug testing
ones person or from intrusion into ones private activities in such a way as to
requirement. The employees privacy interest in an office is to a large extent
cause humiliation to a persons ordinary sensibilities. [27] And while there has
circumscribed by the companys work policies, the collective bargaining
been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against
agreement, if any, entered into by management and the bargaining unit, and
unwarranted search, translation of the abstract prohibition against
the inherent right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the
unreasonable searches and seizures into workable broad guidelines for the
workplace. Their privacy expectation in a regulated office environment is, in
decision of particular cases is a difficult task, to borrow from C. Camara v.
fine, reduced; and a degree of impingement upon such privacy has been
Municipal Court.[28] Authorities are agreed though that the right to
upheld.
privacy yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the states
exercise of police power.[29]
Just as defining as the first factor is the character of the intrusion
authorized by the challenged law. Reduced to a question form, is the scope of
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is
the search or intrusion clearly set forth, or, as formulated in Ople v. Torres, is
couched and as has been held, reasonableness is the touchstone of the
the enabling law authorizing a search narrowly drawn or narrowly focused? [32]
validity of a government search or intrusion.[30] And whether a search at issue
hews to the reasonableness standard is judged by the balancing of the
The poser should be answered in the affirmative. For one, Sec. 36 of
government-mandated intrusion on the individuals privacy interest against the
RA 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR), as couched,
promotion of some compelling state interest.[31] In the criminal context,
contain provisions specifically directed towards preventing a situation that
reasonableness requires showing of probable cause to be personally
would unduly embarrass the employees or place them under a humiliating
determined by a judge. Given that the drug-testing policy for employeesand
9
experience. While every officer and employee in a private establishment is
under the law deemed forewarned that he or she may be a possible subject of
a drug test, nobody is really singled out in advance for drug testing. The goal
is to discourage drug use by not telling in advance anyone when and who is to
be tested. And as may be observed, Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes
what, in Ople, is a narrowing ingredient by providing that the employees
concerned shall be subjected to random drug test as contained in the
companys work rules and regulations x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in
the work place.
For another, the random drug testing shall be undertaken under
conditions calculated to protect as much as possible the employees privacy
and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies that the
procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness
of the results. But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test
shall be conducted by trained professionals in access-controlled laboratories
monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to safeguard against results
tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody.[33] In addition, the IRR
issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the
need to know basis;[34] that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept]
confidential subject to the usual accepted practices to protect the
confidentiality of the test results.[35] Notably, RA 9165 does not oblige the
employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act received as a result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore,
the intrusion into the employees privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by
proper safeguards, particularly against embarrassing leakages of test results,
and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal
drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially
the youth, from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to
achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and resolutely
pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory
random drug test.[36] To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize
illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug
menace cuts across gender, age group, and social- economic lines. And it may
not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs,
with their ready market, would be an investors dream were it not for the illegal
and immoral components of any of such activities. The drug problem has
hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug
trafficker. The state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to
this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies perceive a mandatory
random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use
among employees in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing
being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the chosen method is a
reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation
of privacy on the part of the employees, the compelling state concern likely to
be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the
10
challenged drug test requirement is, under the limited context of the case,
reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and
employees also labor under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed
by the Civil Service law and other laws on public officers, all enacted to
promote a high standard of ethics in the public service.[37] And if RA 9165
passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason
that it should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command,
are required to be accountable at all times to the people and to serve them
with utmost responsibility and efficiency.[38]
Petitioner SJS next posture that Sec. 36 of RA 9165 is objectionable
on the ground of undue delegation of power hardly commends itself for
concurrence. Contrary to its position, the provision in question is not so
extensively drawn as to give unbridled options to schools and employers to
determine the manner of drug testing. Sec. 36 expressly provides how drug
testing for students of secondary and tertiary schools and officers/employees
of public/private offices should be conducted. It enumerates the persons who
shall undergo drug testing. In the case of students, the testing shall be in
accordance with the school rules as contained in the student handbook and
with notice to parents. On the part of officers/employees, the testing shall take
into account the companys work rules. In either case, the random procedure
shall be observed, meaning that the persons to be subjected to drug test shall
be picked by chance or in an unplanned way. And in all cases, safeguards
against misusing and compromising the confidentiality of the test results are
established.
Lest it be overlooked, Sec. 94 of RA 9165 charges the DDB to issue,
in consultation with the DOH, Department of the Interior and Local
Government, Department of Education, and Department of Labor and
Employment, among other agencies, the IRR necessary to enforce the law. In
net effect then, the participation of schools and offices in the drug testing
scheme shall always be subject to the IRR of RA 9165. It is, therefore, incorrect
to say that schools and employers have unchecked discretion to determine
how often, under what conditions, and where the drug tests shall be
conducted.
The validity of delegating legislative power is now a quiet area in the
constitutional landscape.[39] In the face of the increasing complexity of the task
of the government and the increasing inability of the legislature to cope directly
with the many problems demanding its attention, resort to delegation of power,
or entrusting to administrative agencies the power of subordinate legislation,
has become imperative, as here.
Laserna Petition (Constitutionality of Sec. 36[c], [d],
[f], and [g] of RA 9165)
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the
Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons
accused of crimes. In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the
mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they
seek entry to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to
the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and
11
suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned agencies are, accordingly,
policy and requirement.
permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165. No

costs.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged REYNATO S. PUNO
before the public prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six Chief Justice

(6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are randomness and suspicionless. In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a
criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond
suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged, they
are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The persons thus charged,
by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and peaceably
submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. [40] To impose
mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives
of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy
guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No.

161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No.

6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in

G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA

9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec.

12
DIGEST
NOTE: This is a consolidated case with (Pimentel v. COMELEC) and (Atty.
Laserna v. DDB and PDEA), regarding the constitutionality of RA 9165(c),
(d), (f) and (g); ComprehensiveDangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
FACTS: In these kindred petitions, the constitutionality of Section 36 of
Republic Act No. (RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it requires mandatory drug testing
of candidates for public office, students of secondary and tertiary schools,
officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutor’s office with certain offenses, among other
personalities, is put in issue. As far as pertinent, the challenged section reads
as follows:
SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.—Authorized drug testing shall be done by
any government forensic laboratories or by any of the drug testing
laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of
the test results. x x x The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2)
testing methods, the screening test which will determine the positive result as
well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a
positive screening test. x x x The following shall be subjected to undergo
drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.—Students of secondary and
tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the related rules and regulations as
contained in the school’s student handbook and with notice to the parents,
undergo a random drug testing x x x;
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.—Officers and
employees of public and private offices, whether domestic or overseas, shall
be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the company’s
work rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the
workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for use of dangerous
drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for
suspension or termination, subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the
Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutor’s office with a criminal offense
having an imposable penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6) years
and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the
national or local government shall undergo a mandatory drug test.
(Pimentel v. COMELEC | G.R. No. 16158)
On Dec. 23, 2003, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing
the rules and regulations for the mandatory drug testing of candidates for
public office in connection with the May 2004 elections. Pimentel claims that
Sec. 36 (g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 illegally impose
an additional qualification on candidates for senator. He points out that,
subject to the provisions on nuisance candidates, a candidate for senator
needs only to meet the qualifications laid down in Sec. 3, Art. VI of the
Constitution, to wit: (1) citizenship, (2) voter registration, (3) literacy, (4) age,
and (5) residency. Beyond these stated qualification requirements,
candidates for senator need not possess any other qualification to run for
senator and be voted upon and elected as member of the Senate. The
Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify these qualification
standards, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of a
constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
(SJS v. DDM & PDEA | G.R. 157870)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society
(SJS), a registered political party, seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs
Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from
enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the
ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the provisions constitute
undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to
schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For
another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause inasmuch as
they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable.
And for a third, a person’s constitutional right against unreasonable searches
is also breached by said provisions.
(Atty. Laserna v. DDB & PDEA | G.R. 158633)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in
his Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d),
(f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on
the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and for being contrary to the
due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE/S:
1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an
additional qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress
13
enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to
those laid down by the Constitution?
2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional?
Specifically, do these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure, and the equal protection clause?
HELD:
1) YES, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose
an additional qualification for candidates for senator. NO, Congress
CANNOT enact a law prescribing qualifications for candidates for senator in
addition to those laid down by the Constitution.
2) The Court held that, paragraphs (c) and (d) are CONSTITUTIONAL; while
paragraphs (f) and (g) are UNCONSITUTIONAL. Only paragraphs (f) and (g)
violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause.
RATIO:
1) Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165, as sought to be implemented by the assailed
COMELEC resolution, effectively enlarges the qualification requirements
enumerated in the Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution (refer to the
aforementioned facts). As couched, said Sec. 36(g) unmistakably requires a
candidate for senator to be certified illegal-drug clean, obviously as a pre-
condition to the validity of a certificate of candidacy for senator or, with like
effect, a condition sine qua non to be voted upon and, if proper, be
proclaimed as senator-elect. The COMELEC resolution completes the chain
with the proviso that “[n]o person elected to any public office shall enter upon
the duties of his office until he has undergone mandatory drug test.” Viewed,
therefore, in its proper context, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and the implementing
COMELEC Resolution add another qualification layer to what the 1987
Constitution, at the minimum, requires for membership in the Senate.
Whether or not the drug-free bar set up under the challenged provision is to
be hurdled before or after election is really of no moment, as getting elected
would be of little value if one cannot assume office for non-compliance with
the drug-testing requirement.
Congress’ inherent legislative powers, broad as they may be, are subject to
certain limitations. As early as 1927, in Government v. Springer, the Court
has defined, in the abstract, the limits on legislative power in the following
wise: “Someone has said that the powers of the legislative department of the
Government, like the boundaries of the ocean, are unlimited. In constitutional
governments, however, as well as governments acting under delegated
authority, the powers of each of the departments x x x are limited and
confined within the four walls of the constitution or the charter, and each
department can only exercise such powers as are necessarily implied from
the given powers. The Constitution is the shore of legislative authority
against which the waves of legislative enactment may dash, but over which it
cannot leap.”
Thus, legislative power remains limited in the sense that it is subject to
substantive and constitutional limitations which circumscribe both the
exercise of the power itself and the allowable subjects of legislation. The
substantive constitutional limitations are chiefly found in the Bill of Rights[12]
and other provisions, such as Sec. 3, Art. VI of the Constitution prescribing
the qualifications of candidates for senators.
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and
administering election laws or promulgating rules and regulations to
implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose qualifications on candidates for senator
in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If Congress cannot require a
candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the COMELEC, to
be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of
requirement not otherwise specified in the Constitution.
2) The Court is of the view and so holds that the provisions of RA 9165(c)
requiring mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing of students are
constitutional. Indeed, it is within the prerogative of educational institutions to
require, as a condition for admission, compliance with reasonable school
rules and regulations and policies. To be sure, the right to enroll is not
absolute; it is subject to fair, reasonable, and equitable requirements. A
random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable, but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the
student population, doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to
be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory
but random drug test prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165(d) for officers and
employees of public and private offices is justifiable, albeit not exactly for the
same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner SJS, other than
saying that “subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable
cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to
privacy,” has failed to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 violates the right to privacy
and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under Art. III, Secs. 1
and 2 of the Constitution. Petitioner Laserna’s lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.
14
The essence of privacy is the right to be left alone. In context, the right to randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made
privacy means the right to be free from unwarranted exploitation of one’s defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime
cause humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities; and while there has are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
been general agreement as to the basic function of the guarantee against persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s
unwarranted search, “translation of the abstract prohibition against office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the
‘unreasonable searches and seizures’ into workable broad guidelines for the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right
decision of particular cases is a difficult task,” to borrow from C. Camara v. to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant
Municipal Court. Authorities are agreed though that the right to privacy attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary
yields to certain paramount rights of the public and defers to the state’s to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a
exercise of police power. persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate
As the warrantless clause of Sec. 2, Art III of the Constitution is couched and themselves.
as has been held, “reasonableness” is the touchstone of the validity of a
government search or intrusion. While every officer and employee in a
private establishment is under the law deemed forewarned that he or she
may be a possible subject of a drug test, nobody is really singled out in
advance for drug testing. The goal is to discourage drug use by not telling in
advance anyone when and who is to be tested. And as may be observed,
Sec. 36(d) of RA 9165 itself prescribes what, in Ople, is a narrowing
ingredient by providing that the employees concerned shall be subjected to
“random drug test as contained in the company’s work rules and regulations
x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the work place.” It is to be noted the
very reason RA 9165 was enacted is to safeguard the well-being of the
citizens from the deleterious effects of dangerous drugs.

Paragraph (f) of RA 9165 was declared unconstitutional by the Court. Unlike

the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no
valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes.
In the case of students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random,
and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates primarily from the
waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the
school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental
authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public employees,
the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless
drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of the drug test policy and
requirement.

The Court finds the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged
before the public prosecutor’s office with criminal offenses punishable with
six (6) years and one (1) day imprisonment. The operative concepts in the
mandatory drug testing are “randomness” and “suspicionless.” In the case of
persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory
drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of

15
 NACHURA, J.:
GARCILLANO v. HOUSE OF REPS
More than three years ago, tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped
conversation purportedly between the President of the Philippines and a
Republic of the Philippines high-ranking official of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced.
SUPREME COURT They captured unprecedented public attention and thrust the country into a
Manila controversy that placed the legitimacy of the present administration on the
line, and resulted in the near-collapse of the Arroyo government. The tapes,
EN BANC notoriously referred to as the "Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the
President’s instructions to COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to
G.R. No. 170338 December 23, 2008 manipulate in her favor results of the 2004 presidential elections. These
recordings were to become the subject of heated legislative hearings
VIRGILIO O. GARCILLANO, petitioner, conducted separately by committees of both Houses of Congress.1
vs.
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMMITTEES ON PUBLIC In the House of Representatives (House), on June 8, 2005, then Minority
INFORMATION, PUBLIC ORDER AND SAFETY, NATIONAL DEFENSE Floor Leader Francis G. Escudero delivered a privilege speech, "Tale of Two
AND SECURITY, INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS Tapes," and set in motion a congressional investigation jointly conducted by
TECHNOLOGY, and SUFFRAGE AND ELECTORAL REFORMS, the Committees on Public Information, Public Order and Safety, National
respondents. Defense and Security, Information and Communications Technology, and
Suffrage and Electoral Reforms (respondent House Committees). During the
x----------------------x inquiry, several versions of the wiretapped conversation emerged. But on
July 5, 2005, National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Director Reynaldo
G.R. No. 179275 December 23, 2008 Wycoco, Atty. Alan Paguia and the lawyer of former NBI Deputy Director
Samuel Ong submitted to the respondent House Committees seven alleged
SANTIAGO JAVIER RANADA and OSWALDO D. AGCAOILI, petitioners, "original" tape recordings of the supposed three-hour taped conversation.
vs. After prolonged and impassioned debate by the committee members on the
THE SENATE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED admissibility and authenticity of the recordings, the tapes were eventually
BY THE SENATE PRESIDENT THE HONORABLE MANUEL VILLAR, played in the chambers of the House.2
respondents.
On August 3, 2005, the respondent House Committees decided to suspend
x----------------------x the hearings indefinitely. Nevertheless, they decided to prepare committee
reports based on the said recordings and the testimonies of the resource
MAJ. LINDSAY REX SAGGE, petitioner-in-intervention persons.3
x----------------------x Alarmed by these developments, petitioner Virgilio O. Garcillano (Garcillano)
filed with this Court a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction, with Prayer for
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., BENIGNO NOYNOY C. AQUINO, Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction4 docketed
RODOLFO G. BIAZON, PANFILO M. LACSON, LOREN B. as G.R. No. 170338. He prayed that the respondent House Committees be
LEGARDA, M.A. JAMBY A.S. MADRIGAL, and ANTONIO F. restrained from using these tape recordings of the "illegally obtained"
TRILLANES, respondents-intervenors wiretapped conversations in their committee reports and for any other
purpose. He further implored that the said recordings and any reference
DECISION thereto be ordered stricken off the records of the inquiry, and the respondent
House Committees directed to desist from further using the recordings in any
of the House proceedings.5
16

Without reaching its denouement, the House discussion and debates on the
"Garci tapes" abruptly stopped.
After more than two years of quiescence, Senator Panfilo Lacson roused the
slumbering issue with a privilege speech, "The Lighthouse That Brought
Darkness." In his discourse, Senator Lacson promised to provide the public
"the whole unvarnished truth – the what’s, when’s, where’s, who’s and why’s"
of the alleged wiretap, and sought an inquiry into the perceived willingness of
telecommunications providers to participate in nefarious wiretapping
activities.
On motion of Senator Francis Pangilinan, Senator Lacson’s speech was
referred to the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security, chaired
by Senator Rodolfo Biazon, who had previously filed two bills6 seeking to
regulate the sale, purchase and use of wiretapping equipment and to prohibit
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) from performing electoral duties.7
In the Senate’s plenary session the following day, a lengthy debate ensued
when Senator Richard Gordon aired his concern on the possible
transgression of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 42008 if the body were to conduct a
legislative inquiry on the matter. On August 28, 2007, Senator Miriam
Defensor-Santiago delivered a privilege speech, articulating her considered
view that the Constitution absolutely bans the use, possession, replay or
communication of the contents of the "Hello Garci" tapes. However, she
recommended a legislative investigation into the role of the Intelligence
Service of the AFP (ISAFP), the Philippine National Police or other
government entities in the alleged illegal wiretapping of public officials.9
On September 6, 2007, petitioners Santiago Ranada and Oswaldo Agcaoili,
retired justices of the Court of Appeals, filed before this Court a Petition for
Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction,10 docketed as G.R. No. 179275,
seeking to bar the Senate from conducting its scheduled legislative inquiry.
They argued in the main that the intended legislative inquiry violates R.A. No.
4200 and Section 3, Article III of the Constitution.11
As the Court did not issue an injunctive writ, the Senate proceeded with its
public hearings on the "Hello Garci" tapes on September 7,12 1713 and
October 1,14 2007.
Intervening as respondents,15 Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., Benigno
Noynoy C. Aquino, Rodolfo G. Biazon, Panfilo M. Lacson, Loren B. Legarda,
M.A. Jamby A.S. Madrigal and Antonio F. Trillanes filed their Comment16 on
the petition on September 25, 2007.
The Court subsequently heard the case on oral argument.17
On October 26, 2007, Maj. Lindsay Rex Sagge, a member of the ISAFP and
one of the resource persons summoned by the Senate to appear and testify
at its hearings, moved to intervene as petitioner in G.R. No. 179275.18
On November 20, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 170338
and 179275.19
It may be noted that while both petitions involve the "Hello Garci" recordings,
they have different objectives–the first is poised at preventing the playing of
the tapes in the House and their subsequent inclusion in the committee
reports, and the second seeks to prohibit and stop the conduct of the Senate
inquiry on the wiretapped conversation.
The Court dismisses the first petition, G.R. No. 170338, and grants the
second, G.R. No. 179275.
-I-
Before delving into the merits of the case, the Court shall first resolve the
issue on the parties’ standing, argued at length in their pleadings.
In Tolentino v. COMELEC,20 we explained that "‘[l]egal standing’ or locus
standi refers to a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the
party has sustained or will sustain direct injury because of the challenged
governmental act x x x," thus,
generally, a party will be allowed to litigate only when (1) he can show that he
has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to
the challenged action; and (3) the injury is likely to be redressed by a
favorable action.21
The gist of the question of standing is whether a party has "alleged such a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions."22
However, considering that locus standi is a mere procedural technicality, the
Court, in recent cases, has relaxed the stringent direct injury test. David v.
17
Macapagal-Arroyo23 articulates that a "liberal policy has been observed,
allowing ordinary citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to
prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations
and rulings."24 The fairly recent Chavez v. Gonzales25 even permitted a
non-member of the broadcast media, who failed to allege a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy, to challenge the acts of the Secretary of
Justice and the National Telecommunications Commission. The majority, in
the said case, echoed the current policy that "this Court has repeatedly and
consistently refused to wield procedural barriers as impediments to its
addressing and resolving serious legal questions that greatly impact on
public interest, in keeping with the Court’s duty under the 1987 Constitution
to determine whether or not other branches of government have kept
themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws, and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them."26
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano justifies his standing to initiate the
petition by alleging that he is the person alluded to in the "Hello Garci" tapes.
Further, his was publicly identified by the members of the respondent
committees as one of the voices in the recordings.27 Obviously, therefore,
petitioner Garcillano stands to be directly injured by the House committees’
actions and charges of electoral fraud. The Court recognizes his standing to
institute the petition for prohibition.
In G.R. No. 179275, petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili justify their standing by
alleging that they are concerned citizens, taxpayers, and members of the
IBP. They are of the firm conviction that any attempt to use the "Hello Garci"
tapes will further divide the country. They wish to see the legal and proper
use of public funds that will necessarily be defrayed in the ensuing public
hearings. They are worried by the continuous violation of the laws and
individual rights, and the blatant attempt to abuse constitutional processes
through the conduct of legislative inquiries purportedly in aid of legislation.28
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not
only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.29
Given that petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili allege an interest in the execution
of the laws and that intervenor Sagge asserts his constitutional right to due
process,30 they satisfy the requisite personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy by merely being citizens of the Republic.
Following the Court’s ruling in Francisco, Jr. v. The House of
Representatives,31 we find sufficient petitioners Ranada’s and Agcaoili’s and
intervenor Sagge’s allegation that the continuous conduct by the Senate of
the questioned legislative inquiry will necessarily involve the expenditure of
public funds.32 It should be noted that in Francisco, rights personal to then
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. had been injured by the alleged
unconstitutional acts of the House of Representatives, yet the Court granted
standing to the petitioners therein for, as in this case, they invariably invoked
the vindication of their own rights–as taxpayers, members of Congress,
citizens, individually or in a class suit, and members of the bar and of the
legal profession–which were also supposedly violated by the therein assailed
unconstitutional acts.33
Likewise, a reading of the petition in G.R. No. 179275 shows that the
petitioners and intervenor Sagge advance constitutional issues which
deserve the attention of this Court in view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents. The issues are of transcendental and paramount
importance not only to the public but also to the Bench and the Bar, and
should be resolved for the guidance of all.34
Thus, in the exercise of its sound discretion and given the liberal attitude it
has shown in prior cases climaxing in the more recent case of Chavez, the
Court recognizes the legal standing of petitioners Ranada and Agcaoili and
intervenor Sagge.
- II -
The Court, however, dismisses G.R. No. 170338 for being moot and
academic. Repeatedly stressed in our prior decisions is the principle that the
exercise by this Court of judicial power is limited to the determination and
resolution of actual cases and controversies.35 By actual cases, we mean
existing conflicts appropriate or ripe for judicial determination, not conjectural
or anticipatory, for otherwise the decision of the Court will amount to an
advisory opinion. The power of judicial inquiry does not extend to
hypothetical questions because any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to
actualities.36 Neither will the Court determine a moot question in a case in
which no practical relief can be granted. A case becomes moot when its
purpose has become stale.37 It is unnecessary to indulge in academic
discussion of a case presenting a moot question as a judgment thereon
cannot have any practical legal effect or, in the nature of things, cannot be
enforced.38
18
In G.R. No. 170338, petitioner Garcillano implores from the Court, as
aforementioned, the issuance of an injunctive writ to prohibit the respondent
House Committees from playing the tape recordings and from including the
same in their committee report. He likewise prays that the said tapes be
stricken off the records of the House proceedings. But the Court notes that
the recordings were already played in the House and heard by its
members.39 There is also the widely publicized fact that the committee
reports on the "Hello Garci" inquiry were completed and submitted to the
House in plenary by the respondent committees.40 Having been overtaken
by these events, the Garcillano petition has to be dismissed for being moot
and academic. After all, prohibition is a preventive remedy to restrain the
doing of an act about to be done, and not intended to provide a remedy for
an act already accomplished.41
- III -
As to the petition in G.R. No. 179275, the Court grants the same. The Senate
cannot be allowed to continue with the conduct of the questioned legislative
inquiry without duly published rules of procedure, in clear derogation of the
constitutional requirement.
Section 21, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he
Senate or the House of Representatives, or any of its respective committees
may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure." The requisite of publication of the rules is
intended to satisfy the basic requirements of due process.42 Publication is
indeed imperative, for it will be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise
burden a citizen for the transgression of a law or rule of which he had no
notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.43 What constitutes
publication is set forth in Article 2 of the Civil Code, which provides that
"[l]aws shall take effect after 15 days following the completion of their
publication either in the Official Gazette, or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines."44
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006.45 With respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on
June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Recently, the Court had occasion to rule on this very same question. In Neri
v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and
Investigations,46 we said:
Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent
Committees likewise violated Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution,
requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the "duly published rules of
procedure." We quote the OSG’s explanation:
The phrase "duly published rules of procedure" requires the Senate of every
Congress to publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of
legislation because every Senate is distinct from the one before it or after it.
Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years for one-half of the
Senate’s membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the
end of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it
may deem fit. Not having published its Rules of Procedure, the subject
hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the 14th Senate, are therefore,
procedurally infirm.
Justice Antonio T. Carpio, in his Dissenting and Concurring Opinion,
reinforces this ruling with the following rationalization:
The present Senate under the 1987 Constitution is no longer a continuing
legislative body. The present Senate has twenty-four members, twelve of
whom are elected every three years for a term of six years each. Thus, the
term of twelve Senators expires every three years, leaving less than a
majority of Senators to continue into the next Congress. The 1987
Constitution, like the 1935 Constitution, requires a majority of Senators to
"constitute a quorum to do business." Applying the same reasoning in Arnault
v. Nazareno, the Senate under the 1987 Constitution is not a continuing body
because less than majority of the Senators continue into the next Congress.
The consequence is that the Rules of Procedure must be republished by the
Senate after every expiry of the term of twelve Senators.47
The subject was explained with greater lucidity in our Resolution48 (On the
Motion for Reconsideration) in the same case, viz.:
On the nature of the Senate as a "continuing body," this Court sees fit to
issue a clarification. Certainly, there is no debate that the Senate as an
institution is "continuing," as it is not dissolved as an entity with each national
election or change in the composition of its members. However, in the
conduct of its day-to-day business the Senate of each Congress acts
separately and independently of the Senate of the Congress before it. The
Rules of the Senate itself confirms this when it states:
19

RULE XLIV
UNFINISHED BUSINESS
SEC. 123. Unfinished business at the end of the session shall be taken up at
the next session in the same status.
All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of
one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if
present for the first time.
Undeniably from the foregoing, all pending matters and proceedings, i.e.,
unpassed bills and even legislative investigations, of the Senate of a
particular Congress are considered terminated upon the expiration of that
Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if
presented for the first time. The logic and practicality of such a rule is readily
apparent considering that the Senate of the succeeding Congress (which will
typically have a different composition as that of the previous Congress)
should not be bound by the acts and deliberations of the Senate of which
they had no part. If the Senate is a continuing body even with respect to the
conduct of its business, then pending matters will not be deemed terminated
with the expiration of one Congress but will, as a matter of course, continue
into the next Congress with the same status.
This dichotomy of the continuity of the Senate as an institution and of the
opposite nature of the conduct of its business is reflected in its Rules. The
Rules of the Senate (i.e. the Senate’s main rules of procedure) states:
RULE LI
AMENDMENTS TO, OR REVISIONS OF, THE RULES
SEC. 136. At the start of each session in which the Senators elected in the
preceding elections shall begin their term of office, the President may
endorse the Rules to the appropriate committee for amendment or revision.
The Rules may also be amended by means of a motion which should be
presented at least one day before its consideration, and the vote of the
majority of the Senators present in the session shall be required for its
approval.
RULE LII
DATE OF TAKING EFFECT
SEC. 137. These Rules shall take effect on the date of their adoption and
shall remain in force until they are amended or repealed.
Section 136 of the Senate Rules quoted above takes into account the new
composition of the Senate after an election and the possibility of the
amendment or revision of the Rules at the start of each session in which the
newly elected Senators shall begin their term.
However, it is evident that the Senate has determined that its main rules are
intended to be valid from the date of their adoption until they are amended or
repealed. Such language is conspicuously absent from the Rules. The Rules
simply state "(t)hese Rules shall take effect seven (7) days after publication
in two (2) newspapers of general circulation." The latter does not explicitly
provide for the continued effectivity of such rules until they are amended or
repealed. In view of the difference in the language of the two sets of Senate
rules, it cannot be presumed that the Rules (on legislative inquiries) would
continue into the next Congress. The Senate of the next Congress may
easily adopt different rules for its legislative inquiries which come within the
rule on unfinished business.
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the
inquiry be conducted in accordance with the duly published rules of
procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon the Senate to publish the rules
for its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the published
rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in subsequent Congresses
or until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries
to be effective even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the
same language it had used in its main rules regarding effectivity.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.49
The Court does not agree. The absence of any amendment to the rules
cannot justify the Senate’s defiance of the clear and unambiguous language
of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. The organic law instructs, without
more, that the Senate or its committees may conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation only in accordance with duly published rules of procedure, and
does not make any distinction whether or not these rules have undergone
amendments or revision. The constitutional mandate to publish the said rules
prevails over any custom, practice or tradition followed by the Senate.
20
 WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 170338 is DISMISSED, and the
Justice Carpio’s response to the same argument raised by the respondents petition in G.R. No. 179275 is GRANTED. Let a writ of prohibition be issued
is illuminating: enjoining the Senate of the Republic of the Philippines and/or any of its
committees from conducting any inquiry in aid of legislation centered on the
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in "Hello Garci" tapes.
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a SO ORDERED.
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty
at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.

The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,50

otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their
claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes.51
In other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for
their being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic
documents.52 It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws,
rules and regulations.

Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could

not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."

Very recently, the Senate caused the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation in the October 31, 2008
issues of Manila Bulletin and Malaya. While we take judicial notice of this
fact, the recent publication does not cure the infirmity of the inquiry sought to
be prohibited by the instant petitions. Insofar as the consolidated cases are
concerned, the legislative investigation subject thereof still could not be
undertaken by the respondent Senate Committees, because no published
rules governed it, in clear contravention of the Constitution.

With the foregoing disquisition, the Court finds it unnecessary to discuss the
other issues raised in the consolidated petitions.

21

DIGEST:
Facts:
Tapes ostensibly containing a wiretapped conversation purportedly between
the President of the Philippines and a high-ranking official of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) surfaced. The tapes, notoriously referred to as the
"Hello Garci" tapes, allegedly contained the President’s instructions to
COMELEC Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano to manipulate in her favor
results of the 2004 presidential elections. These recordings were to become
the subject of heated legislative hearings conducted separately by
committees of both Houses of Congress.
Intervenor Sagge alleges violation of his right to due process considering that
he is summoned to attend the Senate hearings without being apprised not
only of his rights therein through the publication of the Senate Rules of
Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation, but also of the intended
legislation which underpins the investigation. He further intervenes as a
taxpayer bewailing the useless and wasteful expenditure of public funds
involved in the conduct of the questioned hearings.
The respondents in G.R. No. 179275 admit in their pleadings and even on
oral argument that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation had been published in newspapers of general circulation only
in 1995 and in 2006. With respect to the present Senate of the 14th
Congress, however, of which the term of half of its members commenced on
June 30, 2007, no effort was undertaken for the publication of these rules
when they first opened their session.
Respondents justify their non-observance of the constitutionally mandated
publication by arguing that the rules have never been amended since 1995
and, despite that, they are published in booklet form available to anyone for
free, and accessible to the public at the Senate’s internet web page.
Issue:
Whether or not publication of the Rules of Procedures Governing Inquiries in
Aid of Legislation through the Senate’s website, satisfies the due process
requirement of law.
Held:
The publication of the Rules of Procedure in the website of the Senate, or in
pamphlet form available at the Senate, is not sufficient under the Tañada v.
Tuvera ruling which requires publication either in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation. The Rules of Procedure even provide that
the rules "shall take effect seven (7) days after publication in two (2)
newspapers of general circulation," precluding any other form of publication.
Publication in accordance with Tañada is mandatory to comply with the due
process requirement because the Rules of Procedure put a person’s liberty
at risk. A person who violates the Rules of Procedure could be arrested and
detained by the Senate.
The invocation by the respondents of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, to support their
claim of valid publication through the internet is all the more incorrect. R.A.
8792 considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document only for evidentiary purposes. In
other words, the law merely recognizes the admissibility in evidence (for their
being the original) of electronic data messages and/or electronic documents.
It does not make the internet a medium for publishing laws, rules and
regulations.
Given this discussion, the respondent Senate Committees, therefore, could
not, in violation of the Constitution, use its unpublished rules in the legislative
inquiry subject of these consolidated cases. The conduct of inquiries in aid of
legislation by the Senate has to be deferred until it shall have caused the
publication of the rules, because it can do so only "in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure."
22

ABUNDO v. COMELEC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 201716 January 8, 2013
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr.
(Abundo) assails and seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of
the Second Division, Commission on Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE)
No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution2 of the COMELEC en
banc affirming that division’s disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn,
affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac,
Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55
declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the
2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001 and 2007 runs, he emerged
and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and accordingly
served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby,
however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as
winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time, performed the functions
of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres’ election and proclamation.
Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral
contest, paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until
the end of the 2004-2007 term on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little
over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again
opposed each other. When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for the
mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest, Torres lost no time in seeking
the former’s disqualification to run, the corresponding petition,4 docketed as
SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution5
finding for Abundo, who in the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and
was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the
adverted disqualification case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private
respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto7 action
before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No.
55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his
petition to disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared
Abundo ineligible to serve as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and
declaring Abelardo Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC,10 found Abundo
to have already served three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004,
2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence, disqualified for another, i.e., fourth,
consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared winner in the
aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position
of and actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term,
i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June 30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year
and a month service constitutes a complete and full service of Abundo’s
second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as
EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.
23
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELEC’s Second
Division rendered the first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial
Court Branch 73, Virac, Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELEC’s Second Division ruled against Abundo on
the strength of Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of
a term by a protestant who is declared winner in an election protest is
considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the three-
term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en
banc per its equally assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The fallo of the
COMELEC en banc’s Resolution reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is
DENIED for lack of merit. The Resolution of the Commission (Second
Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc
held in essence the following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of
Abundo’s 2004-2007 term service which would be an exception to the three-
term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the disputed
office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution
prohibits is for an elective official to be in office for the same position for more
than three consecutive terms and not to the service of the term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and/or preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10,
2012 Resolution denying Abundo’s motion for reconsideration, the following
events transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order13 declaring its May 10,
2012 Resolution final and executory. The following day, June 21, 2012, the
COMELEC issued an Entry of Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br.
43 in Virac, Catanduanes.
3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vega’s counsel’s motion16
filed a day earlier, issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD
(COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the
entire records of the instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of
court of RTC-Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records,
the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes granted Vega’s Motion for Execution
through an Order18 of even date. And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on
the same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and
served the same at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via
substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of
the assailed COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Court’s July 3, 2012 Resolution21 and
a copy of the TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and
First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of
office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundo’s Seventh (7th) Most
Extremely Urgent Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying
for the issuance of a TRO and/or status quo ante Order. On the same day,
Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes––who
had taken their oaths of office the day before—assumed the posts of mayor
and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached
Manifestation)25 and Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012
stating that the TRO thus issued by the Court has become functus officio
owing to the execution of the RTC’s Decision in Election Case No. 55.
24
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the
Petitioner’s Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order27 reiterating
the argument that since Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor
Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed the posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of
Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would serve no purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion
to Convert the July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the
Unreasonable and Inappropriate Progression of Events).28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from
his post as incumbent mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed
which characterized Abundo’s ouster despite the supervening issuance by
the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is not
clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put
on notice about the TRO either before they took their oaths of office on July
4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of mayor and vice-mayor on July 5,
2012, the confluence of events following the issuance of the assailed
COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TRO––issued as it
were to maintain the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of
Abundo pending this Court’s resolution of his appeal––appears to have been
trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundo’s petition,
followed not long after by public respondent COMELEC’s Consolidated
Comment.29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in
Abundo’s motion for reconsideration as mere rehash and reiterations of the
claims he raised prior to the promulgation of the Resolution.
6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has
consecutively served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the
remaining one year and one month of the second term as a result of an
election protest.30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundo’s motion for reconsideration on the
basis that his arguments in said motion are mere reiterations of what he
already brought up in his appeal Brief before the COMELEC Second
Division. In this petition, petitioner claims otherwise.
Petitioner’s assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundo’s arguments in the latter’s Brief vis-à-vis those in
his Motion for Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in the MR
are elucidations and amplications of the same issues raised in the brief. First,
in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction of the RTC to
consider the quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term
limit has already been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case
No. 10-128 (DC), while in his MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the
conclusiveness of the COMELEC’s finding on the issue of his qualification to
run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo assailed RTC’s reliance
on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Court’s pronouncement
in Aldovino, Jr., which dealt with preventive suspension, is not applicable to
the instant case as it involves only a partial service of the term. Abundo
argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated with the case of
preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued
before that the almost two years which he did not sit as mayor during the
2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full
term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash
of those in the Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms
The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less
than the full three years by an elected official arising from his being declared
as the duly elected official upon an election protest is considered as full
service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive
term limit for elective local officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of
what otherwise would have been Abundo’s three successive, continuous
mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-2007 term when he was
25
initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and occupy,
an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have
been the rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is
found in Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official
shall serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of
the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in
the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
(Emphasis supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office. —
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive
terms in the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service
for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
(Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to
the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the
different factual milieus, has its complicated side. We shall revisit and
analyze the various holdings and relevant pronouncements of the Court on
the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec.
43(b) of the LGC, voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent
elective local official for any length of time shall NOT, in determining service
for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the continuity of
service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected.
In Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does
not textually state that voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of
service that does not affect ‘continuity of service for a full term’ for purposes
of the three-term limit rule."32
As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections,33 the principle behind
the three-term limit rule covers only consecutive terms and that what the
Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term. Put a bit differently, an
elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term,34 albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh
term for the same position after the election where he could have sought his
fourth term but prevented to do so by reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the
official after his or her third term. An interruption usually occurs when the
official does not seek a fourth term, immediately following the third. Of
course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the
office for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned
was elected." This qualification was made as a deterrent against an elective
local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely resigning
before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as
distinguished from involuntary interruption which may be brought about by
certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has
engendered a host of disputes resulting from the varying interpretations
applied on local officials who were elected and served for three terms or
more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as
involuntary interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents
perceive as a proscribed, fourth term. Involuntary interruption is claimed to
result from any of these events or causes: succession or assumption of office
by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated
candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed
candidate as the losing party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-
candidate as the winner in a recall election, removal of the official by
operation of law, and other analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein
such consecutive terms were considered or not considered as having been
"involuntarily interrupted or broken."
26
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998)
and Montebon v. Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the
effects of "assumption to office by operation of law" on the three-term limit
rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local official fills by
succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to
any of the following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros
on January 18, 1988 for a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2,
1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law, upon the death of the
incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as
mayor for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his
intention to run again for the mayoralty position during the 1998 elections,
Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate for mayor, sought
Capco’s disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it
is not enough that an individual has served three consecutive terms in an
elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the disqualification can apply."38 There
was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not
elected to the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself
thrust into it by operation of law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in
that office.
The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There,
Montebon had been elected for three consecutive terms as municipal
councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007.
However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded
and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent
vice-mayor retired. When Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as
municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification was filed against him based
on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebon’s assumption of
office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of
service as councilor. The Court emphasized that succession in local
government office is by operation of law and as such, it is an involuntary
severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his
post as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his occupation of
the higher office cannot, without more, be deemed as a voluntary
renunciation of his position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service,
Adormeo v. Commission on Elections40 (2002) and the aforementioned case
of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor
of Lucena City during terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998
elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. However, before Tagarao’s
1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000 wherein
Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001.
When Talaga ran for mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the
ground he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms for
violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the
remainder of Tagarao’s term after the recall election during which Talaga
served as mayor should not be considered for purposes of applying the
three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the continuity of Talaga’s
mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in
that case assailed the COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward
Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall election. It appeared that
Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City for
three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001.
Obviously aware of the three-term limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie
for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections, in which Socrates ran
and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the former’s
unexpired term as mayor. Socrates sought Hagedorn’s disqualification under
the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorn’s candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court
ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a
private citizen until the recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won
by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent, Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the
mayor of Puerto Princesa was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn
was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly an interruption in the
27
continuity of Hagedorn’s service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition.41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official
cannot seek immediate reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election
refers to the next regular election for the same office following the end of the
third consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall
election, is no longer covered x x x."42
(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City
On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not
constitute an interruption of the incumbent official’s continuity of service. The
Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected
and served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms
1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During his third term, Digos was
converted into a component city, with the corresponding cityhood law
providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of
candidacy as mayor for the 2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as
disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for violation of the three-term limit
rule on the basis of the following ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as
municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished due to the
conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as municipal
mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from
office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief executive of the
local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his duties and
responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the
period during which a local elected official is under preventive suspension
cannot be considered as an interruption of the continuity of his service. The
Court explained why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that
preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows
an elective official’s stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive
suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended
official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the
functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The
best indicator of the suspended official’s continuity in office is the absence of
a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since
no vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest vis-à-vis the three-term limit
rule, jurisprudence presents a more differing picture. The Court’s
pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections45 (1999), Ong v.
Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on Elections47 (2007) and Dizon
v. Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal
mayor of San Antonio, Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-
1998. However, his proclamation relative to the 1995 election was protested
and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null and
void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about
three months before the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the
mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ of execution it issued.
Lonzanida’s opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the
May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His
opponent, Efren Muli, filed a petition for disqualification on the ground that
Lonzanida had already served three consecutive terms in the same post. The
Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must concur for
the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he
has fully served three consecutive terms."49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent
in the case of Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be
considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections
since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have been by
reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a
corollary point, the Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-
1998 mayoral term having been ordered to vacate his post before the
expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary
relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in
Ong v. Alegre50 owing to a variance in the factual situations attendant.
28
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004.
During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his supposed second term,
the COMELEC nullified Ong’s proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost
during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELEC’s decision became final
and executory on July 4, 2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001
mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the 2001-2004 term
as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent
opposed for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be
considered as having served as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not
duly elected to the post and merely assumed office as a "presumptive
winner." Dismissing Ong’s argument, the Court held that his assumption of
office as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term"
and hence, should be counted for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The
Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the sense that Ong’s
service was deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ong’s
proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted
that the COMELEC decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998
elections was "without practical and legal use and value" promulgated as it
was after the contested term has expired. The Court further reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ong’s contention that he was only a presumptive winner in
the 1998 mayoralty derby as his proclamation was under protest did not
make him less than a duly elected mayor. His proclamation as the duly
elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of
office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish
of the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation
of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to
discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would – under the three-
term rule - be considered as having served a term by virtue of a veritably
meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election.51
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of
Ong was different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once
apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was
declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure of election", and, as a
consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For
another, Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there
being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal processes. In
fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service.52
(Emphasis supplied.)
Ong’s slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the
consolidated cases of Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v.
Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of Mabalacat, Pampanga for
the following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004. In
relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town,
emerged as garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor
for term commencing July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo
warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the ground that he is
ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for three
consecutive terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-
2001 term cannot be considered against him, for, although he was
proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected mayor vis-à-vis
the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001,
his proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his
closest rival, Anthony Dee, proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his
point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served as a mere caretaker.
The Court found Morales’ posture untenable and held that the case of
Morales presents a factual milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For
ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong, in Ong, was nullified, but
after he, like Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the
end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the
three-term limit rule, to wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30,
2001. He assumed the position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He
was mayor for the entire period notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in
the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting him (respondent) as
mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
xxxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of
Mabalacat continuously without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a
29
month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been mayor of Mabalacat for twelve
(12) continuous years.55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the
expiry of the term, cannot constitute an interruption in Morales’ service of the
full term; neither can Morales, as he argued, be considered merely a
"caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of applying
the three-term limit rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections,56 the Court
would again find the same Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification
proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty candidate during the 2007
elections for a term ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from his
post by virtue of this Court’s ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time
around that the three-term limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007
mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his favor, holding that for
purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a
disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales’ involuntary severance from
office with respect to the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office
for any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case was
promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day,
Morales notified the vice mayor’s office of our decision. The vice mayor
assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May 2007 up to 30 June 2007. The
assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter how short
it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales’ continuity of service. Thus,
Morales did not hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007.57
(Emphasis supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues
affecting consecutiveness of terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official
merely assumed the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the
LGC, then his service for the unexpired portion of the term of the replaced
official cannot be treated as one full term as contemplated under the subject
constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be counted in the
application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his
succession to said position is by operation of law and is considered an
involuntary severance or interruption (Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who
did not seek the elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later
won in a recall election, had an interruption in the continuity of the official’s
service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e., from the end of the 3rd term
up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a
municipality to a city does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent
official’s continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective
officer’s continued stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during
the period of suspension, although he is barred from exercising the functions
of his office during this period (Aldovino, Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and
assumes office, his term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest
and is ousted from office, thus disenabling him from serving what would
otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of office had the protest been
dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need not be for a
full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption
for any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break
the continuity of service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision
becomes final after said official had served the full term for said office, then
his loss in the election contest does not constitute an interruption since he
has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His full service, despite
the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because the
nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong
and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling
that he had already served three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by
the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the current 2010-2013 term.
In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:
1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt
with preventive suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service
of a term;
30
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be
interrupted so as to remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-
term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its
reliance on a mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the
disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida58 and
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no
interruption in the service of Abundo since what he considered as an
"interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was
adjudged invalid was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who
was eventually proclaimed winner was not so interrupted is at once absurd
as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi
of Aldovino, Jr. finds application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled
that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his victory in the protest case
confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was only unable to temporarily
discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election
protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election
protest, for which the rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to
be more attuned than the case of Aldovino Jr., the interrupting effects of the
imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the Aldovino,
Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundo’s case presents a different
factual backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals
subject of disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest
and each declared loser during the elections, Abundo was the winner during
the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of the mayoralty
post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated
toward the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who
ousted his opponent and had assumed the remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Court’s pronouncements in the past as
instructive, and consider several doctrines established from the 1998 case of
Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in
arriving at this Court’s conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the
"monopolization of political power" and prevent elected officials from
breeding "proprietary interest in their position"60 but also to "enhance the
people’s freedom of choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza,
"while people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power
may bring about, care should be taken that their freedom of choice is not
unduly curtailed."62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundo’s case meritorious and declares
that the two-year period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as
mayor should be considered as an interruption, which effectively removed
Abundo’s case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.
It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the
term starting July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor.
Otherwise how explain his victory in his election protest against Torres and
his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first
requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-
term limit that the official has been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had
served for "three consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood,
as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes immediately before the 2010 national and
local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the question of whether
or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-
year periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundo’s
mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the
July 2004-June 2007 term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the
enforcement of the decision of the election protest in his favor, Abundo
assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and served the term until
June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it
cannot be said that Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-
2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal
sense, "a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an
31
officer may hold an office."64 It also means the "time during which the officer
may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is the period of time
during which a duly elected official has title to and can serve the functions of
an elective office. From paragraph (a) of Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for
local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30 of the
first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from
June 30, 2004 until May 8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he
wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor as a matter of right. Neither
can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said elective
office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and
the corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, as proclaimed election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held
the office and exercised the functions as mayor only upon his declaration,
following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the May
2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, since the legally contemplated full term for local elected
officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully served the term
2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundo’s
opponent actually served as Mayor is and ought to be considered an
involuntary interruption of Abundo’s continuity of service. An involuntary
interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be
considered as one term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold.67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the
concepts of interruption of service and voluntary renunciation of service. The
word interruption means temporary cessation, intermission or suspension.68
To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the Constitution and
the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to
the continuance of the service by the concerned elected official by effectively
cutting short the service of a term or giving a hiatus in the occupation of the
elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes the idea
of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up,
abandon, decline or resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an
elective local official would thus mean to give up or abandon the title to the
office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official is
entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr.,71
held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which
jurisprudence deems an exception to the three-term limit rule, implies that the
service of the term has begun before it was interrupted. Here, the respondent
did not lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the
office. On the contrary, he actively sought entitlement to the office when he
lodged the election protest case. And respondent-appellant’s victory in the
said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty
post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was
only unable to temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he
was validly elected during the pendency of the election protest, but he never
lost title to the said office.72 (Emphasis added.)
The COMELEC’s Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the
actual length of service by the public official in a given term is immaterial by
reckoning said service for the term in the application of the three-term limit
rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulation—no more than
three consecutive terms—is a clear command suggesting the existence of an
inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to the argument that since
respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term"
should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term
limit rule. When the framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the
three term limit rule, it is clear that reference is to the term, not the actual
length of the service the public official may render. Therefore, one’s actual
service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial.73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of
the actual service of the term is immaterial in his case as he was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELEC’s case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do
not commend themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its
way clear to understand the poll body’s determination that Abundo was only
temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during the pendency
of the election protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election
protest grants the local elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion
of the term. Verily, while he was declared winner in the protest for the
mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundo’s full term has been
32
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent
(Torres). Hence, there was actual involuntary interruption in the term of
Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the full 2004-2007
term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that
pending the favorable resolution of his election protest, Abundo was
relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his opponent, as
presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat.
In other words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004—the start of the
term—until May 9, 2006 or during which his opponent actually assumed the
mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his heels while
awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having
the right to serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration
would not erase the fact that prior to the finality of the election protest,
Abundo did not serve in the mayor’s office and, in fact, had no legal right to
said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondent’s cause of action, or
to COMELEC’s resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court
succinctly defines what temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the
functions of an elective post, even if involuntary, should not be considered an
effective interruption of a term because it does not involve the loss of title to
office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder, while
retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a
reason provided by law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not
apply to the instant case. Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely
was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise the functions of an elective
post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two years, reckoned
from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have
retained title to the mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly
proclaimed winner who would have the legal right to assume and serve such
elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet, Abundo
cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a
title which, in the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, even if the belated declaration in the election protest accords him
title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not entitled
to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his
favor.1âwphi1
Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break
and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and
served barely over a year of the remaining term. At this juncture, We observe
the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundo’s case with the cases of Mayor
Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and
Hagedorn were not proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in
the regularelections. They were proclaimed winners during the recall
elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed
incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their
terms as involuntarily interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private
citizen during the period over which his opponent was serving as mayor. If in
Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanida’s service
because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more
reason, Abundo’s term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since
he was not proclaimed winner after the 2004 elections and was able to
assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after winning
the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law
contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps down
from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the inhabitants of
the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit."75 Applying the
said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the
pendency of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or
authority over the good people of Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor
should be considered as a rest period or break in his service because, as
earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election protest, it was Abundo’s
opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then
valid proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundo’s case differs from other cases
involving the effects of an election protest because while Abundo was, in the
final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the one deprived of his right
and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a
victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not
possess the mandate to remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has
clothed it with enough authority to establish a fortress against the injustices it
may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause
grave injustice to Abundo––an elected official who was belatedly declared as
33
the winner and assumed office for only a short period of the term. If in the
cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing
candidate––or the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the
contested public office but held it anyway––We find more reason to rule in
favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by popular vote, deserves title
to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by an
invalid proclamation.
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice

Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the
injustice that may likewise be committed against the people of Viga,
Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to choose their leaders. Like the
framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate unto
ourselves the right to decide what the people want"76 and hence, should, as
much as possible, "allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion
and rely on their own strength to curtail the power when it overreaches
itself."77 For democracy draws strength from the choice the people make
which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the

assailed February 8, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections
Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August
9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of

Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010
elections and is accordingly ordered IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said
position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are ordered to
immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-
Mayor and First Councilor, respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.

The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.

This Decision is immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

34
DIGEST:
MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO v. COMELEC, GR No. 201716, 2013-01-08
Facts:
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and
2010 national and local elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga municipal board of canvassers
initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due time,
performed the functions of the office of mayor.
Abundo protested
Torres' election and proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the
winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest, paving the way for his
assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term
on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year... and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again
opposed each other.
When Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy... for the mayoralty seat
Torres lost no time in seeking the former's disqualification... to run,...
predicated on the three-consecutive term limit rule.
On June 16, 2010,... COMELEC... issued a Resolution... finding for
Abundo,... accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of Viga... private
respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced a quo warranto... action...
to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his
petition to disqualify.
Issues:
The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively
served for three terms despite the fact that he only served the remaining one
year and one month of the second... term as a result of an election protest.
whether the service of a term less than the full three years by an elected
official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an
election protest is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the...
application of the three consecutive term limit for elective local officials.
Ruling:
The consecutiveness of what otherwise would have been Abundo's three
successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the 2004-
2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably...
disallowed to serve and occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings,
was eventually declared to have been the rightful choice of the electorate.
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to
the aforequoted constitutional and statutory provisions, the following
requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
the Court finds Abundo's case meritorious and declares that the two-year
period during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be
considered as an interruption, which effectively removed Abundo's case from
the ambit of the three-term... limit rule.
during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision of the
election protest in his favor,... Abundo assumed the mayoralty post... for a
period of a little over one year... and one month... it cannot be said that
Mayor Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he
was otherwise entitled.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months,... Abundo
cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the
mayor as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor... serve
the functions of the said elective office.
The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his
opponent, as proclaimed election winner.
Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the mayoralty office as he
was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal
35
right to assume and serve such elective office. For... another, not having
been declared winner yet, Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the
office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in the first place, he did
not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes,... Abundo was not entitled to the
elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break

and effective interruption of his service, until he assumed the office and
served barely over a year of the remaining term.

Principles:

36
 VELASCO, JR., J.:

POBRE v. DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

In his sworn letter/complaint dated December 22, 2006, with enclosures,
THIRD DIVISION Antero J. Pobre invites the Courts attention to the following excerpts of
ANTERO J. POBRE,
Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiagos speech delivered on the Senate floor:

Complainant, x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I

am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I
feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
- versus - am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Sen. MIRIAM DEFENSOR- SANTIAGO, Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
Respondent.
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x.

A.C. No. 7399 To Pobre, the foregoing statements reflected a total disrespect on the part of
the speaker towards then Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and the other
members of the Court and constituted direct contempt of court. Accordingly,
Present: Pobre asks that disbarment proceedings or other disciplinary actions be
taken against the lady senator.

CHICO-NAZARIO, J., In her comment on the complaint dated April 25, 2007, Senator Santiago,
through counsel, does not deny making the aforequoted statements. She,
Acting Chairperson, however, explained that those statements were covered by the constitutional
provision on parliamentary immunity, being part of a speech she delivered in
CARPIO MORALES,*
the discharge of her duty as member of Congress or its committee. The
VELASCO, JR., purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open
controversial anomalies in governance with a view to future remedial
NACHURA, and
legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what she believed to be
PERALTA, JJ. an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC], which, after sending out
public invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief
Justice, would eventually inform applicants that only incumbent justices of
the Supreme Court would qualify for nomination. She felt that the JBC should
Promulgated:
have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting members of the
Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.
August 25, 2009
The immunity Senator Santiago claims is rooted primarily on the provision of
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution, which provides: A Senator or
Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by
not more than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the
Congress is in session. No member shall be questioned nor be held liable in
DECISION any other place for any speech or debate in the Congress or in any

37
committee thereof. Explaining the import of the underscored portion of the
provision, the Court, in Osmea, Jr. v. Pendatun, said:
Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental
privilege cherished in every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As
old as the English Parliament, its purpose is to enable and encourage a
representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness and
success for it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest
liberty of speech and that he should be protected from resentment of every
one, however, powerful, to whom the exercise of that liberty may occasion
offense.[1]
As American jurisprudence puts it, this legislative privilege is founded upon
long experience and arises as a means of perpetuating inviolate the
functioning process of the legislative department. Without parliamentary
immunity, parliament, or its equivalent, would degenerate into a polite and
ineffective debating forum. Legislators are immune from deterrents to the
uninhibited discharge of their legislative duties, not for their private
indulgence, but for the public good. The privilege would be of little value if
they could be subjected to the cost and inconvenience and distractions of a
trial upon a conclusion of the pleader, or to the hazard of a judgment against
them based upon a judges speculation as to the motives.[2]
This Court is aware of the need and has in fact been in the forefront in
upholding the institution of parliamentary immunity and promotion of free
speech. Neither has the Court lost sight of the importance of the legislative
and oversight functions of the Congress that enable this representative body
to look diligently into every affair of government, investigate and denounce
anomalies, and talk about how the country and its citizens are being served.
Courts do not interfere with the legislature or its members in the manner they
perform their functions in the legislative floor or in committee rooms. Any
claim of an unworthy purpose or of the falsity and mala fides of the statement
uttered by the member of the Congress does not destroy the privilege.[3] The
disciplinary authority of the assembly[4] and the voters, not the courts, can
properly discourage or correct such abuses committed in the name of
parliamentary immunity.[5]
For the above reasons, the plea of Senator Santiago for the dismissal of the
complaint for disbarment or disciplinary action is well taken. Indeed, her
privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding
under the Rules of Court. It is felt, however, that this could not be the last
word on the matter.
The Court wishes to express its deep concern about the language Senator
Santiago, a member of the Bar, used in her speech and its effect on the
administration of justice. To the Court, the lady senator has undoubtedly
crossed the limits of decency and good professional conduct. It is at once
apparent that her statements in question were intemperate and highly
improper in substance. To reiterate, she was quoted as stating that she
wanted to spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, and calling the Court a Supreme Court of
idiots.
The lady senator alluded to In Re: Vicente Sotto.[6] We draw her attention to
the ensuing passage in Sotto that she should have taken to heart in the first
place:
x x x [I]f the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of this
Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be
driven to take the law into their own hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos
would be the result.
No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts
should be allowed to erode the peoples faith in the judiciary. In this case, the
lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:
Canon 8, Rule 8.01.A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Canon 11.A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts
and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.
Senator/Atty. Santiago is a cut higher than most lawyers. Her achievements
speak for themselves. She was a former Regional Trial Court judge, a law
professor, an oft-cited authority on constitutional and international law, an
author of numerous law textbooks, and an elected senator of the land.
Needless to stress, Senator Santiago, as a member of the Bar and officer of
the court, like any other, is duty-bound to uphold the dignity and authority of
this Court and to maintain the respect due its members. Lawyers in public
service are keepers of public faith and are burdened with the higher degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than their brethren in private
practice.[7] Senator Santiago should have known, as any perceptive
individual, the impact her statements would make on the peoples faith in the
integrity of the courts.
38

As Senator Santiago alleged, she delivered her privilege speech as a prelude
to crafting remedial legislation on the JBC. This allegation strikes the Court
as an afterthought in light of the insulting tenor of what she said. We quote
the passage once more:
x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I
am suicidal. I am humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I
feel like throwing up to be living my middle years in a country of this nature. I
am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio Panganiban and his
cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of
Chief Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another
environment but not in the Supreme Court of idiots x x x. (Emphasis ours.)
A careful re-reading of her utterances would readily show that her statements
were expressions of personal anger and frustration at not being considered
for the post of Chief Justice. In a sense, therefore, her remarks were outside
the pale of her official parliamentary functions. Even parliamentary immunity
must not be allowed to be used as a vehicle to ridicule, demean, and destroy
the reputation of the Court and its magistrates, nor as armor for personal
wrath and disgust. Authorities are agreed that parliamentary immunity is not
an individual privilege accorded the individual members of the Parliament or
Congress for their personal benefit, but rather a privilege for the benefit of the
people and the institution that represents them.
To be sure, Senator Santiago could have given vent to her anger without
indulging in insulting rhetoric and offensive personalities.
Lest it be overlooked, Senator Santiagos outburst was directly traceable to
what she considered as an unjust act the JBC had taken in connection with
her application for the position of Chief Justice. But while the JBC functions
under the Courts supervision, its individual members, save perhaps for the
Chief Justice who sits as the JBCs ex-officio chairperson,[8] have no official
duty to nominate candidates for appointment to the position of Chief Justice.
The Court is, thus, at a loss to understand Senator Santiagos wholesale and
indiscriminate assault on the members of the Court and her choice of critical
and defamatory words against all of them.
At any event, equally important as the speech and debate clause of Art. VI,
Sec. 11 of the Constitution is Sec. 5(5) of Art. VIII of the Constitution that
provides:
Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers
xxxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the
admission to the practice of the law, the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance
to the underprivileged. (Emphasis ours.)
The Court, besides being authorized to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, exercises specific authority to
promulgate rules governing the Integrated Bar with the end in view that the
integration of the Bar will, among other things:
(4) Shield the judiciary, which traditionally cannot defend itself except within
its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self interest may level at it,
and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence;
xxxx
(11) Enforce rigid ethical standards x x x.[9]
In Re: Letter Dated 21 February 2005 of Atty. Noel S. Sorreda,[10] we
reiterated our pronouncement in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer[11] that
the duty of attorneys to the courts can only be maintained by rendering no
service involving any disrespect to the judicial office which they are bound to
uphold. The Court wrote in Rheem of the Philippines:
x x x As explicit is the first canon of legal ethics which pronounces that [i]t is
the duty of a lawyer to maintain towards the Courts a respectful attitude, not
for the sake of the temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the
maintenance of its supreme importance. That same canon, as a corollary,
makes it peculiarly incumbent upon lawyers to support the courts against
unjust criticism and clamor. And more. The attorneys oath solemnly binds
him to a conduct that should be with all good fidelity x x x to the courts.
Also, in Sorreda, the Court revisited its holding in Surigao Mineral
Reservation Board v. Cloribel[12] that:
A lawyer is an officer of the courts; he is, like the court itself, an instrument or
agency to advance the ends of justice. His duty is to uphold the dignity and
authority of the courts to which he owes fidelity, not to promote distrust in the
administration of justice. Faith in the courts, a lawyer should seek to
39
preserve. For, to undermine the judicial edifice is disastrous to the continuity
of government and to the attainment of the liberties of the people. Thus has it
been said of a lawyer that [a]s an officer of the court, it is his sworn and
moral duty to help build and not destroy unnecessarily that high esteem and
regard towards the courts so essential to the proper administration of
justice.[13]
The lady senator belongs to the legal profession bound by the exacting
injunction of a strict Code. Society has entrusted that profession with the
administration of the law and dispensation of justice. Generally speaking, a
lawyer holding a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the Bar for misconduct committed while in the discharge of official duties,
unless said misconduct also constitutes a violation of his/her oath as a
lawyer.[14]
Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private
capacity, as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good
demeanor,[15] a good character being an essential qualification for the
admission to the practice of law and for continuance of such privilege. When
the Code of Professional Responsibility or the Rules of Court speaks of
conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to ones behavior
exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers professional duties,
but also covers any misconduct, whichalbeit unrelated to the actual practice
of their professionwould show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which their license and the law invest in them.[16]
This Court, in its unceasing quest to promote the peoples faith in courts and
trust in the rule of law, has consistently exercised its disciplinary authority on
lawyers who, for malevolent purpose or personal malice, attempt to obstruct
the orderly administration of justice, trifle with the integrity of courts, and
embarrass or, worse, malign the men and women who compose them. We
have done it in the case of former Senator Vicente Sotto in Sotto, in the case
of Atty. Noel Sorreda in Sorreda, and in the case of Atty. Francisco B. Cruz in
Tacordan v. Ang[17] who repeatedly insulted and threatened the Court in a
most insolent manner.
The Court is not hesitant to impose some form of disciplinary sanctions on
Senator/Atty. Santiago for what otherwise would have constituted an act of
utter disrespect on her part towards the Court and its members. The factual
and legal circumstances of this case, however, deter the Court from doing
so, even without any sign of remorse from her. Basic constitutional
consideration dictates this kind of disposition.
We, however, would be remiss in our duty if we let the Senators offensive
and disrespectful language that definitely tended to denigrate the institution
pass by. It is imperative on our part to re-instill in Senator/Atty. Santiago her
duty to respect courts of justice, especially this Tribunal, and remind her
anew that the parliamentary non-accountability thus granted to members of
Congress is not to protect them against prosecutions for their own benefit,
but to enable them, as the peoples representatives, to perform the functions
of their office without fear of being made responsible before the courts or
other forums outside the congressional hall.[18] It is intended to protect
members of Congress against government pressure and intimidation aimed
at influencing the decision-making prerogatives of Congress and its
members.
The Rules of the Senate itself contains a provision on Unparliamentary Acts
and Language that enjoins a Senator from using, under any circumstance,
offensive or improper language against another Senator or against any public
institution.[19] But as to Senator Santiagos unparliamentary remarks, the
Senate President had not apparently called her to order, let alone referred
the matter to the Senate Ethics Committee for appropriate disciplinary action,
as the Rules dictates under such circumstance.[20] The lady senator clearly
violated the rules of her own chamber. It is unfortunate that her peers bent
backwards and avoided imposing their own rules on her.
Finally, the lady senator questions Pobres motives in filing his complaint,
stating that disciplinary proceedings must be undertaken solely for the public
welfare. We cannot agree with her more. We cannot overstress that the
senators use of intemperate language to demean and denigrate the highest
court of the land is a clear violation of the duty of respect lawyers owe to the
courts.[21]
Finally, the Senator asserts that complainant Pobre has failed to prove that
she in fact made the statements in question. Suffice it to say in this regard
that, although she has not categorically denied making such statements, she
has unequivocally said making them as part of her privilege speech. Her
implied admission is good enough for the Court.
WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty.
Miriam Defensor-Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the
Constitution, DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
40
 After eight months or on May 6, 2009 Jalosjos applied with the Election
JALOSJOS v. COMELEC Registration Board (ERB) of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay, for the transfer of his
voter’s registration record to Precinct 0051F of Barangay Veterans Village.
Republic of the Philippines Dan Erasmo, Sr., respondent in G.R. 192474, opposed the application.1
SUPREME COURT After due proceedings, the ERB approved Jalosjos’ application and denied
Manila
Erasmo’s opposition.2
EN BANC
Undeterred, Erasmo filed a petition to exclude Jalosjos from the list of
G.R. No. 192474 June 26, 2012 registered voters of Precinct 0051F before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial
Court of Ipil-Tungawan-R.T. Lim (MCTC).3 After hearing, the MCTC
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR., Petitioner, rendered judgment on August 14, 2009, excluding Jalosjos from the list of
vs. registered voters in question. The MCTC found that Jalosjos did not abandon
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and DAN ERASMO, SR., Respondents. his domicile in Tampilisan since he continued even then to serve as its
Mayor. Jalosjos appealed4 his case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
x-----------------------x
Pagadian City5 which affirmed the MCTC Decision on September 11, 2009.
G.R. No. 192704
Jalosjos elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) through a petition
DAN ERASMO, SR., Petitioner, for certiorari with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
vs. injunction.6 On November 26, 2009 the CA granted his application and
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR. and HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, enjoined the courts below from enforcing their decisions, with the result that
Respondents. his name was reinstated in the Barangay Veterans Village’s voters list
pending the resolution of the petition.
x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 193566

On November 28, 2009 Jalosjos filed his Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for
the position of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay
DAN ERASMO, SR., Petitioner, for the May 10, 2010 National Elections. This prompted Erasmo to file a
vs. petition to deny due course to or cancel his COC before the COMELEC,7
ROMEO M. JALOSJOS, JR., Respondent. claiming that Jalosjos made material misrepresentations in that COC when
he indicated in it that he resided in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay. But the Second
DECISION
Division of the COMELEC issued a joint resolution, dismissing Erasmo’s
ABAD, J.: petitions for insufficiency in form and substance.8

These cases reiterate the demarcation line between the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
The Facts and the Case
In May 2007 Romeo M. Jalosjos, Jr., petitioner in G.R. 192474, ran for Mayor
of Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte, and won. While serving as Tampilisan
Mayor, he bought a residential house and lot in Barangay Veterans Village,
Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay and renovated and furnished the same. In
September 2008 he began occupying the house.
While Erasmo’s motion for reconsideration was pending before the
COMELEC En Banc, the May 10, 2010 elections took place, resulting in
Jalosjos’ winning the elections for Representative of the Second District of
Zamboanga Sibugay. He was proclaimed winner on May 13, 2010.9
Meantime, on June 2, 2010 the CA rendered judgment in the voter’s
exclusion case before it,10 holding that the lower courts erred in excluding
Jalosjos from the voters list of Barangay Veterans Village in Ipil since he was
qualified under the Constitution and Republic Act 818911 to vote in that
place. Erasmo filed a petition for review of the CA decision before this Court
in G.R. 193566.

41
Back to the COMELEC, on June 3, 2010 the En Banc granted Erasmo’s
motion for reconsideration and declared Jalosjos ineligible to seek election
as Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay. It held that
Jalosjos did not satisfy the residency requirement since, by continuing to hold
the position of Mayor of Tampilisan, Zamboanga Del Norte, he should be
deemed not to have transferred his residence from that place to Barangay
Veterans Village in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay.
Both Jalosjos and Erasmo came up to this Court on certiorari. In G.R.
192474, Jalosjos challenges the COMELEC’s finding that he did not meet the
residency requirement and its denial of his right to due process, citing Roces
v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.12 In G.R. 192704, Erasmo
assails the COMELEC En Banc’s failure to annul Jalosjos’ proclamation as
elected Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay despite
his declared ineligibility.
Subsequently, the Court ordered the consolidation of the three related
petitions.13 In its comment,14 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG)
sought the dismissal of Erasmo’s petitions and the grant of that of Jalosjos
since all such petitions deal with the latter’s qualifications as proclaimed
Representative of the district mentioned. The OSG claims that under Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, jurisdiction over this issue lies with the
HRET.
Threshold Issue Presented
The threshold issue presented is whether or not the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction at this time to pass upon the question of Jalosjos’ residency
qualification for running for the position of Representative of the Second
District of Zamboanga Sibugay considering that he has been proclaimed
winner in the election and has assumed the discharge of that office.
The Court’s Ruling
While the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to decide all
questions affecting elections,15 such power is not without limitation. It does
not extend to contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
members of the House of Representatives and the Senate. The Constitution
vests the resolution of these contests solely upon the appropriate Electoral
Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives.16
The Court has already settled the question of when the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC ends and when that of the HRET begins. The proclamation of a
congressional candidate following the election divests COMELEC of
jurisdiction over disputes relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
the proclaimed Representative in favor of the HRET.17
Here, when the COMELEC En Banc issued its order dated June 3, 2010,
Jalosjos had already been proclaimed on May 13, 2010 as winner in the
election.18 Thus, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction when it still
passed upon the issue of his qualification and declared him ineligible for the
office of Representative of the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay.
It is of course argued, as the COMELEC law department insisted, that the
proclamation of Jalosjos was an exception to the above-stated rule.19 Since
the COMELEC declared him ineligible to run for that office, necessarily, his
proclamation was void following the ruling in Codilla, Sr. v. De Venecia.20
For Erasmo, the COMELEC still has jurisdiction to issue its June 3, 2010
order based on Section 6 of Republic Act 6646. Section 6 provides:
Section 6. Effects of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been
declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the
votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is
voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action,
inquiry, or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor,
may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of
such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Here, however, the fact is that on election day of 2010 the COMELEC En
Banc had as yet to resolve Erasmo’s appeal from the Second Division’s
dismissal of the disqualification case against Jalosjos. Thus, there then
existed no final judgment deleting Jalosjos’ name from the list of candidates
for the congressional seat he sought. The last standing official action in his
case before election day was the ruling of the COMELEC’s Second Division
that allowed his name to stay on that list.1âwphi1 Meantime, the COMELEC
En Banc did not issue any order suspending his proclamation pending its
final resolution of his case. With the fact of his proclamation and assumption
of office, any issue regarding his qualification for the same, like his alleged
lack of the required residence, was solely for the HRET to consider and
decide. 21
Consequently, the Court holds in G.R. 192474 that the COMELEC En Banc
exceeded its jurisdiction in declaring Jalosjos ineligible for the position of
representative for the Second District of Zamboanga Sibugay, which he won
in the elections, since it had ceased to have jurisdiction over his case.
Necessarily, Erasmo’s petitions (G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566) questioning
42
the validity of the registration of Jalosjos as a voter and the COMELEC’s I certify that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in
failure to annul his proclamation also fail. The Court cannot usurp the power consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
vested by the Constitution solely on the HRET.22 Court.

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition in G.R. 192474, REVERSES ANTONIO T. CARPIO
and SETS ASIDE the respondent Commission on Elections En Banc’s order Senior Associate Justice
dated June 3, 2010, and REINSTATES the Commission’s Second Division (Per Section 12, R.A. 296, The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended)
resolution dated February 23, 2010 in SPA 09-114(DC), entitled Dan
Erasmo, Sr. v. Romeo Jalosjos Jr. Further, the Court DISMISSES the
petitions in G.R. 192704 and G.R. 193566 for lack of jurisdiction over the
issues they raise.

SO ORDERED.

ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO
Associate Justice
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
(On Official Leave)
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION

43
 forfeited his legal right to live in Australia, clearly proving, that he gave up his
domicilethere. And he has since lived nowhere else except in Ipil,
DIGEST Zamboanga Sibugay.

FACTS: -Petitioner Rommel Jalosjos was born in Quezon City, on October

26, 1973. He migrated to Australia in1981 when he was eight years old and
there he acquired Australian Citizenship. At the age pf 35, Jalosjos decided
to return to the Philippines and lived with his brother in Zamboanga Sibugay.
Jalosjos took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and was
issued a Certificate of Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship by Bureau of
Immigration. He also executed a sworn renunciation of his Australian
Citizenship incompliance with RA 9225. -Jalosjos acquired a residential
property where he lived and applied for registration as a voter in the
Municipality of Ipil. His application was opposed by Dan Erasmo, Sr., the
Barangay Captain of the Barangay Veteran’s Village. Election Registration
Board approved and included Jalosjos’ name in COMELEC’s voters list. A
petition for the exclusion of Jalosjos’ name in the voter’s list was then filed by
Erasmo before the 1 st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). Said petition
was denied. It was then appealed to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) who also
affirmed the lower court’s decision. -On November 28, 2009,Jalosjos filed his
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Governor of Zamboanga Sibugay
Province. Erasmo filed apetition to deny or cancel said Certificate of
Candidacy on the ground of failure to comply with RA 9225 andthe one-year
residency requirement of the Local Government Code. COMELEC ruled that
Jalosjos failed tocomply with the residency requirement of a gubernatorial
candidate and failed to present ample proof of abona fide intention to
establish his domicile in Ipil, Zamboanga. COMELEC en banc affirmed the
decision.

ISSUE: -Whether or not the COMELEC acted with the grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdiction in ruling that Jalosjos
failed to present ample proof of a bona fide intention to establish hisdomicile
in Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay

.HELD: It is clear from the facts that Quezon City was Jalosjos’ domicile of
origin, the place of his birth.It may be taken for granted that he effectively
changed his domicile from Quezon City to Australia whenhe migrated there
at the age of 8, acquired Australian citizenship, and live in that country for 26
years.Australia became his domicile by operation of aw and by choice. But,
when he came to the Philippines inNovember 2008 to live with his brother in
Zamboanga Sibugay, it is evident that Jalosjos did so withintent to change
his domicile for good. He left Australia, gave up his Australian citizenship,
and renouncehis old citizenship by taking an oath of Reacquisition of
Philippine Citizenship by the Bureau of Immigration.By his acts, Jalosjos
44
REYES v. COMELEC
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 207264 June 25, 2013
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN,
Respondents.
RESOLUTION
PEREZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante
Order dated 7 June 2013 filed by petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes,
assailing the Resolutions dated 27 March 2013 and 14 May 2013 issued by
public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPA No. 13-053.
The assailed Resolutions ordered the cancellation of the Certificate of
Candidacy of petitioner for the position of Representative of the lone district
of Marinduque.
On 31 October 2012, respondent Joseph Socorro Tan, a registered voter and
resident of the Municipality of Torrijos, Marinduque, filed before the
COMELEC an Amended Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel the
Certificate of Candidacy (COC) of petitioner on the ground that it contained
material misrepresentations, specifically: (1) that she is single when she is
married to Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas of Batangas;1 (2) that she
is a resident of Brgy. Lupac, Boac, Marinduque when she is a resident of
Bauan, Batangas which is the residence of her husband, and at the same
time, when she is also a resident of 135 J.P. Rizal, Brgy. Milagrosa, Quezon
City as admitted in the Directory of Congressional Spouses of the House of
Representatives;2 (3) that her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other
documents show that her birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;3 (4)
that she is not a permanent resident of another country when she is a
permanent resident or an immigrant4 of the United States of America;5 and
(5) that she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.6
In her Answer, petitioner countered that, while she is publicly known to be the
wife of Congressman Herminaldo I. Mandanas (Congressman Mandanas),
there is no valid and binding marriage between them. According to petitioner,
although her marriage with Congressman Mandanas was solemnized in a
religious rite, it did not comply with certain formal requirements prescribed by
the Family Code, rendering it void ab initio.7 Consequently, petitioner argues
that as she is not duty-bound to live with Congressman Mandanas, then his
residence cannot be attributed to her.8 As to her date of birth, the Certificate
of Live Birth issued by the National Statistics Office shows that it was on 3
July 1964.9 Lastly, petitioner notes that the allegation that she is a
permanent resident and/or a citizen of the United States of America is not
supported by evidence.10
During the course of the proceedings, on 8 February 2013, respondent filed a
"Manifestation with Motion to Admit Newly Discovered Evidence and
Amended List of Exhibits"11 consisting of, among others: (1) a copy of an
article published on the internet on 8 January 2013 entitled "Seeking and
Finding the Truth about Regina O. Reyes" with an Affidavit of Identification
and Authenticity of Document executed by its author Eliseo J. Obligacion,
which provides a database record of the Bureau of Immigration indicating
that petitioner is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport; (2) a
Certification of Travel Records of petitioner, issued by Simeon Sanchez,
Acting Chief, Verification and Certification Unit of the Bureau of Immigration
which indicates that petitioner used a U.S. Passport in her various travels
abroad.
On 27 March 2013, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution12
cancelling petitioner’s COC, to wit:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition is GRANTED.
Accordingly, the Certificate of Candidacy of respondent REGINA ONGSIAKO
REYES is hereby CANCELLED.
The COMELEC First Division found that, contrary to the declarations that she
made in her COC, petitioner is not a citizen of the Philippines because of her
failure to comply with the requirements of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the
Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003, namely: (1) to take an
oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; and (2) to make a
personal and sworn renunciation of her American citizenship before any
public officer authorized to administer an oath. In addition, the COMELEC
First Division ruled that she did not have the oneyear residency requirement
under Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.13 Thus, she is ineligible
to run for the position of Representative for the lone district of Marinduque.
45

Not agreeing with the Resolution of the COMELEC First Division, petitioner
filed a Motion for Reconsideration14 on 8 April 2013 claiming that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen and that she has not lost such status by simply
obtaining and using an American passport. Additionally, petitioner surmised
that the COMELEC First Division relied on the fact of her marriage to an
American citizen in concluding that she is a naturalized American citizen.
Petitioner averred, however, that such marriage only resulted into dual
citizenship, thus there is no need for her to fulfill the twin requirements under
R.A. No. 9225. Still, petitioner attached an Affidavit of Renunciation of
Foreign Citizenship sworn to before a Notary Public on 24 September 2012.
As to her alleged lack of the one-year residency requirement prescribed by
the Constitution, she averred that, as she never became a naturalized
citizen, she never lost her domicile of origin, which is Boac, Marinduque.
On 14 May 2013, the COMELEC En Banc, promulgated a Resolution15
denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration for lack of merit.
Four days thereafter or on 18 May 2013, petitioner was proclaimed winner of
the 13 May 2013 Elections.
On 5 June 2013, the COMELEC En Banc issued a Certificate of Finality16
declaring the 14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Banc final and
executory, considering that more than twenty-one (21) days have elapsed
from the date of promulgation with no order issued by this Court restraining
its execution.17
On same day, petitioner took her oath of office18 before Feliciano R.
Belmonte Jr., Speaker of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner has yet to assume office, the term of which officially starts at noon
of 30 June 2013.
In the present Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Temporary Restraining
Order and/or Preliminary Injunction and/or Status Quo Ante Order, petitioner
raises the following issues:19
31) Whether or not Respondent Comelec is without jurisdiction over
Petitioner who is a duly proclaimed winner and who has already taken her
oath of office for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for
the lone congressional district of Marinduque.
32) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance
of Respondent Tan’s alleged "newly-discovered evidence" without the same
having been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence which became
the basis for its Resolution of the case without giving the petitioner the
opportunity to question and present controverting evidence, in violation of
Petitioner’s right to due process of law.
33) Whether or not Respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it declared that
Petitioner is not a Filipino citizen and did not meet the residency requirement
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
34) Whether or not Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when, by
enforcing the provisions of Republic Act No. 9225, it imposed additional
qualifications to the qualifications of a Member of the House of
Representatives as enumerated in Section 6 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines.
The petition must fail.
At the outset, it is observed that the issue of jurisdiction of respondent
COMELEC vis-a-vis that of House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET) appears to be a non-issue. Petitioner is taking an inconsistent, if not
confusing, stance for while she seeks remedy before this Court, she is
asserting that it is the HRET which has jurisdiction over her. Thus, she posits
that the issue on her eligibility and qualifications to be a Member of the
House of Representatives is best discussed in another tribunal of competent
jurisdiction. It appears then that petitioner’s recourse to this Court was made
only in an attempt to enjoin the COMELEC from implementing its final and
executory judgment in SPA No. 13-053.
Nevertheless, we pay due regard to the petition, and consider each of the
issues raised by petitioner. The need to do so, and at once, was highlighted
during the discussion En Banc on 25 June 2013 where and when it was
emphasized that the term of office of the Members of the House of
Representatives begins on the thirtieth day of June next following their
election.
According to petitioner, the COMELEC was ousted of its jurisdiction when
she was duly proclaimed20 because pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the HRET has the exclusive jurisdiction to be the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications" of the
Members of the House of Representatives.
46
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, however, the COMELEC retains jurisdiction for
the following reasons:
First, the HRET does not acquire jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s
qualifications, as well as over the assailed COMELEC Resolutions, unless a
petition is duly filed with said tribunal. Petitioner has not averred that she has
filed such action.
Second, the jurisdiction of the HRET begins only after the candidate is
considered a Member of the House of Representatives, as stated in Section
17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have
an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to
the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. x x x
As held in Marcos v. COMELEC,21 the HRET does not have jurisdiction over
a candidate who is not a member of the House of Representatives, to wit:
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the
May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole
judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member
of the House of Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House
of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this point has no
jurisdiction over the question. (Emphasis supplied.)
The next inquiry, then, is when is a candidate considered a Member of the
House of Representatives?
In Vinzons-Chato v. COMELEC,22 citing Aggabao v. COMELEC23 and
Guerrero v. COMELEC,24 the Court ruled that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own
jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This pronouncement was reiterated in the case of Limkaichong v.
COMELEC,25 wherein the Court, referring to the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC vis-a-vis the HRET, held that:
The Court has invariably held that once a winning candidate has been
proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a Member of the House of
Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests relating
to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own
jurisdiction begins. (Emphasis supplied.)
This was again affirmed in Gonzalez v. COMELEC,26 to wit:
After proclamation, taking of oath and assumption of office by Gonzalez,
jurisdiction over the matter of his qualifications, as well as questions
regarding the conduct of election and contested returns – were transferred to
the HRET as the constitutional body created to pass upon the same.
(Emphasis supplied.)
From the foregoing, it is then clear that to be considered a Member of the
House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper oath, and (3) assumption of
office.
Indeed, in some cases, this Court has made the pronouncement that once a
proclamation has been made, COMELEC’s jurisdiction is already lost and,
thus, its jurisdiction over contests relating to elections, returns, and
qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. However, it must
be noted that in these cases, the doctrinal pronouncement was made in the
context of a proclaimed candidate who had not only taken an oath of office,
but who had also assumed office.
For instance, in the case of Dimaporo v. COMELEC,27 the Court upheld the
jurisdiction of the HRET against that of the COMELEC only after the
candidate had been proclaimed, taken his oath of office before the Speaker
of the House, and assumed the duties of a Congressman on 26 September
2007, or after the start of his term on 30 June 2007, to wit:
On October 8, 2007, private respondent Belmonte filed his comment in which
he brought to Our attention that on September 26, 2007, even before the
issuance of the status quo ante order of the Court, he had already been
proclaimed by the PBOC as the duly elected Member of the House of
Representatives of the First Congressional District of Lanao del Norte. On
that very same day, he had taken his oath before Speaker of the House Jose
de Venecia, Jr. and assumed his duties accordingly.
In light of this development, jurisdiction over this case has already been
transferred to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
(Emphasis supplied.)
47

Apparently, the earlier cases were decided after the questioned candidate
had already assumed office, and hence, was already considered a Member
of the House of Representatives, unlike in the present case.
Here, the petitioner cannot be considered a Member of the House of
Representatives because, primarily, she has not yet assumed office. To
repeat what has earlier been said, the term of office of a Member of the
House of Representatives begins only "at noon on the thirtieth day of June
next following their election."28 Thus, until such time, the COMELEC retains
jurisdiction.
In her attempt to comply with the second requirement, petitioner attached a
purported Oath Of Office taken before Hon. Feliciano Belmonte Jr. on 5 June
2013. However, this is not the oath of office which confers membership to the
House of Representatives.
Section 6, Rule II (Membership) of the Rules of the House of
Representatives provides:
Section 6. Oath or Affirmation of Members. – Members shall take their oath
or affirmation either collectively or individually before the Speaker in open
session.
Consequently, before there is a valid or official taking of the oath it must be
made (1) before the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and (2) in
open session. Here, although she made the oath before Speaker Belmonte,
there is no indication that it was made during plenary or in open session and,
thus, it remains unclear whether the required oath of office was indeed
complied with.
More importantly, we cannot disregard a fact basic in this controversy – that
before the proclamation of petitioner on 18 May 2013, the COMELEC En
Banc had already finally disposed of the issue of petitioner’s lack of Filipino
citizenship and residency via its Resolution dated 14 May 2013. After 14 May
2013, there was, before the COMELEC, no longer any pending case on
petitioner’s qualifications to run for the position of Member of the House of
Representative. We will inexcusably disregard this fact if we accept the
argument of the petitioner that the COMELEC was ousted of jurisdiction
when she was proclaimed, which was four days after the COMELEC En
Banc decision. The Board of Canvasser which proclaimed petitioner cannot
by such act be allowed to render nugatory a decision of the COMELEC En
Banc which affirmed a decision of the COMELEC First Division.
Indeed, the assailed Resolution of the COMELEC First Division which was
promulgated on 27 March 2013, and the assailed Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc which was promulgated on 14 May 2013, became final
and executory on 19 May 2013 based on Section 3, Rule 37 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides:
Section 3. Decisions Final after five days. Decisions in pre-proclamation
cases and petitions to deny due course to or cancel certificates of candidacy,
to declare nuisance candidate or to disqualify a candidate, and to postpone
or suspend elections shall become final and executory after the lapse of five
(5) days from their promulgation unless restrained by the Supreme Court.
To prevent the assailed Resolution dated 14 May 2013 from becoming final
and executory, petitioner should have availed herself of Section 1, Rule 3729
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure or Rule 6430 of the Rules of Court by
filing a petition before this Court within the 5-day period, but she failed to do
so. She would file the present last hour petition on 10 June 2013. Hence, on
5 June 2013, respondent COMELEC rightly issued a Certificate of Finality.
As to the issue of whether petitioner failed to prove her Filipino citizenship, as
well as her one-year residency in Marinduque, suffice it to say that the
COMELEC committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding her ineligible
for the position of Member of the House of Representatives.
Petitioner alleges that the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it
took cognizance of "newly-discovered evidence" without the same having
been testified on and offered and admitted in evidence. She assails the
admission of the blog article of Eli Obligacion as hearsay and the photocopy
of the Certification from the Bureau of Immigration. She likewise contends
that there was a violation of her right to due process of law because she was
not given the opportunity to question and present controverting evidence.
Her contentions are incorrect.
It must be emphasized that the COMELEC is not bound to strictly adhere to
the technical rules of procedure in the presentation of evidence. Under
Section 2 of Rule I, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure "shall be liberally
construed in order x xx to achieve just, expeditious and inexpensive
determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before
the Commission." In view of the fact that the proceedings in a petition to deny
due course or to cancel certificate of candidacy are summary in nature, then
the "newly discovered evidence" was properly admitted by respondent
COMELEC.
48
Furthermore, there was no denial of due process in the case at bar as
petitioner was given every opportunity to argue her case before the
COMELEC. From 10 October 2012 when Tan’s petition was filed up to 27
March 2013 when the First Division rendered its resolution, petitioner had a
period of five (5) months to adduce evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail
herself of the opportunity given her.
Also, in administrative proceedings, procedural due process only requires
that the party be given the opportunity or right to be heard. As held in the
case of Sahali v. COMELEC:31
The petitioners should be reminded that due process does not necessarily
mean or require a hearing, but simply an opportunity or right to be heard.
One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps
many times more creditably and predictable than oral argument, through
pleadings. In administrative proceedings moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative process
cannot be fully equated with due process in its strict judicial sense. Indeed,
deprivation of due process cannot be successfully invoked where a party was
given the chance to be heard on his motion for reconsideration. (Emphasis
supplied)
As to the ruling that petitioner is ineligible to run for office on the ground of
citizenship, the COMELEC First Division, discoursed as follows:
"x x x for respondent to reacquire her Filipino citizenship and become eligible
for public office, the law requires that she must have accomplished the
following acts: (1) take the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines before the Consul-General of the Philippine Consulate in the
USA; and (2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath.
In the case at bar, there is no showing that respondent complied with the
aforesaid requirements. Early on in the proceeding, respondent hammered
on petitioner’s lack of proof regarding her American citizenship, contending
that it is petitioner’s burden to present a case. She, however, specifically
denied that she has become either a permanent resident or naturalized
citizen of the USA.
Due to petitioner’s submission of newly-discovered evidence thru a
Manifestation dated February 7, 2013, however, establishing the fact that
respondent is a holder of an American passport which she continues to use
until June 30, 2012, petitioner was able to substantiate his allegations. The
burden now shifts to respondent to present substantial evidence to prove
otherwise. This, the respondent utterly failed to do, leading to the conclusion
inevitable that respondent falsely misrepresented in her COC that she is a
natural-born Filipino citizen. Unless and until she can establish that she had
availed of the privileges of RA 9225 by becoming a dual Filipino-American
citizen, and thereafter, made a valid sworn renunciation of her American
citizenship, she remains to be an American citizen and is, therefore, ineligible
to run for and hold any elective public office in the Philippines."32 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Let us look into the events that led to this petition: In moving for the
cancellation of petitioner’s COC, respondent submitted records of the Bureau
of Immigration showing that petitioner is a holder of a US passport, and that
her status is that of a "balikbayan." At this point, the burden of proof shifted to
petitioner, imposing upon her the duty to prove that she is a natural-born
Filipino citizen and has not lost the same, or that she has reacquired such
status in accordance with the provisions of R.A. No. 9225. Aside from the
bare allegation that she is a natural-born citizen, however, petitioner
submitted no proof to support such contention. Neither did she submit any
proof as to the inapplicability of R.A. No. 9225 to her.
Notably, in her Motion for Reconsideration before the COMELEC En Banc,
petitioner admitted that she is a holder of a US passport, but she averred that
she is only a dual Filipino-American citizen, thus the requirements of R.A.
No. 9225 do not apply to her.33 Still, attached to the said motion is an
Affidavit of Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship dated 24 September 2012.34
Petitioner explains that she attached said Affidavit "if only to show her desire
and zeal to serve the people and to comply with rules, even as a
superfluity."35 We cannot, however, subscribe to petitioner’s explanation. If
petitioner executed said Affidavit "if only to comply with the rules," then it is
an admission that R.A. No. 9225 applies to her. Petitioner cannot claim that
she executed it to address the observations by the COMELEC as the
assailed Resolutions were promulgated only in 2013, while the Affidavit was
executed in September 2012.
Moreover, in the present petition, petitioner added a footnote to her oath of
office as Provincial Administrator, to this effect: "This does not mean that
Petitioner did not, prior to her taking her oath of office as Provincial
Administrator, take her oath of allegiance for purposes of reacquisition of
natural-born Filipino status, which she reserves to present in the proper
proceeding. The reference to the taking of oath of office is in order to make
reference to what is already part of the records and evidence in the present
case and to avoid injecting into the records evidence on matters of fact that
was not previously passed upon by Respondent COMELEC."36 This
statement raises a lot of questions – Did petitioner execute an oath of
49
allegiance for re-acquisition of natural-born Filipino status? If she did, why did
she not present it at the earliest opportunity before the COMELEC? And is
this an admission that she has indeed lost her natural-born Filipino status?
To cover-up her apparent lack of an oath of allegiance as required by R.A.
No. 9225, petitioner contends that, since she took her oath of allegiance in
connection with her appointment as Provincial Administrator of Marinduque,
she is deemed to have reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino
citizen.
This contention is misplaced. For one, this issue is being presented for the
first time before this Court, as it was never raised before the COMELEC. For
another, said oath of allegiance cannot be considered compliance with Sec.
3 of R.A. No. 9225 as certain requirements have to be met as prescribed by
Memorandum Circular No. AFF-04-01, otherwise known as the Rules
Governing Philippine Citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 and Memorandum
Circular No. AFF-05-002 (Revised Rules) and Administrative Order No. 91,
Series of 2004 issued by the Bureau of Immigration. Thus, petitioner’s oath
of office as Provincial Administrator cannot be considered as the oath of
allegiance in compliance with R.A. No. 9225.
These circumstances, taken together, show that a doubt was clearly cast on
petitioner’s citizenship. Petitioner, however, failed to clear such doubt.
As to the issue of residency, proceeding from the finding that petitioner has
lost her natural-born status, we quote with approval the ruling of the
COMELEC First Division that petitioner cannot be considered a resident of
Marinduque:
"Thus, a Filipino citizen who becomes naturalized elsewhere effectively
abandons his domicile of origin. Upon re-acquisition of Filipino citizenship
pursuant to RA 9225, he must still show that he chose to establish his
domicile in the Philippines through positive acts, and the period of his
residency shall be counted from the time he made it his domicile of choice.
In this case, there is no showing whatsoever that petitioner had already re-
acquired her Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 so as to conclude that
she has regained her domicile in the Philippines. There being no proof that
petitioner had renounced her American citizenship, it follows that she has not
abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA.
The only proof presented by petitioner to show that she has met the one-year
residency requirement of the law and never abandoned her domicile of origin
in Boac, Marinduque is her claim that she served as Provincial Administrator
of the province from January 18, 2011 to July 13, 2011. But such fact alone
is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency. For, petitioner has never
regained her domicile in Marinduque as she remains to be an American
citizen. No amount of her stay in the said locality can substitute the fact that
she has not abandoned her domicile of choice in the USA."37 (Emphasis
supplied.)
All in all, considering that the petition for denial and cancellation of the COC
is summary in nature, the COMELEC is given much discretion in the
evaluation and admission of evidence pursuant to its principal objective of
determining of whether or not the COC should be cancelled. We held in
Mastura v. COMELEC:38
The rule that factual findings of administrative bodies will not be disturbed by
courts of justice except when there is absolutely no evidence or no
substantial evidence in support of such findings should be applied with
greater force when it concerns the COMELEC, as the framers of the
Constitution intended to place the COMELEC — created and explicitly made
independent by the Constitution itself — on a level higher than statutory
administrative organs. The COMELEC has broad powers to ascertain the
true results of the election by means available to it. For the attainment of that
end, it is not strictly bound by the rules of evidence.1âwphi1
Time and again, We emphasize that the "grave abuse of discretion" which
warrants this Court’s exercise of certiorari jurisdiction has a welldefined
meaning. Guidance is found in Beluso v. Commission on Elections39 where
the Court held:
x x x A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has
a specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to
passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform
a positive duty enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. For an
act to be struck down as having been done with grave abuse of discretion,
the abuse of discretion must be patent and gross. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, this Court finds that petitioner failed to adequately and substantially
show that grave abuse of discretion exists.
Lastly, anent the proposition of petitioner that the act of the COMELEC in
enforcing the provisions of R.A. No. 9225, insofar as it adds to the
qualifications of Members of the House of Representatives other than those
50
enumerated in the Constitution, is unconstitutional, We find the same
meritless.

The COMELEC did not impose additional qualifications on candidates for the
House of Representatives who have acquired foreign citizenship. It merely
applied the qualifications prescribed by Section 6, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution that the candidate must be a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines and must have one-year residency prior to the date of elections.
Such being the case, the COMELEC did not err when it inquired into the
compliance by petitioner of Sections 3 and 5 of R.A. No. 9225 to determine if
she reacquired her status as a natural-born Filipino citizen. It simply applied
the constitutional provision and nothing more.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is DISMISSED, finding

no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Commission on Elections. The
14 May 2013 Resolution of the COMELEC En Bane affirming the 27 March
2013 Resolution of the COMELEC First Division is upheld.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice No Part Due To Voluntary Inhibition
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
I join the dissent of J. Brion
MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN
Associate Justice

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Resolution were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s
Division.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

51
DIGEST
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and JOSEPH SOCORRO B. TAN

FACTS:

A petition to cancel the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) was filed against the
petitioner, Regina Reyes on the ground that it contained material
misrepresentations, specifically:

That she is single when she is married.

That she is a resident of Marinduque when allegedly she is a resident of
Batangas and Quezon City.
That her date of birth is 3 July 1964 when other documents show that her
birthdate is either 8 July 1959 or 3 July 1960;
That she is a permanent resident or an immigrant in the US; and
That she is a Filipino citizen when she is, in fact, an American citizen.
During the course of the proceedings, COMELEC found newly evidence
indicating that Reyes is an American citizen and a holder of a U.S. passport,
as well as using a U.S. Passport in her various travels abroad. Pursuant to
the evidences found, COMELEC cancelled latter’s COC. On May 2013
elections, Reyes was proclaimed the winner and subsequently, took her oath
of office on June 05, 2013. On that same day, the COMELEC issued a
certificate of finality for the cancellation of the COC of Reyes.

ISSUE:

Whether COMELEC committed a violation of petitioner’s right to due process

of law.

HELD:

There was no denial of due process in the case as Reyes was given every
opportunity to argue her case before the COMELEC. From the time the latter
rendered its resolution, Reyes had a period of five (5) months to adduce
evidence. Unfortunately, she did not avail herself of the opportunity given
her. Due process does not necessarily mean or require a hearing, but simply
an opportunity or right to be heard. Deprivation of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a party was given the chance to be heard on his
motion for reconsideration.

Petition is dismissed.
52
ARNAULT v. NAZARENO
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO
BALAGTAS, Director of Prisons, respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong,
Lorenzo Tañada, and Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his
confinement in the New Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by
virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May 15, 1950, which reads
as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to
the said amount; Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the
Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa,
Rizal, until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the special
committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be ordered
when he shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the
said special committee the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent
here, may be briefly stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the
Rural Progress Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and
Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000 and P500,000, respectively. Of the
first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident American,
thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc.,
represented by Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the
Buenavista Estate. The second sum of P500,000 was all paid to the same
Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila
Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged
interest of the said Burt in the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios
Hospital. The Philippine Government held a 25-year lease contract on said
estate, with an option to purchase it for P3,000,000 within the same period of
25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation Republic of the
Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the
sum of P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June
21, 1944, together with the accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since
1939 the Government has remained in possession of the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate
for P5,000,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000
only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one year and the remainder in
annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on his
part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down
payment of P10,000 and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to him.
Aside from the down payment of P10,000, Burt has made no other payment
on account of the purchase price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust
Company. On May 14, 1946, the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for
the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid P10,000 down and
promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in
ten successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within
which to pay the first installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947,
without Burt's having paid the said or any other amount then or afterwards.
On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed, and
delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an
absolute deed of sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February
5, 1948, the Rural Progress Administration made, under article 1504 of the
Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the resolution and cancellation of
his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his failure
to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months.
Subsequently the Court of First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of
53
Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new one in the name of the
Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme
Court.1
It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding
paragraphs that the Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice
as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Rural Progress Administration
and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National Bank,
from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two
estates in the latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads
as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE
THE BUENAVISTA AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural
Progress Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong
Estates for the aggregate sum of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated
October 31, 1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three
million pesos by virtue of a contract entered into between the San Juan de
Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in 1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to
purchase the Buenavista Estate because the occupation government had
made tender of payment in the amount of three million pesos, Japanese
currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title of Ownership in the
Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court
sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes during
the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay
a single centavo for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically
owned by virtue of a deed of sale from the Philippine Trust Company dated
September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousand pesos, and by virtue
of the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest
in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created,
composed of five members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty
of the said Committee to determine whether the said purchase was honest,
valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was fair and just,
the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may
deem proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to
conduct public hearings; issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to
compel the attendance of witnesses or the production of documents before it;
and may require any official or employee of any bureau, office, branch,
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or
otherwise cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its
functions and duties. Said Committee shall submit its report of findings and
recommendations within two weeks from the adoption of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined
various witnesses, among the most important of whom was the herein
petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question which the committee
sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and
irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000
for his alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed
to have forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought
to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000
were delivered to him on the afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same
date he opened a new account in the name of Ernest H. Burt with the
Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating
P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two
checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the
Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National Bank, and another for
P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the
committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that
gave rise to the present case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving
the disposition of funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal,
that no laws were being violated, and that all requisites had been complied
with. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of representative. I beg
to be excused from making answer which might later be used against me. I
have been assured that it is my constitutional right to refuse to incriminate
myself, and I am certain that the Honorable Members of this Committee,
who, I understand, are lawyers, will see the justness of my position.
54
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a
member of the committee, interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own
typewritten statement, were legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to
your own statement, did not violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner
that no laws were violated, how is it that when you were asked by the
Committee to tell what steps you took to have this money delivered to Burt,
you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would incriminate you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his
dealings with other people.
xxx xxx xxx
Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of
because you would be incriminated, or you would be incriminating
somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of
the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without
having to account for any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator
Sumulong, interrogated the petitioner, the latter testified as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on
October 29, 1949, is payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on
October 29, 1949, what did you do with that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these
P440,000 which you cashed on October 29, 1949?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the
P440,000 was a Filipino?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of
Burt to whom you delivered this big amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you
delivered the big amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the
amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of
Burt, this big amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1-½ million paid
to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.
The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
55
 The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal
The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction? instruction why that certain person should receive these P440,000?

Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction. Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.

The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to
deliver these P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to
reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that
certain person without receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and
where could I meet him.

The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as
verbal? 1946?

Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.

The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt? The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the
prosecution of the two cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago. estates?

The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
Burt was still here in the Philippines?
The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes. official?

The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
the money?
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the name.
Philippines gave you the verbal instruction?
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946. 29, 1949, you knew already that person?

The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
receiving these P440,000?
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know. name?

56
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your
recollection is Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that
family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered
this P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or
three times, you never were able to find out what was his name?
Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my
name; of course, we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila know
me, but they don't know my name, and I don't know them. They sa{ I am
"chiflado" because I don't know their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain
person? What is his complexion: light, dark or light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili),
but smaller. He walks very straight, with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom
you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain
person, you never came to know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate,
which approved and read to him the following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt
consisting of contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation
conducted by the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to
probe the Tambobong and Buenavista estates deal of October 21, 1949, and
that the President of the Senate propounded to him the following
interrogatories:
1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person
whose name it is impossible for you not to remember not only because of the
big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but also by your own
statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was
still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money to him without
receipt, and the last time you saw him was in December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written
answer alleging that the questions were incriminatory in nature and begging
leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional right not to be compelled to
57
be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer Senator
Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the
latter the following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you
for the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that
you can [could] not remember his name. That was the reason then for
refusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the answer that you have
just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you
gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be self-incriminating.
Now, do I understand from you that you are abandoning your former claim
that you cannot remember the name of that person, and that your reason
now for your refusal to reveal the name of that person is that your answer
might be self-incriminating? In other words, the question is this: What is your
real reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave
the P440,000: that you do not remember his name or that your answer would
be self-incriminating?
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure
that the accused should not be required to testify unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question.
The question is very clear. It does not incriminate him.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the
Senate Committee on the first, second, and third hearings to which I was
made in my letter to this Senate of May 2, 1950, in which I gave all the
reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot change
anything in those statements that I made because they represent the best
that I can do , to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has
nothing to do with the question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason
that you gave during the investigation for not revealing the name of the
person to whom you gave the P440,000 is not the same reason that you are
now alleging because during the investigation you told us: "I do not
remember his name." But, now, you are now saying: "My answer might
incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made
at the first, second, and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused
from answering the question. I beg to be excused from making any answer
that might be incriminating in nature. However, in this answer, if the detail of
not remembering the name of the person has not been included, it is an
oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do
you remember or not the name of the person to whom you gave the
P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person,
how can you say that your answer might be incriminating? If you do not
remember his name, you cannot answer the question; so how could your
answer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see
how to answer those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can
help me. I have no means of knowing what the situation is about. I have been
in jail 13 days without communication with the outside. How could I answer
the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of which I am
completely ignorant.
xxx xxx xxx
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.
The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very
clear. It does not incriminate the witness.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg
to be excused from making further answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to
the President of the Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you
cannot reveal the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000
because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable for
prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might render
yourself liable for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those
58
statements when you cannot even tell us whether that person to whom you
gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual ? We are giving
you this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that
your answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or you are just
trying to make a pretext for not revealing the information desired by the
Senate.
The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is
restated and explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and
signed it. That is all I can say how I stand about this letter. I have no
knowledge myself enough to write such a letter, so I had to secure the help
of a lawyer to help me in my period of distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to
show cause why he should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate,
Senator Sumulong propounded to the petitioner questions tending to elicit
information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he delivered
the P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not
remember. The President of the Senate then propounded to him various
questions concerning his past activities dating as far back as when witness
was seven years of age and ending as recently as the post liberation period,
all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the
President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information
from the witness, as follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory.
Answer: Did you deliver the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person,
that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of
the name of that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened
a short time ago and, on the other hand, you remember events that occurred
during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15
hereinabove quoted whereby the petitioner was committed to the custody of
the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have purged the
contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee
the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer
other pertinent questions in connection therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to
wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be
empowered and directed to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and
Buenavista Estates deal of October 21, 1949, more particularly to continue
the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the person to
whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May
18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and
prolonged consideration because it is the first of its kind to arise since the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was adopted. For the first time
this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of Congress to
punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that
our pronouncements here will set an important precedent for the future
guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it
necessary to lay down the general principles of law which form the
background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of
the Government in three independent but coordinate Departments —
Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative power is vested in the
Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(Section 1, Article VI.) Each house may determine the rules of its
proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly behavior, and, with the
concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member. (Section 10,
59
Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such
inferior courts as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the
Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision
empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for
contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United States the
legislative power is shared by and between the Congress of the United
States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different
States, on the other — the powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States,
respectively, or to the people — in the Philippines, the legislative power is
vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may therefore be said that
the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the
Congress of the United States or any State Legislature. Our form of
Government being patterned after the American system — the framers of our
Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices —
we can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in
interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in
other cases in the past. Although there is no provision in the Constitution
expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make
investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry —
with process to enforce it — is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is
intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself
possess the requisite information — which is not infrequently true —
recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown
that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain
vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the
Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power
to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton,
204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can be punished for contumacy as a
witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a matter into
which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L.
ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range
of legislative field than either the Congress of the United States or a State
Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the field of inquiry into which it
may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which the
subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in
this case. Suffice it to say that it must be coextensive with the range of the
legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee
created by it, to investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is
not challenged by the petitioner; and we entertain no doubt as to the
Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8
hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a questionable and allegedly
unnecessary and irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public
funds, of which Congress is the constitutional guardian. It also involved
government agencies created by Congress to regulate or even abolish. As a
result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has
recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the
Secretary of Justice or any other department head from discharging functions
and exercising powers other than those attached to his own office, without
]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near
relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening directly or
indirectly and in whatever capacity in transactions in which the Government
is a party, more particularly where the decision lies in the hands of executive
or administrative officers who are appointees of the President; and (3)
providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big landed
estates at a price of P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without
previous congressional confirmation.2
We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the
petitioner in support of his contention that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt
for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000,
because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any intended or
purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that
since the investigating committee has already rendered its report and has
made all its recommendations as to what legislative measures should be
taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to force the petitioner to
give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In
justice to Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of
suspicion that now pervades the public mind must be dissipated, and it can
only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate to compel Arnault
to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom
he gave the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely
establish the identity of that person . . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the
Committee, who appeared and argued the case for the respondents, denied
that that was the only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from
60
the witness. He said that the investigation had not been completed, because,
due to the contumacy of the witness, his committee had not yet determined
the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction as required by
Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered
and directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to continue its
examination of the witness regarding the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith; that the bills
recommended by his committee had not been approved by the House and
might not be approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that
those bills were not necessarily all the measures that Congress might deem
it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a
legislative body to make, we think the investigating committee has the power
to require a witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject
of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to
be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or
necessary to the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as
to legislate, or to expel a Member; and every question which the investigator
is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to
the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced
to answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the
inquiry. But from this it does not follow that every question that may be
propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or possible
legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined
by its direct relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is,
that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and the form and
character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the
information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a
fraction of such information elicited from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the
power of the Court is limited to determining whether the legislative body has
jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that once that jurisdiction is
conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is
insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question
propounded to the witness is not subject to review by this Court under the
principle of the separation of powers. We have to qualify this proposition. As
was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume
that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is
capable of being so construed, and we have no right to assume that the
contrary was intended." (People ex rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463;
52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the Supreme Court of
the United States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary
deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the
questions are not pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully
may refuse to answer. So we are of the opinion that where the alleged
immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a witness
is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass
upon the contention. The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the
power to make the inquiry would not preclude judicial intervention to correct a
clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the
resolution of the issue under consideration, we find that the question for the
refusal to answer which the petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is
pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be
disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by
the petitioner, requires the Special Committee, among other things, to
determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates
deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave
the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in
fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the
question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation
or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that it is
not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended
by the Committee as a result of the uncompleted investigation and that there
is no need for it to know the name of the person to whom the witness gave
the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been
approved by the lower house and by the President and that they may be
withdrawn or modified if after the inquiry is completed they should be found
unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent the Congress from
approving other measures it may deem necessary after completing the
investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to
determine or imagine what those measures may be. And our inability to do
so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by the Senate to the
witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here.
The inquiry there in question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate
and related to charges, published in the press, that senators were yielding to
corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the Senate and were
speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending
amendments to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers
61
dealing in the stock of the American Sugar Refining Company, appeared
before the committee in response to a subpoena and asked, among others,
the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or
securities, known as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly,
of any United Senate senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in
the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of
Congress for contempt of the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail
he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United States for a writ of habeas
corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in that case was whether the committee had the right to compel the
witness to answer said questions, and the Court held that the committee did
have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the
inquiry. The resolution directed the committee to inquire whether any senator
has been, or is, speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the
consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What the Senate might
or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we
called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as
contended in argument, but is plain that negative answers would have
cleared that body of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations,
while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part of the
Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the
deal is incumbent upon the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch.
But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for such assumption. The
petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that
resolution expressly requires the committee to determine the parties
responsible for the deal. We are bound to presume that the Senate has acted
in the due performance of its constitutional function in instituting the inquiry, if
the act is capable of being so construed. On the other hand, there is no
suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties
responsible for the deal. Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing
that the questioned transaction was affected by the head of the Department
of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of
First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the
parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall determined
those parties are and shall taken such measures as may be within its
competence to take the redress the wrong that may have been committed
against the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the
transaction involved no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That certainly is
a matter of a public concern which it is the duty of the constitutional guardian
of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of
legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called
relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be enforced by the
committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79 S.E., 670; 40
Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied
upon by the petitioner, is not applicable here. In that case the inquiry
instituted by the House of Representatives of the United States related to a
private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook
and Company had had an interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and
their estate was in course of administration in a federal bankruptcy court in
Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their creditors. The trustee in
the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the bankrupts'
interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination and
approval or disapproval by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors,
including the United States, were dissatisfied with the settlement. The
resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature
and history of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with
the amount of property involve, in which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested,
and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with power to send for
persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of the
United States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution
contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; that the matter was one
in respect of which no valid legislation could be had; that the bankrupts'
estate and the trustee's settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court;
and that the United States and other creditors were free to press their claims
in that proceeding. And on these grounds the court held that in undertaking
the investigation "the House of Representatives not only exceeded the limit
of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly
exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in
its nature clearly judicial." The principles announced and applied in that case
are: that neither House of Congress possesses a "general power of making
inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually
possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular
House has jurisdiction, and in respect of which it rightfully may take other
action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein relief or redress could be
62
had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of this power , but
must be left to the court, conformably to the constitutional separation of
government powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There
the court found that the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-
estate pool or partnership, was not within the jurisdiction of either House of
Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry, which
relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the
Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the
Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a creditor of Jay Cooke
and Company, which had had an interest in the pool, was pending
adjudication by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power on
the subject of the inquiry cannot be expected, as we have pointed out above,
until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties responsible are
and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to
take to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people
as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs.
Thompson has evoked strong criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts,
Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926], 74 U. Pa. L.
Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the
Congressional Power of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154,
214-220.) We quoted the following from Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr.
Justice Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by the House to secure to
the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the bankrupt concern. To
him it assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay
Cooke and Co., with the Government, acting through the House, attempting
to override the orderliness of established procedure and thereby prefer a
creditors' bill not before the courts but before Congress. That bankruptcy
proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and Co., in a
federal court gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was
seeking to oust a court of prior acquired jurisdiction by an extraordinary and
unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect of the
investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s
indebtedness and the particular funds in question were only part of the great
administrative problem connected with the use and disposition of public
monies, that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation to
the security demanded for all government deposits, that the facts connected
with one such default revealed the possibility of other and greater
maladministration, such considerations had not been put before the Court.
Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the particular
investigation and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose
exercise was customary and familiar in legislative practice. Instead of
assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the inquiry,
place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and
customary part of the legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative
purpose was thus made the demand of the court in Killbourn vs. Thompson.
But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be achieved. The power
of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for
abstract speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive
examination of the problem. Relationship, and not their possibilities,
determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality depends upon
such disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of legislative or
judicial power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the
Court can predict, prior to the event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243
U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The question there was whether the House of
Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for contempt of its
authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had
written, published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-
tempered and irritating letter respecting the action and purposes of the
committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand jury of alleged
illegal activities of a member of the House of Representatives. Power to
make inquires and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not involved.
The court recognized distinctly that the House of Representatives had
implied power to punish a person not a member for contempt, but held that
its action in this instance was without constitutional justification. The decision
was put on the ground that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not
calculated or likely to affect the House in any of its proceedings or in the
exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts and the
issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to
the present case. There the contempt involved consisted in the district
attorney's writing to the chairman of the committee an offensive and
vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal of
the witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which
the Senate has the power and jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was
recognized that the House of Representatives has implied power to punish a
person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is applicable here
in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's ) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority
to commit him for contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative
session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This contention is based on the
opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-
Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that
63
case it appears that on October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a
member of the House of Representatives while the latter was going to the
hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was then
about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to
attend the sessions on that day and those of the two days next following by
reason of the threats which Candido Lopez made against him. By the
resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared
guilty of contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by
confinement in Bilibid Prison for a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution
was not complied with because the session of the House of Representatives
adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the next
session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested,
whereupon he applied for the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First
Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon appeal to the
Supreme Court, six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street,
and Villa-real, on the ground that the term of imprisonment meted out to the
petitioner could not legally be extended beyond the session of the body in
which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns, Villamor, and Ostrand, on
the ground that the Philippine Legislature had no power to punish for
contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the
United States and not of a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice
Avanceña, Justice Johnson, and Justice Romualdez wrote separate
opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the
Legislature had inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from
the opinion that the order of commitment could only be executed during the
particular session in which the act of contempt was committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided
and no decisive pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice
Malcolm is based mainly on the following passage in the case of Anderson
vs. Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body
ceases to exist on the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It
follows that imprisonment must terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and
application of the two limitations which were expressly pointed out in
Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the power even when applied to
subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and such
imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which
the contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avanceña held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the
penalty is limited to the existence of the legislative body, which ceases to
function upon its final periodical dissolution. The doctrine refers to its
existence and not to any particular session thereof. This must be so,
inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the right which
the Legislature has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during
the existence of the legislative body. Many causes might be conceived to
constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would continue to be a menace
to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against which
contempt was committed.
If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while
the legislative body exercising it is in session, then that power and the
exercise thereof must perforce continue until the final adjournment and the
election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from
Cooley's Constitutional Limitations and from Jefferson's Manual, is to the
same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my opinion, where as in the
case before us, the members composing the legislative body against which
the contempt was committed have not yet completed their three-year term,
the House may take action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs.
Gordon relied upon by Justice Malcolm are obiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn
was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of
Representatives of the United States for assault and battery and false
imprisonment. The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House,
brought before the bar of the House, and reprimanded by the Speaker, and
then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of the penalty
was not involved in that case. The question there was "whether the House of
Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against
themselves, under any circumstances." The court there held that the House
of Representatives had the power to punish for contempt, and affirmed the
judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant. In Marshall vs. Gordon,
the question presented was whether the House had the power under the
Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a
vexatious letter as a contempt of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon
the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative power. The court held
that the House had no such power because the writing of the letter did not
obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not endanger the
64
preservation of the power of the House to carry out its legislative authority.
Upon that ground alone, and not because the House had adjourned, the
court ordered the discharge of the petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs.
Daugherty, supra. There it appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution
authorizing and directing a select committee of five senators to investigate
various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of
Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising
head. In the course of the investigation the committee caused to be served
on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M. Daugherty and president of the
Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a subpoena
commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony
relating to the subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear
without offering any excuse for his failure. The committee reported the matter
to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the President of the
Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or
his deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever
found, and to bring the said M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate,
then and there to answer such questions pertinent to the matter under inquiry
as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to
propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await the
further order of the Senate." Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the
federal court in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus. The federal court
granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the Senate, in
directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power
under the Constitution. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court of the United
States, one of the contentions of the witness was that the case ha become
moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee was
appointed during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926.
In overruling the contention, the court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's
authority to the period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was
changed by a later and amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to
sit at such times and places as it might deem advisable or necessary. It is
said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can continue any portion of itself
in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session without the
consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting
them commissioners for the particular purpose." But the context shows that
the reference is to the two houses of Parliament when adjourned by
prorogation or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the same with the
House of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a
single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a
continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so
divided into classes that the seats of one third only become vacant at the end
of each Congress, two thirds always continuing into the next Congress, save
as vacancies may occur through death or resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing
body, may continue its committees through the recess following the
expiration of a Congress;" and, after quoting the above statement from
Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate, however being a continuing body,
gives authority to its committees during the recess after the expiration of a
Congress." So far as we are advised the select committee having this
investigation in charge has neither made a final report nor been discharged;
nor has been continued by an affirmative order. Apparently its activities have
been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be this as it may, it is
certain that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to that
effect, and if, continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This being
so, and the Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have
become moot in the ordinary sense. The situation is measurably like that in
Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate Commerce Commission, 219 U. S.,
498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep., 279, where it was
held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission did not become moot through the expiration of the
order where it was capable of repetition by the Commission and was a matter
of public interest. Our judgment may yet be carried into effect and the
investigation proceeded with from the point at which it apparently was
interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these
circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as was done in the
case cited.
What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court
discharging the witness from custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a
continuing body whose members are elected for a term of six years and so
divided that the seats of only one-third become vacant every two years, two-
thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may
occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives
are all elected for a term of four years; so that the term of every Congress is
four years. The Second Congress of the Philippines was constituted on
December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The resolution of
the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first session of
the Second Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and
ended in May 18, 1950.
65
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of
Representatives, we think it could be enforced until the final adjournment of
the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find no sound reason
to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of
every session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence
of that body. The very reason for the exercise of the power to punish for
contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its constitutional
function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and
in practice are performed during recess by duly constituted committees
charged with the duty of performing investigations or conducting hearing
relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees the power
of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for
which that the power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the
power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the
Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the
periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives.
There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in
cases where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present
case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of
this proposition. The Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, which we have found it is within its
competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of
the refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions
pertinent to the subject of the inquiry. The Senate has empowered the
committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By refusing to
answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the
Senate of its legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove
the obstruction by compelling the witness to answer the questions thru
restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That power subsists
as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the
particular legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness
for contempt only during the session in which investigation was begun, would
be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its function but at the same
time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance.
Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt
terminates upon the adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to
resume the investigation at the next and succeeding sessions and repeat the
contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation is
completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should
be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the
power may be abusively and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might
keep the witness in prison for life. But we must assume that the Senate will
not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if, contrary
to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this
Court are always open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination.
He contends that he would incriminate himself if he should reveal the name
of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that person be a public
official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a
private individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and
slippery to afford him safety. At first he told the Committee that the
transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and that all requisites
had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused from making
answers "which might later be used against me." A little later he explained
that although the transactions were legal he refused to answer questions
concerning them "because it violates the right of a citizen to privacy in his
dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of
the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without
having to account for the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by
the Committee that his position was untenable, the witness testified that,
without securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain
person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction
made in 1946; that as far as he know, that certain person had nothing to do
with the negotiations for the settlement of the Buenavista and Tambobong
cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him the
P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again
two or three times, the last time being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the
person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age, between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5
feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the witness would not reveal the name of that
person on these pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he was a
representative of Burt." "I am not sure; I don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question,
what is the name of that person to whom you gave the P440,000? were
obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of the Senate that if he
should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that
66
he knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to
a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to
testify and is punishable as contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would
be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15, Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the
case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was called to
testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling
against six other men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said
men when they were arrested, he refused to answer two questions, claiming
so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of cards being
played on this particular evening at the table at which you are sitting?" (2)
"Was there a game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The
foreman of the grand jury reported the matter to the judge, who ruled "that
each and all of said questions are proper and that the answers thereto would
not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was again called and refused to
answer the first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration,
he said in response to the second question: "I don't know." In affirming the
conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United States among
other things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering
merely because they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The
wisdom of the rule in this regard is well illustrated by the enforced answer, "I
don't know ," given by Mason to the second question, after he had refused to
reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he
gave the P440,000 to a representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's
verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to sustain his claim that to
reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the
determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say
that the answer will incriminate him. as he is not the sole judge of his liability.
The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the
court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from
his general conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus
developed, it is the province of the court to determine whether a direct
answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact that the testimony of
a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-
incrimination, unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and
punishment for such violation. The witness cannot assert his privilege by
reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an imaginary danger,
or to secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to
answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill. App., 1939].) A witness is
not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an answer
might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that
question. (Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional
right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful
testimony before a competent authority. The state has the right to exact
fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under
the Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in
claiming constitutional rights and privileges but patently recreant to his duties
and obligations to the Government which protects those rights under the law.
When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and
one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the
former must give way to the latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred
that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may deprive him of it if he
violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr.
Justice Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows
may repine at the fate which awaits him, and yet it is not certain that the laws
under which he suffers were made for the security." Paraphrasing and
applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint
of his liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain
that the laws under which his liberty is restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so
ordered, with costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The estates deal which gave the petitioner's examination by a committee of
the Senate was one that aroused popular indignation as few cases of graft
and corruption have. The investigation was greeted with spontaneous
67
outburst of applause by an outraged citizenry, and the Senate was rightly
commended for making the lead in getting at the bottom of an infamous
transaction.
All the more necessary it is that we should approach the consideration of this
case with circumspection, lest the influence of strong public passions should
get the batter of our judgment. It is trite to say that public sentiment fades into
insignificance before a proper observance of constitutional processes, the
maintenance of the constitutional structure, and the protection of individual
rights. Only thus can a government of laws, the foundation stone of human
liberty, be strengthened and made secure for that very public.
It is with these thoughts in mind that, with sincere regret, I am constrained to
dissent.
The power of the legislative bodies under the American system of
government to punish for contempt was at the beginning totally denied by
some courts and students of constitutional law, on the ground that this power
is judicial in nature and belongs to the judiciary branch of the government
under the constitutional scheme. The point however is now settled in favor of
the existence of the power. This rule is based on the necessity for the
attainment of the ends for which legislative body is created. Nor can the
legitimacy of the purpose of the investigation which the Senate ordered in
this case be disputed. As a corollary, it was likewise legitimate and
necessary for the committee to summon the petitioner with a command to
produce his books and documents, and to commit him to prison for his
refusal or failure to obey the subpoena. And, finally, there is no question that
the arresting officers were fully justified in using necessary bodily force to
bring him before the bar of the Senate when he feigned illness and stalled for
time in the mistaken belief that after the closing of the then current session of
Congress he could go scot-free.
At the same time, there is also universal agreement that the power is not
absolute. The disagreement lies in the extent of the power, and such
disagreement is to be found even between decisions of the same court.
Anderson vs. Dunn, 6 Wheat., No. 204, may be said to have taken the most
liberal view of the legislature's authority and Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103
U.S. 168, which partly overruled and qualified the former, the strictest. By the
most liberal standard the power is restricted "by considerations as to the
nature of the inquiry, occasion, or action in connection with which the
contemptuous conduct has occurred." Punishment must be resorted to for
the efficient exercise of the legislative function. Even Anderson vs. Dunn
speaks of the power as "the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed."
Judged by any test, the question propounded to the witness does not, in my
opinion, meet the constitutional requirement. It is obvious, I think, that the
query has nothing to do with any matter within the cognizance of the
Congress. There is, on the contrary, positive suggestion that the question
has no relation to the contemplated legislation. The statement of the
committee in its report that the information sought to be obtained would clear
the names of the persons suspected of having received the money, is, on the
surface, the most or only plausible reason that can be advanced. Assuming
this to be the motive behind the question, yet little reflection will show that the
same is beyond the scope of legislative authority and prerogatives. It is
outside the concern of the Congress to protect the honor of particular citizens
except that of its own members' as a means of preserving respect and
confidence in that body. Moreover, the purported good intention must
assume, if it is to materialize, that the persons under suspicion are really
innocent; for if they are not and the witness will tell the truth, the result will be
to augment their disgrace rather than vindicate their honor. This is all the
more likely to happen because one of those persons, is judged from the
committee's findings, the most likely one, to say the least, who got the
money.
If the process of deduction is pressed further, the reasonable conclusion
seems to be that the object of the question is, to mention only one, to
prepare the way for a court action. The majority, decision indirectly admits or
insinuates this to be the case. It says, "It appearing that the questioned
transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it
is not reasonable to expect the fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila
will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for
the deal until and unless the Senate shall have determined who those parties
are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to
take, to redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people
as a result of the transaction." So here is an admission, implied if not
express, that the Senate wants the witness to give names because the fiscal
or the courts will not initiate an action against parties who should be
prosecuted. It is needless to say that the institution of a criminal or civil suit is
a matter that devolves upon other departments of the government, alien to
the duties of the Congress to look after.
The Congress is at full liberty, of course, to make any investigation for the
purpose of aiding the fiscal or the courts, but this liberty does not carry with it
the authority to imprison persons who refuse to testify.
In the intricacy and complexity of an investigation it is often impossible to
foretell before its close what relation certain facts may bear on the final
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results, and experience has shown that investigators and courts would do
well to veer on the liberal side in the resolution of doubtful questions. But the
Senate is not now in the midst of an inquiry with the situation still in a fluid or
tentative state. Now the facts are no longer confused. The committee has
finished its investigation and submitted its final report and the Senate has
approved a bill on the bases of the facts found. All the pertinent facts having
been gathered, as is to be inferred from that the report and the nature of the
Senate's action, every question, every fact, every bit of testimony has taken a
distinct meaning susceptible of concrete and definite evaluation; the task has
been reduced to the simple process of sifting the grain from the chaffs.
In the light of the committee's report and of the bill introduced and approved
in the Senate, it seems quite plain that the express naming of the recipient or
recipients of the money is entirely unessential to anything the Senate has a
right or duty to do in premises. Names may be necessary for the purpose of
criminal prosecution, impeachment or civil suit. In such proceedings,
identities are essential. In some legislative investigations it is important to
know the names of public officials involved. But the particular disclosure
sought of the petitioner here is immaterial to the proposed law. It is enough
for the Senate, for its own legitimate object, to learn how the Department of
Justice had in the purchase, and to have a moral conviction as to the identity
of the person who benefited thereby. The need for such legislation and
translated into the bill approved by the Senate is met by an insight into a
broad outline of the deal. To paraphrase the U.S. Supreme Court in
Anderson vs. Dunn, although the passage was used in another connection,
legislation is a science of experiment and the relation between the legislator
and the end does not have to be so direct as to strike the eye of the former.
One of the proposed laws have prohibits brothers and near relatives of any
president of the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly in
transactions in which the Government is a party. It is stated that this is
subject to change depending on the answer Arnault may give. This statement
is wide open to challenge.
If Arnault should Antonio Quirino it must be admitted that the bill would not be
altered. But let us suppose that the witness will point to another man. Will the
result be any different? Will the Senate recall the bill? I can not perceive the
slightest possibility of such eventuality. The pending bill was framed on the
assumption that Antonio Quirino was a party to the deal in question. As has
been said, the committee entertains a moral conviction that this brother of the
President was the recipient of a share of the proceeds of sale. No amount of
assurance by Arnault to the contrary would be believed for truth. And, I
repeat, the proposed legislation does not need for its justification legal
evidence of Antonio Quirino's intervention in the transaction.
All this in the first place. In the second place, it is not to be assumed that the
present bill is aimed solely against Antonio Quirino whose relation to the
Administration is but temporary. It is more reasonable to presume that the
proposed enactment is intended for all time and for all brothers of future
presidents, for in reality it is no more than an extension or enlargement of
laws already found in the statute book which guard against temptations to
exploit official positions or influence to the prejudice of public interests.
The disputed question is, in fact, not only irrelevant but moot. This is decisive
of the irrelevancy of this question. As has been noticed, the committee has
submitted its final report and recommendation, and a bill has been approved
by the Senate calculated to prevent recurrence of the anomalies exposed.
For the purpose for which it was instituted the inquiry is over and the
committee's mission accomplished.
It is true that the committee continues to sit during the recess of Congress,
but it is obvious from all the circumstances that the sole and real object of the
extension of the committee's sittings is to receive the witness' answer in the
event he capitulates. I am unable to see any new phase of the deal which the
Senate could legitimately wish to know, and the respondents and this Court
have not pointed out any. That the committee has not sat and nothing has
been done so far except to wait for Arnault's answer is a convincing
manifestation of the above conclusion.
The order "to continue its investigation" contained in Senate Resolution No.
16 cannot disguise the realities revealed by the Senate's actions already
referred to and by the emphasis given to the instruction "to continue its
(committee's) examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000." The instruction 'to continue the
investigation' is not entitled to the blind presumption that it embraces matters
other than the revelation by the witness of the name of the person who got
the money. Jurisdiction to deprive a citizen of liberty outside the usual
process is not acquired by innuendoes or vague assertions of the facts on
which jurisdiction is made to depend. If the judgment of the court of law of
limited jurisdiction does not enjoy the presumption of legality, much less can
the presumption of regularity be invoked for a resolution of a deliberative
body whose power to inflict punishment upon private citizens is wholly
derived by implication and vehemently contested by some judges. At any
rate, "the stronger presumption of innocence attends accused at the trial",
"and it is incumbent" upon the respondents "to show that the question
pertains to some matter under investigation." (Sinclair vs. U. S., 73 L. ed.,
693.) This rule stems from the fact that the power is in derogation of the
constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or
69
property without due process of law, which presupposes " a trial in which the
rights of the parties shall be decided by a tribunal appointed by law, which
tribunal is to governed by rules of law previously established." Powers so
dangerous to the liberty of a citizen can not be allowed except where the
pertinence is clear. A Judge who abuses such power may be impeached and
he acts at all times under the sense of this accountability and responsibility.
His victims may be reached by the pardoning power. But if the Congress be
allowed this unbounded jurisdiction of discretion, there is no redress, The
Congress may dispoil of a citizen's life, liberty or property and there is no
power on earth to stop its hand. There is, there can be, no such unlimited
power in any department of the government of the Republic. (Loan
Association vs. Topeka, 20 Wall, Nos. 662, 663; Taylor vs. Porter, 4 Hill No.
N.Y. 140.)
The above rule and discussion apply with equal force to the instruction to the
committee in the original resolution, "to determine the parties responsible for
the deal." It goes without saying that the congress cannot authorize a
committee to do what it itself cannot do. In other words, the` Senate could
not insist on the disclosure of Arnault's accomplice in the present state of the
investigation if the Senate were conducting the inquiry itself instead of
through a committee.
Our attention is called to the fact that "in the Philippines, the legislative power
is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone, and therefore that the
Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than the
Congress of the United States or any state legislature." From this premise
the inference is drawn that " the field of inquiry into it (Philippine Congress)
may enter is also wider."
This argument overlooks the important fact that congressional or legislative
committees both here and in the Unived States, do not embark upon fishing
expeditions in search of information which by chance may be useful to
legislation. Inquiries entrusted to congressional committee, whether here or
in the United States, are necessarily for specific objects within the
competence of the Congress to look into. I do not believe any reason, rule or
principle could be found which would sustain the theory that just because the
United States Congress or a state legislature could legislate on, say, only ten
subjects and the Philippine Congress on twenty, the latter's power to commit
to prison for contempt is proportionately as great as that of the former. In the
consideration of the legality of an imprisonment for the contempt by each
House, the power is gauged not be the greater or lesser number of subject
matters that fall within its sphere of action, but by the answer to the question,
has it jurisdiction over the matter under investigation? Bearing this distinction
in mind, it is apparent that the power of a legislature to punish for contempt
can be no greater nor less than that of any other. Were it possible for the
Philippine Senate and the United States Senate to undertake an investigation
of exactly identical anomalies in their respective departments of justice, could
it be asserted with any support of logic that one Senate has a wider authority
to imprison for contempt in such investigation simply because it has a "wider
range of legislative field?"
It is said that the Senate bill has not been acted upon by the lower house and
that even if it should pass in that chamber it would still have the President's
veto to hurdle. It has been expressly stated at the oral argument, and there is
insinuation in this Court's decision, that the revelation of the name or names
of the person or persons who received the money may help in convincing the
House of Representatives or the President of the wisdom of the pending
measure. Entirely apart from the discussion that the House of
Representatives and the Chief Executive have their own idea of what they
need to guide them in the discharge of their respective duties, and they have
the facilities of their own for obtaining the requisite data.
There is another objection, more fundamental, to the Senate invoking the
interest or convenience of the other House or the President as ground of
jurisdiction. The House of Representatives and the President are absolutely
independent of the Senate, in the conduct of legislative and administrative
inquiries, and the power of each House to imprison for contempt does not go
beyond the necessity for its own self-preservation or for making its express
powers effective. Each House exercises this power to protect or accomplish
its own authority and not that of the other House or the President. Each
House and the President are supposed to take care of their respective
affairs. The two Houses and the Chief Executive act separately although the
concurrence of the three is required in the passage of legislation and of both
Houses in the approval of resolutions. As the U.S. Supreme Court in Kilbourn
vs. Thompson, said, "No general power of inflicting punishment by the
Congress (as distinct from a House is found in the Constitution." "An act of
Congress — it said — which proposed to adjudge a man guilty of a crime
and inflict the punishment, will be considered by all thinking men to be
unauthorized by the Constitution."
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra, it is said can not be relied on in this case as a
precedent because, so it is also said, "the subject of the inquiry, which
related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the
jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here it is not disputed that the
subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable
expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the
Jurisdiction of the Senate." Yet the remarks of Judge Land is which are
quoted in the majority decision point out that the inquiry "was a normal and
70
customary part of the legislative process." Moreover, Kilbourn vs. Thompson there is a limit to the legislative power to punish for contempt. The limit is set
is important, not for the matter it treated but for the principles it enunciated. in Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge Land is approved — "the least possible
power adequate to the end proposed."
It is also said that Kilbourn vs. Thompson did not meet with universal
approval as Judge Land is' article above mentioned shows. The jurist who
delivered the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Miller, was one of the "giants"
who have ever sat on the Supreme Federal Bench, venerated and eminent
for the width and depth of his learning. Subsequent decisions, as far as I
have been able to ascertain, have not rejected or criticized but have followed
it, and it still stands as a landmark in this branch of constitutional law.

If we can lean on private opinions and magazine articles for comfort, the
petitioner can cite one by a legal scholar and author no less reknown and
respected than Judge Land is. I refer to Judge Wigmore who, referring to an
investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice said in an article published in
19 (1925) Illinois Law Review, 452:

The senatorial debauch of investigations — poking into political garbage

cans and dragging the sewers of political intrigue — filled the winter of 1923-
24 with a stench which has not yet passed away. Instead of employing the
constitutional, manly, fair procedure of impeachment, the Senate flung self-
respect and fairness to the winds. As a prosecutor, the Senate presented a
spectacle which cannot even be dignified by a comparison with the
persecutive scoldings of Coke and Scroggs and Jeffreys, but fell rather in
popular estimate to the level of professional searchers of the municipal
dunghills.

It is far from my thought to subscribe to this vituperation as applied to our

Senate. Certainly, this august body said not only do the right thing but is
entitled to the lasting gratitude of the people for taking the courageous stand
it did in probing into an anomaly that robbed a depleted treasury of a huge
amount. I have tried to make it clear that my disagreement with the majority
lies not in the propriety or constitutionality of the investigation but in the
pertinence to that investigation of a single question. The investigation, as had
been said, was legal and commendable. My objection is that the Senate
having started within the bounds of its authority, has, in entire good faith,
overstepped those bounds and trespassed on a territory reserved to other
branches of the government, when it imprisoned a witness for contumacy on
a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and irrelevant, let alone
moot.

Thus understood, this humble opinion does not conflict with the views of
Judge Land is and all other advocates of wide latitude for congressional
investigations. All are agreed, and the majority accept the proposition, that

71
 DIGEST
OZAETA, J.:
I. THE FACTS
The Senate investigated the purchase by the government of two
parcels of land, known as Buenavista and Tambobong estates. An
intriguing question that the Senate sought to resolve was the apparent
irregularity of the government’s payment to one Ernest Burt, a non-resident
American citizen, of the total sum of Php1.5 million for his alleged interest
in the two estates that only amounted to Php20,000.00, which he seemed
to have forfeited anyway long before. The Senate sought to determine who
were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the
expense of the government.
Petitioner Jean Arnault, who acted as agent of Ernest Burt in the
subject transactions, was one of the witnesses summoned by the Senate
to its hearings. In the course of the investigation, the petitioner repeatedly
refused to divulge the name of the person to whom he gave the amount of
Php440,000.00, which he withdrew from the Php1.5 million proceeds
pertaining to Ernest Burt.
Arnault was therefore cited in contempt by the Senate and
was committed to the custody of the Senate Sergeant-at-Arms for
imprisonment until he answers the questions. He thereafter filed a petition
for habeas corpus directly with the Supreme Court questioning the validity
of his detention.
II. THE ISSUE
1. Did the Senate have the power to punish the petitioner for contempt for
refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
Php440,000.00?
2. Did the Senate have the authority to commit petitioner for contempt for a
term beyond its period of legislative session?
3. May the petitioner rightfully invoke his right against self-incrimination?
III. THE RULING
[The Court DENIED the petition for habeas corpus filed by Arnault.]
1. Yes, the Senate had the power to punish the petitioner for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he
gave the Php440,000.00.
Although there is no provision in the [1935] Constitution expressly
investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and
exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions as
to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry – with process to enforce
it – is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A
legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to
effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information – which is not infrequently true – recourse must
be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that mere
requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that
information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed.
xxx xxx xxx
[W]e find that the question for the refusal to answer which the
petitioner was held in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter
under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be disputed. Senate Resolution
No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires the
Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties
responsible for the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, and it is
obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave the
P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination — it is in
fact the very thing sought to be determined. The contention is not that the
question is impertinent to the subject of the inquiry but that it has no relation
or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated that
it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation;
what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
xxx xxx xxx
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the
range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the proposed testimony of the
witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its process may be
enforced by the committee by imprisonment.
72
 protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination, unless he
2. YES, the Senate had the authority to commit petitioner for is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation.
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session. The witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for
protection against an imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third
We find no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body person.
to punish for contempt to the end of every session and not to the end of
the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason for It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and
the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative circumstances of the case whether the witness is justified in refusing to
body to perform its constitutional function without impediment or answer. A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own
declaration that an answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial
obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice are performed
judge to decide that question.
during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of
performing investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed
legislation. To deny to such committees the power of inquiry with process
to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the power
is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate
auxiliary to is legislative function. It is but logical to say that the power of
self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be preserved.

But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by

the Senate, which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist
upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress . . . There is no limit as to
time to the Senate’s power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.

3. NO, the petitioner may NOT rightfully invoke his right

against self-incrimination.

Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal,

and that he gave the [P440,000.00] to a representative of Burt in
compliance with the latter’s verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which
to sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate
him. There is no conflict of authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:

Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the

determination of the Court. At least, it is not enough for the witness to say that
the answer will incriminate him as he is not the sole judge of his liability. The
danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real to the court, from
all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is
the province of the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question
may criminate or not. . . The fact that the testimony of a witness may tend to
show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to entitle him to claim the

73
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY v. COMELEC Justice Robert A. Jackson

Republic of the Philippines West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette[1]

Supreme Court

Baguio City

One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY G.R. No. 190582
represented herein by its Chair, that others may make different choices choices we would not make for
DANTON REMOTO, ourselves, choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or
Petitioner, Present:
offend or anger us. However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely
PUNO, C. J., because they are different, and the right to disagree and debate about
CARPIO,
CORONA,
important questions of public policy is a core value protected by our Bill of
CARPIO MORALES, Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine recognition of, and respect
VELASCO, JR., for, diversity and difference in opinion.
NACHURA,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
- versus - BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN, Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about
DEL CASTILLO, the definitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
convictions are concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is
PEREZ, and an insurmountable goal. Yet herein lies the paradox philosophical
MENDOZA, JJ. justifications about what is moral are indispensable and yet at the same time
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Promulgated: powerless to create agreement. This Court recognizes, however, that
Respondent. April 8, 2010 practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates; accommodation
x--------------------------------------------- is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This will allow
persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at
-----------x least, civilly.

x------------------------------------------------------- Factual Background

-x

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
... [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, filed by Ang Ladlad
LGBT Party (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009[2] (the First Assailed
Resolution) and December 16, 2009[3] (the Second Assailed Resolution) in
SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the Assailed Resolutions). The case has
its roots in the COMELECs refusal to accredit Ang Ladlad as a party-list
organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known as the
Party-List System Act.[4]

74

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify
themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals
(LGBTs). Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad first applied for registration with
the COMELEC in 2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the
ground that the organization had no substantial membership base. On
August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again filed a Petition[5] for registration with the
COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged
because of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are
victims of exclusion, discrimination, and violence; that because of negative
societal attitudes, LGBTs are constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and
that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by this Court
in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections.[6] Ang
Ladlad laid out its national membership base consisting of individual
members and organizational supporters, and outlined its platform of
governance.[7]
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioners evidence, the
COMELEC (Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds,
stating that:
x x x This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner defines the
Filipino Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
x x x a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly
disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
x x x refers to a persons capacity for profound emotional, affectional and
sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender.
This definition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner
tolerates immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul
wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women
did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise
also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving
in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women ye are indeed a
people transgressing beyond bounds. (7.81) And we rained down on them a
shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who indulged in
sin and crime! (7:84) He said: O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who
do mischief (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated
October 2, 2008:
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in
the Petitions par. 6F: Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and
lesbians who are already of age. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the
history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,
relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be
complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which defines
nuisance as Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which x x x (3) shocks, defies; or disregards
decency or morality x x x
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they may
deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Art 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy are inexistent and void from the
beginning.
75
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and
indecent shows. The penalty of prision mayor or a fine ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and fine,
shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their knowledge in
any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the owners/operators of
the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place, exhibit
indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being understood that
the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows,
whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue hereof, shall include
those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes; (2) serve no other
purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or pornography; (3) offend
any race or religion; (4) tend to abet traffic in and use of prohibited drugs;
and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals, good customs, established
policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit films, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating
immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it or any
of its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply
with laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections.
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing
our youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our
faith. Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in
one article that older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth. As an
agency of the government, ours too is the States avowed duty under Section
13, Article II of the Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual
degradation.[8]
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration,[9] three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y.
Larrazabal, Rene V. Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three
commissioners voted to deny Ang Ladlads Motion for Reconsideration
(Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N. Tagle, and Elias R.
Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for the
majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating
that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list
system. Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation
and marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlads expressed sexual
orientations per se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the
party-list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable
Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors,
organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies
but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the
House of Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative
organizations would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that
is not the intention of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a
tool to advocate tolerance and acceptance of misunderstood persons or
groups of persons. Rather, the party-list system is a tool for the realization of
aspirations of marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nations
only that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation
because of their under representation. Until the time comes when Ladlad is
able to justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender
identities is beneficial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the
party-list system will remain just that.
II. No substantial differentiation
In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine
jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and
bisexuals (LGBT) as a special class of individuals. x x x Significantly, it has
also been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected
76
fundamental right, and that nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a
comparable intent to protect or promote the social or legal equality of
homosexual relations, as in the case of race or religion or belief.
xxxx
Thus, even if societys understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBTs is
elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males
and females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike.
xxxx
IV. Public Morals
x x x There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim
religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious
groups moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral
parameters and precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are
possibly religious-based, but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its
more than 500 years of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some
moral precepts espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and
these are not publicly accepted moral norms.
V. Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the
land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision
mayor upon Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly
contrary to public morals. It penalizes immoral doctrines, obscene
publications and exhibition and indecent shows. Ang Ladlad apparently falls
under these legal provisions. This is clear from its Petitions paragraph 6F:
Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are
already of age It is further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for
the record: In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines
were estimated as 670,000. Moreoever, Article 694 of the Civil Code defines
nuisance as any act, omission x x x or anything else x x x which shocks,
defies or disregards decency or morality x x x. These are all unlawful.[10]
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court
annul the Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang
Ladlads application for accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex
parte of a preliminary mandatory injunction against the COMELEC, which
had previously announced that it would begin printing the final ballots for the
May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) to
file its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of
January 11, 2010.[11] Instead of filing a Comment, however, the OSG filed a
Motion for Extension, requesting that it be given until January 16, 2010 to
Comment.[12] Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG later filed a Comment in
support of petitioners application.[13] Thus, in order to give COMELEC the
opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to file its own
comment.[14] The COMELEC, through its Law Department, filed its
Comment on February 2, 2010.[15]
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing
until further orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and
desist from implementing the Assailed Resolutions.[16]
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) filed a
Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its
Comment-in-Intervention.[17] The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlads
petition on moral grounds violated the standards and principles of the
Constitution, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19,
2010, we granted the CHRs motion to intervene.
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. filed his Motion to
Intervene[18] which motion was granted on February 2, 2010.[19]
The Parties Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees
against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the
Assailed Resolutions contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom
of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as constituted
violations of the Philippines international obligations against discrimination
based on sexual orientation.
77

The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlads petition and argued that the
COMELEC erred in denying petitioners application for registration since there
was no basis for COMELECs allegations of immorality. It also opined that
LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns which should have
been recognized by the COMELEC as a separate classification. However,
insofar as the purported violations of petitioners freedom of speech,
expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained that there
had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a
concrete and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that
the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the
first time that the LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the
Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful statements in
its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification
reports by COMELECs field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlads application for registration on the
ground that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and
RA 7941, nor is it associated with or related to any of the sectors in the
enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands
for the proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law
or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered under the party-list
system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections,[20] the enumeration of marginalized and under-
represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members
and affiliate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon verification by its
field personnel, it was shown that save for a few isolated places in the
country, petitioner does not exist in almost all provinces in the country.[21]
This argument that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when
it alleged its national existence is a new one; previously, the COMELEC
claimed that petitioner was not being truthful when it said that it or any of its
nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections. Nowhere was this ground
for denial of petitioners accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the
Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is quite curious, considering that the
reports of petitioners alleged non-existence were already available to the
COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution. At best, this
is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondents theory, and a serious violation of petitioners right to procedural
due process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory
perusal of Ang Ladlads initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in
each province of the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT
community in the Philippines was estimated to constitute at least 670,000
persons; that it had 16,100 affiliates and members around the country, and
4,044 members in its electronic discussion group.[22] Ang Ladlad also
represented itself to be a national LGBT umbrella organization with affiliates
around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:
Abra Gay Association
Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB) Aklan
Albay Gay Association
Arts Center of Cabanatuan City Nueva Ecija
Boys Legion Metro Manila
Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
Cant Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC) Metro Manila
Cebu Pride Cebu City
78
 Circle of Friends
Dipolog Gay Association Zamboanga del Norte
Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality
(GALANG) Metro Manila
Gay Mens Support Group (GMSG) Metro Manila
Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS) Lanao del Norte
Iloilo City Gay Association Iloilo City
Kabulig Writers Group Camarines Sur
Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
LUMINA Baguio City
Marikina Gay Association Metro Manila
Metropolitan Community Church (MCC) Metro Manila
Naga City Gay Association Naga City
ONE BACARDI
Order of St. Aelred (OSAe) Metro Manila
PUP LAKAN
RADAR PRIDEWEAR
Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc. Metro Manila
San Jose del Monte Gay Association Bulacan
Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family Rizal
Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP) Metro
Manila
Soul Jive Antipolo, Rizal
The Link Davao City
Tayabas Gay Association Quezon
Womens Bisexual Network Metro Manila
Zamboanga Gay Association Zamboanga City[23]
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or
LADLAD LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no
presence in any of these regions. In fact, if COMELECs findings are to be
believed, petitioner does not even exist in Quezon City, which is registered
as Ang Ladlads principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we find that Ang Ladlad has sufficiently demonstrated
its compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside
from COMELECs moral objection and the belated allegation of non-
existence, nowhere in the records has the respondent ever found/ruled that
Ang Ladlad is not qualified to register as a party-list organization under any
of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani. The
difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlads morality, or lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to Accept Ang Ladlads Petition for
Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is
government neutrality in religious matters.[24] Clearly, governmental reliance
on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.[25] We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the
COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to justify the exclusion of Ang
Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed
Resolutions should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to
advance some justification for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious
doctrine. Otherwise stated, government must act for secular purposes and in
ways that have primarily secular effects. As we held in Estrada v.
Escritor:[26]
79
x x x The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may influence the civil public order but public
moral disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular
terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating
public policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require
conformity to what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The
non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of
conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion,"
anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its actions
upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full
religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose
beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose.
That is, the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or
dangerous) to those conditions upon which depend the existence and
progress of human society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the
beliefs of one religion or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments
based on religion might have a compelling influence on those engaged in
public deliberations over what actions would be considered a moral
disapprobation punishable by law. After all, they might also be adherents of a
religion and thus have religious opinions and moral codes with a compelling
influence on them; the human mind endeavors to regulate the temporal and
spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner, harmonizing earth with
heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian or Aquinian or
utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and discernible
secular purpose and justification to pass scrutiny of the religion clauses. x x x
Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating influence
of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion clauses
prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but
at the same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent
possible within flexible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality
contemplated by laws is secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it does not offend
compelling state interests.[27]
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny Ang Ladlads Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of
homosexuality and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long
been transplanted into generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC
argues:
Petitioners accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group
consists of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people
especially the youth. Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which
believes that there is nothing wrong in having sexual relations with
individuals of the same gender is a bad example. It will bring down the
standard of morals we cherish in our civilized society. Any society without a
set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own existence.[28]
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal
disapproval. It is not difficult to imagine the reasons behind this censure
religious beliefs, convictions about the preservation of marriage, family, and
procreation, even dislike or distrust of homosexuals themselves and their
perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the Philippines has not seen
fit to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore, these generally
accepted public morals have not been convincingly transplanted into the
realm of law.[29]
The Assailed Resolutions have not identified any specific overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that there should have
been a finding by the COMELEC that the groups members have committed
or are committing immoral acts.[30] The OSG argues:
x x x A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of
a different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not
translate to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action.
Reduction ad absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC
would have its hands full of disqualification cases against both the straights
and the gays. Certainly this is not the intendment of the law.[31]
80
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be
prevented, or why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the
COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioners admission into
the party-list system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral
fabric of society. We, of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly
without authority to regulate matters concerning morality, sexuality, and
sexual relations, and we recognize that the government will and should
continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to society. Nonetheless,
we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the loftiest of
intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this,
the notion of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation
of morality will not remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal
and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil
Code defines a nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of
property, or anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or
morality, the remedies for which are a prosecution under the Revised Penal
Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial
proceedings.[32] A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the
other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot
replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial
determination of liability or culpability.
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient
governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation
in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely
moral grounds amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of
homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial public interest.
Respondents blanket justifications give rise to the inevitable conclusion that
the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as a class, not because of
any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective targeting that
implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which
provides nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws, courts
have never interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on
classification. Equality, said Aristotle, consists in the same treatment of
similar persons.[33] The equal protection clause guarantees that no person
or class of persons shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is
enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and in like
circumstances.[34]
Recent jurisprudence has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the
classification as long as it bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
government end.[35] In Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Banko
Sentral ng Pilipinas,[36] we declared that [i]n our jurisdiction, the standard of
analysis of equal protection challenges x x x have followed the rational basis
test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and
unequivocal breach of the Constitution.[37]
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes
sufficient reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent,
the Philippine electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to
criminalize homosexual behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual
behavior. Indeed, even if we were to assume that public opinion is as the
COMELEC describes it, the asserted state interest here that is, moral
disapproval of an unpopular minority is not a legitimate state interest that is
sufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal protection clause.
The COMELECs differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that Ang
Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would benefit
the nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or
dislike for a disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on
the same basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in
this case is equally burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should
apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and under-represented
sectors.
It bears stressing that our finding that COMELECs act of differentiating
LGBTs from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does
not imply that any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and
homosexuals under different circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree
with the OSGs position that homosexuals are a class in themselves for the
purposes of the equal protection clause.[38] We are not prepared to single
out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special or differentiated
81
treatment. We have not received sufficient evidence to this effect, and it is
simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups
similarly situated, and that the COMELEC made an unwarranted and
impermissible classification not justified by the circumstances of the case.
Freedom of Expression and Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda
and attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal
democratic means.[39] It is in the public square that deeply held convictions
and differing opinions should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in
Estrada v. Escritor:[40]
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is
distilled in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every
prejudice, every aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the
public square where people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens
are the bearers of opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing
religious belief, and these citizens have equal access to the public square. In
this representative democracy, the state is prohibited from determining which
convictions and moral judgments may be proposed for public deliberation.
Through a constitutionally designed process, the people deliberate and
decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in this democratic governance.
Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments is finally crystallized into
law, the laws will largely reflect the beliefs and preferences of the majority,
i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless, in the very act of
adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it specifies including
protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small not
only for a majority, however large but for each of us" the majority imposes
upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it otherwise
could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a
democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are
favorably received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any
restriction imposed in this sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim
pursued. Absent any compelling state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or
this Court to impose its views on the populace. Otherwise stated, the
COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech for no better reason
than promoting an approved message or discouraging a disfavored one.
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual
conduct is not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions
concerning ones homosexuality and the activity of forming a political
association that supports LGBT individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public
morality does not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct.[41] European and
United Nations judicial decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants
on both privacy and equality grounds, citing general privacy and equal
protection provisions in foreign and international texts.[42] To the extent that
there is much to learn from other jurisdictions that have reflected on the
issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly illuminating. These
foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts, may
nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Courts analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to
expressive conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular
expression of opinion, public institutions must show that their actions were
caused by something more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and
unpleasantness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.[43]
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and
beliefs, in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may
campaign for a change in the law or the constitutional structures of a state if
it uses legal and democratic means and the changes it proposes are
consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has emphasized that
political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization is
advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of
expression through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas
may seem shocking or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the
population.[44] A political group should not be hindered solely because it
seeks to publicly debate controversial political issues in order to find
solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned.[45] Only if a political
party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association
guarantee.[46]
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even defiant. They are entitled to hold
and express that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all
likelihood, believe with equal fervor that relationships between individuals of
the same sex are morally equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too,
are entitled to hold and express that view. However, as far as this Court is
82
concerned, our democracy precludes using the religious or moral views of
one part of the community to exclude from consideration the values of other
members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for
gay rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight
the discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the
more complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public
opinion, even at its most liberal, reflect a clear-cut strong consensus
favorable to gay rights claims and we neither attempt nor expect to affect
individual perceptions of homosexuality through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor
subsequent punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not
been deprived of their right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no
restriction on their freedom of expression or association. The OSG argues
that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly
denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the
qualifications of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the
party-list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a
transgression of Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxxx
A denial of the petition for registration x x x does not deprive the members of
the petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote
will not be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a
constitutionally-guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends
that the denial of Ang Ladlads petition has the clear and immediate effect of
limiting, if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and
equally participate in public life through engagement in the party list
elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public office is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. x x x[47]
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its
qualifications to participate in the party-list system, and as advanced by the
OSG itself the moral objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation
imposed by law. To the extent, therefore, that the petitioner has been
precluded, because of COMELECs action, from publicly expressing its views
as a political party and participating on an equal basis in the political process
with other equally-qualified party-list candidates, we find that there has,
indeed, been a transgression of petitioners fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically
in its attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For
individuals and groups struggling with inadequate structural and
governmental support, international human rights norms are particularly
significant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic legal systems so
that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to
protect and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the
principle of non-discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral
participation, enunciated in the UDHR and the ICCPR.
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as
follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any
discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall
prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of
general application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons,
regardless of sexual orientation. Although sexual orientation is not
specifically enumerated as a status or ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of
the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee has opined that the
reference to sex in Article 26 should be construed to include sexual
orientation.[48] Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under
various international agreements.[49]
83
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:
Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing
the free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right
to electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its
General Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to
Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every
citizen to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be
elected and the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of
constitution or government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt
such legislative and other measures as may be necessary to ensure that
citizens have an effective opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25
lies at the core of democratic government based on the consent of the
people and in conformity with the principles of the Covenant.
xxxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for
elective office ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as
minimum age, must be justifiable on objective and reasonable criteria.
Persons who are otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be
excluded by unreasonable or discriminatory requirements such as education,
residence or descent, or by reason of political affiliation. No person should
suffer discrimination or disadvantage of any kind because of that person's
candidacy. States parties should indicate and explain the legislative
provisions which exclude any group or category of persons from elective
office.[50]
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines international law obligations,
the blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills.
We refer now to the petitioners invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the
Application of International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity),[51] which petitioner declares to reflect
binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations
and obligations outlined in said Principles which are not reflective of the
current state of international law, and do not find basis in any of the sources
of international law enumerated under Article 38(1) of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice.[52] Petitioner has not undertaken any objective
and rigorous analysis of these alleged principles of international law to
ascertain their true status.
We also hasten to add that not everything that society or a certain segment
of society wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an
arbitrary human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will.
It is unfortunate that much of what passes for human rights today is a much
broader context of needs that identifies many social desires as rights in order
to further claims that international law obliges states to sanction these
innovations. This has the effect of diluting real human rights, and is a result
of the notion that if wants are couched in rights language, then they are no
longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles,
consisting of a declaration formulated by various international law professors,
are at best de lege ferenda and do not constitute binding obligations on the
Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international law is
characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of
84
principles that promote international cooperation, harmony, and respect for
human rights, most of which amount to no more than well-meaning desires,
without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.[53]

As a final note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented
by this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in flux, even the
psychiatric and religious communities are divided in opinion. This Courts role
is not to impose its own view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the
Constitution and laws as best as it can, uninfluenced by public opinion, and
confident in the knowledge that our democracy is resilient enough to
withstand vigorous debate.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions of the

Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009
in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE. The Commission on
Elections is directed to GRANT petitioners application for party-list
accreditation.

SO ORDERED.

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified

that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court.

REYNATO S. PUNO

Chief Justice

85
DIGEST

Facts:

Comelec refused to recognize Ang Ladlad LGBT Party, an organization

composed of men and women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays,
bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs),as a party list based on
moral grounds. In the elevation of the case to the Supreme Court, Comelec
alleged that petitioner made misrepresentation in their application.

Issue:

Whether or not Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualifies for registration as party-list.

Ruling:

Ang Ladlad LGBT Party’s application for registration should be granted.

Comelec’s citation of the Bible and the Koran in denying petitioner’s

application was a violation of the non-establishment clause laid down in
Article 3 section 5 of the Constitution. The proscription by law relative to acts
against morality must be for a secular purpose (that is, the conduct prohibited
or sought to be repressed is “detrimental or dangerous to those conditions
upon which depend the existence and progress of human society"), rather
than out of religious conformity. The Comelec failed to substantiate their
allegation that allowing registration to Ladlad would be detrimental to society.

The LGBT community is not exempted from the exercise of its

constitutionally vested rights on the basis of their sexual orientation. Laws of
general application should apply with equal force to LGBTs, and they
deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as other
marginalized and under-represented sectors. Discrimination based on sexual
orientation is not tolerated ---not by our own laws nor by any international
laws to which we adhere.

86