Chapter 10 searches and siezures

■ Stonehill v. Diokno Digest

Stonehill v. Diokno
20 SCRA 283 (1967)
Concepcion, CJ

Facts:
1. Respondent (porsecution) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to
an alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and
the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the
both the residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.

2.The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants. Thus,he filed a petition with the
Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to prevent the seized effects
from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the petitioner. The court issued
the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both
premises

RULING: No, he can only assail the search conducted in the residences but not those done in the
corporation's premises. The petitioner has no cause of action in the second situation since a
corporation has a personality separate and distinct from the personality of its officers or herein
petitioner regardless of the amount of shares of stock or interest of each in the said corporation,
and whatever office they hold therein. Only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly
object the legality of a seizure--a purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party.
The right to object belongs to the corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things
seized from the offices and the premises).

■ Alvarez vs. CFI

Posted on April 2, 2013 by winnieclaire
Standard
64 Phil. 33 (1937)

ARRESTS, SEARCHES AND SEIZURES > Examination of witnesses

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn
affidavit that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him
as money lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the
task force, didn’t say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only
received by him from a reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the
search of Alvarez’ house. On June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different
documents namely, banknotes, bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc.
Thereafter, the articles seized was not brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued
the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that
all articles in question be returned to him because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand,
the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for
further investigation. When the judge sustained the latter’s motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to
the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the order of the judge authorizing the Anti-
Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis the affidavit of
Agent Almeda in whose oath the latter declared that he had no personal knowledge of the facts
which were to serve as basis for the issuance of the warrant but he had knowledge thereof only
through information secured from a person whom he considered reliable.

Ruling: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders
58 require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that
the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the
witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which
a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is
sometimes defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or
promise is made under an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must
refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses,
because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making
the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true
test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been
drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for
damages caused. The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is
insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and
therefore, the search warrant and the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers
are illegal. Further, it is the practice in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the
applicant or complainant to the application. It is admitted that the judge who issued the search
warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit made by agent Almeda and that he did
not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The Constitution does not provide that it
is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the witnesses to be presented by the
applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The purpose of both in requiring
the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the committing magistrate of the
existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or complainant is
sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the
agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it
is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of
determining the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant. When
the affidavit of the applicant or complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable cause; when the
applicant’s knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the affidavit of one or more witnesses having a
personal knowledge of the facts is necessary. Thus the warrant issued is likewise illegal because it
was based only on the affidavit of the agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts

■ collector of customs
... see the save webpages

■ Terry v. Ohio

Brief Fact Summary. The Petitioner, John W. Terry (the “Petitioner”), was stopped and searched
by an officer after the officer observed the Petitioner seemingly casing a store for a potential
robbery. The officer approached the Petitioner for questioning and decided to search him first.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An officer may perform a search for weapons without a warrant, even
without probable cause, when the officer reasonably believes that the person may be armed and
dangerous.

Facts. The officer noticed the Petitioner talking with another individual on a street corner while
repeatedly walking up and down the same street. The men would periodically peer into a store
window and then talk some more. The men also spoke to a third man whom they eventually
followed up the street. The officer believed that the Petitioner and the other men were “casing” a
store for a potential robbery. The officer decided to approach the men for questioning, and given
the nature of the behavior the officer decided to perform a quick search of the men before
questioning. A quick frisking of the Petitioner produced a concealed weapon and the Petitioner
was charged with carrying a concealed weapon.

Issue. Whether a search for weapons without probable cause for arrest is an unreasonable search
under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (“Constitution”)?

Held. The Supreme Court of the United States (“Supreme Court”) held that it is a reasonable
search when an officer performs a quick seizure and a limited search for weapons on a person that
the officer reasonably believes could be armed. A typical beat officer would be unduly burdened
by being prohibited from searching individuals that the officer suspects to be armed.

Dissent. Justice William Douglas (“J. Douglas”) dissented, reasoning that the majority’s holding
would grant powers to officers to authorize a search and seizure that even a magistrate would not
possess.

Concurrence.
Justice John Harlan (“J. Harlan”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized an additional
necessity of the reasonableness of the stop to investigate the crime.
Justice Byron White (“J. White”) agreed with the majority, but he emphasized that the particular
facts of the case, that there was suspicion of a violent act, merit the forcible stop and frisk.

Discussion. The facts of the case are important to understand the Supreme Court’s willingness to
allow the search. The suspicious activity was a violent crime, armed robbery, and if the officer’s
suspicions were correct then he would be in a dangerous position to approach the men for
questioning without searching them. The officer also did not detain the men for a long period of
time to constitute an arrest without probable cause.

■ Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County of San Francisco

Brief Fact Summary. An inspector from the Department of Health entered a home to investigate
possible violations of a City’s housing code without a warrant.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. “[A]dministrative searches of the kind at issue here are significant
intrusions upon the interests protected by the Fourth Amendment, that such searches when
authorized and conducted without a warrant procedure lack the traditional safeguards which the
Fourth Amendment guarantees to the individual, and that the reasons put forth in [Frank v.
Maryland] and in other cases for upholding these warrantless searches are insufficient to justify so
substantial a weakening of the Fourth Amendment’s protections.”

Facts. “On November 6, 1963, an inspector of the Division of Housing Inspection of the San
Francisco Department of Public Health entered an apartment building to make a routine annual
inspection for possible violations of the city’s Housing Code.” The inspector was informed that
the Appellant was using part of his leasehold as a personal residence. The inspector confronted the
Appellant and demanded to inspect the premises because residential use was not allowed on the
first floor of the apartment building. The Appellant did not allow the inspector to enter because he
did not have a warrant.
The inspector attempted to obtain access to Appellant’s apartment a second time two days later,
and again the Appellant refused to grant him access. The Appellant then was sent a summons
ordering him to appear at the district attorney’s office. The Appellant did not appear and a few
weeks later two other inspectors attempted to gain access to his apartment and were again refused
because they did not have a search warrant.
A complaint was then filed against the Appellant for violation of the Housing Code. His demurrer
was denied and he filed a writ of prohibition. The court of Appeals held the housing section “does
not violate Fourth Amendment rights because it ‘is part of a regulatory scheme which is
essentially civil rather than criminal in nature, inasmuch as that section creates a right of
inspection which is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions.’ ”

Issue. “[W]hether administrative inspection programs, as presently authorized and conducted,

violate Fourth Amendment rights as those rights are enforced against the States through the
Fourteenth Amendment?”

Held. Yes. “[Frank v. Maryland], to the extent that it sanctioned such warrantless inspections, must
be overruled.”
“In [Frank v. Maryland], [the Supreme Court] upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit
a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected
public nuisance.” “[T]he Frank opinion has generally been interpreted as carving out an additional
exception to the rule that warrantless searches are unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.”
The majority here observed, “[t]he practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject
to the discretion of the official in the field. This is precisely the discretion to invade private
property which we have consistently circumscribed by a requirement that a disinterested party
warrant the need to search. We simply cannot say that the protections provided by the warrant
procedure are not needed in this context; broad statutory safeguards are no substitute for
individualized review, particularly when those safeguards may only be invoked at the risk of a
criminal penalty.”
“Unfortunately, there can be no ready test for determining reasonableness [of a search] other than
by balancing the need to search against the invasion which the search entails. But [the majority
thought] that a number of persuasive factors combine to support the reasonableness of area code-
enforcement inspections. First, such programs have a long history of judicial and public
acceptance. Second, the public interest demands that all dangerous conditions be prevented or
abated, yet it is doubtful that any other canvassing technique would achieve acceptable results.
Many such conditions – faulty wiring is an obvious example – are not observable from outside the
building and indeed may not be apparent to the inexpert occupant himself. Finally, because the
inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of crime, they
involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen’s privacy.”
Further, “[after] concluded that the area inspection is a ‘reasonable’ search of private property
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, [the majority observed] it is obvious that ‘probable
cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable legislative or administrative standards
for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. Such
standards, which will vary with the municipal program being enforced, may be based upon the
passage of time, the nature of the building (e. g., a multi-family apartment house), or the condition
of the entire area, but they will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the condition
of the particular dwelling. It has been suggested that so to vary the probable cause test from the
standard applied in criminal cases would be to authorize a ‘synthetic search warrant’ and thereby
to lessen the overall protections of the Fourth Amendment.”
Moreover, “[t]he warrant procedure is designed to guarantee that a decision to search private
property is justified by a reasonable governmental interest. But reasonableness is still the ultimate
standard. If a valid public interest justifies the intrusion contemplated, then there is probable cause
to issue a suitably restricted search warrant. Such an approach neither endangers time-honored
doctrines applicable to criminal investigations nor makes a nullity of the probable cause
requirement in this area. It merely gives full recognition to the competing public and private
interests here at stake and, in so doing, best fulfills the historic purpose behind the constitutional
right to be free from unreasonable government invasions of privacy.”

■ Jose Burgos vs. Chief of Staff

G.R. No L-64261
December 26, 1984

Facts:

Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of “Metropolitan
Mail” and “We Forum” newspapers and the seizure of items alleged to have been used in
subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined from
using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.

Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause and that the two warrants issued
indicated only one and the same address. In addition, the items seized subject to the warrant were
real properties.

Issue:
Whether or not the two warrants were valid to justify seizure of the items.

Held:
The defect in the indication of the same address in the two warrants was held by the court as a
typographical error and immaterial in view of the correct determination of the place sought to be
searched set forth in the application. The purpose and intent to search two distinct premises was
evident in the issuance of the two warrant.

As to the issue that the items seized were real properties, the court applied the principle in the
case of Davao Sawmill Co. v. Castillo, ruling “that machinery which is movable by nature
becomes immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement, property or plant, but not so
when placed by a tenant, usufructuary, or any other person having only a temporary right, unless
such person acted as the agent of the owner.” In the case at bar, petitioners did not claim to be the
owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the
machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to
seizure under a search warrant.
However, the Court declared the two warrants null and void.

Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the
objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.

The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.

Furthermore, jurisprudence tells of the prohibition on the issuance of general warrants. (Stanford
vs. State of Texas). The description and enumeration in the warrant of the items to be searched and
seized did not indicate with specification the subversive nature of the said items.

■ People vs. Burgos (G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986)

G.R. No. L-68955 September 4, 1986
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RUBEN BURGOS y TITO, defendant-appellant.
Facts: Defendant is charged with illegal possession of firearm in furtherance of subversion (tasks
such as recruiting members to the NPA and collection of contributions from its members) and
found guilty by the RTC of Digos, Davao del Sur. From the information filed by the police
authorities upon the information given by Masamlok, allegedly a man defendant tried to recruit
into the NPA, the police authorities arrest defendant and had his house searched. Subsequently,
certain NPA-related documents and a firearm, allegedly issued and used by one Alias Cmdr. Pol of
the NPA, are confiscated. Defendant denies being involved in any subversive activities and claims
that he has been tortured in order to accept ownership of subject firearm and that his alleged
extrajudicial statements have been made only under fear, threat and intimidation on his person and
his family. He avers that his arrest is unlawful as it is done without valid warrant, that the trial
court erred in holding the search warrant in his house for the firearm lawful, and that the trial court
erred in holding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of PD 9 in relation to GOs 6and
7.

Issue: If defendant’s arrest, the search of his home, and the subsequent confiscation of a firearm
and several NPA-related documents are lawful.

Held: Records disclose that when the police went to defendant’s house to arrest him upon the
information given by Masamlok, they had neither search nor arrest warrant with them—in wanton
violation of ArtIV, Sec 3 (now Art III, sec 2). As the Court held in Villanueva vs Querubin, the
state, however powerful, doesn’t have access to a man’s home, his haven of refuge where his
individuality can assert itself in his choice of welcome and in the kind of objects he wants around
him. In the traditional formulation, a man’s house, however humble, is his castle, and thus is
outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by the government.

The trial court justified the warrantless arrest under Rule 113 Sec 6 of the RoC:

a) When the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is about to

commit an offense in his presence;
b) When an offense has in fact been committed, and he has reasonable ground to believe that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment
or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending or
has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another

and the confiscation of the firearm under Rule 126, Sec 12:

A person charged with an offense may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of the offense.

However, the trial court has erred in its conclusion that said warrantless arrest is under the ambit
of aforementioned RoC. At the time of defendant’s arrest, he wasn’t in actual possession of any
firearm or subversive document, and was not committing any “subversive” act—he was plowing
his field. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a crime in a warrantless arrest. An essential precondition is that a crime must have
beenin fact or actually have been committed first; it isn’t enough to suspect a crime may have been
committed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. The Court
also finds no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the
accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of
arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a
crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of
flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.

In proving the ownership of the questioned firearm and alleged subversive documents, assuming
they were really illegal, the defendant was never informed of his constitutional rights at the time
of his arrest; thus the admissions obtained are in violation of the constitutional right against self-
incrimination under Sec 20 Art IV (now Sec 12, Art III) and thus inadmissible as evidence.

Furthermore, the defendant was not accorded his constitutional right to be assisted by counsel
during the custodial interrogation. His extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged
subversive documents are all inadmissible as evidence. In light of the aforementioned, defendant
is acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt of the crime with which he has been charged. Subject
firearm and alleged subversive documents have been disposed of in accordance with law.

The Court also maintains that violations of human rights do not help in overcoming a rebellion.
Reiterating Morales vs Enrile, “while the government should continue to repel the communists,
the subversives, the rebels, and the lawless with the means at its command, it should always be
remembered that whatever action is taken must always be within the framework of our
Constitution and our laws.”

■ Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

FACTS: The challenged search warrant was issued by the respondent judge on May 10, 1984. The
petitioner's house was searched two days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was
discovered. However, the officers conducting the search found in the premises one Colt Magnum
revolver and eighteen live bullets which they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge
against the petitioner.
Respondent Judge said that when PC Capt. Mauro P. Quinosa personally filed his application for a
search warrant on May 10, 1984, he appeared before him in the company of his two (2) witnesses,
Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, both of whom likewise presented to him their respective
affidavits taken by Pat. Josue V. Lining, a police investigator. As the application was not yet
subscribed and sworn to, he proceeded to examine Captain Quillosa on the contents thereof to
ascertain, among others, if he knew and understood the same. Afterwards, he subscribed and
swore to the same before him.

ISSUE: Whether the Respondent Judge failed to comply with the proper procedure in issuing the
Search Warrant.
HELD: Yes, mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The
examining Judge has to take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and attach them to the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge
may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold
liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to
conform with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the
record, rendering the search warrant invalid. (See Rule 126, Sec 4)
The respondent judge also declared that he "saw no need to have applicant Quillosa's deposition
taken considering that he was applying for a search warrant on the basis of the information
provided by the witnesses whose depositions had already been taken by the undersigned.
In other words, the applicant was asking for the issuance of the search warrant on the basis of
mere hearsay and not of information personally known to him, as required by settled
jurisprudence.

■ Alih vs. Castro

151 SCRA 279

June 23, 1987

Facts:

Respondents who were members of the Philippine marine and defense forces raided the compound
occupied by petitioner in search of loose firearms, ammunitions and explosives. A shoot-out
ensued after petitioners resisted the intrusion by the respondents, killing a number of men. The
following morning, the petitioners were arrested and subjected to finger –printing, paraffin testing
and photographing despite their objection. Several kinds of rifle, grenades and ammunitions were
also confiscated.

The petitioners filed an injunction suit with a prayer to have the items illegally seized returned to
them and invoked the provisions on the Bill of Rights

The respondents admitted that the operation was done without a warrant but reasoned that they
were acting under superior orders and that operation was necessary because of the aggravation of
the peace and order problem due to the assassination of the city mayor.

Issue:

Whether or not the seizing of the items and the taking of the fingerprints and photographs of the
petitioners and subjecting them to paraffin testing are violative of the bill of Rights and are
inadmissible as evidence against them.
Held:

The court held that superior orders nor the suspicion that the respondents had against petitioners
did not excuse the former from observing the guaranty provided for by the constitution against
unreasonable searches and seizure. The petitioners were entitled to due process and should be
protected from the arbitrary actions of those tasked to execute the law. Furthermore, there was no
showing that the operation was urgent nor was there any showing of the petitioners as criminals or
fugitives of justice to merit approval by virtue of Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court.

The items seized, having been the “fruits of the poisonous tree” were held inadmissible as
evidence in any proceedings against the petitioners. The operation by the respondents was done
without a warrant and so the items seized during said operation should not be acknowledged in
court as evidence. But said evidence should remain in the custody of the law (custodia egis).

However, as to the issue on finger-printing, photographing and paraffin-testing as violative of the

provision against self-incrimination, the court held that the prohibition against self-incrimination
applies to testimonial compulsion only. As Justice Holmes put it in Holt v. United States, 18 “The
prohibition of compelling a man in a criminal court to be a witness against himself is a prohibition
of the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from him, not an exclusion
of his body as evidence when it may be material.”

■ people vs malstedt

Facts: In an information filed against the accused- appellant Mikael Malmstead was charged
before the RTC of La Trinidad, Benguet, for violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic Act 6425,
as amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish national, entered the Philippines for the third time in
December 1988 as a tourist. He had visited the country sometime in 1982 and 1985.

In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat in the
morning of the following day, he took a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for two (2) days.
Then in the 7 in the morning of May 11, 1989, the accused went to Nangonogan bus stop in
Sagada.

At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the
Commanding Officer of the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa,
ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain
Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region. The order
to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was
received by the Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession prohibited drugs. The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM
officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a checkpoint at the designated area at
about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the Cordillera Region.
The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of
the bus. Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.

During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on
accused's waist to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification
papers. When accused failed to comply, the officer required him to bring out whatever it was that
was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a pouch bag and when accused
opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped
objects turned out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.

Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the
bus, accused stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier. Upon stepping out of
the bus, the officers got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling
the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were bulges inside the same which did not feel like
foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that accused finally presented his
passport.

Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa, La Trinidad,
Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears
and they were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish
found among the personal effects of accused and the same were brought to the PC Crime
Laboratory for chemical analysis.

In the chemistry report, it was established that the objects examined were hashish. a prohibited
drug which is a derivative of marijuana. Thus, an information was filed against accused for
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act.

ACCUSED’S DEFENSE

During the arraignment, accused entered a plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he raised the issue
of illegal search of his personal effects. He also claimed that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2) travelling bags were not owned by him,
but were merely entrusted to him by an Australian couple whom he met in Sagada. He further
claimed that the Australian couple intended to take the same bus with him but because there were
no more seats available in said bus, they decided to take the next ride and asked accused to take
charge of the bags, and that they would meet each other at the Dangwa Station.

The trial court found the guilt of the accused Mikael Malmstedt established beyond reasonable
doubt.

Seeking the reversal of the decision of the trial court finding him guilty of the crime charged,
accused argues that the search of his personal effects was illegal because it was made without a
search warrant and, therefore, the prohibited drugs which were discovered during the illegal
search are not admissible as evidence against him.

Issue: Whether or Not the contention of the accused is valid, and therefore the RTC ruling be
reversed.

Held: The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures. However, where the search is made
pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a
warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private person under the following circumstances.

Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense;

(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and

(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or
place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was
actually being committed by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search
made upon his personal effects falls squarely under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest. While it is true that the
NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient
probable cause for said officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.

Probable cause has been defined as such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonable,
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. Warrantless search of
the personal effects of an accused has been declared by this Court as valid, because of existence of
probable cause, where the smell of marijuana emanated from a plastic bag owned by the accused,
10 or where the accused was acting suspiciously, 11 and attempted to flee.

The appealed judgment of conviction by the trial court is hereby affirmed. Costs against the
accused-appellant.
■ The Checkpoints Case : Valmonte v. De Villa, G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989 (173 SCRA
211)
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

I. THE FACTS

On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated
pursuant to Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the
mission of conducting security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for
the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and
providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development of the
National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed
checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and the Union
of Lawyers and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in
Valenzuela, Metro Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that
respondents Renato De Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be
directed to formulate guidelines in the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the
people. Petitioners contended that the checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make
searches and seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.

II. THE ISSUE

Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search
and seizures?

III. THE RULING

[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]

NO, military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.

xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A
reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to
the facts of each case.

Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked
on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not
constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be
considered as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing
effective territorial defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public.
Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in
the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to
urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased
killings in cities of police and military men by NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance
of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not
all of which are reported in media, most likely brought about by deteriorating economic conditions
– which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very least, as abnormal times. Between
the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare and an
individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former
should prevail.

True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in
the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community.

■ Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt
Avenue, Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office,
about a "sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot
wound. That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00
o'clock noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The
wounded man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed
later that the true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification,
Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security
reasons. While confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who
murdered the 2 CAPCOM mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive
organization. Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it
can be said that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
therefore in connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of
continuing crimes.
■ ople vs torres

Facts: Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of
a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional
grounds, viz: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the
rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents,
then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of
A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its
implementation.

Issue: Petitioner contends:

A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION
REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN
UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE
IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE
EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR
EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE
GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."

Held: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void
for being unconstitutional. SO ORDERED.

Ratio: It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the
Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for the first time a National Computerized
Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of various
contending state policies — the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against
dossier-gathering by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice
Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308 involves the all-important freedom of thought.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers
no right, imposes no duty, affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a
citizen cannot transact business with government agencies delivering basic services to the people
without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get this identification card
for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the
contention that A.O. No. 308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

In view of standing
Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a Senator, petitioner is possessed
of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power. As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance
System (GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and
the misuse of GSIS funds to implement A.O. No. 308.

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the
implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No.
308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action is not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves have started the
implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997,
respondent Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the
manufacture of the National Identification (ID) card.

In view of the need for Legislative Act

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific
aspects in the administrative operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and
should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law and carrying out the legislative policy.

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as
determined by proper governmental organs. 21 It enables the President to fix a uniform standard
of administrative efficiency and check the official conduct of his agents. To this end, he can issue
administrative orders, rules and regulations.
Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not
appropriate to be covered by an administrative order. An administrative order is:
"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders. — Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of
governmental operation in pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in
administrative orders."

Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law and hence,
beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen
and foreign resident, and more particularly, violates their right to privacy.
Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of
Congress is understandable. The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the
Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to execute laws will disturb their delicate
balance of power and cannot be allowed.

In view of right to privacy

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No.
308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is
predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and foreigners with the
facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent
transactions and misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether
these interests are compelling enough to warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not
arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O. No. 308 which if implemented
will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference
Number (PRN) as a "common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies"
through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." A.O. No. 308
should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding
of data is limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor
General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the
"generation of population data for development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will
not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other data with remote relation to the
avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the
identification of the individual through his PRN .

His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded — whether it be in
the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his
transactions for loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities,
reimbursements for medication, hospitalization, etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the
better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base through the electronic
linkage of the files. The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but the
existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a
temptation that may be too great for some of our authorities to resist.

Well to note, the computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information.
Yet, there are no controls to guard against leakage of information. When the access code of the
control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an intruder, without fear of sanction
or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the data stored
within the system. It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal
information which will be gathered about our people will only be processed for unequivocally
specified purposes. 60 The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of A.O. No. 308 may interfere
with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and
circumvent the right against self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by
government authorities and evade the right against unreasonable searches and seizures. The
possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer technology are accentuated
when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded. They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of
Rights seeks to prevent.

In Morfe v. Mutuc, we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public
officer to make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and
expenses, did not infringe on the individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote
morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing the opportunities for official
corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions
into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological
advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely requires that the law
be narrowly focused and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right
must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional
invasions..