Judge Dabu - NOTES AND CASES IN CRIM 1 PDF

NOTES AND CASES
IN CRIMINAL LAW 1
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PROF. PEDRO T. DABU, JR.
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I. Fundamental Principles
a. Definition of Penal Law
Penal laws or statutes are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violation; or
those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment. (Subido vs. Sandiganbayan, 266 SCRA 379,
January 20, 1997)
I. Classes of crimes: difference between mala in se and mala prohibita
1.1. Mala in se crimes are wrong per se even without a law punishing the act or acts. Criminal intent is required
in this kind of crimes. Such being the case, good faith is a defense.
1.2. Mala prohibita- the act is illegal because of the law prohibiting it. Mere violation of the law consummates
the crime. Criminal intent is not required, hence, good faith is not a defense.
II. Cases:
1. Garcia vs. CA, 484 SCRA 617, March 14, 2006

2. Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394, Nov. 19, 2001
3. Ysidoro vs. People, 685 SCRA 637, November 14, 2012
4. Sps. Veroy vs. Layague, , 210 SCRA 97, June 18, l992
b. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OR CHARACTERISTICS OF PENAL LAW
1. Territoriality
Reagan vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. L-26379, December 27, 1969.
2. Generality-
a) Exceptions-
3. Prospectivity
C. Constitutional limitations on the power of Congress to enact penal laws in the Bill of
Rights
i. equal protection
ii. due process
Void for Vagueness Doctrine.

Estrada vs. Desierto, 369 SCRA 394, November 19, 2001.
iii. non imposition of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines
1. RA 9346-An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.
2. Agbanlog vs. People, et al, 222 SCRA 530, May 24, l993,
iv. bill of attainder
1. People vs. Ferrer. 48 SCRA 382 (1972)
Address: Unit 2, 4th Floor, España Place Building, 1139 Adelina Street corner España Boulevard 1
Sampaloc, Manila (Beside UST near Morayta Street)
* www.villasislawcenter.com / www.facebook.com/villasislawcenter / www.remediallawdoctrines.blogspot.com /
villasislawcenter@gmail.com / mvplawoffice@gmail.com
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
v. ex post facto law
d. ARE THERE COMMON LAW CRIMES IN OUR JURISDICTION?
None, “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”
e. APPLICABILITY OF THE RPC TO SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (Art. 10)
1. Go Tan vs. Sps. Perfecto and Juanita Tan, September 30, 2008
OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THE RPC WAS APPLIED TO SPL:
1. Provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC was applied to cases of violations of Act No. 3992,
otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," (People v. Moreno, 60 Phil 712, 1934)
2. The rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC was applied in favor of the accused who
was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering
the lack of similar rules under the special law. (People v. Li Wai Cheung, 214 SCRA 504 (October 13, 1992
2.1. But the provisions of Articles 13, 64, 71 and 76 of the RPC could not be given suppletory effect to
drug offenses (Gallardo vs. Judge Tabamo, 232 SCRA 960, June 2, 1994)
3. Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No.
8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined
therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal
recruitment. (People v. Chowdury, 325 SCRA 572, Feb. 15, 2000)
4. The provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC was applied to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg.
22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in
said special law. (Yu v. People 438 SCRA 431, September 20, 2004)
5. The principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC was applied to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein. (Ladonga v. People 451 SCRA 673, February 17, 2005)
6. The penalty for violation of PD 533 should follow the classification and duration of penalties prescribed in the
RPC since PD 533 merely modified the penalties for qualified theft of large cattle under Article 310 of the RPC (People vs.
Martinada, February 13, 1991; Pil-ey s. People, July 9, 2007)
II. FELONIES
A. CLASSIFICATION OF FELONIES
Acts and omissions punishable by law are felonies. Felonies are committed by means of deceit (dolo) and by means of
culpa (fault). Thus, felonies are either:
1. Intentional, and
2. Culpable
1. Intentional Felonies (Dolo) - the act is performed with deliberate intent or malice to do an injury.
a. mens rea- (guilty mind)
mens rea has been defined as “a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent,” and “essential for
criminal liability.” Ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime,” (Valenzuela vs. People G.R.
No. 160188, June 21, 2007)
There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is the sequence of
wickedness, without which it can not be. It is therefore a principle in our legal system, as probably it is of every other, that the
essence of an offense is the wrongful intent without which it cannot exist.“ Actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”- the act
itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were so. “Actus me invito factus non est meus actus”- an act done by me
against my will is not my act. (U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil. 488, March 19, l910)
Villareal vs. People, 664 SCRA 519, February 1, 2012:
It is not enough to do what the law prohibits. In order for an intentional felony to exist, it is necessary that the act be
committed by means of dolo or malice.
Dolo is a complex idea involving the elements of freedom, intelligence and intent.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Freedom refers to act done with deliberation and with power to choose between two things
Intelligence concerns the ability to determine the morality of human acts as well as the capacity to determine between the licit
and an illicit act.
Intent refers to the purpose of the mind and the resolve with which a person proceeds.
On the other hand, the term felonious means malicious.
Taken together, the requirement of intent in intentional felony must refer to malicious intent.
Homicide
Therefore the presence of an initial malicious intent to commit a felony is a vital ingredient in establishing the commission of
the intentional felony of homicide. Being mala in se, the felony of homicide requires the existence of malice or dolo.
Intent to kill or animus intericendi should not be inferred unless there is proof beyond reasonable doubt of such intent
Now even if there is no intent to kill but if there is malicious intent to injure (animus iniuriandi) and as a result of the
physical injuries inflicted death ensued, then the offenders may still be liable for homicide pursuant to Article 4 (1)
But mere infliction of physical injuries does not make a person automatically liable for an intentional felony.
Calimutan vs. People, 492 SCRA 44, February 9, 2006
Throwing a stone and hitting the victim at the left side of his back at a chance encounter; the incident was a brief scuffle which
lasted only for a few minutes: accused hardly had the time to ponder upon the most appropriate course of action to take, he was
deemed not to have intent to kill, but it was reckless for him to do so, thus is liable for reckless imprudence resulting to death
and not the intentional felony of homicide.
People vs. Carmen, March 26, 2001
Carmen and the other members of her group are not liable for murder. They had no criminal intent to kill the boy. They
performed the ritual not to kill the boy but to cure him of illness. Besides, the ritual performed over the victim was consented to
by the victim’s parents. With the permission of the victim’s parents, accused Carmen, together with the other accused,
proceeded to subject the boy to a “treatment” calculated to drive the “bad spirit” from the boy’s body. Their liability arises
from their reckless imprudence because they ought to know that their actions would not bring about the cure. They are,
therefore, guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide and not of murder. The elements of reckless imprudence are
apparent in the acts done by the accused which, because of their lack of medical skill in treating the victim of his alleged
ailment, resulted in the latter’s death. As already stated, accused, none of whom is a medical practitioner, belong to a religious
group, known as the Missionaries of Our Lady of Fatima, which is engaged in faith healing.
Bagajo vs. People, November 20, 1978
As a matter of law, Bagajo did not incur any criminal liability for her act of whipping her pupil, Wilma, with the bamboo-stick-
pointer. She did not do what she had done with criminal intent. That she meant to punish Wilma and somehow make her feel
such punishment may be true, but the means she actually used was moderate and that she was not motivated by ill-will, hatred
or any malevolent intent. The teacher intended merely to discipline the pupil. And it cannot be said, that Wilma did not deserve
to be discipline. In other words, it was farthest from the thought of the teacher to commit any criminal offense. Actus non facit
reum, nisi mens sit rea.
b. motive is not intent
Motive is the moving power which impels one to action for a definite result; whereas intent is the purpose to use a
particular means to effect such results. Motive is not an essential element of a felony while intent is an essential element of
dolo.
In some instances, however, motive and intent may be considered one and the same. The accused is the brother in law
of the victim. He and his wife lived in the house of his parents in law together with the victim. Prior to the fateful night when
Arlene’s body was discovered, accused was seen peeping through the bathroom while Arlene was taking a bath and through the
bedroom while Arlene was inside the room. Intent to kill was duly established by the witnesses when they testified relative to
the peeping incident. Such peeping incident manifested accused evil motive. Motive and intent may be considered one and the
same, in some instances as in the present case.( Salvador vs. People, 559 SCRA 461, 473, July 23, 2008)
c. good faith negates criminal intent
1. One who fills up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time so indicated therein, she is merely
making an honest claim for the pay corresponding to the time so indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
public document can be ascribed to her. There was no deliberate intent to falsify because she had rendered public service in
those times that she said she was present in her office. (Beradio vs. CA 103 SCRA 567, March 30, l981)
2. A widow who signed the name of her late husband in the checks delivered to her by no less than the School
Supervisor long after her husband’s death and that she used the proceeds of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husband’s
last illness and burial and on the belief that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment of her husband’s vacation and
sick leave credits cannot be said to have acted with criminal intent.( Luage vs.. CA, 112 SCRA 97, Feb. 22, l982)
3. Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is
not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed in good faith. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA
332, Feb. 17, l997)
4. The rule is that any mistake on a doubtful or difficult question of law may be the basis of good faith. (Lecaros vs.
Sandiganbayan, 305 SCRA March 25, 1999)
5. However, ignorance of the law is not an excuse because everyone is presumed to know the law. Ignorantia
legis neminem excusat. (Manuel vs. People, 476 SCRA 461)
d. mistake of fact is absence of criminal intent- A misapprehension of fact on the part of the person causing
injury to another. Such person is not criminally liable as he acted without criminal intent.
A person is not criminally liable if by reason of a mistake as to the facts, does an act for which he would be exempt
from criminal liability if the facts were as he supposed them to be, but which would constitute the crime of homicide if the
actor had known the true state of facts at the time when he committed the act. Mistake of fact cancels the presumption of intent
and works an acquittal. Under such circumstances, there is no criminal liability provided that the alleged ignorance or mistake
of fact was not due to negligence. There can be no crime, large or small, without an evil mind. In other words, punishment is
the sequence of wickedness, without which it can not be. It is therefore a principle in our legal system, as probably it is of
every other, that the essence of an offense is the wrongful intent without which it cannot exist. this doctrine is confirmed by
the legal maxims: “ actus non facit reum nisi mens sit rea”, (the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intention were
so) “actus me invito factus non est meus actus (an act done by me against my will is not my act”). U.S. vs. Ah Chong, 15 Phil
488
Mistake of fact not applicable if there is negligence
1. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 624 SCRA 470, June 25, 2012
Facts: Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were on board a tamarraw jeep and they were traversing the
road after coming from a barrio fiesta when suddenly they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely. Licup died thereafter. Villanueva survived. Members of San Fernando PNP including
barangay officials and CHDF members were at the situs of the shooting because of their information that armed NPA were
spotted at the said place; that when they saw the tamarraw jeepney, a barangay official said that the suspects were on board that
jeepney; the PNP members flagged them down but they did not stop and so the policemen fired at them. Accused policemen
puts “mistake of fact” as a defense. Decide.
Ruling:
Mistake of fact is a misapprehension of a fact which, if true, would have justified the act or omission which is the subject of
the prosecution. Mistake of fact is a defense to a charge of crime where it negates the intent component of the crime. But as
held in People v. Oanis and Baxinela v. People, the justification of an act, which is otherwise criminal on the basis of a mistake
of fact, must preclude negligence or bad faith on the part of the accused. Here, there was negligence on the part of the police
officers because they shot at the victims without following the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement do not require
the police officer to immediately fire his weapon if the person to be accosted does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger
should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged pride.
2. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331 (March 24, 2006)
3. People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257.
2. Culpable felonies (culpa)
See Calimutan vs. People, 482 SCRA 44 (2006) and People vs. Carmen discussed above
III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY:
A. CRIMINAL OFFENDERS
1. A person committing a felony is liable for the resulting injury although not intended. (No. 1, Article 4)
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
a. Proximate cause- that cause, which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury without which the result would not have occurred. Under this rule, while the wrong done may not be the
direct cause, if it is the proximate cause, the offender is still liable.
People vs. Ilagan, 191 SCRA 643, November 26, 1990
i. Effect of supervening event ,
a. Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1, January 7, 1988
b. Accelerating death rule
Garcia vs. People, 597 SCRA 392, August 28, 2009
Ingrained in our jurisprudence is the doctrine that: x x x where death results as a direct consequence of the use of illegal
violence, the mere fact that the diseased or weakened condition of the injured person contributed to his death, does not relieve
the illegal aggressor of criminal responsibility.
Although the assaulted party was previously affected by some internal malady, if, because of a blow given with the hand or the
foot, his death was hastened, beyond peradventure he is responsible therefor who produced the cause for such acceleration as
the result of a voluntary and unlawfully inflicted injury. (Emphasis supplied.)
c. Instilling fear rule- If a man creates in another person’s mind, an immediate sense of danger, which causes such person to
try to escape, and in so doing, the latter injures himself, the man who creates such state of mind is responsible for the resulting
injuries. [People vs. Toling, 62 SCRA 17,33, (1975)Peo vs. Page, 77 SCRA 348, (l977); People vs. Castromero, 280 SCRA
421, (1997)]
2. Impossible Crime [Art. 4 (2) ]
i. Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426, July 13, 2009
The taking of a check without the consent of the owner with intent to gain but which the check bounced when deposited is an
impossible crime, not theft of personal property because the check has no value.
ii. Intod vs. Court of Appeals, et al 215 SCRA 52,
The killing of a person who was not at the room at the time of shooting, but was believed to there is an impossible crime.
Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime. It would apply
to those circumstances where (1) the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; (2) there is
intention to perform the physical act; (3) there is a performance of the intended physical act; and (4) the consequence resulting
from the intended act does not amount to a crime. The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category.
Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the
consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the
intention to steal the latter's wallet and finds the pocket empty.
B. Degree of participation
1. PRINCIPAL
1. By Direct Participation
a. CONSPIRACY
This topic discusses the second category.
Kinds of Multiple Conspiracies (Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 377 SCRA 556, Feb. 26, 2002)
1. Wheel or circle conspiracy in which there is a single person or group (the “hub”) dealing individually with two or
more other persons or groups (the “spokes”)
2. Chain conspiracy, which involves the distribution of narcotics or other contraband, in which there is successive
communication and cooperation in much the same way as with legitimate business operations between manufacturer and
wholesaler, then wholesaler and retailer and then retailer and consumer.
3. Enterprise Conspiracy-it is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or
the activities of which affect, foreign commerce, to conduct or participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
enterprise’s affairs through a pattern of racketeering activity or collection of unlawful debt. Racketeering activity includes
great variety of serious criminal conduct such as murder, kidnappining, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion and drug dealing and
for there to be a “pattern” there must be at least two such acts within a 10 year span. The RICO has its own conspiracy
provision.
Kinds of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code:
1. Express Conspiracy
2. Implied Conspiracy
Doctrine of implied conspiracy
. 1. People vs. Gueverra, November 13, 1989)
1.1. While Joselito and Teofilo were walking, they were waylaid by Stalin and Eduardo. Stalin went immediately
behind Joselito, and embraced him with both hands.; the firm embrace locked the whole body and both arms of Joselito.
Facing the hapless Joselito, Eduardo got his knife from his pocket, opened it, and thrust the weapon at the right side of
Joselito's body and he fell to the ground. Joselito died. Held: There can be no question that the Stalin’s act in holding the
victim from behind immediately before the latter was stabbed by Eduardo constitutes a positive and an overt act towards the
realization of a common criminal intent, although the intent may be classified as instantaneous. The act was impulsively done
on the spur of the moment. It sprang from the turn of events, thereby uniting with the criminal design of the slayer immediately
before the commission of the offense. That is termed as implied conspiracy
1. 2. Subayco, et al vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., August 22, 1996
Several circumstances intersect to show a community of purpose among the accused, that is, to fire at the demonstrators. This
common purpose was pursued by the accused who used firepower against the rallyists. As proved, the plan to disperse the
demonstrators did not include the use of guns, yet, accused did. At the first crack of gunfire coming from CHDF Alfredo
Quinatagcan (a.k.a. Pidong Bagis), accused commenced firing at the demonstrators, as if on signal. They fired indiscriminately
toward the demonstrators who were then already lying prone on the ground. There was no imminent danger to their safety. Not
just one or a few shots were fired but several. The firing lasted a few minutes and cost the lives and limbs of the demonstrators.
The collective acts of the accused clearly show the existence of a common design toward the accomplishment of a united
purpose.
Exceptions to the doctrine of implied conspiracy:
1. Mere signature rule
i. Macadangdang vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 308 , February 14, 1989

Simply because a person in a chain of processing officers happens to sign or initial a voucher as it is going the rounds, it does
not necessarily follow that he becomes part of a conspiracy in an illegal scheme. The guilt beyond reasonable doubt of each
supposed conspirator must be established. It is all too easy to be swept into a long prison term simply because the guilt of some
conspirators is overwhelming and somehow it attaches to all who happen to be charged in one indictment.
Every person who signs or initials documents in the course of their transit through standard operating procedures does not
automatically become a conspirator in a crime which transpired at a stage where he had no participation. His knowledge of the
conspiracy and his active and knowing participation therein must be proved by positive evidence.
2. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309, December 19, 1989
Ruling:
There is no conspiracy by negligence. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies or enter into negotiations…
3. Pareno, vs. Sandiganbayan, 256 SCRA 242, April 17, 1996; Larin vs. Sandiganbayan, April 17, 1996
Ruling:
There is no proof of actual agreement between the petitioners to commit the crimes charged. The acts of petitioners and that of
Evangelista may be considered concerted only because they performed interrelated functions. Larin from the Excise Tax Office
received the letter of Tanduay and referred the matter to Pareño, as head of the Alcohol Tax Division considering that the issue
was a tax on liquor. A certification from the RAD was requested and indorsed back to Larin who made a favorable
recommendation to the Deputy Commissioner. There is no showing that petitioners have acted irregularly, or performed acts
outside of their official functions. The testimony of Jeanet Aurelio that she saw Larin's secretary at their office, following up
the memorandum she was typing has no probative value at all. It must be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures
and presumptions. There is actually no proof that conspiracy exists between the parties.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
It is rather apparent that under the Sandiganbayan's decision, a department secretary, bureau chief, commission chairman,
agency head, department head or chief of office would be equally culpable for every crime arising from any transactions or
held guilty of conspiracy simply because he was the last of a long line of officials or employees who acted upon or affixed his
signature to a transaction. We cannot allow this because guilt must be premised on a more knowing personal, and deliberate
participation of each individual who is charged with others as part of a conspiracy. There must be more convincing proof
which in this case is wanting.
b. mere presence or companionship rule
1. Rosario Astudillo vs. People, November 29, 2006
Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.
2. People vs. Roland Cruz, Nov. l4, l990
The phrase “andiyan na” has no conclusive conspiratorial meaning.
2. Principals by inducement
Inducement may take the form of either by a command (precepto) or for a consideration (pacto),
People vs. Dumancas, et. al ,320 SCRA 584, December 13, 1999
Dumancas was swindled in a fake gold bar transactions losing P300T to Danilo and his cohort. Domingo and his companions
abducted Danilo and his cohorts. They brought the victims to the office of Dumancas. Dumancas investigated the two on the
whereabouts of the money and the two answered that it was already spent. It was then that Dumancas ordered Doming to take
care of the two. The following day Doming and a companion shot the victims to death.
Ruling:
In order that a person may be convicted as principal by inducement, the following must be present:
(1) the inducement be made with the intention of procuring the commission of the crime; and
(2) such inducement be the determining cause of the commission by the material executor ( U.S. vs. Indanan, 24
Phil. 203 [1913] ). To constitute inducement, there must exist on the part of the inducer the most positive
resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the presentation to
the person induced of the strongest kind of temptation to commit the crime.
By the foregoing standards, the remark of Dumancas to “take care of the two” does not constitute the command required by law
to justify a finding that she is guilty as a principal by inducement. As we held in U.S. vs. Indanan, supra, “a chance word
spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless act may give birth to a thought
of, or even a resolution to crime in the mind of one for some independent reason predisposed thereto without the one who
spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion would be followed or any real intention that it
produce the result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the results of it grave in the extreme, he (the one who
spoke the word or performed the act ) would not be guilty of the crime committed”.
3. Principals by indispensable cooperation
People vs. Dina Dulay, 681 SCRA 638, September 24, 2012
Facts: Dina asked AAA to accompany her at a wake at GI San Dionisio, Parañaque City. Before going to the said wake, they
went to Bulungan Fish Port along the coastal road to ask for some fish. Afterwards, AAA and Dina proceeded to the Kubuhan
located at the back of the Bulungan Fish Port. When they reached the Kubuhan, Dina suddenly pulled AAA inside a room
where "Speed" was waiting. AAA saw "Speed" give money to Dina and heard "Speed" tell Dina to look for a younger girl.
Thereafter, "Speed" wielded a knife and tied AAA's hands to the papag and raped her. AAA asked for Dina’s help when she
saw the latter peeping into the room while she was being raped, but Dina did not do so.
Issue: Whether or not Dina is guilty as co-principal by indispensable cooperation in the crime of rape.
Ruling:
(1) To be a principal by indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity in
criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have
been accomplished. Here, the acts committed by Dina are not indispensable in the commission of the crime of rape. The
events from the time Dina convinced AAA to go with her until Dina received money from the man who allegedly raped AAA,
are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and offered the latter's services in exchange
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary
consideration and still end up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of Dina in the crime of rape.
II. ACCOMPLICES
People vs. De Vera , 312 SCRA 640, August 18, 1999
When is a lookout deemed an accomplice and when a conspirator? What is the distinction between the two?
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and agree with the criminal design.
Conspirators, however, know the criminal intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action.
Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in
its execution.
Conspirators decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it. Accomplices do not decide whether
the crime should be committed; they merely assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment.
Conspirators are the authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts not essential to the
perpetration of the offense.
2. Abejuela vs. People, 200 SCRA 806, August 19, 1991
Abejuela lent his passbook to a bank teller, his friend. His friend deposited the checks of his father to Abejuela’s passbook,
then Abejuela withdrew what was deposited and gave the same to his friend. His friend assured him that was alright and
nothing wrong. The deposits turned out to be simulated. Is Abejeula an accomplice.
Answer. Knowledge of the criminal intent of the principal (Glicerio Balo, Jr.) is essential in order that Abejuela can be
convicted as an accomplice in the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial document. To be convicted as an accomplice,
there must be cooperation in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. However, the cooperation which
the law punishes is the assistance rendered knowingly or intentionally, which assistance cannot be said to exist without the
prior cognizance of the offense intended to be committed. Here, Abejuela was not aware of the crime intended to be
committed.
ACCESSORIES
People vs. Vino 178 SCRA 626, October 19, 1989
I. The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a principal for the crime of
murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.
The variance is in the participation or complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a
principal in the information, the evidence adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The
greater responsibility necessarily includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under
an information charging him as a principal.
II. The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of the
separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the principal,
accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly established in
evidence, the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that of the
principal. So much so that even if the principal is acquitted, the accessory may be convicted especially so if the acquittal is
predicated on reasonable doubt.
III. The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of the
petitioner as an accessory be maintained?
In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the
acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the
accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.
Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, where this Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of the principal must
likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the fire was the
result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.
A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as passenger holding a
carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The commission of the
crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In such case, the Court holds
that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Anti Fencing Law, PD 1612
Pamintuan vs. People, July 11, l994

Fencing, as defined in Section 2 of P.D. No. 1612 (Anti-Fencing Law), is "the act of any person who, with intent to gain for
himself or for another, shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any
manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived
from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft."
The elements of the crime of fencing are:
1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or accomplice in the commission of the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives,
possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and
4. There is, on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.
One is deemed to know a particular fact if he has the cognizance, consciousness or awareness thereof, or is aware of the
existence of something, or has the acquaintance with facts, or if he has something within the mind's grasp with certitude and
clarity. When knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of its existence unless he actually believes that it does not exist.
On the other hand, the words "should know" denote the fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would
ascertain the fact in performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact exists
Tan vs. People

313 SCRA 220, August 26, 1999
Rosita Lim never reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted that after Manuelito Mendez, her former
employee, confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime.
It can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As complainant Rosita
Lim reported no loss to the public authorities, we cannot hold for certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the
first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
Dunlao Sr. Vs. CA, August 22, 1996
Corpus Delicti, meaning
People vs. Lorenzo 240 SCRA 624
It is the body (material substance) upon which a crime has been committed e.g. the corpse of a murdered person or the
charred remains of a house burned down. In a derivative sense, it means the substantial fact that a crime was committed. It is
made up of two elements: (a) that a certain result has been proved, for example a man has died or a building has been burned
down and (b) that some person is criminally responsible for the act.
People vs. Marcelino, October 1, 1999
The corpus is the body or material substance upon which a delicti has been committed. Its two elements are: that a certain
result has been proved, and that some person is criminally responsible for the act
Producing the body of the victim, as well as proving its disposal, is not necessary for a murder or homicide conviction. It is
enough to show that a person was killed without legal justification. In certain situations, this may even be presumed or
established by circumstantial evidence.
PD 1829, Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and prosecution of Criminal Offenders
1. Punishable acts
2. Compare with Article 20, RPC (accessories exempt from criminal liability)
IV. Stages of Execution
1. Attempted stage:
1. People vs. Lamahang, 61 Phil. 793,705-708

Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The attempt to commit an offense which the law punishes is that which has a logical relation to a particular, concrete offense.
The attempt to commit an indeterminate offense, inasmuch as its nature in relation to its objective is ambiguous, is not a
juridical fact. It is necessary to prove that said beginning of execution, if carried to its complete termination following its
natural course, without desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen into a concrete offense. Xxx There is
nothing in the record from which such purpose of the accused (to rob) may reasonably be inferred.
2. Baleros vs. People, 483 SCRA 10 (Feb. 22 2006)

Held: It would be too strained to construe petitioner's act of pressing a chemical-soaked cloth in the mouth of Malou which
would induce her to sleep as an overt act that will logically and necessarily ripen into rape. As it were, petitioner did not
commence at all the performance of any act indicative of an intent or attempt to rape Malou. It cannot be overemphasized that
petitioner was fully clothed and that there was no attempt on his part to undress Malou, let alone touch her private part. For
what reason petitioner wanted the complainant unconscious, if that was really his immediate intention, is anybody’s guess.
3. Rule in homicide cases
People vs. Trinidad, 169 SCRA 51
Trinidad fired two shots, one of which hit Tan on his right thigh.
Trinidad can only be convicted of attempted murder. The wound on his thigh was not fatal and the doctrinal rule is that where
the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death, the crime is only Attempted Murder, the accused not
having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought about death (People vs. Phones, L-32754-5, July 21, 1978,
84 SCRA 167; People vs. Garcia, L-40106, March 13, 1980, 96 SCRA 497).
People vs. Tiu, December 1, l992
Otillo, was awakened by a noise outside of his house. With a flashlight, he saw that it was a carabao that was causing the noise.
He and his son tried to tie the carabao. Suddenly, shots were fired from the direction of the road. Otillo was hit on the right
ankle joint and fell down. He then crawled towards the back of the house near the kitchen. Held: The shooting of Otillo, also
attended by treachery, was only attempted murder because, although the intent to kill him was clearly established, he was shot
only in the ankle. The doctrinal rule is that where the wound inflicted on the victim is not sufficient to cause his death , the
accused not having performed all the acts of execution that would have brought it about, the crime is only attempted murder.
Rule in estafa:
If only deceit and intent to cause damage were proved but not actual damage, only attempted estafa is
committed.
1. Lateo vs. People, 651 SCRA 262, June 8, 2011
At first, Lateo and Elca proposed to Lucero that she financed the titling of the 122 hectares of land located in
Muntinlupa allegedly owned by Elca. Lucero released P4.7M. But the project turned out to be hoax. When Lucero confronted
Lateo, et al and demanded from them the return of the money, Lateo and Elca instead offered a five (5) hectare property
identified as Lot 10140 of Plan Sgs 04213-000441 located at Bacoor, Cavite allegedly owned by Elca. Elca, however,
demanded an additional P2 million for the transfer of title. Lucero initially gave them P200,000.00. When Lucero verified with
the Land Management Bureau (LMB), she discovered that Elca only had a pending application for the sales patent over a four
(4) hectare area of the subject land. Lucero charged Lateo and Elca with estafa relative to the foiled Bacoor lot transaction
where complainant parted P200,000.00.
Issue: What is the crime committed by Lateo et al?
Ruling:
Accused representation that Elca owned 14 hectares in Bacoor, Cavite, and was offering a 5-hectare portion of it, in
substitution of the Muntinlupa property, and demanding an additional P2,000,000.00 from Lucero, constituted fraud and
deceit.
Accused commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but they failed to perform all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime, not by reason of their own spontaneous desistance but because of their apprehension by the
authorities before they could obtain the amount.
Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself had been shown, they are merely liable for
attempted estafa.
2. Koh Tieck Heng vs. People 192 SCRA 533, where the Supreme Court held [that] “although one of the essential
elements of Estafa is damage or prejudice to the offended party, in the absence of proof thereof, the offender would x x x be
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
guilty of attempted estafa.” Appellant commenced the commission of the crime of estafa but he failed to perform all the acts of
execution which would produce the crime not by reason of [their] spontaneous desistance but because of his apprehension of
the authorities before they could obtain the amount. Since only the intent to cause damage and not the damage itself has been
shown respondent court correctly convicted appellant of attempted estafa.)
2. Frustrated
Requisites:
1. Offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony
2. but felony was not produced by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.
Rule in Theft
No frustrated theft; only attempted and consummated
Valenzuela vs. People, 525 SCRA 306, June 21, 2007
On the face of the definition of theft under Article 308, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in
theft ─ the taking of personal property of another.
Theft is already “produced” upon the “tak[ing of] personal property of another without the latter’s consent.”
Theft is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed from that
perspective, it is immaterial that the offender is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation
from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice Aquino’s
commentaries, as earlier cited, that “[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of
the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated.”
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment the offender
gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
Rule in rape
no frustrated rape, only attempted and consummated
People vs. Orita- April 3, l990
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential. Any penetration of the
female organ by the male organ is sufficient. Entry of the labia or lips of the female organ, without rupture of the hymen or
laceration of the vagina is sufficient to warrant conviction. Necessarily, rape is attempted if there is no penetration of the
female organ (People v. Tayaba, 62 Phil. 559 People v. Rabadan et al., 53 Phil. 694; United States v. Garcia: 9 Phil. 434)
because not all acts of execution was performed. The offender merely commenced the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts. Taking into account the nature, elements and manner of execution of the crime of rape and jurisprudence on the matter, it
is hardly conceivable how the frustrated stage in rape can ever be committed.
People vs. Alcoreza, G.R. Nos. 135452-53, October 5, 2001
There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penis indeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ and not
merely stroked the external surface thereof for an accused to be convicted of consummated rape. As the labias are required to
be "touched" by the penis, which are by their natural situs or location beneath the mons pubis or the vaginal surface, to touch
with the penis is to attain some degree of penetration beneath the surface, hence the conclusion that touching the labia majora
or minora of the pudendum constitutes consummated rape."
Rule in arson
If a person had poured gasoline under the house of another and was about to strike a match to set the house on fire but
was apprehended, he was guilty only of attempted arson.
If there was blaze, but no part of the house is burned, the crime of arson is frustrated.
If any part of the house, no matter how small, is burned, the crime of arson is consummated.
(Reyes, The Revised Penal Code, Book I 2006 Edition, page 111)
3. Consummated
1. People vs. Salvilla, April 26, l990
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the
unlawful taking is complete. The crime is consummated when the offender acquires possession of the property, even for a
short time, and it is not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried
the property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with it.
2. See Valenzuela case as discussed in the topic on frustrated theft
V. Conspiracy and proposal (Article 8)
Conspiracy is either a crime or a way of committing a crime. It is a crime when there is a law punishing it.
Otherwise, it is only a way of committing a crime, and if it is present, there is collective, rather than individual, criminal
responsibility among the actors.
To be a crime there must be a law punishing conspiracy. At present, there are only a few conspiracies punished by the
Revised Penal Code. These are (1) Conspiracy to Commit Treason (Article 115); Conspiracy to Commit Rebellion (Art. 136);
Conspiracy to Commit Coup d etat (Art. 136); conspiracy to commit sedition (Art. 142). On the other, the “Human Security
Act of 2007”, RA 9372 punishes conspiracy to commit terrorism (Sec. 4); PD 1612 punishes conspiracy to commit arson
(Section 7)
On proposal, these are the crimes punished: (1) Proposal to commit treason (Art. 115) ; (2) proposal to commit
rebellion (Art. 136); and (3) proposal to commit coup d etat (Art 136)
Conspiracy as a way of committing a crime was discussed in the topic: Degree of Participation under No. III
VI. Multiple Offenders
(1) Recidivism- A recidivist is one who, at the time of his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final
judgment of another crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code.
Absolute pardon does not affect recidivism. ( People vs. Lacao, September 4, l991)
Basis- greater perversity of the offender
(2) Reitaracion (or habituality) the offender has been previously punished for an offense to which the law attaches an equal or
greater penalty or for two or more crimes to which it attaches a lighter penalty.
Basis- greater perversity of the offender.
The offender must have served, partially or totally, the penalty imposed upon him. The controlling factor is the penalty for the
previous crime.
Reiteracion is distinguished from recidivism- In recidivism the previous offense and crime for which he is on trial must fall
under the same title of the Code, irrespective of penalty, while in reiteracion the controlling factor is the penalty for the
previous crime. In recidivism, it is enough that the offender has been previously convicted by final judgment, while in
reitaracion, it is required that the offender must have served the penalty for the previous offense.
3. Habitual Delinquency (art. 62, par. 5)
1. Within a period of 10 years from the date of his release or last conviction, he is found guilty of any of RETFI2 a third time
or oftener.
2. RETFI2 means robbery, estafa, theft, falsification, serious physical injuries and less serious physical injuries.
3. One conviction should take place within 10 years from the last conviction or release (People vs. Lacsamana, 70 Phil. 517)
4. Offender should undergo service of the penalty for the first offense
5. Purpose of the law, to render more effective social defense and the reformation of the offender (People vs. Abuyen 52 Phil.
722)
6. Distinguish habitual deliquency from recidivism
4. Quasi Recidivism (Art. 160)- Any person who shall commit a felony after having been convicted by final judgment, before
beginning to serve such sentence or while serving the same, shall be punished by the maximum period of the penalty
prescribed by law for the new felony.
VII. Complex Crimes vs. Special Complex Crimes
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
A complex crime exists when a single act results in two or more grave or less grave offenses (compound crime or delito
compuesto) or when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other (complex proper or delito complejo)
Special complex crimes, the terminology not being found in law, are different in nature since they arise from different acts and
neither of which is a necessary means to commit the other. But they are similar to complex crimes because a single penalty is
imposed by the Code. Examples are robbery with homicide ; robbery with rape; robbery with serious physical injuries (Art.
294); kidnapping and serious illegal detention with murder (Art. 267); arson resulting in homicide (Art. 320 as amended by RA
7659); attempted or frustrated robbery with homicide (Article 297);
Plurality of crimes may be (i). formal (ideal) or (ii). material (real)
Formal plurality involves the same criminal intent producing two or more crimes but with only one criminal liability. Material
plurality refers to different criminal intents producing in two or more crimes and for each of which the accused incurs criminal
liability (Regalado, Criminal Law)
When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must
allege in the information and prove during the trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex crime.
However, the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not
necessarily lead to a declaration of innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a complex crime is charged and
the evidence fails to establish one of the component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as they are
proved. (Monteverde vs. People, August 12, 20012)
Examples of compound crime (delito compuesto)
1. When Cpl. Inocencio heard a commotion from a card game downstairs, he went down and saw Lacao with a knife.
He held the latter’s hand. When he released the hand, Lacao suddenly stabbed Cpl. Inocencio which caused his death. Held:
Lacao committed the crime of murder with direct assault. One single act resulted into two grave or less grave offenses, to wit:
murder and direct assault of an agent of a person in authority. (People vs. Lacao, September 4, l991)
2. From the store, Maghanoy proceeded to the national road where he met his other victims, Reynante Sabalino, David
Baguio and Benito Pacanot who were on their way home. Then Maghanoy, without warning, he opened fire upon them felling
all three. By sheer luck, Sabelino was hit only in the left thigh, Baguio and Pacanot died. Held: The accused should have been
prosecuted for the complex crime of double murder and frustrated murder. The deaths of Baguio and Pacanot and the
wounding of Sabelino were the result of one single act of the accused. (People vs. Maghanoy, December 15, l989)
3. Desalisa stabbed to death his wife who was then pregnant. Held: The accused-appellant has committed the
complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion was caused by the same violence that caused the death of
the victim. It is unintentional because accused-appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to
cause an abortion. (People vs. Desalisa, January 4, 1994)
6. People vs. Gaffud 566 SCRA 76, September 19, 2008; the Supreme Court En Banc:
The single act of accused-burning the house of Manuel Salvador, with the main objective of killing the latter and his
daughter, Analyn, resulting in their deaths resulted in the complex crime of double murder.
1. People vs. Guillen, 85 Phil 307 (1950). The single act of throwing a grenade at President Roxas resulting in the
death of another person and injuring four others produced the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murders.
2. People vs. Carpo, 356 SCRA 248 (April 24, 2001). The single act of hurling a grenade into the bedroom of
the victims causing the death of three persons and injuries to one person constituted the complex crime of multiple murder and
attempted murder.
3. People vs. Comadre, 431 SCRA 366 (June 8, 2004). The single act of detonating a hand grenade may
quantitatively constitute a cluster of several separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be
considered only as a single crime in law because the offender was impelled by a “single criminal impulse”, which shows his
lesser criminal perversity.
Examples of complex crime proper (delito complejo)
1. People vs. Salvilla, April 26, l990
Robbery with serious illegal detention. The term “necessary means” does not connote indispensable means for if it
did then the offense as a necessary means to commit another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an
ingridient thereof. The phrase “necessary means” merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the
commission of the other. In this case, the crime of serious illegal detention was such a necessary means as it was selected by
appellant and his co accused to facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery. The detention of
the four persons facilitated the commission of the robbery.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
2. People vs. Hon. Villallon, et al, December 21, 1990
The accused committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of public document. The falsification of a public document may
be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of
falsification has already been consumated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification
of public, official or commercial document. The damage to another is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document, hence the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means
to commit estafa.
3. Domingo vs. People, October 12, 2009
Domingo committed the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document. First, encashment slips are
commercial documents. It is falsification not only because the signature of Remedios was counterfeited but also because
Domingo made it appear that Remedios participated in an act or proceeding when in fact she did not.
Whenever a person carries out on a public, official, or commercial document any of the acts enumerated in Art. 171 of
the RPC as a necessary means to perpetrate another crime, such as estafa or malversation, a complex crime is formed by the
two crimes.
The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa, because before
the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official, or commercial
document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official, or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official, or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit estafa.
4. People vs. Dawandawan, April 6, l990
Accused boxed Maria at her mid section causing her to lose consciousness. Accused then sexually molested her .
After sexually molesting her, accused slashed Maria’s neck. He slapped her and boxed her in several parts of her body and
stabbed her on the left side of her breast and she again lost her consciousness. She did not die however. Held: Accused has
committed the two separate crimes of rape and frustrated homicide. The physical injuries which could have caused victim’s
death were not the result of the rape committed; neither was the slashing a necessary means for committing the rape.
Independently of the slashing of the victim’s neck and the stabbing, the accused was able to consumate the rape. The physical
injuries were inflicted after the rape and were not a necessary means to commit the same.
Delito Continuado
(CONTINUED/CONTINOUS CRIME not continuing crime)
People vs. De Leon, June 26, 2009 (Justice Peralta)
Six people armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber, alighted from their car. Marlon poked a gun at Eduardo and took his
wallet containing P50.00. Four of Marlon’s companions went to the cashier and took the money worth P3,000 and shot the
security guard and took his revolver. Held: The accused intended only to rob one place. That they did; and in the process, also
took away by force the money and valuables of the employees working in said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these
circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal resolution. A continued offense is a continuous,
unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated by an unintermittent force, however long a time it
may occupy.
Defensor Santiago vs. Garchitorena, 228 SCRA 214, Dec. 2, 1993)
For delito continuado to exist there should be a plurality of acts performed during a period of time, unity of penal
provision violated and unity of criminal intent or purpose which means that two or more violations of the same penal
provisions are united in one and same intent or resolution leading to the perpetration of the same criminal purpose or aim. In
appearance, a delito continuado consists of several crimes but in reality there is only one crime in the mind of the perpetrator.
On May 1, 1991, then BID Commissioner, Miriam Defensor Santiago was charged with 32 counts for violation of
Sec. 3 (e) of R.A. 3019 by allegedly favoring unqualified aliens with the benefits of the Alien Legalization Program. The 32
Informations stated the same date when the alleged offenses were committed. Held: The 32 amended informations charged
what is known as delito continuado or continued crime or continous crime.
2. Other examples of delito continuado
1. The theft of 13 cows belonging to two different owners committed by the accused at the same place and at the
same period of time. (People vs. Tumlos, 67 Phil 320, l939)
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
2. The theft of six roosters belonging to two different owners from the same coop and at the same period of time
(People vs. Jaranillo, 55 SCRA 563, l974.
3. The theft of two roosters in the same place and on the same occasion (People vs. de Leon, 49 Phil. 437, l926)
4. The illegal charging of fees for services rendered by a lawyer everytime he collects veteran’s benefits on behalf of
a client, who agreed that the attorney’s fees shall be paid out of the said benefits [People vs. Sabbun, 10 SCRA 156 (l964)].
The collections of the legal fees were compelled by the same motive, that of collecting fees for services rendered, and all acts
of collection were made under the same criminal impulse. [People vs. Lawas, 97 Phi. 975 (1955)]
3. Cases where crimes were not considered delito continuado
1. Two estafa cases, one of which was committed during the period from January 19 to December 1955 and the other
from January 1956 to July 1956 (People vs. Dichupa, 113 Phil 306, l961). The said acts were comitted on different occassions.
2. Several malversations committed in May, June and July, l936, and falsifications to conceal the said offenses
committed in August and October, l936. The malversations and falsifications were not the result of only purpose or of only
one resolution to embezzle and falsify. (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354, 1938)
3. Two estafa cases, one committed in December, l963 involving failure of the collector to turn over the installments
for a radio and the other in June l964 invloving the pocketing of the installments for a sewing machine (People vs. Ledesma, 73
SCRA 77 (1976]
4. 75 estafa cases committed by the conversion by the agent of collections from customers of the employer made on
different dates. (Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, 68 SCRA 308, l975]
FOREKNOWLEDGE PRINCIPLE
The offender had advanced knowledge or could have foreseen that same event will continuously happen.
Paera vs. People. 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011
The theory of fusing his criminal liability to one count of Grave Threat can be sustain only if he had foreknowledge of A, B
and C’s presence near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999. But not having known in advance of A, B and C’s
presence near the water tank at the time in question, Paera could not have formed any intent to threatened any of them until
shortly before he inadvertently came across each of them.
VII. Circumstances which Affect Criminal Liability
A. JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Defense of one’s person.
Stand ground when in the right- the law does not require a person to retreat when his assailant is rapidly advancing
upon him with a deadly weapon. Reason: He runs the risk of being attacked in the back by the aggressor.
It is axiomatic that the mere thrusting of one’s hand into his pocket as if for the purpose of drawing a weapon is
not unlawful aggression. Even the cocking of a rifle without aiming the firearm at any particular target is not sufficient to
conclude that one’s life was in imminent danger. Hence, a threat, even if made with a weapon, or the belief that a person was
about to be attacked, is not sufficient. It is necessary that the intent be ostensibly revealed by an act of aggression or by some
external acts showing the commencement of actual and material unlawful aggression. (People vs. Rubiso, 399 SCRA 267,
March 18, 2003; see also People vs. Daquipil, 240 SCRA 708)
The victim told the accused: “So you are brave now you had the guts to fight against me; go home, get your firearm
because I will go home to get a gun. If you won’t go home and get a gun, I will go to your place and kill you including your
parents. Held: Such utterances can’t be regarded as unlawful aggression. Such statements could not reasonably inspire well
grounded and reasonable belief that accused was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm. Unlawful aggression refers to an
attack that has actually broken out or materialized or clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or a merely threatening
stance or posture (People vs. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601)
The victim addressed offensive language to the accused such as “vulva of your mother, you’re talking as if you have
no debts, not like me I have no debts.” Held: The victim had not acted with unlawful aggression that might have provoked the
accused’s deadly wrath. Infurious words of threats do not amount unlawful aggression. (People vs. Agapinay, June 27, l990)
The claim of appellant that the act of the victim in reaching for a clutch bag and slapping his fellow security guard
constitute unlawful aggression is devoid of merit. The aggression must be real or at least imminent and not merely
imaginary. A belief that a person is about to be attacked is not sufficient. Even an intimidating or threatening attitude is by
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
no means enough. A mere push or shove not followed by other acts placing in real peril the life or personal safety of the
accused is not unlawful aggression. (People vs. Bautista, 254 SCRA 621, March 12, 1996)
There can be no defense where there is no aggression. Alconga had no right to pursue, no right to kill or injure Barion
for the reason that "a fleeing man is not dangerous to the one from whom he flees. (People vs. Alconga, 78 Phil 366, April 30,
1947)
It is settled that the moment the first aggressor runs away, unlawful aggression on his part ceases to exist, and when
unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any right to kill or wound the former aggressor, otherwise, retaliation
and not self-defense is committed. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. (Razon vs. People, 525 SCRA 284, June 21,
2007;
Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the aggression means rational equivalence not
material commensurability. In rational equivalence, what should be considered are the factors of emergency, the danger to the
life of a person and instinct more than reason impels the defense (People vs. Gutual, 254 SCRA 37, February 22, 1986)
2. Defense of Property
The assault on one’s property amounts to unlawful aggression as contemplated by law. But the reasonableness of the
resistance is doubtful. When the accused fired his shotgun from his window, killing his two victims, his resistance was
disproportionate to the attack. (People vs. Narvaez, 121 SCRA 403, April 20, 1983)
3. Defense of Honor
The placing of hand by a man on the woman’s upper thigh is unlawful aggression (People vs. Jaurigue 76 Phil 174)
4. Defense of Relatives
Olbinar vs. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 115, January 21, l991
In case the wife saw her husband on the ground, with blood on his person, and two men were boxing and kicking him, she is
not required to investigate the nature of her husband’s injuries, determine if he was in danger of death, analyze the situation
and ascertain what would be the most reasonable mode by which she could stop her husband’s mauling, but has to act and act
quickly in defense of her husband. The wife had acted in justifiable defense of her husband.
People vs. Luis Toring, et al, October 26, l990
When A was about to dance a girl, the victim stopped him, pointed his shotgun at him, took a bullet from his jacket, showed it
to A and even asked if A would like it. B, first cousin of A, took his knife and stabbed the victim. Before this, a brother of the
victim shot, not only B but also a brother of B. Held: B is entitled to an incomplete defense of relative only. No doubt, there
was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. There was no provocation also on the part of B, the accused. But B cannot
be given the full credence of the justifying circumstance because he was not inspired by pure compassion or beneficence or the
lawful desire to avenge the immediate wrong inflicted upon his cousin. Rather, he was motivated by revenge, resentment or
evil motive because of a running feud between the victim and accused brothers. Indeed vendetta appears to have driven both
camps to commit unlawful acts against each other.
People vs. Lingatong, January 29, l990
Accused is not entitled to the benefit of a justifying circumstance of defense of a relative. It was the accused’s brother and not
the victim who was the unlawful aggressor by his act of clubbing EJ with a kulafu bottle on the right eyebrow.
5. Defense of Strangers
Paera vs. People, 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011
The defense of stranger rule requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the
means employed to prevent or repel it and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment.
None of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties’ rights.
6. State of Necessity
People vs. Punzalan, 687 SCRA 687, December 10, 2012
Facts: Punzalan was punched by Bacosa in his right ear. To avoid further altercation, Punzalan left the bar. When he passed by
the sentry, somebody threw stones at his van. When he alighted, Bacosa and another man boxed him. He saw four other men
approaching him. So, Punzalan went back to his car and drove it in a rushing and zigzagging manner that hit and bumped
Duclayna and Andal. Charged with double murder, Punzalan contended that the attack against him by two men whose four
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
companions were also approaching created in his mind a fear of greater evil prompting him to speed up his vehicle to avoid a
greater evil or injury.
Issue: Whether or not Punzalan is entitled to the justifying circumstance of state of necessity.
Ruling: Punzalan’s contention cannot be sustained. Under paragraph 4, Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code, infliction of
damage or injury to another so that a greater evil or injury may not befall one’s self may be justified only if it is taken as a last
resort and with the least prejudice to another. If there is another way to avoid the injury without causing damage or injury to
another, then such course should be taken. In this case, the road where the incident happened was wide, some 7 meters in
width, and the place was well lighted. With this wide space, Punzalan had other way to avoid hitting the approaching four men.
He failed to resort to other practical and less harmful available means of preventing the evil or injury he claimed to be
avoiding.
People vs. Retubado, 417 SCRA 393 December 10, 2003
Retubado followed the victim up to his house when the latter refused to talk to him; the victim, irritated, went inside his room;
when he went out of his room, he had already a gun, although the trigger finger was outside the trigger guard and the muzzle
facing downward, Retubado feared for his life and so tried to wrestle possession of the gun; in the process the gun went off and
hit the victim who died. Retubado put up defense of state of necessity. Held: Not entitled. It is indispensable that the state of
necessity must not be brought about by the intentional provocation of the party invoking the same. Retubado provoked the
victim in getting his gun.
6.1. Compare with Pure Accident (Article 12 (4)
People vs. Nepomuceno, 298 SCRA 450, November 11, 1998
Accused was always being nagged by his wife. Because of this, he thought of ending his life. He took the gun from
their child’s drawer. Their son however woke up, walked to the space between him and his wife, he raised his arm holding the
gun passing over the left leg of his wife but the gun went off, his wife was hit and died. Held: Accident to be exempting,
presupposes that the act done is lawful. Here, however, the act of accused of drawing a weapon in the course of a quarrel, the
same not being in self defense, is at least constitutes light threats (Art. 285, par. 1,RPC). There is thus no room for the
invocation of accident as a ground for exemption.
Talampas vs. People, 661 SCRA 197, November 23, 2011
Facts Talampas alighted from his bicycle and fired his revolver at Eduardo, who was hit and took refuge behind Ernesto.
Talampas fired his gun again three times, one shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of this back causing him to fall on the ground
on his back. Ernesto died instantaneously. Charged with homicide, Talampas puts up the defense of accident because the shot
was aimed at Eduardo and not at Ernesto, the victim. Is Talampas entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident?
Explain.
Ruling: Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised
Penal Code, contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising due care,
diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to something not in the least in the mind of
the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal act. Accident presupposes the lack of intention to commit the wrong done.
Here, Talampas brandished and poked his revolver at Eduardo and fired it, hitting Eduardo, who then hid behind
Ernesto. Then Talampas fired his revolver again thrice. One shot hit Ernesto at the right portion of his back and another shot
hit Eduardo on the nape. Clearly, Talampas’ acts were not lawful, being a criminal assault against both Eduardo and Ernesto.
The fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not excuse him from criminal liability. The
fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct consequence of Talampas’ felonious act against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor
aim amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him from criminal responsibility
nor mitigated his criminal liability. “Lo que es causa de la causa, es causa del mal causado (what is the cause of the cause is
the cause of the evil caused). Under Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code, criminal liability is incurred by any person
committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
People vs. Latosa, 621 SCRA 586, June 23, 2010
Facts: Felixberto and Susan, husband and wife, were at their house on that fateful day. When Felixberto was awaken, he asked
his wife Susan to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him, it suddenly
fired, hitting Felixberto at his left temple. Susan claimed that it was an accidental shooting. Decide.
Rule: Susan is liable for parricide. To avail of the exempting circumstance of accident, the offender must be performing a
lawful act with due care. The pointing of the gun towards her husband cannot be considered as performing a lawful act with
due care. Susan held the gun in one hand and extended it towards her husband who was still lying in bed. Prudence dictates
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
that when handing over a gun, the muzzle should not be pointed to a person. Susan should have known this. Here the muzzle
of the gun was pointed at her husband. Besides, a gun does not fire unless there was pressure on the trigger.
7. Performance of a duty
1. Cabanlig vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 324 , July 28, 2005
A warning shot is not absolutely mandated at all times.
The duty to issue a warning is not absolutely mandated at all times and at all cost, to the detriment of the life of law enforcers.
The directive to issue a warning contemplates a situation where several options are still available to the law enforcers. In
exceptional circumstances such as this case, where the threat to the life of a law enforcer is already imminent, and there is no
other option but to use force to subdue the offender, the law enforcer’s failure to issue a warning is excusable.
2. Paera vs. People, 649 SCRA 384, May 30, 2011
On justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies
upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance of duty or the lawful exercise of
office. Arguably, Paera acted in the performance of his duty to “ensure delivery of basic services” when he barred the Darongs’
access to the communal water tank.
Nevertheless, Paera exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed
weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. Paera ought to know that no amount of concern for the
delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.
3. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 624 SCRA 470, June 25, 2012
Facts: Villanueva, Flores, Calma, De Vera, Panlican and Licup were on board a tamarraw jeep and they were traversing the
road after coming from a barrio fiesta when suddenly they met a burst of gunfire and instantly, Villanueva and Licup were both
wounded and bleeding profusely. Licup died thereafter. Villanueva survived. Members of San Fernando PNP including
barangay officials and CHDF members were at the situs of the shooting because of their information that armed NPA were
spotted at the said place; that when they saw the tamarraw jeepney, a barangay official said that the suspects were on board that
jeepney; the PNP members flagged them down but they did not stop and so the policemen fired at them. Accused policemen
puts up performance of duty as a defense. Decide.
Ruling:
The policemen are not entitled to the justifying circumstance of performance of duty. To avail of this justifying circumstance,
the public officials are not only performing their duty but that the injury was inflicted because of the due performance of duty.
True, they were at the situs of the incident because of call of duty to arrest armed NPA. But the death of Licup and the injury
inflicted on Villanueva were in violation of the rules of engagement, even if the group of Licup did not stop when flagged
down. The rules of engagement do not require the police officer to immediately fire his weapon if the person to be accosted
does not heed his call. Pursuit without danger should be his next move, and not vengeance for personal feelings or a damaged
pride.
4. Mamangun vs. People, 514 SCRA 44 , February 2, 2007
Accused policeman and his two companions responded to a call to a report that a robbery was being held in a certain
house. Upon arriving at the scene, accused Mamangun went to the rooftop of the house where the suspect was allegedly taking
refuge. There he saw a man whom he thought was the suspect. He pointed his .45 cal pistol at the man who instantly
exclaimed, “hindi ako, hindi ako” but still Mamangun fired his handgun once hitting the man which caused his death. The man
turned out to be Contreras who was not the robbery suspect. Held: The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty under
paragraph 5, Artilce 11, of the Revised Penal Code may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the
accused acted in the performance of a duty and (2) the injury inflicted or offense committed is the necessary consequence of
the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty. There is no rational necessity for the killing of Contreras. Mamangun
could have first fired a warning shot before pulling the trigger against Contreras.
5. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331, March 24, 2006
Policeman Baxinela and his co-policeman were summoned because a man was creating trouble in a pub. Once there,
they sat at a table and saw Lajo with a handgun visibly tucked behind his waist. Then the armed man walked towards the
entrance. When he passed their table, Baxinela stood up, introduced himself as a policeman and asked why he had a gun. The
man did not respond but turned to face Baxinela, drawing his gun. Baxinela immediately drew his firearm and beat him to the
draw. Ruling: there was negligence on the part of Baxinela. Lajo, when he was shot, was simply turning around to see who was
accosting him. Moreover, he identified himself saying “Iam MIG”. These circumstances alone would not lead a reasonable and
prudent person to believe that Baxinela’s life was in peril. Thus, his act of shooting constitutes clear negligence and so mistake
of fact, as held in US vs, Ah Chong, cannot apply.
Difference between Fulfillment of Duty and self defense

Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Self-defense and fulfillment of duty operate on different principles. Self-defense is based on the principle of self-preservation
from mortal harm, while fulfillment of duty is premised on the due performance of duty. A policeman in the performance of
duty is justified in using such force as is reasonably necessary to secure and detain the offender, overcome his resistance,
prevent his escape, recapture him if he escapes, and protect himself from bodily harm. In case injury or death results from the
policeman’s exercise of such force, the policeman could be justified in inflicting the injury or causing the death of the offender
if the policeman had used necessary force. Since a policeman’s duty requires him to overcome the offender, the force exerted
by the policeman may therefore differ from that which ordinarily may be offered in self-defense. Unlike in self-defense where
unlawful aggression is an element, in performance of duty, unlawful aggression from the victim is not a requisite. (Cabanlig
vs. Sandiganbayan, 464 SCRA 324 , July 28, 2005)
8. Obedience to the order of superior
Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the MARCOS Memorandum required him to do.
He could not be faulted if he had to obey and strictly comply Even if the order is illegal if it is patently legal and the
subordinate is not aware of its illegality, the subordinate is not liable, for then there would only be a mistake of fact committed
in good faith. (Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, 268 SCRA 332, February 17, 1997)
10. Battered woman syndrome. Victim survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from battered woman
syndrome do not incur criminal liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self
defense (Sec. 26, RA 9262, Anti Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004.)
Battered Woman Syndrome refers to a scientifically defined pattern of psychological and behavioral symptoms found
in women living in battering relationships as a result of cumulative abuse. (Section 3 (c), RA 9262)
Battery refers to an act of inflicting physical harm upon the woman or her child resulting to physical and
psychological or emotional distress. (Section 3 (b), RA 9262
A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or
psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified
as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered
woman.”(People vs. Genosa, G.R. 135981, January 15, 2004)
More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of violence, which has three
phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent)
phase.[28]
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be verbal or slight physical abuse or another form
of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply
staying out of his way.
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality, destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered
woman deems this incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no control; only the batterer may
put an end to the violence. The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that resistance would
only exacerbate her condition.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period, the
couple experience profound relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior towards his
partner. He begs for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand, the battered woman also tries
to convince herself that the battery will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this “good,
gentle and caring man” is the real person whom she loves.
B. EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. INSANITY
There are two tests of insanity (a) the test of cognition which is the "complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the [criminal] act," and (b) the test of volition "or that there be a total deprivation freedom of the will." We
follow the test of cognition. This is perhaps to be expected since a person's volition naturally reaches out only towards that
which is presented as desirable by his intelligence, whether that intelligence be diseased or healthy. (People vs. Formigones,
G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950; People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991; People vs. Valledor, July 3, 2002; People
vs. Dungo, July 31, 1991 ( 199 SCRA 860)
Schizophrenia has been described as a chronic mental disorder characterized by inability to distinguish between
fantasy and reality, and often accompanied by hallucinations and delusions. Formerly called dementia praecox, it is said to be
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
the most common form of psychosis and usually develops between the ages 15 and 30. It is not exempting but only mitigating.
(People vs. Rafanan, Jr. November 21, 1991)
2. Imbecility
Accused’s act of cutting grass rather that guarding his victim could hardly be indicative of imbecility. Rather, it may
be considered as negligence but definitely not childishness or even that of one completely deprived of reason or discernment
and freedom of the will.
Imbecility is defined as feeblemindedness or a mental condition approaching that of one who is insane. It is
analogous to childishness and dotage. An imbecile, within the meaning of Article 12 is one who must be deprived completely
of reason or discernment and freedom of will at the time of committing the crime. He is one, who while advanced in age, has a
mental development comparable to that of children between two and seven years of age.( People vs. Nunez, 276 SCRA 9)
In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so
as to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at the
time of committing the crime. (People vs. Formigones, G.R. No. L-3246, November 29, 1950)
3. MINORITY
People v. Jacinto, 645, SCRA 590, March 16, 2011
A boy of 17 year old raped a child of five year old. The boy held victim’s hand while on the road near the store. They walked
towards the rice field. There he made her lie down on harrowed ground, removed her panty and boxed her on the chest.
Already half-naked from waist down, he mounted on her.
Issues:
Ruling:
Sec. 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 exempts a child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age from criminal
liability, unless the child is found to have acted with discernment, in which case, "the appropriate proceedings" in accordance
with the Act shall be observed.s This means if he acted with discernment, there is criminal liability.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case. The surrounding circumstances must demonstrate that the minor knew what he was doing and that it was wrong. Such
circumstance includes the gruesome nature of the crime and the minor’s cunning and shrewdness.
In the present case, (1) choosing an isolated and dark place to perpetrate the crime, to prevent detection[;] and (2) boxing the
victim xxx, to weaken her defense" are indicative of then seventeen (17) year-old accused’s mental capacity to fully understand
the consequences of his unlawful action.
The provision on automatic suspension of sentence makes no distinction as to the nature of the offense committed by the child
in conflict with the law. When the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Since R.A. No. 9344 does not
distinguish between a minor who has been convicted of a capital offense and another who has been convicted of a lesser
offense, the Court should also not distinguish and should apply the automatic suspension of sentence to a child in conflict with
the law who has been found guilty of a heinous crime.
The legislative intent as reflected in the Senate deliberations is that even in heinous crimes, the child’s restoration,
rehabilitation and reintegration shall be the primordial considerations.
Madali vs. People, 595 SCRA 274, August 4, 2009

.
Raymund, 14 years old, and Rodel, 16 years old, and the victim AAA climbed the stairs, atop of which was a reservoir. The
victim AAA, ascended first; behind him were Rodel and Raymund. As soon as they reached the reservoir, Raymund clobbered
AAA at the back of his thighs with a coconut frond. AAA wobbled. Before he could recover, he received punches to his head
and body from Rodel, who was wearing brass knuckles. The punishments proved too much, as AAA lost consciousness and
died.
Ruling:
Raymund is exempted from criminal liability. Raymund, who was only 14 years of age at the time he committed the crime,
should be exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6
and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344. Although the crime was committed on 13 April 1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect
only on 20 May 2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor of Raymund who was not shown to be a habitual
criminal. This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Retroactive effect of penal laws. — Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of
a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
As to Rodel’s situation, it must be borne in mind that he was 16 years old at the time of the commission of the crime. A
determination of whether he acted with or without discernment is necessary.
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be
known and should be determined by taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case.
Rodel acted with discernment. Rodel, together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to reveal their hideous act to anyone;
otherwise, they would kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy.
He fully appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.
Discernment is not the same with criminal intent
A minor was charged with reckless imprudence resulting to death; he was playing a tanzan target shooting with his friend but
instead of hitting the tanzan, he hit the body of his friend. Since it is a case of reckless imprudence, the information recited that
the accused…voluntarily but without intent to kill, negligently hit the victim… Accused contended that the information
charges no offense, since without intent to kill means without discernment. Held: Not correct. Intent is not the same with
discernment. Intent is defined as a design; a determination to do certain thing; an aim, the purpose of the mind, including such
knowledge as is essential to such intent. Intent is the third element of dolo. Discernment, on the other hand, is the mental
capacity of a minor to understand the difference between right or wrong. Intent refers to the desired of one’s act, while
discernment relates to the moral signnificance that person ascribes to the said act. (Gueverra vs. Hon. Almodovar 169 SCRA
476)
Some important provisions of RA 9344
Definition of terms
Child refers to a person under the age of eighteen (18) years (Section 4 ( c ), RA 9344)
“Child in Conflict with the law” refers to a child who is alleged as, accused of, or adjudged as, having committed an offense
under Philippine laws (Section 4 (e), Id)
Diversion refers to an alternative, child-appropriate process of determining the responsibility and treatment of a child in
conflict with the law on the basis of his/hersocial, cultural, economic, psychological or educational background without
resorting to formal court proceedings.(Section 4 (i) id)
Diversion Program refers to the program that the child in conflict with the law is required to undergo after he/she is found
responsible for an offense without resorting to formal court proceedings.
Intervention refers to a series of activities which are designed to address issues that caused the child to commit an offense. It
may take the form of an individualized treatment program which may include counseling, skills training, education, and other
activities that will enhance his/her psychological, emotional and psycho-social well-being (Section 4 (j)
Restorative Justice refers to a principle which requires a process of resolving conflicts with the maximum involvement of the
victim, the offender and the community. It seeks to obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation of the offender, the offended
and the community; and reassurance to the offender that he/she can be reintegrated into society. It also enhances public safety
by activating the offender, the victim and the community in prevention strategies.(Section 4, (q) id)
Status Offenses refers to offenses which discriminate only against a child, while an adult does not suffer any penalty for
committing similar acts. These shall include curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience and the like. (Section 4, ( r)
Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.
A child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal liability.
(Section 6, I.d)
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal liability unless
he/she has acted with discernment,. The exemption from criminal liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with existing laws. (Section 6, id)
The child in conflict with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority. He/she shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict
with the law until he/she is proven to be 18 years old or older. His age may be determined from his birth certificate, baptismal
certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these documents, age may be based on information from the
child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. In case of
doubt as to the age of the child, it shall be resolved in his/her favor. (Section 7, i.d)
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Intervention and Diversion
A child who is exempt from criminal liability because he is 15 years old or below shall undergo intervention program. A child
who is above 15 years of age but below 18 years old and who have not acted with discernment shall also undergo intervention
program. (Section 6, Id.)
In case the child is over 15 years old but below 18 years and he acted with discernment, he shall undergo diversion proceedings
to be conducted by LEO OR PB with the assistance of the LSWDO or by the LSWDO in case of victimless offense where the
imposable penalty for the crime committed is not more than 6 years imprisonment. (Section 23). But where the imposable
penalty for the crime committed exceeds 6 years but not more than 12 years, diversion measures may be resorted to only by the
court.( Section 23, c) Where the maximum penalty imposed by law for the offense with which the child in conflict with the law
is charged is imprisonment of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine or fine alone regardless of the amount,
and before arraignment of the child in conflict with the law, the court shall determine whether or not diversion is appropriate
(Section 37)
Automatic Suspension of Sentence.
Once the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of the
offense charged, the court shall determine and ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from the offense
committed. However, instead of pronouncing the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child in conflict with the law
under suspended sentence, without need of application: Provided, however, That suspension of sentence shall still be applied
even if the juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt. Upon
suspension of sentence and after considering the various circumstances of the child, the court shall impose the appropriate
disposition measures as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in Conflict with the Law.(Section 38)
Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the Law.
Upon the recommendation of the social worker who has custody of the child, the court shall dismiss the case against the child
whose sentence has been suspended and against whom disposition measures have been issued, and shall order the final
discharge of the child if it finds that the objective of the disposition measures have been fulfilled. The discharge of the child in
conflict with the law shall not affect the civil liability resulting from the commission of the offense, which shall be enforced in
accordance with law. (Section 39)
Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law to Court. – If the court finds that the objective of the disposition measures imposed
upon the child in conflict with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in conflict with the law has willfully failed to
comply with the conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation program, the child in conflict with the law shall be brought
before the court for execution of judgment. If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years of age while
under suspended sentence, the court shall determine whether to discharge the child in accordance with this Act, to order
execution of sentence, or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain specified period or until the child reaches the
maximum age of twenty-one (21) years.(Section 40)
Credit in Service of Sentence. – The child in conflict with the law shall be credited in the services of his/her sentence with the
full time spent in actual commitment and detention under this Act (Section 41)
Probation as an Alternative to Imprisonment. – The court may, after it shall have convicted and sentenced a child in conflict
with the law, and upon application at any time, place the child on probation in lieu of service of his/her sentence taking into
account the best interest of the child. For this purpose, Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise known as the
“Probation Law of 1976”, is hereby amended accordingly.(Section 42)
Exemption from Criminal Liability
Status Offenses. – Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered an
offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child. (Section 57)
Offenses Not Applicable to Children. – Persons below eighteen (18) years of age shall be exempt from prosecution for the
crime of vagrancy and prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal Code, of mendicancy under Presidential Decree No.
1563, and sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree No. 1619, such prosecution being inconsistent with the United Nations
Convention of the Rights of the Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo appropriate counseling and treatment
program. (Section 58)
Exemption from the Application of Death Penalty. – The provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, Republic Act No.
9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and other special laws notwithstanding, no death
penalty shall be imposed upon children in conflict with the law. (Section 59)
4. Pure Accident
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
See discussion on state of necessity
5. Duress
People v. Dequina, 640, SCRA 111, January 19, 2011
A person who acts under the compulsion of an irresistible force, like one who acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear
of equal or greater injury, is exempt from criminal liability because he does not act with freedom. Actus me invito factus non
est meus actus. An act done by me against my will is not my act.
The force contemplated must be so formidable as to reduce the actor to a mere instrument who acts not only without will but
against his will.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending, and of such nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act be done.
A threat of future injury is not enough. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused
for escape or self-defense in equal combat.
People vs. Salvatierra June 20, l996, (257 SCRA 489)
In order that duress may be validly availed of by an accused as a defense, it should actually be anchored on a real, imminent or
reasonable fear for one’s own life or limb and should not be speculative, fanciful or imagined. The compulsion employed upon
the accused must have been such character as to leave no opportunity for him to spring an escape or to himself foist any act of
defense of self preservation. Duress is unavailing where the accused had every opportunity to run away if he had wanted to or
resist any possible aggression because he was also armed. In this case, accused could well have disassociated himself from the
criminal escapade considering that when the group flagged down a taxicab, it did not appear at that point that accused was
being threatened at all. Again upon reaching the residence of the victim accused had all the opportunity to escape from the
time when he rang the doorbell and when they were allowed by Elizabeth to go inside the house and especially thereafter.
OTHER ABSOLUTORY CAUSES
1. Instigation
a) But distinguish it from entrapment. Entrapment is lawful and is not an absolutory cause.
In an entrapment, ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of traping and capturing the law breakers in the execution of
their criminal plan; whereas in instigation, the instigator practically induces the would be defendant into the commission of the
offense and he himself becomes a co-principal. (People vs. Efren Asio, September 01, l989)
In entrapment ways and means are resorted to for the purpose of trapping and capturing the law breakers in the execution of
their criminal plan. In instigation, on the other hand, the instigator practically induces the would be defendant into the
commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. Entrapment is no bar to prosecution and conviction, while in
instigation, the defendant would have to be acquitted. (People vs. John Guiagui, April 25, 1990.)
The accused and his companion had a ready supply of marijuana for sale and disposition to anyone willing to pay the
price asked for the prohibited material. It appears that the crime of illegal possession of prohibited drugs had already been
committed by the accused when the NARCOM agents resolved to entrap them into revealing such possession and selling of
prohibited drugs. (People vs. Juan Sanchez, May 13, l989)
Accused Quintana was charged with violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act for having sold 100 grams of dried
marijuana leaves. Pat. Alcantara asked Quintanma to buy marijuana leaves for him. There is here a clear case of instigation.
Alcantara had admitted that he induced Quintana to buy marijuana leaves for him. What the court clearly sees is that Quintana
did not sell but was asked by Alcantara to buy marijuana leaves for him. (People vs. Quintana, June 30, l989)
People v. Dansico, 644, SCRA 151, February 23, 2011
On the basis of reports that the accused were engaged in peddling marijuana, the police organized a buy-bust operation against
the accused. The buy-bust team proceeded to the nipa hut owned by accused Dansico. The confidential informant informed
the accused that he wanted to buy P5,000.00 worth of marijuana. He handed the buy-bust money to the accused who left in a
motorcycle to get the marijuana. After three hours, more or less, the accused returned with a brick, allegedly marijuana,
wrapped in a newspaper. Accused Dansico gave it to the informant. At this point, he gave the pre-arranged signal. The team
immediately apprehended accused Dansico. Charged in court, the accused put up the defense of Instigation.
Issue: Whether or not the accused was instigated into selling marijuana.
Ruling: There was entrapment rather than instigation.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Instigation means luring the accused into a crime that he, otherwise, had no intention to commit, in order to prosecute him. On
the other hand, entrapment is the employment of ways and means in order to trap or capture a lawbreaker.
Instigation presupposes that the criminal intent to commit an offense originated from the inducer and not the accused who had
no intention to commit the crime and would not have committed it were it not for the initiatives by the inducer. In entrapment,
the criminal intent or design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused; the law enforcement officials
merely facilitate the apprehension of the criminal by employing ruses and schemes.
In instigation, the law enforcers act as active co-principals. Instigation leads to the acquittal of the accused, while entrapment
does not bar prosecution and conviction.
To determine whether there is instigation or entrapment, the conduct of the apprehending officers and the predisposition of
the accused to commit the crime must be examined
Buy-bust operations demands that the details of the purported transaction must be clearly and adequately shown. This must
start from the (1) initial contact between the poseur-buyer and the pusher, (2) the offer to purchase, the promise or payment of
the consideration (3) until the consummation of the sale by the delivery of the illegal drug subject of the sale. If there is
overwhelming evidence of habitual delinquency, recidivism or plain criminal proclivity, then this must also be considered.
Courts should look at all factors to determine the predisposition of an accused to commit an offense in so far as they are
relevant to determine the validity of the defense of inducement.
2. In attempted felony and the accused desisted spontaneously, please see discussion on execution of offenses.
3. Accessorial acts of those who are such with respect to their SAD-BSR, except accessory no. 1
4. Certain relatives in the crimes of TEM
C. MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Lack of essential elements to justify or exempt from criminal liability
a. Incomplete Defense of Relatives
a.1. please read People vs. Luis Toring, et al, October 26, l990, discussed in the defense of relatives.
b. Incomplete performance of duty; Injury is not the consequence of the due performance of duty
please refer to our discussion under performance of duty
1. Mamangun vs. People, 514 SCRA 44 , February 2, 2007
2. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331, March 24, 2006
3. Lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed- praeter intentionem
1. Misappropriation by a public officer of public funds because he was impelled by the genuine love for his brother
and his family as he used the money in buying medicines for his sick brother , there was no intention to commit so grave a
wrong. (Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532, February 12, 2008)
2. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was Lingan who provoked him shows that he
had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, the mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong as that
committed should be taken into account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro (Navarro vs.
Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153, August 26, 1999.
3. People v. Maglian 646 SCRA 770, March 30, 2011
Maglian and Mary Jay, husband and wife, were having dinner at their home in Dasmariñas, Cavite when they got into
a fight. Maglian did not want Mary Jay to attend a party. Incensed, Maglian collected the clothes of and told her he would
burn them all and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary tried to wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at the same
time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife's plea, Maglian still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes
and his wife on fire. The wife died soon thereafter.
The accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely accidental. To spite her, he took the clothes
that she had given him and told her he would burn them all. He then got a match and a gallon of kerosene. Mary Jay caught up
with him at the dirty kitchen and took the match and kerosene from him. In the process, they both got wet from the spilled
kerosene.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Issue: (1) Whether or not the accused had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed.
Ruling:
The Revised Penal Code provides under Article 13(3) the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed.
This mitigating circumstance addresses itself to the intention of the offender at the particular moment when the offender
executes or commits the criminal act. This mitigating circumstance is obtaining when there is a notable disparity between the
means employed by the accused to commit a wrong and the resulting crime committed. The intention of the accused at the
time of the commission of the crime is manifested from the weapon used, the mode of attack employed and the injury
sustained by the victim.
It is extremely far-fetched that accused-appellant could accidentally pour kerosene on his wife and likewise
accidentally light her up and cause third degree burns to 90% of her body. The accused-appellant knew the fatal injuries that he
could cause when he poured kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to ignite a fire. There was no disparity between the
means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to the mitigating
circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.
4. Provocation
1. The victim told to accused: “Vulva of your mother, if you are talking as if you have no debts, not like me, I have
no debts” The accused should be entitled to the mitigating circumstance of provocation (or vindication of a grave offense or
passion or obfuscation. (People vs. Agapinay, June 27, l990)
2. When the victim challenged the policeman to a fight; that the policeman is only brave because of his gun, these
remarks which immediately preceded the act of the accused constituted sufficient provocation. Provocation is defined to be any
unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone. The provocation
must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a person to commit
the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party
and the commission of the crime by the accused. (Navarro vs. Court of Appeals, 313 SCRA 153, August 26, 1999)
5. Vindication of grave offense
1. The remarks of the victim that he would eat not until someone is killed and that he went to the house of the accused
not to eat but to have somebody killed are considered grave offense to the accused. Thus the mitigating circumstance of having
acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offense was, likewise, properly appreciated. Petitioner was humiliated in
front of his guests and kin in his own house. It is settled, however, that the mitigating circumstance of sufficient
provocation cannot be considered apart from the circumstance of vindication of a grave offense. These two circumstances
arose from one and the same incident so that they should be considered as only one mitigating circumstance. (Pelonia vs.
People, 521 SCRA 207, April 13, 2007)
2. When the accused learned that his father was mauled, accused took a sleep and when he went to the store to buy
cigarets he met the victim and killed him, a sufficient interval of time had elapsed for appellant to attain a cool composure.
There can be no immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. (People
vs. Sambulan, 289 SCRA 500, April 24, 1998)
3. The brother of the accused was mauled at 11:30 a.m. by the accused. The killing took place after the lapse of 10
hours.Held: The lapse of 10 hours between the mauling incident and the killing was more than sufficient to enable the accused
to recover his serenity. Hence, vindication of a grave offense cannot be appreciated in favor of the accused. (People vs.
Pajeres, 210 SCRA 237)
4. The word “immediate” in the English text is not the correct translation of the controlling Spanish text of the
Revised Penal Code, which uses the word “proxima.” The Spanish text, on this point, allows a lapse of time between the grave
offense and the actual vindication. But the lapse of two (2) weeks between his discovery of his wife’s infidelity and the killing
of her supposed paramour could no longer be considered proximate. The passage of a fortnight is more than sufficient time for
appellant to have recovered his composure and assuaged the unease in his mind. The established rule is that there can be no
immediate vindication of a grave offense when the accused had sufficient time to recover his serenity. (People vs. Ignas,
September 30, 2003)
5. The offense committed on Edzel was "hitting" his ear with a stick (according to Jesus), a bamboo pole (according to
Edzel). By Edzel's own clarification, "[he] was hit at [his] ear, not on [his] head." That act would certainly not be classified as
"grave offense (People vs. Bacabac, September 11, 2007)
6. Passion or obfuscation
1. After being informed that he would find his wife together with her alleged paramour in a certain house, accused
went there. He saw his wife sleeping with another man (but not in actual sexual intercourse). He killed both of them. Held:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The stabbing incident happened because accused acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion or
obfuscation.( People vs. Cabalhin, 231 SCRA 486)
2. There can no passion and obfuscation where more than five (5) hours had elapsed between the discovery of his
wife’s unfaithfulness and the killing of his wife. The accused had enough time to reflect and gain control of his self. (People
vs. Sicat, 213 SCRA 603)
3. Obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally result from a quarrel or
fight should not be confused with the sentiment of person injured to such a degree as to deprive him of his self control. People
vs. Bautista, March 12, 1996, 254 SCRA 621
4. Passion cannot co-exist with treachery because in passion, the offender loses his control and reason while in
treachery the means employed are consciously adopted. One who loses his reason and self control could not deliberately
employ particular means, method or form of attack in the execution of the crime. (People vs. Germina, May 19, l998, 290
SCRA 146)
7. Voluntary surrender
1. The mere filing of an information and/or the issuance of a warrant of arrest will not automatically make the
surrender "involuntary." In People v. Oco, the Court appreciated the mitigating circumstance because immediately upon
learning that a warrant for his arrest was issued, and without the same having been served on him, the accused surrendered to
the police. Thus, it is clear that notwithstanding the pendency of a warrant for his arrest, the accused may still be entitled to the
mitigating circumstance in case he surrenders, depending on the actual facts surrounding the very act of giving himself up. (De
Vera vs. De Vera, April 7, 2009; People vs. Sion, August 11, l997, 277 SCRA 127)
2 Surrender to a Barangay Kagawad is surrender to the authorities within the contemplation of the law. Under Section
388 of the Local Government Code of 1991, Punong Barangay, Sangguniang Barangay members and members of the Lupong
Tagapamayapa shall deemed persons in authority in their jurisdiction. (People vs. Sion, August 11, l997, 277 SCRA 127)
3 The law does not require that the perpetrator must give himself up to the authorities in the municipality where the
offense was committed. (People vs. Magallanes, July 8, l997)
4 If the only reason for the supposed surrender is to ensure the safety of the accused whose arrest is inevitable, the
surrender is not spontaneous and hence not voluntary. Denying to the police any personal knowledge of the crime is not a mark
of voluntary surrender. (People vs. Pinca, 318 SCRA 270, November 17, 1999; People vs. Camahalan, et al., 241 SCRA 558;
People vs. Ablao, March 26, l990)
5 To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: 1. that the offender had not been actually arrested.
2. that the offender surrender himself to a person in authority or his agent. 3. that the surrender was voluntary. The
“surrender” by the appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were, indeed, asked to surrender by the
police but they refused until only much later when they knew they were completely surrounded and there was no chance of
escape. Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated more by an intent to insure their safety. (People vs. Salvilla,
supra, see notes under consummated felony)
6 The fact that the accused went to the police station to report the stabbing of his wife, not by him but by Buaco, does
not constitute voluntary surrender. (People vs. Trigo, 194 SCRA)
7 The fact that Valero yielded when he was apprehended did not operate to mitigate the penalty because mere non-
resistance to arrest is not considered voluntary surrender. (People vs. Carmina, 193 SCRA 429)
8. Plea of guilt
Although the confession was qualified and introduction of evidence became necessary, the qualification did not deny
the accused’s guilt and what is more, was subsequently fully justified. It was not the defendant fault that aggravating
circumstances were erroneously alleged in the information and mitigating circumstances omitted therefrom. If such
qualification could deprive the accused of the benefit of plea of guilty, then the prosecution could nullify this mitigating
circumstance by counteracting it with unfounded allegations of aggravating circumstances. (People vs. Magallanes, July 8,
l997)
9. Illness as would diminish the exercise of will power
9.1. People vs. Genosa discussed in the topic of BWS
D. AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Qualifying and aggravating must be alleged in the information.
1. People vs. Buayaban, 400 SCRA 48

Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
2. Belongbilot vs. RTC Zamboanga del Norte, 402 SCRA 221
3. People vs. de Castro 403 SCRA 543
4. People vs. de la Cruz, 406 SCRA 439
5. People vs. Vallejo, 416 SCRA 193
6. People vs. Otayde, 416 SCRA 597
1. taking advantage of public position
People vs. Ordiales, 42 SCRA 238

November 23, 1971
For abuse of public position to be appreciated, it is not only necessary that the person committing the crime be a public official,
he must also use the influence, prestige or ascendancy which such office gives him as a means by which he realized his
purpose. The essence of the matter is presented in the inquiry: “Did the accused abuse his office in order to commit the crime?
Sazon vs. Sandiganbayan, February 10, 2009
The accused abused her public position. The fact that petitioner was Senior Forest Management Specialist of the DENR
situated her in a position to perpetrate the offense. It was on account of petitioner’s authority that the complainants believed
that they could be prosecuted and the subject logs confiscated unless they gave her what she wanted. Consequently, we find
that a modification of the penalty imposed by the Sandiganbayan is in order.
2. contempt/insult to public authority
People vs. Tacan, 182 SCRA 601
A teacher is not a public authority within the purview of Art. 14 par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code. While the last paragraph of
Art. 152 will show that a teacher is deemed a person in authority, such teacher is so deemed only for purposes of application of
Articles 148 and 151. In marked contrast, the first paragraph of Article 152 does not identify specific articles of the Revised
Penal Code for the application of the same. Besides a penal statute is not to be given a broader scope, therefore a teacher may
not be regarded as a public authority within the meaning of par. 2, Art. 14, RPC.
3. Disregard of respect due to offended party, etc
People vs. Ablao, March 26, 1990
Accused killed the barangay captain who was then the President of the ABC of Lumban, Laguna. The aggraving circumstance
of disregard or insult of rank was present. The fact that the accused shot the victim while still in the session hall immediately
after the meeting and with other members of the Sanggunian members still around indubitably prove that the appellant
deliberately intended to disregard or insult his rank.
People vs. Collado, 196 SCRA 519
Disregard of respect due to the offended party is not proper to consider in robbery with homicide. This crime is primarily a
crime against property. Homicide is a mere incident of the robbery, the latter being the main purpose and object of the
criminal.
4. Dwelling
People vs. Badilla, May 21, 1990
Dwelling is an aggravating circumstance even though the victim was not the owner of the house where the crime was
committed. Dwelling may mean temporary dwelling.
People vs. Uycoque, 246 SCRA 769
Dwelling is still aggravating when the victim was resting in the comfort of his home when the accused forcibly let him out of
his house and shortly before he was shot to death. An act performed cannot be divided when the offender began the aggression
in the dwelling of the offended party and ended it in the street.
5. Nighttime
People vs. Palon, February 20, 1984, G.R. No. L-33271
There are two tests of nocturnity as an aggravating circumstance. Objective test under which nocturnity is aggravating because
it facilitates the commission of the crime. Subjective test under which nocturnity is aggravating because it was purposely
sought by the offender. The two are to be applied in the alternative.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
6. Uninhabited place
People vs. Desalisa, 229 SCRA 35
The aggravating circumstance of uninhabited place was present. The uninhabitedness of a place is determined not by the
distance of the nearest house to the scene of the crime but whether or not in the place of commission, there was reasonable
possibility of the victim receiving some help. Considering that the killing was done during nighttime and many fruit trees and
shrubs obstruct the view of neighbors and passersby, there was no reasonable possibility for the victim to receive any
assistance.
7. Band
7.1. People vs. Manlolo, 169 SCRA 394- stone is an arm
8. Recidivism
9. Reiteracion
See discussion on the topic of multiple offenders (under Felonies)
10. ignominy- produces moral suffering; offended party was humiliated or put to shame because of the commission of
the crime.
10. 1. offender raped the offended party in the presence of her husband (US vs. Iglesia 21 Phil. 55.
10.2. People vs. Fernandez, March 22, 199, plastering mud on the victim’s vagina right after she was raped.
The following are also qualifying circumstances which will be discussed in Article 248
E. ALTERNATIVE CIRCUMSTANCES
1. Intoxication
1. People vs. Cudal October 31, 2006
Intoxication, not habitual or intentional, is mitigating
Absent any showing then that the offender’s intoxication was habitual or intentional, it may only be considered as mitigating to
correctly call for the imposition of the penalty of reclusion perpetua, in accordance with Article 63, paragraph 2(3) of the
Revised Penal Code.
When a person considered intoxicated?
1. People vs Mondigo, January 31, 2008
Intoxication as mitigating circumstance was not proven. To be considered mitigating, there must be showing that the
accused’s drunkenness affected his mental faculties. The evidence shows that at the time of attacked, accused drank “about
3 to 4 bottles of beer.” The low alcohol content of beer, the quantity of such liquor accused imbibed, and the absence of any
independent proof that accused’s alcohol intake affected his mental faculties all negate the finding that appellant was
intoxicated enough at the time he committed the crimes to mitigate his liability.
2. Licyayo vs. People, March 4, 2008
For intoxication to be considered as a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that the intoxication impaired the willpower of
the accused and that he did not know what he was doing or could not comprehend the wrongfulness of his acts. The person
pleading intoxication must prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the commission of the crime, as
would blur his reason. There is no plausible evidence showing that the quantity of liquor taken by accsued was of such quantity
as to affect his mental faculties. Accused cannot avail himself of the mitigating circumstance of intoxication merely on the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses that he was drunk during the incident. Such testimonies do not warrant a conclusion
that the degree of petitioner’s intoxication had affected his faculties. There must be convincing proof of the nature and effect
of his intoxication which petitioner failed to adduce in the present case.
2. Relationship
People vs. Capareda

May 27, 2004
Jocelyn, together with her minor daughter Rizalyn, resided in the two-storey house of her parents, the spouses Cariño and
Victorina. Carino had a sister (Anita) who is married for the second time to Emiliano, accused herein. Emiliano therefore is the
step grandfather of Rizalyn. While Rizalyn was studying her lessons, the accused entered Rizalyn’s room and raped her. Held:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The alternative aggravating circumstance of relationship under Article 15 of the Revised Penal Code cannot be considered in
the instant case considering that the relationship between a step-grandniece and her step-grandfather is not one of the
relatives specifically enumerated therein.
F. Provisions of Special Penal Laws affecting criminal liability:
I. P.D. 1866 as amended by RA 8294
If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance
II. R.A. 9162, or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002,
1. Use of dangerous drugs is a qualifying aggravating circumstance. Under Section 25 of R.A. 9162, or the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, a positive finding for the use of dangerous drugs is a qualifying aggravating
circumstance in the commission of a crime by the offender, and the application of the penalty provided for in the Revised Penal
Code shall be applicable.
2. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment (Articles 33 and 34)

Section 33. Immunity from Prosecution and Punishment. – Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 17, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the provisions of Republic Act No. 6981 or the Witness Protection, Security and
Benefit Act of 1991, any person who has violated Sections 7, 11, 12, 14, 15, and 19, Article II of this Act, who voluntarily
gives information about any violation of Sections 4, 5, 6, 8, 10, 13, and 16, Article II of this Act as well as any violation of the
offenses mentioned if committed by a drug syndicate, or any information leading to the whereabouts, identities and arrest of all
or any of the members thereof; and who willingly testifies against such persons as described above, shall be exempted from
prosecution or punishment for the offense with reference to which his/her information of testimony were given, and may plead
or prove the giving of such information and testimony in bar of such prosecution: Provided, That the following conditions
concur:
(1) The information and testimony are necessary for the conviction of the persons described above;
(2) Such information and testimony are not yet in the possession of the State;
(3) Such information and testimony can be corroborated on its material points;
(4) the informant or witness has not been previously convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude, except when
there is no other direct evidence available for the State other than the information and testimony of said informant or
witness; and
(5) The informant or witness shall strictly and faithfully comply without delay, any condition or undertaking, reduced
into writing, lawfully imposed by the State as further consideration for the grant of immunity from prosecution and
punishment.
Provided, further, That this immunity may be enjoyed by such informant or witness who does not appear to be most guilty for
the offense with reference to which his/her information or testimony were given: Provided, finally, That there is no direct
evidence available for the State except for the information and testimony of the said informant or witness.
Section 34. Termination of the Grant of Immunity. – The immunity granted to the informant or witness, as prescribed in
Section 33 of this Act, shall not attach should it turn out subsequently that the information and/or testimony is false, malicious
or made only for the purpose of harassing, molesting or in any way prejudicing the persons described in the preceding Section
against whom such information or testimony is directed against. In such case, the informant or witness shall be subject to
prosecution and the enjoyment of all rights and benefits previously accorded him under this Act or any other law, decree or
order shall be deemed terminated.
In case an informant or witness under this Act fails or refuses to testify without just cause, and when lawfully obliged to do so,
or should he/she violate any condition accompanying such immunity as provided above, his/her immunity shall be removed
and he/she shall likewise be subject to contempt and/or criminal prosecution, as the case may be, and the enjoyment of all
rights and benefits previously accorded him under this Act or in any other law, decree or order shall be deemed terminated.
In case the informant or witness referred to under this Act falls under the applicability of this Section hereof, such individual
cannot avail of the provisions under Article VIII of this Act.
3. Minors (Articles 66, 67. 68, 69, 70)
Section 66. Suspension of Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – An accused who is over fifteen (15) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense mentioned in Section 11 of this Act, but not more than eighteen (18) years of age at the
time when judgment should have been promulgated after having been found guilty of said offense, may be given the benefits of
a suspended sentence, subject to the following conditions:
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
(a) He/she has not been previously convicted of violating any provision of this Act, or of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended; or of the Revised Penal Code; or of any special penal laws;
(b) He/she has not been previously committed to a Center or to the care of a DOH-accredited physician; and
(c) The Board favorably recommends that his/her sentence be suspended.
While under suspended sentence, he/she shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board, under such
conditions that the court may impose for a period ranging from six (6) months to eighteen (18) months.
Upon recommendation of the Board, the court may commit the accused under suspended sentence to a Center, or to the care of
a DOH-accredited physician for at least six (6) months, with after-care and follow-up program for not more than eighteen (18)
months.
In the case of minors under fifteen (15) years of age at the time of the commission of any offense penalized under this Act,
Article 192 of Presidential Decree No. 603, otherwise known as the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 1179 shall apply, without prejudice to the application of the provisions of this Section.
Section 67. Discharge After Compliance with Conditions of Suspended Sentence of a First-Time Minor Offender. – If the
accused first time minor offender under suspended sentence complies with the applicable rules and regulations of the Board,
including confinement in a Center, the court, upon a favorable recommendation of the Board for the final discharge of the
accused, shall discharge the accused and dismiss all proceedings.
Upon the dismissal of the proceedings against the accused, the court shall enter an order to expunge all official records, other
than the confidential record to be retained by the DOJ relating to the case. Such an order, which shall be kept confidential, shall
restore the accused to his/her status prior to the case. He/she shall not be held thereafter to be guilty of perjury or of
concealment or misrepresentation by reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or recite any fact related thereto in
response to any inquiry made of him for any purpose.
Section 68. Privilege of Suspended Sentence to be Availed of Only Once by a First-Time Minor Offender. – The privilege of
suspended sentence shall be availed of only once by an accused drug dependent who is a first-time offender over fifteen (15)
years of age at the time of the commission of the violation of Section 15 of this Act but not more than eighteen (18) years of
age at the time when judgment should have been promulgated.
Section 69. Promulgation of Sentence for First-Time Minor Offender. – If the accused first-time minor offender violates any of
the conditions of his/her suspended sentence, the applicable rules and regulations of the Board exercising supervision and
rehabilitative surveillance over him, including the rules and regulations of the Center should confinement be required, the court
shall pronounce judgment of conviction and he/she shall serve sentence as any other convicted person.
Section 70. Probation or Community Service for a First-Time Minor Offender in Lieu of Imprisonment. – Upon promulgation
of the sentence, the court may, in its discretion, place the accused under probation, even if the sentence provided under this Act
is higher than that provided under existing law on probation, or impose community service in lieu of imprisonment. In case of
probation, the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance shall be undertaken by the Board through the DOH in coordination
with the Board of Pardons and Parole and the Probation Administration. Upon compliance with the conditions of the probation,
the Board shall submit a written report to the court recommending termination of probation and a final discharge of the
probationer, whereupon the court shall issue such an order.
The community service shall be complied with under conditions, time and place as may be determined by the court in its
discretion and upon the recommendation of the Board and shall apply only to violators of Section 15 of this Act. The
completion of the community service shall be under the supervision and rehabilitative surveillance of the Board during the
period required by the court. Thereafter, the Board shall render a report on the manner of compliance of said community
service. The court in its discretion may require extension of the community service or order a final discharge.
In both cases, the judicial records shall be covered by the provisions of Sections 60 and 64 of this Act.
If the sentence promulgated by the court requires imprisonment, the period spent in the Center by the accused during the
suspended sentence period shall be deducted from the sentence to be served.
4. Limited application of the Revised Penal Code (Article 98)
Section 98. Limited Applicability of the Revised Penal Code. – Notwithstanding any law, rule or regulation to the contrary, the
provisions of the Revised Penal Code (Act No. 3814), as amended, shall not apply to the provisions of this Act, except in the
case of minor offenders. Where the offender is a minor, the penalty for acts punishable by life imprisonment to death provided
herein shall be reclusion perpetua to death.
II. RA 10591 “Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act” (May 29,
2013)
Question: Is illegal possession of firearm a crime or merely an aggravating circumstance?
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Answer: It is either a crime or an aggravating circumstance but it cannot be both. If the crime is committed by the person
without using the loose firearm, the violation of the law shall be considered as a distinct and separate offense.
Question: What is the effect of the use of loose firearm in the commission of the crime?
Answer: As a general rule, the use of a loose firearm, when inherent in the commission of a crime punishable under the RPC or
other special laws, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. This means the offender cannot be charged separately
for illegal possession of firearm.
Question: What if the maximum penalty for the crime committed with the use of firearm is lower than that prescribed for
illegal possession of firearm, what penalty shall be imposed upon the culprit?
Answer: The penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of the penalty for the crime.
Question: Suppose the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized by the law with a maximum penalty which
is equal to that imposed for illegal possession of firearms, what penalty shall be imposed upon the culprit?
Answer: The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period shall be imposed in addition to the penalty for the crime
punishable under the RPC or other special laws of which he is found guilty.
Question: What is the effect if the violation of RA 10591 is in furtherance of, or incident to, or in connection with the crime of
rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat?
Answer: Such violation shall be absorbed as an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat..
IX. PENALTIES
1. RA 9346-An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines
2. Protective Theory of Punishment, see Magno vs. Court of Appeals, June 26, 1992.
3. Art. 21- No felony shall be punished by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission.
This simply enunciates the general principle on non retroactivity of a penal statute. It ordains that a penal law cannot
be applied to any act that was not punishable by law prior to its commission.
Exception:
Article 22 which says that penal laws shall have retroactive effect in so far as they favor the accused. The benefit
extends even if a final judgment has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
Exception does not apply:
a. In case the accused is a habitual delinquent under Rule 5, Art. 62, RPC
b. In case the law expressly provides that offenses committed prior to the enactment of the law shall be
governed by the laws in force at the time of the commission of the felony( Criminal Law, Kapunan, et al,
1990 Edition page 191 citing People vs. Moran, 44 Phil. 387; Tavera vs. Valdez, 1 Phil. 468)
b.1. Imelda Marcos vs. Court of Appeals, Sept. 5, 1997, 278 SCRA 843
Issue: Whether or not the amendatory CB Circulars could benefit Mrs. Marcos, et al.
Ruling: Such amendments and saving clauses are valid and were authorized enactments under a delegated power of
the Monetary Board. Section 14 of the Central Bank Act expressly grants the MB the power to prepare and issue
rules and regulations for the effective discharge of the responsibilities and exercise of the powers assigned to the MB
and to the CB.
Administrative bodies have the authority to issue administrative regulations which are penal in nature where the law
itself makes the violation of the administrative regulation punishable and provides for its penalty. The Central Bank
Act defined the offense and its penalty while the questioned circular merely spelled the details of the offense.
4 Pardon- its effects:
i. Pardon by the private offended party (Article 23)
a. does not extinguish criminal action. The reason for this is that in criminal cases the real offended party is the
People of the Philippines and the injured person is only the complaining witness.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
N.B. There are two situations where the pardon by the private offended party shall extinguish the criminal
actions. These are:
1. Under Art. 344
1.1. Pardon by the offended spouse in the crime of adultery and concubinage
1.2. Pardon by the offended party in the case of seduction, acts of lasciviousness and abduction
1.3. Marriage of the offender with the offended party
2. Light offenses- compromised under the Barangay Katarungan Law
2.1 People vs. Caruncho, G.R. No. 57804, Jan. 23, 1984
2.2. Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1-
b. but civil liability to the injured party is extinguished by his express waiver.
ii. Pardon by the Chief Executive (Art. 36)
a. extinguish criminal liability (see Art. 89 (4)

b. does not exempt culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
c. does not restore culprit’s right to hold public office or the right of suffrage, unless such rights are expressly
restored by the terms of the sentence.
But if pardon is granted after the culprit has served his sentence, then the pardon restores his
political rights. (Pelobello vs. Palatino, G.R. No. 48100, June 30, 1941 IX Lawyers Journal 438; 72 Phil
441:Pendon vs. Diasnes, 79 Phil. 441)
5. Measures of prevention or safety which are not considered penalties (Art. 24)
1. arrest and temporary detention as well as detention by reason of insanity or imbecility or illness requiring
their confinement in a hospital.
2. commitment of a minor to any welfare institutions
3. suspension from employment or public office during the trial or in order to institute proceedings.
Gonzaga vs. Sandiganbayan, September 6, 1991. Under Section 13 of RA 3091, suspension of a public
officer upon the filing of a valid information is mandatory. The petitioner questioned the
constitutionality of said provision as it violates his right to be presumed innocent. The Supreme Court
ruled that preventivesuspension is not a penalty. Article 24 of the RPC is very clear on this. A person
under preventive suspension remains entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence as his
culpability must still be established.
See also Bayot vs. Sandiganbayan, 128 SCRA 348
4. fines and other corrective measures that superior officials may impose upon their subordinates
5. deprivation of rights and reparations which civil law may establish in penal form.
6. Period of preventive imprisonment deducted from term of imprisonment (Art. 29)
Question: What benefits are accorded to offenders who had undergone preventive imprisonment?
Answer: Offenders who have undergone preventive imprisonment are entitled to deductions from their term of imprisonment.
They are entitled either to the full credit or four fifths of the time they have undergone preventive imprisonment (Article 29 of
the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 10592, May 29, 2013)
Question: When is an offender entitled to the full credit of his preventive imprisonment?
Answer: When the offender agrees voluntarily in writing after being informed of the effects thereof and with the assistance of
counsel to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, the actual time he had undergone preventive
imprisonment plus good conduct allowances shall be deducted from the term of his imprisonment. However, if the offender is a
recidivist or has been convicted previously twice or more crimes or when upon being summoned for the execution of his
sentence, he failed to surrender voluntarily, he is not entitled to a full deduction. (Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as
amended by RA 10592, May 29, 2013)
Question: When is an offender entitled only to four fifths of his preventive imprisonement?
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Answer: If the offender does not agree to abide by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, which he
shall do so in writing with the assistance of a counsel. (Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 10592, May
29, 2013)
Problem: Saturnino was charged with the crime of theft of property valued at P200. Saturnino has no money to put up his bail
bond. So, he was detained at the city jail. He has been in jail for two years and four months. If you are the pro bono lawyer of
Saturnino, what action will you take? Explain.
Answer: If I were the counsel of Saturnino, I will file a motion for his release. Under the law whenever an offender has
undergone preventive imprisonment for a period equal to the possible maximum imprisonment of the offense charged and is
case is not yet terminated, he shall be released immediately without prejudice to the continuation of the trial thereof or the
proceeding on appeal, if the same is under review. The computation of the preventive imprisonment shall be the actual period
of detention with good conduct allowance. However, this benefit shall not apply to recidivists, habitual delinquents, escapees
and persons charged with heinous crimes. (Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by RA 10592, May 29, 2013)
Question: Suppose the offender who is undergoing preventive imprisonment has committed a crime the maximum penalty of
which is destierro, when shall he be released? Explain.
Answer: He shall be released after thirty (30) days of preventive imprisonment.
7. Reclusion perpetua not the same with life imprisonment
People vs. Alvarez, September 9, l991
8. No medium period of reclusion perpetua
People vs. Benitez, October 4, l991
9. Reclusion perpetua imposed regardless of mitigating
People vs. Orita, April 3, l990
10. Reclusion perpetua is still indivisible despite having fixed duration.
People vs. Zulla, 323 SCRA 589, January 28, 2000
Ruling:
After deliberating on the motion and re-examining the legislative history of RA 7659, the Court concludes that although
Section 17 of the law has fixed the duration of reclusion perpetua from 20 years and 1 day to 40 years, there was no clear
legislative intent to alter its original classification as an indivisible penalty. It shall then remain as an indivisible penalty (This
abandons People vs. Lucas, 232 SCRA 537, 1994)
11. Minority privileged, lower penalty
People vs. Galang, June 29, l989
The accused being a minor is entitled to the privilege mitigating circumstance under Article 68. This despite the fact that the
penalty that may be imposed upon is reclusion perpetua.
Article 68 is an exception or limitation of the first paragraph of Article 63 because first, the said paragraph of Article 63 is a
general rule, secondly Article 68 follows or comes after and thirdly Article 68 is favorable to the accused. All these grounds
are sanctioned by well known rules of statutory construction.
12. Problem: Since Republic Act No. 9346 prohibits the imposition of the penalty of death, what penalty should be imposed
upon a minor who committed rape against a five year old baby?
Answer: Considering that the victim was only five (5) years old at the time the offender defiled her, the law prescribing the
death penalty when rape is committed against a child below seven (7) years old applies. But the offender is entitled to a penalty
one degree lower than that prescribed by law, pursuant to Article 68 of the Revised Penal Code besides Republic Act No. 9346
prohibits the imposition of the penalty of death. However, for purposes of determining the proper penalty because of the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority, the penalty of death is still the penalty to be reckoned with. (People v. Jacinto,
645, SCRA 590, March 16, 2011)
13. A fine x x x shall be considered a correctional penalty if it does not exceed P6,000.00 but is not less than P200.00 (Article
26) Compare with Art. 9, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor
or a fine not exceeding P200 or both is provided.
If the fine is exactly P200.00. It is a light felony but a correctional penalty.

Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
13. Subsidiary penalty (Article 39)
Question: What is subsidiary penalty?
Answer: A subsidiary penalty is an additional penalty of imprisonment that may be imposed by the court in case the convict is
insolvent to pay the fine imposed by the court. It should be expressly imposed by the court in the judgment of conviction. If it
is not imposed expressly, the convict can not be made to suffer an additional penalty. But subsidiary penalty can be imposed by
the judge in case the penalty, aside from fine, is prision correctional or less. If the penalty is prision mayor or more, it is not
proper to impose it. Subsidiary penalty shall not relieve the convict from paying the fine in case his financial condition
improves. It is not an imprisonment for non-payment of debt. This constitutional right applies only to debt ex contractu and
not to debt imposed by law.
Question: How is subsidiary imprisonment computed?
Answer: It is computed at one day for each amount equivalent to the highest minimum wage rate prevailing in the Philippines
at the time of the rendition of the judgment of conviction. In case the principal penalty is prision correctional or arresto and
fine, the subsidiary penalty shall not exceed 1/3 of the term of the sentence or one year whichever is lower. In case the
principal penalty is fine only, the subsidiary imprisonment should not exceed six (6) months if the culprit shall have been
prosecuted for a grave or less grave felony or shall not exceed fifteen (15) days if the culprit shall have been prosecuted for a
light felony. (Article 39 of the Revised Penal Code as amended by R.A. 10159)
14. Accessory penalty (Arts. 73, 40 to 45, 30 to 34)
a. Article 73: whenever a penalty is imposed it is understood that accessory penalties are also imposed
b. illustration
ARTICLE PENALTY ACCESSORY EFFECTS
40 Death Perpetual Abs. Disq. 30
Civil Interdiction 34
41 Recl. Perpetua Perpetual Abs. Disq. 30
Recl. Temporal Civil interdiction 34
42 Prision Mayor Tem’ry Abs. Disq. 30
Perpetual Sp. Disq. 32
From the right of
suffrage
43 Prision Corr Susp’sion from p.o., 33
right to follow prof, 33
or calling
perp. Sp disq. from the 32
right of suffrage
if duration exceed 18
mos.
44 Arresto Suspension from the 33
right hold office and the
right of suffrage during
term of sentence.
c. Article 45, confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime
1. in favor of the government

2. return to owner if property of innocent third persons.
3. not subject to lawful commerce-destroy
15. Penalty upon principals, accomplices accessories, consumated, frustrated & attempted. (Arts. 46, 50 to 57)
a. Art. 46, penalty prescribed by law –principals and applicable to consumated felony.
b. illustration
PRINCIPAL ACCOMPLICE ACCESSORY
CONSUMATED 46 1 2
FRUSTRATED 1 2 3
ATTEMPTED 2 3 4
16. EFFECTS OF THE ATTENDANCE OF MITIGATING OR AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES (ART. 62)
1. Aggravating which in themselves constitute a crime.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
2. Aggravating which are included by law in defining crime.
note: 1. advantage of public position- maximum penalty regardless of mitigating

2. also if committed by syndicate, two or more persons collaborating
3. Inherent aggravating circumstances
4. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from (MPP) the moral attributes of the offender, or from his private
relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of the
principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.
17. IMPOSITION OF SENTENCE: INDETERMINATE SENTENCE
1. Indeterminate sentence, mandatory

2. It consists of a maximum and minimum term
3. Maximum term shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the
rules of the RPC ( see rules under Articles 64 and 65)
4. Minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the RPC.
5. Purpose- to uplift and redeem valuable human material and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
personal liberty and economic usefulness.
6. Instances where IS shall not be imposed:
1. To persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment.
2. To those whose maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year.
3. To those convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason, misprision of treason, rebellion, sedition
or espionage.
4. Habitual delinquents
5. Those who escaped from confinement or evaded sentence.
6. Those who were granted conditional pardon, shall violate the terms thereof.
18. SERVICE OF SENTENCE (ART. 70)
1. Simultaneous, if the nature of the penalties will permit

2. Otherwise, successive
3. Arresto menor to be served ahead of destierro (7 & 8)
4. Threefold rule— sentence shall not be more than three fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the
penalties.
-But there must be at least 4 penalties.
5. Forty year rule-the maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.
19. PROBATION
i. Probation is not service of sentence, but suspension of service of sentence
Moreno vs. Comelec, 498 SCRA 547
Section 40 of the Local Government Code provides:
“Section 40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local positions:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude, or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more imprisonment, within two years after serving sentence.
Under letter (a), a person cannot run within two years after serving his sentence. This two year bar applies to both
convicted persons mentioned in letter (a). It applies to those who have been sentenced by final judgment for an offense
involving moral turpitude and also to those who have been sentenced for an offense punishable by one (1) year or more
imprisonment. This is so because “(T) he placing of the comma (,) in the provision means that the phrase “within two years
after serving sentence” modifies both parts of Sec. 40(a) of the Local Government Code.”
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Under the two-year bar rule, a person cannot run for public office within two years from service of sentence. What is
then the meaning of service of sentence? The phrase "service of sentence," understood in its general and common sense,
means the confinement of a convicted person in a penal facility for the period adjudged by the court.
Do we consider probation of sentence a service of sentence? The Answer is No. The period within which a person is under
probation cannot be equated with service of sentence. The order placing defendant on probation is not a sentence but is rather,
in effect, a suspension of the imposition of sentence; that the grant of probation to Moreno suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as well as the accessory penalties of suspension from public office and from the right to
follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage.
Two waiver rule:
1. Perfection of an appeal is a relinquishment of the alternative remedy of availing of the probation law, the purpose of which is
to prevent speculation or opportunism on the part of the accused who, although already eligible, did not at once apply for
probation, but did so only after failing in his appeal. (Moreno vs. Comelec, 498 SCRA 547, August 10, 2006)
Petitioner is no longer qualified to avail of probation. Section 4 of the Probation Law mandates that no application for
probation shall be entertained or granted if the defendant has perfected the appeal from the judgment of conviction. This is true
even if the appeal is taken solely to reduce the penalty. (Francisco vs. CA, et al, April 6, 1995)
Exception to the rule: In case the convict’s sentence was reduced by the appellate court making the new penalty
probationable.
Problem: At around 7:00 o’clock in the evening, Rufino went out to buy cigarettes at a nearby store. From nowhere, Arnel
sneaked behind and struck Rufino twice on the head with a huge stone, about 15 inches in diameter. Rufino fell unconscious as
Arnel fled. The RTC convicted Arnel with frustrated homicide as charged and sentenced him to suffer an imprisonment from
two years and one day of prision correctional, as minimum, to six years and one day of prision mayor, as maximum. Arnel
appealed to the Court of Appeals and later to the Supreme Court seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide
with the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. The Supreme Court found Arnel guilty only of attempted
homicide and sentenced him to suffer a penalty of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two years and four months of
prision correctional, as maximum. With this new penalty, is Arnel entitled to apply for probation upon remand of the case to
the trial court? Explain.
Answer. In Colinares vs. People, 662 SCRA 266, December 13, 2011, the Supreme Court En Banc answered this question in
the affirmative. With the new penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon remand of the case
to the lower court. To hold otherwise will make Arnel pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with the forfeiture of his
right to apply for probation. “Ang kabayo ang nagkasala, ang hagupit ay sa kalabao (the horse errs, the carabo gets the whip).”
The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no fault of his. “The underlying
philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent
interpretation of the statutory provisions.” “Besides, in a real sense, the Supreme Court finding that Arnel was guilty, not of
frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty.”
2. Filing of probation is a waiver of the right to appeal (Section 4 of the Probation law)
Exception:
YUSI vs. MORALES

April 28, 1983
May persons who apply for the benefits of the Probation Law withdraw their application during the period for filing an appeal
and ask that their appeal from the judgment of conviction be given due course?
Ruling: We find the strict and unyielding application of the "waiver rule" under the Probation Law unwarranted.
Under the factual circumstances of the instant case, the respondent court in granting the application for probation and denying
the prayer to withdraw, failed to take into account the fact that the petitioners' counsel of record was not present when the
petitioners applied for probation. True, they were represented by a counsel de oficio appointed by the court on the spot but the
counsel de oficio was not fully acquainted with their case. He could not have considered fully the strength of a possible appeal
when he advised them about the effects of the application for probation.
It is in the best interests of justice that the court should take the necessary steps to insure that the accused has been fully
apprised of the full import of his application before the court acts on it.
Qualifications/ Disqualifications
1. Multiple prison terms shall be taken separately, not added up, and so as long as any one of them does not exceed six
years, the applicant is qualified.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Multiple prison terms imposed against an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision are not, and should not be,
added up. And the sum of the multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should not be determinative of his eligibility
for, nay his disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law i.e. not more than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation. The number of
offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken separately, are within the probationable period. For Section 9,
par. (a) PD 968, as amended, uses the word maximum, not total, when it says that “[t]he benefits of this Decree shall not be
extended to those xxx sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years.” (Francisco vs. CA, et al,
April 6, 1995)
2. Applicant is not entitled to probation because she had displayed a devious and reprehensible character in trying to evade the
implementation of the execution against her thereby rendering the judgment against her ineffective. Her issuing subject fifty-
four (54) bouncing checks is a serious offense. To allow petitioner to be placed on probation would be to depreciate the
seriousness of her malefactions. (Santos vs. CA, 319 SCRA 609, December 2, 1999 but see Santos vs. Hon. E. Cruz Pano, Jan.
17, 1983
3. On “previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense...” the statute relates “previous” to the date of conviction, not
to the date of commission of the crime. So even if the applicant was convicted of five counts of crimes on the same day, he has
not been previously been convicted…., thus still qualified to avail of probation provided none of the sentences exceeds 5 years.
(Rura vs. Leopena, June 19, 1985)
Probation is not co-terminus with its period; order of final discharge necessary
(Bala vs. Martinez, 181 SCRA 459)
20. EXTINCTION OF CRIMINAL LIABILITY (Art. 89)
1. Effects of death on the:
i. Criminal Liability
ii. Pecuniary liability
People vs.. Badeo, et al., November 21, l991
Pecuniary penalties in Article 89 are extinguished if death of the convict occurs before final judgment. These
pecuniary penalties refers to fine and costs. They should be distinguished from pecuniary liabilities in Article 38 which
includes reparation and indemnity.
iii. On the civil liability arising from crime
People vs. Bayotas, 236 SCRA 239, September 2, 1994

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability
based solely thereon. As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates
his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil
liability ex delicto in senso strictiore."
2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be
predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates these other sources of
obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:
a) Law
b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts
d) . . .
e) Quasi-delicts
3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as
amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party
instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted
during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby
avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
2. PRESCRIPTION OF THE CRIME
i. from the discovery by the offended party, the authorities or their agents.
a. meaning of offended party- State as well as the private offended party.
GARCIA vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL 266 SCRA 678, January 27, l997
It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But it is entirely incorrect to state that only the State is the offended party in such
case, as well as in other public offenses and therefore only the State’s discovery of the crime could effectively commence the
running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that the period of prescription shall commence to
run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities or their agents. This rule makes no
distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the offended party, the
authorities or their agents.
Art. 91 does not define the term offended party. We find its definition in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as the
person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed.
“Section 12. Name of the offended party.- A complaint or information must state the name and surname of
the person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or
nickname by whish such person has been or is known, and if there is no better way of identifying him, he
must be described under a fictitious name.
More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party
to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that every person
criminally liable is also civilly liable. Invariably then, the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the
offended party.
This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court which reads:
“When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted
with a criminal action, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves right to institute it
separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
ii. In falsification involving sales/conveyances of real properties, the period of prescription starts to run from the
registration of the deed in the Register of Deeds (“constructive notice” rules applies)
People vs. Reyes, 175 SCRA 597
Facts: Spouses Julio Rizare and Patricia Pampo owned a parcel of land located at Lipa City registered in their names.
In June l983, complainant discovered from the records of the Register of Deeds of Lipa City that the above mentioned property
had already been transferred in the name of Mizpah. The conveyance was effected through a notarized deed of sale executed
and signed on May 19, l961. The signature of Patricia was falsified and that accused made an untruthful statement that she was
single although she was married to one Benfari Reyes on May 2, l950.
Issue: Whether or not the crime of falsification of public document has prescribed already at the time the complaint was filed.
Ruling: Yes. The application of the rule on constructive notice in the construction of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
would or certainly be favorable to the accused since the prescriptive period of the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier
i.e. from the time the notarized deed of sale was registered with the Register of Deeds.
In the instant case, the notarized deed of sale was registered on May 26, l961. The criminal information for falsification of
public document having been filed on October 18, l984, or more than 10 years from May 26, l961, the crime for which the
accused was charged has prescribed.
People vs. Villalon, et al, December 21, l990
Facts: The falsified document was a notarized special power of attorney registered with the Register of Deeds on February 13,
l964. The complainant discovered the falsification in January 1972. The information for estafa through falsification of public
document was filed on March 21, l974.
Issue: Whether or not the crime has prescribed.
Ruling: The ten year prescriptive period should be counted from the date of the registration with the Register of Deeds.
Registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is a constructive notice of its contents as well as all
interests, legal or equitable, included therein. All persons are charged with knowledge of what it contains.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The application of this rule on constructive notice shall be applied in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code
because that would most certainly be favorable to the accused. This is so because the prescriptive period of the crime shall
have to be reckoned with earlier, that is from the time the question document was recorded in the Register of Deeds.
Since the document was registered on February 13, l964 and that the information was filed on March 29, l974, or more than 10
years thereafter, the crime has indubitably prescribed.
iii. But the constructive notice rule does not apply to bigamous marriages even if the second marriage contract is
registered in the Local Civil Register.
Sermonia vs. Court of Appeals, 233 SCRA 155, June 14, 1994
The principle of constructive notice should not be applied in regard to the crime of bigamy.
In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right or interest therein is made in the Register of
Deeds of the place where the said property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned of the
transactions involving the said property can easily be made by any interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage,
verification by the offended person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a marriage may be
entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a married person.
To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the
marriages listed in the National Census Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no
second or even third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is too formidable a
task to even contemplate.
More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for constructive notice to all persons of
every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or
entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of
such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register)
or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the
constructive notice rule to the documents registered in the Civil Register.
iv. For violation of special penal laws, prescription shall begin to run from the violation of the special penal laws, if the
same is known at that time.
a. People vs. Sandiganbayan, et al, July 3, l992 (211 SCRA 241)
Ruling.
The date of the violation of the law becomes the operative date of the commencement of the period of prescription and this
would be the date when Paredes filed his application on January 21, l976.
There are several government officials who passed upon the application of Paredes. Aside from the Land Inspector, there was
the surveyor who prepared the technical description. There was also the Regional Director who assessed the application. The
Director of Lands prepared the free patent and the Department Secretary signed the free patent. All these officials should have
discovered that the land applied for was non disposable public agricultural land.
“blameless ignorance” doctrine
b. Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto 648 SCRA 586, April 13, 2011
Respondents Mohammad Ali Dimaporo, Abdullah Dimaporo, and Amer Dianalan, were stockholders and officers of the
Mindanao Coconut Oil Mills (MINCOCO), a domestic corporation established in 1974, while respondents Panfilo O.
Domingo, Conrado S. Reyes, Enrique M. Herboza, and Ricardo Sunga, were then officers of the National Investment and
Development Corporation (NIDC). On 10 May 1976, MINCOCO applied for a Guarantee Loan Accommodation with the
NIDC for the amount of approximately P30,400,000.00, which the NIDC’s Board of Directors approved on 23 June 1976. The
guarantee loan was, however, both undercapitalized and under-collateralized because MINCOCO’s paid capital then was only
P7,000,000.00 and its assets worth is P7,000,000.00. This notwithstanding, MINCOCO further obtained additional Guarantee
Loan Accommodations from NIDC in the amount of P13,647,600.00 and P7,000,000.00,respectively. When MINCOCO’s
mortgage liens were about to be foreclosed by the government banks due its outstanding obligations, Eduardo Cojuangco
issued a memorandum dated 18 July 1983, bearing the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos’ (President Marcos) marginal note,
disallowing the foreclosure of MINCOCO’s properties. The government banks were not able to recover any amount from
MINCOCO and President Marcos’ marginal note was construed by the NIDC to have effectively released MINCOCO,
including its owners, from all of its financial liabilities.
In 1997 the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest Loans filed with the Ombudsman a sworn complaint against
MINCOCO’s Officers and NIDC’s Board of Directors for violation of Section 3(e) and (g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
By Resolution dated 9 July 1998, the Ombudsman motu prorio dismissed the complaint on the ground that the alleged
offenses had prescribed. The Ombudsman explained:
The time as to when the prescriptive period starts to run for crimes committed under Republic Act No. 3019,
a special law, is covered by Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which provides that:
Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if
the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
Issue: Is the Ombudsman correct?
Ruling:
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is committed. That an aggrieved person
“entitled to an action has no knowledge of his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises,” does not prevent the
running of the prescriptive period.
An exception to this rule is the “blameless ignorance” doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this
doctrine, “the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right which will support a cause of
action. In other words, the courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does not know or has no
reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.”
In a catena of cases it was held that if the violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.
Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is the subject herein, commenced from the date
of its discovery in 1992 after the Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in 1997, only
five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in.
The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that
“it was well-high impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the 1986 EDSA
Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the
loans.”
In yet another pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R.
No. 130817),[38] the Court held that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these
transactions.
From the 1999 landmark case of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No.
130140),[45] to the 2008 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Tabasondra (G.R. No. 133756),[46]
and to the 2009 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 135703),[47] the same
issues confronted the Court as the one presented in the present petition and the Court is one in saying that the crime of violation
of the Anti Graft Law has not yet prescribed.
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS VS. DISIERTO, et. al, 317 SCRA
272 October 25, 1999
Since the law alleged to have been violated i.e., paragraphs (e) and (g) of section 3 R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special
law, the applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, which
provides:
“Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run form the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the
same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and institution of judicial proceedings for its
investigation and punishment.
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person and shall begin
to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting double jeopardy.”
This simply means that if the commission of the crime is known, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the
day it was committed.
In the present case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the violations of R.A. No.
3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as alleged, the public officials concerned, connived or
conspired with the “beneficiaries of the loans.” Thus, we agree with the COMMITTEE that the prescriptive period for the
offenses x x x should be computed from the discovery of the commission.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
[N.B. “Blameless ignorance”doctrine- the statute of limitation runs only upon discovery of the fact of the invasion of a right
which will support a cause of action. In other words, courts decline to apply the statute of limitation where the plaintiff neither
knew or had reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action. [this is also known as the discovery rule]
Principle of equitable tolling- it is based on the doctrine that no prescription shall run against a person unable to bring an action
[contra non valentem agere nulla currit praescriptio]
( see also Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto, et al, 548 SCRA 295, March 14, 2008;
also Presidential Ad Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans vs. Ombudsman Desierto, 363 SCRA 489 (2001)
v. The period of prescription is interrupted by the filing of a complaint or information against the guilty person
a. Is the filing of a complaint in the Fiscal’s office suspend the running of the statute of limitations?
a. Zaldivia vs. Reyes, July 3, 1992
Zaldivia was charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series
of 1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.
The referral-complaint of the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May 30, 1990. The
corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990.
Zaldivia moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to
the Regional Trial Court of Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge.
Ruling:
Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, provides:
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal
action shall be as follows:
a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing the complaint with the appropriate officer for
the purpose of conducting the requisite preliminary investigation therein;
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the
complaint directly with the said courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila and other
chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the fiscal.
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. (Emphasis supplied.)
This section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases,"
which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all
cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed
by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a statute should be read in relation
to and not isolation from the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need
of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only
when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the
running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be
suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are
"judicial proceedings,".
At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of
the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law.
Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission
on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not
interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a
judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the
Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
b. Reodica vs. CA, July 8, 1998, 292 SCRA 87
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Facts: On the evening of 17 October 1987, petitioner Isabelita Reodica was driving a van along Doña Soledad Avenue, Better
Living Subdivision, Parañaque, Metro Manila. Allegedly because of her recklessness, her van hit the car of complainant
Norberto Bonsol. As a result, complainant sustained physical injuries, while the damage to his car amounted to P8,542.00.
Three days after the incident, or on 20 October 1987, the complainant filed an Affidavit of Complaint against petitioner with
the Fiscal's Office.
On 13 January 1988, an information was filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati (docketed as Criminal Case
No. 33919) charging petitioner with "Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with Slight Physical Injury."
Petitioner insists that the offense of slight physical injuries through reckless imprudence, being punishable only by arresto
menor, is a light offense; as such, it prescribes in two months. Here, since the information was filed only on 13 January 1988,
or almost three months from the date the vehicular collision occurred, the offense had already prescribed.
Ruling:
To resolve the issue of whether these quasi offenses have already prescribed, it is necessary to determine whether the filing
of the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the incident in question tolled the running of the prescriptive period.
Art. 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. — The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint of information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped by any reason not imputable to him. (emphasis supplied)
Notably, the aforequoted article, in declaring that the prescriptive period "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or
information," does not distinguish whether the complaint is filed for preliminary examination or investigation only or for an
action on the merits. Thus, in Francisco v. Court of Appeals and People v. Cuaresma, this Court held that the filing of the
complaint even with the fiscal's office suspends the running of the statute of limitations.
We cannot apply Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, which provides that in cases covered thereby, such as offenses
punishable by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months, as in the instant case, "the prosecution commences by the filing of a
complaint or information directly with the MeTC, RTC or MCTC without need of a prior preliminary examination or
investigation; provided that in Metropolitan Manila and Chartered Cities, said cases may be commenced only by information."
However, this Section cannot be taken to mean that the prescriptive period is interrupted only by the filing of a complaint or
information directly with said courts.
Neither does Zaldivia control in this instance. It must be recalled that what was involved therein was a violation of a municipal
ordinance; thus, the applicable law was not Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, but Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An
Act to Establish Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin to Run." Under Section 2 thereof, the period of prescription is suspended only when judicial
proceedings are instituted against the guilty party. Accordingly, this Court held that the prescriptive period was not interrupted
by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor, as such did not constitute a judicial proceeding;
what could have tolled the prescriptive period there was only the filing of the information in the proper court.
In the instant case, as the offenses involved are covered by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof and the rulings in
Francisco and Cuaresma apply. Thus, the prescriptive period for the quasi offenses in question was interrupted by the filing of
the complaint with the fiscal's office three days after the vehicular mishap and remained tolled pending the termination of this
case. We cannot, therefore, uphold petitioner's defense of prescription of the offenses charged in the information in this case.
c. Panaguiton vs. DOJ , 571 SCRA 549, November 25, 2008
On 8 January 1993, Cawili and Tongson jointly issued in favor of petitioner three (3) checks in payment of the said loans.
Upon presentment for payment on 18 March 1993, the checks were dishonored.
On 24 August 1995, petitioner filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating BP 22. The Prosecutor dismissed the
case against Tiongson. Petitioner appealed to DOJ. The DOJ returned the case to Prosecutor for further investigation.
On 15 March 1999, Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson. ACP Sampaga held that the
case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22
shall prescribe after four (4) years. The filing of the complaint before the Quezon City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 did not
interrupt the running of the prescriptive period, as the law contemplates judicial, and not administrative proceedings.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
The filing of a complaint in the Prosecutor’s Office, whether the case is penalized by the RPC or the special penal law,
suspends the period of prescription.
It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed on 4 December 1926, preliminary investigation of
criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, "institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment," and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with
the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.
The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act No. 3226 was approved on 4 December 1926
at a time when the function of conducting the preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of
the peace. Thus, the prevailing rule at the time, as shown in the cases of U.S. v. Lazada and People v. Joson, is that the
prescription of the offense is tolled once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation
inasmuch as the filing of the complaint signifies the institution of the criminal proceedings against the accused. In People
vs. Parao 52 Phil. 712 (1929) it was declared that the first step taken in the investigation and examination of offenses partakes
the nature of a judicial proceeding which suspends the prescription of the offense.
In People vs. Olarte, 19 SCRA 715, it was held that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Trial Court for preliminary
investigation interrupts the period of prescription.
In Ingco vs. Sandiganbayan 272 SCRA 563 (1997); Sanrio Company Limited vs. Lim 546 SCRA 303, which involved
violations of the Antil Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and the Intellectual Property Code, which are both special laws, it was
ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation.
In the more recent case of SEC vs. Interport Resources Corporation , it was held that the nature and purpose of the
investigation conducted by the SEC on violations of Revised Securities Act, another special law, is equivalent to the
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
We rule and so hold that petitioner’s filing of his complaint before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the
commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period
for the offenses they have been charged under BP 22.
d. Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation vs, Judge Lidua, Sr, et al, 706 SCRA 724, October 7, 2013
LEONEN, J.:
Facts: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly authorized to operate and manage the
parking spaces in Baguio City pursuant to City Ordinance 003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City
Ordinance to render any motor vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked. Jadewell
personel placed a clamp to the left front wheel of the Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang
which was then illegally parked and left unattended at a Loading and Unloading Zone. On May 17, 2003, Ang, et al removed
the clamp and did not pay the fine and the declamping fee. On May 23, 2003, Jadewell filed a complaint with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Baguio City for robbery and violations of City Ordinance. The Prosecutor’s Office found probable cause for
violation of the City Ordinance and filed the Information on October 2, 2003
Issue: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23, 2003 tolled the prescription
period of the commission of the offense charged against the respondents.
Ruling: With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that provides for any prescriptive
period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances. No other special law provides any other prescriptive period,
and the law does not provide any other distinction. When Act No. 3326 says that the period of prescription shall be suspended
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." the proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial
proceedings,".
Under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, violations of municipal and city ordinance are covered by the said
rules. Under Section 11 of the said Rules, the filing of criminal cases shall be either by complaint or by information but in
Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense
cannot be prosecuted de officio. Although Section 451 of the Local Government Code classifies cities as either component or
highly urbanized, yet this classification does not affect the classification and corporate status of existing cities. All cities as
defined by Congress are chartered cities. In United States v. Pascual Pacis, the Supreme Court recognized the validity of the
Baguio Incorporation Act or Act No. 1963 of 1909, otherwise known as the charter of Baguio City.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls the prescriptive period where
the crime charged involved is an ordinance. The respondent judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes.
The offense was committed on May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These
actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period. The prescription period is 60 days from May 7. Hence
when the Information was filed on October 2, 2003, more than 60 days had elapsed, hence, the offense had already prescribed.
PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES (Articles 92 and 93)
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626
Pangan vs. Gatbalite 449 SCRA 144, January 21, 2005
Facts: On September 16, 1987, Pangan was convicted of simple seduction and was sentenced to serve a penalty of two
months and one day of arresto mayor.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto the decision of the Municipal Trial Court.
On August 9, 1991, the case was called for promulgation of the decision in the court of origin. Despite due notice,
Pangan and his counsel failed to appear. The court issued an order directing the recording of the decision in the criminal
docket of the court and an order of arrest against the petitioner.
On January 20, 2000 or almost 9 years later, Pangan was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. He
then filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. He claims that his penalty, which prescribes in five pursuant to Article 92,
had already prescribed when he was arrested nine years later. According to him, the period for the computation of penalties
under Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code begins to run from the moment the judgment of conviction becomes final and the
convict successfully evades, eludes, and dodges arrest for him to serve sentence.
Issue: When does the period of prescription of penalties begin to run?
Ruling: In legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC, escape means unlawful departure of
prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to prison cannot be said to have escaped
therefrom.
In the instant case, petitioner was never brought to prison.
The prescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the Revised Penal Code, applies only to those who are convicted by
final judgment and are serving sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty. The period for prescription of penalties begins
only when the convict evades service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. Since petitioner never suffered
deprivation of liberty before his arrest on January 20, 2000 and as a consequence never evaded sentence by escaping during the
term of his service, the period for prescription never began.
Tel. No. (02) 241-4830 / Cel. Nos. (0949) 343-6092; (0922) 898-8626

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NOTES AND CASES

a. Definition of Penal Law

I. Classes of crimes: difference between mala in se and mala prohibita

1. Garcia vs. CA, 484 SCRA 617, March 14, 2006

b. SCOPE OF APPLICATION OR CHARACTERISTICS OF PENAL LAW

ii. due process

Void for Vagueness Doctrine.

iii. non imposition of cruel and unusual punishment or excessive fines

1. RA 9346-An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines.

iv. bill of attainder

1. People vs. Ferrer. 48 SCRA 382 (1972)

d. ARE THERE COMMON LAW CRIMES IN OUR JURISDICTION?

None, “nullum crimen, nulla poena sine lege”

e. APPLICABILITY OF THE RPC TO SPECIAL PENAL LAWS (Art. 10)

OTHER INSTANCES WHERE THE RPC WAS APPLIED TO SPL:

a. mens rea- (guilty mind)

Villareal vs. People, 664 SCRA 519, February 1, 2012:

On the other hand, the term felonious means malicious.

Calimutan vs. People, 492 SCRA 44, February 9, 2006

People vs. Carmen, March 26, 2001

b. motive is not intent

c. good faith negates criminal intent

Mistake of fact not applicable if there is negligence

1. Yapyuco vs. Sandiganbayan, 624 SCRA 470, June 25, 2012

2. Baxinela vs. People, 485 SCRA 331 (March 24, 2006)

3. People vs. Oanis, 74 Phil. 257.

2. Culpable felonies (culpa)

III. CRIMINAL LIABILITY:

People vs. Ilagan, 191 SCRA 643, November 26, 1990

i. Effect of supervening event ,

a. Urbano vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 1, January 7, 1988

b. Accelerating death rule

Garcia vs. People, 597 SCRA 392, August 28, 2009

2. Impossible Crime [Art. 4 (2) ]

i. Jacinto vs. People, 592 SCRA 426, July 13, 2009

ii. Intod vs. Court of Appeals, et al 215 SCRA 52,

This topic discusses the second category.

Kinds of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code:

Doctrine of implied conspiracy

. 1. People vs. Gueverra, November 13, 1989)

1. 2. Subayco, et al vs. Sandiganbayan, et al., August 22, 1996

Exceptions to the doctrine of implied conspiracy:

1. Mere signature rule

i. Macadangdang vs. Sandiganbayan, 170 SCRA 308 , February 14, 1989

2. Arias vs. Sandiganbayan, 180 SCRA 309, December 19, 1989

b. mere presence or companionship rule

1. Rosario Astudillo vs. People, November 29, 2006

Mere companionship does not establish conspiracy.

2. People vs. Roland Cruz, Nov. l4, l990

The phrase “andiyan na” has no conclusive conspiratorial meaning.

3. Principals by indispensable cooperation

People vs. De Vera , 312 SCRA 640, August 18, 1999

2. Abejuela vs. People, 200 SCRA 806, August 19, 1991

People vs. Vino 178 SCRA 626, October 19, 1989

Pamintuan vs. People, July 11, l994

The elements of the crime of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;

Tan vs. People

Dunlao Sr. Vs. CA, August 22, 1996

Corpus Delicti, meaning

People vs. Lorenzo 240 SCRA 624

People vs. Marcelino, October 1, 1999

PD 1829, Decree Penalizing Obstruction of Apprehension and prosecution of Criminal Offenders