PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
G.R. No. 203284
NICOLAS S. MATUDAN, Petitioner,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and MARILYN** B.
MATUDAN, Respondents.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1seeks to set aside the
January 31, 2012 Decision2 and August 23, 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) denying the Petition
in CA·G.R. CV No. 95392 and the Motion for
Reconsideration,4 thus affirming the December 18, 2009
Decision5 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827.
Factual Antecedents
Petitioner Nicolas S, Matudan (petitioner) and respondent
Marilyn B. Matudan (Marilyn) were married in Laoang,
Northern Samar on October 26, 1976. They had four
children.
In 1985, Marilyn left to work abroad. From then on, petitioner
and the children lost contact with her; she had not been seen
nor heard from again.
Twenty-three years later, or on June 20, 2008, petitioner filed
a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,6docketed as
Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 with the RTC of Quezon City,
Branch 94. Petitioner alleged that before, during, and after
his marriage to Marilyn, the latter was psychologically
incapable of fulfilling her obligations as a wife and mother;
that she consistently neglected and failed to provide
petitioner and her children with the necessary emotional and
financial care, support, and sustenance, and even so after
leaving for work abroad; that based on expert evaluation
conducted by Clinical Psychologist Nedy L. Tayag (Dr.
Tayag), Marilyn's psychological incapacity is grave,
permanent, and incurable; that petitioner's consent to the
marriage was obtained by Marilyn through misrepresentation
as she concealed her condition from him; and that Marilyn is
"not ready for a lasting and pennanent commitment like
marriage"7 as she "never (gave) him and their children
financial and emotional support x x x and for being selfish
through their six (6) years of cohabitation;"8 that Marilyn
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
became "so despicably irresponsible as she has not shown
love and care upon her husband, x x x and that she cannot
properly and morally take on the responsibility of a loving
and caring wife x x x."9
The Republic of the Philippines (Republic), through the
Office of the Solicitor General, opposed the Petition.
The Quezon City Office of the City Prosecutor having
determined that there is no collusion between the parties,
proceedings were conducted in due course. However, trial
proceeded in Marilyn's absence.
Apart from the testimonies of the petitioner, his daughter
Maricel B. Matudan (Maricel), and Dr. Tayag, the following
documents were submitted in evidence:
1. Petitioner's Judicial Affidavit10 (Exhibit "A") which was
adopted as his testimony on direct examination;
2. The Judicial Aftidavit11 of Maricel (Exhibit "D"), which was
adopted as part of her testimony on direct examination;
3. The Sworn Affidavit12 of Dr. Tayag (Exhibit "B"), which was
considered part of her testimony on direct examination;
4. Dr. Tayag's evaluation report entitled "A Report on the
Psychological Condition of NICOLAS T. MATUDAN, the
petitioner for Nullity of Marriage against respondent
MARILYN BORJA-MATUDAN''13(Exhibit "C"); and
5. Other relevant evidence, such as petitioner's marriage
contract/certificate and respective birth certificates of his
children, and a Letter/Notice, with Registry Return Receipt,
sent by Dr. Tayag to Marilyn requesting evaluation/interview
relative to petitioner's desire to file a petition for declaration
of nullity of their marriage (Exhibits "E" to "G").
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On December 18, 2009, the RTC issued its
Decision14 dismissing the Petition in Civil Case No. Q-08-
62827 on the ground that petitioner's evidence failed to
sufficiently prove Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.
It held, thus:
Petitioner, his daughter Maricel Matudan and psychologist
Nedy L. Tayag testified. Petitioner offered in evidence
Exhibits "A" to ''G" which were admitted by the Court.
The State and the respondent did not present any evidence.
From the testimonial and documentary evidence of the
petitioner, the Court gathered the following:
Petitioner and respondent were roamed on October 26, 1976
x x x. They begot four (4) children x x x. Petitioner and
respondent lived together with their children. On June 25,
1985, petitioner asked respondent [sic] for permission to
work and left the conjugal dwelling. Since then she was
never heard of [sic]. Respondent never communicated with
the petitioner and her children. Petitioner inquired from the
relatives of the respondent but they did not tell him her
whereabouts.
In his Affidavit which was considered as his direct testimony,
petitioner claimed that respondent failed to perform her
duties as a wife to him. Respondent never gave petitioner
and their children financial and emotional support, love and
care during their cohabitation. She was irresponsible,
immature and exhibited irrational behavior towards petitioner
and their children. She was self-centered, had no remorse
and involved herself in activities defying social and moral
ethics.
On cross-examination, petitioner testified that he and the
respondent had a happy married life and they never had a
fight. The only reason why he filed this case was because
respondent abandoned him and their children.
Maricel Matudan was only two (2) years old when
respondent left them. She corroborated the testimony of the
petitioner that since respondent left the conjugal dwelling she
never provided financial support to the family and never
communicated with them.
Nedy L. Tayag, Psychologist, testified on the 'Report on the
Psychological Condition of Nicolas Matudan' which she
prepared (Exhibit "C''). She subjected petitioner to
psychological test and interview. She likewise interviewed
Maricel Matudan. She came up with the findings that
petitioner is suffering from Passive-Aggressive Personality
Disorder and respondent has Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with Antisocial Traits. The features of petitioner's
disorder are the following: negativistic attitude, passive
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resistance, lacks the ability to assert his opinions and has
great difficulty expressing his feelings.
The root cause of his personality condition can be attributed
to his being an abandoned child. At a young age, his parents
separated and he was left in the custody of his paternal
grandmother. He lacked a support system and felt rejected.
He developed a strong need for nurturance, love and
attention and that he would do anything to attain such.
As for respondent, the manifestation of her disorder are as
follows: Preoccupation with pursuing matters that would
make her happy; has a high sense of self-importance; wants
to have her way and disregards her husband's opinions;
lacks empathy; wants to have a good life.
Her personality condition is rooted on her unhealthy familial
environment. She came from an impoverished family. Her
parents were more pre-occupied with finding ways to make
ends meet to such extent that they failed to give adequate
attention and emotional support to their children.
Ms. Tayag further testified that the psychological condition of
the parties are grave and characterized by juridical
antecedence as the same already existed before they got
married, their disorders having been in existence since their
childhood years are permanent and severe.
The sole issue to be resolved is whether x x x respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital
obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Article 36 of the Family Code as amended, states:
'A marriage contracted by any party who at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapicity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.'
Article 68 of the same Code provides:
'The husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity, and render mutual help and
support.'
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
In the case of Leouel Santos vs. Court of Appeals, January
4, 1995, G.R. No. 112019, the Honorable Supreme Court
held:
'Justice Alicia Sempio Dy, in her commentaries on the Family
Code cites with approval the work of Dr. Gerardo Veloso a
former Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Marriage Tribunal
of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila x x x, who opines that
psychological incapacity must be characterized by (a)
gravity, (b) juridical antecedence and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party
would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties
required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and it
must be incurable or even if it were otherwise, the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.
For psychological incapacity however to be appreciated, the
same must be serious, grave and 'so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of
the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.' x x x.
In the case of Santos, it was also held that the intendment of
the law has been to confine the meaning of 'psychological
incapacity' to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
give meaning and significance to the marriage.'
It must be emphasized that the cause of action of petitioner
is the alleged psychological incapacity of the respondent.
During the pre-trial, the sole issue raised is whether or not
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform her
marital obligations under Article 36 of the Family Code. The
alleged personality disorder of the petitioner is clearly not an
issue in this case.
Prescinding from the foregoing, the Court finds that the
totality of the evidence adduced by petitioner has not
established the requisites of gravity, juridical antecedence
and incurability. Again, it must be emphasized that this
petition was filed on the ground of the psychological
incapacity of respondent and not the petitioner.
Respondent is said to be suffering from Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with antisocial traits. The salient
features of her disorder were enumerated by Nedy Tayag in
her report as follows: pre-occupation with pursuing matters
that would make her happy; has a high sense of self-
importance; wants to have her way and disregards her
husband's opinions; lacks empathy; wants to have a good
life. Her personality disorder is considered permanent, grave
and incurable. It has its root cause in her unhealthy familial
environment during her early developmental years.
In petitions for declaration of marriage (sic), the testimony of
the petitioner as to the physical manifestation of the
psychological incapacity is of utmost importance.
Unfortunately, petitioner's testimony particularly his affidavit
which was considered as his direct examination contained
only general statements on the supposed manifestations of
respondent's incapacity. Respondent was described therein
as irresponsible, immature, self -centered, lacks remorse, got
involved with activities defying social and moral ethics.
Petitioner however miserably failed to expound on these
allegations. In fact during his cross-examination, he even
contradicted the allegations in his petition and affidavit. He
clearly stated that he had a happy marital relationship with
the respondent and never had a fight with her (TSN,
December 5, 2008, page 8).
Petitioner harped on the abandonment of respondent. He
even admitted that this the [sic] only reason why he wants
their marriage dissolved (TSN, December 5, 2008, page 9).
Abandonment of spouse however is not psychological
incapacity. It is only a ground for legal separation.
Petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage are sui
generis, the allegations therein must be supported by clear
and convincing evidence that would warrant the dissolution
of the marriage bond. Absent such proof, the Court will
uphold the validity of the marriage for 'the rule is settled that
every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity
of marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage bond.' (Sevilla
v. Cardenas, G.R. No. 167684, July 31, 2006).
In a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden
of proof to show the nullity of the marriage is on the
petitioner.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence.
SO ORDERED.15
Petitioner moved to reconsider, 16 but in a May 12, 2010
Order,17 the RTC held its ground reiterating its
pronouncement that petitioner failed to demonstrate
Marilyn's psychological incapacity, and that the petition is
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anchored merely on Marilyn's abandonment of the marriage
and family, which by itself is not equivalent to psychological
incapacity.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an appeal before the CA, docketed as CA-
G.R CV No. 95392. However, in its assailed January 31,
2012 Decision, the CA instead affirmed the RTC judgment,
declaring thus:
Petitioner-appellant asserts that the ETC should not have
denied the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Marilyn x x x. He maintains that, contrary to the conclusion
reached by the trial court, he was able to establish by the
quantum of evidence required, the claimed psychological
incapacity of his wife.
The argument of Nicolas R. Matudan fails to persuade Us.
Verily, instead or substantiating the alleged psychological
incapacity his wife, petitioner-appellant revealed during his
cross examination that it was actually his wife's act of
abandoning the family that led him to seek the nullification of
their marriage. In fact, during his cross-examination, he
readily admitted that they were happily married and that they
never engaged in bickering with each other.
xxxx
Q: But how would you describe your marital relations [sic]?
Were there moments that you were happy with your wife?
A: Yes, ma' am, that is why we begot four children.
COURT
And so, you so you [sic] had a happy married life then?
FISCAL
I would presume that you had a happy married life, how
come your wife just left you like that? Do you have any idea
why your wife just left you like that?
A: She did not communicate with us to tell her whereabouts.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Q: Did you ever have a fight with your wife?
A: None, ma'am.
xxxx
COURT
All right, you stated in this Affidavit that you are filing this
case for the declaration of nullity of marriage because of the
psychological incapacity of your wife, what do you mean by
that?
WITNESS
'Pinabayaan lang kmning pamilya niya, hindi naman niya
sinasabi kung saan siya hahanapin.' She did not inform us of
her whereabouts.
COURT
Is that the only reason why you want your marriage with her
dissolved?
WITNESS
Yes, your honor.
As correctly observed by the RTC, abandonment by a
spouse, by itself, however, does not warrant a finding of
psychological incapacity within the contemplation of the
Family Code. It must be shown that such abandonment is a
manifestation of a disordered personality which makes the
spouse concerned completely unable to discharge the
essential obligations of the marital state.
Indeed, the term 'psychological incapacity' to be a ground for
the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code,
refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even
before the celebration of the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must refer to no less than a mental not physical)
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals and Rorodel Glaviano
Molina, the following definitive guidelines were laid down in
resolving petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage,
based on Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff: Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be:
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision.
(3) Tue incapacity must be proven to be existing at 'the time
of the celebration' of the marriage,
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition.
These Guidelines incorporate the basic requirements
established in Santos v. Court of Appeals that psychological
incapacity must be characterized by: (a) gravity; (b) juridical
antecedence; and (c) incurability. These requisites must be
strictly complied with, as the grant of a petition for nu1lity of
marriage based on psychological incapacity must be
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confined only to the most serious cases of personality
disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.
Using the above standards, We find the totality of the
petitioner-appellant's evidence insufficient to prove that the
respondent-appellee is psychologically unfit to discharge the
duties expected of her as a wife.
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment
and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot be relied upon
to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the
psychological incapacity of his wife.
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the
proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of
the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to
some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy,
however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age
at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be
expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not
have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case
because she could not have been there when the spouses
were married and could not have been expected to know
what was happening between her parents until long after her
birth. On the other hand; as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas'
description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and
a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling
in Jocelyn Suazo v.Angelita Suazo, et al., is illuminating on
this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the
expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and
the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist
evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an
indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon,
the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion
with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above, i.e., that there
must be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties
by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
xxxx
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist,
using meager information coming from a directly interested
party, could not have secured a complete personality profile
and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion
or diagnosis of Angelita's psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy
the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological
report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion
that psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward
Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.'
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical
psychologist on the psychological condition of the
respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential
obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely
concluded that Marilyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she
perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither
explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder,
nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really
incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a
psychological, not physical, nature.
xxxx
Dr. Tayag's testimony during her cross-examination as well
as her statements in the Sworn Affidavit are no different.
When asked to explain the personality disorder of Marilyn,
Dr. Tayag simply replied:
Q: On her case you assessed her as, likewise, suffering from
a personality disorder characterized by Narcissistic
Personality Disorder with Anti-Social Trait. Will you please
tell to the Court what do you mean by that personality
disorder?
A: In layman's term, once you are being labeled as a
narcissistic [sic], this is a person whose preoccupation are all
toward his own self satisfaction both materially or emotionally
at the expense of somebody. They have what you called [sic]
strong sense of entitlement thinking that she can get away
whatever [sic] she wants to in pursuit of her own satisfaction
at the expense of somebody. And this is what happened to
the respondent. She gave more consideration to her own
satisfaction material wise at the expense of social
embarrassment of the children because of what happened to
her.
On the other hand, in her Sworn Affidavit, Dr. Tayag stated:
7. Without a doubt, Marilyn is suffering from a form of
personality disorder that rooted [sic] the downfall of their
marriage. As based on the DSM-IV, respondent's behavioral
disposition fits with individuals with NARCISSISTIC
PERSONALITY DISORDER with Anti-social traits, as
characterized by her disregard for and violation of the rights
of others as well as her failure to conform to social norms
with respect to lawful behaviors as indicated by repeatedly
performing acts that are clearly immoral and socially
despised. Such is also depicted through his [sic]
deceitfulness, as indicated by repeated lying and conning
methods she used upon others in order to achieve personal
profit or pleasure. In addition, her consistent irresponsibility,
as indicated by her repeated failure to sustain consistent
work behavior or honor financial obligations and her lack of
remorse, as indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing
having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another. x x x. And
such condition is considered to [sic] grave, severe, long
lasting and incurable by any treatment available.
Accordingly, even if We assume that Marilyn is really afflicted
with Narcissistic Personality Disorder with anti-social traits, in
the absence of any showing that the same actually
incapacitated her from fulfilling her essential marital
obligations, such disorder cannot be a valid basis for
declaring Nicolas' marriage to Marilyn as null and void under
Article 36 of the Family Code. To be sure, jurisprudence has
declared that not every psychological
illness/disorder/condition is a ground for declaring the
marriage a nullity under Article 36. '[T]he meaning of
'psychological incapacity' [is confined] to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.'
All told, We find that no reversible error was committed by
the trial court in rendering its assailed Decision:
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WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
94, in Civil Case No. Q-08-62827, is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.18 (Citations omitted)
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but in its assailed
August 23, 2012 Resolution, the CA stood its ground. Hence,
the instant Petition.
In a November 19, 2014 Resolution,19 this Court resolved to
give due course to the Petition.
Issue
Petitioner mainly questions the CA's appreciation of the
case, insisting that he was able to prove Marilyn's
psychological incapacity.1âwphi1
Petitioner's Arguments
20
In his Petition and Reply, petitioner argues that contrary to
the CA's findings, he was able to prove Marilyn's
psychological incapacity which is rooted in Dr. Tayag's
diagnosis that she was suffering from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder which existed even before their marriage, and
continued to subsist thereafter; that her illness is grave,
serious, incurable, and permanent as to render her incapable
of assuming her marriage obligations; that the nullification of
his marriage to Marilyn is not an affront to the institutions of
marriage and family, but will actually protect the sanctity
thereof because in effect, it will discourage individuals with
psychological disorders that prevent them from assuming
marital obligations from remaining in the sacred bond;21 that
the issue of whether psychological incapacity exists as a
ground to nullify one's marriage is a legal question; and that
the totality of his evidence and Marilyn's failure to refute the
same despite due notice demonstrate that he is entitled to a
declaration of nullity on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
Respondent's Arguments
In its Comment22 praying for denial, the Republic argues that
the Petition calls for an evaluation of facts, thus violating the
rule that a petition for review on certiorari should be confined
to legal questions. Citing Perez-Ferraris v. Ferraris,23which
decrees as follows-
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Tue issue of whether or not psychological incapacity exists in
a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of
this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-
established principle that factual findings of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this
Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like
when the findings of the appellate court go beyond the
issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts
which, if properly considered, will justify a different
conclusion; or when there is a misappreciation of facts,
which are unavailing in the instant case. (Citations omitted)
the State argues that the instant case should be dismissed
instead.
The public respondent adds that allegations and proof of
irresponsibility, immaturity, selfishness, indifference, and
abandonment of the family do not automatically justify a
conclusion of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code; that the intent of the law is to confine the
meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious
cases of personality disorders - existing at the time of the
marriage - clearly demonstrating an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage,
and depriving the spouse of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the marital bond he/she is about to
assume; that petitioner failed to show how each of Marilyn's
claimed negative traits affected her ability to perform her
essential marital obligations; that the supposed psychological
evaluation of Marilyn was in fact based on the one-sided,
self-serving, and biased information supplied by petitioner
and Maricel - which renders the same unreliable and without
credibility; that petitioner's real reason for seeking
nullification is Marilyn's abandonment of the family; and that
all in all, petitioner failed to prove the gravity, juridical
antecedence, and incurability of Marilyn's claimed
psychological incapacity.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals24taught us
that psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family
Code must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. Thus, the incapacity "must
be grave or serious such that the party would be incapable of
carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must
be rooted in the history of the party antedating the marriage,
although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it must be incurable or, even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved."25 In this connection, the burden of proving
psychological incapacity is on the petitioner, pursuant
to Republic v. Court of Appeals,26or the Molina case.
The foregoing pronouncements in Santos and Molina have
remained as the precedential guides in deciding cases
grounded on the psychological incapacity of a spouse. But
the Court has declared the existence or absence of the
psychological incapacity based strictly on the facts of each
case and not on a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations. Indeed, the incapacity should be established
by the totality of evidence presented during trial, making it
incumbent upon the petitioner to sufficiently prove the
existence of the psychological incapacity. 27
Both the trial and appellate courts dismissed the petition in
Civil Case No. Q-08-62827 on the ground that the totality of
petitioner's evidence failed to sufficiently prove that Marilyn
was psychologically unfit to enter marriage - in short, while
petitioner professed psychological incapacity, he could not
establish its gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability.
The Court agrees.
Petitioner's evidence consists mainly of his judicial affidavit
and testimony; the judicial affidavits and testimonies of his
daughter Maricel and Dr. Tayag; and Dr. Tayag's
psychological evaluation report on the psychological
condition both petitioner and Marilyn. The supposed
evaluation of Marilyn's psychological condition was based
solely on petitioner's account, since Marilyn did not
participate in the proceedings.
Indeed, "[w]hat is important is the presence of evidence that
can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition."28 "[T]he complete facts should allege the physical
manifestations, if any, as are indicative of psychological
incapacity at the time of the celebration of the
marriage."29 Petitioner's judicial affidavit and testimony during
trial, however, fail to show gravity and juridical antecedence.
While he complained that Marilyn lacked a sense of guilt and
was involved in "activities defying social and moral
ethics,"30 and that she was, among others, irrational,
5
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
irresponsible, immature, and self-centered, he nonetheless
failed to sufficiently and particularly elaborate on these
allegations, particularly the degree of Marilyn's claimed
irresponsibility, immaturity, or selfishness. This is
compounded by the fact that petitioner contradicted his own
claims by testifying that he and Marilyn were happily married
and never had a fight, which is why they begot four children;
and the only reason for his filing Civil Case No. Q-08-62827
was Marilyn's complete abandonment of the marriage and
family when she left to work abroad.
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less
than a mental-- not merely physical - incapacity that causes
a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68
of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. 31
If any, petitioner's accusations against Marilyn are untrue, at
the very least. At most, they fail to sufficiently establish the
degree of Marilyn's claimed psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, Maricel cannot be of help either. She was
only two years old when Marilyn left the family. Growing up,
she may have seen the effects of Marilyn's abandonment -
such as the lack of emotional and financial support; but she
could not have any idea of her mother's claimed
psychological incapacity, as well as the nature, history, and
gravity thereof.
Just as well, Dr. Tayag's supposed expert findings regarding
Marilyn's psychological condition were not based on actual
tests or interviews conducted upon Marilyn herself; they are
based on the personal accounts of petitioner. This fact gave
more significance and importance to petitioner's other pieces
of evidence, which could have compensated for the
deficiency in the expert opinion which resulted from its being
based solely on petitioner's one-sided account. But since
these other pieces of evidence could not be relied upon, Dr.
Tayag's testimony and report must fail as well. In one
decided case with a similar factual backdrop and involving
the very same expert witness, this Court held:
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
It is worth noting that Glenn and Mary Grace lived with each We find these observations and conclusions insufficiently in-
other for more or less seven years from 1999 to 2006. The depth and comprehensive to warrant the conclusion that a
foregoing established fact shows that living together as psychological incapacity existed that prevented the
spouses under one roof is not an impossibility. Mary Grace's respondent from complying with the essential obligations of
departure from their home in 2006 indicates either a refusal marriage. It failed to identify the root cause of the
or mere difficulty, but not absolute inability to comply with her respondent's narcissistic personality disorder and to prove
obligation to live with her husband. that it existed at the inception of the marriage. Neither did it
explain the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder, nor
show that the respondent was really incapable of fulfilling his
Further, considering that Mary Grace was not personally
duties due to some incapacity of a psychological, not
examined by Dr. Tayag, there arose a greater burden to
physical, nature. Thus, we cannot avoid but conclude that Dr.
present more convincing evidence to prove the gravity,
Tayag's conclusion in her Report --i.e., that the respondent
juridical antecedence and incurability of the former's
suffered 'Narcissistic Personality Disorder with traces of
condition. Glenn, however, failed in this respect. Glenn's
Antisocial Personality Disorder declared to be grave and
testimony is wanting in material details. Rodelito, on the
incurable' -is an unfounded statement, not a necessary
other hand, is a blood relative of Glenn. Glenn's statements
inference from her previous characterization and portrayal of
are hardly objective. Moreover, Glenn and Rodelito both
the respondent. While the various tests administered on the
referred to MaryGrace's traits and acts, which she exhibited
petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to assess
during the marriage. Hence, there is nary a proof on the
her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot
antecedence of Mary Grace's alleged incapacity. Glenn even
be made with respect to the respondent's condition. To make
testified that, six months before they got married, they saw
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
each other almost everyday. Glenn saw "a loving[,] caring
psychological condition based on the information fed by only
and well[-] educated person" in Mary Grace.
one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
Anent Dr. Tayag's assessment of Mary Grace's condition, evidence.32
the Court finds the same as unfounded. Rumbaua provides
some guidelines on how the courts should evaluate the
Finally, the identical rulings of the trial and appellate courts
testimonies of psychologists or psychiatrists in petitions for
should be given due respect and finality. This Court is not a
the declaration of nullity of marriage, viz.:
trier of facts.
We' cannot help but note that Dr. Tayag's conclusions about
The issue of whether or not psychological inq1pacity exists in
the respondent's psychological incapacity were based on the
a given case calling for annulment of marriage depends
information fed to her by only one side - the petitioner -
crucially, more than in any field of the law, on the facts of the
whose bias in favor of her cause cannot be doubted. While
case. Such factual issue, however, is beyond the province of
this circumstance alone does not disqualify the psychologist
this Court to review. It is not the function of the Court to
for reasons of bias, her report, testimony and conclusions
analyze or weigh all over again the evidence or premises
deserve the application of a more rigid and stringent set of
supportive of such factual determination. It is a well-
standards in the manner we discussed above. For,
established principle that factual findings of the trial court,
effectively, Dr. Tayag only diagnosed the respondent from
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this
the prism of a third party account; she did not actually hear,
Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons x x
see and evaluate the respondent and how he would have
x.33
reacted and responded to the doctor's probes.
With the foregoing disquisition, there is no need to resolve
Dr. Tayag, in her report, merely summarized the petitioner's
the other issues raised. They have become irrelevant.
narrations, and on this basis characterized the respondent to
be a self-centered, egocentric, and unremorseful person who
'believes that the world revolves around him'; and who 'used WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The January 31,
love as a . . . deceptive tactic for exploiting the confidence 2012 Decision and August 23, 2012 Resolution of the Court
[petitioner] extended towards him.' x x x of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 95392 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
6
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
G.R. No. 214064
MIRASOL CASTILLO, Petitioner
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and FELIPE IMPAS,
Respondents
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari filed by
petitioner Mirasol Castillo (Mirasol) challenging the
Decision1and Resolution,2 dated March 10, 2014 and August
28, 2014, respectively, of the Court of Appeals (CA), which
ruled against the dissolution and nullity of her marriage under
Article 36 of the Family Code.
The facts of the case follow:
As their parents were good friends and business partners,
Mirasol and Felipe started as friends then, eventually,
became sweethearts. During their courtship, Mirasol
discovered that Felipe sustained his affair with his former
girlfriend. The couple's relationship turned tumultuous after
the revelation. With the intervention of their parents, they
reconciled. They got married in Bani, Pangasinan on April
22, 1984 and were blessed with two (2) children born in 1992
and in 2001.3
On June 6, 2011, Mirasol filed a Complaint4 for declaration of
nullity of marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dasmariñas, Cavite, Branch 90.
Mirasol alleged that at the beginning, their union was
harmonious prompting her to believe that the same was
made in heaven. However, after thirteen (13) years of
marriage, Felipe resumed philandering. Their relatives and
friends saw him with different women. One time, she has just
arrived from a trip and returned home to surprise her family.
But to her consternation, she caught him in a compromising
act with another woman. He did not bother to explain or
apologize. Tired of her husband's infidelity, she left the
conjugal dwelling and stopped any communication with
him.5Felipe's irresponsible acts like cohabiting with another
woman, not communicating with her, and not supporting their
children for a period of not less than ten (10) years without
any reason, constitute a severe psychological disorder.6
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
In support of her case, Mirasol presented clinical
psychologist Sheila Marie Montefalcon (Montefalcon) who, in
her Psychological Evaluation Report,7 concluded that Felipe
is psychologically incapacitated to fulfill the essential marital
obligations. A portion of the report reads:
x x xx
The personality disorder speaks of antecedence as it has an
early onset, with an enduring pattern and behavior that
deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual's
culture. His poor parental and family molding (particularly
lack of parental parenting) caused him to have a defective
superego and he proved to be selfish, immature and
negligent person and followed a pattern of gross
irresponsibility and gross disregard of the feelings of his
partner/wife disregarding the marriage contract and the
commitment he agreed on during the wedding. In other
words, the root cause of respondent's flawed personality
pattern can be in childhood milieu. Respondent's familial
constellation, unreliable parenting style from significant
figures around him, and unfavorable childhood experiences
have greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his
environment in general. The respondent did not grow up
mature enough to cope with his obligations and
responsibilities as married man and father.
It also speaks of gravity as he was not able to carry out the
normative and ordinary duties of marriage and family,
shouldered by any married man, existing in ordinary
circumstances. He just cannot perform his duties and
obligations as a husband, as he entered into marriage for his
own self-satisfaction and gratification, manipulate and
denigrate the petitioner for his own pleasures and
satisfaction. In the process, respondent was unable to
assume his marital duties and responsibilities to his wife. He
failed to render mutual help and support (Article 68, FC).
Additionally, it also speaks of incurability, as respondent has
no psychological insight that he has a character problem. He
would not acknowledge the pain he caused to people around
him. People suffering from this personality disorder are
unmotivated to treatment and impervious to recovery. There
are no medications and laboratory examinations to be taken
for maladaptive behavior such as the NPD (Narcissistic
Personality Disorder).
Otherwise stated, his personality disorder is chronic and
pervasive affecting many aspects of his life, such as social
functioning and close relationships.1âwphi1 Apparently, he
has failed to develop appropriate adjustment methods. He
lacks the intrapersonal and interpersonal integration that
caused him the failure to understand the very nature of that
sharing of life that is directed toward the solidarity and
formation of family.
x x x x8
In a Decision9 dated January 20, 2012, the RTC in Civil Case
No. 4853-11 declared the marriage between Mirasol and
Felipe null and void. The dispositive portion of the decision
states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, Court hereby declares
the marriage contract by the petitioner MIRASOL CASTILLO
to the respondent FELIPE IMPAS on April 22, 1984 in Bani,
Pangasinan to be NULL AND VOID AB INITIO.
ACCORDINGLY, pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, the Clerk of Court is directed to enter this
judgment upon its finality in the Book of Entry of Judgment
and to issue the corresponding Entry of Judgment.
Thereupon, the Office of the Civil Registrars in Bani,
Pangasinan and Imus, Cavite, are also mandated to cause
the registration of the said ENTRY OF JUDGMENT in their
respective Book of Marriages.
Likewise, furnish the petitioner and the counsel of the
petitioner, the respondent, the Solicitor General, 3rd
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar R. Jarlos and the Civil
Registrar General with copies hereof.
Upon compliance, the Court shall forthwith issue the
DECREE OF NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.
SO ORDERED.10
On February 22, 2012, the Republic of the Philippines,
through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a
motion for reconsideration, which the RTC denied in an
Order11 dated April 3, 2012.
On appeal, the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 99686 reversed and
set aside the decision of the RTC, ruling that Mirasol failed to
present sufficient evidence to prove that Felipe was suffering
from psychological incapacity, thus, incapable of performing
marital obligations due to some psychological illness existing
7
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
at the time of the celebration of the marriage.12 A pertinent
portion of the decision reads:
x x xx
Based on the records, it appears more likely that Felipe
became unfaithful as a result of unknown factors that
happened during the marriage and not because of his family
background. His tendency to womanize was not shown to be
due to causes of a psychological nature that are grave,
permanent and incurable. In fact, it was only after thirteen
(13) years of marriage that he started to engage in extra-
marital affairs. In the complaint filed by Mirasol, she said that
after they got married, their relationship as husband and wife
went smoothly and that she was of the belief that she had a
marriage made in heaven.
In short, Felipe's marital infidelity does not appear to be
symptomatic of a grave psychological disorder which
rendered him incapable of performing his spousal
obligations. Sexual infidelity, by itself, is not sufficient proof
that petitioner is suffering from psychological incapacity. It
must be shown that the acts of unfaithfulness are
manifestations of a disordered personality which make him
completely unable to discharge the essential obligations of
marriage. Since that situation does not obtain in the case,
Mirasol's claim of psychological incapacity must fail.
Psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some marital
obligations. Rather, it is essential that the concerned party
was incapable of doing so, due to some psychological illness
existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
In fine, given the insufficiency of the evidence proving the
psychological incapacity of Felipe, We cannot but rule in
favor of the existence and continuation of the marriage and
against its dissolution and nullity.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
January 20, 2012 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.13
Upon the denial of her motion for reconsideration, Mirasol
elevated the case before this Court raising the issue, thus:
[Petitioner] was able to establish that respondent is suffering
from grave psychological condition that rendered him
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
incognitive of his marital covenants under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
Basically, the issue to be resolved by this Court is whether or
not the totality of evidence presented warrants, as the RTC
determined, the declaration of nullity of the marriage of
Mirasol and Felipe on the ground of the latter's psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
This Court rules in the negative.
Mirasol alleges that she has sufficiently established that
Felipe is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. The conclusions of the trial
court regarding the credibility of the witnesses are entitled to
great respect because of its opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witnesses. Since the court a quo accepted
the veracity of the petitioner's premises, there is no cause to
dispute the conclusion of Felipe's psychological incapacity
drawn from the expert witness. She claims that Montefalcon
was correct in interviewing her for it was submitted that it
was only her who knew best whether her husband was
complying with his marital obligations. Moreover, the OSG
admits that personal examination of the respondent by the
clinical psychologist is not an indispensable requisite for a
finding of psychological incapacity.
On the other hand, the OSG argues that Mirasol failed to
establish from the totality of evidence the gravity, juridical
antecedence and incurability of Felipe's alleged Narcissistic
Personality Disorder. The conclusions of the clinical
psychologist that he was psychologically incapacitated and
that such incapacity was present at the inception of the
marriage were not supported by evidence. At most, the
psychologist merely proved his refusal to perform his marital
obligations.14 Moreover, she has no personal knowledge of
the facts from which she based her findings and was working
on pure assumptions and secondhand information related to
her by one side.15
Time and again, it was held that "psychological incapacity"
has been intended by law to be confined to the most serious
cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an
utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance
to the marriage.16 Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and
(c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.17
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina,18 this
Court laid down the more definitive guidelines in the
disposition of psychological incapacity cases, viz.:
x x xx
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. x x x
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. x x x
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. x x x
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
xxx
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. x x x In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. x x x
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. x x x
8
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. x x x
xxx19
The existence or absence of the psychological incapacity
shall be based strictly on the facts of each case and not on
a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations.20
As held in Ting v. Velez-Ting:21
By the very nature of cases involving the application of
Article 36, it is logical and understandable to give weight to
the expert opinions furnished by psychologists
regarding the psychological temperament of parties in
order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence,
gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity.
However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not
conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for declaration
of nullity of marriage. At best, courts must treat such
opinions as decisive but not indispensable evidence in
determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding
of psychological incapacity, then actual medical or
psychological examination of the person concerned need not
be resorted to. The trial court, as in any other given case
presented before it, must always base its decision not
solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties
but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the
course of the proceedings.22
The presentation of any form of medical or psychological
evidence to show the psychological incapacity, however, did
not mean that the same would have automatically ensured
the granting of the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage. It bears repeating that the trial courts, as in all the
other cases they try, must always base their judgments not
solely on the expert opinions presented by the parties but on
the totality of evidence adduced in the course of their
proceedings.23
Guided by the foregoing principles and after a careful perusal
of the records, this Court rules that the totality of the
evidence presented failed to establish Felipe's psychological
incapacity.
Clinical psychologist Montefalcon opined that respondent is
encumbered with a personality disorder classified as
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Narcissistic Personality Disorder deeply ingrained in his
personality structure that rendered him incapacitated to
perform his marital duties and obligations. In her direct
testimony, she stated:
ATTY. BAYAUA:
Question: Were you able to interview and conduct
examination on the respondent?
Answer: No, sir.
Question: [W]here did you base your conclusion that
supported your findings that the husband of Mirasol is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage?
Answer: From the interviews I had with the petitioner and
also from my interview of the couple's common friend who
validated all information given to me by the petitioner.
Question: You mean to say you were not able to interview
the respondent?
Answer: No sir. But I sent him an invitation to undergo the
same psychological evaluation I administered with the
petitioner but he did not respond to my invitation.
Question: [W]hat relevant information were you able to
gather from your interview of the friend of the couple?
Answer: She validated every piece of information relayed to
me by the petitioner during the interview.
x x xx
Question: Madam witness, were you able to determine at
what point in time in the life of the respondent did he acquire
this disorder that you mentioned?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent already existed even
at the time of celebration of their marriage, although the
incapacity became manifest only after their marriage. His
disorder seemed to have started during the early years
of his life.
Question: In your expert opinion, what would be the likely
source of the disorder of the respondent?
Answer: The disorder of the respondent seemed to have
developed during the early years of his life due to his
poor parental and family [molding] particularly lack of
parental guidance. [His] parents separated when he was
still young and when [his] mother had another affair and lived
with her common-law husband. Respondent's familial
constellation and [unfavorable] childhood experiences have
greatly affected his perceptions of himself and his
environment. Respondent did not grow up mature enough to
cope with his obligations and responsibilities as a married
man and father.
x x x24
The RTC noticeably relied heavily on the result of the
psychological evaluation by Montefalcon. A perusal of the
RTC's decision would reveal that there was no assessment
of the veracity of such allegations, the credibility of the
witnesses, and the weight of the pieces of evidence
presented. Also, there were no factual findings which can
serve as bases for its conclusion of Felipe's psychological
incapacity.
The presentation of expert proof in cases for declaration of
nullity of marriage based on psychological incapacity
presupposes a thorough and an in-depth assessment of the
parties by the psychologist or expert, for a conclusive
diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.25 The probative force of the
testimony of an expert does not lie in a mere statement of
her theory or opinion, but rather in the assistance that she
can render to the courts in showing the facts that serve
as a basis for her criterion and the reasons upon which
the logic of her conclusion is founded.26
Although the evaluation report of Montefalcon expounds on
the juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of Felipe's
personality disorder, it was, however, admitted that she
evaluated respondent's psychological condition indirectly
from the information gathered from Mirasol and her witness.
Felipe's dysfunctional family portrait which brought about his
personality disorder as painted in the evaluation was based
solely on the assumed truthful knowledge of petitioner. There
was no independent witness knowledgeable of respondent's
upbringing interviewed by the psychologist or presented
before the trial court. Angelica Mabayad, the couple's
common friend, agreed with petitioner's claims in the
9
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
interview with the psychologist, confirmed the information
given by petitioner, and alleged that she knew Felipe
as "chick boy" or ''playboy."27 She did not testify before the
court a quo.
As such, there are no other convincing evidence asserted to
establish Felipe's psychological condition and its
associations in his early life. Montefalcon's testimony and
psychological evaluation report do not provide evidentiary
support to cure the doubtful veracity of Mirasol's one-sided
assertion. The said report falls short of the required proof for
the Court to rely on the same as basis to declare petitioner's
marriage to respondent as void.
While the examination by a physician of a person in order to
declare him psychologically incapacitated is not required, the
root cause thereof must still be "medically or clinically
identified," and adequately established by evidence.28 We
cannot take the conclusion that Felipe harbors a personality
disorder existing prior to his marriage which purportedly
incapacitated him with the essential marital obligations as
credible proof of juridical antecedence. The manner by which
such conclusion was reached leaves much to be desired in
terms of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity. The lack of
corroborative witness and evidence regarding Felipe's
upbringing and family history renders Montefalcon's opinion
on the root cause of his psychological incapacity conjectural
or speculative.
Even if the testimonies of Mirasol and Montefalcon at issue
are considered since the judge had found them to be
credible enough, this Court cannot lower the evidentiary
benchmark with regard to information on Felipe's pre-marital
history which is crucial to the issue of antecedence in this
case because we only have petitioner's words to rely on. To
make conclusions and generalizations on a spouse's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side, as in the case at bar, is, to the Court's mind, not
different from admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the
truthfulness of the content of such evidence.29
Anent Felipe's sexual infidelity, Mirasol alleged in her judicial
affidavit, to wit:
x x xx
Question: You said Madam Witness that after several
months you and respondent became sweethearts, what
happened next Madam Witness?
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Answer: Sir, while we were already sweethearts, I got
dismayed when respondent was also maintaining another
woman who was his former girlfriend.
Question: What was the reaction of the respondent when you
told him about his relation with his former girlfriend?
Answer: Respondent was shocked and became moody Sir.
This turned our relationship sour and it led to being stormy.
Question: You said Madam Witness that you and
respondent's relationship became sour and stormy, what
happened next, if any?
Answer: Sir, my relationship with respondent should have
been ended had it not been with the timely intervention of our
parents. Respondent and I reconciled.
x x xx
Question: Madam Witness as you said you finally got
married with the respondent as evidenced in fact by a
Marriage Certificate. What happened next after the
marriage?
Answer: After our wedding, our relationship as husband and
wife went on smoothly. I was of the belief that my marriage
was made in heaven and that respondent had already
reformed his ways and had completely deviated from his
relationship with his ex-girlfriend;
x x x30
Question: After giving birth to your first child did respondent
change or become responsible considering that he is already
a father?
Answer: No, Sir. I thought that having our first child would
already change the ways of respondent. The birth of our first
child did not actually help improve respondent's ways
because respondent is really a man who is not contented
with one woman even before we got married;
xxx31
Question: After you gave birth to you[r] second child what
happened next Madam Witness?
Answer: Sir, after thirteen (13) years of marriage, respondent
is back to his old habit where he has been seen having
relationship with a different woman. This was also seen by
our relatives and friends of respondent.
x xx32
Irreconcilable differences, sexual infidelity or perversion,
emotional immaturity and irresponsibility and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity
under Article 36, as the same may only be due to a person's
refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations
of marriage.33 In order for sexual infidelity to constitute as
psychological incapacity, the respondent's unfaithfulness
must be established as a manifestation of a disordered
personality, completely preventing the respondent from
discharging the essential obligations of the marital
state; there must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor that effectively incapacitated him from
complying with the obligation to be faithful to his spouse. 34 It
is indispensable that the evidence must show a link, medical
or the like, between the acts that manifest psychological
incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.35
As discussed, the findings on Felipe's personality profile did
not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
himself. Apart from the psychologist's opinion and petitioner's
allegations, no other reliable evidence was cited to prove that
Felipe's sexual infidelity was a manifestation of his alleged
personality disorder, which is grave, deeply rooted, and
incurable. We are not persuaded that the natal or
supervening disabling factor which effectively incapacitated
him from complying with his obligation to be faithful to his
wife was medically or clinically established.
Basic is the rule that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by
evidence, are not equivalent to proof, i.e., mere allegations
are not evidence.36 Based on the records, this Court finds
that there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to conclude
that Felipe's sexual infidelity and irresponsibility can be
equated with psychological incapacity as contemplated by
law. We reiterate that there was no other evidence adduced.
Aside from the psychologist, petitioner did not present other
witnesses to substantiate her allegations on Felipe's infidelity
notwithstanding the fact that she claimed that their relatives
saw him with other women. Her testimony, therefore, is
considered self-serving and had no serious evidentiary
value.
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
In sum, this Court finds no cogent reason to reverse the
ruling of the CA against the dissolution and nullity of the
parties' marriage due to insufficiency of the evidence
presented. The policy of the State is to protect and
strengthen the family as the basic social institution and
marriage is the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of validity of the marriage.37
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review
on certiorari filed by herein petitioner Mirasol Castillo.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the assailed Decision and
Resolution, dated March 10, 2014 and August 28, 2014,
respectively, of the Court of Appeals.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 222541
RACHEL A. DEL ROSARIO, Petitioner
vs.
JOSE O. DEL ROSARIO and COURT OF APPEALS,
Respondents
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is this petition for review
on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2 dated May 29, 2015 and
the Resolution3 dated December 1, 2015 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745, which reversed
the Decision4 dated April 23, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City, Branch 136 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 11-891
declaring the marriage of Jose O. Del Rosario (Jose) and
Rachel A. Del Rosario (Rachel) void on the ground of
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 365 of the Family
Code, as amended.6
The Facts
Rachel, then fifteen (15) years old, met Jose, then seventeen
(17) years old, sometime in December 1983 at a party in
Bintawan, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.7 Very soon, they
became romantically involved.8
Sometime in 1988, Rachel went to Hongkong to work as a
domestic helper. During this period, Rachel allegedly
provided for Jose's tuition fees for his college education.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Rachel and Jose eventually decided to get married on Report18 (Report) on Rachel. The remarks section of Dr.
December 28, 1989 in a civil rites ceremony held in San Tayag's Report, which was primarily based on her interview
Jose City, Nueva Ecija, and were blessed with a son, named with Rachel and Wesley, stated that Jose suffered from
Wesley, on December 1, 1993. On February 19, 1995, they Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD) characterized
renewed their vows in a church ceremony held in the by: (a) his lack of empathy and concern for Rachel; (b) his
Philippine Independent Church, Bagabag, Nueva Vizcaya.9 irresponsibility and his pleasure-seeking attitude that catered
only to his own fancies and comfort; (c) his selfishness
marked by his lack of depth when it comes to his marital
In 1998, Rachel went back to Hongkong to work as domestic
commitments; and (d) his lack of remorse for his
helper/caregiver and has been working there ever since, only
shortcomings.19
returning to the Philippines every year for a vacation.
Through her efforts, she was able to acquire a house and lot
in Rufino Homes Subdivision, San Jose, Nueva Ecija.10 For his part, Jose denied all the allegations in the petition.
Jose maintained that: (a) he had dutifully performed all of his
marital and parental duties and obligations to his family;
In September 2011, Rachel filed a petition11 for declaration of
(b) he had provided for his family's financial and emotional
nullity of marriage before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
needs; and (c) he contributed to the building and
No. 11-891, alleging that Jose was psychologically
maintenance of their conjugal home. He claimed that
incapacitated to fulfill his essential marital obligations. In
although they occasionally had misunderstandings, they
support of her petition, Rachel claimed that: during their
nevertheless had a blissful relationship, pointing out that their
marriage, Jose conspicuously tried to avoid discharging his
first major argument was when Rachel decided to go to
duties as husband and father. According to Rachel, Jose
Hongkong to work; that they continued to communicate
was hot tempered and violent; he punched her in the
through mail during her stay overseas; and that he remained
shoulder a few days before their church wedding, causing it
supportive of Rachel and would advise her to give her family
to swell, when she refused to pay for the transportation
the financial aid that they need so long as she would not
expenses of his parents; he hit his own father with a pipe,
sacrifice her well-being. Finally, he denied the alleged extra-
causing the latter to fall unconscious, which forced them to
marital affair and having laid hand on Rachel and their
leave Jose's parents' house where they were then staying;
son.20 Jose presented as well the testimony of Faustino
and he even locked her out of their house in the middle of
Rigos to support his allegations.21
the night sometime in December 2007 when she fetched her
relatives from the bus terminal, which he refused to perform.
Rachel added that Jose would represent himself as single, The RTC Ruling
would flirt openly, and had an extra-marital affair which she
discovered when Jose mistakenly sent a text message to her
In a Decision22 dated April 23, 2014, the RTC declared the
sister, Beverly A. Juan (Beverly), stating: "love, kung ayaw
marriage between Jose and Rachel void on the ground of
mo na akong magpunta diyan, pumunta ka na lang
dito."12 Another text message read: "Dumating lang ang
psychological incapacity. It relied on the findings and
testimony of Dr. Tayag, declaring that Jose's APD interferes
asawa mo, ayaw mo na akong magtext at tumawag sa
with his capacity to perform his marital and paternal duties,
'yo." On one occasion, she, together with Wesley and
as he in fact even refused to take responsibility for his
Beverly, caught Jose and the other woman with their child
inside their conjugal dwelling. Finally, she claimed that Jose
actions, notwithstanding the overwhelming evidence against
him.23
would refuse any chance of sexual intimacy between them
as they slowly drifted apart.13
Jose appealed24 to the CA, arguing that his alleged refusal to
seek employment, squandering of their money on vices,
Rachel, however, admitted that their married life ran
violent nature, and infidelity are not the serious, grave, and
smoothly during its early years, and it was only later in their
permanent psychological condition that incapacitates him to
marriage that Jose started frequenting bars and engaging in
perform his marital obligations required by Article 36 of the
drinking sessions.14
Family Code, as amended. At most, they are personality
defects, i.e., immaturity, irresponsibility, and unfaithfulness,
Rachel also presented the testimonies of Wesley15 and her which may be considered as grounds for legal separation
sisters, Beverly and Jocelyn Cabusora,16 which corroborated under Article 5525 of the same code.26
her allegations, as well as the testimony17 of Dr. Nedy L.
Tayag (Dr. Tayag), who prepared the Psychological
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
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The CA Ruling
In a Decision27 dated May 29, 2015, the CA reversed the
ruling of the RTC,28 holding that the totality of the evidence
Rachel presented was not enough to sustain a finding that
Jose is psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage.29 Particularly, the CA
declared that Jose's alleged infidelity, his refusal to seek
employment, his act of squandering their money on his vices,
and his temper and alleged propensity for violence were not
so grave and permanent as to deprive him of awareness of
the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond
sufficient to nullify the marriage under Article 36 of the Family
Code; at best, they showed that Jose was irresponsible,
insensitive, or emotionally immature which nonetheless do
not amount to the downright incapacity that the law requires.
Additionally, the CA pointed out that the root cause of the
alleged psychological incapacity, its incapacitating nature,
and the incapacity itself were not sufficiently explained as Dr.
Tayag's Report failed to show the relation between Jose's
"deprived childhood" and "poor home condition," on one
hand, and grave and permanent psychological malady, on
the other. Finally, it observed that while Dr. Tayag's
testimony was detailed, it only offered a general evaluation
on the supposed root cause of Jose's personality disorder. 30
Rachel moved for reconsideration,31 which was, however,
denied by the CA in a Resolution32 dated December 1, 2015;
hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or
not the CA erred in reversing the RTC's finding of
psychological incapacity.
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic social institution,33 and marriage as the
foundation of the family.34 Because of this, the Constitution
decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. In this regard,
psychological incapacity as a ground to nullify the marriage
under Article 3635 of the Family Code, as amended, should
refer to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
give meaning and significance to the marriage.36 It should
refer to no less than a mental - not merely physical -
incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as
provided under Article 6837 of the Family Code, among
others,38 include their mutual obligations to live together,
observe love, respect and fidelity, and render help and
support.39 In other words, it must be a malady that is so
grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is
about to assume.40
In Santos v. CA,41 the Court declared that psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code must be
characterized by: (a) gravity, i.e., it must be grave and
serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical
antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage; and (c)
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or otherwise the cure
would be beyond the means of the party involved.42 The
Court laid down more definitive guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Article 36
in Republic v. Molina43 (Molina) whose salient points are
44
footnoted below, that incorporated the basic requirements
the Court established in Santos.
Notwithstanding the Molina guidelines, note, however, that
an expert opinion is not absolutely necessary and may be
dispensed with in a petition under Article 36 of the Family
Code if the totality of the evidence shows that psychological
incapacity exists and its gravity, juridical antecedence, and
incurability can be duly established.45 The evidence need not
necessarily come from the allegedly incapacitated spouse,
but can come from persons intimately related to the
spouses, i.e., relatives and close friends, who could clearly
testify on the allegedly incapacitated spouse's condition at or
about the time of the marriage.46 In other words,
the Molina guidelines continue to apply but its application
calls for a more flexible approach in considering petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriages based on psychological
incapacity.47 To be clear, however, the totality of the
evidence must still establish the characteristics
that Santos laid down: gravity, incurability, and juridical
antecedence.
Thus, in Dedel v. CA,48 the Court declared that therein
respondent's emotional immaturity and irresponsibility could
not be equated with psychological incapacity as it was not
shown that these acts are manifestations of a disordered
personality which make her completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due
to her youth, immaturity, or sexual promiscuity. 49 In Taring v.
Taring,50 the Court emphasized that "irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional
immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not by
themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity, as
[these] may only be due to a person's difficulty, refusal, or
neglect to undertake the obligations of marriage that is not
rooted in some psychological illness that Article 36 of the
Family Code addresses."51 The Court equally did not
consider as tantamount to psychological incapacity the
emotional immaturity, irresponsibility, sexual promiscuity,
and other behavioral disorders invoked by the petitioning
spouses in Pesca v. Pesca,52 Republic v.
Encelan,53 Republic v. De Gracia,54 and Republic v.
Romero,55 to name a few, and thus dismissed their petitions
for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court maintains a similar view in this case and, thus,
denies the petition. Based on the totality of the evidence
presented, there exists insufficient factual or legal basis to
conclude that Jose's immaturity, irresponsibility, or infidelity
amount to psychological incapacity.
Particularly, the Court notes that Rachel's evidence merely
showed that Jose: (1) would often indulge in drinking sprees;
(2) tends to become violent when he gets drunk; (2) avoids
discharging his duties as a father to Wesley and as a
husband to Rachel, which includes sexual intimacy; (3) flirts
openly and represented himself as single; and (4) engaged
in an extra-marital affair with a bar girl who he brought to the
conjugal dwelling on several occasions. Significantly, Rachel
admitted that their married life ran smoothly in its early years.
Dr. Tayag's findings, on the other hand, simply summarized
Rachel and Wesley's narrations as she diagnosed Jose with
APD and proceeded to conclude that Jose's "personality flaw
is deemed to be severe, grave, and have become deeply
embedded within his adaptive systems since early childhood
years, thereby rendering such to be a permanent component
of his life [and] [t]herefore x x x incurable and beyond repair
despite any form of intervention."56
It should be pointed out that Dr. Tayag's Report does not
explain in detail how Jose's APD could be characterized as
grave, deeply rooted in his childhood, and incurable within
the jurisprudential parameters for establishing psychological
incapacity. Particularly, the Report did not discuss the
concept of APD which Jose allegedly suffers from, i.e., its
classification, cause, symptoms, and cure, or show how and
to what extent Jose exhibited this disorder or how and to
what extent his alleged actions and behavior correlate with
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
his APD, sufficiently clear to conclude that Jose's condition
has no definite treatment, making it incurable within the law's
conception. Neither did the Report specify the reasons why
and to what extent Jose's APD is serious and grave, and
how it incapacitated him to understand and comply with his
marital obligations.1awp++i1 Lastly, the Report hastily
concluded that Jose had a "deprived childhood" and "poor
home condition" that automatically resulted in his APD
equivalent to psychological incapacity without, however,
specifically identifying the history of Jose's condition
antedating the marriage, i.e., specific behavior or habits
during his adolescent years that could explain his behavior
during the marriage.
Moreover, Dr. Tayag did not personally assess or interview
Jose to determine, at the very least, his background that
could have given her a more accurate basis for concluding
that his APD is rooted in his childhood or was already
existing at the inception of the marriage. To be sure,
established parameters do not require that the expert
witness personally examine the party alleged to be suffering
from psychological incapacity provided corroborating
evidence are presented sufficiently establishing the required
legal parameters.57 Considering that her Report was based
solely on Rachel's side whose bias cannot be doubted, the
Report and her testimony deserved the application of a more
rigid and stringent standards which the RTC failed to apply.
In sum, Dr. Tayag's assessment, even when taken together
with the various testimonies, failed to show that Jose's
immaturity, irresponsibility, and infidelity rise to the level of
psychological incapacity that would justify the nullification of
the parties' marriage. To reiterate and emphasize,
psychological incapacity must be more than just a "difficulty,"
"refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of the marital
obligations; it is not enough that a party prove that the other
failed to meet the responsibility and duty of a married
person.58 There must be proof of a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person - an adverse integral element in
the personality structure that effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to marriage - which must be linked with
the manifestations of the psychological incapacity.59
A final note. It is well to reiterate that Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, is not a divorce law that cuts the marital
bond at the time the grounds for divorce manifest
themselves;60 a marriage, no matter how unsatisfactory, is
not a null and void marriage. Thus, absent sufficient
evidence establishing psychological incapacity within the
context of Article 36, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
May 29, 2015 and the Resolution dated December 1, 2015 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 102745 are
hereby AFFIRMED. Accordingly, the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage filed under Article 36 of the Family
Code, as amended, is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 188400
MARIA TERESA B. TANI-DE LA FUENTE, Petitioner
vs
RODOLFO DE LA FUENTE, JR., Respondent
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Psychological incapacity is a mental illness that leads to an
inability to comply with or comprehend essential marital
obligations.
This resolves the Petition for Review1 filed by Maria Teresa
B. Tani- De La Fuente (Maria Teresa) assailing the Court of
Appeals Decision2 and Resolution3 dated August 29, 2008
and May 25, 2009, respectively, in CA- G.R. CV. No. 76243,
which reversed the Decision4 dated August 14, 2002 of
Branch 107 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q- 99-37829.
Petitioner Maria Teresa and respondent Rodolfo De La
Fuente, Jr. (Rodolfo) first met when they were students at
the University of Sto. Tomas. Soon thereafter, they became
sweethearts.5
After graduating from college, Maria Teresa found work at
the University of Sto. Tomas Treasurer's Office.6Meanwhile,
Rodolfo, who was unable to finish his college degree, found
continued employment at his family's printing press
business.7
While they were still sweethearts, Maria Teresa already
noticed that Rodolfo was an introvert and was prone to
jealousy.8 She also observed that Rodolfo appeared to have
no ambition in life and felt insecure of his siblings, who
excelled in their studies and careers.9
On June 21, 1984, Maria Teresa and Rodolfo got married in
Mandaluyong City. They had two children: Maria Katharyn,
who was born on May 23, 1985, and Maria Kimberly, who
was born on April 6, 1986.10
Rodolfo's attitude worsened as they went on with their
marital life. He was jealous of everyone who talked to Maria
Teresa, and would even skip work at his family's printing
press to stalk her.11 Rodolfo's jealousy was so severe that he
once poked a gun at his own 15-year old cousin who was
staying at their house because he suspected his cousin of
being Maria Teresa's lover.12
In addition, Rodolfo treated Maria Teresa like a sex slave.
They would have sex four (4) or five (5) times a day.13 At
times, Rodolfo would fetch Maria Teresa from her office
during her lunch break, just so they could have sex. 14During
sexual intercourse, Rodolfo would either tie her to the bed or
poke her with things.15 Rodolfo also suggested that they
invite a third person with them while having sex, or for Maria
Teresa to have sex with another man in Rodolfo's
presence.16 Rodolfo's suggestions made Maria Teresa feel
molested and maltreated.17 Whenever Maria Teresa refused
Rodolfo's advances or suggestions, he would get angry and
they would quarrel.18
Maria Teresa sought the advice of a doctor, a lawyer, and a
priest, as well as any person she thought could help her and
Rodolfo.19 Maria Teresa also suggested that she and
Rodolfo undergo marriage counselling, but Rodolfo refused
and deemed it as mere "kalokohan".20
Sometime in 1986, the couple quarrelled because Rodolfo
suspected that Maria Teresa was having an affair.21 In the
heat of their quarrel, Rodolfo poked a gun at Maria Teresa's
head. Maria Teresa, with their two (2) daughters in tow, left
Rodolfo and their conjugal home after the gunpoking
incident. Maria Teresa never saw Rodolfo again after that,
and she supported their children by herself.22
On June 3, 1999, Maria Teresa filed a petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage23 before the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City. The case was initially archived because
Rodolfo failed to file a responsive pleading.24 Maria Teresa
moved for the revival of the Petition.25 The trial court granted
the motion and referred the case to the Office of the City
Prosecutor for collusion investigation.26 Assistant City
Prosecutor Jocelyn S. Reyes found no collusion and
recommended the trial of the case on the merits.27
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
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Despite notice, Rodolfo failed to attend the scheduled pre-
trial conference.28 The pre-trial conference was declared
closed and terminated, and Maria Teresa was allowed to
present her evidence.29
Aside from Maria Teresa, Dr. Arnulfo V. Lopez (Dr. Lopez), a
clinical psychologist, was presented as an expert
witness.30 Dr. Lopez testified that he conducted an in-depth
interview with Maria Teresa to gather information on her
family background and her marital life with Rodolfo, and
subjected her to a battery of psychological tests.31 Dr. Lopez
also interviewed Rodolfo's best friend.32
After subjecting Maria Teresa to interviews and tests, Dr.
Lopez concluded that Maria Teresa was not suffering from
any severe mental disorder and had no indication of any
organic or functional impairment.33 Although Dr. Lopez found
that Maria Teresa had an emotionally disturbed personality,
he opined that this was not severe enough to constitute
psychological incapacity.34
Dr. Lopez affirmed that he sent Rodolfo a letter of invitation
through registered mail.35 After two (2) months, Rodolfo
contacted Dr. Lopez and said, "Doctor, ano ba ang pakialam
niyo sa amin, hindi niyo naman ako kilala." Dr. Lopez
explained that he only wanted to hear Rodolfo's side of the
story, but Rodolfo replied with, "[I]nuulit ko doktor, wala
kayong pakialam sa akin."36
Dr. Lopez diagnosed Rodolfo with "paranoid personality
disorder manifested by [Rodolfo's] damaging behavior like
reckless driving and extreme jealousy; his being distrustful
and suspicious; his severe doubts and distrust of friends and
relatives of [Maria Teresa]; his being irresponsible and lack
of remorse; his resistance to treatment; and his emotional
coldness and severe immaturity."37
Dr. Lopez stated that Rodolfo's disorder was one of the
severe forms of personality disorder, even more severe than
the other personality disorders like borderline and narcissistic
personality disorders.38 Dr. Lopez explained that Rodolfo's
personality disorder was most probably caused by a
pathogenic parental model.39 Rodolfo's family background
showed that his father was a psychiatric patient, and Rodolfo
might have developed psychic contamination called double
insanity, a symptom similar to his father's.40 Dr. Lopez further
claimed that Rodolfo's disorder was serious and incurable
because of his severe paranoia.41
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Dr. Lopez recommended that Maria Teresa and Rodolfo's
marriage be annulled due to Rodolfo's incapacity to perform
his marital obligations.42
Summons was served upon Rodolfo but he did not file any
responsive leading.43 He likewise did not appear during the
pre-trial conference.44 He was given a specific date to
present evidence but he still failed to appear.45 he trial court
eventually deemed his non-appearance as a waiver of his
right to present evidence.46
On June 26, 2002, the trial court directed the Office of the
Solicitor General to submit its comment on Maria Teresa's
formal offer of evidence.47 The Office of the Solicitor General
was also directed to submit its certification.48 The Office of
the Solicitor General, however, failed to comply with the trial
court's orders; thus, the case was submitted for decision
without the certification and comment from the Office of the
Solicitor General.49
On August 14, 2002, the trial court promulgated its
Decision50 granting the petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
While Dr. Lopez was not able to personally examine Rodolfo,
the trial court gave credence to his findings as they were
based on information gathered from credible informants. The
trial court held that the marriage between Maria Teresa and
Rodolfo should be declared null and void because
"[Rodolfo's] psychological incapacity [was] grave, serious
and incurable."51 The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads:
WHEREFORE IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is
hereby rendered, to wit:
(1) Declaring the marriage of petitioner, MARIA TERESA B.
TANI DE LA FUENTE to respondent, RODOLFO DE LA
FUENTE, JR. null and void on the ground of respondent's
psychological incapacity pursuant to Article 36 of the Family
Code. Their conjugal partnership (sic) property relations is
hereby dissolved. There being no mention of properties
acquired by the parties, no pronouncement as to its
liquidation and partition is hereby made;
(2) Their children, Maria Katharyn and Maria Kimberly, both
surnamed De la Fuente shall remain legitimate. They shall
remain in the custody of the petitioner.
(3) Both parties must support their children. There being no
evidence presented as to the capability of the respondent to
give support, no pronouncement is hereby made in the
meantime;
(4) Henceforth, the petitioner shall be known by her maiden
name, TANI.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrars of Quezon City and Mandaluyong City where the
marriage was celebrated upon the finality of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.52 (Emphasis in the original)
On August 20, 2002, the Office of the Solicitor General filed
a motion for reconsideration.53 The Office of the Solicitor
General explained that it was unable to submit the required
certification because it had no copies of the transcripts of
stenographic notes.54 It was also unable to inform the trial
court of its lack of transcripts due to the volume of cases it
was handling.55
On September 13, 2002, the trial court denied the motion for
reconsideration, with the dispositive portion reading:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the Motion for
Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General is
hereby deemed moot and academic.
This Court would like to call the attention of the Office of the
Solicitor General that this case was filed on June 3, 1999
and there should be no more delay in the disposition of the
case.56
The Office of the Solicitor General filed an appeal before the
Court of Appeals.57 It argued that the trial court erred a) in
deciding the case without the required certification from the
Office of the Solicitor General,58 and b) in giving credence to
Dr. Lopez's conclusion of Rodolfo's severe personality
disorder. It held that Dr. Lopez's finding was based on
insufficient data and did not follow the standards set forth in
the Molina case.59
The Court of Appeals granted60 the Office of the Solicitor
General's appeal.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimony of Dr. Lopez
was unreliable for being hearsay, thus, the trial court should
14
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
not have given it weight.61 The Court of Appeals also
disagreed with Dr. Lopez's finding that Rodolfo's behavior
descended from psychological illness contemplated under
Article 36 of the Family Code.62
In addition, the Court of Appeals emphasized that Maria
Teresa's admission that she married Rodolfo with the belief
that he would change, and that they were in a relationship for
five (5) years before getting married, showed that they were
in good terms during the early part of their marriage. It also
negated her claim that Rodolfo's psychological defect existed
at the time of the celebration of their marriage, and that it
deprived him of the ability to assume the essential duties of
marriage.63 The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the DECISION DATED AUGUST 14, 2002 is
REVERSED and the petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of the parties is DISMISSED.
64
SO ORDERED. (Emphasis in the original)
Maria Teresa moved for reconsideration65 but this was
denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution66 dated May
25, 2009.
On July 24, 2009, Maria Teresa filed a Petition for Review
on Certiorari.67
Petitioner argued that based on current jurisprudence, trial
courts had a wider discretion on whether expert opinion was
needed to prove psychological incapacity.68 Petitioner further
argued that for as long as the trial court had basis in
concluding that psychological incapacity existed, such
conclusion should be upheld.69
Rodolfo filed a Comment70 stating that he was not opposing
Maria Teresa's Petition since "[h]e firmly believes that there
is in fact no more sense in adjudging him and petitioner as
married."71
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its Comment, 72 agreed
that a physician was not required to declare a person
psychologically incapacitated but emphasized that the
evidence presented must be able to adequately prove the
presence of a psychological condition. The Office of the
Solicitor General maintained that Maria Teresa was unable
to sufficiently prove Rodolfo's alleged psychological
incapacity.73
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
The Office of the Solicitor General pointed out that Dr.
Lopez's psychological report stated that his assessment was
based on interviews he made with petitioner and two (2) of
the parties' common friends. However, Dr. Lopez did not
name the two (2) common friends in the
report.74 Furthermore, during trial Dr. Lopez testified that he
only interviewed petitioner and Rodolfo's best friend, not two
(2) friends as indicated in his report.75 The Office of the
Solicitor General insisted that the finding of Rodolfo's
psychological incapacity should be dismissed as hearsay as
it was based solely on information given by petitioner to Dr.
Lopez.76
The only issue raised for the resolution of this Court is
whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying the Petition
for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage because petitioner's
evidence was insufficient to prove that Rodolfo was
psychologically incapacitated to fulfill his marital obligations.
The Petition is granted.
The 1995 case of Santos v. Court of Appeals77 was the first
case that attempted to lay down the standards for
determining psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Santos declared that "psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability."78 Furthermore, the
incapacity "should refer to no less than a mental (not
physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly incognitive
of the basic marital covenants that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage[.]"79
Two (2) years later, Republic v. Court of Appeals and
Molina,80 provided the guidelines to be followed when
interpreting and applying Article 36 of the Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage
belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor
of the existence and continuation of the marriage and against
its dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both
our Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage
and unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an
entire Article on the Family, recognizing it "as the foundation
of the nation." It decrees marriage as legally "inviolable,"
thereby protecting it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties. Both the family and marriage are to be "protected" by
the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be
(a) medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the
complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly
explained in the decision. Article 36 of the Family Code
requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may
be physical. The evidence must convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was mentally or psychically ill to such
an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of
such incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the
application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as
a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at "the time
of the celebration" of the marriage. The evidence must show
that the illness was existing when the parties exchanged
their "I do's." The manifestation of the illness need not be
perceivable at such time, but the illness itself must have
attached at such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the
assumption of marriage obligations, not necessarily to those
not related to marriage, like the exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of children and prescribing medicine
to cure them but may not be psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise his/her own children as an
essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, "mild characterological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outbursts" cannot be
accepted as root causes. The illness must be shown as
downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill will. In other words, there is a natal or
supervening disabling factor in the person, an adverse
integral element in the personality structure that effectively
15
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
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incapacitates the person from really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced
by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the
husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the
same Code in regard to parents and their children. Such
non-complied marital obligation(s) must also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence and included in the text of the
decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given
great respect by our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was
taken by the Family Code Revision Committee from Canon
1095 of the New Code of Canon Law, which became
effective in 1983 and which provides:
"The following are incapable of contracting marriage: Those
who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature."
Since the purpose of including such provision in our Family
Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious faith of
our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally - subject to our
law on evidence - what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source and
purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church - while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other - shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the
state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor
General issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his agreement
or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The
Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting attorney, shall
submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of
the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated
under Canon 1095.81 (Emphasis in the original)
Contrary to the ruling of the Court of Appeals, we find that
there was sufficient compliance with Molina to warrant the
nullity of petitioner's marriage with respondent. Petitioner
was able to discharge the burden of proof that respondent
suffered from psychological incapacity.
The Court of Appeals chided the lower court for giving undue
weight to the testimony of Dr. Lopez since he had no chance
to personally conduct a thorough study and analysis of
respondent's mental and psychological condition. The Court
of Appeals cited Republic v. Dagdag,82 where this Court held
that "the root cause of psychological incapacity must be
medically or clinically identified and sufficiently proven by
experts."83 The Court of Appeals then ruled that "[o]bviously,
this requirement is not deemed complied with where no
psychiatrist or medical doctor testifies on the alleged
psychological incapacity of one party."84
The Court of Appeals is mistaken.
Camacho-Reyes v. Reyes85 states that the non-examination
of one of the parties will not automatically render as hearsay
or invalidate the findings of the examining psychiatrist or
psychologist, since "marriage, by its very definition,
necessarily involves only two persons. The totality of the
behavior of one spouse during the cohabitation and marriage
is generally and genuinely witnessed mainly by the other."86
Marcos v. Marcos87 emphasizes that Molina does not require
a physician to examine a person and declare him/her to be
psychologically incapacitated. What matters is that the
totality of evidence presented establishes the party's
psychological condition.88
Dr. Lopez's testimony, as corroborated by petitioner,
sufficiently proved that respondent suffered from
psychological incapacity. Respondent's paranoid personality
disorder made him distrustful and prone to extreme jealousy
and acts of depravity, incapacitating him to fully comprehend
and assume the essential obligations of marriage. As the trial
court found:
Dr. Lopez testified that he arrived at his conclusion of
respondent' [s] personality by taking into consideration the
psychological impression and conclusion he gathered from
the analysis of the different behaviors he manifested during
the time that he and petitioner were living together.
According to him, under the Diagnostic Statistical Manual, he
found the respondent to be suffering from a paranoid
personality disorder manifested by the respondent's
damaging behavior like reckless driving and extreme
jealousy; his being distrustful and suspicious; his severe
doubts and distrust of friends and relatives of the petitioner;
his being irresponsible and lack of remorse; his resistance to
treatment; and his emotional coldness and severe
immaturity. He also testified that this kind of disorder is
actually one of the severe forms of personality disorder even
more severe than the other personality disorders like the
borderline and narcissistic personality disorders.
As to the root cause, [h]e explained that this must have been
caused by a pathogenic parental model. As he investigated
the family background of the respondent, Dr. Lopez
discovered that his father was a psychiatric patient such that
the respondent developed a similar symptom or psychic
contamination which is called double insanity. This,
according to Dr. Lopez is usually developed among close
family members, bestfriends (sic), sweethearts and even
couples who are close to one another; that people close to
one another get psychically contaminated; that surprisingly,
the symptom that the father manifested is the same as those
of the respondent. The said disorder started during
respondent's late childhood years and developed in his early
adolescent years.
He further testified that this disorder is very severe, serious
and incurable because of the severe paranoia of the patient;
that patients with this kind of personality disorder could never
accept that there is something wrong with them and if ever
forced to seek treatment, they would rather engage in an
intellectual battle with the therapist rather than cooperate
with them.
Dr. Lopez concluded that because of respondent's
personality disorder, he is incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations of giving love, respect, and support to the
petitioner.1âwphi1 He recommends that the marriage be
annulled.89 (Emphasis supplied)
By the very nature of Article 36, courts, despite having the
ultimate task of decision-making, must give due regard to
expert opinion on the psychological and mental disposition of
the parties.90
The root cause of respondent's paranoid personality disorder
was hereditary in nature as his own father suffered from a
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
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similar disorder. Dr. Lopez stated that respondent's own
psychological disorder probably started during his late
childhood years and developed in his early adolescent years.
Dr. Lopez explained that respondent's psychological
incapacity to perform his marital obligations was likely
caused by growing up with a pathogenic parental model.
The juridical antecedence of respondent's psychological
incapacity was also sufficiently proven during trial. Petitioner
attested that she noticed respondent's jealousy even before
their marriage, and that he would often follow her to make
sure that she did not talk to anyone or cheat on him. 91 She
believed that he would change after they got
married;92 however, this did not happen. Respondent's
jealousy and paranoia were so extreme and severe that
these caused him to poke a gun at petitioner's head.93
The incurability and severity of respondent's psychological
incapacity were likewise discussed by Dr. Lopez. He
vouched that a person with paranoid personality disorder
would refuse to admit that there was something wrong and
that there was a need for treatment. This was corroborated
by petitioner when she stated that respondent repeatedly
refused treatment. Petitioner consulted a lawyer, a priest,
and a doctor, and suggested couples counselling to
respondent; however, respondent refused all of her attempts
at seeking professional help. Respondent also refused to be
examined by Dr. Lopez.
Article 68 of the Family Code obligates the husband and wife
"to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity,
and render mutual help and support." In this case, petitioner
and respondent may have lived together, but the facts
narrated by petitioner show that respondent failed to, or
could not, comply with the obligations expected of him as a
husband. He was even apathetic that petitioner filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of their marriage.
This Court also noticed respondent's repeated acts of
harassment towards petitioner, which show his need to
intimidate and dominate her, a classic case of coercive
control. At first, respondent only inflicted nonphysical forms
of mistreatment on petitioner by alienating her from her
family and friends due to his jealousy, and stalking her due to
his paranoia. However, his jealousy soon escalated into
physical violence when, on separate instances, he poked a
gun at his teenage cousin, and at petitioner.
Coercive control is a form of psychological abuse, which
refers to a pattern of behavior meant to dominate a partner
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
through different tactics such as physical and sexual
violence, threats, emotional insults, and economic
deprivation.94 Although not specifically named, coercive
control as a form of psychological abuse or harm has been
recognized in Republic Act No. 9262 or the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Children Act of 2004:
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. -As used in this Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against a
woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship,
or with whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family
abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not limited
to, the following acts:
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering of
the victim such as but not limited to intimidation, harassment,
stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or humiliation,
repeated verbal abuse and mental infidelity. It includes
causing or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual
or psychological abuse of a member of the family to which
the victim belongs, or to witness pornography in any form or
to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted
deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
Respondent's repeated behavior of psychological abuse by
intimidating, stalking, and isolating his wife from her family
and friends, as well as his increasing acts of physical
violence, are proof of his depravity, and utter lack of
comprehension of what marriage and partnership entail. It
would be of utmost cruelty for this Court to decree that
petitioner should remain married to respondent. After she
had exerted efforts to save their marriage and their family,
respondent simply refused to believe that there was anything
wrong in their marriage. This shows that respondent truly
could not comprehend and perform his marital obligations.
This fact is persuasive enough for this Court to believe that
respondent's mental illness is incurable.
In granting the petition and declaring void the marriage of
Maria Teresa and Rodolfo, this Court reiterates the
pronouncement we made in an opinion in Mallilin v.
Jamesolamin:95
Our choices of intimate partners define us - inherent
ironically in our individuality. Consequently, when the law
speaks of the nature, consequences, and incidents of
marriage governed by law, this refers to responsibility to
children, property relations, disqualifications, privileges, and
other matters limited to ensuring the stability of
society.1âwphi1 The state's interest should not amount to
unwarranted intrusions into individual liberties.
Since the State's interest must be toward the stability of
society, the notion of psychological incapacity should not
only be based on a medical or psychological disorder, but
should consist of the inability to comply with essential marital
obligations such that public interest is imperiled.96
Lastly, this Court takes note of Ngo Te v. Gutierrez Yu
Te's observation that a straitjacket application of
the Molina guidelines "has taken its toll on people who have
to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and sociopathic
personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by
little the very foundation of their families, our basic social
institutions."97 Ironically, the ultimate effect of such stringent
application of the Molina guidelines is the perversion of the
family unit, the very institution that our laws are meant to
protect.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition
is GRANTED. The marriage of Maria Teresa Tani-De La
Fuente and Rodolfo De La Fuente is declared NULL and
VOID. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated August 29, 2008 and May 25, 2009, respectively, in
CA-G.R. CV. No. 76243 are REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated August 14, 2002 of Branch 107,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-99-
37829 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 217993
MANUEL R. BAKUNAWA III,, Petitioner,
vs.
NORA REYES BAKUNAWA,, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
REYES, JR, J.:
For resolution of the Court is a petition for review
on certiorari1 filed by Manuel R. Bakunawa III (Manuel)
challenging the Decision2 dated March 27, 2014 and
Resolution3 dated April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 98579, which upheld the validity of
his marriage to Nora Reyes Bakunawa (Nora).
The Facts
Manuel and Nora met in 1974 at the University of the
Philippines where they were students and became
sweethearts. When Nora became pregnant, she and Manuel
got married on July 26, 1975 at St. Ignatius Church, Camp
Aguinaldo, Quezon City.4
Because Manuel and Nora were both college
undergraduates at that time, they lived with Manuel's
parents. While Nora was able to graduate, Manuel had to
stop his studies to help his father in the family's construction
business. Manuel was assigned to provincial projects and
came home only during weekends. This setup continued
even as Nora gave birth to their eldest child, Moncho Manuel
(Moncho). However, whenever Manuel came back from his
provincial assignments, he chose to spend his limited time
with friends and girlfriends instead of his family. Nora
resented this and they started quarreling about Manuel's
behavior. Worse, Manuel depended on his father and on
Nora for their family's needs.5
In 1976, Manuel and Nora lived separately from Manuel's
parents. It was during this period th.at Manuel first observed
Nora's passiveness and laziness; she was moody and
mercurial. Their house was often dirty and disorderly. Thus,
Manuel became more irritated with Nora and their verbal
quarrels escalated to physical violence.6
On May 9, 1977, Nora gave birth to their second child.
However, nothing changed in their relationship. Manuel
spent most of his time with friends and engaged in drinking
sprees. In 1979, he had an extramarital affair and seldom
came home. He eventually left Nora and their children in
1980 to cohabit with his girlfriend. They considered
themselves separated.7
In 1985, Manuel, upon Nora's request, bought a house for
her and their children. After Manuel spent a few nights with
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
them in the new house, Nora became pregnant again and
thereafter gave birth to their third child.8
On June 19, 2008, Manuel filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Quezon City,9 on the ground that he and Nora are
psychologica11y incapacitated to comply with the essential
obligations of marriage.
Manuel presented a psychiatrist, Dr. Cecilia Villegas (Dr.
Villegas), who testified that Manuel has Intermittent
Explosive Disorder, characterized by irritability and
aggressive behavior that is not proportionate to the cause.
Dr. Villegas diagnosed Nora with Passive Aggressive
Personality Disorder, marked by a display of negative
attitude and passive resistance in her relationship with
Manuel. Her findings were based on her interview with
Manuel and the parties' eldest son, Moncho, because Nora
did not participate in the psychological assessment.10
Manuel alleges in his petition that he continues to live with
his common-law wife and has a son with her, whereas, Nora
lives alone in her unit in Cubao, Quezon City. Their house
and lot was already foreclosed following Nora's failure to pay
a loan secured by a mortgage on the said property.11
Ruling of the RTC
The R TC granted the petition in its Decision12 dated March
28, 2011. The dispositive portion thereof reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby
rendered declaring the marriage
between MANUEL R. BAKUNAWAIII and NORAREYESBA
KUNAWA null and void ab initio under Article 36 of the
Family Code.
The Office of the City Civil Registrar of Quezon City is
hereby ordered to make entries into the records of the
respective parties pursuant to the judgment of the Court.
Let a copy of this Decision be furnished upon the Office of
Solicitor General, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon
City, the Office of the Civil Registrars of Quezon City, and
the National Statistics Office, as well as the parties and
counsel.
SO ORDERED.13
Nora appealed the RTC decision to the CA, arguing inter
alia that the RTC erred in finding that the testimony of the
psychiatrist is sufficient to prove the parties' psychological
incapacity.
Ruling of the CA
The CA, in its Decision14 dated March 27, 2014, granted
Nora's appeal and reversed the RTC decision. The decretal
portion of the decision states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal filed
by [Nora] is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 28, 2011
of the RTC, National Capital Judicial Region in Civil Case
No. Q-08-62822 is REVERSED and SETASIDE.
SO ORDERED.15
The CA denied Manuel's motion for
reconsideration16 through a Resolution17 dated April 22,
2015.
Manuel filed the present petition raising the following
grounds:
I. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT UPHELD THE
VALIDITY OF °THE MARRIAGE OF THE PARTIES
DESPITE MORE THAN CLEAR AND CONVINCING
EVIDENCE TO DECLARE ITS NULLITY DUE TO THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF EITHER OR BOTH
PARTIES TO PERFORM THEIR MARITAL OBLIGATIONS;
and
II. THE HONORABLE CA ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
RECONSIDER ITS DECISION DATED MARCH 27, 2014
DESPITE MORE THAN COMPELLING REASONS FOR
THE REVERSAL THEREOF.18
Ruling of the Court
As the CA correctly ruled, the totality of evidence presented
by Manuel comprising of his testimony and that of Dr.
Villegas, as well as the latter's psychological evaluation
report, is insufficient to prove that he and Nora are
psychologically incapacitated to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
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Dr. Villegas' conclusion that Manuel is afflicted with
Intermittent Explosive Disorder and that Nora has Passive
Aggressive Personality Disorder which render them
psychologically incapacitated under Article 36 of the Family
Code,19 is solely based on her interviews with Manuel and
the parties' eldest child, Moncho. Consequently, the CA did
not err in not according probative value to her psychological
evaluation report and testimony.
20
In Republic of the Philippines v. Galang, the Court held that
"[i]f the incapacity can be proven by independent means, no
reason exists why such independent proof cannot be
admitted to support a conclusion of psychological incapacity,
independently of a psychologist's examination and
report."21 In Toring v. Toring, et al.,22 the Court stated that:
Other than from the spouses, such evidence can come from
persons intimately related to them, such as relatives, close
friends or even family doctors or lawyers who could testify on
the allegedly incapacitated spouses' condition at or about the
time of marriage, or to subsequent occurring events that
trace their roots to the incapacity already present at the time
of marriage.23
In this case, the only person interviewed by Dr. Villegas
aside from Manuel for the spouses' psychological evaluation
was Moncho, who could not be considered as a reliable
witness to establish the psychological incapacity of his
parents in relation to Article 36 of the Family Code, since he
could not have been there at the time his parents were
married.
The Court also notes that Dr. Villegas did not administer any
psychological tests on Manuel despite having had the
opportunity to do so. While the Court has declared that there
is no requirement that the person to be declared
psychologically incapacitated should be personally examined
by a physician,24 much less be subjected to psychological
tests, this rule finds application only if the totality of evidence
presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological
incapacity. In this case, the supposed personality disorder of
Manuel could have been established by means of
psychometric and neurological tests which are objective
means designed to measure specific aspects of people's
intelligence, thinking, or personality.25
With regard to the Confirmatory Decree26 of the National
Tribunal of Appeals, which affirmed the decision of the
Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the Archdiocese of
Manila in favor of nullity of the Catholic marriage of Manuel
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
and Nora, the Court accords the same with great respect but
does not consider the same as controlling and decisive, in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.27
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby DENIED.
The Decision dated March 27, 2014 and Resolution dated
April 22, 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
98579 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210766
MARIA CONCEPCION N. SINGSON a.k.a. CONCEPCION
N. SINGSON, Petitioner
vs.
BENJAMIN L. SINGSON, Respondent
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the
August 29, 2013 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) and
its January 6, 2014 Resolution3 in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662,
which reversed and set aside the November 12, 2010
Decision4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque
City, Branch 260, in Civil Case No. 07-0070.
Factual Antecedents
On February 27, 2007, Maria Concepcion N. Singson a.k.a.
Concepcion N. Singson (petitioner) filed a Petition5 for
declaration of nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code of the Philippines6 (Family Code). This was
docketed as Civil Case No. 07-0070.
It was alleged therein that on July 6, 1974, petitioner and
Benjamin L. Singson (respondent) were married before the
Rev. Fr. Alfonso L. Casteig at St. Francis Church,
Mandaluyong, Rizal; that said marriage produced four
children, all of whom are now of legal age; that when they
started living together, petitioner noticed that respondent was
"dishonest, unreasonably extravagant at the expense of the
family's welfare, extremely vain physically
spiritually,"7 and a compulsive gambler; that respondent was
immature, and was w1ab1e to perform his paternal duties;
that respondent was also irresponsible, an easy-going man,
and guilty of infidelity; that respondent's abnormal behavior
made him completely unable to render any help, support, or
assistance to her; and that because she could expect no
help or assistance at all from respondent she was compelled
to work doubly hard to support her family as the sole
breadwinner.
Petitioner also averred that at the time she filed this Petition,
respondent was confined at Metro Psych Facility, 8 a
rehabilitation institution in Pasig City; and that respondent's
attending psychiatrist, Dr. Benita Sta. Ana-Ponio (Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio), made the following diagnosis on respondent:
Based on history, mental status examination and
observation, he is diagnosed to be suffering from
Pathological Gambling as manifested by:
a. preoccupation with gambling, thinking of ways to
get money with which to gamble as seen in his
stealing and pawning jewelries and appliances[;]
b. needs to gamble with increasing amounts of
money in order to achieve the desired effect[;]
c. lies to family members or others to conceal the
extent of [his] involvement with gambling[;]
d. committed illegal acts such as forging the
signature of his wife, issuing bouncing checks in
order to finance his gambling[;]
e. has jeopardized his relationship with his wife,
lost the respect of his children, lost a good career
in banking because of gambling[;]
f. [relies] on his parents, his wife, and siblings to
provide money to relieve a desperate fmancial
situation caused by gambling[;]
While he apparently had Typhoid fever that resulted [in]
behavioral changes as a young boy, it would be difficult to
say that the psychotic episodes he manifested in 2003 and
2006 [are] etiologically related to the general medical
condition that occurred in his childhood.
and
Furthermore, [respondent] manifests an enduring pattern of
behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of our
culture as manifested in the following areas:
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
a. his ways of perceiving and interpreting [his own]
self, other people, and events[;]
b. his emotional response[;]
c. his poor impulse control[;]
Such pattern is inflexible and pervasive and has led to
significant impairment in social, occupational and
interpersonal relationship. In [respondent's] case, this has
persisted for several years, and can be traced back [to] his
adolescence since he started gambling while in high school.
He is therefore diagnosed to be suffering from Personality
Disorder.
All these[,] put together, [hinder respondent] from performing
his marital obligations.9
Petitioner moreover asserted that respondent came from a
"distraught" family and had a "dysfunctional" childhood; 10that
respondent had all the love, care, and protection of his
parents as the youngest child for some time; but that these
parental love, care and protection were, however, transferred
to his youngest brother who was born when respondent was
almost five years old; and that these factors caused
respondent emotional devastation from which he never
recovered.
Petitioner added that unknown to her, respondent even as a
high school student, was already betting on jai alai. She also
claimed that she tried to adjust to respondent's personality
disorders, but that she did not attain her goal.
Finally, petitioner claimed that she and respondent did not
enter into any ante-nuptial agreement to govern their
prope1ty relations as husband and wife and that they had no
conjugal assets or debts.
On June 19, 2007, respondent filed his Answer.11
Traversing petitioner's allegations, respondent claimed that
"psychological incapacity" must be characterized by gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability, which are not present
in the instant case because petitioner's allegations are not
supported by facts.
Respondent further averred that it was not true that he failed
to render any help, support or assistance to petitioner and
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
their family; that the family home where petitioner and their
children are living was in fact his own capital property; that
his shortcomings as mentioned by petitioner do not pertain to
the most grave or serious cases of personality disorders that
would satisfy the standards required to obtain a decree of
nullity of marriage; that petitioner's complaint is nothing more
than a complaint of a woman with an unsatisfactory marriage
who wants to get out of it; that contrary to petitioner's claim
that he is a good-for-nothing fellow, he has a college degree
in business administration, and is a bank employee, and, that
it was money problem, and not his alleged personality
disorder, that is the wall that divided him and petitioner.
Respondent also claimed that petitioner failed to lay the
basis for the conclusions of the psychiatrist to the effect that
he is suffering from pathological gambling and personality
disorder; that petitioner's allegation that he came from a
distraught family and that he suffered emotional devastation
is vague, and bereft of particular details, and even
slanderous; and that assuming that he had not acted the way
petitioner expected him to conduct himself, his actions and
behavior are not psychological illnesses or personality
disorders, but simply physical illnesses of the body, akin to
hypertension and allied sicknesses, and that these physical
illnesses are not at all incurable psychiatric disorders that
were present at the time of his marriage with petitioner.
Respondent furthermore claimed that he and petitioner had
conjugal assets and debts; that the land where their family
home is built came from his earnings, hence the family home
is their conjugal property; that he and petitioner also have a
house and lot in Tagaytay City, as well as bank accounts that
are in petitioner's name only; and he and petitioner also have
investments in shares of stocks, cars, household appliances,
furniture, and jewelry; and that these are conjugal assets
because they came from petitioner's salaries and his
(respondent's) own inheritance money.
Respondent moreover alleged that before the filing of the
present Petition, petitioner had caused him to be admitted
into the Metro Psych Facility for treatment; that on account of
his confinement and treatment in this psychiatric facility, he
has incurred medical expenses and professional medical
fees; and that since it is petitioner who manages all their
finances and conjugal assets it stands to reason that he
should be awarded '"spousal support."
12
On July 25, 2007, the RTC issued its Pre-Trial Order.
Trial thereafter ensued. Petitioner's witnesses included
herself, her son, Jose Angelo Singson (Jose), and Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio.
On February 23, 2010, petitioner filed her Formal Offer of
Evidence which included a photocopy of the marriage
contract; the birth certificates of their four children; her son
Jose’s Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a photocopy of
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's Judicial Affidavit dated June 25, 2008;
Clinical Summary of respondent issued by Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio dated February 11, 2007 (Clinical Summary); her
(petitioner's) own Judicial Affidavit dated April 2, 2008; a
photocopy of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 179751
registered in the names of the parties' four children:, and a
notarized document entitled "Summary of Sources and Uses
of Funds for tJ1e period November 1999 to March 31, 2008"
executed by petitioner and described as a detailed summary
of expenses paid for with the proceeds of respondent's share
in the sale of the latter's house in Magallanes Village.13
Respondent filed his Comment thereon.14
On March 29, 2010, the RTC admitted petitioner’s exhibits.15
On May 13, 2010, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss16 "on
the ground that the totality of evidence presented by
petitioner did not establish [his] psychological incapacity x x x
to comply with the essential martial obligations x x
x".17 Petitioner filed her Opposition18 thereto, and respondent
tendered his Comment thereon.19
On May 17, 2010, the RTC denied respondent’s Motion to
Dismiss and stood pat on its March 29, 2010 Order.20
During the September 30, 2010 hearing, respondent’s
counsel manifested that his client was waiving the right to
present countervailing evidence. Respondent’s counsel also
moved that the Petition at bar be submitted for decision on
the basis of the evidence already on the record. The RTC
thus declared the case submitted for decision.21
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
In its Decision of November 12, 2010, the RTC granted the
Petition and declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent void ab initio on the ground of the latter’s
psychological incapacity. The RTC disposed thus-
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WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the
petition is GRANTED. Judgment is hereby rendered[:]
1. DECLARING null and void ab initio the marriage
between MARIA CONCEPCION v. SINGSON a.k.a.
CONCEPCION N. SINGSON and BENJAMIN L children as evidenced by TCT No.
SINGSON solemnized on JULY 6, 1974 in Mandaluyong City
or any other marriage between them on the ground of
psychological' incapacity of the respondent.
2. ORDERING the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City
and the National Statistics Office to cancel the marriage
between the petitioner and the respondent as appearing in
the Registry of Marriage.
There are no other issues in this case.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Local Civil
Registrars ofMandaluyong City and Parañaque City, the
Office of the Solicitor General, the Office of the Civil Register
General (National Statistics Office) and the Office of the City
Prosecutor, Parañaque City.
SO ORDERED.22
The RTC ruled that the requisites warranting a finding of
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the family Code
are present in the instant case because the totality of
evidence showed that respondent is suffering from a
psychological condition that is grave, incurable, and has
juridical antecedence.
The RTC also found that the combined testimonies of
petitioner and Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio convincingly showed that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations; that respondent's inability to
perform his marital obligations as set out in Articles 68 to 71
of the Family Code, was essentially due to a psychological
abnormality arising from a pathological and utterly irresistible
urge to gamble.
The RTC cited "[Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's] findings [which] reveal
that respondent is suffering from Personality Disorder
known as Pathological Gambling."23 It ruled that it has
been shown that this personality disorder was present at the
time of celebration of marriage but became manifest only
later; that because of this personality disorder respondent
had already jeopardized his relationship with his family; and
that respondent's psychological disorder hinders the
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
performance of his obligations as a husband and as a
father.
Lastly, the RTC found that the only property owned in
common by spouses was donated in favor of the parties'
Respondent moved for reconsideration of this verdict.
But in its older dated January 6, 2011,24 the RTC denied
respondent's motion for reconsideration. It reiterated that the
expert witness had adequately established that respondent is
suffering from "Pathological Gambling Personality Disorder''
which is grave, permanent, and has juridical antecedence.
On February 4, 2011, respondent filed a Notice of
Appeal25 which was given due course by the RTC in its
order26 dated February 28, 2011.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In its Decision of August 29, 2013, the CA overturned the
RTC, and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated
12 November 2010 issued by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 260, Parañaque City in Civil Case No. 07-0070,
declaring the marriage between Maria Concepcion N.
Singson and Benjamin L. Singson null and void ab initio, is
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Instead, the Petition for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.27
The CA held that the totality of evidence presented by
petitioner failed to establish respondent's alleged
psychological incapacity to perform the essential marital
obligations, which in this case, was not at all proven to be
grave or serious, much less incurable, and furthermore was
not existing at the time of the marriage. What is more, the CA
declared that any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage, and against its
dissolution and nullity, in obedience to the mandate of the
Constitution and statutory laws; and that in this case,
petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving that
respondent is suffering from a serious or grave psychological
disorder that completely disables or incapacitates him from
understanding and discharging the essential obligations of
the marital union.
According to the CA, psychological incapacity is the
downright or utter incapacity or inability to take cognizance of
and to assume the basic marital obligations. The CA did not
go along with the RTC, which placed heavy reliance on Dr.
Sta. Ana-Ponio's finding that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations due
to a personality disorder known as pathological gambling.
The CA held that, contrary to petitioner's claim that
respondent's pathological gambling was grave or serious,
the evidence in fact showed that the latter was truly capable
of carrying out the ordinary duties of a married man because
he had a job, had provided money for the family from the
sale of his own property, and he likewise provided the land
on which the family home was built, and he also lives in the
family home with petitioner and their children.
On top of these, the CA ruled that it is settled that mere
difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations, or ill will on the part of a spouse, is different from
incapacity rooted in some debilitating psychological condition
or illness; that the evidence at bar showed that respondent's
alleged pathological gambling arose after the marriage; that
in fact petitioner admitted that she was not aware of any
gambling by respondent before they got married; that
petitioner moreover acknowledged that respondent was a
kind and a caring person when he was courting her; that
petitioner likewise admitted that respondent also brought
petitioner to the hospital during all four instances when she
gave birth to their four children.
In other words, the CA found that respondent's purported
pathological gambling was not proven to be incurable or
permanent since respondent has been undergoing treatment
since 2003 and has been responding to the treatment.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration28 of the CA's Decision.
But her motion was denied by the CA in its Resolution of
January 6, 2014.29
Issue
Hence, the instant recourse with petitioner raising the
following question –
[WHETHER] THE [CA] ERRED IN REVERSING THE
DECISION OF THE [RTC].30
Petitioner's Arguments
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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
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In praying for the reversal of the assailed CA Decision and
Resolution, and in asking for the reinstatement of the RTC
Decision, petitioner argues in her Petition,31 Reply,32 and
Memorandum33 that respondent's psychological incapacity
had been duly proved in court, including its juridical
antecedence, incurability, and gravity.
First, petitioner maintains that respondent failed to perform
the marital duties of mutual love, respect, and support; that
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's expert findings are corroborated by the
testimonies of petitioner end her son Jose both of whom
demonstrated that respondent’s psychological incapacity is
grave or serious rendering him incapable to perform the
essential marital obligations; that for his pan, respondent had
adduced no proof that he (respondent) is capable of carrying
out the ordinary duties required in a marriage for the reason
that everything that the family had saved and built had been
squandered by respondent; and that respondent's
confinement at the rehabilitation facility is itself proof of the
gravity or seriousness of his psychological incapacity.
Second, petitioner contends that respondent’s psychological
incapacity preceded the marriage, as shown in Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio’s Clinical Summary, which pointed out that such
psychological incapacity, which included pathological
gambling, can be traced back when respondents was
already betting on jai alai even in high school, and this was
not known to his family; that the Clinical Summary was
based on information provided not only by petitioner, but by
respondent’s sister, and by respondent himself; that such
juridical antecedence was neither questioned nor overthrown
by countervailing evidence; and that the root cause could be
traced back to respondent’s flawed relationship with his
parents which developed into a psychological disorder that
existed before the marriage.
Third, petitioner insists that this Court can take judicial notice
of the fact that personality disorders are generally incurable
and permanent, and must continuously be treated medically;
that in this case the Clinical Summary; had pointed out that
respondent's understanding of his gambling problem is only
at the surface level; and that in point of fact Dr. Sta. Ana-
Ponio had affirmed that personality disorders are incurable.
Respondent’s Arguments
In his Comment34 and Memorandum,35 respondent counters
that the assailed CA Decision should be affirmed. He argues
that the grounds cited by petitioner are the self-same
grounds raised by petitioner before the RTC and the CA; that
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
petitioner's evidence indeed failed to prove convincingly that
he (respondent) is psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations, hence there is no basis
to declare the parties' marriage void ab initio.
Our Ruling
The Petition will not succeed.
It is axiomatic that the validity of marriage and the unity of
the family are enshrined in our Constitution and statutory
laws, hence any doubts attending the same are to be
resolved in favor of the continuance and validity of the
marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the
same rests at all times upon the petitioner.36 "The policy of
the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic social institution, and marriage as the foundation of the
family. Because of this, the Constitution decrees marriage as
legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim
of the parties."37
Article 1 of the Family Code describes marriage as "a special
contract of permanent union between a man and a woman
entered into in accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life" and as "the foundation of the family
and an inviolable social institution."
In the instant case, petitioner impugns the inviolability of this
social institution by suing out pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, which provides that:
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage,
shall likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes
manifest only after its solemnization. (As amended by
Executive Order 227)
Petitioner's case will thus be examined in light of the well-
entrenched case law rulings interpreting and construing the
quoted Article, to wit:
'Psychological incapacity,' as a ground to nullify a marriage
under Article 36 of the Family Code, should refer to no less
than a mental - not merely physical - incapacity that causes a
party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants
that concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the
parties to the marriage which, as so expressed in Article 68
of the Family Code, among others, include their mutual
obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity
and render help and support. There is hardly any doubt that
the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of
'psychological incapacity' to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. In Santos v. CA (Santos),the Court first
declared that psychological incapacity must be characterized
by: (a) gravity (i.e., it must be grave and serious such that
the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage); (b) juridical
antecedence (i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations
may emerge only after the marriage); and (c)
incurability (i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved). The Court laid down more definitive guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family
Code in Republic of the Phils. v. CA, x x x [also known as the
Molina guidelines]. These guidelines incorporate the basic
requirements that the Court established in Santos.38
In setting aside the RTC's ruling, the CA in this case held
that petitioner failed to prove that respondent was
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential
marital obligations because she failed to establish that such
incapacity was grave and serious, and that it existed at the
time of the marriage, and that it is incurable. We agree.
At the outset, this Court is constrained to peruse the records
because of the conflicting findings between the trial court and
the appellate court.39 We thus did peruse and review the
records, and we are satisfied that the CA correctly found that
respondent has the capability and ability to perform his
duties as a husband and father as against the RTC' s rather
general statement that respondent's psychological or
personality disorder hinders the performance of his basic
obligations as a husband and a father.
We agree with the CA that the evidence on record does not
establish that respondent's psychological incapacity was
grave and serious as defined by jurisprudential parameters
since "[respondent] had a job; provided money for the family
from the sale of his property; provided the land where the
family home was built on; and lived in the family home with
petitioner-appellee and their children."40
Upon the other hand, petitioner herself testified that
respondent had a job as the latter "was working at a certain
point."41 This is consistent with the information in Dr. Sta.
Ana-Ponio's Clinical Summary and testimony, which were
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both included in petitioner's formal offer of evidence,
respecting the parties' relationship history that petitioner and
respondent met at the bank where petitioner was applying for
a job and where respondent was employed as a credit
investigator prior to their courtship and their marriage.42
It is significant to note moreover that petitioner also
submitted as part of her evidence a notarized summary
dated February 18, 2010 which enumerated expenses paid
for by the proceeds of respondent's share in the sale of his
parents' home in Magallanes, Makati City which amounted to
around ₱2.9 million. Although petitioner was insinuating that
this amount was insufficient to cover the family expenses
from 1999 to 2008, we note that she admitted under oath
that the items for their family budget, such as their children's
education, the payments for association dues, and for
electric bills came from this money.
And no less significant is petitioner's admission that
respondent provided the land upon which the family home
was built, thus -
[Respondent's counsel to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Does [respondent] [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: He does not [own] any real property?
A: No.
Q: Showing to you Transfer Certificate of Title No. 413513 of
the Register of Deeds of Rizal which has been transferred
with the Register of Deeds of Paranaque and is now re-
numbered as S-25470, which is in the name of [respondent],
Filipino, of legal age, single.
xxxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Who owned this property?
A: Based on the document, it's Benjamin Singson.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Q: Where is this property located?
A: It is located in United Paranaque.
Q: Where in United Paranaque?
A: No. 2822 Daang Hari.
Q: Are you staying in that property?
A: We are staying in that property.
xxxx
[Respondent's counsel to the Witiress, petitioner]
Q: How about the house there, in the United Parañaque
[property], who owns it?
A: It was donated to the children.
xxxx
[COURT to the witness, petitioner]
Q: Based on the document, who is the registered owner?
A: It says there, [respondent], Your Honor.
Q: Who owns it now?
43
A: The children because it was donated [to them].
What's more, petitioner and respondent likewise lived
together as husband and wife since their marriage on
July 6,1974 (and in the company of their four children, too).
In fact, shunting aside the time that respondent was under
treatment at the Metro Psych Facility, petitioner did not
allege any instance when respondent failed to live with them.
To the foregoing, we ought to add the fact that petitioner
herself admitted, that respondent likewise brought her to the
hospital during all four instances that she gave birth to their
children.44
By contrast, petitioner did not proffer any convincing proof
that respondent’s mere confinement at the rehabilitation
center confirmed the gravity of the latter’s psychological
incapacity.
Neither does petitioner’s bare claim that respondent is a
pathological gambler, is irresponsible, and is unable to keep
a job, necessarily translate into unassailable proof that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated to perform the
essential marital obligations. It is settled that "[p]sychological
incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code contemplates
an incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume basic marital obligations, and is not merely the
difficulty, refusal, or neglect in the performance of marital
obligations or ill will."45 "[I]t is not enough to prove that a
spouse failed to meet his responsibility and duty as a married
person; it is essential that he or she must be shown to be
incapable of doing so because of some psychological, not
physical, illness."46
Nor can Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony in open court and her
Clinical Summary be taken for gospel truth in regard to the
charge that respondent is afflicted with utter inability to
appreciate his marital obligations. That much is clear from
the following testimony –
[Petitioner's counsel to the witness, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio]
Q: Madam Witness, do you know the respondent in this
case, Benjamin Singson?
A: Yes. [S]ir, [respondent] has been my patient since 2003,
during his first admission and again [in] 2006, [S]ir.
Q: So, he was confined twice in your facility, [M]adam
witness?
A: Yes, [S]ir.
Q: Why was he confined, Madam witness?
A: He was initially confined because of problems with
gambling and subsequently because of [behavioral] problem,
[S]ir.
xxxx
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Q: What was the cause of his second confinement, Madam
[W]itness?
A: Initially, he was able to cope after discharged. However,
[in] September of 2006, he knocked on the doors of the
maids in the middle of the night. And in one occasion, he got
his car in the garage and drove out bumping the car parked
right across the garage and he [also kept] takfr1g things out
from his cabinet. And if the maids would clean [these], he
[would] immediately take them out again. So, he was brought
to the facility in October because of his uncontrolled
behavior, [S]ir.
xxxx
Q: So, what [were] your clinical findings on the state of the
respondent, Benjamin Singson, Madam witness?
A: Based on history, mental status examination and
observations during his stay, I found that [respondent] is
suffering from pathological gambling. Also, with his history of
typhoid fever when he was younger, it is difficult to attribute
the behavioral changes that he manifested in 2003 and
2006. Aside from pathological gambling, [respondent] is
suffering from a personality disorder, [S]ir.
Q: What are the results or symptoms of this personality
disorder with [regard] to [respondent's dealings] with other
people, with his wife and his family, [M]adam witness?
A: Your Honor, may I read from my report to refresh my
memory.
COURT: Go ahead.
A: Because of his maladaptive behavior, [respondent] sees
[sic] his problems which [makes] his personal[,] family[,] and
social life[,] and even his vocational pleasure [suffer]. He was
pre-occupied with gambling, thinking of ways to get money
with which to gamble as seen in his stealing and pawning
jewelries and appliances. He needs to amble with increasing
amounts of money in order achieve his desired effects into
gambling, [S]ir.
COURT: Your findings, Dr., are incorporated in your report?
A: Yes, Your Honor.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
xxxx
[Cross-examination of Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio by respondent’s
counsel]
Q: Who were the ones who made the examination, Madam
witness?
A: I made the examination, [S]ir, and also the psychologist
did the psychological testing, [S]ir.
Q: Now, in your opinion as an expert witness, Madam
witness, which we would like to request [from] this Honorable
Court, later on, that you present your credentials as expert
witness, you concluded that the respondent is suffering from
personality disorder?
A: Yes,[S]ir.
Q: What does this mean in layman’s language, [M]adam
witness?
A: Personality disorder is a maladaptive pattern of behavior
that has distracted his ability to perform his functions as a
married man to his wife as a father to his children and as a
person who is supposed to be employed productively, [S]ir.47
Futhermore, "[h]abitual drunkenness, gambling and failure to
find a job, [while undoubtedly negative traits are nowhere
nearly the equivalent of ‘psychological incapacity’], in the
absence of [incontrovertible] proof that these are
manifestations of an incapacity rooted in some debilitating
psychological condition or illness."48
We now turn to the second point. Again, in view of the
contrasting findings of the trial court and appellate
court,49 we take recourse to the records to assist us in
evaluating the perspective postures taken by the parties.
Here again, well-entrenched is the rule that "there must be
proof of a natal or supervening disabling factor that
effectively incapacitated the respondent spouse from
complying with the basic marital obligations x x x."50 "A cause
has to be shown and linked with the manifestations of the
psychological incapacity."51
Again we agree with the CA that the RTC did not clearly or
correctly lay down the bases or premises for this particular
finding relative to respondent's psychological incapacity,
thus:
Second, there is also sufficient evidence to prove that the
respondent's inabilities to perform his marital obligations was
a result of not mere intentional refusal on his part but are
caused by psychological abnormality. Such psychological
incapacity of the respondent has been shown as already
present at the time of celebration of marriage but became
manifest only after the solemnization. x x x.52
As heretofore mentioned, the medical basis or evidence
adverted to by the RTC did not specifically identify the root
cause of respondent's alleged psychological incapacity. In
fact, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not point to a definite or a
definitive cause, viz. "with his history of typhoid fever when
he was younger, it is difficult to attribute the behavioral
changes that he manifested in 2003 and 2006."53 Besides,
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio admitted that it was not she herself, but
another psychologist who conducted the tests.54 And this
psychologist was not presented by petitioner. More than that,
Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio's testimony regarding respondent's
alleged admission that he was allegedly betting on jai
alai when he was still in high school is essentially hearsay as
no witness having personal knowledge of that fact was called
to the witness stand. And, although Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio
claimed to have interviewed respondent's sister in
connection therewith, the latter did testify in court. And we
are taught that "[t]he stringency by which the Court assesses
the sufficiency of psychological evaluation reports is
necessitated by the pronouncement in our Constitution that
marriage is an inviolable institution protected by the State."55
Equally bereft of merit is petitioner's claim that respondent's
alleged psychological incapacity could be attributed to the
latter's family or childhood, which are circumstances prior to
the parties' marriage; no evidence has been adduced to
substantiate this fact. Nor is there basis for upholding
petitioner's contention that respondent's family was
"distraught" and that respondent's conduct was
"dysfunctional"; again, there is no evidence to attest to this.
These are very serious charges which must be substantiated
by clear evidence which, unfortunately, petitioner did not at
all adduce. Indeed, Dr. Sta. Ana-Ponio did not make a
specific finding that this was the origin of respondent's
alleged inability to appreciate marital obligations.
Needless to say, petitioner cannot lean upon her son Jose's
testimony that his father's psychological incapacity existed
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before or at the time of marriage.1âwphi1 It has been held
that the parties' child is not a very reliable witness in an
Article 36 case as "he could not have been there when the
spouses were married and could not have been expected to
know what was happening between his parents until long
after his birth."56
To support her Article 36 petition, petitioner ought to have
adduced convincing, competent and trustworthy evidence to
establish the cause of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity and that the same antedated their marriage.57 If
anything, petitioner failed to successfully dispute the CA's
finding that she was not aware of any gan1b1ing by
respondent before they got married and that respondent was
a kind and caring person when he was courting her.58
Against this backdrop, we must uphold the CA's declaration
that petitioner failed to prove that respondents alleged
psychological incapacity is serious or grave and that it is
incurable or permanent.
To be sure, this Court cannot take judicial notice of
petitioner's assertion that "personality disorders are generally
incurable" as this is not a matter that courts are mandated to
take judicial notice under Section 1, Rule 129 of the Rules of
Court.59
"'Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation
where the parties or one of them, by reason of a grave and
incurable psychological illness existing at the time the
marriage was celebrated, was incapacitated to fulfill the
obligations of marital life (and thus could not then have
validly entered into a marriage), then we are compelled to
uphold the indissolubility of the marital tie."60 This is the
situation here.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 29, 2013
Decision and January 6, 2014 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 96662 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 218630
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner
vs.
KATRINA S. TOBORA-TIONGLICO, Respondent
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
DECISION fights ended up in full blown arguments, often in front of
Lanz. One time, when Katrina remembered and missed her
youngest brother who was then committed in a substance
TIJAM, J.:
rehabilitation center, Lawrence told her to stop crying or
sleep in the rehabilitation center if she will not stop.11
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the
Decision1 dated May 27, 2015 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
In 2003, due to their incessant fighting, Lawrence asked
in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed the May 8, 2012
Katrina to leave his parents' home and never to come back.
Decision2 rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
They have been separated in fact since then.12
Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for declaration
of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36 of the Family
Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora- Katrina consulted with a psychiatrist, Dr. Juan Arellano (Dr.
Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio. Arellano), who confirmed her beliefs on Lawrence's
psychological incapacity. Dr. Arellano, based on the
narrations of Katrina, diagnosed Lawrence with Narcissistic
Respondent Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico (Katrina) filed a
Personality Disorder, that is characterized by a heightened
petition for declaration of nullity of her marriage with
sense of self-importance and grandiose feelings that he is
Lawrence C. Tionglico (Lawrence) on the ground of
unique in some way.13
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
Dr. Arellano determined that this personality disorder is
Katrina and Lawrence met sometime in 1997 through a
permanent, incurable, and deeply integrated within his
group of mutual friends. After a brief courtship, they entered
psyche;14 and that it was present but repressed at the time of
into a relationship. When she got pregnant, the two panicked
the celebration of the marriage and the onset was in early
as both their parents were very strict and conservative.
adulthood. His maladaptive and irresponsible behaviors
Lawrence did not receive the news well as he was worried
interfered in his capacity to provide mutual love, fidelity,
how it would affect his image and how his parents would take
respect, mutual help, and support to his wife.15
the situation.3 Nevertheless, they got married on July 22,
2000.4
The RTC granted the petition and declared the marriage of
Katrina and Lawrence as void ab initio. It disposed, thus:
Even during the early stage of their marriage, it was marred
by bickering and quarrels. As early as their honeymoon, they
were fighting so much that they went their separate ways WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
most of the time and Katrina found herself wandering the marriage of Katrina S. Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C.
streets of Hong Kong alone.5 Tionglico Ito (sic) as void ab initio. As a necessary
consequence of this pronouncement, petitioner shall cease
using the surname of her husband having lost the right over
Upon their return, they moved into the home of Lawrence's
the same and so as to avoid the misconception that she is
parents until the birth of their child, Lanz Rafael Tabora
still the legal wifo of respondent. Custody over the couple's·
Tionglico (Lanz), on December 30, 2000.6 Lawrence was
minor child is awarded to petitioner, with reasonable
distant and did not help in rearing their child, saying he knew
visitation rights accorded to respondent, preferably Saturday
nothing about children and how to run a family.7 Lawrence
and Sunday, or as the parties may agree among
spent almost every night out for late dinners, parties and
themselves.
drinking sprees.8 Katrina noticed that Lawrence was
alarmingly dependent on his mother and suffered from a very
high degree of immaturity.9 Lawrence would repeatedly taunt Furnish a copy of this decision the Office of the Solicitor-
Katrina to fight with him and they lost all intimacy between General, the National Statistics Office and the Local Civil
them as he insisted to have a maid sleep in their bedroom Registrar of Imus, Cavite who, in turn, shall endorse a copy
every night to see to the needs of Lanz.10 of the same to the Local Civil Registrar of Mandaluyong City,
·Metro Manila, so that the appropriate amendment and/or
cancellation of the parties' marriage can be effected in its
Lawrence refused to yield to and questioned any and all of
registry. Furnish, likewise, the parties and counsel.
Katrina's decisions-from the manner by which she took care
of Lanz, to the way she treated the household help. Most
25
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
SO ORDERED.16
The CA affirmed the RTC decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. Accordingly, the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Imus, Cavite, Branch
20, in Civil Case No. 4903-11dated8 May 2012 is hereby
AFFIRMED.17
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that
there has been a myriad of cases declaring that
psychological assessment based solely on the information
coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident
that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in
concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated,
exclusively from Katrina.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) points out that
there has been a myriad of cases declaring that
psychological assessment based solely on the information
coming from either party in a petition for declaration of nullity
of marriage is considered as hearsay evidence. It is evident
that in this case, the psychiatrist obtained his data, in
concluding that Lawrence is psychologically incapacitated,
exclusively from Katrina.
Katrina counters that the facts, bases and surrounding
circumstances of each and every case for the nullity is
different from the other and must be appreciated for its
distinctiveness. She points out that the psychological report
of Dr. Arellano clearly outlined well-accepted scientific and
reliable tests18 to come up with his findings. In any case, the
decision must be based not solely on the expert opinions but
on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings, which the RTC and the CA have found to have
been sufficient in proving Lawrence's psychological
incapacity.
The issue before Us is plainly whether the totality of
evidence presented by Katrina supports the findings of both
the RTC and the CA that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated to perform his essential marital obligations,
meriting the dissolution of his marriage with Katrina.
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
Contrary to the findings of both the RTC and the CA, We rule Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
in the negative. regard to parents and their children. xxx
Time and again, it has been held that "psychological (7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
incapacity" has been intended by law to be confined to the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
most serious cases of personality disorders clearly Philippines, while not controlling or decisive,
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give should be given great respect by our courts. xxx
meaning and significance to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be characterized by (a) gravity, i.e., it must
(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting
be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable
attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
of carrying out the ordinary duties required in a marriage, (b)
appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall
juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of
be handed down unless the Solicitor General
the party antedating the marriage, although the overt
issues a certification, which will be quoted in the
manifestations may emerge only after the marriage, and (c)
decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for his
incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were
agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to
otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
the petition. xxx21
involved.19
Using these standards, We find that Katrina failed to
The case of Republic of the Philippines v. Court of
sufficiently prove that Lawrence is psychologically
Appeals20has set out the guidelines that has been the core of
incapacitated to discharge the duties expected of a husband.
discussion of practically all declaration of nullity of marriage
on the basis of psychological incapacity cases that We have
decided: Indeed, and We have oft-repeated that the trial courts, as in
all the other cases they try, must always base their
judgments not solely on the expert opinions presented by the
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the
parties but on the totality of evidence adduced in the course
marriage belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should
of their proceedings.22 Here, We find the totality of evidence
be resolved in favor of the existence and
clearly wanting.
continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. xxx
First, Dr. Arellano's findings that Lawrence is psychologically
incapacitated were based solely on Katrina's
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity
statements.1âwphi1 It bears to stress that Lawrence, despite
must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
notice, did not participate in the proceedings below, nor was
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by
he interviewed by Dr. Arellano despite being invited to do so.
experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
xxx
The case of Nicolas S. Matudan v. Republic of the
Philippines and Marilyn B. Matudan23is instructive on the
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at
matter:
"the time of the celebration" of the marriage. xxx
Just like his own statements and testimony, the assessment
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be
and finding of the clinical psychologist cannot [be] relied
medically or clinically permanent or incurable. xxx
upon to substantiate the petitioner-appellant's theory of the
psychological incapacity of his wife.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring
about the disability of the party to assume the
It bears stressing that Marilyn never participated in the
essential obligations of marriage. xxx
proceedings below. The clinical psychologist's evaluation of
the respondent-appellee's condition was based mainly on the
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those information supplied by her husband, the petitioner, and to
embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family some extent from their daughter, Maricel. It is noteworthy,
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as however, that Maricel was only around two (2) years of age
26
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS – NEW CASES
Cases
at the time the respondent left and therefore cannot be
expected to know her mother well. Also, Maricel would not
have been very reliable as a witness in an Article 36 case
because she could not have been there when the spouses
were married and could not have been expected to know
what was happening between her parents until long after her
birth. On the other hand, as the petitioning spouse, Nicolas'
description of Marilyn's nature would certainly be biased, and
a psychological evaluation based on this one-sided
description can hardly be considered as credible. The ruling
in Jocelyn Suazo v. Angelita Suazo, el al., is illuminating on
this score:
We first note a critical factor in appreciating or evaluating the
expert opinion evidence - the psychologist's testimony and
the psychological evaluation report - that Jocelyn presented.
Based on her declarations in open court, the psychologist
evaluated Angelito's psychological condition only in an
indirect manner - she derived all her conclusions from
information coming from Jocelyn whose bias for her cause
cannot of course be doubted. Given the source of the
information upon which the psychologist heavily relied upon,
the court must evaluate the evidentiary worth of the opinion
with due care and with the application of the more rigid and
stringent set of standards outlined above i.e., that there must
be a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a
psychological incapacity that is grave, severe and incurable.
xxxx
From these perspectives, we conclude that the psychologist,
using meager information coming from a directly interested
party, could not have secured a complete personality profile
and could not have conclusively formed an objective opinion
or diagnosis of Angelito's psychological condition. While the
report or evaluation may be conclusive with respect to
Jocelyn's psychological condition, this is not true for
Angelito's. The methodology employed simply cannot satisfy
the required depth and comprehensiveness of examination
required to evaluate a party alleged to be suffering from a
psychological disorder. In short, this is not the psychological
report that the Court can rely on as basis for the conclusion
that psychological incapacity exists.
In the earlier case of Rowena Padilla-Rumbaua v. Edward
Rumbaua, it was similarly declared that '[t]o make
conclusions and generalizations on the respondent's
psychological condition based on the information fed by only
one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting hearsay
Averell B. Abrasaldo – II-Sanchez Roman
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such of evidence is clearly lacking to support the factual and legal
evidence.' conclusion that Lawrence and Katrina's marriage is void ab
initio. No other evidence or witnesses were presented by
Katrina to prove Lawrence's alleged psychological
At any rate, We find the report prepared by the clinical
incapacity. Basic is the rule that bare allegations,
psychologist on the psychological condition of the
unsubstantiated by evidence, are not equivalent to
respondent-appellee to be insufficient to warrant the
proof, i.e., mere allegations are not evidence.27 Here, we
conclusion that a psychological incapacity existed that
reiterate that apart from the psychiatrist, Katrina did not
prevented Marilyn from complying with the essential
present other witnesses to substantiate her allegations on
obligations of marriage. In said report, Dr. Tayag merely
Lawrence's psychological incapacity. Her testimony,
concluded that Marilyn suffers from. Narcissistic Personality
therefore, is considered self-serving and had no serious
Disorder with antisocial traits on the basis of what she
evidentiary value.28
perceives as manifestations of the same. The report neither
explained the incapacitating nature of the alleged disorder,
nor showed that the respondent-appellee was really WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is
incapable of fulfilling her duties due to some incapacity of a hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated May 27, 2015 of the
psychological, not physical, nature. (Emphasis Ours) Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 101985, which affirmed
the May 8, 2012 Decision rendered by the Regional Trial
Court of Imus Cavite, Branch 20, granting the petition for
The same could be said in this case, where the various tests
declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of Article 36
conducted by Dr. Arellano can most certainly be conclusive
of the Family Code and declaring the marriage of Katrina S.
of the psychological disposition of Katrina, but cannot be said
Tabora-Tionglico and Lawrence C. Tionglico void ab initio, is
to be indicative of the psychological condition of Lawrence.
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petition for
There was simply no other basis for Dr. Arellano to conclude
declaration of nullity of marriage docketed as Civil Case No.
that Lawrence was psychologically incapacitated to perform
4903-11 is hereby DISMISSED.
his essential marital obligations apart from Katrina's self-
serving statements. To make conclusions and
generalizations on a spouse's psychological condition based SO ORDERED.
on the information fed by only one side, as in the case at bar,
is, to the Court's mind, not different from admitting hearsay
evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such
evidence.24
Second, the testimony of Katrina as regards the behavior of
Lawrence hardly depicts the picture of a psychologically
incapacitated husband. Their frequent fights, his insensitivity,
immaturity and frequent night-outs can hardly be said to be a
psychological illness. These acts, in our view, do not rise to
the level of the "psychological incapacity" that the law
requires, and should be distinguished from the "difficulty," if
not outright "refusal" or "neglect" in the performance of some
marital obligations that characterize some marriages.25 It is
not enough to prove that a spouse failed to meet his
responsibility and duty as a married person; it is essential
that he must be shown to be incapable of doing so due to
some psychological illness. The psychological illness that
must afflict a party at the inception of the marriage should be
a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive the party of
his or her awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was then about to assume.26
Although We commiserate with Katrina's predicament, We
are hardpressed to affirm the RTC and CA when the totality
27