G.R. Nos.
L-32370 & 32767 April 20, 1983
SIERRA MADRE TRUST, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES, DIRECTOR OF MINES, JUSAN
TRUST MINING COMPANY, and J & S PARTNERSHIP, respondents.
Lobruga Rondoz & Cardenas Law Offices for petitioner.
Fortunato de Leon for respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is a petition to review a decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources dated July 8,
1970, in DANR Cases Numbered 3502 and 3502-A. The decision affirmed a decision of the Director of
Mines dated November 6, 1969.
The appeal was made pursuant to Sec. 61 of the Mining Law (C.A. No. 137, as amended) which provides:
"... Findings of facts in the decision or order of the Director of Mines when affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources shall be final and conclusive, and the aggrieved party or parties
desiring to appeal from such decision or order shall file in the Supreme Court a petition for review
wherein only questions of law may be raised."
The factual background is given in the brief of the petitioner-appellant which has not been contradicted
by the respondents-appellees and is as follows:
On July 26, 1962, the Sierra Madre Trust filed with the Bureau of Mines an Adverse
Claim against LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) of the Jusan Trust Mining Company over six (6)
lode mineral claims, viz.: (1) Finland 2, (2) Finland 3, (3) Finland 5, (4) Finland 6, (5)
Finland 8 and (6) Finland 9, all registered on December 11, 1964 with the office of
the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and all situated in Sitio Maghanay, Barrio
Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode minerals claims
covered by LLA No. V-7872 (Amd) encroached and overlapped the eleven (11) lode
mineral claims of the herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz., (1) A-12, (2) H-12,
(3) JC-11, (4) W-11, (5) JN-11, (6)WM-11, (7) F-10, (8) A-9, (9) N-9, (10) W-8, and
(11) JN-8, all situated in Sitio Taduan Barrio of Abaca, Municipality of Dupax,
Province of Nueva Vizcaya, and duly registered with the office of the Mining
Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya on May 14, 1965.
The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned
six (6) lode mineral claims of respondent Jusan Trust Mining Company, null, void,
and illegal; and denying lode lease application LLA No. V-7872 over said claims.
Further, the adverse claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available
in the premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative
Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as DANR Case No. 3502.
Likewise, on the same date July 26, 1966, the same Sierra Madre Trust filed with
the Bureau of Mines an Adverse Claim against LLA No. V-9028 of the J & S
Partnership over six (6) lode mineral claims viz.: (1) A-19, (2) A-20, (3) A-24, (4) A-
25, (5) A-29, and (6) A-30, all registered on March 30, 1965 and amended August 5,
1965, with the office of the Mining Recorder of Nueva Vizcaya, and situated in Sitio
Gatid, Barrio of Abaca Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya.
The adverse claim alleged that the aforementioned six (6) lode mineral claim
covered by LLA No. V-9028, encroached and overlapped the thirteen (13) lode
mineral claims of herein petitioner Sierra Madre Trust, viz.: (1) Wm-14, (2) F-14, (3)
A-13, (4) H-12 (5) Jc-12, (6) W-12, (7) Jn-11, (8) Wm-11, (9) F-11, (10) Wm-11, (11)
F-11; (12) H-9 and (13) Jc-9, all situated in Sitio Taduan, Barrio of Abaca
Municipality of Dupax, Province of Nueva Vizcaya and duly registered with the
office of the Mining Recorder at Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya, on May 14,1965.
The adverse claim prayed for an order or decision declaring the above- mentioned
six (6) claims of respondent J & S Partnership, null void, and illegal; and denying
lode lease application LLA No. V-9028 over the said claims. Further, the adverse
claimant prayed for such other reliefs and remedies available in the premises.
This adverse claim was docketed in the Bureau of Mines as Mines Administrative
Case No. V-404, and on appeal to the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as DANR Case No. 3502A.
These two (2) adverse claims, MAC Nos. V-403 and V-404 were jointly heard in the
Bureau of Mines, and also jointly considered in the appeal in the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources.
The dispositive portion of the decision rendered by the Director of Mines reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office believes and so holds that the
respondents have the preferential right over their "Finland-2", "Finland- 3",
"Finland-5", "Finland-6", "Finland-8", "Finland-9", "A-19", "A-20", "A-24", "A-25",
"A-29" and "A-30" mining claims. Accordingly, the protests (adverse claims) filed
by protestant Sierra Madre Trust should be, as hereby they are, DISMISSED.
And that of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources reads:
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appeal interposed by the appellant,
Sierra Madre Trust is hereby dismissed and the decision of the Director of Mines
dated November 6, 1969, affirmed. "
The adverse claims of Sierra Madre Trust against Jusan Trust Mining Company and J and S Partnership
were based on the allegation that the lode lease applications (LLA) of the latter "encroached and
overlapped" the former's mineral claims, However, acting on the adverse claims, the Director of Mines
found that, "By sheer force of evidence, this Office is constrained to believe that there exists no conflict
or overlapping between the protestant's and respondents' mining claims. " And this finding was affirmed
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources thus: "Anent the first allegation, this Office finds
that the Director of Mines did not err when he found that the twelve (12) claims of respondents Jusan
Trust Mining Company and J & S Partnership did not encroach and overlap the eighteen (18) lode mineral
claims of the appellant Sierra Madre Trust. For this fact has been incotrovertibly proven by the records
appertaining to the case."

It should be noted that according to the Director of Mines in his decision, "during the intervening period
from the 31st day after the discovery [by the respondents] to the date of location nobody else located
the area covered thereby. ... the protestant [petitioner herein] did not establish any intervening right as
it is our findings that their mining claims do not overlap respondents' mining claims."

After the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources had affirmed the factual findings of the Director
of Mines to the effect that there was no overlapping of claims and which findings were final and
conclusive, Sierra Madre Trust should have kept its peace for obviously it suffered no material injury and
had no pecuniary interest to protect. But it was obstinate and raised this legal question before Us: "May
there be a valid location of mining claims after the lapse of thirty (30) days from date of discovery, in
contravention to the mandatory provision of Section 33 of the New Mining Law (Com. Act No. 137, as
amended)?" It also raised ancillary questions.

We see no reason why We have to answer the questions in this petition considering that there is no
justiciable issue between the parties. The officers of the Executive Department tasked with administering
the Mining Law have found that there is neither encroachment nor overlapping in respect of the claims
involved. Accordingly, whatever may be the answers to the questions will not materially serve the
interests of the petitioner. In closing it is useful to remind litigation prone individuals that the
interpretation by officers of laws which are entrusted to their administration is entitled to great respect.'
In his decision, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources said: "This Office is in conformity with
the findings of the Director of Mines that the mining claims of the appellees were validly located,
surveyed and registered."

Finally, the petitioner also asks: "May an association and/or partnership registered with the Mining
Recorder of a province, but not registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission, be vested with
juridical personality to enable it to locate and then lease mining claims from the government?" Suffice it
to state that this question was not raised before the Director of Mines and the Secretary of Agriculture
and Natural Resources. There is also nothing in the record to indicate whether or not the appellees are
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission. For these reasons, even assuming that there is
a justiciable issue between the parties, this question cannot be passed upon.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion Jr., Guerrero, De Castro and Escolin JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., is on leave.

G.R. No. L-50444 August 31, 1987
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY, HON. G.V. TOBIAS, in his capacity as General Manager of the
National Housing Authority, THE HON. JACOBO C. CLAVE, in his capacity as Presidential Executive
Assistant and VIRGILIO A. YUSON, respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
By virtue of a Contract to Sell dated 18 August 1970, Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial
ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the
petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation.
On 28 August 1974, Mr. Hernando transferred his rights over Lot No. 15 to private respondent Virgilio
Yuson. The transfer was embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor (Delegacion),
executed with the consent of Antipolo Realty, in which Mr. Yuson assumed the performance of the
vendee's obligations under the original contract, including payment of his predecessor's installments in
arrears. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its
undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the
period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments
falling due thereafter Clause 17 reads:
Clause 17. — SUBDIVISION BEAUTIFICATION. To insure the beauty of the
subdivision in line with the modern trend of urban development, the SELLER
hereby obligates itself to provide the subdivision with:
a) Concrete curbs and gutters
b) Underground drainage system
c) Asphalt paved roads
d) Independent water system
e) Electrical installation with concrete posts.
f) Landscaping and concrete sidewall
g) Developed park or amphi-theatre
h) 24-hour security guard service.
These improvements shall be complete within a period of two (2) years from date
of this contract. Failure by the SELLER shall permit the BUYER to suspend his
monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that
such improvements shall have been completed. 1
On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising
that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting
resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he
would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth of the representation in the
notice.
In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request that Mr. Yuson resume
payment of his monthly installments, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority
(NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes,
respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot
buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell executed by and between the lot buyers and the respondent." In
addition, a formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73,
representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the
improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976.
Mr. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972-October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the
post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by rescinding the Contract to Sell, and
claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson.
Aggrieved by the rescission of the Contract to Sell, Mr. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty
before public respondent NHA through a letter-complaint dated 10 May 1977 which complaint was
docketed in NHA as Case No. 2123.
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion to Dismiss which was heard on 2 September 1977. Antipolo Realty,
without presenting any evidence, moved for the consolidation of Case No. 2123 with several other cases
filed against it by other subdivision lot buyers, then pending before the NHA. In an Order issued on 7
February 1978, the NHA denied the motion to dismiss and scheduled Case No. 2123 for hearing.
After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract
to Sell under the following conditions:
l) Antipolo Realty Corporation shall sent [sic] to Virgilio Yuzon a statement of
account for the monthly amortizations from November 1976 to the present;
m) No penalty interest shall be charged for the period from November 1976 to the
date of the statement of account; and
n) Virgilio Yuzon shall be given sixty (60) days to pay the arrears shown in the
statement of account. 2
Antipolo Realty filed a Motion for Reconsideration asserting: (a) that it had been denied due process of
law since it had not been served with notice of the scheduled hearing; and (b) that the jurisdiction to
hear and decide Mr. Yuson's complaint was lodged in the regular courts, not in the NHA, since that
complaint involved the interpretation and application of the Contract to Sell.
The motion for reconsideration was denied on 28 June 1978 by respondent NHA General Manager G.V.
Tobias, who sustained the jurisdiction of the NHA to hear and decide the Yuson complaint. He also found
that Antipolo Realty had in fact been served with notice of the date of the hearing, but that its counsel
had failed to attend the hearing. 3 The case was submitted for decision, and eventually decided, solely on
the evidence presented by the complainant.
On 2 October 1978, Antipolo Realty came to this Court with a Petition for certiorari and Prohibition with
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-49051. Once more, the jurisdiction of
the NHA was assailed. Petitioner further asserted that, under Clause 7 of the Contract to Sell, it could
validly terminate its agreement with Mr. Yuson and, as a consequence thereof, retain all the prior
installment payments made by the latter. 4
This Court denied certiorari in a minute resolution issued on 11 December 1978, "without prejudice to
petitioner's pursuing the administrative remedy." 5 A motion for reconsideration was denied on 29
January 1979.
Thereafter, petitioner interposed an appeal from the NHA decision with the Office of the President
which, on 9 March 1979, dismissed the same through public respondent Presidential Executive Assistant
Jacobo C. Clave. 6
In the present petition, Antipolo Realty again asserts that, in hearing the complaint of private respondent
Yuson and in ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties, the NHA had not
only acted on a matter beyond its competence, but had also, in effect, assumed the performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial functions which the NHA was not authorized to perform.
We find the petitioner's arguments lacking in merit.
It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory
powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial
authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National
Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, 7 basically because the need for special
competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex
or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts
have remained crowded and clogged. In Spouses Jose Abejo and Aurora Abejo, et al. vs. Hon. Rafael dela
Cruz, etc., et al., 8 the Court, through Mr. Chief Justice Teehankee, said:
In the fifties, the Court taking cognizance of the move to vest jurisdiction in
administrative commissions and boards the power to resolve specialized disputes
in the field of labor (as in corporations, public transportation and public utilities)
ruled that Congress in requiring the Industrial Court's intervention in the resolution
of labor management controversies likely to cause strikes or lockouts meant such
jurisdiction to be exclusive, although it did not so expressly state in the law. The
Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary
jurisdiction . . . the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a
question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the
special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to
determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is
essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute
administered" (Pambujan Sur United Mine Workers v. Samar Mining Co., Inc., 94
Phil, 932, 941 [1954]).
In this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards
or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters,
subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion has become well nigh
indispensable. Thus, in 1984, the Court noted that 'between the power lodged in
an administrative body and a court, the unmistakeable trend has been to refer it to
the former, "Increasingly, this Court has been committed to the view that unless
the law speaks clearly and unequivocably, the choice should fall on fan
administrative agency]" ' (NFL v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419, 428, citing precedents). The
Court in the earlier case of Ebon vs. De Guzman (113 SCRA 52, 56 [1982]), noted
that the lawmaking authority, in restoring to the labor arbiters and the NLRC their
jurisdiction to award all kinds of damages in labor cases, as against the previous
P.D. amendment splitting their jurisdiction with the regular courts, "evidently, . . .
had second thoughts about depriving the Labor Arbiters and the NLRC of the
jurisdiction to award damages in labor cases because that setup would mean
duplicity of suits, splitting the cause of action and possible conflicting findings and
conclusions by two tribunals on one and the same claim."
In an even more recent case, Tropical Homes, Inc. vs. National Housing Authority, et al., 9 Mr. Justice
Gutierrez, speaking for the Court, observed that:
There is no question that a statute may vest exclusive original jurisdiction in an
administrative agency over certain disputes and controversies falling within the
agency's special expertise. The very definition of an administrative agency includes
its being vested with quasi-judicial powers. The ever increasing variety of powers
and functions given to administrative agencies recognizes the need for the active
intervention of administrative agencies in matters calling for technical knowledge
and speed in countless controversies which cannot possibly be handled by regular
courts.
In general the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise
is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency. 10 In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly
interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One
thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the
determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by
our regular courts.
Thus, the extent to which the NHA has been vested with quasi-judicial authority must be determined by
referring to the terms of Presidential Decree No. 957, known as "The Subdivision and Condominium
Buyers' Decree." 11 Section 3 of this statute provides as follows:
National Housing Authority. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the
provisions of this decree (emphasis supplied)
The need for and therefore the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the NHA are indicated in
the second and third preambular paragraphs of the statute which provide:
WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners,
developers, operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and
 obligations to provide and maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage,
sewerage, water systems lighting systems and other similar basic
requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;
WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and
fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and
condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or
titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and
fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for
value — . (emphasis supplied)
Presidential Decree No. 1344 12 clarified and spelled out the quasi-judicial dimensions of the grant of
regulatory authority to the NHA in the following quite specific terms:
SECTION 1. In the exercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and
business and in addition to its powers provided for in Presidential Decree No. 957,
the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide
cases of the following nature:
A. Unsound real estate business practices:
B. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by sub- division lot or
condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or
salesman; and
C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations
filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner,
developer, dealer, broker or salesman.(emphasis supplied.)
The substantive provisions being applied and enforced by the NHA in the instant case are found in
Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 957 which reads:
Sec. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a buyer
in a subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy
shall be forfeited in favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due
notice to the owner or developer, desists from further payment due to the failure of
the owner or developer to develop the subdivision or condominium project
according to the approved plans and within the time limit for complying with the
same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid
including amortization and interests but excluding delinquency interests, with
interest thereon at the legal rate. (emphasis supplied.)
Having failed to comply with its contractual obligation to complete certain specified improvements in the
subdivision within the specified period of two years from the date of the execution of the Contract to
Sell, petitioner was not entitled to exercise its options under Clause 7 of the Contract. Hence, petitioner
could neither rescind the Contract to Sell nor treat the installment payments made by the private
respondent as forfeited in its favor. Indeed, under the general Civil Law, 13 in view of petitioner's breach
of its contract with private respondent, it is the latter who is vested with the option either to rescind the
contract and receive reimbursement of an installment payments (with legal interest) made for the
purchase of the subdivision lot in question, or to suspend payment of further purchase installments until
such time as the petitioner had fulfilled its obligations to the buyer. The NHA was therefore correct in
holding that private respondent's prior installment payments could not be forfeited in favor of
petitioner.
Neither did the NHA commit any abuse, let alone a grave abuse of discretion or act in excess of its
jurisdiction when it ordered the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties. Such
reinstatement is no more than a logical consequence of the NHA's correct ruling, just noted, that the
petitioner was not entitled to rescind the Contract to Sell. There is, in any case, no question that under
Presidential Decree No. 957, the NHA was legally empowered to determine and protect the rights of
contracting parties under the law administered by it and under the respective agreements, as well as to
ensure that their obligations thereunder are faithfully performed.
We turn to petitioner's assertion that it had been denied the right to due process. This assertion lacks
substance. The record shows that a copy of the order denying the Motion to Dismiss and scheduling the
hearing of the complaint for the morning of 6 March 1978, was duly served on counsel for petitioner, as
evidenced by the annotation appearing at the bottom of said copy indicating that such service had been
effected. 14 But even if it be assumed, arguendo, that such notice had not been served on the petitioner,
nevertheless the latter was not deprived of due process, for what the fundamental law abhors is not the
absence of previous notice but rather the absolute lack of opportunity to be heard. 15 In the instant
case, petitioner was given ample opportunity to present its side and to be heard on a motion for
reconsideration as well, and not just on a motion to dismiss; the claim of denial of due process must
hence sound even more hollow. 16
We turn finally to the question of the amount of P16,994.73 which petitioner insists had accrued during
the period from September 1972 to October 1976, when private respondent had suspended payment of
his monthly installments on his chosen subdivision lot. The NHA in its 9 March 1978 resolution ruled that
the regular monthly installments under the Contract to Sell did not accrue during the September 1972 —
October 1976 period:
[R]espondent allowed the complainant to suspend payment of his monthly
installments until the improvements in the subdivision shall have been completed.
Respondent informed complainant on November 1976 that the improvements
have been completed. Monthly installments during the period of suspension of
payment did not become due and demandable Neither did they accrue Such must
be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments. If the suspension
is lifted the debtor shall resume payments but never did he incur any arrears.
Such being the case, the demand of respondent for complainant to pay the arrears
due during the period of suspension of payment is null and void. Consequently, the
notice of cancellation based on the refusal to pay the s that were not due and
demandable is also null and void. 17
The NHA resolution is probably too terse and in need of certification and amplification. The NHA
correctly held that no installment payments should be considered as having accrued during the period of
suspension of payments. Clearly, the critical issue is what happens to the installment payments which
would have accrued and fallen due during the period of suspension had no default on the part of the
petitioner intervened. To our mind, the NHA resolution is most appropriately read as directing that
the original period of payment in the Contract to Sell must be deemed extended by a period of time equal
to the period of suspension (i.e., by four (4) years and two (2) months) during which extended time
(tacked on to the original contract period) private respondent buyer must continue to pay the monthly
installment payments until the entire original contract price shall have been paid. We think that such is
the intent of the NHA resolution which directed that "[i]f the suspension is lifted, the debtor shall resume
payments" and that such is the most equitable and just reading that may be given to the NHA resolution.
To permit Antipolo Realty to collect the disputed amount in a lump sum after it had defaulted on its 6 Rollo, pp. 23-25, Annex "C" of Petition.
obligations to its lot buyers, would tend to defeat the purpose of the authorization (under Sec. 23 of
Presidential Decree No. 957, supra) to lot buyers to suspend installment payments. As the NHA
7 See, e.g., National Federation of Labor v. Eisma, 127 SCRA 419 (1984) and Philex
resolution pointed out, [s]uch must be the case, otherwise, there is no sense in suspending payments."
Mining Corporation v. Reyes, 118 SCRA 602 (1982).
Upon the other hand, to condone the entire amount that would have become due would be an
expressively harsh penalty upon the petitioner and would result in the unjust enrichment of the private
respondent at the expense of the petitioner. It should be recalled that the latter had already fulfilled, 8 G.R. No. L-63558, promulgated 19 May 1987; underscoring supplied.
albeit tardily, its obligations to its lot buyers under their Contracts to Sell. At the same time, the lot buyer
should not be regarded as delinquent and as such charged penalty interest. The suspension of 9 G.R. No. L-48672, promulgated 31 July 1987; underscoring supplied.
installment payments was attributable to the petitioner, not the private respondent. The tacking on of
the period of suspension to the end of the original period precisely prevents default on the part of the lot
buyer. In the words of the NHA resolution, "never would [the buyer] incur any arrears." 10 See, in this connection, DMRC Enterprises v. Este del Sol Mountain Reserve,
Inc., 132 SCRA 293 (1984); Union Glass and Container Corporation v. Securities and
Exchange Commission, 126 SCRA 31 (1983); and Philex Mining Corporation v.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The NHA decision appealed from is hereby Reyes, supra.
AFFIRMED and clarified as providing for the lengthening of the original contract period for payment of
installments under the Contract to Sell by four (4) years and two (2) months, during which extended time
private respondent shall continue to pay the regular monthly installment payments until the entire
original contract price shall have been paid. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

4 Clause 7 provides: "In case the BUYER fails to satisfy any monthly installments, or
any other payments herein agreed upon, he is granted a month of grace within
which to make the retarded payment, it is understood, however, that should the
month of grace herein granted to the BUYER expire, without the payments
corresponding to both months having been satisfied, an interest of 12% per annum
will be charged on the amounts he should have paid; it is understood further, that
should a period of 60 days elapse, to begin from the expiration of the month of
grace herein mentioned, and the BUYER has not paid all the amounts he should
have paid, with the corresponding interest, up to that date, the SELLER has the
right to declare this contract cancelled, ex parte, and of no effect, and as
consequence thereof, the SELLER may dispose of the parcel or parcels of land
covered by this contract, without notice to the BUYER, in favor of other persons, as
if this contract had never been entered into. In case of such cancellation of this
contract, all the amounts paid in accordance with this agreement, together with all
the improvements made on the premises, shall be considered as rents and charges
paid for the use and occupation of the above-mentioned premises, and as
payment for the damages suffered by failure of the BUYER to fulfill his part of this
agreement, and the BUYER hereby renounces all his right to demand or reclaim the
return of the same and obliges himself to peacefully and immediately vacate the
premises and deliver the same to the SELLER without delay.

5 Rollo of G.R. No. 49051, p. 63.

G.R. No. 161811 April 12, 2006
THE CITY OF BAGUIO, MAURICIO DOMOGAN, and ORLANDO GENOVE, Petitioners,
vs.
FRANCISCO NIÑO, JOSEFINA NIÑO, EMMANUEL NIÑO, and EURLIE OCAMPO, Respondents.
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
The Bureau of Lands awarded on May 13, 1966 to Narcisa A. Placino (Narcisa) a parcel of land identified
as Lot No. 10 (the lot) located at Saint Anthony Road, Dominican-Mirador Barangay, Baguio City.
Francisco Niño (Niño), one of the herein respondents, who has been occupying the lot, contested the
award by filing a Petition Protest on December 23, 1975 before the Bureau of Lands.
The Director of Lands dismissed the Petition Protest by Order of November 11, 1976.
Niño appealed the dismissal all the way to the Supreme Court but he did not succeed.
The decision of the Director of Lands dated November 11, 1976 having become final and executory, 1 the
then-Executive Director of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources-Cordillera
Autonomous Region (DENR-CAR), on petition of Narcisa, issued an Order of Execution dated February 1,
1993 directing the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) Officer to enforce the
decision "by ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously
occupying the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto." 2
Attempts to enforce the Order of Execution failed, prompting Narcisa to file a complaint for ejectment
before the Baguio City Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC). The MTCC dismissed Narcisa’s complaint,
however, by Order3of August 7, 1996.
Narcisa’s counsel, Atty. Edilberto Claravall (Atty. Claravall), later petitioned the DENR-CAR for the
issuance of a Special Order authorizing the City Sheriff of Baguio, the City Police Station, and the
Demolition Team of the City Government to demolish or remove the improvements on the lot
introduced by Niño. The DENR-CAR denied the petition, citing lack of jurisdiction over the City Sheriff of
Baguio, the City Police Station, and the Demolition Team of the City Government. The DENR-CAR also
invoked Section 14 (now Section 10 (d)) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 4
Atty. Claravall thereupon moved to have the Order of Execution previously issued by the DENR-CAR
amended, which was granted. As amended, the Order of Execution addressed to the CENRO Officer read:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 1844 of the Revised Administrative Code as amended
by Act No. 3077, you are hereby enjoined to enforce the aforementioned order, with the assistance upon
request of the City Sheriff of Baguio City, the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City Police
Station, by Ordering Petitioner Niño and those acting in his behalf to refrain from continuously occupying
the area and remove whatever improvements they may have introduced thereto.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The DENR-CENRO, together with the Demolition Team of Baguio City and the Baguio City police,
desisted, however, in their earlier attempt to enforce the Amended Order of Execution. 6
On July 16, 1997, the Demolition Team of Baguio City headed by Engineer Orlando Genove and the
Baguio City Police, on orders of then Baguio City Police Officer-In-Charge (OIC) Donato Bacquian, started
demolishing the houses of Niño and his herein co-respondents.7
The demolition was, however, temporarily stopped upon the instructions of DENR-CENR Officer
Guillermo Fianza, who later advised Niño that the DENR-CENRO would implement the Amended Order of
Execution on August 4, 1997.8
Niño and his wife Josefina Niño thereupon filed a Petition 9 for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for
Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baguio City against Guillermo
Fianza, Teofilo Olimpo of the DENR-CENRO, Mayor Mauricio Domogan (hereafter petitioner), Atty.
Claravall, Engr. Orlando Genove (hereafter petitioner), Rolando Angara, and Police Officer Donato
Bacquian challenging the Amended Order of Execution issued by the DENR-CENRO.1avvphil.net
The Niño spouses later filed an Amended Petition 10 by impleading Emmanuel Niño and Eurlie Ocampo as
therein co-petitioners and the City of Baguio (hereafter petitioner) and Narcisa as therein additional
respondents, and further praying for damages.
Branch 6 of the Baguio RTC dismissed the petition of Niño et al. (hereafter respondents) for lack of
merit.11Respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration12 having been denied, they filed a Petition for
Review13 under Rule 42 of the Rules before the Court of Appeals.
By Decision14 of December 11, 2002, the Court of Appeals granted the Petition for Review, holding that
Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules reading:
SEC. 10. Execution of judgments for specific act.
xxxx
(d) Removal of improvements on property subject of execution. — When the property subject of the
execution contains improvements constructed or planted by the judgment obligor or his agent, the
officer shall not destroy, demolish or remove said improvements except upon special order of the court,
issued upon motion of the judgment obligee after due hearing and after the former has failed to remove
the same within a reasonable time fixed by the court. (Underscoring supplied)
applies.
Thus disposed the appellate court:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is hereby GRANTED and the Orders dated September 24, 1997 and
November 23, 1998 are hereby SET ASIDE. Public respondent City Mayor Mauricio Domogan thru the
Demolition Team and City Engineer’s Office are hereby ordered to cease and desist from enforcing the
amended order of execution issued by Oscar N. Hamada, Regional Executive Director of the Department
of Environmental and Natural Resources, concerning the demolition or removal of the structures made
by petitioners until private respondent applied for a special order abovementioned with the proper
court.1avvphil.net
SO ORDERED.15 (Underscoring supplied)
Respondents filed before the appellate court an Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration16 on January 9,
2003, alleging that some of the reliefs they prayed for in their petition were left unacted
upon.17 Petitioners too filed a Motion for Reconsideration 18 on January 28, 2003, raising the following
grounds:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE CITY MAYOR HAS THE POWER TO
ORDER THE DEMOLITION OF ILLEGALLY-BUILT STRUCTURES;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE PETITION FOR
REVIEW;
3. THE HONORABLE COURT MISAPPLIED SEC. 10 (d), RULE 39 of the RULES OF
COURT.19(Underscoring supplied)
In support of the first ground, petitioners raised before the appellate court, in their Motion for
Reconsideration, for the first time, the power of the City Mayor to validly order the demolition of a
structure constructed without a building permit pursuant to Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government
Code of 1991 in relation to the National Building Code of the Philippines.
Alleging that respondents built their house without the required entry and building permits, petitioners
argued that the City Mayor may order the demolition of a house without a special court order. 20
The Court of Appeals denied both parties’ motions for reconsideration by Resolution 21 of December 17,
2003.
Hence, the present petition of the City of Baguio, Mayor Domogan (now a Congressman), and Orlando
Genove, faulting the appellate court:
1. . . . IN RULING THAT A SPECIAL COURT ORDER IS NEEDED FOR THE DEMOLITION OF
RESPONDENTS’ STRUCTURES;
2. . . . IN APPLYING SEC. 10(d) RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT IN THIS CASE;
3. . . . IN ENTERTAINING RESPONDENTS’ PETITION FOR REVIEW.22
The petition fails.
While it is noted that respondent’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was erroneously brought under Rule
42 of the Rules of Court, instead of under Rule 41, the RTC having rendered the questioned decision in
the exercise of its original, not appellate, jurisdiction, this Court overlooks the error in view of the merits
of respondents’ case.23
Petitioners’ contention that the enforcement of the Amended Order of Execution does not need a
hearing and court order which Sec. 10(d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court requires does not lie. That an
administrative agency which is clothed with quasi-judicial functions issued the Amended Order of
Execution is of no moment, since the requirement in Sec. 10 (d) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court echoes
the constitutional provision that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws."24
Antipolo Realty Corporation v. National Housing Authority teaches:
In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise
is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to which an administrative entity
may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or
empowering such agency.25(Underscoring supplied)
There is, however, no explicit provision granting the Bureau of Lands (now the Land Management
Bureau) or the DENR (which exercises control over the Land Management Bureau) the authority to issue
an order of demolition26— which the Amended Order of Execution, in substance, is.
Indeed,
[w]hile the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Lands is confined to the determination of the respective rights of
rival claimants to public lands or to cases which involve the disposition of public lands, the power to
determine who has the actual, physical possession or occupation or the better right of possession over
public lands remains with the courts.
The rationale is evident. The Bureau of Lands does not have the wherewithal to police public lands.
Neither does it have the means to prevent disorders or breaches of peace among the occupants. Its
power is clearly limited to disposition and alienation and while it may decide disputes over possession,
this is but in aid of making the proper awards. The ultimate power to resolve conflicts of possession is
recognized to be within the legal competence of the civil courts and its purpose is to extend protection
to the actual possessors and occupants with a view to quell social unrest.27 (Emphasis added)
Consequently, this Court held:28
x x x the power to order the sheriff to remove improvements and turn over the possession of the land
to the party adjudged entitled thereto, belongs only to the courts of justice and not to the Bureau of
Lands.29(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In fine, it is the court sheriff which is empowered to remove improvements introduced by respondents
on, and turn over possession of, the lot to Narcisa.
Petitioners’ invocation of the City Mayor’s authority under Sec. 455(b) 3(vi) of the Local Government
Code to order the demolition or removal of an illegally constructed house, building, or structure within
the period prescribed by law or ordinance and their allegation that respondents’ structures were
constructed without building permits 30 were not raised before the trial court. Petitioners having, for the
first time, invoked said section of the Local Government Code and respondents’ lack of building entry
permits in their Motion for Reconsideration of the Court of Appeals’ decision, it was correctly denied of
merit,31 it being settled that matters, theories or arguments not brought out in the proceedings below
will ordinarily not be considered by a reviewing court as they cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.32
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN G.R. No. 162070 On April 27, 1993, respondents reiterated to petitioner DAR the withdrawal of their VOS and
REFORM, represented by SECRETARY requested the return of the supporting papers they submitted in connection therewith.[4] Petitioner
JOSE MARI B. PONCE (OIC), Present: ignored their request.
Petitioner, Davide, C.J.,
Puno, On December 27, 1993, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series of 1993,[5] which provided that only
Panganiban, portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988
Quisumbing, shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. In determining the area of land to be excluded, the A.O.
Ynares-Santiago, fixed the following retention limits, viz: 1:1 animal-land ratio (i.e., 1 hectare of land per 1 head of animal
Sandoval-Gutierrez, shall be retained by the landowner), and a ratio of 1.7815 hectares for livestock infrastructure for every
Carpio, 21 heads of cattle shall likewise be excluded from the operations of the CARL.
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona, On February 4, 1994, respondents wrote the DAR Secretary and advised him to consider as final and
Carpio Morales, irrevocable the withdrawal of their VOS as, under the Luz Farms doctrine, their entire landholding is
Callejo, Sr., exempted from the CARL.[6]
Azcuna,
Tinga, On September 14, 1995, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order [7] partially granting the
Chico-Nazario and application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits
Garcia, JJ. outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing
DELIA T. SUTTON, ELLA T. purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the rest of
SUTTON-SOLIMAN and Promulgated: respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.
HARRY T. SUTTON,
Respondents. October 19, 2005 Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be
x-----------------------------------x exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] They filed a notice of
appeal[9] with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9,
PUNO, J.: s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock in determining the land area qualified for
exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms
case which declared cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.
This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, which On October 9, 2001, the Office of the President affirmed the impugned Order of petitioner DAR. [10] It ruled
declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and void for being violative of the that DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, does not run counter to the Luz Farms case as the A.O. provided the
Constitution. guidelines to determine whether a certain parcel of land is being used for cattle-raising. However, the
issue on the constitutionality of the assailed A.O. was left for the determination of the courts as the sole
The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been devoted arbiters of such issue.
exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform
program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) [1] their landholdings to On appeal, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the respondents. It declared DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, void
petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. for being contrary to the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude livestock farms from the
land reform program of the government. The dispositive portion reads:
On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for WHEREFORE, premises considered, DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993
raising livestock, poultry and swine. is hereby DECLARED null and void. The assailed order of the Office of the President
dated 09 October 2001 in so far as it affirmed the Department of Agrarian Reforms
On December 4, 1990, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of ruling that petitioners landholding is covered by the agrarian reform program of the
DAR,[2] this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition government is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they SO ORDERED.[11]
included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform.
In view of the Luz Farms ruling, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to Hence, this petition.
withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from
the coverage of the CARL.[3] The main issue in the case at bar is the constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, series of 1993, which prescribes
a maximum retention limit for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising.
On December 21, 1992, the Municipal Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected Invoking its rule-making power under Section 49 of the CARL, petitioner submits that it issued DAR A.O.
respondents land and found that it was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended No. 9 to limit the area of livestock farm that may be retained by a landowner pursuant to its mandate to
to the DAR Secretary that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL. place all public and private agricultural lands under the coverage of agrarian reform. Petitioner also
contends that the A.O. seeks to remedy reports that some unscrupulous landowners have converted their
agricultural farms to livestock farms in order to evade their coverage in the agrarian reform program.
Petitioners arguments fail to impress.
Administrative agencies are endowed with powers legislative in nature, i.e., the power to make rules
and regulations. They have been granted by Congress with the authority to issue rules to regulate the
implementation of a law entrusted to them. Delegated rule-making has become a practical necessity in
modern governance due to the increasing complexity and variety of public functions. However, while
administrative rules and regulations have the force and effect of law, they are not immune from judicial
review.[12] They may be properly challenged before the courts to ensure that they do not violate the
Constitution and no grave abuse of administrative discretion is committed by the administrative body
concerned.
The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative rules and regulations must
be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the provisions of the Constitution. [13] The rule-
making power of an administrative agency may not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress
or by the Constitution. Nor can it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the
scope intended. Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and
regulations may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations. [14]
In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the Constitution.
The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and
prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However, the deliberations of the 1987
Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and
poultry-raising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural
activity. The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial,
not an agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of industrial
fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers and blowers, feedmill
with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and
other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and digester plants augmented by lagoons and
concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks, pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological
appurtenances.[15]
after the enactment of the CARL that may lead one to suspect that respondents intended to evade its
coverage. It must be stressed that what the CARL prohibits is the conversion of agricultural lands for non-
agricultural purposes after the effectivity of the CARL. There has been no change of business interest in
the case of respondents.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that the reenactment of a statute
by Congress without substantial change is an implied legislative approval and adoption of the previous law.
On the other hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks to supersede an earlier one. [19] In the case at bar,
after the passage of the 1988 CARL, Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881[20] which amended certain provisions
of the CARL. Specifically, the new law changed the definition of the terms agricultural activity and
commercial farming by dropping from its coverage lands that are devoted to commercial livestock,
poultry and swine-raising.[21] With this significant modification, Congress clearly sought to align the
provisions of our agrarian laws with the intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission to exclude
livestock farms from the coverage of agrarian reform.
In sum, it is doctrinal that rules of administrative bodies must be in harmony with the provisions
of the Constitution. They cannot amend or extend the Constitution. To be valid, they must conform to and
be consistent with the Constitution. In case of conflict between an administrative order and the provisions
of the Constitution, the latter prevails.[22] The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down
as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987
Constitution.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004, respectively, are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.

Clearly, petitioner DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted
by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed
A.O.

The subsequent case of Natalia Realty, Inc. v. DAR[16] reiterated our ruling in the Luz
Farms case. In Natalia Realty, the Court held that industrial, commercial and residential lands are not
covered by the CARL.[17] We stressed anew that while Section 4 of R.A. No. 6657 provides that the CARL
shall cover all public and private agricultural lands, the term agricultural land does not include lands
classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial. Thus, in Natalia Realty, even portions
of the Antipolo Hills Subdivision, which are arable yet still undeveloped, could not be considered as
agricultural lands subject to agrarian reform as these lots were already classified as residential lands.

A similar logical deduction should be followed in the case at bar. Lands devoted to raising of livestock,
poultry and swine have been classified as industrial, not agricultural, lands and thus exempt from agrarian
reform. Petitioner DAR argues that, in issuing the impugned A.O., it was seeking to address the reports it
has received that some unscrupulous landowners have been converting their agricultural lands to livestock
farms to avoid their coverage by the agrarian reform. Again, we find neither merit nor logic in this
contention. The undesirable scenario which petitioner seeks to prevent with the issuance of the A.O.
clearly does not apply in this case. Respondents family acquired their landholdings as early as 1948. They
have long been in the business of breeding cattle in Masbate which is popularly known as the cattle-
breeding capital of the Philippines.[18]Petitioner DAR does not dispute this fact. Indeed, there is no evidence
on record that respondents have just recently engaged in or converted to the business of breeding cattle
[A.C. No. 4634. September 24, 1997]
JESUS CABARRUS, JR., complainant, vs. JOSE ANTONIO BERNAS, respondents.
TORRES, JR., J.:
On August 30, 1996, Mr. Jesus Cabarrus, Jr. filed and administrative complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas for alleged violations of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code and Code
of professional Resposibility.In his complaint-affidavit [1] dated August 12, 1996, complainant alleged as
follows:
A.That on April 16, 1996, respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., subscribe under oath before Marie Lourdes
T. Sia Bernas, a notary public in Makati City, wife of lawyer jose Antonio Bernas, a verification and
certification of non-forum shopping which was appended to a complaint for reconveyance of property
and damages, denominated as Civil Case No. 65646, filed before the Regional Trial Court in National
Capital Region, RTC, which case was raffled to RTC Branch 159 in Pasig City. A photocopy of said
complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annexex (sic) A, A-1, A-3, A-4, A-5 and A-6;
B.That as basis for the instant complaint for falsification of public document, I am hereto quoting
verbatim, the test (sic) of Annex A-6, the verification and certification of non-forum shopping which
states:
Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., under oath, depose and states:
He is the plaintiff in this case, and certify that he cause the preparation of the foregoing pleading, the
content of which are true to his personal knowledge and that he has not commenced any other action or
proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or
any other tribunal or agency. If he should learn that a similar action of (sic) proceeding has been filed or
is pending before the Supreme Court or any other Tribunal agency, he undertake to report to (sic) that
the fact within Five (5) days from the notice to this notice (sic) to this Honorable Court. Underscoring
supplied.
C.That the cause of action relied upon by the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is fraud, facilitated by
forgery as gleaned from paragraph 15, 16, and 22;
D.That contrary to the tenor, import and meanoing (sic) of the allegation under 1-B of the instant
complaint, respondent and his counsel Jose Antonio Bernas caused the preparation and filing of a
criminal complaint for falsification of a public document on April 11, 1996, (three days before the filing of
the aforecited Civil Case) at the AOED of the National Bureau of Investigation if (sic) Taff (sic) Ave., a
xerox copy of said complaint is hereto attached and marked as Annex B.
D-1.That as stated in Annex B, the gravaman of the affidavit complaint of the respondent is forgery, the
same legal issue in Civil Case No. 65646;
D-2.That as early as August 14, 1995, respondent counsel, Jose Antonio Bernas filed a written complaint
at the NBI for the same cause of action which was reiterated in another letter submitting to the NBI
standard specimen signitures dated October 1995, copies of said letter complaint are hereto attached
and marked as Annexes (sic) C.
E. That respondent Ramon B. Pascual, Jr., on the basis of Annexes A, B, C, D, inclusive of submarkings
knowingly subverted and perverted the truth when he falsify certified (sic) and verified under oath in the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping, that:
He has not commenced any other action or proceeding involving the same issues in any court, including
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, or any other Tribunal or agency. Where verification-
certification was placed under oath and was conveniently notarized by the wife of the counsel of
respondent in both cases at Branch 159 of the RTC in Pasig and at the NBI, an agency within the ambis
(sic) and purview of the circulus (sic) of the Supreme Court prohibiting forum shopping.
F. That Jose Antonio Bernas, the counsel on record of the respondents in Civil Case No. 65646 is the same
lawyer who instigated a criminal complaint at the NBI for forgery and respondents themselves conspired
and confabulated with each other in facilitating and insuring the open, blatant and deliberate violation of
Art. 172 of the Revised Penal Code which states:
Art. 172. Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents.- The penalty of prison
correctional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than p 5,000 pesos shall be
imposed upon:
1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of exchange (sic) or any other kind of commercial
documents; and
2. Any person who, to the damage of the third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in
any private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.
Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or the damage of
another or who, with the intent to cause such damage , shall use any of the false documents embraced
in the next preceding article, or any of the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the
penalty next lower in degree.
G. That Atty. Jose Antonio Bernas should be disbarred for having instigated abetted and facilitated the
perversion and subversion of truth in the said verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. Contrary to Canon 1, Rule 1.01, 1.02, Canon 3, 3.01, Canon 10 of the code of Professional
responsibility for Lawyers, the pertinent provisions of which are herein below quoted and a copy of said
code is hereto attached and marked as Annex E;
CANON 1. A. LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in lawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful (sic) conduct.
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities simed (sic) at defiance of the law or at lessening
confidence in the legal system.
CANON 3 A. LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY TRUE, HONEST, FAIR,
DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OF (sic) STATEMENT OF FACTS.
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent, misleading, deceptive,
undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim regarding his qualified (sic) or legal services.
CANON 10. A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT.
 In his Comment, [2] respondents Jose Antonio Bernas avers that he has not committed forum (d) To give technical aid to all prosecuting and law-enforcement officers and entities of the Government
shopping because the criminal action is not an action that involves the same issue as those in the civil as well as the courts that may request its services;
action and both suits can exist without constituting forum shopping so long as the civil aspect has not yet
been prosecuted in the criminal case. He emphasized that forum shopping only exist when identical reliefs
(e) To extend its services, whenever properly requested in the investigation of cases of administrative or
are issued by the same parties in multiple fora.
civil nature in which the Government is interested;
In his Supplemental Comment,[3] respondent further contends that neither he or his client Pascual
has commenced any criminal action. Pascual merely requested the NBI to assist in the investigation or (f) To undertake the instruction and training of representative number of city and municipal peace
prosecution, and left it to the NBI to determine whether the filing of an endorsement to the prosecutor, officers at the request of their respective superiors along effective methods of crime
who would determine probable caused, would be appropriate. It was only upon request of the NBI the he investigation and detection in order to insure greater efficiency in the discharge of their
assisted Ramon Pascual in drafting an affidavit-complaint for falsification of public documents against duties;
complainant. Likewise, respondent by counsel reiterates that the letter transmitted to the NBI cannot
constitute an action or proceeding because the NBIs functions are merely investigatory and informational
(g) To establish and maintain an up-to-date scientific crime laboratory and to conduct researches inn
in nature. NBI has no prosecutorial functions or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting relief or
furtherance of scientific knowledge in criminal investigation;
remedy. The NBI cannot be an agency contemplated by the circular.

The core issue to be resolved here is whether respondent Atty. Bernas transgressed Circular No. 28- (h) To perform such other related function as the secretary of Justice may assign from time to time.
91, Revised Circular No. 28-91, and administrative Circular No. 04-94 on forum shopping.

After a careful scrutiny of the records, we find the administrative complaint bereft of merit and
should be dismissed.
There is forum-shopping whenever, as a result of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a
favorable opinion (other than by appeal or certiorari) in another. Therefore, a party to a case resort to
forum shopping because by filling another petition involving the same essential facts and circumstances,
xxx, respondents approached two different for a in order to increase their chances of obtaining a favorable
decision or action, [4] In this case, there is no forum shopping to speak of Atty. Bernas, as counsel of Mr.
Pascual, Jr., merely requested the assistance of the NBI to investigate the the alleged fraud and forgery
committed by Mr. Jesus Cabarrus.[5] The filing of the civil case for conveyance and damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City does not preclude respondent to institute a criminal action. The rule
allows the filing of a civil case independently with the criminal case without violating the circulars on forum
shopping. It is scarcely necessary to add that Circular No. 28-91 must be so interpreted and applied as to
achieve the purposes projected by the Supreme Court when it promulgated that Circular No. 28-91 was
designed to serve as an instrument to promote and facilitate the orderly administration of justice and
should not be interpreted with such absolute literalness as to subvert and legitimate objective or the goal
of all rules of procedure-which is to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. [6]
Adjunct to this, Act No. 157 [7], specifically section 1 hereof provides, viz:
Explicitly, the function of the National Bureau of Investigations are merely investigatory and
informational in nature. It has no judicial or quasi-judicial powers and is incapable of granting any relief to
a party. It cannot even determine probable cause. It is an investigative agency whose findings are merely
recommendatory. It undertakes investigation of crimes upon its own initiative and as public welfare may
require. It renders assistance when requested in the investigation or detection of crimes which precisely
what Atty. Bernas sought in order to prosecute those person responsible for defrauding his client.
The courts, tribunal and agencies referred to under Circular No. 28-91, revised Circular No. 28-91
and Administrative Circular No. 04-94 are those vested with judicial powers or quasi-judicial powers and
those who not only hear and determine controversies between adverse parties, but to make binding
orders or judgments. As succinctly put it by R.A. 157, the NBI is not performing judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. The NBI cannot therefore be among those forums contemplated by the Circular that can
entertain an action or proceeding, or even grant any relief, declaratory or otherwise.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado (Chairman), and Puno, JJ., concur.
Mendoza, J., on leave.

Section 1. There is hereby created a Bureau of Investigation under the Department of Justice which shall
have the following functions:

(a) To undertake investigation of crimes and other offenses against the laws of the Philippines, upon its
initiative and as public interest may require;

(b) To render assistance, whenever properly requested in the investigation or detection of crimes and
other offenses;

(c) To act as a national clearing house of criminal and other infromations for the benefit and use of the
prosecuting and law-enforcement entities of the Philippines, identification records of all
person without criminal convictions, records of identifying marks, characteristics, and
ownership or possession of all firearms as well as bullets fired therefrom;
GMA NETWORK, INC., G.R. No. 148579
Petitioner,
Present:
PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,
- v e r s u s - SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.
MOVIE AND TELEVISION
REVIEW AND CLASSIFICATION
BOARD,
Respondent. Promulgated:
February 5, 2007
x---------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Subject of this petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the June 18, 2001
decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the January 7, 2000 order [2] of respondent Movie and
Television Review and Classification Board (MTRCB) which read:
In view thereof, the BOARD, by the undersigned, hereby imposes the
administrative penalty of SUSPENSION FROM AIRING/BROADCASTING any program
on EMC Channel 27 for a period of seven (7) days which period shall commence
immediately upon receipt of this Order. Your failure to comply with this ORDER shall
be construed by the BOARD as defiance on your part of a lawful order of the BOARD.
The facts follow.
Petitioner GMA Network, Inc. operates and manages the UHF television station, EMC Channel
27. On January 7, 2000, respondent MTRCB issued an order of suspension against petitioner for
airing Muro Ami: The Making without first securing a permit from it as provided in Section 7 of PD 1986. [3]
The penalty of suspension was based on Memorandum Circular 98-17 dated December 15,
1998[4] which provided for the penalties for exhibiting a program without a valid permit from the MTRCB.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the suspension order and, at the same time, informed
MTRCB that Channel 27 had complied with the suspension order by going off the air since midnight of
January 11, 2000. It also filed a letter-protest which was merely noted by the MTRCB thereby, in effect,
denying both the motion for reconsideration and letter-protest.
Petitioner then filed with the CA a petition for certiorari which was dismissed in the now
assailed June 18, 2001 decision. The January 7, 2000 suspension order issued by MTRCB was
affirmed in toto.
Hence, this recourse.
The pivotal issues for our resolution are:
(1) whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the show Muro Ami: The
Making prior to its broadcast by television and
(2) whether Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 was enforceable and binding on petitioner.
First, Section 3 of PD 1986[5] empowers the MTRCB to screen, review and examine all motion pictures,
television programs including publicity materials. This power of prior review is highlighted in its Rules and
Regulations, particularly Section 7 thereof, which reads:
SECTION 7. REQUIREMENT OF PRIOR REVIEW. -- No motion picture, television
program or related publicity material shall be imported, exported, produced,
copied, distributed, sold, leased, exhibited or broadcasted by television without
prior permit issued by the BOARD after review of the motion picture, television
program or publicity material.
The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly mentioned in Section 7, [6] such
as (1) television programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or departments and
agencies, and (2) newsreels.
According to the CA, the subject program was a publicity for the movie, Muro Ami. In adopting this finding,
we hold that Muro Ami: The Making, did not fall under any of the exemptions and was therefore within
the power of review of MTRCB.
On the other hand, petitioner claims that Muro Ami: The Making was a public
affairs program.[7] Even if that were so, our resolution of this issue would not change. This Court has
already ruled that a public affairs program -- described as a variety of news treatment; a cross between
pure television news and news-related commentaries, analysis and/or exchange of opinions -- is within
the MTRCBs power of review.[8] Clearly, MuroAmi: The Making (which petitioner claims to be a public
affairs program) was well within the purview of MTRCBs power of prior review.
However, while MTRCB had jurisdiction over the subject program, Memorandum Circular 98-
17, which was the basis of the suspension order, was not binding on petitioner. The Administrative Code
of 1987, particularly Section 3 thereof, expressly requires each agency to file with the Office of the National
Administrative Register (ONAR) of the University of the Philippines Law Center three certified copies of
every rule adopted by it. Administrative issuances which are not published or filed with the ONAR are
ineffective and may not be enforced.[9]
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17, which provides for the penalties for the first, second and
third offenses for exhibiting programs without valid permit to exhibit, has not been registered with the
ONAR as of January 27, 2000.[10] Hence, the same is yet to be effective.[11] It is thus unenforceable since it
has not been filed in the ONAR.[12] Consequently, petitioner was not bound by said circular and should not
have been meted the sanction provided thereunder.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated June 18, 2001, insofar as it affirmed the public respondent Movie and Television Review and
Classification Boards jurisdiction over Muro Ami: The Making, is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the suspension order issued against petitioner GMA Network, Inc. pursuant to
Memorandum Circular No. 98-17 is hereby declared null and void.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR
BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], petitioners,
vs.
HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS,
in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his
capacity as Director, Malacañang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director,
Bureau of Printing, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6,
Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to be valid and
enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners
seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication
in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.
Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:
a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200,
234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404,
406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574,
594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961,
1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278,
1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-
1847.
b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150,
153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-
224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283,
285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357,
358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488,
498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641,
642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-
1178,1180-1278.
c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.
d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529,
1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600,
1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734,
1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797,
1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832,
1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866,
1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966,
1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.
e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507,
509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-
568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-
786, 788-852, 854-857.
f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-
81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground
that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted
that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by
the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners are without the
requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties"
within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as
a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another
from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and
there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law,
the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do
the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
defendant.
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for
their petition to be given due course.
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case of Severino vs. Governor
General, 3 this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a
private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved,
or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large,"
and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved
[Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the
object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the
real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show
that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as
such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].
Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party
to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the
position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr.
Justice Grant T. Trent said:
We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the
proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when
 a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were
otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the
reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case
without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular
circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable
and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'
No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by
counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are
different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper
party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not
the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people
in cases of this character.
The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned
case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not
allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to
initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to
represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.
Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they
are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long
line of decisions,4 this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws
with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the
Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of
sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents
or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from
time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may
authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the
various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and
publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It
would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of
which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken
so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the
debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus,
without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de
conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. 5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the
Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty.
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public
concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in
the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to
what must be included or excluded from such publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated
by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation
or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this
category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as
administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been
circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said
in Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been
published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those
presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or
implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this
Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter
Bank 8 to wit:
 The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having
been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative,
conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the
challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry.
Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad
statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot
justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in
various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions
of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations
deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of
the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand
examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have
engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from
numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute
retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs. Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party
under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
unconstitutional by this Court.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the
Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a
principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees
sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to
1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject
matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever
their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been
implemented or enforced by the government. In Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon
Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations
and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is
apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the
government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same
shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some
criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished
presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no
binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Relova, J., concurs.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and
effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made
to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the
Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a
legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true
that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is,
to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph
sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine
Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its
closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of
mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to
repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the
Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the
exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could
arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement
with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2
expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera.
The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application
to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures.
The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they
can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier
cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its
penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of
the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are
silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a
law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The
best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect
[only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws
or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is
not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable
and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of
15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to
be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date
of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run
counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.
PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):
The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication
of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be
published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for
the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes
the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution,
and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts
are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I
beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:
I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication
being in the Official Gazette.
DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring (with qualification):
There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of
Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement
of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and
effect.
I shall explain why.
1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made
to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act
having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the
Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to
certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases
and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the
same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a
constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a
legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official
Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true
that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is,
to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or
presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.
2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph
sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine
Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some
Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws
to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in
the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. 1 I am likewise in agreement with its
closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before
laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary
fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the
Official Gazette. 2
3. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must
be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all. 3 It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of
mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable. 4 Publication, to
repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the
Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the
exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of
past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties
aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal
consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could
arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters
deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated
by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal
prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident. 5 In civil cases though,
retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of
arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the
police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked.
There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be
tainted by infirmity. 6 In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional
application. That is as far as it goes.
4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is
essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement
with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2
expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of
their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided."
Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and
cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has
the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.
5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential
decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any
legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with
undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.
I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this
separate opinion.
Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.
TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:
I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera.
The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application
to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures.
The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable
opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they
can be punished for its violation,1 citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier
cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or
circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its
penalties.
Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the
Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of
the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the
public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one
from compliance therewith.
Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are
silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is
manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after
fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
provided, " i.e. a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a
law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The
best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect
[only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication. 2 To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws
or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is
not necessary for their effectivity 3 would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable
and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of
providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itself before the completion of
15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper
dissemination.
publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication
of laws in the Official Gazette required by any statute as a prerequisite for their effectivity, if said laws
already provide for their effectivity date.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided " Two things may be said of this
provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take
effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning
its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be
published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.
Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition that for their
effectivity, laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for
the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes
the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution,
and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be
published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public
nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and
proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts
are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature."
Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the
effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law,
especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or
restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will
take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.
In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become
effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I
beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.
Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.

GUTIERREZ, Jr., J., concurring:

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:

I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication
I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to
being in the Official Gazette.
be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of
effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its
publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date DE LA FUENTE, J., concurring:
of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run
counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights. I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or
general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.

PLANA, J., concurring (with qualification):

The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity,
unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. * It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires
notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by
G.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954 laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include
regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio
QUE PO LAY, defendant-appellant. de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
tambien los Reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordenes dictadas
de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder
Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.
ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus
First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.
disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su
publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion
MONTEMAYOR, J.: al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Español, Vol. I. p. 52).

Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of
violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and
sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment
in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars,
U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular
No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette
prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force
and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to
be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor
General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the
publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have
force and effect.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the
circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that
said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals,
notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely
enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the
guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.
In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not
published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is
clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one
until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not
be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the
foreign exchange in his possession thereof.
But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being
raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may
raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within
the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the
question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not
been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such
circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed
any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at
any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.
In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de
oficio.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno, JJ., concur.

However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall,
in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion
of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No.
386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the
Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its
issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina,
29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like
the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is
bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published
and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.

Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws,
(Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that
their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the
G.R. No. L-32166 October 18, 1977 Commissioner of Fisheries, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 (62 O.G. 1224),
prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. The order is quoted below: ñé+.£ªwph!1
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs. SUBJECT: PROHIBITING ELECTRO FISHING IN ALL WATERS ñé+.£ªwph!1
HON. MAXIMO A. MACEREN CFI, Sta. Cruz, Laguna, JOSE BUENAVENTURA, GODOFREDO REYES,
BENJAMIN REYES, NAZARIO AQUINO and CARLO DEL ROSARIO, accused-appellees.
OF THE PHILIPPINES.

Office of the Solicitor General for appellant.

Pursuant to Section 4 of Act No. 4003, as amended, and Section 4 of R.A. No. 3512, the following rules
and regulations regarding the prohibition of electro fishing in all waters of the Philippines are
Rustics F. de los Reyes, Jr. for appellees. promulgated for the information and guidance of all concerned.ñé+.£ªwph!1

AQUINO, J.:têñ.£îhqw⣠SECTION 1. — Definition. — Words and terms used in this Order 11 construed as
follows:
This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries,
promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries (a) Philippine waters or territorial waters of the Philippines' includes all waters of
under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries Commission. the Philippine Archipelago, as defined in the t between the United States and
Spain, dated respectively the tenth of December, eighteen hundred ninety eight
and the seventh of November, nineteen hundred. For the purpose of this order,
On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino and Carlito del
rivers, lakes and other bodies of fresh waters are included.
Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with
having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.
(b) Electro Fishing. — Electro fishing is the catching of fish with the use of electric
current. The equipment used are of many electrical devices which may be battery
It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969 resorted to electro
or generator-operated and from and available source of electric current.
fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their own motor banca, equipped with
motor; with a generator colored green with attached dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and
electrocuting device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other (c) 'Persons' includes firm, corporation, association, agent or employee.
end of a bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with
the use of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic
(d) 'Fish' includes other aquatic products.
animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal Case No.
5429).
SEC. 2. — Prohibition. — It shall be unlawful for any person to engage in electro
fishing or to catch fish by the use of electric current in any portion of the Philippine
Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed. The
waters except for research, educational and scientific purposes which must be
Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case No. SC-36). The case is now
covered by a permit issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440. which shall be carried at all times.

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an obnoxious
SEC. 3. — Penalty. — Any violation of the provisions of this Administrative Order
or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance
shall subject the offender to a fine of not exceeding five hundred pesos (P500.00)
at all but a form of energy conducted or transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that,
or imprisonment of not extending six (6) months or both at the discretion of the
since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot
Court.
consider it unlawful.

SEC. 4. — Repealing Provisions. — All administrative orders or parts thereof

As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the use of any
inconsistent with the provisions of this Administrative Order are hereby revoked.
obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.

SEC. 5. — Effectivity. — This Administrative Order shall take effect six (60) days
Section 76 of the same law punishes any person who uses an obnoxious or poisonous substance in
after its publication in the Office Gazette.
fishing with a fine of not more than five hundred pesos nor more than five thousand, and by
imprisonment for not less than six months nor more than five years.
On June 28, 1967 the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending section 2 of
It is noteworthy that the Fisheries Law does not expressly punish .electro fishing." Notwithstanding the
Administrative Order No. 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries (63
silence of the law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the
O.G. 9963).
Thus, the phrase "in any portion of the Philippine waters" found in section 2, was changed by the
amendatory order to read as follows: "in fresh water fisheries in the Philippines, such as rivers, lakes,
swamps, dams, irrigation canals and other bodies of fresh water."
The Court of First Instance and the prosecution (p. 11 of brief) assumed that electro fishing is punishable
under section 83 of the Fisheries Law (not under section 76 thereof), which provides that any other
violation of that law "or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall subject the offender
to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos (P200), or in t for not more than six months, or both, in the
discretion of the court."
That assumption is incorrect because 3 of the aforequoted Administrative Order No. 84 imposes a fm of
not exceeding P500 on a person engaged in electro fishing, which amount the 83. It seems that the
Department of Fisheries prescribed their own penalty for swift fishing which penalty is less than the
severe penalty imposed in section 76 and which is not Identified to the at penalty imposed in section 83.
Had Administrative Order No. 84 adopted the fighter penalty prescribed in on 83, then the crime of
electro fishing would be within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the inferior court (Sec. 44 [f],
Judiciary Law; People vs. Ragasi, L-28663, September 22,
We have discussed this pre point, not raised in the briefs, because it is obvious that the crime of electro
fishing which is punishable with a sum up to P500, falls within the concurrent original jurisdiction of the
inferior courts and the Court of First instance (People vs. Nazareno, L-40037, April 30, 1976, 70 SCRA 531
and the cases cited therein).
And since the instant case was filed in the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna, a provincial capital, the
order of d rendered by that municipal court was directly appealable to the Court, not to the Court of First
Instance of Laguna (Sec. 45 and last par. of section 87 of the Judiciary Law; Esperat vs. Avila, L-25992,
June 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 596).
It results that the Court of First Instance of Laguna had no appellate jurisdiction over the case. Its order
affirming the municipal court's order of dismissal is void for lack of motion. This appeal shall be treated
as a direct appeal from the municipal court to this Court. (See People vs. Del Rosario, 97 Phil. 67).
In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued
under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing by means of an
obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken because, as already stated, the
Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of
fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.
The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh water
fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of the Fisheries Law; (2)
the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions of the Fisheries Law and the
regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules and regulations consistent with the
purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and
[h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our
fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides
that "any other violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder
"shall subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not more
than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."
As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place because the
penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as the penalty fixed in
section 83.
We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that
those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission, Republic Act No. 3512.
The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not
banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of
Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in
penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.
Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have
been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.
That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing; (2) unlawful
fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal taking of sponges; (5) failure
of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish caught, and (6) other violations.
Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in punishing
electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the category of "other violations"
because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for
fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the
penalty for "other violations" of the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should
constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty
provided for in the law itself. (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 11 25, citing 11 Am. Jur. 965 on p. 11 32).
Originally, Administrative Order No. 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against
electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro
fishing is not condemnable per se. It could be tolerated in marine waters. That circumstances
strengthens the view that the old law does not eschew all forms of electro fishing.
However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law
and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704,
which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries and which was
promulgated on May 16, 1975 (71 O.G. 4269), expressly punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt
water areas.
That decree provides: ñé+.£ªwph!1
SEC. 33. — Illegal fishing, dealing in illegally caught fish or fishery/aquatic
products. — It shall he unlawful for any person to catch, take or gather or cause to
be caught, taken or gathered fish or fishery/aquatic products in Philippine waters
with the use of explosives, obnoxious or poisonous substance, or by the use of
electricity as defined in paragraphs (1), (m) and (d), respectively, of Section 3
hereof: ...
The decree Act No. 4003, as amended, Republic Acts Nos. 428, 3048, 3512 and 3586, Presidential
Decrees Nos. 43, 534 and 553, and all , Acts, Executive Orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with it (Sec. 49, P. D. No. 704).
The inclusion in that decree of provisions defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of
the deficiency or silence on that point of the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive
regulation is not legally adequate to penalize electro fishing.
Note that the definition of electro fishing, which is found in section 1 (c) of Fisheries Administrative
Order No. 84 and which is not provided for the old Fisheries Law, is now found in section 3(d) of the
decree. Note further that the decree penalty electro fishing by "imprisonment from two (2) to four (4)
years", a punishment which is more severe than the penalty of a time of not excluding P500 or
imprisonment of not more than six months or both fixed in section 3 of Fisheries Administrative Order
No. 84.
An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in
particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources (now Secretary of Natural Resources)
under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means
of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the law
prescribes (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil. 1125; Director of Forestry vs. Muñ;oz, L-24796, June 28, 1968,
23 SCRA 1183, 1198; Geukeko vs. Araneta, 102 Phil. 706, 712).
The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular statute
(U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, 125, citing U.S. vs. Grimaud 220 U.S. 506; Interprovincial Autobus
Co., Inc. vs. Coll. of Internal Revenue, 98 Phil. 290, 295-6).
The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle of
separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because
of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law" Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726;
People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeñ;a, 68 Phil. 328).
Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in
harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. (U.S. vs. Tupasi
Molina, supra). An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress (Santos vs. Estenzo, 109 Phil.
419, 422; Teoxon vs. Members of the d of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel
vs. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao vs. Casteel, L-21906,
August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA 350).
The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into
effect the law as it his been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the
statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute
cannot be sanctioned. (University of Santo Tomas vs. Board of Tax A 93 Phil. 376, 382, citing 12 C.J. 845-
46. As to invalid regulations, see of Internal Revenue vs. Villaflor 69 Phil. 319, Wise & Co. vs. Meer, 78
Phil. 655, 676; Del March vs. Phil. Veterans Administrative, L-27299, June 27, 1973, 51 SCRA 340, 349).
There is no question that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources has rule-making powers.
Section 4 of the Fisheries law provides that the Secretary "shall from time to time issue instructions,
orders, and regulations consistent" with that law, "as may be and proper to carry into effect the
provisions thereof." That power is now vested in the Secretary of Natural Resources by on 7 of the
Revised Fisheries law, Presidential December No. 704.
Section 4(h) of Republic Act No. 3512 empower the Co of Fisheries "to prepare and execute upon the
approval of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, forms instructions, rules and regulations
consistent with the purpose" of that enactment "and for the development of fisheries."
Section 79(B) of the Revised Administrative Code provides that "the Department Head shall have the
power to promulgate, whenever he may see fit do so, all rules, regulates, orders, memorandums, and
other instructions, not contrary to law, to regulate the proper working and harmonious and efficient
administration of each and all of the offices and dependencies of his Department, and for the strict
enforcement and proper execution of the laws relative to matters under the jurisdiction of said
Department; but none of said rules or orders shall prescribe penalties for the violation thereof, except as
expressly authorized by law."
Administrative regulations issued by a Department Head in conformity with law have the force of law
(Valerie vs. Secretary of culture and Natural Resources, 117 Phil. 729, 733; Antique Sawmills, Inc. vs.
Zayco, L- 20051, May 30, 1966, 17 SCRA 316). As he exercises the rule-making power by delegation of the
lawmaking body, it is a requisite that he should not transcend the bound demarcated by the statute for
the exercise of that power; otherwise, he would be improperly exercising legislative power in his own
right and not as a surrogate of the lawmaking body.
Article 7 of the Civil Code embodies the basic principle that administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."
As noted by Justice Fernando, "except for constitutional officials who can trace their competence to act
to the fundamental law itself, a public office must be in the statute relied upon a grant of power before
he can exercise it." "department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by
statute." (Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Santiago, L-29236, August 21, 1974, 58 SCRA
493, 496-8).
"Rules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon
the administrative agency by law, partake of the nature of a statute, and compliance therewith may be
enforced by a penal sanction provided in the law. This is so because statutes are usually couched in
general terms, after expressing the policy, purposes, objectives, remedies and sanctions intended by the
legislature. The details and the manner of carrying out the law are oftentimes left to the administrative
agency entrusted with its enforcement. In this sense, it has been said that rules and regulations are the
product of a delegated power to create new or additional legal provisions that have the effect of law."
The rule or regulation should be within the scope of the statutory authority granted by the legislature to
the administrative agency. (Davis, Administrative Law, p. 194, 197, cited in Victories Milling Co., Inc. vs.
Social Security Commission, 114 Phil. 555, 558).
In case of discrepancy between the basic law and a rule or regulation issued to implement said law, the
basic law prevails because said rule or regulation cannot go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic
law (People vs. Lim, 108 Phil. 1091).
This Court in its decision in the Lim case, supra, promulgated on July 26, 1960, called the attention of
technical men in the executive departments, who draft rules and regulations, to the importance and
necessity of closely following the legal provisions which they intend to implement so as to avoid any
possible misunderstanding or confusion.
The rule is that the violation of a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the government in
conformity with and based upon a statute authorizing such regulation constitutes an offense and renders
the offender liable to punishment in accordance with the provisions of the law (U.S. vs. Tupasi Molina, 29
Phil. 119, 124).
In other words, a violation or infringement of a rule or regulation validly issued can constitute a crime
punishable as provided in the authorizing statute and by virtue of the latter (People vs. Exconde 101 Phil.
1125, 1132).
It has been held that "to declare what shall constitute a crime and how it shall be punished is a power
vested exclusively in the legislature, and it may not be delegated to any other body or agency" (1 Am.
Jur. 2nd, sec. 127, p. 938; Texas Co. vs. Montgomery, 73 F. Supp. 527).
In the instant case the regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries
Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro
fishing.
The instant case is similar to People vs. Santos, 63 Phil. 300. The Santos case involves section 28 of Fish
and Game Administrative Order No. 2 issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
pursuant to the aforementioned section 4 of the Fisheries Law.
Section 28 contains the proviso that a fishing boat not licensed under the Fisheries Law and under the
said administrative order may fish within three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations
over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military reservations authorities of the United States
only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary
upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned. A violation of the proviso may be
proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code.
Augusto A. Santos was prosecuted under that provision in the Court of First Instance of Cavite for having
caused his two fishing boats to fish, loiter and anchor without permission from the Secretary within
three kilometers from the shoreline of Corrigidor Island.
This Court held that the Fisheries Law does not prohibit boats not subject to license from fishing within
three kilometers of the shoreline of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval
and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources upon recommendation of the military and naval authorities concerned.
As the said law does not penalize the act mentioned in section 28 of the administrative order, the
promulgation of that provision by the Secretary "is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power
which has not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being expressly reserved" to the lawmaking body.
"Such an act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon the Secretary but
also an exercise of a legislative power which he does not have, and therefore" the said provision "is null
and void and without effect". Hence, the charge against Santos was dismiss.
A penal statute is strictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make ranks and
regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power
to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers
expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. (Glustrom vs. State, 206 Ga. 734, 58 Second 2d
534; See 2 Am. Jr. 2nd 129-130).
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not
represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body
to legislate (State vs. Miles, Wash. 2nd 322, 105 Pac. 2nd 51).
In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is one
which falls within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will
be scrutinized with special care. (State vs. Miles supra).
The Miles case involved a statute which authorized the State Game Commission "to adopt, promulgate,
amend and/or repeal, and enforce reasonable rules and regulations governing and/or prohibiting
the taking of the various classes of game.
Under that statute, the Game Commission promulgated a rule that "it shall be unlawful to offer, pay or
receive any reward, prize or compensation for the hunting, pursuing, taking, killing or displaying of any
game animal, game bird or game fish or any part thereof."
Beryl S. Miles, the owner of a sporting goods store, regularly offered a ten-down cash prize to the person
displaying the largest deer in his store during the open for hunting such game animals. For that act, he
was charged with a violation of the rule Promulgated by the State Game Commission.
It was held that there was no statute penalizing the display of game. What the statute penalized was the
taking of game. If the lawmaking body desired to prohibit the display of game, it could have readily said
so. It was not lawful for the administrative board to extend or modify the statute. Hence, the indictment
against Miles was quashed. The Miles case is similar to this case.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision of June 9, 1970 is set aside for lack of appellate jurisdiction and
the order of dismissal rendered by the municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna in Criminal Case No. 5429 is
affirmed. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.