Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS -- 2006

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Home > About us > Who we are > IG CSIS > Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS -- 2006

● Our responsibilities Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS – 2006

❍ Emergency
management
❍ National security
❍ Crime prevention
❍ Law enforcement policy
❍ Corrections policy
● The Department
Submitted to the Minister of Public Safety pursuant to Subsection 33(2) of the Canadian
Security Intelligence Service Act
Note: This is the text of the Inspector General of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service's 2006 Certificate made public in
March 2007 pursuant to a request under Canada's Access to Information Act
(The 2006 Certificate was classified TOP SECRET when submitted to the Minister of Public Safety in November 2006. The symbol
[––] represents classified information removed from the document.)

Our Minister
❍
Introduction
❍ About us
❍ Newsroom 1 Section 33 (2) of the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act requires that I submit to you a Certificate
stating the extent to which I am satisfied with the Director's Annual Report to you. It also requires that I
Publications
state whether, in my opinion, the Service has done anything in the course of its operational activities, in
❍

● Services the time period covered by the Annual Report, which is not authorized by the Act, has contravened any
Ministerial Directions, or has involved the unreasonable or unnecessary use of its powers. The mandate
❍ RSS Feeds and functions of the Inspector General are described in an appendix to this Certificate.

❍ Cyber tracking
2This is my third Certificate that I am submitting since my appointment in 2003. It is, however, my first
❍ Daily Infrastructure Certificate for you as Minister, and so I believe that some initial background information for you may be
Report helpful.
●

3The office of the Inspector General was created in large part to provide independent assurance to the
Proactive disclosure
Minister to support Ministerial responsibility for CSIS. The Inspector General serves no other master,
neither political nor bureaucratic, than the Minister of Public Safety. The specific form this service takes is
in the carrying out of internal, and at the same time, independent reviews of CSIS for you. The internal
dimension means that there is a direct reporting relationship to you, similar to that between you and the
other public officeholders in your portfolio. Consequently, the Inspector General works in concert with, not
in opposition to, the Director of CSIS. It also means that the Inspector General can be directly tasked by
you to carry out reviews or studies of CSIS as your 'eyes and ears' into the Service. The independent facet
of the Inspector General's function means that the IG's judgments or review results are not subject to
direction or control by CSIS, your Deputy Minister, SIRC, or even, with all respect, you as Minister. It also
means that great pains are taken to ensure that the Inspector General is in no way part of the decision

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Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS -- 2006

making process affecting such matters as targets, warrants, and section 16 requests for assistance. When
the Inspector General or staff review something, it is de novo, for the first time, without having any stake
in how the matter was decided. This quality of independence is what lends to the Office of the Inspector
General value and credibility for you as Minister in what is submitted and reported to you.

4 In order to provide you with this independent and external perspective to the work of CSIS, my office
undertakes a variety of review activities which I will report on in more detail in the following pages.

5 Over the past year, I have sought and obtained briefings on a variety of matters from the senior executive
at Headquarters and the associated operational branches and have undertaken and completed one-day
visits to all the regional offices in order to have face-to-face exchanges with regional management and
select investigators. Indeed, I am of the view that this type of contact is essential to my support of you in
your Ministerial responsibility for CSIS. Meeting the people "on the ground" who are carrying out the
operational work of the Service gives me a greater appreciation of the environment in which they work
and the challenges that they face. Some of the messages I noted from these visits were the resource
pressures and the changing demographic of the Service with increased retirements [––] In addition and
perhaps of special note was the great interest among all levels in the Service and across Canada for
legislative provisions to keep pace with the rapid and unceasing advances in telecommunications
technology. This is seen as a key tool to aid CSIS in their intelligence gathering capabilities.

6 In my Certificate last year, I highlighted some of the contacts and consultations that I had with members
of the larger intelligence review community in the international context. This year marked the holding of
the biennial International Conference of Intelligence Review Agencies in Cape Town, South Africa. I was
invited to participate in a panel on "Establishing an Intelligence Oversight System". The conference
afforded me the opportunity to meet other Inspectors General and a wide range of senior officeholders and
Parliamentarians in the intelligence review community from [––] the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand and other allies such as the Netherlands and Poland. I also met, prior to the
Conference in October, with Sir Peter Gibson, the Intelligence Services Commissioner of the UK during his
first visit to Ottawa since his appointment. As well, [––] completing an on-site inspection and review of
the security liaison office (SLO) [––] I met with [––] to discuss generally intelligence liaison [––] and the
particular threat circumstances there.

7 As I have indicated in my previous two Certificates, I placed the utmost importance on maintaining a
healthy working relationship with CSIS, at all levels of contact, while at the same time making clear and
respecting our separate and distinct roles in the national security system. We both share the mutual
objective of working to continuously improve the effectiveness of CSIS operations while enhancing
democratic accountability. I can state without reservation that is what both parties have strived to do over
this reporting period.

Certification

8 Minister, let me begin by stating the following:

In respect of all the reports and information that I, and my Office, have obtained and
reviewed and of all the discussions held, and subject to the concerns raised below, I am
as satisfied as I can be with the Director's Annual Report to you on the Service's
operational activities for the period 2005-2006. In that respect, it is my opinion that the
Service has not acted beyond the framework of its statutory authority, has not
contravened any Ministerial Directions, and has not exercised its powers unreasonably or
unnecessarily.

9 In order to ensure that every statement in the Director's section 33 (1) Report is fully supported and
documented, my Office reviews all the pertinent information and intelligence collected and retained by the
Service. At a minimum, this involves examining Branch accountability reports and the 'facting' intelligence
reports on which they are based. This baseline is supplemented by exchanges of questions and answers in
writing, by discussions, briefings and interviews. The extent of the Inspector General's satisfaction as set
out in the Certificate is based on this comprehensive process of validation.

10In addition to the validation of the Director's report to you dated 4 August 2006, this Certification is based
on reviews of CSIS operational activities and monitoring of compliance with CSIS operational policy
conducted during the annual reporting period, which consisted of:

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Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS -- 2006

1. reviews of a sample of warrants and targets as well as of human source case management;
2. the review of the CSIS investigation of [––] including a sample of targets, human sources and a
warrant;
3. the review of a sample of cases involving interviews [––]
4. the review of a sample of cases involving the exchange of information with foreign agencies;
5. the review of a sample of cases related to foreign intelligence collection under section 16 of the Act;
6. the review of [––]
7. the review of the security liaison post [––]
8. comprehensive CSIS briefings on:
1. information management,
2. outreach and engagement strategies,
3. foreign agency assessments, and
4. [––]

General comments

11 I think that it is of value to you to be apprised of those areas where non-compliance has been identified
even though in many cases corrective action has been taken. This goes to my mandate to support your
Ministerial responsibility for CSIS.

12Over this review year, I have observed a larger number of issues of non-compliance with CSIS operational
policy than noted in my two previous Certificates. I define non-compliance as a non-adherence to the
rules, procedures, principles and guidelines set out in operational policy, without any qualification as to the
degree of significance of such non-compliance. To do so, that is to rank order non-compliance, for example
in terms of 'administrative' or 'substantive', would be in effect to screen cases of non-compliance, or at
least to minimize them, before they are reported to you, Minister, and to rank order the 'importance' of
each operational policy. My judgment is that it is far more appropriate to report all cases of non-
compliance without importing any pre-judgments.

13 As for the greater number of non-compliance issues this past year, the reasons for this are somewhat
uncertain. It may be due [––] to the rapid unfolding of threat circumstances that demand action or the
fact that my office has been fully staffed for the first time in three years and can approach our compliance
reviews with more rigour or perhaps a combination of these and other factors. Be that as it may, it must
be noted that there have been more issues of non-compliance identified in this review year.

Areas of concern

Ministerial Direction on National Requirements for Security Intelligence

14As you know, Ministerial Direction on Responsibility and Accountability that was given to the CSIS Director
in 2001 provides for the annual preparation of recommendations to Cabinet on National Requirements for
Security Intelligence. If Ministers approve the recommendations on National Requirements, they become
the basis for annual Ministerial Direction to the Director on the Government's requirements in the areas of
security intelligence collection, analysis and advice.

15 In the absence of such Ministerial Direction in 2005-2006, the Service relied on priorities set out by an ad
hoc Cabinet Committee of security intelligence Ministers on 6 April 2005 for the issuing of a directional
statement by the Deputy Director of Operations (DDO). This approach does present some problems for my
office and my ability to best serve you as Minister.

16 The Inspector General enjoys complete access to all CSIS information, including Ministerial Directions, with
the exception of Confidences of Cabinet. The April 2005 priorities on security intelligence are considered a
Cabinet Confidence. The importance of this matter goes beyond the rights of access of the Inspector
General; its significance goes to the heart of democratic control of a security intelligence service. [––]

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Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS -- 2006

Director's Annual Report 2005-2006

17 As I have noted, my Office completes a thorough validation of the Director's report to you. Some
numerical discrepancies were identified between the Director's report of 4 August 2006 and the 'facting'
material that my office examined. For example, the number of CSIS reports cited in the Director's report
as having been disclosed to the Department of Foreign Affairs and to the Department of National Defence
is not consistent with the number that is supported by the 'facting' material. A second example relates to
the approval of joint operations with other agencies: the report states [––] joint operations were
approved while the 'facting' material substantiates only [––]

18 I have communicated these and other discrepancies in more detail to the Director for his action but am at
your disposal should you wish to have more information.

19On 13 October 2006, the Director wrote to me with a Compliance Statement for 2005-2006 in which he
sets out five cases where employees were found to be in non-compliance. This letter is based on annual
statements submitted by CSIS Headquarters Branches and Regional Offices and is a component of the
CSIS internal accountability process. In four of these cases, he also indicated to me the final disposition of
the matter in regard to the employees involved. I am satisfied that the Service has taken appropriate
corrective action in these four cases. We have pursued with the Service the final disposition of the fifth
case, and are satisfied with the action taken.

Information Handling

20The matter of information handling by the Service and the accuracy of information continues to be an area
of concern. The identification of a number of discrepancies again in the Director's report, as well as
through our review work, suggests to me the possibility of further discrepancies and inaccuracies in CSIS
databases that I have not been in a position to identify. Additionally troubling this year is that there were
instances where, when requested, CSIS was unable to locate or retrieve documents. Some examples are
presented in the following paragraphs.

21In 2005, the Federal Court dismissed an application for a warrant that had been duly approved by the
Minister in connection with the CSIS investigation [––] The reasons for the dismissal were essentially the
Service's failure to disclose full, fair and accurate information. When my office requested the 'facting'
material that had been collated in support of this dismissed warrant application, we were informed that it
was not available [––] CSIS also advised that it was not under any obligation to retain the 'facting'
material as it was only transitional given the dismissal of the warrant application. I find this view
problematic. The 'facting' material was collated in order to substantiate a warrant application approved by
the Minister and submitted to the Federal Court for decision. Dismissal by the court of the application to it
does not colour the substantiating material that supported it as transitional, but rather invests it with
greater importance as part of Government holdings that must be retained. In my view, it would only have
been transitional if in the first place the warrant application had never been submitted to the Minister for
approval to be sent to the Federal Court.

22 In connection with one of our review projects, a situation was identified [––] I was quite concerned,
however, to learn that the Service could not produce any written report of the region's investigation into
the incident. [––]

23 As a final example, a number of instances were identified where [––] While probably a clerical error, it
has great import. [––]

Gaps in CSIS policy framework

24Policy is one of the cornerstones to governance of the activities of CSIS. It provides the framework within
which all operational work is undertaken and establishes the standard for measuring compliance. As the
threat environment changes and the work of CSIS increases in new and more challenging situations, it is
essential that policy be continuously reviewed to be expanded or revised or newly developed as
appropriate.

25 In my 2005 Certificate, the matter of certain deficiencies in the CSIS policy framework was discussed in

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Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS -- 2006

relation to liaison and operational activities undertaken abroad. This year, too, I pursue this discussion
under the same heading of work outside Canada. (Please see the section below, "Investigative activities
abroad"). In addition to that discussion, I would highlight some gaps in the policy framework governing
work within Canada that were identified through the reviews undertaken by my Office during the reporting
year.

26Our reviews of the Service's use of warrants identified what appears to be a growing disconnect between
the existing policy and actual practice with respect to the execution of certain warrant powers. I believe
that it would be in the best interests of CSIS to address this gap in order to clearly indicate the different
requirements for planning, approval and execution of each warrant power.

27There continues to be a policy gap with respect to [––] reports, an instrument designed initially to report
foreign intelligence to government clients. Specifically, my office noted that section 12 information (threat-
related) that is disclosed to domestic and foreign agencies through the [––] reporting mechanism should
be properly recorded as an exchange of information in CSIS's section 12 database, since this is essentially
what it is. As well, it is suggested that policy should set out standard procedures for uploading [––] to this
database and cross-referencing these reports [––] especially when they have been sourced from the
section 12 database. This also would enhance CSIS's information handling regime.

28 In the course of two reviews [––] of a sample of exchanges of information with foreign agencies, it was
discovered that none of the exchanges examined had been approved by a Headquarters Director General
even though operational policy assigns responsibility for such exchanges to this level. While I accept that it
may not be operationally feasible to have the HQ DG approve each and every exchange of information, the
current practice of verbally delegating the authority to approve disclosures of information to a variety of
lower-level positions, while holding HQ DGs responsible for disclosures they have not reviewed, does not,
in my view, meet the standards of due diligence that I believe was intended in this operational policy. This
concern could be addressed if policy were to set out the requirement for the clear and written designation
of individuals authorized to approve disclosures of CSIS information. It is understood that CSIS is
currently revising policy in this area and I look forward to being apprised of the outcome of these revisions.

29 In the matter of our review of CSIS interviews [––] Gaps in the policy framework [––] should be filled.

30 Finally, we learned that CSIS consults [––] This practice was established [––] This requirement has not
been incorporated into Ministerial Direction nor into operational policy. This consultation practice and
requirement should be set out in operational policy for the sake of greater clarity, certainty and
accountability.

Investigative activities abroad

31 Last year I anticipated that the work of the Director's Foreign Operations Task Force would address the
gaps in the policy framework in this area that I had identified. While the Task Force has reported, another
year has gone by and I have not yet seen any changes to policy or new policy to fill the vacuum in this
uncharted operating environment for CSIS. With the continued growth and change of CSIS activities
outside of Canada, the need for policy to keep abreast is essential.

32 This year, I would draw attention to the work of SLOs. As you know, the mandate of these officers abroad
is principally liaison with foreign intelligence agencies. [––] In doing so, implications are raised in the
context of CSIS's Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with Foreign Affairs, [––]

33 I am also concerned with a case that was identified [––]

34 I understand that CSIS is currently in the process of re-negotiating its MoU with Foreign Affairs. This is a
positive development and should be completed without delay. This process should deal with some of the
issues mentioned above, but new operational policy provisions are required to ensure CSIS staff have a
prescribed framework within which to operate.

Collection of Foreign Intelligence

35 As you are aware, the CSIS Act requires the Service to limit its collection of foreign intelligence to within
Canada only, as distinct from security intelligence which can be collected anywhere. In my review this
year, I have found nothing to confirm that the Service has not complied with this geographical limitation
imposed by the Act but I continue to have concerns similar to those that I expressed last year.

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Certificate of the Inspector General CSIS -- 2006

In last year's Certificate I pointed out the potential risks that foreign collection activities pose to
contravening the existing limitation and the inability of a review mechanism to give the Minister iron-clad
assurances that no contraventions have taken place. This assessment arises from the fact that CSIS can
collect foreign intelligence outside Canada if it is done 'incidentally' as a result of the performance of its
duties and functions such as the collection of security intelligence outside Canada. [––]

36 This year, I wish to highlight the considerable overlap between the Service's section 12 (security
intelligence) and section 16 (foreign intelligence) information requirements that exists in some cases.
[––] In these cases, the 'within Canada' limitation would apply only to the portion of the section 16
tasking that would require collection of information beyond that which would be strictly necessary for the
investigation of threats to the security of Canada. In two such cases reviewed by my office this past year,
the effect of the geographical restrictions of section 16 seemed negligible. [––]

37 Taken together, the overlap of section 12 and section 16 information requirements, and the 'incidental'
collection of foreign intelligence by CSIS [––] outside Canada leads me to believe that, in some subject
areas, the geographical restriction of section 16 is, to an extent, meaningless. I recognize the importance
of foreign intelligence to Canada and I am aware that the means for its collection is a policy issue with
which you are seized. My purpose in describing the current state of play with CSIS is to underscore the
point that the 'within Canada' limitation of section 16 is, in reality, not as constraining as it would seem.

Conclusions

38 As I complete my third year in office as Inspector General, I can say to you, Minister, with some degree of
confidence, that I believe that CSIS exercises its duties and functions effectively and professionally. As I
indicated last year, I continue to be impressed with the dedication, competence and commitment of
employees at all levels. These men and women have chosen a path to serve Canada and Canadians and
they do it very well indeed. The concerns and observations raised in this Certificate are not presented to in
any way detract from the good work performed by CSIS employees, but are offered as a contribution to
the continuing maturation of CSIS as an organization and to assist you in your responsibility for CSIS.

39 Over the past two years I am sure that, at times, CSIS has felt "overburdened" by review in their efforts
to respond to the various mandated reviews in addition to the statutory review mechanisms established
under the CSIS Act. I am aware that the Director has raised with you some of these concerns last spring.
At the risk of manifest self-interest, I wish to reiterate the observations made at the beginning of this
Certificate.

40 Minister, the Inspector General was originally conceived to be your 'eyes and ears', your window into
CSIS, in order to give you an independent source of support for your Ministerial Responsibility for the
Service. The value of this position can be seen in terms of your capacity to task it to do work on your
behalf and in terms of its independence from direction or control. Because of its independence, its absence
from the internal decision making process governing CSIS activities, its credibility is enhanced when it
submits its findings and conclusions to you. Indeed, when I was in Cape Town at the International
Conference of Intelligence Review Agencies, I was approached by delegates [––] who expressed great
interest in creating an Inspector General function within their respective review arrangements.

41 I wish to assure you that I am working very hard with the Service to minimize any disruptions my
statutory responsibilities may pose to their important obligations and duties for countering threats to the
security of Canada. In closing, let me re-affirm that I am fully committed to working with CSIS in a
constructive partnership to fulfill my role in supporting your Ministerial responsibility and accountability
for CSIS.

Date Modified: 2007-11-08 Important

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