MOCK BAR EXAMINATION IN

POLITICAL & INTERNATIONAL LAW

By Atty. Alexis F. Medina1

I.

The Judicial and Bar Council submitted to the President three (3) shortlists of
nominees, with five (5) nominees each, corresponding to the three (3) vacancies in
the Sandiganbayan, particularly the 19th, 20th and 21st Associate Justices. Acting on
the nominations, the President appointed the 19th, 20th and 21st Associate Justices,
all coming from the shortlist of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) for the 19th
Associate Justice, thus, disregarding JBC’s nominees in the shortlists for the
20th and 21st Associate Justices. Atty. Galit, a JBC nominee included in the third
shortlist, but who was not appointed by the President, filed a petition for quo
warranto before the Supreme Court questioning the appointments. He contends
that only a nominee for the position of the 19th Associate Justice should be
appointed as the 19th Associate Justice, and the same goes for the nominees for
each of the vacancies for the 20th and 21st Associate Justices. Thus, he asserts that
the two nominees whom the JBC recommended for the 19th Associate Justice cannot
be validly appointed as 20th and 21st Associate Justices, rendering the appointments
by the President for these vacancies void.

a) Is Atty. Galit, a rejected nominee, a proper party to question the

appointments through a quo warranto petition?

No, he is not a proper party to file the quo warranto case. For a quo warranto petition to
be successful, the private person suing must show a clear right to the contested office. A
nominee for the position of Sandiganbayan Associate Justice does not have a clear right to said
position. Being included in the list of nominees gives the nominees only the possibility, but not
the certainty, of being appointed to the position, because of the discretionary power of the
President in making judicial appointments. (Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November
29, 2016)

b) Is the President’s action valid?

Yes, as long as the President appoints someone nominated by the JBC, the appointment
is valid. The clustering of nominees by the JBC unduly restricts the President's power of
appointment, because (1) the President's option for every vacancy is limited to the five to seven
nominees in the cluster; and (2) once the President has appointed from one cluster, then he is
proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other vacancies. The
said limitations are utterly without legal basis and in contravention of the President's appointing
power.

Moreover, by already designating the numerical order of the vacancies through

clustering of nominees, the JBC would be establishing the seniority or order of preference of the
new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even before their appointment by the President and,
thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the President's power of appointment.
(Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2016)

1 AB Political Science, University of the Philippines (UP), Diliman; Order of the Purple Feather (OPF), UP, College of
Law; Valedictorian, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila, College of Law; Philippine Representative to the World
Trade Organization (WTO) Trade Facilitation Preparatory Committee Meeting for Legal Review (Geneva, Switzerland,
2014); Transaction Adviser on Public Private Partnerships (PPPS); Litigation lawyer; formerly with the Ponce Enrile
Reyes & Manlastas Law Offices (Pecabar); Professor of Constitutional Law, San Sebastian College-Recoletos, Manila,
College of Law, and Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Manila, College of Law; former professor of
Constitutional Law, New Era University, College of Law, Quezon City; Bar Review Lecturer, Recoletos Review Center,
Manila
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 The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive vacancies
in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee.
(Aguinaldo v. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February 21, 2017)

II.

Can the President enter into an executive agreement, instead of a treaty, on

foreign military bases, troops and facilities?

Yes, the President may enter into an executive agreement on foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities, provided that

(a) it is not the instrument that allows the presence of foreign military bases, troops, or
facilities; or
(b) it merely aims to implement an existing law or treaty.

The constitutional restriction on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities in the

Philippines refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities.
Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the limitations
provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the requirement of
validity through a treaty. (Saguisag v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No. 212426, January
12, 2016)

III.

A lawyer wrote the Supreme Court about the holding of Catholic masses and
other religious rituals in the hall of justice of Quezon City. Upon investigation, the
Office of the Deputy Court Administrator found that the masses were indeed being
conducted on work days, but during noon breaks. However, the court proceedings
were not being distracted or interrupted and the performance of the judiciary
employees were not being adversely affected. Nevertheless, the lawyer asserted
that allowing such Catholic rituals in a government building that houses public
courts violates the constitutional provision on the separation of Church and State.
Should the Supreme Court allow the Catholic masses in this government building to
continue?

Allowing the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of Justice does
not violate the principle of separation of Church and State. The State recognizes the inherent
right of the people to freely exercise their religion. Allowing religion to flourish is not contrary to
the principle of separation of Church and State.

Although religious freedom is not absolute, a compelling interest of the state can prevail
over the fundamental right to religious liberty. To successfully invoke compelling state interest,
it must be demonstrated that the masses in the QC Hall of Justice unduly disrupt the delivery of
public services or affect the judges and employees in the performance of their official functions.
In this case, there is no state interest compelling enough to prohibit the exercise of religious
freedom in the halls of justice.

Finally, allowing the holding of Catholic masses at the basement of the QC Hall of
Justice is not a case of establishment of religion, but merely accommodation. To give life to the
constitutional right of freedom of religion, the State adopts a policy of accommodation.
Accommodations are government policies that take religion specifically into account, not to
promote the government's favored form of religion, but to allow individuals to exercise their
religion without hindrance. Their purpose or effect therefore is to remove a burden on, or
facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's religion. (In re: Holding of Religious Rituals
at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon City, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC, March 7, 2017)

IV.

2. A law is passed prohibiting the following:

a) Unsolicited commercial communications with the use of computers,

wherein the communications seek to advertise, sell or offer for sale products or
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services, unless with prior consent of the recipient; and

This law is invalid. To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person
the right to read his emails, even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial
speech is also entitled to protection. The State cannot rob him of this right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate
forms of expression. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February 11, 2014)

b) Aiding and abetting in the commission of the crime of online libel, with
online libel defined as the act of committing through a computer system or any
other similar means the unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in Article 355
of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

Decide the validity of each of the above prohibitions.

Under the doctrine of overbreadth, a governmental purpose, such as to regulate the use
of this cyberspace communication technology to protect a person’s reputation and peace of
mind, cannot adopt means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area of
protected freedoms.

In this case, the terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace posts, comments, and other
messages. This prohibition causes self-inhibition borne of fear of what sinister predicaments
await internet users will suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.

Under the void-for-vagueness doctrine, penal laws should provide reasonably clear
guidelines for law enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary and
discriminatory enforcement. When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of speech, a
facial challenge grounded on the void-for-vagueness doctrine is acceptable.

A person who does not know whether his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad
or vague law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to avoid being charged of a
crime. The overbroad or vague law thus chills him into silence.

In this case, the term “aiding or abetting” is vague and does not give netizens "fair
notice" or warning as to what is criminal conduct and what is lawful conduct. Its vagueness
raises apprehension on the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the
freedom of expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting ensnares all the actors in
the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way. (Disini v. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 203335, February
11, 2014)

V.

President Duterte signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with the Prime

Minister of China for the grant by China of $ 10 Billion worth of low-interest loans to
the Philippines to finance the latter’s massive infrastructure projects. The political
organization Huwag Utang (HU) filed a petition in the Supreme Court challenging
the validity of the MOA, invoking the following grounds: a) the MOA will not benefit
the Filipino people who only will be mired in deeper debt because of it; and b) there
are better alternatives to borrowing from China to finance government
infrastructure projects. Decide the petition.

The petition should be dismissed as it involves political questions, which are beyond
judicial review. Political questions refer "to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of government." Political
questions are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not the legality, of a
particular measure. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 208566, November 19, 2013;
Vinuya v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 162230, 28 April 2010; Francisco v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)
Policy matters are not the concern of the Court, but of the political branches of the
government. (Farinas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 147387, December 10, 2003)
The exercise of the power of judicial review is merely to check not supplant the
Executive, or to simply ascertain whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his
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jurisdiction but not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act.
(Constantino v. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064 October 13, 2005)

In this case, the petition raises issues on the propriety, soundness or wisdom of the
economic policy of obtaining foreign loans from China, issues which are not for the courts to
resolve. (Garcia v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 157584, April 2, 2009; Francisco v. House of
Representatives, G.R. No. 160261, November 10, 2003)

VI.

Based only on the facts stated, are the following actions of the Commission
on Elections valid? Why?

a) Upholding the validity of the expulsion from the Magulo Party List of
Congressman Gary Alahoy, incumbent Magulo Party List Representative, pursuant to
a reorganization undertaken within the Magulo Party List.

The action of the Comelec is invalid. The COMELEC has no jurisdiction over a petition
for the expulsion from a party-list organization of an incumbent party-list Member of the House
of Representatives. Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution endows the HRET with
jurisdiction to resolve questions on the qualifications of members of Congress. In the case of
party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a disqualification case upon
proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the nominee, and assumption of office as
member of the House of Representatives. (Lico v. Commission on Elections, G. R. No. 205505,
September 29, 2015)

b) Ordering the cancellation of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for

President of Donald Trumpo, on the basis of a petition alleging material
misrepresentation in his COC, wherein he declared that he is a Filipino citizen. The
Comelec found that Trumpo is not a Filipino citizen after considering the evidence
submitted by the petitioner and Trumpo.

The action of the Comelec is invalid. Comelec, in a petition to cancel or deny due course
to a Certificate of Candidacy (COC), cannot by itself decide the qualification or lack thereof of
the candidate. A certificate of candidacy cannot be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of
false representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding or
declaration by final judgment of a competent court that he or she is not qualified, such prior
authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the representation can be found.
The only exceptions that can be conceded are self-evident facts of unquestioned or
unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No.
221697, March 8, 2016)

VII.

The Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) has a policy of requiring applicants for
judgeship in the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to have served at least for five (5)
years of service as judge of first-level courts (Municipal or Metropolitan Trial Courts
[MTC]). A judge with two (2) years of experience in the MTC questioned the validity
of JBC’s policy on the ground that a) JBC has no power to impose the 5-year service
as additional qualification for judges of lower courts, and b) the JBC is violating the
Equal Protection Clause by discriminating against applicants with less than 5 years
of experience as MTC judge. Decide.

The policy is valid. Under the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend
appointees to the judiciary. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set
the standards or criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only
to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position.

Moreover, the policy does not violate the equal protection clause. There is a substantial
distinction between judges with 5-year experience and those with less than 5 five years. The
classification is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose of selecting those with proven
competence. (Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015)

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 VIII.

Based only on the facts given, will the following acts lead to loss of Philippine
citizenship?

a. Repeated use of a foreign passport, after executing an Oath of

Allegiance to the Philippine Government and Affidavit of Renunciation of foreign
citizenship, pursuant to Republic Act 9225.

No, it will not lead to loss of citizenship. The use of foreign passport after renouncing
one’s foreign citizenship is a positive and voluntary act of representation as to one’s nationality
and citizenship; it does not divest Filipino citizenship regained by repatriation but it recants the
Oath of Renunciation required to qualify one to run for an elective position. (Maquiling v.
Comelec, G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013)

b. Applying for an American passport and obtaining an Alien Certificate of

Registration from the Philippine Bureau of Immigration, by a man born in the United
States in September 1973 of a Filipino mother, and an American father.

The person did not lose his Philippine citizenship by the mere act of applying for or
holding an American passport and obtaining an alien certificate of registration. Such acts do not
constitute an effective renunciation of citizenship and do not militate against his claim of
Filipino citizenship. For renunciation to effectively result in the loss of citizenship, the same
must be express. An application for an alien certificate of registration does not amount to an
express renunciation or repudiation of one’s citizenship. (Valles v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 137000. August 9, 2000)

IX.

The Philippines is not a signatory to the 1961 United Nations Convention on

the Reduction of Statelessness under which a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found. Is the Philippine State bound to follow
this principle?

Yes, the Philippines is bound to follow these principles, even if the Philippines is not a
signatory to the treaty. Under the 1987 Constitution, generally accepted principles of
international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws
of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as
law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations. International customary
rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). That the Philippines is not a
party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of
Statelessness does not mean that their principles are not binding. It is a generally accepted
principle of international law to presume foundlings as having been born of
nationals of the country in which he or she is found. Thus, the Philippine State is bound
by such principle even if it is not a signatory or party to the 1961 United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness. (Poe-Llamanzares v. Comelec, G.R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016)

X.

The beaches of Paradise Island, a popular international tourist destination in

the Visayas, has become too crowded due to the proliferation of tourist hotels, inns,
lodging houses and bars that have been constructed on the beaches and near the
edge of the sea. A fact-finding investigation by the Office of the Mayor revealed that
many of these establishments were constructed without building permits and were
operating without business permits, in violation of law and local ordinances. Can the
Mayor order the demolition the said structures?

Yes. A mayor has the power to order the demolition of illegal constructions after
complying with due process.
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 The LGC authorizes city and municipal governments, acting through their local chief
executives, to issue demolition orders. The LGC empowers the mayor to order the closure and
removal of illegally constructed establishments for failing to secure the necessary permits.
Under the LGC, insofar as illegal constructions are concerned, the mayor can, after satisfying the
requirement of due notice and hearing, order their closure and demolition. (Aquino v.
Municipality of Malay, Aklan, G.R. No. 211356, September 29, 2014)

XI.

Based only on the facts stated, are the following ordinances of the City of
Manila valid?

a) An ordinance requiring that walls and fences commercial and

educational institutions be built with a five (5) meter setback, or a parking area
allowance, located between the front monument line and the building line of such
establishments. The City of Manila justifies the ordinance as a police power exercise
to ease traffic and improve the aesthetic appearance of the city.

The ordinance is not valid. It is an exercise of eminent domain, not police power
considering that the property is not noxious.

Private property cannot be taken for public use without payment of just compensation. A
deprivation of ordinary use of property is a compensable taking. The implementation of the
setback requirement would be tantamount to a taking of private property for public use without
just compensation, in contravention to the Constitution. The State may not, under the guise of
police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their property solely to preserve
or enhance the aesthetic appearance of the community. The ordinance substantially divest the
owner of the beneficial use of their property solely for aesthetic purposes. (Fernando v. St.
Scholastica’s College, G.R. No. 161107, March 12, 2013)

b. An ordinance prohibiting the establishment of night clubs, bars, motels

and inns in the Ermita District of Manila to prevent the rise of prostitution and
sexually transmissible diseases (STDs).

This prohibition is invalid for violating the equal protection clause. For a classification to
be valid, the classification must be germane to the purpose of the law and based on substantial
distinction. In this case, the classification is not based on substantial distinction because there is
no substantial distinction between night clubs, bars, motels and inns in Ermita District and other
areas in Manila, where prostitution may also be present. Moreover, the classification is not
germane to the purpose of the law, because banning these establishments will not necessarily
stamp out prostitution, which can happen in other establishments within the same area. (City of
Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The prohibition is invalid. The city only has the power to
regulate, not prohibit such establishments. Under the Local Government Code (Section 458 (a) 4
(iv)) the city has the power to regulate the establishment and operation of motels, hotels and
other similar establishments. The word "regulate" is not synonymous with "suppress" or
"prohibit." (City of Manila v. Laguio, G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005) A municipal corporation
cannot prohibit when its power is merely to regulate. (Dela Cruz v. Paras, G.R. No. L-42571-72,
July 25, 1983)

XII.

Is there a denial of due process in the following instances? Briefly explain

your answers.

a) Failure of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), during its

investigation on alleged drug-related offenses of Ms. Laila, to give her an
opportunity to file an answer to the complaint or submit counter-evidence in her
defense.

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 There is no denial of due process in this case. The functions of NBI are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is
incapable of granting any relief to any party. It cannot even determine probable cause. The NBI
is an investigative agency whose findings are merely recommendatory.

Since the NBI’s findings were merely recommendatory, no denial of the respondents’ due
process right could have taken place; the NBI’s findings were still subject to the prosecutor’s and
the Secretary of Justice’s actions for purposes of finding the existence of probable cause. (Shu v.
Dee, G.R. No. 182573, April 23, 2014)

e) Removal without opportunity to be heard and without cause of Atty.

DeLuma, as acting Director of the Legal Service of the Department of Agriculture.

There is no violation of due process in the removal. An "acting" appointment is

merely temporary. (Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88498, June 9, 1992)

A temporary appointment is "one made in an acting capacity, the essence of which lies in
its temporary character and its terminability at pleasure by the appointing power." Under the
Administrative Code, the term of a temporary appointment shall be 12 months, unless sooner
terminated by the appointing authority. Such pre-termination of a temporary appointment may
be with or without cause as the appointee serves merely at the pleasure of the appointing power.
(Civil Service Commission v. Darangina, G.R. No. 167472, January 31, 2007)

XIII.

In 2015, Mr. Lupa, filed an action in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against
the Department of National Defense (DND) for just compensation for the land
owned by Mr. Lupa, that, in 1935, the DND took over and converted into a military
camp. The DND moved to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: a) the
DND is an unincorporated agency immune from suit; and b) the action has
prescribed. Decide.

The motion to dismiss should be denied. The doctrine of sovereign immunity cannot be
invoked to defeat a valid claim for compensation arising from a taking without just
compensation. The doctrine of sovereign immunity is not an instrument for perpetrating any
injustice on a citizen. (Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February
23, 2011)

Neither shall prescription bar a property owner’s claim following the long-standing rule
“that where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring
title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the
land or the value thereof does not prescribe.” (Secretary of the Department of Public Works and
Highways v. Spouses Tecson, G.R. No. 179334, July 1, 2013)

XIV.

Briefly explain why the doctrine of condonation was abandoned by the

Supreme Court.

The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of
accountability to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, are plainly
inconsistent with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term
of office, or even another elective post.

Moreover, election is not a mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is

simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an
official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative liability arising from
an offense done during a prior term. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015)

XV.

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 An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no duties;
it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. Is this rule absolute?

No, this rule is not absolute. In the interest of fair play, under the doctrine of operative
facts, actions previous to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are
not nullified. This is because the existence of a law or executive act prior to its invalidation is an
operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
always be erased by a new judicial declaration. (Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council, G.R. No.
202242, July 17, 2012)

XVI.

Article XXX of the 2017 General Appropriations Act set aside PhP 34 Billion for
the Development Acceleration (DAF). Under this law, the DAF budget shall be used
for infrastructure, agricultural development assistance and other priority projects
and activities, as proposed and identified by Members of Congress concerned after
the passage of the GAA, according to the following allocations: Members of the
House Representatives, PhP 100 Million each; and, Senators, Php 200 Million each.

Under the 2017 GAA, any modification and revision by the Executive Branch of
the project identification under DAF shall be submitted to the House Committee on
Appropriations and the Senate Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to
the DBM or the implementing agency. Moreover, any realignment of funds under DAF
shall be submitted to the House Committee on Appropriations and the Senate
Committee on Finance for favorable endorsement to the DBM or the implementing
agency. The funds for DAF will not be released unless the legislator identifies his
specific priority project. Give at least two (2) legal bases to assail the
constitutionality of the DAF appropriation.

The DAF appropriation is void for the following reasons:

1. It violates the principle of separation of powers, as it authorizes legislators to

participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation, such as project
identification, and fund release, thus allowing legislators to intervene and/or assume duties that
properly belong to the sphere of budget execution.

2. It violates the principle of non-delegation of legislative power considering that an

individual legislator is given the authority to (a) dictate how much funds would be allocated; and
(b) determine the specific project or beneficiary, two (2) acts that comprise the exercise of the
power of appropriation, which is lodged in Congress.

3. It undermines the system of checks and balance by impairing the President’s item
veto power. For the President to exercise his item-veto power, there must be a proper "item"
which may be the object of the veto. Because DAF is a lump-sum appropriation, the actual items
of DAF appropriation would not have been written into the General Appropriations Bill and thus
effectuated without veto consideration. The legislator‘s identification of the projects after the
passage of the GAA denies the President the chance to veto that item later on.

4. The “Pork Barrel System” undermines public accountability by impairing Congress’

oversight functions considering that legislators would, in effect, be checking on activities in
which they themselves participate. It also violates the constitutional prohibition on legislators’
intervention on matters where they may be called upon to act.

5. It violates the constitutional principles on local autonomy as it allows district

representatives who are national officers to substitute the judgement of local officials on use of
public funds for local development. A Congressman can simply bypass the local development
council and initiate projects on his own. (Belgica v. Executive Secretary Ochoa, G.R. No.
208566, November 19, 2013)

XVII.

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 The Senate is conducting an inquiry in aid of legislation on the alleged
acceptance of bribe money from alleged gambling syndicates by Atty. Julio Jule and
Atty. Ben Bistado, two incumbent Commissioners of the Bureau of Immigration
(BOI). The Senate issued a subpoena ad testificandum to both Atty. Jule and Atty.
Bistado to attend the senate inquiry as resources speakers, but they refused to
attend the inquiry. Rule on the validity of each the following grounds they intend to
invoke.

a) They were not given advance or prior notice of the questions that may be
asked of them.

This is a valid ground to refuse to attend. Invitations to a legislative inquiry should

contain notice of the "possible needed statute, the subject of inquiry and the questions relative
thereto.” Compliance is imperative. (Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability, G.R. No.
180643, March 25, 2008)

b) Their right against self-incrimination will be violated.

This is not a valid ground to refuse attendance. They are neither the accused in a
criminal case nor will they be subjected by the Senate to any penalty by reason of their
testimonies. They may only invoke their right against self-incrimination is when a question
calling for an incriminating answer is propounded. (Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate
Committee on Banks, G.R. No. 167173, December 27, 2007)

c) They are already respondents in criminal complains pending before the

Ombudsman involving the same alleged bribe transaction subject of the
legislative inquiry.

The mere filing of a criminal or an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-

judicial body should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative investigation. Otherwise, it
would be extremely easy to subvert any intended inquiry by Congress through the convenient
ploy of instituting a criminal or an administrative complaint. A legislative investigation in aid of
legislation and court proceedings have different purposes. On one hand, courts conduct hearings
or like adjudicative procedures to settle, through the application of a law, actual controversies
arising between adverse litigants and involving demandable rights. On the other hand, inquiries
in aid of legislation are, inter alia, undertaken as tools to enable the legislative body to gather
information and, thus, legislate wisely and effectively. (Romero v. Estrada, G.R. No. 174105, 02
April 2009)

XVIII.

Based only on the facts given, do the following warrantless searches violate
the Constitution?

a. Opening by jail guards of mail envelopes addressed to or coming from,

detention prisoners.

No, the search does not violate the Constitution. Pre-trial detainees and convicted
prisoners have a diminished expectation of privacy rights. The right to privacy of those detained
is subject to the law (RA 7438) giving detention officers the power to undertake reasonable
measures to secure the safety of the detainee and prevent his escape. (Alejano v. Cabuay, G.R.
No. 160792, August 25, 2005)

b. Search on a person who was arrested while walking on the street, after
getting out of a house which, according to reliable information, is a drug den.

The search violates the Constitution. There was no valid search incident to a lawful
arrest, because the arrest was invalid. "Reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a
warrantless arrest. The rule requires that the accused perform some overt act that would
indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

9|Page
Since there was no valid arrest, there can be no valid search incident to a lawful arrest. (People
v. Racho, G.R. No. 186529, August 3, 2010)

c. Search by a government investigating team of a government employees’

electronic/digital files that are stored in his government-assigned computer located
in his government office.

The search does not violate the Constitution. A warrantless search by a government
employer of an employees’ office is justified at inception when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related misconduct. A
government employee’s expectation of privacy in a regulated office environment is reduced, due
to the company’s work policies, the collective bargaining agreement, if any, and the inherent
right of the employer to maintain discipline and efficiency in the workplace.

Moreover, a government employee cannot have a subjective expectation of privacy in his

government-issued computer containing his personal files, if the government office implements
a policy that put its employees on notice that they have no expectation of privacy in anything
they create, store, send or receive on the office computers. (Pollo v. Constantino-David, G.R.
No. 181881, October 18, 2011)

d. Search of the second floor of the house of the suspect, immediately after
his arrest at the garage located on the ground floor of the same house, by virtue of a
warrant of arrest in his name.

The search is invalid. While a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous
weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant, such search should be limited to the area within his immediate
control. The seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons must be either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his “immediate control.” The phrase “within the area of his
immediate control” means the area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. The second floor of the house is not within the immediate control of the
suspect who was at the ground floor when he was arrested. Thus, the search on the second floor
is invalid. (Valeroso v. Court of Appeals, 3 September 2009, G.R. No. 16481; People v.
Cubcubin, 360 SC RA 690, 10 July 2001)

e. Routine x-ray scanning of baggage of boarding passengers at domestic

ports by port authorities.

The security measures of x-ray scanning and inspection in domestic ports by port
authorities -- akin to routine security procedures in airports –are reasonable due to the reduced
expectation of privacy when coming into airports or ports of travel. Such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and
the reduced privacy expectations associated with passenger vessel travel. Port authorities were
acting within their duties and functions when it used x-ray scanning machines for inspection of
passengers’ bags. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 209387, January 11, 2016)

XIX.

For the 2019 national elections, the Commission on Elections issued COMELEC
Resolution No. 222 (Resolution) limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of
candidates for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred
twenty (120) minutes. During the previous elections of May 2013 and May 2016,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 111 implementing and interpreting Section 6 of R.A.
No. 9006, regarding airtime limitations, to mean that a candidate is entitled to the
aforestated number of minutes "per station." For the May 2019 elections, however,
COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 22, changing the interpretation of said
airtime limitation for political campaigns or advertisements from a "per station"
basis, to a "total aggregate" basis. Give at least two legal bases for declaring the
Comelec resolution invalid.

First, the Comelec’s rule limiting the broadcast and radio advertisements of candidates
and political parties for national election positions to an aggregate total of one hundred twenty
(120) minutes for political campaigns or advertisements unreasonably restricts the freedom of
speech and of the press. It unduly restricts and constrains the ability of candidates and political

10 | P a g e
parties to reach out and communicate with the people. (GMA Network v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

Second, the COMELEC’s rule violates the people’s right to suffrage. Fundamental to the
idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of the people to determine their own
destiny through the choice of leaders they may have in government. Thus, the primordial
importance of suffrage and the concomitant right of the people to be adequately informed for
the intelligent exercise of such birthright. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205357, September 2, 2014)

Third, the new Resolution introduced a radical change in the manner in which the rules
on airtime for political advertisements are to be reckoned. As such there is a need for adequate
and effective means by which they may be adopted, disseminated and implemented. In this
regard, it is not enough that they be published - or explained - after they have been adopted.

x x x [W]hatever might have been said in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of

Appeals, should also apply mutatis mutandis to the COMELEC when it comes to promulgating
rules and regulations which adversely affect, or impose a heavy and substantial burden on, the
citizenry, in a matter that implicates the very nature of government we have adopted:

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely

interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare
issuance for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already
prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of
those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a
chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is
given the force and effect of law.

xxx

For failing to conduct prior hearing before coming up with the assailed rule, the new rule
on aggregate airtime is defective and ineffectual. (GMA Network v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 205357, September 2, 2014)

(NOTE: The examinee may cite any two of the above legal grounds)

XX.

Are the following acts of the Commission on Elections valid?

a) Prohibiting owners of Public Utility Vehicles from posting election

campaign materials during the campaign period on their PUVs? Briefly explain.

The regulation is invalid as it constitutes a prior restraint on the right to free expression.
Prior restraints are presumed invalid. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and
transport terminals are forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences
under the pain of indictment for an election offense and the revocation of their franchise or
permit to operate. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The regulation is invalid. Prohibiting owners of Public Utility

Vehicles (PUVs) from posting election campaign materials violates the equal protection clause.
If owners of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and
opinion by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to
deny the same preferred right to owners of PUVs.

In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act
may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four requisites of
valid classification be complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the class.

As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and

owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of PUVs
and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners

11 | P a g e
of private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion
by posting election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the
same preferred right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals.

Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of
private vehicles and other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g)
items(5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to
candidates in elections. (1-United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections,
G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015)

ALTERNATIVE ANSWER: The Comelec may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate, and not the ownership per se of Public Utility Vehicles (PUVs) and transport terminals;
regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an election
campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but a
regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.

The constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC over
franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly unrestrained, has its limits.

Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the posting of an

election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to operate, but
a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle. A prohibition on the posting of commercial
advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation on the ownership of the vehicle per se; the
restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle does not have any relation to its
operation as a PUV.

The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or on
transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership – it
has nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal. (1-
United Transport Koalisyon [1-Utak] v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 206020, April 14,
2015)

b) Requiring survey companies to disclose, pursuant the Fair Election Act, the
names of those who commission or pay for election surveys, including subscribers of
survey firms.

The regulation is valid. Election surveys may influence voter preferences. When left
unregulated, election surveys can undermine the holding of "fair" elections, which is the purpose
of the Fair Election act.

Election surveys may tend to shape voter preferences. When published, election surveys
partake of the nature of election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. The requirement of
disclosing the names of subscribers to election surveys is valid regulation of declarative speech
by private entities in the context of an election campaign because 1) it has basis in a statute, 2) it
furthers not just an important or substantial state interest but even a compelling one, which is to
guarantee equal access to opportunities for public service, and 3) narrowly tailored to meet the
objective and is least restrictive means to achieve that objective.

Moreover, the Comelec’s regulation requiring disclosure of names of those who

commission or pay for election surveys is not a prior restraint as the disclosure requirement
kicks in only upon, not prior to, publication. (Social Weather Station v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 208062, April 7, 2015)

XXI.

To strengthen the power of the Ombudsman, Congress passed a law

prohibiting courts, other than the Supreme Court, from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman.
Is the law valid?

The law is ineffective until adopted by the Supreme Court. A similar prohibition under
Section 14 of RA 6770 against courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional
injunctive writs to enjoin investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman was deemed
as an encroachment upon the Supreme Court’s rule-making authority and should be considered
ineffective, pending deliberation on whether or not the Supreme Court should adopt such
prohibition.

12 | P a g e
 Through the provision, Congress took away from the courts their power to issue a TRO
and/or WPI to enjoin an investigation conducted by the Ombudsman, and encroached upon the
Supreme Court’s constitutional rule-making authority. Clearly, these issuances, which are, by
nature, provisional reliefs and auxiliary writs created under the provisions of the Rules of Court,
are matters of procedure which belong exclusively within the province of this Court. Congress
interfered with a provisional remedy created by the Supreme Court under its duly promulgated
rules of procedure, in violation of the separation of powers principle. Moreover, it also
practically dilutes a court’s ability to carry out its functions. Thus, pending deliberation on
whether or not to adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative and authority over all
matters of procedure, deems it proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against courts
other than the Supreme Court from issuing provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is adopted as part of the rules of procedure
through an administrative circular duly issued therefor. (Carpio-Morales v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10, 2015)

XXII.

At the height of the campaign period in April 2016, the Commission on

Elections (Comelec) ordered the priests of Sto. Domingo Church in Quezon City to
remove two (2) large tarpaulin banners (“tarpaulins”) hanging on the front walls of
the church, on the ground that these were election campaign banners that were
oversized (beyond the 2’ by 5’ size limit imposed by the Comelec).

Indeed, the banners were eight feet (8') by twelve feet (12') in size. The
priests of the Sto. Domingo Church, on their own initiative, posted the banners
within the Church compound to be viewed by the public. The first banner expressed
this message "NO TO POLITICAL DYNASTIES," while the second banner listed
Congressional candidates as either "Anti-Political Dynasty," with each name with a
check mark, or "Pro-Political Dynasty” with each name with an "X" mark. The
election candidates were listed and classified based on their official stand on
political dynasties. Give at least two legal grounds to assail the validity of the
Comelec’s order.

The order is invalid. First, speech with political consequences enjoys a high degree of
protection. Tarpaulins put up by private individuals that contain statements of their approval or
criticisms of public officials’ vote on political dynasties, as part of these private individuals’
advocacy campaign against political dynasties, and not paid for by any candidate or political
party – are not election propaganda subject to Comelec regulation. (The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Second, the prohibition on the posting by non-candidates of tarpaulins containing

opinions that may affect elections is a content-based prior restraint that is presumed invalid
unless the prohibition passes the clear and present danger test. (The Diocese of Bacolod v.
Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

Third, regulation of speech in the context of electoral campaigns made by non-

candidates or who do not speak as members of a political party which are principally advocacies
of a social issue during elections -- is unconstitutional. Regulation of election paraphernalia
involving speech of persons who are not candidates is valid, if what is regulated is declarative
speech that, taken as a whole, has for its principal object the endorsement of a candidate only.
The regulation (a) should be provided by law, (b) reasonable, (c) narrowly tailored to meet the
objective of enhancing the opportunity of all candidates to be heard and considering the primacy
of the guarantee of free expression, and (d) demonstrably the least restrictive means to achieve
that object. The regulation must only be with respect to the time, place, and manner of the
rendition of the message. (The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No.
205728)

The Comelec’s general role includes ensuring equal opportunities and reduce spending
among candidates and their registered political parties. It is not to regulate or limit the speech of
the electorate in the electoral exercise. Expression by the electorate on contemporary issues is a
form of speech protected as a fundamental and primordial right by our Constitution. (The
Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)January
21, 2015)

13 | P a g e
 Fourth, the act of the Comelec in restraining private individuals from posting tarpaulins
expressing political views in their own private property is an impermissible encroachment on
the right to property. The Comelec prohibition is a deprivation of property without due process.
(The Diocese of Bacolod v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015)

XXIII.

Based only on the stated facts, are the following pieces of evidence
admissible to prove the guilt of the accused?

a. Testimony of a police officer that the accused walked into a police

station and voluntarily and freely told the police officers that he indeed committed a
crime, which the police did not yet know at that time.

This is admissible. A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights,

which attach upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the
two other rights. However, the constitutional procedures on custodial investigation is not
applicable to a spontaneous statement, not elicited through questioning, whereby the accused
orally admitted having slain the victim. (Aballe v. People, G.R. No. L-64086, March 15, 1990;
People v. Benny Dy, G.R. No. 74517, February 23, 1988)

Moreover, the person was not yet under custodial investigation when he made his
confession. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be
a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the
suspect is taken into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that
lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. In this
case, there is no custodial investigation, and thus the person who confessed cannot
invoke his Miranda Rights. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015;
People v. Domantay, G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999)

b. Testimony of a TV reporter that the accused confessed to him the

commission of the crime upon his questioning while the accused was in detention.

This is admissible. A person under custodial investigation is guaranteed certain rights,

which attach upon the commencement thereof. These are the rights (1) to remain silent, (2) to
competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the
two other rights.

However, the confession to the news reporters, given free from any undue influence from
the police authorities, is not covered by the rule on Miranda rights under the Constitution,
which are limitations on the State, not private individuals. (People v. Andan, G.R. No. 116437,
March 3, 1997)

Moreover, the person was not under custodial investigation when he made his
confession to the media. Custodial investigation involves any questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant way. It is only after the investigation ceases to be a general
inquiry into an unsolved crime and begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken
into custody, and the police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the rule begins to operate. In this case, the confession was made
not during a custodial investigation, and thus the person who confessed cannot invoke his
Miranda Rights. (People v. Guting, G.R. No. 205412, September 9, 2015; People v. Domantay,
G.R. No. 130612, May 11, 1999)

XXIV.

Rule on the legal standing of the following petitioners:

a) Mr. Buwis, a Filipino citizen and taxpayer, who filed a petition in court,
invoking the people’s right to information, to compel the Department
14 | P a g e
 of Transportation (DOTr) to allow him to access to the DOTr papers and
documents relating to the company profile and legal capacity of the
winning bidder in a Metro Manila railway project. DOTr questioned the
standing of Mr. Buwis to sue on the ground that the contract does not
involve disbursement of public funds as the contract is a Build Operate
and Transfer (BOT) project to be financed solely by the private sector.
(2.5 points)

Mr. A has standing to sue. If the petition is anchored on the people’s right to information
on matters of public concern, any citizen can be the real party in interest. The requirement of
personal interest is satisfied by the mere fact that the petitioner is a citizen, and therefore, part
of the general public which possesses the right. There is no need to show any special interest in
the result. It is sufficient that petitioners are citizens and, as such, are interested in the faithful
execution of the laws. (Initiatives for Dialogue and Empowerment [IDEAL] v. Power Sector
Liabilities and Management Corporation [PSALM], G.R. No. 192088, October 9, 2012)

b) Mr. B, a Filipino citizen and taxpayer, who filed a petition in court to

stop Mina Corp., a mining company, from continuing its operations in
the province of Zambales, on the ground that its operations are causing
massive pollution in the rivers of the province, and severe health
problems among residents. Mina Corp. questioned the standing of Mr.
B on the ground that he has not shown that he suffered health
problems because of the mining operations, and in fact, he is not even
a resident of Zambales.

Mr. B has standing to sue. The Rule of Procedure for Environmental Cases allow for a
"citizen suit," and permit any Filipino citizen, as a steward of nature, to file an action before our
courts for violations of our environmental laws. This collapses the traditional rule on personal
and direct interest, on the principle that humans are stewards of nature. (Resident Marine
Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April
21, 2015)

XXV.

The Philippine Government and the Government of China entered into a

Memorandum of Agreement for the joint large-scale development, exploration and
extraction of petroleum resources underneath the sea off one of the islands in the
Kalayaan Group of Islands, which is also being claimed by China. Pursuant to this
MOA, the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a contract with China Oil
Company (COC), a 100 percent China-owned corporation for the latter to provide
DOE the capital, technology, technical know-how, and managerial expertise for the
DOE to directly undertake such project. Is such contract valid?

Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the President may enter into
agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other
mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. The President shall
notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within
thirty days from its execution.

Thus, the contract in this case can only be valid if it complies with the following
Constitutional requirements for a valid service contract for the large-scale exploration and
development of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils:

(1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general law that will set
standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably to attain a certain
uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms disadvantageous to the
country.

(2) The President shall be the signatory for the government because, supposedly before an
agreement is presented to the President for signature, it will have been vetted several times over
at different levels to ensure that it conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny.

15 | P a g e
 (3) Within thirty days of the executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress
to give that branch of government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose
timely objections, if any. (Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape of Tañon Strait
v. Secretary Reyes, G.R. No. 180771, April 21, 2015)

XXVI.

Antonio Trililing, a former navy officer, was arrested by the police for extortion
during an entrapment operation. While in detention, the police noticed that Trililing
displayed provocative behavior, and seemed to be hallucinating with his grandiose
claims about himself and his fantastic stories of his war exploits. Suspecting that
Trililing might be a drug addict, the police subjected him to a drug test by extracting
blood from his arm to determine if he is positive for the presence of illegal drugs in
his body. Assuming that Trililing did not consent to the drug test, was any of his
constitutional rights violated?

Mandatory drug testing of a person arrested for a non-drug-related offense violates a

person’s right to privacy guaranteed under the right against unreasonable searches and seizures
and the right against self-incrimination. The constitutional right against self-incrimination
proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused
and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. However, a drug test
result is immaterial evidence in the prosecution for non-drug offenses. Moreover, to impose
mandatory drug testing for all persons arrested regardless of the crime or offense for which the
arrest was made is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution.
We cannot condone drug testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for
which the arrest is being made. (Dela Cruz v. People, G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014)

XXVII.

The Cabinet Cluster Committee on Finance (CCCF), composed of the

Secretaries of Finance, Budget and Management, and Trade and Industry and the
Director General of NEDA held a meeting in which they resolved to recommend to
the President several measures to control inflation by imposing price restrictions on
basic commodities, including gasoline. The President eventually issued executive
orders to implement the recommendations of the CCCF. Mr. Lang, president of the
Petroleum Retailers Association of the Philippines (PARA) wrote a letter to the CCCF
demanding copies of the minutes of the meeting of the CCCF so that PARA may be
informed of the legal and technical basis of the CCCF’s recommendation to impose
price restrictions on gasoline. In the same request, Mr. Lang insisted that the
President cannot impose price controls on gasoline under the law and that CCCF
must fully disclose the minutes of the meeting, which involves public interest.
However, despite repeated demands by PARA, the CCCF refused to provide the
copies of the requested minutes of the meeting. Does CCCF have any legal basis to
deny the request for copies of the said documents?

Yes, the request may be denied on the ground that it is covered by the deliberative
process privilege, which is one of the exceptions to the constitutional right to information.
Deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure advisory opinions, recommendations,
and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.

Two fundamental requirements for the deliberative process privilege to be invoked:

First, the communication must be pre-decisional, i.e., "antecedent to the adoption of an agency
policy." Second, the communication must be deliberative, i.e., "a direct part of the deliberative
process in that it makes recommendations or expresses opinions on legal or policy matters."
Both these requirements are present in this case (Department of Foreign Affairs v. BCA
International, June 29, 2016, G.R. No. 210858)

XXVIII.

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 John Gala, a construction engineer, is a candidate for Mayor of Quezon City.
However, a rival candidate sought his disqualification on the ground that he is not in
fact a resident of the city. The petition alleges that his lack of residence is proven by
the following facts: 1) he does not own a house in the city; and 2) he is seldom seen
by the barangay officials in barangay where he supposedly lives. Assuming these
facts are true, are these sufficient to disqualify Gala?

No, these facts should not be sufficient to prove Gala’s lack of residence as to cause his
disqualification.

A candidate is not required to have a house in a community to establish his residence or

domicile in a particular place. It is sufficient that he should live there even if it be in a rented
house or in the house of a friend or relative. To insist that the candidate own the house where he
lives would make property a qualification for public office. (Jalosjos v. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

Moreover, the law does not require a person to be in his home twenty-four (24) hours a
day, seven (7) days a week, to fulfill the residency requirement. (Jalover v. Osmena, G.R. No.
209286, September 23, 2014)

What matters is that the candidate can prove two things: actual physical presence in the
locality and an intention of making it his domicile. (Jalosjos v. Commission on Elections, G.R.
No. 191970, April 24, 2012)

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