Barredo v.
Garcia Whether or not there can be an independent civil action for damages to
At about 1:30am on May 3, 1936, Fontanilla’s taxi collided with a
“kalesa” thereby killing the 16 year old Faustino Garcia. Faustino’s
parents filed a criminal suit against Fontanilla and reserved their right
to file a separate civil suit. Fontanilla was eventually convicted. After
the criminal suit, Garcia filed a civil suit against Barredo – the owner of
the taxi (employer of Fontanilla). The suit was based on Article 1903 of
the civil code (negligence of employers in the selection of their
employees). Barredo assailed the suit arguing that his liability is only
subsidiary and that the separate civil suit should have been filed
against Fontanilla primarily and not him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Barredo is just subsidiarily liable.
HELD: No. He is primarily liable under Article 1903 which is a separate
civil action against negligent employers. Garcia is well within his rights
in suing Barredo. He reserved his right to file a separate civil action and
this is more expeditious because by the time of the SC judgment
Fontanilla is already serving his sentence and has no property. It was
also proven that Barredo is negligent in hiring his employees because
it was shown that Fontanilla had had multiple traffic infractions already
before he hired him – something he failed to overcome during hearing.
Had Garcia not reserved his right to file a separate civil action, Barredo
would have only been subsidiarily liable. Further, Barredo is not being
sued for damages arising from a criminal act (his driver’s negligence)
but rather for his own negligence in selecting his employee (Article
1903).
Cinco v. Canonoy
FACTS:
Petitioner filed a complaint in the City Court for recovery of damages on
account of a vehicular accident involving his car and a jeepney driven by
respondent Romeo Hilot and operated by respondents Valeriana Pepito and
Carlos Pepito. Subsequently, a criminal case was filed against the driver. At
the pre-trial of the civil case counsel for the respondents moved for the
suspension of the civil action pending determination of the criminal case
invoking Section 3(b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The City Court
granted the motion and ordered the suspension of the civil case. Petitioner
elevated the matter on certiorari to the Court of First
Instance, alleging that the City Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion in
suspending the civil action for being contrary to law and jurisprudence. The
Court of First Instance dismissed the petition; hence, this petition to review
on certiorari.
ISSUE:
property during the pendency of the criminal action.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that an action for damages based on Articles 2176
and 2180 of the New Civil Code is quasi-delictual in character which can be
prosecuted independently of the criminal action.Where the plaintiff made
essential averments in the complaint that it was the driver's fault or
negligence in the operation of the jeepney which caused the collision
between his automobile and said jeepney; that plaintiff sustained damages
because of the collision; that a direct causal connection exists
between the damage he suffered and the fault or negligence of the defendant-
driver and where the defendant-operator in their answer, contended, among
others, that they observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of
their employees, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict , such
action is principally predicated
on Articles 32176 and 2180 of the New Civil Code which is quasi-delictual
in nature and character. Liability being predicated on quasi-delict , the civil
case may proceed as a separate and independent court action as specifically
provided for in Article 2177. Section 3 (b), Rule 111 of the Rules of Court
refers to "other civil actions arising from cases not included in Section 2 of
the same rule" in which, "once the criminal action has been commenced, no
civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted and the same
shall be suspended in whatever stage
it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered". The civil action referred to in Section 2(a) and 3(b), Rule 11 of
the Rules of Court which should be suspended after the criminal action has
been instituted is that arising from the criminal offense and not the civil
action based on quasi delict.
The concept of quasi-delict enunciated in Article 2176 of the New Civil
Code is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but also damage
to property. It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one
hand and "damage to property" on the other. The word "damage" is used in
two concepts: the "harm" done and "reparation" for the harm done. And with
respect to "harm" it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries.
An example of quasi-delict in the law itself
which includes damage to property in Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code
which holds proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke
which may be harmful "to person or property". Respondent Judge gravely
abused his discretion in upholding the decision of the city court
suspending the civil action based on quasi-delict until after the criminal
action is finally terminated.

Garcia v. Florido
Applicable: Elements of Quasi-Delict (Torts and Damages)
FACTS:
 August 4, 1971: German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis
Occidental Hospital, his wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester
Francisco, bookkeeper of the hospital, hired and boarded a
PU car owned and operated by Marcelino Inesin, and driven
by respondent, Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from
Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City for the purpose of
attending a conference
 August 4, 1971 9:30 a.m.: While the PU car was negotiating
a slight curve on the national highway at 21 km, it collided
with an oncoming passenger bus owned and operated by the
Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and driven by Pedro Tumala
 Garcia et al. sustained various physical injuries which
necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization
 Garcia et al. filed an action for damages against both drivers
and their owners for driving in a reckless, grossly negligent
and imprudent manner in gross violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard
the PU car
 RTC: Dismissed the case because it is not quasi-delict
because there is a violation of law or traffic rules or
regulations for excessive speeding
ISSUE: W/N Garcia et al. can still file a civil action for quasi-
delict despite having a criminal action.
HELD: YES. decision appealed reversed and set aside, and
the court a quo is directed to proceed with the trial of the
case
 essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under
Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present,
namely:
 a) act or omission of the private respondents
 b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in
the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by Pedro Tumala
resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car
 c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by as a
result of the collision
 d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage
or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private
respondents
 e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between
the parties
 violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of
said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of
others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which
the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in
the injury on petitioners
 petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted
by the Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala,
much less has the said criminal action been terminated
either by conviction or acquittal of said accused
 It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present
civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the
criminal case, and have opted instead to recover them in the
present civil case
 petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene
therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need
not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of
the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure
of the offended party to do so does not bar him from
bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the
case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's
order of dismissal
Baksh v. CA
In August 1986, while working as a waitress in Dagupan City, Pangasinan,
Marilou Gonzales, then 21 years old, met Gashem Shookat Baksh, a 29 year
old exchange student from Iran who was studying medicine in Dagupan. The
two got really close and intimate. On Marilou’s account, she said that Gashem
later offered to marry her at the end of the semester. Marilou then introduced
Gashem to her parents where they expressed their intention to get married.
Marilou’s parents then started inviting sponsors and relatives to the wedding.
They even started looking for animals to slaughter for the occasion.
Meanwhile, Marilou started living with Gashem in his apartment where they
had sexual intercourse. But in no time, their relationship went sour as Gashem
began maltreating Marilou. Gashem eventually revoked his promise of
marrying Marilou and he told her that he is already married to someone in
Bacolod City. So Marilou went home and later sued Gashem for damages.
The trial court ruled in favor of Marilou and awarded her P20k in moral
damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
On appeal, Gashem averred that he never proposed marriage to Marilou and
that he cannot be adjudged to have violated Filipino customs and traditions
since he, being an Iranian, was not familiar with Filipino customs and
traditions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct.
HELD: Yes. Gashem is liable to pay for damages in favor of Marilou not
really because of his breach of promise to marry her but based on Article 21
of the Civil Code which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.
Breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong per se. In this case, it
is the deceit and fraud employed by Gashem that constitutes a violation of
Article 21 of the Civil Code. His promise of marrying Marilou was a deceitful
scheme to lure her into sexual congress. As found by the trial court, Marilou
was not a woman of loose morals. She was a virgin before she met Gashem.
She would not have surrendered herself to Gashem had Gashem not promised
to marry her. Gashem’s blatant disregard of Filipino traditions on marriage
and on the reputation of Filipinas is contrary to morals, good customs, and
public policy. As a foreigner who is enjoying the hospitality of our country
and even taking advantage of the opportunity to study here he is expected to
respect our traditions. Any act contrary will render him liable under Article 21
of the Civil Code.
The Supreme Court also elucidated that Article 21 was meant to expand the
concepts of torts and quasi delict. It is meant to cover situations such as this
case where the breach complained of is not strictly covered by existing laws.
It was meant as a legal remedy for the untold number of moral wrongs which
is impossible for human foresight to specifically enumerate and punish in the
statute books – such as the absence of a law penalizing a the breach of promise
to marry.
The Supreme Court however agreed with legal luminaries that if the promise
to marry was made and there was carnal knowledge because of it, then moral
damages may be recovered (presence of moral or criminal seduction), Except
if there was mutual lust; or if expenses were made because of the promise
(expenses for the wedding), then actual damages may be recovered.
Cangco v. Manila Railroad
HELD: Yes. Alighting from a moving train while it is slowing down is a
common practice and a lot of people are doing so every day without suffering
injury. Cangco has the vigor and agility of young manhood, and it was by no
means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the same
act would have been in an aged or feeble person. He was also ignorant of the
fact that sacks of watermelons were there as there were no appropriate
warnings and the place was dimly lit.
The Court also elucidated on the distinction between the liability of employers
under Article 2180 and their liability for breach of contract [of carriage]:

On January 20, 1915, Cangco was riding the train of Manila Railroad Co
(MRC). He was an employee of the latter and he was given a pass so that he
could ride the train for free. When he was nearing his destination at about 7pm,
he arose from his seat even though the train was not at full stop. When he was
about to alight from the train (which was still slightly moving) he accidentally
stepped on a sack of watermelons which he failed to notice due to the fact that
it was dim. This caused him to lose his balance at the door and he fell and his
arm was crushed by the train and he suffered other serious injuries. He was
dragged a few meters more as the train slowed down.

It was established that the employees of MRC were negligent in piling the
sacks of watermelons. MRC raised as a defense the fact that Cangco was also
negligent as he failed to exercise diligence in alighting from the train as he did
not wait for it to stop.

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co is liable for damages.


NOTES: But, if the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in
the selection and direction of the servant, he is not liable for the acts of the
latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage
done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the
master and the person injured.
The liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon a
voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere
negligence or inattention, has caused damage to another.
These two fields, figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact
that a person is bound to another by contract does not relieve him from extra-
contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists
the obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act
which constitutes the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract
existed between the parties.
Manresa: Whether negligence occurs an incident in the course of the
performance of a contractual undertaking or in itself the source of an extra-
1. Culpa Aquiliana, which is the wrongful or negligent act or omission
contractual undertaking obligation, its essential characteristics are identical.
Vinculum Juris: (def) It means “an obligation of law”, or the right of the
2. Culpa Contractual, which is the fault or negligence incident in the
obligee to enforce a civil matter in a court of law.
Sps. Batal v. Sps. San Pedro
FACTS:
Respondents Sps. Luz and Kenichiro Tominaga contracted the services of
petitioner Frank Batal who represented himself as a geodetic engineer to
survey the exact boundaries of their property for the construction of their
perimeter fence. Sometime in 1996, a complaint was lodged against the Sps.
that allegedly they encroached upon a designated right-of-way of an
adjoining lot and upon further verification it was found out that their wall
indeed encroached to it. They also discovered that it was not Frank but his
wife Erlinda Batal, who is a licensed geodetic engineer. Frank, consequently
admitted that he made a mistake and offered to share in the expenses for the
demolition and reconstruction of the questioned portion of fence, however
failed to deliver on his word, thus the filing of the instant suit.
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioners failed to exercise due care and diligence in the
conduct of the resurvey which eventually caused damage to the respondents.
HELD:
Culpa, or negligence, may be understood in two different senses, either as:
which creates a vinculum juris and gives rise to an obligation between two
persons not formally bound by any other obligation, and is governed by
Art. 2176 of the Civil Code, or
performance of an obligation which already existed, and which increases
the liability from such already existing obligation, and is governed by
Articles 1170 to 1174 of the same Code.
In the present case, it is clear that the petitioners, in carrying out their
contractual obligations, failed to exercise the requisite diligence in the
placement of the markings for the concrete perimeter fence that was later
constructed. As a result, the placement of the monuments did not accurately
reflect the dimensions of the lot. Because of the encroachment, the
respondents had to demolish and reconstruct the fence and, thus, suffered
damages. Being guilty of a breach of their contract, petitioners are liable for
damages suffered by the respondents.
Calalas v. CA
FACTS:
At 10 o'clock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza
Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college freshman majoring in Physical Education
at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and operated by
petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24
passengers, Sunga was given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden
stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the vehicle.
On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to
let a passenger off. As she was seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave
way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu truck
driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left
rear portion of the jeepney. As a result, Sunga was injured.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas,
alleging violation of the contract of carriage by the former in failing to
exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner
of the Isuzu truck.
DECISION OF LOWER COURTS:
1. RTC – Dumaguete – rendered judgment against Salva holding that the
driver of the Isuzu truck was responsible
It took cognizance of another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas
against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which Branch 37 of the same
court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the
damage to his jeepney.
2. CA – reversed the RTC, awarding damages instead to Sunga as plaintiff in
an action for breach of contract of carriage since the cause of action was
based on such and not quasi delict.
Hence, current petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE:
Whether (per ruling in Civil Case) negligence of Verena was the proximate
cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be
to make the common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers
In relation thereto, does the principle of res judicata apply?
RULING:
No.
The issue in Civil Case No. 3490 was whether Salva and his driver Verena
were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioner's jeepney. On
the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his
contract of carriage.
Quasi-delict / culpa aquiliana / culpa extra contractual
1. Has as its source the negligence of the tortfeasor
2. negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of
the action
3. doctrine of proximate cause is applicable
(device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between
him and another party, obligation is created by law itself)
Breach of contract / culpa contractual
1. premised upon the negligence in the performance of a contractual
obligation
2. action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the contract
and the fact that the obligor (here, the common carrier) failed to transport his
passenger safely to his destination
3. not available; it is the parties themselves who create the obligation and the
function of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created
In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code
provides that common carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have
acted negligently unless they prove that they observed extraordinary
diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision
necessarily shifts to the common carrier the burden of proof.
Hence, Vicente Calalas (operator) is liable since he did not exercise utmost
diligence.
1. Jeepney was not properly parked;
3. Overloading of passengers.

MMTC vs. CA
Facts:
The case arose from Nenita who incurred injuries from being thrown out of
the windshield of the jeepney that she was riding that collided with a bus operated by
MMTC (petitioner). Nenita filed for damages for neither the operator of the jeepney nor the
MMTC would pay for the damages sustained by Nenita. The RTC ruled that MMTC is
abstained from liability for it has proven that it has shown diligence of a good father of a
family in employing and supervising its employees. MMTC stated that it goes through a
process of screening! interviewing! and seminar attending before they hire their employees.
The C" reversed the decision of the RTC holding that the MMTC was not able to further
prove that its employees complied with its requirements.
Issue:
whether or not diligence of a good father has been observed by MMTC.
Ruling:
The SC ruled that MMTC! being sued as employer of the bus driver
&eonardo under "rt. ' * or icarious liability! was not able to prove that it had
e+ercised due diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and super ision of its
employees as it has not proven that it exercised due diligence in supervising its employees
for mere imposition of hiring procedures and supervisory policies without anything more is
not su,cient to overcome the presumption of negligence imposed upon them by the law. The
basis of the employer-s vicarious liability is that the responsibility imposed
by the article arises by reason of a presumption of negligence on the part of the persons
made responsible under the article from their failure to e+ercise due care and igilance o er
the acts of subordinates to prevent them from causing damage. Negligence is imputed to
them by law! unless they prove the contrary by showing that they e+ercised diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent damage. t is clear that
it is the non !er"or#ance o" certain $uties o" !recaution an$ !ru$ence
i#!ose$ u!on the# that is %h& the& are #a$e ans%era'le "or $a#ages cause$
'& their e#!lo&ee.
/or the doctrine to apply! it must rst be shown that there is employer0employee
relationship and that the plainti1 must show that the tort complained of was committed in the
scope of his assigned tas2 and that is when the employer may nd it necessary to interpose a
defense of due diligence of a good father of a family. The diligence of a good father of a
family re#uired to be obser ed by the employer to pre ent damages under "rt. ' * refers
to due diligence in the selection and super ision the employees to protect the public
Taylor v. Manila Electric
David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at
sea; he was also able to learn some principles of mechanical
engineering and mechanical drawing from his dad’s office (his dad
was a mechanical engineer); he was also employed as a mechanical
draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was mature well
beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of
Manila Electric power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps
which they took home. In an effort to explode the said caps, Taylor
experimented until he succeeded in opening the caps and then he
lighted it using a match which resulted to the explosion of the caps
causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the
caps exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the
company’s negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or
some person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and
the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in
disposing off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that
said caps caused damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection
between the company’s negligence and the injuries sustained by
Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct acts of Taylor which led to the
explosion of the caps as he even, in various experiments and in
multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said acts that led
to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more
mature both mentally and physically than the average boy of his age;
he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a
mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the
record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to
take care. The evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that he
well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his
attempt to produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His
attempt to discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his
efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the final success of
his endeavors brought about by the applications of a match to the
contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor
can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate that
the explosion might be dangerous.
Elcano v. Hill
Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano).
Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was
acquitted for “lack of intent coupled with mistake.” Elcano then filed a
civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages
based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil
action is barred by his son’s acquittal in the criminal case; and that if
ever, his civil liability as a parent has been extinguished by the fact
that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his
marriage.
Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as
a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated,
culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be
punishable by law.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon
emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article
397, emancipation takes place “by the marriage of the minor child”, it
is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by
marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus
“Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate
parental authority over the child’s person. It shall enable the minor to
administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot
borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the
consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in
court only with the assistance of his father, mother or guardian.”
Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill – the SC however
ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age,
Marvin’s liability should be subsidiary only – as a matter of equity.

ISSUE: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under
Article 2180.

HELD: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not
bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies
against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally
prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended
party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards
made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil
liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised