OSMENA V RAMA

SEPT 9, 1909 DISPOSITIVE PORTION

JOHNSON, J. We are satisfied, from all of the evidence adduced during the
trial, that the judgment of the lower court should be
Old case showing that if condition is based on the sole will of
affirmed. So ordered.
debtor, condition is voided and thus will take effect like a pure
obligation.
DOCTRINE
Art 1115 CC; Art 1182 NCC – Conditions relying on sole will of
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
the debtor or obligor is void.
Tomas Osmena as the plaintiff-appellee
Cenona Rama as the accused-appellant
HERMOSA V LONGARA
FACTS
LABRADOR
1. Victoriano Osmena and the defendant executed a
contract
Epifanio Longara was claiming against the testate estate of Fernando
a) Rama from Cebu will pay Osmena 200 pesos for
Hermosa, Sr. on the basis that the latter asked for credit advances on
sugar in January or February of coming year at
condition that the latter’s property in Spain was sold and he receive
price ruling the day of delivery to warehouse at half
money derived from the sale. The court ruled that this is a potestative
cuartillo per month on each peso
and a casual condition since its fulfillment is dependent not only on the
b) If not paid in full, a balance struck at end of each
will of the debtor (he can decide when to sell), but the will of a third
June with interest
party (still dependent if anyone would buy).
c) Will sell all the sugar harvested to Osmena as
guarantee security of present and future property
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
d) Special security the house with tile roof and ground
Francisco Hermosa, Sr., Epifanio Longara, Luz Hermosa
floor of stone (where he lives)
2. Defendant executed and delivered another:
FACTS
a) Asked for further loan and have received from
7. He claims P2,341.41 representing credit advances made
Osmena received P 70 in cash, 50 loaned from
to the intestate from 1932-1944, P12,924.12 made to
Evaristo Penares (to be paid in sugar in month of
his son Francisco Hermosa, and P3,772 made to his
January), 20 from Rama
grandson, Fernando Hermosa, Jr. from 1945 to 1947,
3. Osmena died sometime after execution and delivery of
after the death of the intestate, which occurred in Dec
aboved contracts. Contracts became property of heir
1944.
Agustina Rafols then ceded it to plaintiff Tomas
8. CA found that the intestate had asked for the said credit
Osmena.
advances for himself and for the members of his family
4. Plaintiff presented contracts to defendant for payment,
“on condition that their payment should be made by
Defendant acknowledged responsibility but didn’t pay
Fernando Hermosa, Sr. as soon as he receive funds
amound due.
derived from the sale of his property in Spain."
5. Action to CFI to pay the part of the defendant –
9. CA held that payment of the advances did not become
Defendant’s defense: Prescription and denial. At CFI
due until the administratrix (Luz Hermosa) received the
defendant didn’t offer any proof. CFI in favor of
sum of P20,000 from the buyer of the property.
PLAINTIFF. CFI ruled that 50 of the 70 is not borrowed
by defendant but by Evaristo Penares
ISSUE with HOLDING
6. SC appeal
2. W/N obligation contracted by the intestate was subject
ISSUE with HOLDING
to a condition exclusively dependent upon the will of
1. W/N proof adduced during trial not sufficient to support
the debtor (a condicion potestativa) and therefore null
the findings of the Lower Court
and void
a) NO. It is sufficient thus CFI judgment affirmed
a. Condition in question does not depend
b) Suggested that the acknowledgment of the
exclusively upon the will of the debtor, but
indebtedness should be regarded as a condition (In
also upon other circumstances beyond his
the acknowledgment made by the defendant, she
power or control. (mixed, depending partly
imposed the condition that she would pay the
upon the will of intestate and partly upon
obligation if she sold her house) WHICH depended
chance)
upon her EXCLUSIVE WILL thus void (Art 1115 CC;
b. Without such a buyer the sale could not be
Art 1182 NCC).
carried out or the proceeds thereof sent to
c) The acknowledgment therefore by Rama was an
the islands.
ABSOLUTE acknowledgment of obligation thus
c. the sale was not effected in the lifetime of the
sufficient to prevent the statute of limitation from
debtor (the intestate), but after his death and
barring the action upon the original contract.
 by his administrator, the very wife of the
claimant.
i. CA found no evidence to show that
the claim was the product of a
collusion or connivance between
the administratrix and the claimant.
d. As the obligation retroacts to the date when
the contract was entered into, all amounts
advanced from the time of the agreement
became due, upon the happening of the
suspensive condition. As the obligation to pay
became due and demandable only when the
house was sold and the proceeds received in
the islands, the action to recover the same
only accrued, within the meaning of the
statute of limitations, on date the money
became available here hence the action to
recover the advances has not yet prescribed.
e. Even if authorization to furnish necessaries to
his grandson may have been given, this
authorization could not be made to extend
after his death, for two obvious reasons.
i. First because the obligation to
furnish support is personal and is
extinguished upon the death of the
person obliged to give support
(article 150, old Civil Code), and
ii. second because upon the death of a
principal (the intestate in this case),
his agent's authority or
authorization is deemed
terminated (article 1732, old Civil
Code).
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Judgment affirmed in so far as it approves the claims of appellee in the
amounts of P2,341 and P12,942.12, and reversed as to that of P3,772.
DISSENTS
Paras: Concurring and dissenting:
 Concurs in reversing judgment allowing claim for
P3,772, but dissents as it afirms the appealed
jugment approving appellee’s other claims
 The condition to pay the advances was condicion
potestiva and therefore null and void in
accordance with art 1115 of the Civil Code because
it is very obvious that the matter of the sale of the
house rested on the sole will of the debtor
 Under the condition imposed by Fernando
Hermosa, Sr., it is immaterial whether or not he
had already decided to sell his house, since there is
no pretence that acceptable conditions of the sale
had been made the subject of an agreement, such
that if such conditions presented themselves the
debtor would be bound to proceed with the sale.
 As the condition above referred to is null and void,
the debt resulting from the advances made to
Fernando Hermosa, Sr. became either immediately
demandable or payable within a term to be fixed
by the court, but action has prescribed after the
lapse of 10 years.
 Does not agree that it is a mixed condition because
in the absence of any contract setting forth the
minimum or maximum terms which would be
acceptable to the debtor, nobody could legally
compel Fernando Hermosa, Sr. to make any sale.
Taylor vs. Uy Tieng Piao and Tan Liuan
Street
Taylor was contracted by Tan Liuan and Co to become the
superintendent of the respondents’ oil factory. However, Taylor’s
contract was subject to a stipulation which states that if the
machinery for the proposed factory does not arrive within 6 months,
then the employment contract can be cancelled. The machinery did
not arrive, leading for the respondents to cancel the contract and for
Taylor to file an action to recover damages.
FACTS
1. On December 12, 1918, Taylor contracted his services
to Tan Liuan and Co, the company of the respondents.
The petitioner was hired to potentially become the
superintendent of an oil factory.
a. The period of the contract was for over 2
years with a salary of P600 per month in the
1st year and P700 per month during the
second. In addition to this, he also received
electric light and water for domestic
consumption, and a residence to live in for
P60 per month.
2. However, the machinery for the contemplated factory
had not been acquired, even though ten expellers had
been ordered from the United States. The arrival of the
machines is one of the stipulations inserted in the
contract:
a. “It is understood and agreed that should the
machinery to be installed in the said factory
fail, for any reason, to arrive in the city of
Manila within a period of six months from
date hereof, this contract may be cancelled
by the party of the second part at its option,
such cancellation, however, not to occur
before the expiration of such six months.”
3. The machinery did not arrive in the city of Manila
within the six months succeeding the making of the
contract; nor was other equipment necessary for the
 establishment of the factory at any time provided by
the defendants.
a. The reason for this probably due to the fact
that the defendants, in the first months of
1919, seeing that the oil business no longer
promised large returns, either cancelled the
order for the machinery from choice or were
unable to supply the capital necessary to
finance the project.
4. This led for the respondents to avail of the option
given in the clause, deciding to rescind the contract.
5. Thus, the plaintiff thereupon instituted this action to
recover damages in the amount of P13,000.
6. However, the CFI only gave the plaintiff P300. Hence
this appeal.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. WON the contract can be cancelled due to the
independent will of the defendant
a. The plaintiff argues that the stipulation must
be understood as applicable only in those
cases where such non-arrival is due to causes
that are not due to the will of the defendants
(ie force majeur etc etc).
i. In this connection the plaintiff
relies on article 1256 of the Civil
Code, which is to the effect that
the validity and fulfilment of
contracts cannot be left to the will
of one of the contracting parties,
and to article 1119, which says
that a condition shall be deemed
fulfilled if the obligor intentionally
impedes its fulfilment.
b. However, the language conferring the right
of cancellation upon the defendants is broad
enough to cover any case of the non-arrival
of the machinery
i. "for any reason”
ii. Thus, the defendants had the right
to cancel the contract in the
contingency that occurred, unless
some clear and sufficient reason
can be adduced for limiting the
operation of the words conferring
the right of cancellation.
c. The SC believes that Article 1256 of the Civil
Code creates no impediment to the insertion
in a contract for personal service of a
resolutory condition permitting the
cancellation of the contract by one of the
parties.
i. Such a stipulation, as can be
readily seen, does not make either
the validity or the fulfillment of
the contract dependent upon the
will of the party to whom is
conceded the privilege of
cancellation; for where the
contracting parties have agreed
that such option shall exist, the
exercise of the option is as much
in the fulfillment of the contract
as any other act which may have
been the subject of agreement.
d. A condition at once facultative and
resolutory may be valid even though the
condition is made to depend upon the will of
the obligor.
i. If it were apparent that the
defendants were under a positive
obligation to cause the machinery
to arrive in Manila, they would of
course be liable. The contract,
however, expresses no such
positive obligation, and its
existence cannot be implied in the
fact of stipulation, defining the
conditions under which the
defendants can cancel the
contract.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
The judgment appealed from will be modified by declaring that the
defendants shall pay to the plaintiff the sum of P360, instead of P300,
as allowed by the lower court, and as thus modified the judgment will
be affirmed with interest from November 4, 1919, as provided in
section 510 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and with costs. So ordered.
DOCTRINE
A condition at once facultative and resolutory may be valid even
though the condition is made to depend upon the will of the obligor.
Smith, Bell & Co. vs Sotelo Matti
Romualdez, J.
Smith, Bell Co. entered into contract with Vicente Sotelo where the
former agreed to sell certain items and the latter agreed to purchase.
When the shipments arrived, Sotelo refused to pay as the items’
arrivals were late. The court held that the contract was conditional as
it was dependent on the US gov’s regulations. The plaintiff did all in
his power to deliver the items and so it they could not have been said
to have incurred delay.
With regard to the class syllabus, this conditional obligation is mixed,
meaning it partly depended on the will of a party (plaintiff company)
and partly on the chance or will of a stranger (US government).
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Vicente Sotelo (defendant)
Smith, Bell Co. (plaintiff, juridical person)

FACTS
1. In August 1918, the plaintiff corporation and the
defendant, Sotelo entered into contract where the plaintiff
corporation sells and Sotelo purchases
a. Two steel tanks for P21,000 total to be
shipped from New York to Manila within three or four months
b. Two expellers for P25,000 each to be
shipped from San Francisco in the month of September 1918
or as soon as possible
c. Two electric motors for P2,000 each
with “approximate delivery within 90 days – This is not
guaranteed”
2. The tanks arrived on April 27, 1919, the expellers
on October 26, 1918, and the motors on February 27, 1919.
3. Plaintiff corporation notified defendant of the
arrival, but the latter refused to receive them and pay the prices. For
this, the plaintiff corporation brought suits against the defendant
4. In their Answer, the defendant and Intervenor
Manila Oil Refining and By-products Co. (of which Sotelo was said to
be a manager) denied the allegations of plaintiff. It alleged that the
products were not in good condition, and that Mr. Sotelo had made
the contracts as manager of the Intervenor and that it was only on
May 1919 that the tanks had arrived, the motors and expellers
having arrived incomplete and long after the date stipulated. It
further alleged that it suffered damages in the sums of P116,783.91
and P21,250 due to the delay and non-delivery.
5. The court below absolved the defendants insofar
as the tanks and motors were concerned, but ordered them to
receive the expellers and pay the plaintiff P50,000 with legal interest
for the item.
6. Both parties appealed from this decision.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. WON, under the contract, the plaintiff has fulfilled, in due
time, its obligation to bring the goods to Manila. YES.
There exists this clause as regards the tank:
“To be delivered within 3 or 4 months. The promise or indication of
shipment carries with it absolutely no obligation on our part the
exigencies of requirements of the US government, or a number of
causes may act to entirely vitiate the indication of shipment as stated.
In other words, the order is accepted on the basis of shipment at
Mill’s convenience, time of shipment being merely an indication of
what we hope to accomplish.”
As for the expellers, there is this clause:
“The following articles to be shipped at San Francisco within the
month of September 1918 or as soon as possible”
And in the contract of the motors:
“Approximate delivery within 90 days. This is not guaranteed. This
sale is subject to our being able to obtain Priority Certificate, subject
to the US gov requirements and also subject to confirmation by
manufacturers.”
On all contracts, there is this clause:
“The sellers are not responsible for the delays caused by fires, riots on
land or on the sea, strikes or other causes known as Force Majeure
entirely beyond the control of sellers or their representatives.”
The reason these clauses were inserted was because the contracts
were executed during the world war when transport was difficult,
the US government being strict with transport and regulation during
that time.
Given these clauses, the Supreme Court concluded that the
obligation must be regarded as conditional because the terms do not
fix the date of arrival or whether the items would be brought to
Manila or not. It was up to conditions set by US government. Hence,
the fulfillment of the obligations were dependent on third persons
who could not be compelled to fulfill the condition.
In cases like this, the obligors part is deemed to have been sufficiently
performed if he has done all in his power even if the condition has
not ben fulfilled in reality. In the case at hand, the plaintiff has
sufficiently proven that it has made all the efforts it could possibly
be expected to under the circumstances.
“As soon as possible” does not necessitate that the seller must stop
all his work to devote himself to that order. But he must act with
reasonable diligence or without unreasonable delay.
“Delivery within a reasonable time” depends on the circumstances
attending the transaction such as the character and purpose of the
goods, ability of seller to produce, facilities for transport, distance of
transport, etc. The court holds that the plaintiff company brought
the goods to Manila within a reasonable time and is therefore could
not have incurred liabilities mentioned by intervenor.
2. WON the Intervenor has right of action. NO.
Sotelo entered into contract in his individual capacity and in his own
name. If he transacts in the name of a principle, he must state that
fact in the contract.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Wherefore, the judgement appealed from is modified, and the
defendant Mr. Vicente Sotelo Matti, is sentenced to accept and
receive from the plaintiff the tanks, the expellers, and the motors in
question, and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P96,000, with legal
interest thereon from July 17, 1919, the date of the filing of
complaint, until fully paid, and the cost of both instances. So ordered.
DOCTRINE a. No, the resumption of the contract, based on
In conditional obligations, such as where it the fulfillment is Rustan’s actions is purely dependent on the
dependent on the will of a third person who cannot be compelled to will of one party. They could always claim, as
they did in the instant case, that they have
act, the obligors part is deemed to have been sufficiently performed if
more than sufficient supply of pulp wood,
he has done all in his power even if the condition has not ben fulfilled even if they are accepting materials from
in reality. other firms.
i. There is evidence on record that
A conditional obligation is mixed, if it partly depends on the will of a appellees have been accepting
party and partly on the chance or will of the stranger. deliveries of pulp wood materials
from other sources even after
September 30, 1968.
Rustan Pulp and Paper Mills vs. IAC
b. The contract suggests a condition solely
Melo
dependent upon the petitioner’s exclusive
will. A purely potestative imposition of this
A paper mill started operations and executed a contract with a supplier
character must be obliterated from the face
with the condition that the paper mill has the right to stop accepting
of the contract without affecting the rest of
deliveries whenever the supply was sufficient. The paper mill exercised
the stipulations considering that the
that right, but continued accepting periodic deliveries from other
condition relates to the fulfilment of an
suppliers, leading for respondent Lluch to file a complaint.
already existing obligation and not to its
inception
i. A condition which is both
FACTS
potestative (or facultative) and
1. In 1966, petitioner Rustan established a pulp and paper
resolutory may be valid, even
mill in Baloi, Lanao del Norte.
though the saving clause is left to
2. March 20, 1967, respondent Lluch, who is a holder of a
the will of the obligor.
forest products license, gave a letter to petitioner
ii. However, the conclusion drawn
Rustan asking to be its supplier of raw materials.
from the Taylor case, which
3. This led to the execution of a contract on April 1968,
allowed a condition for unilateral
where the respondent agreed to sell for a price of
cancellation of the contract when
P30.00 per cubic meter of pulp wood raw materials.
the machinery to be installed on
4. This contract included several stipulations including:
the factory did not arrive in Manila,
a. “That BUYER shall have the option to buy from
is certainly inappropriate for
other SELLERS who are equally qualified and
application to the case at hand
holders of appropriate government authority
because the factual milieu in the
or license to sell or dispose, that BUYER shall
legal tussle dissected by Justice
not buy from any other seller whose pulp
Street conveys that the proviso
woods being sold shall have been established
relates to the birth of the
to have emanated from the SELLER'S lumber
undertaking and not to the
and/or firewood concession. . . . And that
fulfilment of an existing obligation.
SELLER has the priority to supply the pulp
c. That fact that the petitioners continued
wood materials requirement of the BUYER;
accepting deliveries after the stoppage
b. That the BUYER shall have the right to stop
means that petitioners are estopped from
delivery of the said raw materials by the seller
claiming that the breakdown of the
covered by this contract when supply of the
machinery line was an extraordinary obstacle
same shall become sufficient until such time
to their compliance to the prestation
when need for said raw materials shall have
d.
become necessarily provided, however, that
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
the SELLER is given sufficient notice.”
5. During the test run of the pulp mill, the machinery line
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED in the
thereat had major defects while deliveries of the raw
sense that only petitioner Rustan Pulp and Paper Mills is ordered to
materials piled up, which prompted the
pay moral damages and attorney's fees as awarded by respondent
recommendation for the stoppage of deliveries.
Court.
6. This led for Rustan to send a letter which informed
suppliers to stop deliveries, including its main business
DOCTRINE
partner Lluch, leading for the latter to file a complaint.
7. On January 23, 1969, the court of origin dismissed the
A purely potestative imposition of this character should be obliterated
complaint but at the same time enjoined petitioners to
from the contract without affecting the rest of the stipulations
respect the contract of sale
considering that the condition relates to the fulfilment of an already
8. Hence this appeal
existing obligation and not to its inception.
ISSUE with HOLDING
1. WON the stoppage of deliveries was a proper exercise
of the petitioner’s rights according to the contract’s
stipulations considering that there is a glut of materials
in the plant.
Romero vs. CA (MIXED CONDITION)  A sale is at once perfected when a the seller
Vitug, J. obligates himself, for a price certain, to
deliver and to transfer ownership of a
Petitioner and respondent execute a Deed of Conditional Sale, the specified thing or right to another the buyer
condition being that respondent uses petitioner’s Php 50K advance to over which the latter agrees.
evict squatters on the property. Respondent wins the ejectment case o The title given to the contract by
but files a petition for recission (she realizes she wants to keep the the parties is not as much
property), which the CA grants. Petitioner appeals to the SC and wins. significant as its substance. For
example, a deed of sale, although
IMPORTANT PEOPLE stated as a deed of conditional
Virgilio Romero – petitioner; buyer sale, may be treated as absolute in
Enriqueta Chua vda. de Ongsiong – private respondent; nature, if the vendor is not granted
vendor the right to unilaterally rescind the
contract predicated on the
FACTS fulfillment or non-fulfillment, as
10. 1988: Petitioner and his partners decided to put up a the case may be, of the prescribed
warehouse in Metro Manila, making it known to several condition (the eviction of the
real estate brokers. squatters).
11. Alfonso Flores and his wife, with a broker, offered  From the moment the contract is perfected,
petitioner a parcel of land measuring 1,952 sq.m. in the parties are bound not only to the
Paranaque. It was covered by TCT No. 361402 in the fulfillment of what has been expressly
name of respondent. stipulated but also to all the consequences
 Petitioner found the lot suitable except for which, according to their nature, may be in
the presence of squatters. Flores gave him an keeping with good faith, usage and law.
offer: if he made an advance of Php 50K (to be o Under the agreement, private
used in an ejectment case against the respondent is obligated to evict the
squatters), respondent would agree to sell the squatters on the property. The
property for only Php 800 pero square meter. ejectment of the squatters is a
12. Petitioner agreed, and a Deed of Conditional Sale was condition the operative act of
executed between him and respondent. which sets into motion the period
13. Following the agreement, respondent filed an of compliance by petitioner of his
ejectment case against the squatters in the said own obligation, which is to pay the
property with the MeTC of Paranaque. balance of the purchase price.
a) Judgment was rendered ordering them to o Private respondent’s failure “to
vacate the premises. The MeTC later remove the squatters from the
suspended the execution of the judgment to property” within the stipulated
give the squatters time to relocate. period gives petitioner the right to
b) However, this was already past the 60-day either refuse to proceed with the
period for the eviction stipulated in the Deed agreement or waive that condition
of Conditional Sale between petitioner and under Art. 1545. This option clearly
respondent. Respondent then sought to belongs to petitioner, not to
return the Php 50K petitioner gave, saying she private respondent, because he is
failed to evict the squatters, and she wants to the injured party.
retain the property. The deed of sale was  There was no potestative condition on the
nullified. part of Ongsiong but a “mixed” condition
c) Petitioner’s counsel then disagreed and said “dependent not on the will of the vendor
that alone but also of third persons like the
14. Respondent then filed a petition for recission of the squatters and government agencies and
Deed of Conditional Sale, which was granted by the CA. personnel concerned.”
Petitioner appealed.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
ISSUE with HOLDING Petition granted. CA decision reversed and set aside.
3. W/N the vendor (R) may demand the recission of a Petitioner is ordered to pay private respondent the balance
contract of sale for a cause traceable to her own failure of the purchase price, and respondent to execute a deed of
to evict squatters on the subject property within the sale in favor of petitioner.
contractually-stipulated period – No.
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v Court of Appeals
J. Regalado
IMPORTANT PEOPLE
Eusebio de Castro, Martina Rieta – Donor
Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila (RCAM) - donee
FACTS
15. In 1930, spouses Eusebio de Casto and Martina Rieta
(now both deceased), executed a deed of donation in
favor of the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
(RCAM) covering a parcel of land, with an area of 964 sq
meters, in Kawit, Cavite.
a) The deed of donation had a condition: the
donee shall not dispose/sell the property for
a period of 100 years from the execution of
the deed of donation. Violation thereof will
render the contract null and void and would
revert the property to the estate of the
donors.
16. In 1980, the Bishop of Imus, who administered all
properties of RCAM in Cavite, sold the property to
spouses Ignao for P114,000.
17. Respondents, representing the deceased couple De
Castro and Rieta, filed a complaint for nullification of
deed of donation, rescission of contract and
reconveyance of real property with damages against
spouses Ignao.
18. The Ignaos and RCAM both filed a motion to dismiss
saying that the respondents have no cause of action, no
legal capacity to sue, that the complaint states no cause
of action and that the cause of action has prescribed.
19. RTC dismissed the respondents’ complaint.
Respondents appealed to CA and rendered a decision in
their favor. Ignaos and RCAM filed MRs but was denied
by the CA.
ISSUE with HOLDING
4. W/N the respondents’ cause of action has already
prescribed. NO.
a. Petitioners’ claim: Acc. to Art. 764 of the CC,
an action for revocation of a donation must be
brought within 4 years from the non-
compliance of the conditions.
b. SC: Art. 764 does not apply as the deed of
donation expressly provides for automatic
reversion in case the condition is violated.
Judicial action for rescission is not necessary if
the contract already provides that it will be
revoked once its conditions are violated. SC
can only step in if there is an absence of a
special provision granting the power of
cancellation.
i. De Luna v. Abrigo: there is no need
for a judicial declaration of
revocation of donation if the
agreement has a stipulation
granting a party the right to rescind
a contract unilaterally in case of
breach
ii. Art. 1306 provides that parties are
authorized to establish conditions
not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, public policy.
Automatic revocation of a deed of
donation, without judicial action, is
valid.
iii. Art. 1144 (1) should be applied – an
action to enforce a written contract
prescribes in 10 years. In this case,
it has only been a little over 4 years
when the respondents filed the
complaint.
5. W/N the respondents have a cause of action. NO.
a. Respondents’ claim: cause of action is based
on the resolutory condition (don’t sell it until
after 100 years) in the deed of donation.
b. SC: The condition is an undue restriction on
the rights arising from the ownership of the
petitioners and is contrary to public policy.
i. Donation – transfers the property
from donor to donee and thus, the
donee becomes the absolute owner
of the property. The donor may
impose conditions as long as they
are not contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public policy, public
order (see Art. 1306).
ii. Prohibition against alienation must
not be for an unreasonable period
of time. Art 494 allows prohibition
against partition for 20 years. Art
870 declares that stipulations
declaring the estate inalienable for
more than 20 years are void.
iii. The prohibition against alienation
of the property for 100 years is an
impossible condition under Art.
727.
DISPOSITIVE PORTION
Judgement of respondent court is set aside. Case dismissed.
DOCTRINE
Art 494 allows prohibition against partition for 20 years. Art
870 declares that stipulations declaring the estate inalienable for more
than 20 years are void. Art. 727 states that impossible conditions are
considered as not imposed.