CIVIL LAW

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS Nationality Principle

Accion in Rem verso vs Solution indebiti
Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the
Accion in rem verso Solutio indebiti status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.
In both cases:
Lex Rei Sitae
1. Both are unjustly enriched at the
expense of another, Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject
2. There is payment to the law of the country where it is stipulated.
3. An obligation to return what was unduly
delivered or paid arises Exception: However, intestate and testamentary
4. Purpose is to prevent unjust enrichment successions, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights
and to the intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions,
1. Defendant has 1. Payment is shall be regulated by the national law of the person
been enriched; made; whose succession is under consideration, whatever
2. Plaintiff 2. It was made by may be the nature of the property and regardless of
suffered a loss mistake the country wherein said property may be found.
3. Enrichment is 3. The payor has
 All matters concerning the title and disposition of real
without just or no duty to pay;
property are determined by what is known as the lex
legal ground; 4. There is no
loci rei sitae. This general principle includes all rules
4. Plaintiff has no binding
governing the descent, alienation and transfer of
other action relationship
immovable property and the validity, effect and
based on between the
construction of wills and other conveyances.
contract, quasi- payor and the
 This principle even governs the capacity of the
contract, crime one who
person making a deed relating to immovable
or quasi-delict received
property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an
payment
instrument will be ineffective to transfer title to land
There is no mistake in Essence is payment by if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci
payment. mistake rei sitae, even though under the law of his domicile
and by the law of the place where the instrument is
Note: Mistake refers to actually made, his capacity is undoubted. [Orion
mistake of fact, except Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)]
when it involves a
Lex Loci Celebrationis
doubtful or difficult
interpretation of law Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and
other public instruments shall be governed by the laws of the
Source of obligation is Source of obligation is a country in which they are executed.
law quasi-contract
When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic
Principle of Territoriality or consular officials of the Republic of the Philippines in a
foreign country, the solemnities established by Philippine laws
Art. 14. Penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be observed in their execution.
shall be obligatory upon all who live or sojourn in the
Philippine territory, subject to the principles of public NOTE: Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts
international law and to treaty stipulations. or property, and those which have, for their object,

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 public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country.
 In Del Soccoro v. Van Wilsem [744 SCRA 516 (2014)],
a Dutch national, after divorcing his Filipino spouse,
failed to support their child for several years. When
charged with violation of R.A. No. 9262 for refusing
and/or failing to give support to the child, he pleaded
the law of the Netherlands to advance his position
that he is not obliged to support his son.
The Court held that even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, said foreign law cannot be applied in the
Philippines because it is contrary to a sound and
established policy of the forum and that, additionally,
prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or
property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not
be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions
agreed upon in a foreign country. Thus
notwithstanding his national law, his obligation to
support his child is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to
the child to be denied of financial support when the
latter is entitled thereto.
Principle of Abuse of Right
Art. 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
 Damnum Absque Injuria if there was a valid or
legitimate exercise of right.
 The proper exercise of a lawful right cannot constitute
a legal wrong for which an action will lie, although
the act may result in damage to another, for no legal
right has been invaded.
Unfair Competition
Art. 28. Unfair competition in agricultural, commercial or
industrial enterprises or in labor through the use of force,
intimidation, deceit, machination or any other unjust,
oppressive or highhanded method shall give rise to a right of
action by the person who thereby suffers damage.
 The concept of "unfair competition" under Article 28
of the NCC is very much broader than that covered by
intellectual property laws. Under this article, which
follows the extended concept of "unfair competition"
in American jurisdictions, the term covers even cases
of discovery of trade secrets of a competitor, bribery
of his employees, misrepresentation of all kinds,
interference with the fulfillment of a competitor’s
contracts, or any malicious interference with the
latter’s business [Willaware Products Corporation vs.
Jesichris Manufacturing Corp., 734 SCRA 238 (2014)].
In order to qualify the competition as "unfair," it must
have two characteristics: (1) it must involve an injury
to a competitor or trade rival, and (2) it must involve
acts which are characterized as "contrary to good
conscience," or "shocking to judicial sensibilities," or
otherwise unlawful; in the language of our law, these
include force, intimidation, deceit, machination or any
other unjust, oppressive or high-handed method. The
public injury or interest is a minor factor; the essence
of the matter appears to be a private wrong
perpetrated by unconscionable means.
Simplified Elements of damage:
1. Injury sustained by a competitor
2. By reason of an unlawful act
Natural Persons
Art. 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to
it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
Art. 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is
alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's
womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less
than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within
twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the
maternal womb.
NOTE: A conceived child, although as yet unborn, has
a limited and provisional personality for purposes
favorable to it, such as the following rights:
1. To be a donee of simple donations;
2. To receive support;
3. To be a testamentary heir, even if it be born
after the testator’s death
4. To be a beneficiary in an insurance policy
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 5. It can be a recipient of a pure obligation
Q: Can the provisional personality of the child be
asserted if the issue is the right of the parents?
A: No. In Continental Steel Manufacturing vs
Montano, the Supreme Court said: “We need not
establish civil personality of the unborn child herein
since his/her juridical capacity and capacity to act as
a person are not in issue. It is not a question before us
whether the unborn child acquired any rights or
incurred any obligations prior to his/her death that
were passed on to or assumed by the childs
parents. The rights to bereavement leave and other
death benefits in the instant case pertain directly to
the parents of the unborn child upon the latter’s
death.”
Rules on Survivorship
Art. 43. If there is a doubt, as between two or more persons
who are called to succeed each other, as to which of them
died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to the other,
shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed
that they died at the same time and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to the other.
Survivorship under Art 43 Survivorship under the
of the Civil Code Rules of Court
1. Successional
rights are
involved
2. The persons are
heirs of each
other
Marriage
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
law for the establishment of conjugal and family life. It is the
foundation of the family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are governed by
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix the property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
Art. 2. No marriage shall be valid, unless these essential
requisites are present:
(1) Legal capacity of the contracting parties who must
be a male and a female; and
(2) Consent freely given in the presence of the
solemnizing officer.
Art. 3. The formal requisites of marriage are:
(1) Authority of the solemnizing officer;
2) A valid marriage license except in the cases
provided for in Chapter 2 of this Title; and
(3) A marriage ceremony which takes place with the
appearance of the contracting parties before the
solemnizing officer and their personal declaration
that they take each other as husband and wife in the
presence of not less than two witnesses of legal age.
NOTE: In Republic vs. Albios [707 SCRA 584 (2013)],
where a citizen of the Philippines got married to an
American citizen solely for the purpose of acquiring
American citizenship in consideration of a sum of
money, it was alleged that the marriage was void
because it was one made in jest and consent was
therefore lacking. In declaring the marriage to be
valid, the Court ruled that that there is no law that
declares a marriage void if it is entered into for
purposes other than what the Constitution or law
declares, such as the acquisition of foreign citizenship.
While the avowed purpose of marriage under Article
1 of the Family Code is for the couple to establish a
conjugal and family life, the possibility that the
parties in a marriage might have no real intention to
establish a life together is, however, insufficient to
nullify a marriage freely entered into in accordance
with law. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid. Love, though the ideal consideration in
a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for
marriage. Other considerations, not precluded by law,
may validly support a marriage.
Art. 4. The absence of any of the essential or formal requisites
shall render the marriage void ab initio, except as stated in
Article 35 (2).
A defect in any of the essential requisites shall not affect the
validity of the marriage but the party or parties responsible for
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the irregularity shall be civilly, criminally and administratively A: Valid marriage, but the party responsible shall be
liable. civilly, criminally and administratively liable

Essential Formal Note: The local civil registrar has no power to extend
Absence Void GR: Void the validity of marriage license.
Exception: if
both/either parties Marriages solemnized outside the Philippines
believed in good faith Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in
that the solemnizing accordance with the laws in force in the country where they
officer had legal were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
authority to this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4),
solemnize
(5) and (6), 3637 and 38.
Defect Voidable Recognition of Divorce decree in the Philippines
Irregularity Does not affect the marriage but the
party responsible shall be civilly, Three Important Legal Premises On Divorce First, a
criminally and administratively divorce obtained abroad by an alien married to a
liable. Philippine national may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is valid
according to the national law of the foreigner.
Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of
the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid
Marriage License divorce is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute
divorce secured by a Filipino married to another
Art. 20. The license shall be valid in any part of the Philippines Filipino is contrary to our concept of public policy and
for a period of one hundred twenty days from the date of morality and shall not be recognized in this
issue, and shall be deemed automatically canceled at the jurisdiction. [Bayot vs. CA, G.R. No. 155635, Nov. 7,
expiration of the said period if the contracting parties have not 2008, 570 SCRA 472]
made use of it. The expiry date shall be stamped in bold
characters on the face of every license issued.
Q: If a foreigner, married to another foreigner obtains
 No marriage license shall be issued by the Local Civil a decree of absolute divorce abroad, can the decree
Registrar unless the applicants present a Certificate be recognized in the Philippines?
of Compliance issued for free by the local Family
A: Yes.
Planning Office certifying that they had duly received
adequate instructions and information on Q: If a Filipino, married to another Filipino obtains a
responsible parenthood, family planning, decree of absolute divorce abroad, can the decree be
breastfeeding and infant nutrition [Sec. 15, R.A. No. recognized in the Philippines?
10354, The Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law)]. A: NO. It is contrary to public policy and shall not be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Q: What if there is no marriage license at all at the
time of celebration of marriage? Q: If a foreigner, married to a Filipino, obtains a
decree of absolute divorce abroad, can the decree be
A: Marriage is void.
recognized in the Philippines?
Q: What if there is a marriage license, but it is a
A: Yes. Legal Basis: Article 26(2) of the Family Code.
spurious marriage license?
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is

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 thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under
Philippine law.
Q: What if it was the Filipino spouse who obtained
the divorce decree?
A: Valid, and can be recognized in the Philippines.
In Republic v. Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (April 2018),
the Court, in a landmark ruling, declared the absolute
divorce obtained by the Filipino spouse married to a
 Only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second
foreigner valid even if it is the Filipino spouse who
obtained it. In this case, the RTC ruled that Article 26
(2) of the Family Code does not apply because it was
the Filipino spouse that initiated the divorce. But the
Court of Appeals overturned the decision, holding that
Article 26 of the Family Code applies even if it was the
Filipino spouse who filed for divorce against the
foreign spouse because the decree obtained makes
the foreigner no longer married to the Filipino,
enabling the foreigner to remarry. The appellate
court held that it would be unjust to consider the
Filipino still married to the foreigner who is no longer
considered married to the Filipino. The Supreme Court
sustained the appellate court's ruling.
Q: What if the absolute divorce decree was applied
for jointly by the spouses?
A: Valid, and can be recognized in the Philippines
NOTE: Before the divorce decree can be recognized
by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the
divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to
the foreign law allowing it.
 The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code is also
If the court finds that the decree capacitated the
alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that
the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage.
 The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or
right of a party or a particular fact [Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA
266; Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013)].
 The registration of a foreign divorce decree in the
civil registry without the requisite judicial recognition
is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.
The Court explained that while the law requires the
entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the
law and the submission of the decree by themselves
do not ipso facto authorize the decrees registration.
The law should be read in relation with the
requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign
judgment before it can be given res judicata effect
[Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No. 186571, 11 August
2010, 628 SCRA 266].
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code while the
alien spouse can claim no right under said provision.
The Court explained that the provision was included
in the law to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse
who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse. The legislative intent is for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her
marital status, settling the doubts created by the
divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino
spouse a substantive right to have his or her marriage
to the alien spouse considered as dissolved,
capacitating him or her to remarry. Thus, if the
Filipino spouse invokes the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the action is not limited
to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If
the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the
Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. [Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, G.R. No.
186571, 11 August 2010, 628 SCRA 266]
applicable to a marriage between a Filipino and a
foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment
nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The
Court explained that the principle in the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies
because the foreign spouse, after the foreign
judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to
remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the
foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines,
the Filipino spouse will be discriminated — the
foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse
cannot remarry. [Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69
(2013)]
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  In the case of San Luis v. San Luis [514 SCRA 294
(2007)], the Court held that there is no need to
retroactively apply the provisions of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code because
there is sufficient jurisprudential basis to apply the
rule embodied in said law to absolute divorces
obtained by the foreign spouse prior to the effecivity
of the Family Code, as exemplified by the cases of
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr., Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera and
Quita v. Court of Appeals.
Marriages Exempt from Marriage License Requirement
Remote The residence of either party is so
Places located that there is no means of
transportation to enable such party
to appear personally before the LCR.
Among a. Among Muslims or members of
Muslims ethnic cultural
communities;
b. Solemnized in accordance with
their customs, rites or practices
5- Year a. Living together as husband and
Cohabitation wife for at least 5 years before the
marriage;
b. No legal impediment to marry
during the 5-year period
 In Republic v. Dayot [550 SCRA 435 (2008)], the
Supreme Court ruled that the falsity of an affidavit of
marital cohabitation, where the parties have in truth
fallen short of the minimum five-year requirement,
effectively renders the marriage void ab initio for lack
of a marriage license.
 In De Castro v. Assidao-De Castro [G.R. No. 160172
February 13, 2008, 545 SCRA 162], the Court further
clarified that the falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage. To permit a false affidavit to
take the place of a marriage license, the Court
explained in Dayot, is to allow an abject
circumvention of the law.
 In Santiago v. People [G.R. No. 200233, July 15,
2015], the Court held that the falsity of an affidavit of
cohabitation CANNOT be used as a defense in the
crime of bigamy, for it will be the height of absurdity
for the Court to allow the accused to use her illegal
act to escape criminal conviction.
Marriage Ceremony
 In Ronulo v. People [728 SCRA 675 (2014)], a
solemnizing officer from the Aglipayan Church was
charged with violation of Article 352 of the RPC for
allegedly performing an illegal marriage ceremony
because he solemnized the marriage knowing fully
well that the parties did not have marriage license.
The accused contended that he merely conducted a
“blessing” and that in order for a marriage ceremony
to exist, the law require the verbal declaration that
the couple take each other as husband and wife, and
a marriage certificate containing the declaration in
writing which is duly signed by the contracting
parties and attested to by the solemnizing officer. In
holding that the accused indeed performed a
marriage ceremony, the Court ruled that the law sets
the minimum requirements constituting a marriage
ceremony: first, there should be the personal
appearance of the contracting parties before a
solemnizing officer; and second, their declaration in
the presence of not less than two witnesses that they
take each other as husband and wife. Both
requirements were present in this case.
Void Marriages
Art. 35. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning:
(1) Those contracted by any party below eighteen years of age
even with the consent of parents or guardians;
(2) Those solemnized by any person not legally authorized to
perform marriages unless such marriages were contracted
with either or both parties believing in good faith that the
solemnizing officer had the legal authority to do so;
(3) Those solemnized without license, except those covered
the preceding Chapter;
(4) Those bigamous or polygamous marriages not failing under
Article 41;
(5) Those contracted through mistake of one contracting party
as to the identity of the other; and
(6) Those subsequent marriages that are void under Article 53.
Art. 36. A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall
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likewise be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only (6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
after its solemnization. adopter;

Art. 37. Marriages between the following are incestuous and
void from the beginning,whether relationship between the
parties be legitimate or illegitimate:
(1) Between ascendants and descendants of any degree; and
(2) Between brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half
blood.
(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the
adopter;
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry
the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her own
spouse.

Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the
beginning for reasons of public policy:
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
(2) Between step-parents and step-children;
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;
(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and
the adopted child;
(6) Between the surviving spouse of the adopted child and the
adopter;
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
Art. 53. Either of the former spouses may marry again after
compliance with the requirements of the immediately
preceding Article; otherwise, the subsequent marriage shall be
null and void.

(7) Between an adopted child and a legitimate child of the Art 35 (4) Art 40
adopter; Those bigamous or Art. 40. The absolute
polygamous marriages nullity of a previous
(8) Between adopted children of the same adopter; and
not failing under Article marriage may be invoked
(9) Between parties where one, with the intention to marry 41 for purposes of
the other, killed that other person’s spouse, or his or her own remarriage on the basis
spouse. solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous
Art. 38. The following marriages shall be void from the marriage void.
beginning for reasons of public policy: Valid/voidable prior Applies only if the prior
marriage marriage is void ab initio
(1) Between collateral blood relatives whether legitimate or
Article 148 ACP
illegitimate, up to the fourth civil degree;
CPG or
(2) Between step-parents and step-children; Complete separation of
property
(3) Between parents-in-law and children-in-law;

(4) Between the adopting parent and the adopted child;
(5) Between the surviving spouse of the adopting parent and
the adopted child;
 The Court applied Article 40 retroactively to cases
where the second marriage took place prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and prior to the
promulgation of the Wiegel case. In Jarillo v. People
[G.R. No. 164435, Sep. 29, 2009; and the Resolution

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 of the Motion for Reconsideration, G.R. No. 164435,
June 29, 2010, 622 SCRA 24], the second marriage
was celebrated on November 26, 1979; while in
Montañez v. Cipriano [684 SCRA 315 (2012)], the
second marriage took place on January 24, 1983.
 In both cases, the Court applied Article 40
retroactively in a criminal action for bigamy holding
that said provision, being a rule of procedure, may be
applied retroactively.
 HOWEVER: In the 2016 case of Castillo v. De Leon
Castillo (789 SCRA 503), the Court reiterated the
ruling in Apiag v. Cantero (1997) and Ty v. CA (2000)
that the requirement of a judicial decree of nullity
does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code,
particularly if the children of the parties were born
while the Civil Code was in force.
 In Ty, the Court clarified that those cases continue to
be governed by Odayat v. Amante (1977), People v.
Mendoza (1954), and People v. Aragon (1957), which
embodied the then-prevailing rule that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of
void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
 Castillo reritrated the rule that Article 40 cannot be
applied retroactively to a marriage celebrated under
the Civil Code because it would impair vested rights.
 In Vitangcol v. People, Vitangcol contracted a first
marriage in 1987 and another marriage in 1994. The
second wife filed a criminal complaint for bigamy.
Vitangcol presented as evidence a Certification from
the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which
states that the Office has no record of the marriage
license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife,
Gina. He argued that with no proof of existence of an
essential requisite of marriage—the marriage
license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality
of his first marriage. The Court held that persons
intending to contract a second marriage must first
secure a judicial declaration of nullity of their first
marriage. If they proceed with the second marriage
without the judicial declaration, they are guilty of
bigamy regardless of evidence of the nullity of the
first marriage. [Vitangcol v. People, 780 SCRA 598
(2016)]
 In Vitangcol, the accused presents a Certification
from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite,
which states: “After a diligent search on the files of
Registry Book on Application for Marriage License
and License Issuance available in this office, no
record could be found on the alleged issuance of this
office of Marriage License No. 8683519 in favor of
MR. NORBERTO A. VITANGCOL and MS. GINA M.
GAERLAN dated July 17, 1987.” The Court then ruled
that “the appreciation of the probative value of the
certification cannot be divorced from the purpose of
its presentation, the cause of action in the case, and
the context of the presentation of the certification in
relation to the other evidence presented in the case.”
The Court adds, “We are not prepared to establish a
doctrine that a certification that a marriage license
cannot be found may substitute for a definite
statement that no such license existed or was issued.
Definitely, the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus,
Cavite should be fully aware of the repercussions of
those words. That the license now cannot be found is
not basis per se to say that it could not have been
issued.”
 In Kho v. Republic, 791 SCRA 604 (2016), however,
among the pieces of evidence presented by
petitioner is a Certification issued by the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern Samar attesting
that the Office of the Local Civil Registrar "has no
record nor copy of any marriage license ever issued
in favor of Raquel G. Kho [petitioner] and Veronica M.
Borata [respondent] whose marriage was celebrated
on June 1, 1972." The RTC granted the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of such marriage,
which decision, however, was reversed by the CA.
The CA held that since a marriage was, in fact,
solemnized between the contending parties, there is
a presumption that a marriage license was issued for
that purpose and that petitioner failed to overcome
such presumption. The CA also ruled that the
absence of any indication in the marriage certificate
that a marriage license was issued is a mere defect in
the formal requisites of the law which does not
invalidate the parties' marriage. On appeal to the SC,
it was held that based on the Certification issued by
the Municipal Civil Registrar of Arteche, Eastern
Samar, coupled with respondent's failure to produce
a copy of the alleged marriage license or of any
evidence to show that such license was ever issued,
the only conclusion that can be reached is that no
Page 8 of 24
 valid marriage license was, in fact, issued. The Court
adds: “Contrary to the ruling of the CA, it cannot be
said that there was a simple defect, not a total
absence, in the requirements of the law which would
not affect the validity of the marriage. The fact
remains that respondent failed to prove that the
subject marriage license was issued and the law is
clear that a marriage which is performed without the
corresponding marriage license is null and void.”
Who May File a Petition to Declare Absolute Nullity of
Marriage
Marriages during ANY PARTY IN INTEREST (may
the Civil Code be filed even after the death of
the spouses)
Marriages during Apply AM 02-11-10
the Family Code Only the husband or wife may
fie during the lifetime of the
spouses
EXCEPTION: the rule in A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC that only the
husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind
the petition is bigamy.
The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the
one who has the personality to
file a petition for declaration
of absolute nullity of void
marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. [Fujiki v.
Marinay, 700 SCRA 69 (2013)]
(PROBABLE BAR QUESTION)
 In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan
City, Negros Occidental [G.R. No. 181174, 4
December 2009, 607 SCRA 638], the Court ruled that
the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction
of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Since
the cause of action is actually to seek the declaration
of the second marriage as void for being bigamous
and impugn the child’s legitimacy, which causes of
action are governed not by Rule 108 but by A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC which took effect on March 15, 2003,
and Art. 171of the Family Code, respectively, it was
held that the petition should be filed in a Family
Court.
 The case of Braza must be distinguished from the case
of Republic vs. Olaybar [G.R. No. 189538, Feb. 10,
2014, 715 SCRA 605], involving a case of identity
theft. In Olaybar, the respondent found out that
someone stole her identity in contracting marriage to
a Korean national. Upon such discovery, she
immediately filed a petition for cancellation of entries
in the marriage contract filed with the NSO,
specifically the entries in the wife portion thereof.
The Republic opposed the petition which it claimed
to be actually a petition for declaration of nullity of
marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. In
allowing the correction of the subject certificate of
marriage by cancelling the name of the respondent in
the wife portion thereof, the Court held that the
respondent did not seek the nullification of marriage
as there was no marriage to speak of.
PROBABLE BAR QUESTION: [Juliano-Llave v. Republic,
646 SCRA 753 (2011)]. Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
marriage to question the validity of a subsequent
marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary,
when Section 2(a) states that “ a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife” — it refers
to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage.
Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the
parties in a A petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife, if the marriage is covered by
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. However, the rule in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a
declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage does
not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the
wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the
personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. [Fujiki v. Marinay, 700 SCRA 69
(2013)]
Psychological Incapacity
Page 9 of 24
 In Ngo Te v. Yu-Te [G.R. No. 161793, February 13,
2009, 579 SCRA 193], the Court revisited the Molina
guidelines and put into question the applicability of
said time-tested guidelines. However, in the
subsequent cases of Ting v. Velez-Ting [G.R. No.
166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694.], Suazo v.
Suazo [G.R. No. 164493, March 10, 2010, 615 SCRA
514] and Agraviador v. Agraviador [G.R. 170729, Dec.
8, 2010, 637 SCRA 519], the Court laid to rest any
question regarding the applicability of Molina.
 In these cases, it was clarified that Ngo Te did not
abandon Molina; far from abandoning Molina, it
simply suggested the relaxation of its stringent
requirements. The Court also explained in Suazo that
Ngo Te merely stands for a more flexible approach in
considering petitions for declaration of nullity of
marriages based on psychological incapacity. In the
more recent case of Kalaw v. Fernandez [745 SCRA
512 (2015)], however, the Court, in granting the
petition for declaration of nullity of a marriage based
on Article 36, relied heavily on the teachings of Ngo
Te.
Rule of thumb: Deny the petition. Why? It is difficult
to prove psychological incapacity. In order to
establish psychological incapacity, it is necessary to
determine whether or not it is connected with a
certain psychological disorder.
 In Republic v. Romero II, 785 SCRA 164 (2016), it was
held that the fact that the husband married his wife
not out of love, but out of reverence for the latter’s
parents, does not mean that he is psychologically
incapacitated in the context of Article 36 of the
Family Code. Citing Republic v. Albios [707 SCRA 584
(2013)], the Court held that: “Motives for entering
into a marriage are varied and complex. The State
does not and cannot dictate on the kind of life that a
couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their
lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to
privacy and would raise serious constitutional
questions. The right to marital privacy allows married
couples to structure their marriages in almost any
way they see fit, to live together or live apart, to have
children or no children, to love one another or not,
and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience,
companionship, money, status, and title, provided
that they comply with all the legal requisites, are
equally valid.
 Love, though the ideal consideration in a marriage
contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Other considerations, not precluded by law, may
validly support a marriage.”
Decalaration of Presumptive Death
Art. 41. A marriage contracted by any person during
subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void,
unless before the celebration of the subsequent marriage, the
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and
the spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent
spouse was already dead. In case of disappearance where
there is danger of death under the circumstances set forth in
the provisions of Article 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of
only two years shall be sufficient.
Requisites:
1. The prior spouse has been absent for 4 or 2 years;
2. Well-founded belief that the absent spouse is dead;
 PROBABLE BAR QUESTION In Santos v.
Santos [737 SCRA 637 (2014)], the Court
ruled that a subsequent marriage
contracted in bad faith by the spouse
present (who knew that the alleged
absentee spouse is alive), even if it was
contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of
a well-founded belief that the spouse is
already dead, and does not validly terminate
the first marriage. Hence, the subsequent
marriage is void for being bigamous under
Article 35(4) of the Family Code.
 Additionally, the Court ruled that if the
presumptively dead spouse has not really
been absent and the judicial declaration of
presumptive death was obtained by reason
of extrinsic fraud, the proper remedy
available to the presumptively dead spouse
is not the filing of an affidavit of
reappearance but an action to annul the
judgment declaring him/her presumptively
dead.
 The law did not define what is meant by
"well-founded belief." It depends upon the
circumstances of each particular case. Its
determination, so to speak, remains on a
caseto- case basis. To be able to comply
with this requirement, the present spouse
Page 10 of 24
 must prove that his/her belief was the result insurance policy, even if such designation be stipulated as
of diligent and reasonable efforts and irrevocable; and
inquiries to locate the absent spouse and
that based on these efforts and inquiries, (5) The spouse who contracted the subsequent marriage in
he/she believes that under the bad faith shall be disqualified to inherit from the innocent
circumstances, the absent spouse is already spouse by testate and intestate succession.
dead. It requires exertion of active effort
 In Republic v. Sarenogon, Jr. [783 SCRA 615 (2016)],
(not a mere passive one).
the Court reiterated the rule that a petition for
3. The present spouse wishes to remarry;
certiorari pursuant to Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is
4. Judicial declaration of presumptive death
the proper remedy to challenge a trial court’s
declaration of presumptive death under Article 41 of
 The proper remedy available to the presumptively
The Family Code of the Philippines (Family Code).
dead spouse who has not really been absent is not
the filing of an affidavit of reappearance but an
Effect of Judicial Declaration of Nullity of Marriage
action to annul the judgment declaring him/her
presumptively dead. gr xpn
retroactivity Retroacts to
Effect of bad faith the
Party in bad faith Status of subsequent marriage date of
Spouse present Void ab initio celebration
 Bigamous even if the Status of Illegitimate Legitimate if the
other spouse is in good Children ground is:
faith a. Psychological
Second spouse Perfectly valid marriage incapacity
 Remedy of aggrieved b. Non-
spouse is to file an compliance with
affidavit of Art. 52
reappearance Property 147 or 148 Ground is Art.
Both spouses Void ab initio Relations 40: ACP,
CPG or
Effect of Termination of Subsequent Marriage complete
(1) The children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior separation
to its termination shall be considered legitimate; Donation Revocable at Art. 40: Valid
Propter the EXCEPT if the
(2) The absolute community of property or the conjugal Nuptias instance of the donee
partnership, as the case may be, shall be dissolved and donor spouse was in
liquidated, but if either spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith –
bad faith, his or her share of the net profits of the community revoked by
property or conjugal partnership property shall be forfeited in operation of law
favor of the common children or, if there are none, the Art. 44: Those
children of the guilty spouse by a previous marriage or in made by one
default of children, the innocent spouse; in favor of the
other are
(3) Donations by reason of marriage shall remain valid, except
revoked by
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith, such
operation of law
donations made to said donee are revoked by operation of
Designation If irrevocable, Art. 40:
law;
as Beneficiary the Innocent spouse
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of the insured cannot may revoke it if
other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary in any
Page 11 of 24
 change it the Art. 46. Any of the following circumstances shall constitute
beneficiary fraud referred to in Number 3 of the preceding Article:
spouse acted in
bad faith (1) Non-disclosure of a previous conviction by final judgment
Right to Valid Art. 40: Guilty of the other party of a crime involving moral turpitude;
Inherit spouse is
(2) Concealment by the wife of the fact that at the time of the
disqualified to
marriage, she was pregnant by a man other than her husband;
inherit
Art. 44: Those (3) Concealment of sexually transmissible disease, regardless
made by one of its nature, existing at the time of the marriage; or
in favor of the
other are (4) Concealment of drug addiction, habitual alcoholism or
revoked by homosexuality or lesbianism existing at the time of the
operation of law marriage. No other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
Voidable marriages marriage. (86a)

Art. 45. A marriage may be annulled for any of the following Art. 47. The action for annulment of marriage must be filed by
causes, existing at the time of the marriage: the following persons and within the periods indicated herein:

(1) That the party in whose behalf it is sought to have the
marriage annulled was eighteen years of age or over but
below twenty-one, and the marriage was solemnized without
the consent of the parents, guardian or person having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order,
unless after attaining the age of twenty-one, such party freely
cohabited with the other and both lived together as husband
and wife;
2) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party
after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(3) That the consent of either party was obtained by fraud,
unless such party afterwards, with full knowledge of the facts
constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;
(1) For causes mentioned in number 1 of Article 45 by the
party whose parent or guardian did not give his or her
consent, within five years after attaining the age of twenty-
one, or by the parent or guardian or person having legal
charge of the minor, at any time before such party has
reached the age of twenty-one;
(2) For causes mentioned in number 2 of Article 45, by the
same spouse, who had no knowledge of the other’s insanity;
or by any relative or guardian or person having legal charge of
the insane, at any time before the death of either party, or by
the insane spouse during a lucid interval or after regainin
sanity;
(3) For causes mentioned in number 3 of Article 45, by the
injured party, within five years after the discovery of the
fraud;

(4) That the consent of either party was obtained by force,
intimidation or undue influence, unless the same having
disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;
(5) That either party was physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with the other, and such
incapacity continues and appears to be incurable; or
(6) That either party was afflicted with a sexually-transmissible
disease found to be serious and appears to be incurable. (85a)
(4) For causes mentioned in number 4 of Article 45, by the
injured party, within five years from the time the force,
intimidation or undue influence disappeared or ceased;
(5) For causes mentioned in number 5 and 6 of Article 45, by
the injured party, within five years after the marriage.
Doctrine of Triennial Cohabitation: If the wife remains a virgin
after 3 years of cohabitation, the husband will be presumed
impotent.
Effects of Annulment Decree

Page 12 of 24
 General Rule Effect of Bad (7) Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous
Faith marriage, whether in the Philippines or abroad;
Status of Legitimate
Children (8) Sexual infidelity or perversion;
Property Dissolution or Net profits shall (9) Attempt by the respondent against the life of the
Relations liquidation go to: petitioner; or
according a. Common
to ACP or CPG children; (10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without
b. Children of justifiable cause for more than one year. For purposes of this
the guilty Article, the term “child” shall include a child by nature or by
spouse by a adoption.
prev marriage
c. Innocent Defenses in Legal Separation
spouse
Donation Valid Revoked by (1) Where the aggrieved party has condoned the offense or
Propter operation of act complained of;
Nuptias law
(2) Where the aggrieved party has consented to the
Designation Insured cannot Innocent
commission of the offense or act complained of;
as Beneficiary change if spouse may
irrevocable revoke it (3) Where there is connivance between the parties in the
Right to Spouse in bad commission of the offense or act constituting the ground for
Inherit faith will be legal separation;
disqualified to
inherit by (4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;
testate and
(5) Where there is collusion between the parties to obtain
intestate
decree of legal separation; or
succession
(6) Where the action is barred by prescription.
Legal Separation
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of  Connivance Implies an agreement, express or implied,
the following grounds: by both spouses to the ground for legal separation
 Collusion Implies an agreement between the parties:
(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct a. For one of them commit, appear to
directed against the petitioner, a common child, or a child of commit or to be represented as having
the petitioner; committed a matrimonial offense;
b. To suppress evidence of a valid defense
(2) Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the
c. For the purpose of enabling the other
petitioner to change religious or political affiliation;
to obtain a legal separation
(3) Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner,
a common child, or a child of the petitioner, to engage in Effects of Decree of Legal Separation
prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;
(4) Final judgment sentencing the respondent to General: Right to live separately from each other but
imprisonment of more than six years, even if pardoned; the marriage
bonds shall not be severed
(5) Drug addiction or habitual alcoholism of the respondent; Effect on Guilty
Spouse
(6) Lesbianism or homosexuality of the respondent;
Property Dissolution or Net profits shall
Relations liquidation go to:
according a. Common
Page 13 of 24
 to ACP or CPG children; Remedies
b. Children of
the guilty Sale of a portion of conjugal property
spouse by a Art. 96. The administration and enjoyment of the community
previous property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In case of
marriage disagreement, the husband’s decision shall prevail, subject to
c. Innocent recourse to the court by the wife for proper remedy, which
spouse must be availed of within five years from the date of the
Donation May be revoked Donations contract implementing such decision.
Propter by made by a third
Nuptias the innocent party to In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
spouse him/her may be unable to participate in the administration of the common
within 5 years revoked properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
Designation Insured cannot Innocent administration. These powers do not include disposition or
as Beneficiary change if spouse may encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
irrevocable revoke it consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
Intestate Innocent Disqualified to
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
Succession spouse may inherit
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third
inherit from from innocent
person, and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
guilty spouse
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
spouse
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
Testate A disposition Provisions
Succession may already made Q: Anastacio and Flora got married during the
still be made will be revoked effectivity of the Civil Code without any marriage
after by settlement. In 1968, Flora died. In 1978, Anastacio
decree of LS operation of sold his interest in the land which was acquired
law during the marriage to the Spouses Molina, who
Support Obligation of The court may registered the sale several years after the death of
mutual order Anastacio. Is the sale valid?
support ceases him/her to
support the A: The Court ruled that while Article 130 of the Family
innocent Code provides that any disposition involving the
spouse conjugal property without prior liquidation of the
partnership shall be void, this rule does not apply
Property Relations Between the Spouses since the provisions of the Family Code shall be
"without prejudice to vested rights already acquired
ACP CPG in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
Commencement 88 107
Composition 91,95 106, 116-120, The Court noted that upon the death of Flora in
123 1968, an implied ordinary co-ownership ensued
Exclusions 91,92 109,113 among Flora’s surviving heirs, including Anastacio,
Charges 94 121,122 with respect to Flora’s share of the conjugal
Administration 96 124 partnership until final liquidation and partition; while
Dissolution 99 126 Anastacio, on the other hand, owned one-half of the
Liquidation 102-104 129-131 original conjugal partnership properties as his share,
but this is an undivided interest. Anastacio, as a co-
Separation De 100 127
owner, had the right to freely sell and dispose of his
Facto
undivided interest, but not the interest of his co-
Abandonment 101 128
owners.
Page 14 of 24
 Consequently, Anastactio’s sale to the spouses
Molina without the consent of the other co-owners
was not totally void, for Anastacio’s rights or a
portion thereof were thereby effectively transferred,
making the spouses Molina a coowner of the subject
property to the extent of Anastacio’s interest. This
result conforms with the well-established principle
that the binding force of a contract must be
recognized as far as it is legally possible to do so
(quando res non valet ut ago, valeat quantum valere
potest). The spouses Molina would be a trustee for
the benefit of the co-heirs of Anastacio in respect of
any portion that might belong to the co-heirs after
liquidation and partition. [Domingo v. Molina, 791
SCRA47 (2016)]
 In Hapitan vs. Sps. Lagradilla [G.R. No. 170004,
January 13, 2016, 780 SCRA 288], the RTC declared
the sale of conjugal property (house and lot) of the
spouses null and void, which decision was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals. Thereafter, the husband
entered into an amicable settlement with the other
parties recognizing the validity of the sale previously
declared void in the court’s decision. Since the
husband made the amicable settlement over the
wife’s objection, the latter questioned the validity of
said settlement. The Court declared the amicable
settlement void. The Court explained that by
agreeing to the validity of the sale, the husband
disposed of or waived his and the wife's rights over
the house and lot and such disposal or waiver by the
husband is not allowed by law. Article 124 of the
Family Code requires that any disposition or
encumbrance of conjugal property must have the
written consent of the other spouse; otherwise, such
disposition is void. Further, under Article 89 of the
Family Code, no waiver of rights, interests, shares,
and effects of the conjugal partnership of gains
during the marriage can be made except in case of
judicial separation of property. Clearly, the wife did
not consent to the husband’s disposing or waiving
their rights over the house and lot through the
Amicable Settlement.
 In Heirs of Patricio Go, Sr. and Marta Barola vs.
Servacio [657 SCRA 10 (2011)], it was held that the
disposition by sale of a portion of the conjugal
property by the surviving spouse without the prior
liquidation mandated by Article 130 of the Family
Code (which is the counterpart provision of Article
103 in the regime of conjugal partnership of gains) is
not necessarily void if said portion has not yet been
allocated by judicial or extrajudicial partition to
another heir of the deceased spouse. Instead, the
sale is valid insofar as the ideal share of the selling co-
owner/co-heir in the property is concerned but
without affecting the ideal shares of the other co-
owners. The ruling was reiterated in the 2016 case of
Domingo v. Molina (791 SCRA 47). According to Heirs
of Go, Sr., Article 130 will only apply if the death and
the sale both occurred during the effectivity of the
Family Code; otherwise, the ruling in said case and in
Domingo will be applicable.
 In conjugal partnership, when the property is
registered in the name of only one spouse and there
is no showing as to when the property was acquired
by same spouse, this is an indication that the
property belongs exclusively to the said spouse
[Valdez, Jr. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 55 (2004); citing PNB vs.
CA, 153 SCRA 435 (1987); see also Ruiz vs. CA, 449
Phil. 419, 431 (2003); Dela Pena vs. Avila, 665 SCRA
553 (2012)].  When there is no showing as to when
the property was acquired, the presumption in favor
of conjugal partnership cannot prevail when the title
is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of
innocent third parties are involved [Lim vs. Equitable
PCI Bank, 713 SCRA 555 (2014)]. Under Philippine law
and jurisprudence, if the property is registered in the
name of one of the spouses, with a description that
he or she “is married to” the other spouse, the same
is merely descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner [Orient Savings Bank vs. Suzuki, 740
SCRA 345 (2014); Calalang-Parulan vs. Calalang-
Garcia, 725 SCRA 402 (2014) ; Dela Pena vs. Avila,
665 SCRA 553 (2012)]. Note that in numerous cases
where the Court held that registration of the
property in the name of only one spouse does not
negate the possibility of it being conjugal or
community property, there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only
one spouse, were indeed either conjugal or
community properties [Orient Savings Bank vs.
Suzuki, 740 SCRA 345 (2014)].
 But even if the property was acquired during the
marriage, the presumption in favor of conjugality
cannot be applied with respect to private lands if one
of the spouses is an alien for this will be in violation
of Section 7, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution
Page 15 of 24
 which prohibits aliens from acquiring private lands in
the Philippines [Matthews vs. Taylor, G.R. No. 164584
, June 22, 2009].
Q: Can the buyer invoke good faith?
A: Yes. In the cases of Bautista v. Silva [G.R. No.
157434, September 19, 2006, 502 SCRA 334], Ravina
v. Villa Abrille [604 SCRA 120 (2009)], and Aggabao v.
Parulan, [Aggabao vs. Parulan, G.R. No.165803, Sep.
1, 2010], the Court erected a standard to determine
the good faith of the buyers dealing with a seller who
had title to and possession of the land but whose
capacity to sell was restricted, in that the consent of
the other spouse was required before the
conveyance, declaring that in order to prove good
faith in such a situation, the buyers must show that
they inquired not only into the title of the seller but
also into the sellers capacity to sell. Thus, the buyers
of conjugal property must observe two kinds of
requisite diligence, namely: (a) the diligence in
verifying the validity of the title covering the
property; and (b) the diligence in inquiring into the
authority of the transacting spouse to sell conjugal
property in behalf of the other spouse.
Property regimes of union without marriage
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership
shall be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of
default of or waiver by any or all of the common children or
their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of
descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In
all cases, the forfeiture shall take place upon termination of
the cohabitation. (144a)
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property, or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married to another, his or her shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the preceding Article.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if

Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
both parties are in bad faith
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in
equal shares and the property acquired by both of them 147 148
through their work or industry shall be governed by the rules Requisites There is a In cases of
on co-ownership. marriage, but void cohabitation
on the ground amounting to
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired
other than absence adultery or
while they lived together shall be presumed to have been
of legal capacity concubinage
obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry, and shall be
and article 40
owned by them in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a
Grounds
party who did not participate in the acquisition by the other
or 1. Absence of
party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
legal capacity
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the former’s efforts
When a man and 2. art 38
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of the
woman who are 3. art 35(1)
household.
free to marry each 4. art 35(4)
Neither party can encumber or dispose by acts inter vivos of other exclusively
his or her share in the property acquired during cohabitation cohabitate
and owned in common, without the consent of the other, until
after the termination of their cohabitation. Salaries and EQUAL SHARES NO WORK,
Wagies NO SHARE

Page 16 of 24
 Property Those acquired by Properties title system merely confirms, and does not vest title
Acquired both parties acquired by [Ventura, Jr. vs. Abuda, 708 SCRA 640 (2013)]. The
during through their work both words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse
cohabitation or industry parties through are merely descriptive of the civil status of the
ACTUAL joint registered owner and such words do not prove co-
contributions ownership under Article 148 [Go-Bangayan vs.
Proof Properties There must be Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702 (2013)].
required acquired are prima proof of actual
facie presumed to contribution Q: A Filipina is married to a foreigner, under a bigamous
have been marriage. Foreigner acquired a property, but had it
obtained through named under the name of the Filipina because of the
joint efforts constitutional prohibition. Who has a right over the
Form of May consist of property?
Contribution efforts in the care
and maintenance A: The foreigner spouse. However, there exists a
of the family constitutional prohibition against alien acquiring lands in
and household the Philippines. Therefore, the property will be escheated
in favor of the State.
 If the subsequent marriage is void by reason of non-
compliance with Article 40 (but the prior marriage is
indeed void ab initio), the property relations of the
parties to the subsequent marriage may either Family Home
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, Art. 152. The family home, constituted jointly by the husband
as the case may be, unless the parties agree to a and the wife or by an unmarried head of a family, is the
complete separation of property in a marriage dwelling house where they and their family reside, and the
settlement entered into before the marriage [Diño land on which it is situated.
vs. Diño, 640 SCRA 178 (2011)]. As such, Sec. 19(1) of
Art. 153. The family home is deemed constituted on a house
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, which requires the liquidation,
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.
partition and distribution of properties prior to the
From the time of its constitution and so long as any of its
issuance of decree of nullity of the marriage applies
beneficiaries actually resides therein, the family home
only to a void marriage under Article 40 of the Family
continues to be such and is exempt from execution, forced
Code when said rule mentions of “decree of absolute
sale or attachment except as hereinafter provided and to the
nullity” and not to a marriage declared void by
extent of the value allowed by law.
reason of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code. In the latter case, since the Effect GR: It shall be exempt from
applicable property regime is that provided in Article execution
147 of the Family Code, the declaration of nullity can Except:
already be made even without waiting for the a. Non-payment of taxes;
liquidation of the properties of the parties because it b. Debts incurred PRIOR to
is not necessary to liquidate the properties of the the constitution of the
spouses in the same proceeding for declaration of FH;
nullity of marriage. c. Debts secured by
 In Article 148, the fact that the controverted property mortgages on the premises
was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous before OR after such
relationship is not sufficient proof of co-ownership constitution;
absent evidence of actual contribution in the d. Debts due to laborers,
acquisition of the property [Adriano v. Court of mechanics, architects,
Appeals, 385 Phil. 474, cited in Saguid vs. CA, 403 builders and materialmen
SCRA 678 (2003)]. Registration under the Torrens
Page 17 of 24
 and others who have increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in
rendered service or furnished Article 157 and results from subsequent voluntary
material for the improvements introduced by the person or persons
construction of the building constituting the family home, by the owner or owners of the
When After FC: Deemed constituted property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the same rule and
on a house and lot procedure shall apply.
from the time it is occupied
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for a
as a family residence
family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall be
applied first to the amount mentioned in Article 157, and then
Before FC: Considered as
to the liabilities under the judgment and the costs. The excess,
family homes by
operation of law and are if any, shall be delivered to the judgment debtor.
prospectively entitled to
 PROBABLE BAR QUESTION If the increase in value of a
the benefits accorded to a
family home is by reason of an involuntary
FH.
improvement, like the conversion into a residential
Where a. ACP;
area or the establishment of roads and other
b. CPG;
facilities, the one establishing the family home should
c. Exclusive property of either
not be punished by making his home liable to
spouse with the
creditors [Eulegio v. Bell, Sr., 762 SCRA 103 (2015)].
consent of the other;
 Hence, the family home still enjoys protection from
d. Property of the unmarried
execution, force sale or attachment. If the value of
head of the family
the family home exceeded the maximum amount
Who may a. Jointly by the husband and
because of voluntary improvements by the one
Constitute wife;
establishing the family home, then Article 160 will
b. Unmarried head of the
apply.
family
 To warrant, therefore, the execution sale of the
Effect of Beneficiaries FH will
family home under Article 160, the following facts are
Death survive continue
required to be established: (1) there was an increase
for 10
in its actual value; (2) the increase resulted from
years
voluntary improvements on the property introduced
There is a FH will by the persons constituting the family home, its
minor continue owners or any of its beneficiaries; and (3) the
beneficiary until he increased actual value exceeded the maximum
becomes allowed under Article 157.
of age
Partition GR: The heirs cannot Paternity and Filiation
partition the Family Home
Except: Compelling reasons  Filiation may either be natural or by adoption.

Legitimate and Illegitimate Children

Art. 160. When a creditor whose claims is not among those
mentioned in Article 155 obtains a judgment in his favor, and
Art. 164. Children conceived or born during the marriage of
he has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is
the parents are legitimate. Children conceived as a result of
actually worth more than the maximum amount fixed in
artificial insemination of the wife with the sperm of the
Article 157, he may apply to the court which rendered the
husband or that of a donor or both are likewise legitimate
judgment for an order directing the sale of the property under
children of the husband and his wife, provided, that both of
execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the actual
them authorized or ratified such insemination in a written
value of the family home exceeds the maximum amount
instrument executed and signed by them before the birth of
allowed by law as of the time of its constitution. If the

Page 18 of 24
the child. The instrument shall be recorded in the civil registry
together with the birth certificate of the child.
These are also legitimate children:
1. Children conceived as a result of artificial
insemination
2. Born of voidable marriages before decree of
annulment
Art. 165. Children conceived and born outside a valid marriage
are illegitimate, unless otherwise provided in this Code.
Generally, children of void marriages are illegitimate
children. By way of exception:
1. Conceived or born before judgment of
annulment or absolute nullity under art 36 has
become final and executor;
2. Conceived or born of subsequent marriages
under article 53
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final
judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or
a private handwritten instrument and signed by the parent
concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate
filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special
laws. (265a, 266a, 267a)
Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the
child during his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the
heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of
insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five
years within which to institute the action.
Art. 174. Legitimate children shall have the right:

Action to Claim Legitimate or Illegitimate Filiation (1) To bear the surnames of the father and the mother, in
conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on Surnames;
Action to Claim Action to Claim
(2) To receive support from their parents, their ascendants,
Legitimate Filiation Illegitimate Filiation
and in proper cases, their brothers and sisters, in conformity
with the provisions of this Code on Support; and
In both cases, can be proved by the same means,
(3) To be entitled to the legitimate and other successional
under Article 172 and Article 175 in relation to Article
rights granted to them by the Civil Code.
172
can only be claimed During the lifetime of Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate
during the lifetime of the child only filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
child, and even after the legitimate children. The action must be brought within the
death of the alleged What if the father dies? same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
parent If 172(1), the action may based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case
still be filed because it is the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
a voluntary admission of parent.
paternity,
 It is the rule that if the father did not sign in the birth
If 172(2), it must be filed certificate, the placing of his name by the mother,
during the lifetime of the doctor, register, or other person is incompetent
putative father because evidence of paternity and the Local Civil Registrar is
it is a compulsory devoid of authority to record the paternity of an
recognition of paternity. illegitimate child upon the information of such third
person [Perla v. Baring, 685 SCRA 101 (2012); Salas v.
Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560 (2013)]. The foregoing rule
Proof of Legitimacy does not, however, apply when there is a showing
that the putative father had a hand in the
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by preparation of the birth certificate, as when he was
any of the following: the one who went to the Local Civil Registry and gave
all the data about his child’s birth, or who caused the
Page 19 of 24
 registration the child’s birth certificate [Arado v.
Alcoran, 762 SCRA 37],or who supplied the
information himself about child’s birth, including his
paternity [Ilano v. CA, 230 SCRA 242 (1994)].
 If the birth certificate of the child was registered
after the death of the putative father thru “delayed
registration,” the same is not a competent proof of
paternity against the putative father because he was
not involved nor had a hand in its preparation [Ara v.
Pizarro (2017)]
 For a public or private instrument to be considered
competent evidence of paternity or filiation, the
following requisites must concur: (1) There must be a
statement of admission of paternity or filiation; (2) It
must be signed by the parent concerned [Salas v.
Matusalem, 705 SCRA 560 (2013); Nepomuceno v.
Lopez, 616 SCRA 145 (2010)] and (3) The admission
must be made personally by the parent himself or
herself, not by any brother, sister or relative [Cenido
v. Apacionado, 318 SCRA 688 (1999)]; otherwise,
such recognition is ineffectual [Rivero v. CA,458 SCRA
714]. In the 2016 case of Zoleta-San Agustin v. Sales,
801 SCRA 683, the Court ruled that the signing thru
thumbprint is considered sufficient signature for
purposes of recognition of paternity.
 PROBABLE BAR QUESTION: In the case of Dela Cruz v.
Gracia [594 SCRA 648 (2009); reiterated in Aguilar v.
Siasat, 748 SCRA 555 (2015) J. DEL CASTILLO CASE],
the Court adopted the following rules respecting the
requirement of affixing the signature of the
acknowledging parent in any private handwritten
instrument wherein an admission of filiation of a
legitimate or illegitimate child is made: a) Where the
private handwritten instrument is the lone piece of
evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the
same must be signed by the acknowledging parent;
and Where the private handwritten instrument is
accompanied by other relevant and competent
evidence, it suffices that the claim of filiation therein
be shown to have been made and handwritten by the
acknowledging parent as it is merely corroborative of
such other evidence.
 In Perla v. Baring [685 SCRA 101 (2012)], the child
offered the following testimony to prove his
illegitimate filiation with the putative father: (1) that
during their first encounter in 1994, the child called
the alleged father as “Papa” and kissed his hand
while the alleged father hugged him and promised to
support him; and (2) that his alleged Aunt treated
him as a relative and was good to him during his one-
week stay in her place. The Court ruled that such acts
cannot be considered as indications of Randy’s open
and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child under the second paragraph of
Article 172(1). The Court held that except for that
singular occasion in which they met, there are no
other acts of the alleged father treating the child as
his son. Neither may paternity be deduced from how
the alleged father’s sister treated the child because in
the mind of the Court, such actuations could have
been done due to charity or some other reason.
 In Grande v. Antonio [G.R. No. 206248, Oct. 18, 2014,
716 SCRA 698], the Court clarified that Article 176 of
the Family Code, as amended by R.A. No. 9255, gives
illegitimate children the right to decide if they want
to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the
father or the mother who is granted by law the right
to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.
The use of the word "may" in the provision readily
shows that an acknowledged illegitimate child is
under no compulsion to use the surname of his
illegitimate father. Hence, a father cannot compel the
use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon
his recognition of their filiation.
 While Article 176 of the Family Code, as amended,
does not explicitly state that the private handwritten
instrument acknowledging the child’s paternity must
be signed by the putative father, said provision must,
however, be read in conjunction with related
provisions of the Family Code which require that
recognition by the father must bear his signature,
specifically Articles 172 and 175 of the Family Code.
That a father who acknowledges paternity of a child
through a written instrument must affix his signature
thereon is clearly implied in Article 176 of the Family
Code [Dela Cruz vs. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, July 31,
2009, 594 SCRA 648].
PROBABLE BAR QUESTION: If the admission of paternity is
made in a private handwritten instrument which was not
signed by the father, may the illegitimate child be allowed
Page 20 of 24
 to make use of the father’s surname on the basis of such
instrument?
A: In Dela Cruz v. Gracia [G.R. No. 177728, July 31, 2009,
594 SCRA 648], the Court allowed the child to use the
father’s surname on the basis of such private handwritten
instrument considering that there are other evidence to
prove paternity and filiation. In the same case, the Court
adopted the following rules respecting the requirement of
affixing the signature of the acknowledging parent in any
private handwritten instrument wherein an admission of
filiation of a legitimate or illegitimate child is made: (a)
Where the private handwritten instrument is the lone
piece of evidence submitted to prove filiation, there should
be strict compliance with the requirement that the same
must be signed by the acknowledging parent; and (b)
Where the private handwritten instrument is accompanied
by other relevant and competent evidence, it suffices that
the claim of filiation therein be shown to have been made
and handwritten by the acknowledging parent as it is
merely corroborative of such other evidence.
Impugning the Legitimacy of the Child
The child cannot choose his own filiation. If the husband,
presumed to be the father does not impugn the legitimacy of
the child, then the status of the child is fixed and the latter
cannot choose to be the child of his mother’s alleged
paramour.
The general rule is that impugning the legitimacy of child is a
personal right of the husband which must be made in a direct
proceeding.
 While the rule is that a person's legitimacy can only
be questioned in a direct action seasonably filed by
the proper party, it was held that such issue may be
resolved in an action for annulment of deed of sale
and cancellation of title with damages since it was
necessary for the purpose of determining the legal
rights of the respondents to the subject property and
the question of whether the respondents have the
legal capacity to sue as alleged heirs was among the
issues agreed upon by the parties in the pre-trial.
[Calimag v. Heirs of Silvestra N. Macapaz, 791 SCRA
620 (2016)]
The presumption that a child conceived or born during a valid
marriage is legitimate applies only to a situation where the
wife denies the paternity of the husband and not where a
child is alleged not to be the child of the couple.
Q: Can the mother declare against the legitimacy of
her own child?
A: No. article 167 of the family code states that the
child shall be considered legitimate although the
mother may have declared against its legitimacy or
may have been sentenced as an adulteress.
Q: What if the mother declares that the birth
certificate of a child is void, will article 167 apply?
A: No If the allegation is that the child is not a child of
the parents at all, then article 167 will not apply.
Legitimation
a. The child is conceived and born outside of
wedlock;
b. At the time of conception, the parents were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each other,
or were disqualified only because any or both were
below 18;
c. The parents got married after the child’s birth;
d. The marriage is valid or at least voidable
Adoption
 In Grande v. Antonio [716 SCRA 698 (2014), the Court
clarified that Article 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 9255, gives illegitimate children
the right to decide if they want to use the surname of
their father or not. It is not the father or the mother
who is granted by law the right to dictate the
surname of their illegitimate children. The use of the
word "may" in the provision readily shows that an
acknowledged illegitimate child is under no
compulsion to use the surname of his illegitimate
father. Hence, a father cannot compel the use of his
surname by his illegitimate children upon his
recognition of their filiation. In the same case, the
Court declared void the provision of the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA
9255, Office of Civil Registrar General (OCRG)
Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 2004, issued by
Page 21 of 24
 the National Statistics Office-Office of the Civil
Registrar General, which makes it mandatory on the
part of illegitimate children to use the surname of
their father upon recognition
 The Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available
for Adoption applies only to surrendered,
abandoned, neglected, and dependent children as
mentioned in R.A. No. 9523. Any of the following
adoption proceedings in court does not require a
Certification Declaring a Child Legally Available for
Adoption: (1) adoption of an illegitimate child by any
of his/her biological parent; (2) adoption of a child by
his/her step-parent; or (3) adoption of a child by a
relative within the fourth degree of consanguinity or
affinity. [Sec. 4, IRR of R.A. No. 9523]
 One of the exceptions to the rule of joint adoption by
the spouses is when one spouse seeks to adopt his or
her own illegitimate son/daughter. However, the law
requires the spouse seeking to adopt his/her
illegitimate child to first obtain the consent of his/her
spouse. This requirement is mandatory according to
the case of Castro v. Gregorio [738 SCRA 415 (2014)].
According to the Court, in all instances where it
appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out
of wedlock, the other spouse and other legitimate
children must be personally notified through
personal service of summons and it is not enough
that they be deemed notified through constructive
service; otherwise, the court does not validly acquire
jurisdiction over the proceedings and the decision of
the court is null and void.
 Under the Foster Care Act of 2012 (Sec. 17, R.A. No.
10165), in case adoption of the foster child by the
designated foster parents, the trial custody period
may be partially waived to the extent of the period
equivalent to the period in which the foster child has
been under the foster care of the foster parents;
provided, that a harmonious relationship exists
between the foster child, the foster parents, and,
where applicable, the foster family.
 When the adopter dies during the time that the
adopted is still a minor or incapacitated, the parental
authority of the biological parent is deemed to have
been restored. Considering that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral
relatives by adoption, there shall be no one left to
care for minor adopted child if the adopter passed
away, hence, the parental authority of the biological
parent should be deemed to have been restored,
applying by analogy the provisions of Section 20 of
the DAA. [Bartolome v. SSS, 740 SCRA 78 (2014)]
 Article 189(3) of the Family Code and Section 18,
Article V of RA 8552 (law on adoption) provide that
the adoptee remains an intestate heir of his/her
biological parent [Obiter Dictum in In the Matter of
Adoption of Stephanie Naty Astorga Garcia, 454 SCRA
541 (2005)]. Also, the biological parents retain their
rights of succession to the estate of the adopted child
pursuant to Article 190(2) of the Family Code [Obiter
Dictum in Bartolome v. SSS, 740 SCRA78 (2014)].
 The law says that the adoption decree “shall be
effective as of the date the original petition was filed”
and that this rule “shall also apply in case the
petitioner(s) dies before the issuance of the decree of
adoption to protect the interest of the adoptee [Sec.
13, DAA].” Hence, for purposes that are beneficial to
the interest of the adopted child, the latter acquires
the rights that are being enjoyed by legitimate
children as of the date of the filing of the petition for
adoption and not only at the time of the issuance of
the adoption decree. However, no retroactive effect
may be given to the granting of the petition for
adoption for the purpose of imposing a liability upon
the adopting parents accruing at a time when
adopting parents had no actual or physically custody
over the adopted child [Tamargo v. CA, 209 SCRA 518
(1992)].
 It must be emphasized that the basis of parental
liability for the torts of a minor child is the
relationship existing between the parents and the
minor child living with them and over whom, the law
presumes, the parents exercise supervision and
control. Put a little differently, no presumption of
parental dereliction on the part of the adopting
parents may arise if the adopted child is not in fact
subject to their control at the time the tort is
committed.
 In the case of Castro v. Gregorio [738 SCRA 415
(2014)], the Court suggested that the remedy of
annulment of judgment could be resorted to if the
Page 22 of 24
 adoption was found to have been obtained
fraudulently, which action must be brought within
four years from discovery of the fraud.
Tender-age presumption
Foundlings
 If the child is under the age of seven, the law
presumes that the mother is the best custodian.
Hence, the law provides that “no child under seven
years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.” This is the so-called “tender-age
presumption [Pablo-Gualberto v. Gualberto, 461
SCRA 450, 476(2005); Gamboa-Hirsch v. CA, G.R. No.
174485, July 11, 2007].” In the case of Dacasin v.
Dacasin [611 SCRA 657 (2010)], the Court held that
this statutory awarding of sole parental custody to
the mother under the second paragraph of Article
213 of the Family Code is mandatory and any
agreement to the contrary is void. In this case, the
Court declared void a compromise agreement
providing for joint custody of a child below seven
years of age. The Court in Dacasin recognized,
however, the validity of an agreement providing for
joint custody if the children are already over seven
years of age considering the fact that the imposed
custodial regime under the second paragraph of
Article 213 is limited in duration, lasting only until the
child’s seventh year.
From the eighth year until the child’s emancipation,
the law gives the separated parents freedom, subject
to the usual contractual limitations, to agree on
custody regimes they see fit to adopt.
Support
 In Lim v. Lim [604 SCRA 691 (2009)], the
grandparents theorized that their liability to give
support to their legitimate grandchildren is activated
only upon default of parental authority, conceivably
either by its termination or suspension during the
children’s minority. The Court held that neither the
text of the law nor the teaching of jurisprudence
supports this severe constriction of the scope of
familial obligation to give support. In the first place,
the governing text are the relevant provisions in Title
VIII of the Civil Code, as amended, on Support, not
the provisions in Title IX on Parental Authority. Under
the law, the obligation to provide legal support
passes on to ascendants not only upon default of the
parents but also for the latter’s inability to provide
sufficient support
 Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle
that foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not
provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the
adoptee. Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in
the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such
laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides
that "[l]aws relating to family rights, duties, status,
conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on
citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad."
 Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine adoption
court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a
Filipino. [Poe-Llamanzares v. Commission on
Elections, 786 SCRA 1 (2016)]
 Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules to Govern the
Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For
Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the "Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552,
entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on
the Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic
Adoption Act of 1998) and this Court's A.M. No. 02-6-
02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to
"Filipino children" and include foundlings as among
Filipino children who may be adopted.
 On the contention that Poe-Llamanzares committed
a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to"
in her application for repatriation under R.A. No.
9225 the names of her adoptive parents, the Court
ruled that the law allows Poe to state that her
adoptive parents were her birth parents as that was
what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway.
And given the policy of strict confidentiality of
adoption records, Poe was not obligated to disclose
that she was an adoptee. The Court explained: “One
of the effects of adoption is to sever all legal ties
between the biological parents and the adoptee,
except when the biological parent is the spouse of
the adoptee. Under R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was
Page 23 of 24
 also entitled to an amended birth certificate attesting the Civil Code in relation to Article 199 of the
to the fact that the adoptee is the child of the Family Code, and subject the same to those
adopter(s) and which certificate shall not bear any charged with the right and duty to make the
notation that it is an amended issue. That law also proper arrangements to bury the remains of their
requires that [a]ll records, books, and papers relating loved-one
to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or
any other agency or institution participating in the
adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly
confidential." Hence, she can state that her adoptive
parents were her birth parents. [Poe-Llamanzares v.
Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1 (2016)]

Funerals

Art. 305. The duty and the right to make arrangements for the
funeral of a relative shall be in accordance with the order
established for support, under Article 294. In case of
descendants of the same degree, or of brothers and sisters,
the oldest shall be preferred. In case of ascendants, the
paternal shall have a better right.

Art. 307. The funeral shall be in accordance with the

expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine
the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of the funeral shall
be decided upon by the person obliged to make arrangements
for the same, after consulting the other members of the
family.

 In Valino vs Adriano (2014) SC ruled that it is

apparent that Article 307 simply seeks to prescribe
the "form of the funeral rites" that should govern
in the burial of the deceased. As thoroughly
explained earlier, the right and duty to make
funeral arrangements reside in the persons
specified in Article 305 in relation to Article 199 of
the Family Code. As Article 307 itself provides, the
wishes of the deceased must be expressly
provided. It cannot be inferred lightly, such as from
the circumstance that Atty. Adriano spent his last
remaining days with Valino. It bears stressing once
more that other than Valino’s claim that Atty.
Adriano wished to be buried at the Valino family
plot, no other evidence was presented to
corroborate it.

In this case, the wishes of the deceased with

respect to his funeral are limited by Article 305 of

Page 24 of 24