PART FIVE: UNION REPRESENTATION: ESTABLISHING UNION

Premature Contract (cont’n)

Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303 [1997]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 123426 March 10, 1999

NATIONAL FEDERATION OF LABOR (NFL), petitioner,

vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA, UNDERSECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, AND ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION-KILUSANG MAYO
UNO (ANGLO-KMU), respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assailing the Resolution in OS-A-7-142-93 (RO700-9412-RU-
037) dated August 8, 1995 of Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, by authority of the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, setting aside the Resolution of the Med-Arbiter dated March 13, 1995.

The antecedents are summarized in the assailed Resolution of Undersecretary Laguesma as follows:

Records show that on 27 December 1994, a petition for certification election among the rank and file employees
of Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Work, Inc. was filed by the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor
Organization (ANGLO-KMU), alleging among others, that it is a legitimate labor organization; that respondent
Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Work, Inc. is a company engaged in the business of shipbuilding and repair with
more or less, four hundred (400) rank and file employees; that the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Baradero —
National Federation of Labor is the incumbent bargaining agent of the rank and file employees of the respondent
company; that the petition is supported by more than twenty-five percent (25%) of all the employees in the
bargaining unit; that the petition is filed within the sixty (60) day period prior to the expiry date of the collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) entered into by and between the Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Baradero-NFL and
Cebu Shipyard Engineering Work, Inc. which is due to expire on 31 December 1994; and, that there is no bar to
its bid to be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the rank and file employees of the
respondent company.

On 2 January 1995, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order, the pertinent portion of which reads as follows:

The petitioner is given five days from receipt of this Order to present proofs that it has created a local in the
appropriate bargaining unit where it seeks to operate as the bargaining agent and that, relative thereto, it has
submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations or the Industrial Relations Division of this Office the following: 1) A
charter certificate; 2) the constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers, and the books of accounts
all of which are certified under oath by the Secretary or Treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter
and attested to by its President, OTHERWISE, this case will be dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

On 9 January 1995, forced-intervenor National Federation of Labor (NFL) moved for the dismissal of the petition
on grounds that petitioner has no legal personality to file the present petition for certification election and that it
failed to comply with the twenty-five percent (25%) consent requirement. It averred among others, that settled is
the rule that when a petition for certification election is filed by the federation which is merely an agent, the
petition is deemed to be filed by the local/chapter, the principal, which must be a legitimate labor organization;
that for a local to be vested with the status a legitimate labor organization, it must submit to the Bureau of Labor
Relations (BLR) or the Industrial Relations Division of the Regional Office of the Department of Labor and
Employment the following: a) charter certificate, indicating the creation or establishment of a local or chapter; b)
constitution and by-laws; c) set of officers, and d) books of accounts; that petitioner failed to submit the aforesaid
requirements necessary for its acquisition of legal personality; that compliance with the aforesaid requirements
must be made at the time of the filing of the petition within the freedom period; that the submission of the
aforesaid requirements beyond the freedom period will not operate to allow the defective petition to prosper; that
contrary to the allegation of the petitioner, the number of workers in the subject bargaining unit is 486, twenty-five
percent (25%) of which is 122; that the consent signatures submitted by the petitioner is 120 which is below the
required 25% consent requirement; that of the 120 employees who allegedly supported the petition, one (1)
executed a certification stating that the signature, Margarito Cabalhug, does not belong to him, 15 retracted, 9 of
which were made before the filing of the petition while 6 were made after the filing of the petition; and, that the
remaining 104 signatures are way below the 25% consent requirement.

On 16 January 1995, forced-intervenor filed an Addendum/Supplement to its Motion to Dismiss, together with the
certification issued by the Regional Office No. VII, this Department, attesting to the fact that the mandatory
requirements necessary for the petitioner to acquire the requisite legal personality were submitted only on 6
January 1995 and the certification issued by the BLR, this Department, stating that as of 11 January 1995, the
ANGLO-Cebu Shipyard and Engineering Work has not been reported as one of the affiliates of the Alliance of
Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organization (ANGLO). Forced intervenor alleged that it is clear from the said
certification that when the present petition was filed on 27 December 1994, petitioner and its alleged local/chapter
have no legal personality to file the same. It claimed that the fatal defect in the instant petition cannot be cured
with the submission of the requirements in question as the local/chapter may be accorded the status of a
legitimate labor organization only on 6 January 1995 which is after the freedom period expired on 31 December
1994. Forced intervenor further claimed that the documents submitted by the petitioner were procured thru
misrepresentation, and fraud, as there was no meeting on 13 November 1994 for the purpose of ratifying a
constitution and by-laws and there was no election of officers that actually took place.

On 15 February 1995, petitioner filed its opposition to the respondent's motion to dismiss. It averred among
others, that in compliance with the order of the Med-Arbiter, it submitted to the Regional Office No. VII, this
Department, the following documents; charter certificate, constitution and by-laws; statement on the set of officers
and treasurer's affidavit in lieu of the books of accounts; that the submission of the aforesaid document, as
ordered, has cured whatever defect the petition may have at the time of the filing of the petition, that at the time of
the filing of petition, the total number of rank and file employees in the respondent company was about 400 and
that the petition was supported by 120 signatures which are more than the 25% required by law; that granting
without admitting that it was not able to secure the signatures of at least 25% of the rank and file employees in
the bargaining unit, the Med-Arbiter is still empowered to order for the conduct of a certification election precisely
for the purpose of ascertaining which of the contending unions shall be the exclusive bargaining agent pursuant
to the ruling of the Supreme Court in the case of California Manufacturing Corporation vs. Hon. Undersecretary of
Labor, et al., G.R. No. 97020, June 8, 1992.

On 20 February 1995, forced-intervenor filed its reply, reiterating all its arguments and allegations contained in its
previous pleadings. It stressed that petitioner is not a legitimate labor organization at the time of the filing of the
petition and that the petitioner's submission of the mandatory requirements after the freedom period would not
cure the defect of the petition.

On 13 March 1995, the Med-Arbiter issued the assailed Resolution dismissing the petition, after finding that the
submission of the required documents evidencing the due creation of a local was made after the lapse of the
freedom period. 1

The Alliance of Nationalist Genuine Labor Organization-Kilusang Mayo Uno (ANGLO-KMU) filed an appeal from
the March 13, 1995 Med-Arbiter's resolution insisting that it is a legitimate labor organization at the time of the
filing of the petition for certification election, and claiming that whatever defect the petition may have had was
cured by the subsequent submission of the mandatory requirements.
In a Resolution dated August 8, 1995, respondent Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma, by authority of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment, set aside the Med-Arbiter's resolution and entered in lieu thereof a new
order "finding petitioner [ANGLO-KMU] as having complied with the requirements of registration at the time of
filing of the petition and remanding the records of this case to the Regional Office of origin . . . ." 2

The National Federation of Labor thus filed this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court raising the following grounds:

A. RESOLUTION OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT HON. BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA DATED 8 AUGUST 1995

AND HIS ORDER DATED 14 SEPTEMBER 1995 WERE ISSUED IN DISREGARD OF EXISTING LAWS AND
JURISPRUDENCE; AND

B. GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION IN APPLYING THE RULING IN THE CASE OF FUR V. LAGUESMA,
G.R. NO. 109251, MAY 26, 1993, IN THE PRESENT CASE.

We will not rule on the merits of the petition. Instead, we will take this opportunity to lay the rules on the
procedure for review of decisions or rulings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under the Labor Code and
its Implementing Rules. (P.D. No. 442 as amended)

In St. Martin Funeral Homes v. National Labor Relations Commission and Bienvenido Aricayos, G.R. No. 130866,
September 16, 1998, the Court re-examined the mode of judicial review with respect to decisions of the National
Labor Relations Commission.

The course taken by decisions of the NLRC and those of the Secretary of Labor and Employment are tangent,
but all are within the umbra of the Labor Code of the Philippines and its implementing rules. On this premise, we
find that the very same rationale in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC finds application here, leading ultimately to
the same disposition as in that leading case.

We have always emphatically asserted our power to pass upon the decisions and discretionary acts of the NLRC
well as the Secretary of Labor in the face of the contention that no judicial review is provided by the Labor Code.
We stated in San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor 3 thus:

. . . It is generally understood that as to a administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power

there is an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and
jurisdiction even though no right of review is given by statute (73 C.J.S. 506, note 56).

The purpose of judicial review is to keep the administrative agency within its jurisdiction and protect substantial
rights of parties affected by its decision (73 C.J.S. 507, Sec. 165). It is part of the system of checks and balances
which restricts the separation of powers and forestalls arbitrary and unjust adjudications.

Considering the above dictum and as affirmed by decisions of this Court, St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC
succinctly pointed out, the remedy of an aggrieved party is to timely file a motion for reconsideration as a
precondition for any further or subsequent remedy, and then seasonably file a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The propriety of Rule 65 as a remedy was highlighted in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, where the legislative
history of the pertinent statutes on judicial review of cases decided under the Labor Code was traced, leading to
and supporting the thesis that "since appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court were eliminated, the
legislative intendment was that the special civil action of certiorari was and still is the proper vehicle for judicial
review of decision of the NLRC" 4 and consequently "all references in the amended Section 9 of B.P. No. 129 to
supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to
petitions for certiorari under Rule 65." 5

Proceeding therefrom and particularly considering that the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 is within
the concurrent original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, St. Martin Funeral Homes v.
NLRC concluded and directed that all such petitions should be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict
observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.
In the original rendering of the Labor Code, Art. 222 thereof provided that the decisions of the NLRC are
appealable to the Secretary of Labor on specified grounds. 6 The decisions of the Secretary of Labor may be
appealed to the President of the Philippines subject to such conditions or limitations as the President may direct.

Thus under the state of the law then, this Court had ruled that original actions for certiorari and prohibition filed
with this Court against the decision of the Secretary of Labor passing upon the decision of the NLRC were
unavailing for mere error of judgment as there was a plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
of law, which was an appeal to the President. We said in the 1975 case, Scott v. Inciong, 7quoting Nation Multi
Service Labor Union v. Acgoaili: 8 "It is also a matter of significance that there was an appeal to the President. So it is
explicitly provided by the Decree. That was a remedy both adequate and appropriate. It was in line with the executive
determination, after the proclamation of martial law, to leave the solution of labor disputes as much as possible to
administrative agencies and correspondingly to limit judicial participation." 9

Significantly, we also asserted in Scott v. Inciong that while appeal did not lie, the corrective power of this Court
by a writ of certiorari was available whenever a jurisdictional issue was raised or one of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to a lack or excess thereof, citing San Miguel Corporation v. Secretary of Labor. 10

P.D. No. 1367 11amending certain provisions of the Labor Code eliminated appeals to the President, but gave the
President the power to assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest cases. The
subsequent P.D. No. 1391, 12 enacted "to insure speedy labor justice and further stabilize industrial peace", further
eliminated appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor but the President still continued to exercise his power to
assume jurisdiction over any cases which he considered national interest
cases. 13

Though appeals from the NLRC to the Secretary of Labor were eliminated, presently there are several instances
in the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules where an appeal can be filed with the Office of the
Secretary of Labor or the Secretary of Labor issues a ruling, to wit:

(1) Under the Rules and Regulations Governing Recruitment and Placement Agencies for Local Employment 14

dated June 5, 1997 superseding certain provisions of Book I (Pre-Employment) of the implementing rules, the decision
of the Regional Director on complaints against agencies is appealable to the Secretary of Labor within ten (10) working
days from receipt of a copy of the order, on specified grounds, whose decision shall be final and inappealable.

(2) Art. 128 of the Labor Code provides that an order issued by the duly authorized representative of the
Secretary of Labor in labor standards cases pursuant to his visitorial and enforcement power under said article
may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor.

Sec. 2 in relation to Section 3 (a), Rule X, Book III (Conditions of Employment) of the implementing rules gives
the Regional Director the power to order and administer compliance with the labor standards provisions of the
Code and other labor legislation. Section 4 gives the Secretary the power to review the order of the Regional
Director, and the Secretary's decision shall be final and executory.

Sec. 1, Rule IV (Appeals) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in the Regional Offices dated
September 16, 1987 15 provides that the order of the Regional Director in labor standards cases shall be final and
executory unless appealed to the Secretary of Labor.

Sec. 5, Rule V (Execution) provides that the decisions, orders or resolutions of the Secretary of Labor and
Employment shall become final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the case records. The
filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the order or decision
unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court within fifteen (15) calendar days
from the date of finality of the order or decision or posts a supersedeas bond.

Sec. 6 of Rule VI (Health and Safety Cases) provides that the Secretary of Labor at his own initiative or upon the
request of the employer and/or employee may review the order of the Regional Director in occupational health
and safety cases. The Secretary's order shall be final and executory.

(2) Art. 236 provides that the decision of the Labor Relations Division in the regional office denying an applicant
labor organization, association or group of unions or workers' application for registration may be appealed by the
applicant union to the Bureau of Labor Relations within ten (10) days from receipt of notice thereof.

Sec. 4, Rule V, Book V (Labor Relations), as amended by Department Order No. 9 dated May 1, 1997 16 provides

that the decision of the Regional Office denying the application for registration of a workers association whose place of
operation is confined to one regional jurisdiction, or the Bureau of Labor Relations denying the registration of a
federation, national or industry union or trade union center may be appealed to the Bureau or the Secretary as the case
may be who shall decide the appeal within twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the records of the case.

(3) Art. 238 provides that the certificate of registration of any legitimate organization shall be canceled by the
Bureau of Labor Relations if it has reason to believe, after due hearing, that the said labor organization no longer
meets one or more of the requirements prescribed by law.

Sec. 4, Rule VIII, Book V provides that the decision of the Regional Office or the Director of the Bureau of Labor
Relations may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt thereof by the aggrieved party to the Director of the
Bureau or the Secretary of Labor, as the case may be, whose decision shall be final and executory.

(4) Art. 259 provides that any party to a certification election may appeal the order or results of the election as
determined by the Med-Arbiter directly to the Secretary of Labor who shall decide the same within fifteen (15)
calendar days.

Sec. 12, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the petition for certification election may
be appealed to the Secretary.

Sec. 15, Rule XI, Book V provides that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on an appeal from the Med-Arbiter's
decision on a petition for certification election shall be final and executory. The implementation of the decision of
the Secretary affirming the decision to conduct a certification election shall not be stayed unless restrained by the
appropriate court.

Sec. 15, Rule XII, Book V provides that the decision of the Med-Arbiter on the results of the certification election
may be appealed to the Secretary within ten (10) days from receipt by the parties of a copy thereof, whose
decision shall be final and executory.

Sec. 7, Rule XVIII (Administration of Trade Union Funds and Actions Arising Therefrom), Book V provides that
the decision of the Bureau in complaints filed directly with said office pertaining to administration of trade union
funds may be appealed to the Secretary of Labor within ten (10) days from receipt of the parties of a copy
thereof.

Sec. 1, Rule XXIV (Execution of Decisions, Awards, or Orders), Book V provides that the decision of the
Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by the parties
unless otherwise specifically provided for in Book V.

(5) Art. 263 provides that the Secretary of Labor shall decide or resolve the labor dispute over which he assumed
jurisdiction within thirty (30) days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction. His decision shall be final and
executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties.

From the foregoing we see that the Labor Code and its implementing and related rules generally do not provide
for any mode for reviewing the decision of the Secretary of Labor. It is further generally provided that the decision
of the Secretary of Labor shall be final and executory after ten (10) days from notice. Yet, like decisions of the
NLRC which under Art. 223 of the Labor Code become final after ten (10) days, 17 decisions of the Secretary of
Labor come to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari even beyond the ten-day period provided in the Labor Code
and the implementing rules but within the reglementary period set for Rule 65 petitions under the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. For example, in M. Ramirez Industries v. Secretary of Labor, 18 assailed was respondent's order affirming
the Regional Director's having taken cognizance of a case filed pursuant to his visitorial powers under Art. 128 (a) of
the Labor Code; in Samahang Manggagawa sa Permex v. Secretary of
Labor, 19 assailed was respondent's order setting aside the Med-Arbiter's dismissal a petition for certification election;
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 20 assailed was respondent's order affirming the Med-
Arbiter's decision on the results of a certification election; in Philtread Workers Union v. Confessor, 21 assailed was
respondent's order issued under Art. 263 certifying a labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration.
In two instances, however, there is specific mention of a remedy from the decision of the Secretary of Labor,
thus:

(1) Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the amended implementing rules provides that the decision of the Secretary of
Labor on appeal from the Med-Arbiter's decision on a petition for certification election shall be final and
executory, but that the implementation of the Secretary's decision affirming the Med-Arbiter's decision to conduct
a certification election "shall not be stayed unless restrained by the appropriate court."

(2) Section 5, Rule V (Execution) of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices
provides that "the filing of a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court shall not stay the execution of the
[appealed] order or decision unless the aggrieved party secures a temporary restraining order from the Court."

We perceive no conflict with our pronouncements on the proper remedy which is Rule 65 and which should be
initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts. Accordingly, we
read "the appropriate court" in Section 15, Rule XI, Book V of the Implementing Rules to refer to the Court of
Appeals.

Sec. 5, Rule V of the Rules on the Disposition of Labor Standards Cases in Regional Offices specifying the
Supreme Court as the forum for filing the petition for certiorari is not infirm in like manner or similarly as is the
statute involved in Fabian v. Desierto. 22 And Section 5 cannot be read to mean that the petition for certiorari can only
be filed exclusively and solely with this Court, as the provision must invariably be read in relation to the pertinent laws
on the concurrent original jurisdiction of this Court and the Court of Appeals in Rule 65 petitions.

In fine, we find that it is procedurally feasible as well as practicable that petitions for certiorari under Rule 65
against the decision of the Secretary of Labor rendered under the Labor Code and its implementing and related
rules be filed initially in the Court of Appeals. Paramount consideration is strict observance of the doctrine on the
hierarchy of the courts, emphasized in St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC, on "the judicial policy that this Court
will not entertain direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts or
where exceptional and compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for the exercise
of our preliminary jurisdiction." 23

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, certiorari, together with all pertinent records REFERRED to the Court of
Appeals for disposition.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 23-27

2 Id., at 29.

3 64 SCRA 56(1975). Cited fn 11 St. Martin Funeral Homes v. NLRC.

4 At pp. 13-14.

5 At p. 15.

6 Art. 223. . . .

(a) If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion;

(b) If made purely on questions of law; and

(c) If there is a showing that the national security or social and economic stability is threatened.

7 68 SCRA 473 (1975).

8 64 SCRA 274 (1975).

9 Also Confederation of Citizens Labor Unions (CCLU) v. National Labor Relations Commission, 60 SCRA 450
(1974).

10 See footnote no. 3.

11 Entitled "Further Amending Certain Provisions of Book V of Presidential Decree No. 442,Otherwise Known as
the Labor Code of the Philippines, As Amended." Issued May 1, 1978.

12 Entitled "Amending Book V of the Labor Code of the Philippines to Insure Speedy Labor Justice and Further
Stabilize Industrial Peace." Issued May 29, 1978.

13 Sec. 7, Rule II of the Rules Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1391 effective September 15, 1978
provides that "[t]here shall henceforth be no appeal from decisions [of the Commission] to the Minister of Labor
except as provided in PD 1367 and its implementing rules concerning appeals to the Prime Minister, and the
decisions of the Commission en banc or any of its Divisions shall be final and executory.

14 Issued by then Secretary of Labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing pursuant to Art. 5 of the Labor Code.

15 Issued by then Secretary of Labor and Employment Franklin M. Drilon.

16 Issued by the Secretiily of labor Leonardo A. Quisumbing.

17 Observation made in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC.

18 266 SCRA 111 (1997).

19 G.R. No. 107792, March 2, 1998.

20 267 SCRA 303 (1997).

21 269 SCRA 393 (1997).

22 G.R. No. 129742, September 16, 191)8, where we declared invalid Section 27 of R.A. No. 6770 (Ombudsman
Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the Office of
the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the aforesaid Act and insofar as they
provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the office of the Ombudsman to the Supreme Court,
on the ground that these violate the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which
increases the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.

We note parenthetically that rules and regulations issued by administrative or executive officers in accordance
with, and as authorized by, law have the force and effect of law or partake the nature of a statute. Victorias Milling
Co., Inc. v. Social Security Commission, 114 Phil.555 (1962).

23 Santiago v. Vasquez, 217 SCRA 633(1993), cited at p. 15.

Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 178 [1989]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
 Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 93016 July 3, 1992

UNITED ALUMINUM FABRICATORS, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, and KAISAHAN NG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO
(KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN), respondents.

G.R. No. 93079 July 3, 1992

UNITED ALUMINUM FABRICATORS WORKERS UNION, petitioner,

vs.
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, ASSISTANT SECRETARY CRESENCIANO F.
TRAJANO, DIRECTOR LUNA C. PIEZAS, REPRESENTATION OFFICERS EUSEBIO JIMENEZ & ADELAIDA
GREGORIO, KAISAHAN NG MANGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) & UNITED ALUMINUM
FABRICATORS, respondents.

PARAS, J.:

These two consolidated cases are petitions for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order which
seek to annul and set aside the: (a) decision of the then Sec. of Labor and Employment Franklin M. Drilon dated
November 24, 1989 in OS-M-A-9-194-89 (NCR-OD-M-7-511-89) entitled "In re: petition for Direct
Certification/Certification Election at United Aluminum Fabricators, Kaisahan ng Manggagawang Pilipino
(KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN) v. United Aluminum Fabricators and United Aluminum Fabricators Workers' Union" by
setting aside the order of Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin dated August 15, 1989 and ordering the conduct of
certification election notwithstanding the existence of a duly ratified and registered collective bargaining
agreement between United Aluminum Fabricators and United Aluminum Fabricators Workers' Union; (b) order of
Sec. of Labor and Employment Ruben Torres dated February 28, 1990 denying the motions for reconsideration;
and (c) order of Sec. of Labor and Employment Ruben Torres dated April 25, 1990 denying the second motion for
reconsideration.

The facts of the case are as follows:

United Aluminum Fabricators Workers' Union (UAFWU for short) is the exclusive bargaining representative of the
rank-and-file employees of the United Aluminum Fabricators (United Aluminum for short). They entered into a
collective bargaining agreement (CBA for short).The said CBA is for a period of three (3) years beginning April 1,
1986 to April 29, 1989. This agreement was registered with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE for
short) (Rollo, G.R. No. 93070, p. 5).

Before the expiration of the said CBA on April 29, 1989, and considering that no petition for certification election
had been filed nor a similar petition was likely to be filed within the remaining twenty six (26) days of the freedom
period and no petition questioning the majority status of UAFWU was filed with the DOLE within the freedom
period, United Aluminum and UAFWU renegotiated a new CBA (Rollo, G.R. No. 93016, p. 5; Annex D, pp. 45-
55).

On April 3, 1989, United Aluminum and UAFWU executed a new CBA for five (5) years in accordance with R.A.
6715 to take effect upon the expiration of the old CBA or on April 29, 1989 (Ibid.).

The five (5) year CBA was filed, registered and recorded in the log book of the docket section of the National
Capital Region office of the DOLE on the same date it was executed and clearly written in the entry is that the
CBA consists of fourteen (14) pages with ratification, posting, minutes of the meeting etc. (Rollo, G.R. No. 93079,
pp. 5-6; G.R. No. 93016, p. 57).

On July 7, 1989, sixty nine (69) days or more than two (2) months after the expiry date of the so-called freedom
period and after the conclusion and registration of the CBA between United Aluminum and UAFWU, KAMPIL filed
a petition for direct certification/certification election with the DOLE. It alleged that it is a legitimate labor
organization duly registered with the DOLE under registration Certificate No. (Fed. 509) — 7793-IP and may be
notified at Rooms 503-507 Insurance Bldg., Gen. Luna, Intramuros, Manila; that United Aluminum is a private
entity engaged in the manufacture of wire, glass, jalousies and other related products and may be notified at Km.
19, No. 1128 Quirino Highway, Novaliches, Quezon City, Metro Manila. It was also alleged therein that there are
more or less 170 regular rank-and-file employees in the company and that to its knowledge there is no existing
union and more than twenty-five percent (25%) of the workers have joined or are directly affiliated with it (Rollo,
G.R. No. 93079, pp. 9-10; Annex E, p. 52).

Accordingly, United Aluminum filed a motion to dismiss KAMPIL's petition for certification election on the grounds
that it has an existing and duly registered CBA with UAFWU which is a bar to any petition for certification election
and that said petition is not supported by the employees bargaining unit. In support of its motion to dismiss,
United Aluminum submitted the following documentary evidence, viz:

(i) A copy of the new CBA executed on April 3, 1989, between United Aluminum and UAFWU (Rollo, G.R. No.
93016, Annex D, pp.
43-55).

(ii) A Certification dated November 28, 1989 issued by Atty. Ferdinand L. Magabilin, Chief, Industrial Relations
Division (NCR-DOLE), attesting that:

. . . there is an existing CBA between United aluminum and UAFWU as of April 3, 1989 as filed with this office.

This Certification supersedes the one issued to Ms. Jenny Capa dated June 15, 1989 in view of the error in the
indexing of records where apparently, the name of the corporation was inadvertently used. (Rollo, G.R. No.
93016, pp. 6-7; Annex F, p. 58)

(iii) Proofs of ratification of the CBA by majority of the employees of United Aluminum. (Rollo, Ibid., p. 7; Annexes
G-J, pp.
59-62).

UAFWU having learned of the pendency of the above petition filed by KAMPIL, immediately filed a motion for
leave to intervene dated July 31, 1989, alleging that it has an interest in the outcome of the case so that any
order, ruling decision or resolution that may be issued or promulgated in the case will inevitably affect the movant
union and its members who constitute the majority of the workers within the appropriate collective bargaining
unity of the rank-and-file workers; and that any encroachment or pendency of case/s similar to the case will
hamper, impair or affect the smooth implementation of the existing CBA (Rollo, G.R. No. 93079, p. 10; Annex F,
p. 54).

On August 15, 1989, Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin, issued an order, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for direct certification/certification election is hereby dismissed
for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, G.R. No. 93016, Annex K, p. 69)

KAMPIL appealed from the aforesaid August 15, 1989 order of Med-Arbiter Anastacio L. Bactin.

On November 24, 1989, the then Sec. of Labor Franklin M. Drilon, rendered its decision, the dispositive part of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 15 August 1989 is hereby set-aside. A
certification election is hereby ordered conducted among the rank-and-file workers of the United Aluminum
Fabricators with the following choices:

1. KAISAHAN ANG MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO (KAMPIL-KATIPUNAN)

2. UNITED ALUMINUM FABRICATORS WORKERS UNION; and

3. NO UNION.

The company's payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition shall be the bases of the list of eligible
voters.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, G.R. No. 93079, Annex I, pp. 68-69).

UAFWU filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid decision as well as a supplement to motion for
reconsideration. United Aluminum also filed a motion for reconsideration and a supplement for reconsideration
(Rollo, Ibid., p. 16).

On February 28, 1990, Sec. Ruben D. Torres, the new Sec. of Labor, issued an order denying the motions for
reconsideration, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motions are hereby denied for lack of merit and the Decision sought to
be reconsidered sustained.

Let therefore, the conduct of the certification election proceed immediately.

No further motion of a similar nature shall hereinafter be entertained.

SO ORDERED. (Rollo, Ibid., Annex J, p. 73).

Hence, United Aluminum's and UAFWU's second motions for reconsideration filed separately, were again denied
by Sec. Torres in his order dated April 25, 1990 (Rollo, Memorandum for United Aluminum, p. 399; Annex C, pp.
41-42; G.R. No. 93016).

Hence, these petitions.

As prayed for in the petition, the Second Division of this Court in its resolution dated May 3, 1990 issued a
temporary restraining order, restraining respondents from conducting the scheduled pre-election conference and
the subsequent certification election under Case No. OS-MA-A-9194-89 (NCR-OD-M-7-511-89) (Rollo, G.R. No.
93016, Resolution, p. 96) and on July 4, 1990 resolved to consolidate G.R. Nos. 93016 & 93079 (Rollo, G.R. No.
93016, Resolution, p. 190).

On October 31, 1990, KAMPIL filed a manifestation stating that its individual members are no longer interested in
the further prosecution of their case in view of their agreement entered into with United Aluminum (Rollo, Ibid.,
pp. 266-267).

In a resolution dated September 25, 1991, the Court gave due course to these petitions and required both parties
to submit their respective memoranda (Rollo, Ibid., p. 259).

On October 23, 1991, the Solicitor General filed a manifestation stating that they be excused from filing the
Memorandum (Rollo, Ibid., p. 260). Likewise, KAMPIL manifested that they be excluded from the filing of the
memorandum (Rollo, Ibid., p. 263).

Both UAFWU and UFA filed their respective memoranda, the UAFWU, on December 2, 1991 (G.R. No. 93079,
Rollo, pp. 123-126) and the UAF on December 6, 1991 (G.R. No. 93016, Rollo, pp. 391-417).
In a resolution dated February 24, 1992, the Court calendared the case for deliberation (Rollo, Ibid., p. 427).

The pivotal issue in these two consolidated cases is whether or not public respondent committed grave abuse of
discretion in ordering the conduct of a certification election notwithstanding the existence of a valid CBA.

But because of KAMPIL's aforementioned manifestation which in effect is a withdrawal from the case, there
appears to be no reason to pass upon the parties' varied contentions.

In addition law and jurisprudence fully support the merits of the petition Article 232 of the Labor Code, provides
that:

Art. 232. Prohibition on Certification Election — The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification
election or any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective bargaining
agreements affecting the parties except under Article 353-A and 256 of this Code.

Corollary thereto Rule V, Sec. 3, Book V of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Labor Code provides
in effect that if a collective bargaining agreement validly exists, a petition for certification election can only be
entertained within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of said agreement (Pagkakaisa ng mga Manggagawa sa
Triumph Int'l.-United Lumber and General Workers of the Philippines v. Ferrer-Calleja, 181 SCRA 119, 1990).

A petition for direct certification filed before or after the sixty-day freedom period shall be dismissed outright
(Liberty Commercial Center, Inc., v. Ferrer-Calleja, 175 SCRA 483; 1989).

KAMPIL's petition for certification election was filed on July 7, 1989 or 69 days after the expiration of the Freedom
Period.

The rule prohibits the filing of a petition for certification election during the existence of a CBA except within the
freedom period of sixty (60) days (Associated Trade Union [ATU] v, Trajano, 162 SCRA 318, 1988). In the case
at bar, while the sixty (60) day freedom period was in operation between February 28 to April 29, 1989 there was
no other labor organization questioning nor challenging the majority status of herein UAFWU so much so that it
had no impediment under the law to enter into a new CBA with the United Aluminum with a life span of five (5)
years beginning from April 29, 1989 up to April 28, 1994, in accordance with law (R.A. 6715).

The CBA with all the requirements attached to it were submitted and registered on April 13, 1989 with the DOLE
for record purposes. The submission and registration were attested to and certified to by the Chief of the
Industrial Relations Division and the Record Officer III on November 28, 1989 and December 6, 1989,
respectively. The required document was also written and reflected in the log book of the docket section for the
April 3, 1989 period.

Undoubtedly, therefore, when KAMPIL filed a petition for certification election, there was a valid and existing CBA
between UAFWU and United Aluminum effective until 1994, which constituted a bar to the holding of the
certification election in question.

Furthermore, the records show that KAMPIL's petition was not supported by the written consent of at least 20%
of the rank-and-file employees of the company, to make it mandatory for the Bureau to order a certification
election (Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180 SCRA 749, 1989). In fact failure to determine with legal
certainty whether the union enjoyed majority representation may be ground to nullify the certification election
(Associated Labor Union [ALU] v. Ferrer-Calleja, 173 SCRA 178, 1989).

Under the circumstances, it is evident that public respondent gravely abused his discretion in setting aside the
Orders of Med-Arbiter and ordering the conduct of certification election among the rank-and-file employees
notwithstanding the existence of a duly ratified and collective bargaining agreement between the petitioners UAF
and UAFWU.

PREMISES CONSIDERED, (a) both petitions in G.R. Nos. 93016 and 93079 are GRANTED; (b) the assailed
decision to the public respondents are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE; (c) the Order of Med-Arbiter Anastacio L.
Bactin dated August 15, 1989 is REINSTATED; and (d) the temporary restraining order issued in G.R. No. 93016
is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.

Narvasa, C.J., took no part.

Port Workers Union etc. v. Undersecretary of Labor, 207 SCRA 329 [1992]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 94929-30 March 18, 1992

PORT WORKERS UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES (PWUP), petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE UNDERSECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA,
ATTY. ANASTACIO L. BACTIN, MED-ARBITER NCR-DOLE, Public Respondents; INTERNATIONAL
CONTAINER TERMINAL SERVICES, INC., (ICTSI) and ASSOCIATED PORT CHECKERS AND WORKERS
UNION (APCWU), Private Respondents; SANDIGAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA DAUNGAN (SAMADA) and
PORT EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION AND LABOR UNION (PEALU), Nominal Private Respondents,
respondents.

CRUZ, J.:

There was muffled excitement among the workers of the International Container Terminal Services, Inc. (ICTSI)
because its collective bargaining agreement with private respondents Associate Port Checkers and Workers
Union (APCWU), the incumbent union, was due to expire on April 14, 1990. Other unions were seeking to
represent the laborers in the negotiation of the next CBA and were already plotting their moves.

The first challenge to APCWU was hurled on March 14, 1990, when the Sandigan ng Manggagawa sa Daungan
(SAMADA) filed a petition for certification election. The consent signatures of at least 25% of the employees in
the bargaining unit were submitted on March 26, 1990, or eleven days after the petition.

On April 2, 1990, herein petitioner Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) filed a petition for intervention.

Still another petition for certification election was filed by the Port Employees Association and Labor Union
(PEALU), on April 6, 1990. The consent signatures were submitted on May 11, 1990, or thirty-five days after the
filing of the petition.

The petitions of SAMADA and PEALU were consolidated for joint decision. On April 26, 1990, APCWU filed a
motion to dismiss them on the ground that they did not comply with the requirement set forth in Section 6, Rule V,
Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted in part as follows:

In a petition involving an organized establishment or enterprise where the majority status of the incumbent
collective bargaining union is questioned through a verified petition by a legitimate labor organization, the Med-
Arbiter shall immediately order the certification election by secret ballot if the petition is filed during the last sixty
(60) days of the collective bargaining agreement and supported by the written consent of at least twenty-five
percent (25%) of all the employees in the bargaining unit. Any petition filed before or after the sixty-day freedom
period shall be dismissed outright. The twenty-five percent (25%) requirement shall be satisfied upon the filing of
the petition, otherwise the petition shall be dismissed. (Emphasis supplied.)

Specifically, APCWU faulted both petitions for non-compliance with the requirement for the 25% consent
signatures at the time of filing. This contention was upheld by the Med-Arbiter in an order dated June 5, 1990,
dismissing the consolidated petitions. 1

PWUP appealed to the Secretary of Labor on June 28, 1990, arguing that Article 256 of the Labor Code did not
require the written consent to be submitted simultaneously with the petition for certification election. The principal
petitioners did not appeal. On August 21, 1990, DOLE Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma affirmed the order
of the Med-Arbiter and dismissed PWUP's appeal. 2

Thereafter, ICTSI and APCWU resumed negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, which was
concluded on September 28, 1990. This was ratified on October 7, 1990, by a majority of the workers in the
bargaining unit, i.e., 910 out of the 1,223 members, and subsequently registered with the DOLE.

PWUP is now before us, claiming grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public respondent in the application
of Article 256 of the Labor Code. The article provides in part as follows:

Art. 256. Representation issue in organized establishments. — In organized establishments, when a verified
petition questioning the majority status of the incumbent bargaining agent is filed before the Department of Labor
and Employment within the sixty-day period before the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement, the
Med-Arbiter shall automatically order an election by secret ballot when the verified petition is supported by the
written consent of at least twenty-five (25%) percent of all the employees in the bargaining unit to ascertain the
will of the employees in the appropriate bargaining unit. . . .

The petitioner argues that under this article, the Med-Arbiter should automatically order election by secret ballot
when the petition is supported by at least 25% of all employees in the bargaining unit. SAMADA and PEALU
substantially complied with the law when they submitted the required consent signatures several days after filing
the petition. The petitioner complains that the dismissal of the petitions for certification election, including its own
petition for intervention, had the effect of indirectly certifying APCWU as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the ICTSI employees.

Private respondent ICTSI maintains that the dismissal was based on Article 256 of the Labor Code as
implemented by Section 6, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, quoted above. Moreover, under Section
10, Rule V, Book V of the Implementing Rules, decisions of the Secretary in certification election cases shall be
final and unappealable.

ICTSI also cites the following ruling of this Court in Tupas v. Inciong: 3

We find no merit in the petition. As observed by the Solicitor General, while the petition of TUPAS for a
certification election may have the written support of 30 per cent of all the workers of the bargaining unit, it is also
an undisputed fact that UMI (the rival union of TUPAS) has a clear majority of the said workers, as shown by the
fact that 499 workers out of the total working force of 641 have not only ratified the collective bargaining
agreement concluded between UMI and LUSTEVECO, but also affirmed their membership in UMI so that there is
no more need for holding a certification election. (Emphasis supplied.)

For its part, APCWU questions PWUP's personality in these proceedings in view of the lack of consent signatures
in its petition, and argues as well that the petitioner has no authority to represent SAMADA or PEALU, which had
not appealed. The private respondent also invokes Tupas and maintains that the ratification of the new CBA by
the majority of the workers was an affirmation of their membership in the union that negotiated that agreement.

In his own Comment, the Solicitor General agrees with the petitioner that there has been substantial compliance
with the requirements of the law. He submits that Article 256 should be liberally interpreted pursuant to Article 4
of the Labor Code, stating as follows:

Art. 4. Construction in favor of labor. — All doubts in the implementation and interpretation of the provisions of
this Code including its implementing rules and regulations, shall be resolved in favor of labor.

The Court has deliberated on the arguments of the parties in their respective pleadings and finds for the
petitioner.

We have held that pursuant to the constitutional provision guaranteeing workers the right to self-organization and
collective bargaining, "the constant and unwavering policy of this Court" has been "to require a certification
election as the best means of ascertaining which labor organization should be the collective bargaining
representative." 4

The certification election is the most democratic and expeditious method by which the laborers can freely
determine the union that shall act as their representative in their dealings with the establishment where they are
working. 5 As we stressed in Belyca Corporation vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 6 the holding of a certification election is a statutory
policy that should not be circumvented.

This Court also held in Western Agusan Workers Union-Local 101 of the United Lumber and General Workers of
the Philippines vs. Trajano: 7

. . . it has long been settled that the policy of the Labor Code is indisputably partial to the holding of a certification
election so as to arrive in a manner definitive and certain concerning the choice of the labor organization to
represent the workers in a collective bargaining unit. Conformably to said basic concept, this Court recognized
that the Bureau of Labor Relations in the exercise of sound discretion, may order a certification election
notwithstanding the failure to meet the 30% requirement. (Scout Ramon V. Albano Memorial College v. Noriel, 85
SCRA 494 [1978]; Vicmico Industrial Wokers Asso. v. Noriel, 131 SCRA 569 [1984])

In line with the policy, we feel that the administrative rule requiring the simultaneous submission of the 25%
consent signatures upon the filing of petition for certification election should not be strictly applied to frustrate the
determination of the legitimate representative of the workers. Significantly, the requirement in the rule is not found
in Article 256, the law it seeks to implement. This is all the more reason why the regulation should at best be
given only a directory effect. Accordingly, we hold that the mere filing of a petition for certification election within
the freedom period is sufficient basis for the issuance of an order for the holding of a certification election, 8 subject
to the submission of the consent signatures within a reasonable period from such filing.

This interpretation is consonant with Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 9
where we declared:

. . . even conceding that the statutory requirement of 30% of the labor force asking for a certification election had
not been strictly complied with, respondent Director is still empowered to order that it be held precisely for the
purpose of ascertaining which (of the contending labor organizations) shall be the exclusive collective bargaining
representative. (National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, et al., 83 SCRA 607)

It is not denied that the petition to intervene filed by PWUP did not carry the 25% consent signatures, but that the
requirement is in fact not applicable to a petition in intervention. We so held in PAFLU v. Ferrer-Calleja thus: 10

It is crystal clear from the said provisions that the requisite written consent of at least 20% of the workers in the
bargaining unit applies to petitioners for certification election only and not to motions for intervention. . . . As long
as the motion for intervention has been properly and timely filed and the intervention would not cause any
injustice to anyone, it should not be denied and this is so even if the eventual purpose of the Motion for
Intervention is to participate in the Certification Election. After all, the original applicant had already met the 20%
requirement.

The contention that the petitioners had no right to represent the principal petitioners which had not appealed the
dismissal order is also not acceptable. We repeat that the certification election is not litigation but a mere
investigation of a non-adversary character where the rules of procedure are not strictly applied. 11 Technical rules
and objections should not hamper the correct ascertainment of the labor union that has the support of confidence of the
majority of the workers and is thus entitled to represent them in their dealings with management.

The above-quoted decision affirms the right of PWUP to call for the holding of the election although it was initially
only an intervenor. That recognition should not be defeated by the circumstance that the other petitioning unions
have not seen fit to appeal the dismissal of their petitions even if such dismissal was questionable and is in fact
being reversed here. The petition for intervention was viable at the time it was filed because the principal petitions
had complied with the requirement for the consent signatures as specified by Article 256. Hence, its intervention
should not be disallowed simply because of the withdrawal or failure to appeal of SAMADA and PEALU.

It is correct to say that as a matter of strict procedure, a petition for intervention should be deemed automatically
dismissed where the principal petition itself fails. However, that technical rule should be allowed to prevent a
correct determination of the real representative of the workers in line with their constitutional rights to self-
organization and collective bargaining.

Regarding the invocation of Inciong by the private respondents, the Court has modified that decision in
Associated Labor Unions vs. Calleja, 12 where we held:

Finally, the petitioner assails the decision of the respondent Director on the ground that "the ratification of the
collective bargaining agreement renders the certification election moot and academic."

This contention finds no basis in law.

The petitioner was obviously referring to the contract-bar rule where the law prohibits the holding of certification
elections during the lifetime of the collective bargaining agreement. Said agreement was hastily and prematurely
entered into apparently in an attempt to avoid the holding of a certification election.

Deviation from the contract-bar rule is justified only where the need for industrial stability is clearly shown to be
imperative. 13 Subject to this singular exception, contracts where the identity of the authorized representative of the
workers is in doubt must be rejected in favor of a more certain indication of the will of the workers. As we stated in
Philippine Association of Free Labor Union vs. Estrella, 14 any stability that does not establish the type of industrial
peace contemplated by the law must be subordinated to the employees' freedom to choose their real representative.

The private respondents contend that the overwhelming ratification of the CBA is an affirmation of their
membership in the bargaining agent, rendering the representation issue moot and academic and conclusively
barring the holding of a certification election thereon. That conclusion does not follow. Even Tupas did not say
that the mere ratification of the CBA by the majority of the workers signified their affirmation of membership in the
negotiating union. That case required, first, ratification of the CBA, the second, affirmation of membership in the
negotiating union. The second requirement has not been established in the case at bar as the record does not
show that the majority of the workers, besides ratifying the new CBA, have also formally affiliated with APCWU.

Section 4, Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code provides that the representation
case shall not be adversely affected by a collective agreement submitted before or during the last 60 days of a
subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation case. As the new CBA was entered into at the
time when the representation case was still pending, it follows that it cannot be recognized as the final agreement
between the ICTSI and its workers.

On the allegation that the decision of the Secretary of Labor on certification election is final and inappealable, this
Court held in San Miguel Corp. v. Secretary of Labor 15 that:

It is generally understood that as to administrative agencies exercising quasi-judicial or legislative power there is
an underlying power in the courts to scrutinize the acts of such agencies on questions of law and jurisdiction even
though no right of review is given by statute. (73, C.J.S. 506, note 56). . . . judicial review is proper in case of lack
of jurisdiction, grave abuse of discretion. error of law, fraud or collusion (Timbancaya v. Vicente, 82 O.G. 9424;
Macatangay v. Secretary of Public Works and Communication, 63 O.G. 11236; Ortua v. Singson Encarnacion, 59
Phil. 440).

There was indeed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of public
respondents when they dismissed the petitions for certification election because the consent signatures had not
been submitted simultaneously with the petition. The issue of majority representation thus remains open and
awaits settlement. Following the rulings above-quoted, we hereby declare that the newly-concluded CBA cannot
constitute a bar to the holding of a certification election.

It is possible that the APCWU will prevail in the certification election, in which event the new CBA it concluded
with ICTSI will be upheld and recognized. It is also possible that another union will be chosen, in which event it
will have to enter into its own negotiations with ICTSI that may result in the adoption of a new CBA. In the
meantime, however, the old CBA having expired, it is necessary to lay down the rules regulating the relations of
the workers with the management. For this reason, the Court hereby orders that the new CBA concluded by
ICTSI and APCWU shall remain effective between the parties, subject to the result and effects of the certification
election to be called.

The certification election is the best method of determining the will of the workers on the crucial question of who
shall represent them in their negotiations with the management for a collective bargaining agreement that will
best protect and promote their interests. It is essential that there be no collusion against this objective between an
unscrupulous management and a union covertly supporting it while professing its loyalty to labor, or at least that
the hopes of labor be not frustrated because of its representation by a union that does not enjoy its approval and
support. It is therefore sound policy that any doubt regarding the real representation of the workers be resolved in
favor of the holding of the certification election. This is preferable to the suppression of the voice of the workers
through the prissy observance of technical rules that will exalt procedure over substantial justice.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged order dated August 21, 1990, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE and the public respondent is DIRECTED to schedule and hold certification election among the workers of
the International Container Terminal Services, Inc., this to be done with all possible dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Bellosillo, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 22-29.

2 Rollo, p. 19.

3 115 SCRA 847.

4 National Mines and Allied Workers Union v. Luna, 83 SCRA 127.

5 National Association of Free Trade Unions v. Bureau of Labor Relations, 164 SCRA 12.

6 168 SCRA 184.

7 196 SCRA 622.

8 Associated Labor Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127.

9 69 SCRA 132.

10 169 SCRA 491.

11 Associated Labor Unions (ALU) vs. Ferrer-Calleja, supra.

12 175 SCRA 490.

13 Foamtex Labor Union-Tupas vs. Noriel, 72 SCRA 371.

14 170 SCRA 378.

15 64 SCRA 56.

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

Registered CBA Assn. of Independent Unions v. NLRC, 305 SCRA 219 [1999]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 120505 March 25, 1999

ASSOCIATION OF INDEPENDENT UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES (AIUP), JOEL DENSING, HENEDINO

MIRAFUENTES, CHRISTOPHER PATENTES, AND ANDRES TEJANA, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), CENAPRO CHEMICAL CORPORATION and/or GO
SING CHAN in his capacity as Managing Director, respondents.

PURISMA, J.:

The Petition for review on Certiorari at bar seeks to reinstate the Decision 1 of the Labor Arbiter insofar as it ordered
the reinstatement and payment of backwages of the four petitioners herein. The said decision was affirmed 2 in toto by
the NLRC. On February 21, 1995, however, upon motion for reconsideration of the respondent company, the NLRC
came out with a Resolution 3 modifying its decision, by deleting therefrom the award of backwages, ordering payment
of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, and declaring the loss of employment status of petitioner Joel Densing.

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, the petitioners herein, were
casual employees of respondent CENAPRO Chemicals Corporation. In the said company, the collective
bargaining representative of all rank and file employees was CENAPRO Employees Association (CCEA), with
which respondent company had a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Their CBA excluded casual employees
from membership in the incumbent union. The casual employees who have rendered at least one to six years of
service sought regularization of their employment. When their demand was denied, they formed themselves into
an organization and affiliated with the Association of Independent unions in the Philippines (AIUP). Thereafter,
AIUP filed a petition for certification election, which petition was opposed by the respondent company. The CCEA
anchored its opposition on the contract bar rule.

On May 4 and July 3 1990, the union filed a notice of strike, minutes of strike vote, and the needed
documentation, with the Department of Labor and Employment. The notice of strike cited as grounds therefor the
acts of respondent company constituting unfair labor practice, more specifically coercion of employees and
systematic union busting.

On July 23, 1992, the union proceeded to stage a strike, in the course of which, the union perpetrated illegal acts.
The strikers padlocked the gate of the company. The areas fronting the gate of the company were barricaded and
blocked by union strikers. The strikers also prevented and coerced other non-striking employees from reporting
for work. Because of such illegal activities, the respondent company filed a petition for injunction with the NLRC,
which granted a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), enjoining the strikers from doing further acts of violence,
coercion, or intimidation and from blocking fee ingress and egress to the company premises.

Subsequently, or on July 25, 1990, to be precise, the respondent company filed a complaint for illegal strike. The
day before, July 24, 1990, petitioners filed a complaint for unfair labor practice and illegal lockout against the
respondent company.

In a consolidated Decision, dated September 10, 1993, the Labor Arbiter declares illegal the strike staged by the
petitioners, and dismissed the charge of illegal lockout and unfair labor practice. The dispositive portion of the
Labor Arbiter's decision was to the following effect:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the strike illegal and as a
consequence thereto, the officers who participated in the illegal strike namely: Oscar Enicio, Jaime dela Piedra,
Lino Isidro, Ariel Jorda, and Jose Catnubay are declared to have lost their employment status. CENAPRO is
directed however to reinstate the other workers, except Ireneo Sagaral, Artemio Guinto, Ruben Tulod, Marcelo M.
Matura, Gilbert Holdilla, Cesar Buntol, Rey Siarot, Lucio Nuneza, Jose Basco, Gervacio Baldespinosa, Jr.,
Cresecente Buntol, Dennis Pepito, Florencio Pepito, Edwin Ramayrat, Daniel Canete, and Vivencio Sinadjan who
executed quitclaims in favor of CENAPRO and cenapro is being absolved from the charges of illegal lockout and
unfair labor practice.

SO ORDERED. 4

In short, five (5) union officers were declared to have lost their employment status, fifteen (15) union members
were not reinstated because they executed quit claims in favor of the respondent company, and six (6) workers,
Rosalito Bantulan, Edward Regner, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres
Tejana, ordered to be reinstated.

On October 8, 1993, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order excluding Rosalito Bantulan and Edward Regner from the
list of those to be reinstated and to be paid backwages. The remaining four (4) workers, Joel Densing, Henedino
Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, are the petitioners here.

On October 5, 1993, the respondent company appealed the aforesaid decision insofar as it ordered the
reinstatement of some of the strikers.

On October 7, 1993, the petitioners also appealed the same decision of the Labor Arbiter.

Pending resolution of the said appeals, petitioner AUIP filed with the Labor Arbiter a Motion for Execution of the
Labor Arbiter's Decision directing reinstatement of some of its members. The motion was granted in the Order
dated October 15, 1993.

On December 7, 1993, respondent company presented Manifestation/Motion praying that instead of

reinstatement. it be allowed to pay separation pay petitioners.

On December 16, 1993, petitioners presented a motion for payroll reinstatement, which motion was opposed by
the respondent company, alleging mainly that the circumstances of the case have strained the relationship of the
parties herein, rendering their reinstatement unwise and inappropriate. But such opposition was overruled by the
Labor Arbiter. In his Order of March 23, 1994, the same Labor Arbiter issued a second writ of execution directing
actual, if not payroll reinstatement of the strikers.

On April 6, 1994, respondent company appealed the second order for the reinstatement of the strikers, placing
reliance on the same grounds raised in support of its first appeal.
In its Decision dated August 15, 1994, the NLRC affirmed in toto the Labor Arbiter's decision, dismissed both the
appeal of private respondent and that of petitioners, and reiterated the Labor Arbiter's Order for the reinstatement
of the herein petitioners, Joel Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana. The
said decision disposed and directed as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, these appeals are DISMISSED, and the decision of the Labor Arbiter is
AFFIRMED in its entirety.

Appellant Cenapro Chemical Corporation is hereby ordered to immediately comply with the Labor Arbiter's Order
dated March 23, 1994 and to release the salaries of four (4) appellant-workers namely Joel Densing, Henedino
Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana from October 15, 1993 and continue paying them up to
the time this decision has become final and executory, less earning earned elsewhere.

SO ORDERED. 5

Respondent company moved for reconsideration of that portion of the NLRC's decision ordering the
reinstatement of the said strikers.

Acting thereupon, the NLRC modified its Decision of August 15, 1994, by ordering the payment of separation pay
in lieu of the reinstatement of the petitioners, deleting the award of backwages, and declaring the loss of
employment status of Joel Densing. The dispositive portion of the Amendatory Resolution, ruled thus:

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Commission promulgated on August 15, 1994 is hereby MODIFIED. In view of
reinstatement to complainants Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, appellant-
movant CENAPRO Chemicals corporation is directed to pay them amount equivalent to one (1) month pay for
every year of service and without backwages. As regards Joel Densing, he is declared to have lost his
employment status.

SO ORDERED. 6

Hence, the present petition, theorizing that respondent NLRC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction in:

1) Entertaining the 6 April 1994 (the first appeal dated 5 October 1993) which was based on similar grounds.

2) Reversing its earlier Resolution of the first appeal promulgated 15 August 1994 by way of another
contradictory and baseless ruling promulgated on 21 February 1995.

3) Depriving Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana of their right to reinstatement and
backwages; and

4) Depriving Joel Densing of his right to reinstatement or separation pay with backwages.

It is decisively clear that although the grounds invoked in the two appeals were the same, the said appeals were
the same, the said appeals were separate and distinct remedies. Filed on October 5, 1993, the first appeal was
from the decision of Labor Arbiter Nicasio Aninon, dated September 10, 1993, seeking loss of employment status
of all the union members who participated in the illegal strike. The second appeal, dated April 6, 1994, was, in
effect, an opposition to the second writ of execution issued on March 23, 1994. The second writ pertained to the
order to effect immediate actual or payroll reinstatement of the four petitioners herein. The said appeals were
acted upon separately by the NLRC, which did not act with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining such
appeals.

When they filed the notice of strike, petitioners cited as their grounds therefor unfair labor practice, specifically
coercion of employees and systematic union busting. But the said grounds wee adjudged as baseless by the
Labor Arbiter. The court quotes with approval the following findings of Labor Arbiter Aninon, to wit:

. . . In fact, in the undated Joint Affidavit of Oscar Enecio, Edgardo Regner, Christopher Patentes, Edgar
Sanchez, Ariel Jorda, Jaime dela Piedra, the workers stated that what they considered as harassments and
insults are those when they were scolded for little mistakes and memoranda for tardiness. These acts, if really
committed cannot be considered as harassment and insults but were ordinary acts which employers have to do
as part of their administrative supervision over their employees. Moreover, Oscar Enecio's testimony that some of
his fellow union members like vice-president Jaime dela Piedra, Christopher Patentes and Henodino Mirafuentes,
were also harass when they were made to work another eight (8) hours after their tour of duty deserves scant
consideration not only because it is uncorroborated but he could not even give the dates when these workers
were made to work for sixteen (16) hours, how many instances these happened and whether or not the workers
have actually worked. 7

The court discerns no basis for altering the aforesaid findings which have been affirmed by the NLRC.

The court is not persuaded by petitioners' allegation of union busting. The NLRC correctly ruled that the strike
staged by petitioners was in the nature of a union-recognition-strike. A union-recognition-strike, as its legal
designation implies, is calculated to compel the employer to recognize one's union, and not the other contending
group, as the employees' bargaining representative to work out a collective bargaining agreement despite the
striking union's doubtful majority status to merit voluntary recognition and lack of formal certification as the
exclusive representative in the bargaining unit. It is undisputed that at the time the petition for certification election
was filed by AUIP, petitioner union, there was an existing CBA between the respondent company and CCEA, the
incumbent bargaining representative of all rank and file employees. The petition should have not been
entertained because of the contract bar rule. When a collective bargaining agreement has been duly registered in
accordance with Article 231 of the Labor Code, a petition for certification election or motion for intervention may
be entertained only within sixty (60) days prior to the expiry date of the said agreement. 8 Outside the said period,
as in the present case, the petition for certification election or motion for intervention cannot be allowed. Hence, the
conclusion that the respondent company did not commit the alleged union busting.

From the gamut of evidence on hand, it can be gathered that the strike staged by the petitioner union was illegal
for reasons, that:

1) The strikers committed illegal acts in the course of the strike. They formed human barricades to block the road,
prevented the passage of the respondent company's truck, padlocked the company's gate, and prevented co-
workers from entering the company premises. 9

2) And violated the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) 10

enjoining the union and/or its members from obstructing
the company premises, and ordering the removal therefrom of all the barricades.

A strike is a legitimate weapon in the universal struggle for existence. 11

It is considered as the most effective
weapon in protecting the rights of the employees to improve the terms and conditions of their employment. 12 But to be
valid, a strike must be pursued within legal bounds. The right to strike as a means for the attainment of social justice is
never meant to oppress or destroy the employer. The law provides limits for its exercise. Among such limits are the
prohibited activities under Article 264 of the Labor Code, particularly paragraph (e), which states that no person
engaged in picketing shall:

a) commit any act of violence, coercion, or intimidation or

b) obstruct the free ingress to or egress from the employer's premises for lawful purposes or

c) obstruct public thoroughfares.

Even if the strike is valid because its objective or purpose is lawful, the strike may still be declared invalid where
the means employed are illegal. For instance, the strike was considered illegal as the "strikers formed a human
cordon along the side of the Sta. Ana wharf and blocked all the ways and approaches to the launches and
vessels of Petitioners". 13

It follows therefore that the dismissal of the officers of the striking union was justified and valid. Their dismissal as
a consequence of the illegality of the strike staged by them finds support in Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code,
pertinent portion of which provides: " . . Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any . .
union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have
lost his employment status. . ."

Union officers are duty bound to guide their members to respect the law. If instead of doing so, the officers urge
the members to violate the law and defy the duly constituted authorities, their dismissal from the service is a just
penalty or sanction for their unlawful acts. The officers' responsibility is greater than that of the members. 14

The court finds merit in the finding by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the respondent company committed
no illegal lockout. Lockout means temporary refusal of the employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute. 15

As observed by the Labor Arbiter, it was the appellant-workers who voluntarily stopped working because of their
strike. In fact the appellant workers admitted that non-striking workers who wanted to return to work were allowed
to do so. Their being without work could not therefore be attributed to the employer's refusal to give them work
but rather, to the voluntary withdrawal of their services in order to compel the company to recognize their union. 16

The next aspect of the case to consider is the fate of the four petitioners herein. Decisive on the matter is the
pertinent provision of Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code that: ". . any worker . . who knowingly participates in the
commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared to have lost his employment status. . ." It can be
gleaned unerringly from the aforecited provision of law in point, however, that an ordinary striking employee can
not be terminated for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed illegal acts
during the strike 17 and the striker who participated in the commission of illegal act must be identified. But proof
beyond reasonable doubt is not required. Substantial evidence available under the attendant circumstances, which
may justify the imposition of the penalty of dismissal, may suffice.

In the landmark case of Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 18the court ruled "Not only must there be some evidence to support a
finding or conclusion, but the evidence must be "substantial". Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla. It
means such relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion."

Respondent company contends that sufficient testimonial, documentary and real evidence, including the
photographs supposedly taken by a certain Mr. Ponce, were presented at the arbitration level. It is argued that
the said pictures best show the participation of the strikers in the commission of illegal acts in the course of the
strike. In connection therewith, it is worthy to point out the sole basis of the NLRC for declaring the loss of
employment status of petitioner Joel Densing, to wit:

ATTY. PINTOR:

Q: Now, Mr. Ponce, on page 1 of your affidavit, paragraph 4 thereof, you alleged that: "While in the gate, I saw
several strikers of Cenapro blocked its gate and prevented the truck from proceeding to its destination." Who
were these several workers you referred to, in this affidavit of yours?

WITNESS:

A. The strikers.

HON. LABOR ARBITER:

Q. Are you referring to the complainants in this case who are now present?

WITNESS:

A. Yes sir, I am referring to AIU members.

HON, LABOR ARBITER:

Make it of record that the witness is referring to the five persons inside the court namely: Rosalito Bentulan, Ariel
Jorda, Ranulfo Cabrestante, Jose Catnubay and Joel Densing. 19 (emphasis supplied)
All things studiedly considered, the court is not convinced that the quantum of proof on record hurdled the
substantiality of evidence test 20 to support a decision, a basic requirement in administrative adjudication. If the said
pictures exhibited before the Labor Arbiter portrayed the herein petitioners performing prohibited acts during the strike,
why were these pictures not exhibited for identification of petitioners? Petitioners could have been identified in such
pictures, if they were reflected therein, in the same manner that the lawyer who examined Mr. Ponce, asked witness
Armamento to identify the Sheriff Mr. Leahmon Tolo, thus:

ATTY. PINTOR:

Q I refer your attention Mr. Armamento to Exhibit "16". There is a person here wearing a short sleeve barong
tagalog. Can you please tell the Honorable office if you will be able to identify this person?

WITNESS:

A Yes, this is the Sheriff Mr. Leahmon Tolo. 21

The identification of the alleged pictures of the strikers, if properly made, could have been categorized as
substantial evidence, which a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a conclusion that Joel
Densing participated in blocking the gate of respondent company.

Verily, the uncorroborated testimony of Mr. Ponce does not suffice to support a declaration of loss of employment
status of Joel Densing. This could be the reason why the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, in its decision dated
August 15, 1994, upheld the reinstatement of Joel Densing.

The contention of petitioners that the factual findings by the Labor Arbiter, as trial officer in the case, deserve
much weight is tenable. The NLRC is bound by the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter as the latter was in a
better position to observe the demeanor and department of the witnesses. "Absent any substantial proof that the
trial court's decision was based on speculation, the same must be accorded full consideration and should not be
disturbed on appeal. 22

Premises studiedly considered, we are of the ineluctable conclusion, and hold, that the NLRC gravely abused its
discretion in declaring the loss of employment status of Joel Densing.

As regards the other petitioners, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, their
reinstatement is warranted. In its resolution, the NLRC adjudged petitioners as "not entirely faultless" in light of
the following revelation of Mr. Ponce, to wit:

ATTY. PINTOR:

Q. Mr. Ponce, I will refer you to a picture previously marked as our Annex "H". Showing to you the said picture. In
said picture, there are persons who are lying on the road. Can you please identify who are these persons?

WITNESS:

A. They are the strikers.

ATTY. PINTOR:

Q. Are you referring to the AIU strikers the complainants in this case?

WITNESS:

A. Yes. Sir. 23

For the severest administrative penalty of dismissal to attach, the erring strikers must be duly identified. Simply
referring to them as "strikers", "AIU strikers" "complainants in this case" is not enough to justify their dismissal.
On the issue of reinstatement and payment of salaries, the court also find for petitioners. Telling on the monetary
award is Article 223 of the Labor Code, the pertinent of which reads:

. . . In any event, the decision of the labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed employee shall be immediately
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and
conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the
payroll. The posting of bond shall not stay the execution of the reinstatement provided therein. . . .

The NLRC Resolution of February 21, 1995 does not state any plausible ground or basis for deleting the award
for backwages. The mere fact that the petitioners were "not entirely faultless" is of no moment. Such finding
below does not adversely affect their entitlement to backwages. As opined by the NLRC in its Decision of August
15, 1994, affirming in its entirety the conclusion arrived at by the Labor Arbiter "the only option left to the
appellant-company is whether to physically reinstate appellant workers or to reinstate them on the payroll."

The unmeritorious appeal interposed by the respondent company, let alone the failure to execute with dispatch
the award of reinstatement delayed the payroll reinstatement of petitioners. But their long waiting is not
completely in vain, for the court holds that their (petitioners') salaries and backwages must be computed from
October 15, 1993 until full payment of their separation pay, without any deduction. This is in consonance with the
ruling in the case of Bustamante vs. NLRC, 24 where payment of full backwages without deductions was ordered.
The four petitioners herein are entitled to reinstatement absent any just ground their dismissal. Considering, however,
that more than eight (8) years have passed since subject strike was staged, an award of separation pay equivalent to
one (1) month pay for every year of service, in lieu of reinstatement, is deemed more practical and appropriate to all
the parties concerned.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED; the Resolution of NLRC, dated February 21, 1995, is SET ASIDE, and
the Decision of the Labor Arbiter of October 8, 1993 REINSTATED, with the modification that the petitioners, Joel
Densing, Henedino Mirafuentes, Christopher Patentes, and Andres Tejana, be paid full backwages computed
from October 15, 1993 until full payment of their separation pay. The payment of separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement, is hereby authorized. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Romero, Vitug, Panganiban and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Not appended to the Petition

2 Decision, dated Aug. 15, 1994; Annex "B"; Rollo, pp. 22-31.

3 Dated February 21, 1995; Annex "A"; Rollo, pp. 16-20.

4 Petition; Rollo, p. 6.

5 Rollo, p. 31.

6 Rollo, pp. 19-20.

7 Decision; Rollo, pp. 28-29.

8 Sec. 3, par. 2, Rule XI, Book V, of the Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code, as amended by
D.O. No. 09, which took effect on 21 Jun3 1997.

9 Comment, citing TSN, Pence , 17 June 1992; Rollo, pp. 63-66; Armamento, 7 December 1992, Rollo,. pp. 66-
67; de la Piedra, 19 February 1991, Rollo, pp. 68-69.

10 Dated August 6, 1990; made permanent on August 28, 1990.

11 Alcantara, Philippine Labor and Social Legislation, 1994, p. 565.

12 Bisig ng Manggagawa sa Concrete Aggregates, Inc. vs. NLRC, 226 SCRA 499, p.511.

13 United Seamen's Union of the Philippines vs. Davao Shipowners Association, 20 SCRA 1226, 1236.

14 Continental Cement Labor Union vs. Continental Cement Corporation, 189 SCRA 134, 141

15 Art. 212 (p), Labor Code.

16 Decision; Rollo, p. 28.

17 Gold City Integrated Port Service Inc. vs. NLRC, 245 SCRA 627, p. 637.

18 69 Phil. 635, 642.

19 Resolution; Annex "A"; Rollo, pp. 17-18.

20 Ang Tibay vs. CIR, 69 Phil. 635.

21 Comment; Rollo, p. 67.

22 People vs. Gelaver, 223 SCRA 310, p. 315 citing People vs. Martinada 194 SCRA 36 and Mercury Drug vs.
CIR 56 SCRA 694.

23 Resolution; Annex "A"; Rollo, pp. 18-19.

24 265 SCRA 61, p. 71.

Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. No.
141471 [2000]

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 141471. September 18, 2000]

COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN, petitioner, vs. ASSOCIATION OF

EMPLOYEES AND FACULTY OF LETRAN and ELEONOR AMBAS,
respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals, promulgated on 9 August 1999, dismissing the petition filed by Colegio de San Juan de
Letran (hereinafter, "petitioner") and affirming the Order of the Secretary of Labor, dated December
2, 1996, finding the petitioner guilty of unfair labor practice on two (2) counts.
 The facts, as found by the Secretary of Labor and affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are as
follows:
"On December 1992, Salvador Abtria, then President of respondent union, Association of Employees
and Faculty of Letran, initiated the renegotiation of its Collective Bargaining Agreement with petitioner
Colegio de San Juan de Letran for the last two (2) years of the CBA's five (5) year lifetime from 1989-1994.
On the same year, the union elected a new set of officers wherein private respondent Eleanor Ambas
emerged as the newly elected President (Secretary of Labor and Employment's Order dated December 2,
1996, p. 12).
Ambas wanted to continue the renegotiation of the CBA but petitioner, through Fr. Edwin Lao, claimed
that the CBA was already prepared for signing by the parties. The parties submitted the disputed CBA to a
referendum by the union members, who eventually rejected the said CBA (Ibid, p. 2).
Petitioner accused the union officers of bargaining in bad faith before the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Labor Arbiter Edgardo M. Madriaga decided in favor of petitioner. However, the Labor
Arbiter's decision was reversed on appeal before the NLRC (Ibid, p. 2).
On January 1996, the union notified the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB) of its
intention to strike on the grounds (sic) of petitioner's: non-compliance with the NLRC (1) order to delete the
name of Atty. Federico Leynes as the union's legal counsel; and (2) refusal to bargain (Ibid, p. 1).
On January 18, 1996, the parties agreed to disregard the unsigned CBA and to start negotiation on a
new five-year CBA starting 1994-1999. On February 7, 1996, the union submitted its proposals to petitioner,
which notified the union six days later or on February 13, 1996 that the same had been submitted to its
Board of Trustees. In the meantime, Ambas was informed through a letter dated February 15, 1996 from her
superior that her work schedule was being changed from Monday to Friday to Tuesday to Saturday. Ambas
protested and requested management to submit the issue to a grievance machinery under the old CBA
(Ibid, p. 2-3).
Due to petitioner's inaction, the union filed a notice of strike on March 13, 1996. The parties met on
March 27, 1996 before the NCMB to discuss the ground rules for the negotiation. On March 29, 1996, the
union received petitioner's letter dismissing Ambas for alleged insubordination. Hence, the union amended
its notice of strike to include Ambas' dismissal. (Ibid, p. 2-3).
On April 20, 1996, both parties again discussed the ground rules for the CBA renegotiation. However,
petitioner stopped the negotiations after it purportedly received information that a new group of employees
had filed a petition for certification election (Ibid, p. 3).
On June 18, 1996, the union finally struck. On July 2, 1996, public respondent the Secretary of Labor
and Employment assumed jurisdiction and ordered all striking employees including the union president to
return to work and for petitioner to accept them back under the same terms and conditions before the actual
strike. Petitioner readmitted the striking members except Ambas. The parties then submitted their pleadings
including their position papers which were filed on July 17, 1996 ( Ibid, pp. 2-3).
On December 2, 1996, public respondent issued an order declaring petitioner guilty of unfair labor
practice on two counts and directing the reinstatement of private respondent Ambas with backwages.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in an Order dated May 29, 1997 (Petition, pp.
8-9)."i
Having been denied its motion for reconsideration, petitioner sought a review of the order of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment before the Court of Appeals. The appellate court
dismissed the petition and affirmed the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The
dispositive portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals sets forth:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, this Petition is DISMISSED, for being without merit in
fact and in law.
With cost to petitioner.
SO ORDERED.ii
 Hence, petitioner comes to this Court for redress.
Petitioner ascribes the following errors to the Court of Appeals:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER LETRAN GUILTY OF REFUSAL TO BARGAIN (UNFAIR LABOR
PRACTICE) FOR SUSPENDING THE COLLECTIVE BARGAINING NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPONDENT
AEFL, DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE SUSPENSION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WAS BROUGHT ABOUT
BY THE FILING OF A PETITION FOR CERTIFICATION ELECTION BY A RIVAL UNION WHO CLAIMED
TO COMMAND THE MAJORITY OF THE EMPLOYEES WITHIN THE BARGAINING UNIT.
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN AFFIRMING THE RULING OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
WHICH DECLARES PETITIONER LETRAN GUILTY OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR DISMISSING
RESPONDENT AMBAS, DESPITE THE FACT THAT HER DISMISSAL WAS CAUSED BY HER
INSUBORDINATE ATTITUDE, SPECIFICALLY, HER REFUSAL TO FOLLOW THE PRESCRIBED WORK
SCHEDULE.iii
The twin questions of law before this Court are the following: (1) whether petitioner is guilty of
unfair labor practice by refusing to bargain with the union when it unilaterally suspended the
ongoing negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) upon mere information that
a petition for certification has been filed by another legitimate labor organization? (2) whether the
termination of the union president amounts to an interference of the employees' right to self-
organization?
The petition is without merit.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, this Court finds that petitioner has not
shown any compelling reason sufficient to overturn the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the
findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. It is axiomatic that the findings of fact of the
Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding on the Supreme Court and will not be reviewed or
disturbed on appeal. In this case, the petitioner failed to show any extraordinary circumstance
justifying a departure from this established doctrine.
As regards the first issue, Article 252 of the Labor Code defines the meaning of the phrase
"duty to bargain collectively," as follows:
Art. 252. Meaning of duty to bargain collectively. - The duty to bargain collectively means the
performance of a mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the
purpose of negotiating an agreement with respect to wages, hours of work and all other terms and
conditions of employment including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such
agreement and executing a contract incorporating such agreements if requested by either party but such
duty does not compel any party to agree to a proposal or to make any concession.
Noteworthy in the above definition is the requirement on both parties of the performance of the
mutual obligation to meet and convene promptly and expeditiously in good faith for the purpose of
negotiating an agreement. Undoubtedly, respondent Association of Employees and Faculty of
Letran (AEFL) (hereinafter, "union") lived up to this requisite when it presented its proposals for the
CBA to petitioner on February 7, 1996. On the other hand, petitioner devised ways and means in
order to prevent the negotiation.
Petitioner's utter lack of interest in bargaining with the union is obvious in its failure to make a
timely reply to the proposals presented by the latter. More than a month after the proposals were
submitted by the union, petitioner still had not made any counter-proposals. This inaction on the
part of petitioner prompted the union to file its second notice of strike on March 13, 1996. Petitioner
could only offer a feeble explanation that the Board of Trustees had not yet convened to discuss
the matter as its excuse for failing to file its reply. This is a clear violation of Article 250 of the Labor
Code governing the procedure in collective bargaining, to wit:
Art. 250. Procedure in collective bargaining. - The following procedures shall be observed in collective
bargaining:
(a) When a party desires to negotiate an agreement, it shall serve a written notice upon the other party
with a statement of its proposals. The other party shall make a reply thereto not later than ten (10) calendar
days from receipt of such notice.iv
x x x
As we have held in the case of Kiok Loy vs. NLRC, v the company's refusal to make counter-
proposal to the union's proposed CBA is an indication of its bad faith. Where the employer did not even
bother to submit an answer to the bargaining proposals of the union, there is a clear evasion of the duty to
bargain collectively.vi In the case at bar, petitioner's actuation show a lack of sincere desire to negotiate
rendering it guilty of unfair labor practice.
Moreover, the series of events that transpired after the filing of the first notice of strike in
January 1996 show petitioner's resort to delaying tactics to ensure that negotiation would not push
through. Thus, on February 15, 1996, or barely a few days after the union proposals for the new
CBA were submitted, the union president was informed by her superior that her work schedule was
being changed from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. A request from the union
president that the issue be submitted to a grievance machinery was subsequently denied.
Thereafter, the petitioner and the union met on March 27, 1996 to discuss the ground rules for
negotiation. However, just two days later, or on March 29, 1996, petitioner dismissed the union
president for alleged insubordination. In its final attempt to thwart the bargaining process, petitioner
suspended the negotiation on the ground that it allegedly received information that a new group of
employees called the Association of Concerned Employees of Colegio (ACEC) had filed a petition
for certification election. Clearly, petitioner tried to evade its duty to bargain collectively.
Petitioner, however, argues that since it has already submitted the union's proposals to the
Board of Trustees and that a series of conferences had already been undertaken to discuss the
ground rules for negotiation such should already be considered as acts indicative of its intention to
bargain. As pointed out earlier, the evidence on record belie the assertions of petitioner.
Petitioner, likewise, claims that the suspension of negotiation was proper since by the filing of
the petition for certification election the issue on majority representation of the employees has
arose. According to petitioner, the authority of the union to negotiate on behalf of the employees
was challenged when a rival union filed a petition for certification election. Citing the case of Lakas
Ng Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprises, vii petitioner asserts that in view of the
pendency of the petition for certification election, it had no duty to bargain collectively with the union.
We disagree. In order to allow the employer to validly suspend the bargaining process there
must be a valid petition for certification election raising a legitimate representation issue. Hence,
the mere filing of a petition for certification election does not ipso facto justify the suspension of
negotiation by the employer. The petition must first comply with the provisions of the Labor Code
and its Implementing Rules. Foremost is that a petition for certification election must be filed during
the sixty-day freedom period. The "Contract Bar Rule" under Section 3, Rule XI, Book V, of the
Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, provides that: " . If a collective bargaining
agreement has been duly registered in accordance with Article 231 of the Code, a petition for
certification election or a motion for intervention can only be entertained within sixty (60) days prior
to the expiry date of such agreement." The rule is based on Article 232, viii in relation to Articles 253,
253-A and 256 of the Labor Code. No petition for certification election for any representation issue may be
filed after the lapse of the sixty-day freedom period. The old CBA is extended until a new one is signed. The
rule is that despite the lapse of the formal effectivity of the CBA the law still considers the same as
continuing in force and effect until a new CBA shall have been validly executed.ix Hence, the contract bar
rule still applies.x The purpose is to ensure stability in the relationship of the workers and the company by
preventing frequent modifications of any CBA earlier entered into by them in good faith and for the stipulated
original period.xi
In the case at bar, the lifetime of the previous CBA was from 1989-1994. The petition for
certification election by ACEC, allegedly a legitimate labor organization, was filed with the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) only on May 26, 1996. Clearly, the petition was filed
outside the sixty-day freedom period. Hence, the filing thereof was barred by the existence of a
valid and existing collective bargaining agreement. Consequently, there is no legitimate
representation issue and, as such, the filing of the petition for certification election did not constitute
a bar to the ongoing negotiation. Reliance, therefore, by petitioner of the ruling in Lakas Ng
Manggagawang Makabayan v. Marcelo Enterprisesxii is misplaced since that case involved a legitimate
representation issue which is not present in the case at bar.
Significantly, the same petition for certification election was dismissed by the Secretary of
Labor on October 25, 1996. The dismissal was upheld by this Court in a Resolution, dated April 21,
1997.xiii
In view of the above, there is no doubt that petitioner is guilty of unfair labor practice by its
stern refusal to bargain in good faith with respondent union.
Concerning the issue on the validity of the termination of the union president, we hold that the
dismissal was effected in violation of the employees' right to self-organization.
To justify the dismissal, petitioner asserts that the union president was terminated for cause,
allegedly for insubordination for her failure to comply with the new working schedule assigned to
her, and pursuant to its managerial prerogative to discipline and/or dismiss its employees. While
we recognize the right of the employer to terminate the services of an employee for a just or
authorized cause, nevertheless, the dismissal of employees must be made within the parameters
of law and pursuant to the tenets of equity and fair play. xiv The employer's right to terminate the
services of an employee for just or authorized cause must be exercised in good faith. xv More
importantly, it must not amount to interfering with, restraining or coercing employees in the exercise
of their right to self-organization because it would amount to, as in this case, unlawful labor practice
under Article 248 of the Labor Code.
The factual backdrop of the termination of Ms. Ambas leads us to no other conclusion that she
was dismissed in order to strip the union of a leader who would fight for the right of her co-workers
at the bargaining table. Ms. Ambas, at the time of her dismissal, had been working for the petitioner
for ten (10) years already. In fact, she was a recipient of a loyalty award. Moreover, for the past ten
(10) years her working schedule was from Monday to Friday. However, things began to change
when she was elected as union president and when she started negotiating for a new CBA. Thus, it
was when she was the union president and during the period of tense and difficult negotiations
when her work schedule was altered from Mondays to Fridays to Tuesdays to Saturdays. When
she did not budge, although her schedule was changed, she was outrightly dismissed for alleged
insubordination.xvi We quote with approval the following findings of the Secretary of Labor on this
matter, to wit:
"Assuming arguendo that Ms. Ambas was guilty, such disobedience was not, however, a valid ground
to teminate her employment. The disputed management action was directly connected with Ms. Ambas'
determination to change the complexion of the CBA. As a matter of fact, Ms. Ambas' unflinching position in
faithfully and truthfully carrying out her duties and responsibilities to her Union and its members in getting a
fair share of the fruits of their collective endeavors was the proximate cause for her dismissal, the charge of
insubordination being merely a ploy to give a color of legality to the contemplated management action to
dismiss her. Thus, the dismissal of Ms. Ambas was heavily tainted with and evidently done in bad faith.
Manifestly, it was designed to interfere with the members' right to self-organization.
Admittedly, management has the prerogative to discipline its employees for insubordination. But when
the exercise of such management right tends to interfere with the employees' right to self-organization, it
amounts to union-busting and is therefore a prohibited act. The dismissal of Ms. Ambas was clearly
designed to frustrate the Union in its desire to forge a new CBA with the College that is reflective of the true
wishes and aspirations of the Union members. Her dismissal was merely a subterfuge to get rid of her,
which smacks of a pre-conceived plan to oust her from the premises of the College. It has the effect of
busting the Union, stripping it of its strong-willed leadership. When management refused to treat the charge
of insubordination as a grievance within the scope of the Grievance Machinery, the action of the College in
finally dismissing her from the service became arbitrary, capricious and whimsical, and therefore violated
Ms. Ambas' right to due process."xvii
In this regard, we find no cogent reason to disturb the findings of the Court of Appeals affirming
the findings of the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The right to self-organization of employees
must not be interfered with by the employer on the pretext of exercising management prerogative
of disciplining its employees. In this case, the totality of conduct of the employer shows an evident
attempt to restrain the employees from fully exercising their rights under the law. This cannot be
done under the Labor Code.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., on leave.

Suspension of Certification Election

United CMC Textile Workers Union v. BLR, 128 SCRA 316 [1984
SUPREME COURT FIRST DIVISION

UNITED CMC TEXTILE WORKERS UNION, Petitioner,

-versus- G.R. No. 51337 March 22, 1984

BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, HON. CARMELO NORIEL, PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF

FREE LABOR UNIONS, (JULY CONVENTION),

Respondents.
x---------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

The question to resolve is whether or not public respondent acted with grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the Order of the MedArbiter calling for a certification election despite: (a) the pendency of
an unfair labor practice case filed by petitioner charging respondent PAFLU as being company-
dominated; (b) the existence of a deadlock in negotiations for renewal of the collective bargaining
agreement between petitioner and the Central Textile Mills, Inc. (CENTEX, for short); and (c) a
reasonable doubt as to whether the 30% requirement for holding a certification election has been
met. chanroblespublishingcompany

Petitioner is a legitimate labor organization, the incumbent collective bargaining representative of

all rank and file workers of CENTEX since 1956. Respondent PAFLU is also a legitimate labor
organization seeking representation as the bargaining agent of the rank and file workers of
CENTEX. chanroblespublishingcompany

On August 31, 1978, petitioner filed a complaint for Unfair Labor Practice (R4-LRD-C-8-1493-78)
(the ULP Case, for brevity) against CENTEX and PAFLU alleging that CENTEX had “helped and
cooperated in the organization of the Central Textile Mills, Inc. Local PAFLU by allowing the
organizing members of the PAFLU to solicit signatures of employees of the company who are
members of the complainant union to disaffiliate from complainant union and join the respondent
PAFLU, during company time and inside the company premises on August 21, 1978 and the
following days thereafter.”[1]

While the ULP Case was pending, PAFLU, on September 5, 1978, filed a Petition for Certification
Election (R4-LRD-M-9432-78) (the Certification Case, for short) among the rank and file workers of
CENTEX, alleging that: 1) there has been no certification election during the 12 months period prior
to the filing of the petition; 2) the petition is supported by signatures of 603 workers, or more than
30% of the rank and file workers of CENTEX; 3) the collective bargaining agreement between
CENTEX and petitioner will expire on October 31, 1978; 4) the petition is filed within the 60-day-
freedom-period immediately preceding the expiration of the CBA, and 6) there is no legal
impediment to the filing of the petition.[2]

Petitioner intervened in the Certification Case and filed a Motion to Dismiss on September 27, 1978
on the grounds that: 1) the ULP Case charging that PAFLU is a company-dominated union is a
prejudicial question and bars the holding of the certification election; and 2) PAFLU failed to comply
with the 30% requirement for mandatory certification election since only 440 of the 603 are valid
signatures and that 719 signatories are required as constitutive of 30% of the rank and file workers
totalling 2,397 and not 1,900 as alleged by PAFLU.[3] chanroblespublishingcompany

On October 16, 1978, petitioner filed a Notice of Strike with the Bureau of Labor Relations for
deadlock in the CBA negotiations with CENTEX. The parties having failed to effect a conciliation,
the Labor Minister assumed jurisdiction on November 9, 1978 in Case No. AJML-033-78[4]
(referred to hereafter as the Deadlock Case). chanroblespublishingcompany

A Supplemental Motion to Dismiss in the Certification Case was filed by petitioner on December 7,
1978 alleging that the Labor Minister had already taken cognizance of the deadlock in the CBA
negotiations and constituted an impediment to the holding of a certification election.[5]

On December 18, 1978, in the Deadlock Case, the Deputy Minister of Labor released a Decision
directing petitioner and CENTEX to execute and sign a CBA to take effect on November 1, 1978 up
to October 30, 1981 based on the guidelines enumerated therein, and to furnish the Office of the
Minister of Labor with a signed copy of the renewed agreement not later than January 31, 1979.[6]

On January 23, 1979, in the Certification Case, the Med-Arbiter issued an Order for the holding of a
certification election among CENTEX rank and file workers, whereby qualified voters could choose
either PAFLU or petitioner as the collective bargaining representative or No Union at all.[7] This
was affirmed by respondent Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations on appeal, in the challenged
Resolution, dated May 25, 1979, stating that: 1) the Bureau has discretion to order certification
election where several unions are contending for representation and when there is doubt as to
whether the 30% requirement has been met; and 2) to preclude the filing of a petition for
certification election the notice of strike for deadlock in CBA negotiations must occur prior to the
petition.[8]

A Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioner was denied for lack of merit in the Resolution of
August 20, 1979,[9] also assailed herein.

Hence, this petition, on the general proposition that public respondent has committed serious error
of law and acted with grave abuse of discretion, and that petitioner has no plain and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. chanroblespublishingcompany

We issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining the conduct of the certification election, and
eventually gave the Petition due course.

The issues raised are: (1) is the pendency of the ULP Case charging a participating union in the
certification election proceedings as company-dominated a prejudicial question to the conduct of
the election? (2) Does the decision in the Deadlock Case directing the parties to execute a CBA
have the effect of barring the certification election? (3) Does respondent Director have the
discretion to call for a certification election even if the 30% consent requirement is lacking?

The case can be resolved on the basis of the first issue alone, which must be answered in the
affirmative. Under settled jurisprudence, the pendency of a formal charge of company domination is
a prejudicial question that, until decided, bars proceedings for a certification election,[10] the
reason being that the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be free.[11] The ULP
Case herein was filed on August 31, 1978, or anterior to the Certification Case, which was
presented on September 5, 1978. The pendency of the charge was known to respondent public
official by virtue of the Motion to Dismiss filed by petitioner as intervenor in the Certification Case.
No allegation has been made that said ULP Case was instituted in bad faith to forestall the
Certification Case. The following ruling is thus squarely in point: chanroblespublishingcompany

“There is no assertion that such complaint was flimsy, or made in bad faith or filed purposely to
forestall the certification election. So, no reason existed for the Industrial Court to depart from its
established practice of suspending the election proceeding. And this seems to be accepted rule in
the law of labor relations, the reason being, in the words of Mr. Justice Montemayor, ‘if there is a
union dominated by the company, to which some of the workers belong, an election among
workers and employees of the company would not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said
workers and employees because the votes of the members of the dominated union would not be
free.’ (Manila Paper Mills Employees vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10)

“And we have held, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that such charge of company domination is a
prejudicial question that until decided, shall suspend or bar proceedings for certification election.
(Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 101 Phil. 126)

“Indeed, if as a result of the Pelta’s complaint in Case No. 255ULP, the Workers Union should be
ordered dissolved as a company dominated union, any election held in the meantime would be a
waste of energy and money to all parties concerned.”[12] chanroblespublishingcompany

The rationale for the suspension of the election proceedings has been further amplified as follows:

“What is settled law, dating from the case of Standard Cigarette Workers’ Union vs. Court of
Industrial Relations (101 Phil. 126), decided in 1957, is that if it were a labor organization objecting
to the participation in a certification election of a companydominated union, as a result of which a
complaint for an unfair labor practice case against the employer was filed, the status of the latter
union must be first cleared in such a proceeding before such voting could take place. In the
language of Justice J.B.L. Reyes as ponente: ‘As correctly pointed out by Judge Lanting in his
dissenting opinion on the denial of petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, a complaint for unfair
labor practice may be considered a prejudicial question in a proceeding for certification election
when it is charged therein that one or more labor unions participating in the election are being
aided, or are controlled, by the company or employer. The reason is that the certification election
may lead to the selection of an employer-dominated or company union as the employees’
bargaining representative, and when the court finds that said union is employer-dominated in the
unfair labor practice case, the union selected would be decertified and the whole election
proceedings would be rendered useless and nugatory.’ (Ibid., 128). The next year, the same jurist
had occasion to reiterate such doctrine in Manila Paper Mills Employees and Workers Association
vs. Court of Industrial Relations (104 Phil. 10 [1958]), thus: `We agree with the CIR on the reasons
given in
its order that only a formal charge of company domination may serve as a bar to and stop a
certification election, the reason being that if there is a union dominated by the Company, to which
some of the workers belong, an election among the workers and employees of the company would
not reflect the true sentiment and wishes of the said workers and employees from the standpoint of
their welfare and interest, because as to the members of the company dominated union, the vote of
the said members in the election would not be free. It is equally true, however, that the opposition
to the holding of a certification election due to a charge of company domination can only be filed
and maintained by the labor organization which made the charge of company domination, because
it is the entity that stands to lose and suffer prejudice by the certification election, the reason being
that its members might be overwhelmed in the voting by the other members controlled and
dominated by the Company,’ (Ibid., 15). It is easily understandable why it should be thus. There
would be an impairment of the integrity of the collective bargaining process if a company-
dominated union were allowed to participate in a certification election. The timid, the timorous, and
the fainthearted in the ranks of labor could easily be tempted to cast their votes in favor of the
choice of management. Should it emerge victorious, and it becomes the exclusive representative of
labor at the conference table, there is a frustration of the statutory scheme. It takes two to bargain.
There would be instead a unilateral imposition by the employer. There is need therefore to inquire
as to whether a labor organization that aspires to be the exclusive bargaining representative is
company-dominated before the certification election.”[13]

With the suspension of the certification proceedings clearly called for by reason of a prejudicial
question, the necessity of passing upon the remaining issues is obviated.
chanroblespublishingcompany

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of August 20, 1979 issued by public respondent affirming the Order
of the Med-Arbiter, dated January 23, 1979, calling for a certification election is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The Temporary Restraining Order heretofore issued by this Court shall continue
to be in force and effect until the
status is cleared of respondent Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions (July Convention) in
Case No. R4-LRD-M-9-432-78 entitled “In the Matter of Certification Election Among Rank and File
Workers of Central Textile Mills, Inc., Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions, Petitioner,
United CMC Textile Workers Union, Intervenor.” chanroblespublishingcompany

No costs. chanroblespublishingcompany

SO ORDERED. chanroblespublishingcompany
Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and De la Fuente, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J., is on leave.
chanroblespublishingcompany

[1] p. 22, Rollo. chanroblespublishingcompany [2] pp. 11-12, ibid. chanroblespublishingcompany [3]
pp. 15-21, ibid. [4] p. 32, ibid. chanroblespublishingcompany [5] p. 130, ibid.
chanroblespublishingcompany [6] pp. 32-34, ibid. chanroblespublishingcompany [7] pp. 35-37, ibid.
chanroblespublishingcompany [8] pp. 47-48, ibid. chanroblespublishingcompany [9] pp. 49-55, ibid.
chanroblespublishingcompany [10] Standard Cigarette Workers Union vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, 101 Phil. 126 (1.957). chanroblespublishingcompany [11] Manila Paper Mills Employees
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 104 Phil. 10 (1958). chanroblespublishingcompany [12] Acoje
Mines Employees and Acoje United Workers Union vs. Acoje Labor Union and Acoje Mining Co.,
104 Phil. 814 at 816 & 817 (1958). chanroblespublishingcompany [13] B. F. Goodrich Philippines,
Inc. vs. B. F. Goodrich (Marikina Factory) Confidential & Salaried Employees Union-NATU, 49
SCRA 532 at 538-540 (1973). chanroblespublishingcompany

Barrera v. CIR, 107 SCRA 596 [1981]

Opposition
Protection Technology v. Sec. of DOLE, 242 SCRA 99 [1995]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 117211 March 1, 1995

PROTECTION TECHNOLOGY, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, MED-ARBITER BRIGIDA C.
FADRIGON and SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA PROTECTION-ALLIANCE OF NATIONALIST AND
GENUINE LABOR ORGANIZATION (SMP-ANGLO), respondents.

RESOLUTION

FELICIANO, J.:

On 12 January 1994, private respondent Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Protection — Alliance of Nationalist and
Genuine Labor Organizations ("Union"), a newly organized union affiliated with a federation, filed a Petition for
direct certification or for certification election to determine the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the
regular rank and file employees of petitioner Protection Technology Inc. ("Company"), at its Pasay City and
Guiguinto, Bulacan offices, with the National Capital Region Med Arbitration Branch, Department of Labor and
Employment ("DOLE"). 1

In its Comment on the petition, petitioner Company stated that the Union was not a legitimate labor organization
capable of filing the petition because it had failed to submit its books of account with the Bureau of Labor
Relations ("BLR") at the time it was registered as a legitimate labor organization. Submission of such
documentation is a "mandatory" requirement before a union can exercise the rights and privileges of a legitimate
labor organization, pursuant to the Court's ruling in ruling Progressive Development Corporation v. Secretary,
Department of Labor and Employment. 2

In an Order dated 14 March 1994, Med Arbiter Brigida C. Fadrigon dismissed the Union's petition and held further
that the submission of the books of account, consisting of journals, ledgers and other accounting books, was one
of several "preventive measures against commission of fraud" arising from "improper or incorrect recording of
union funds, inefficient administration and even malversation of union funds." 3

The Union appealed to the Secretary, DOLE, contending that the Labor Code and Progressive Development
"never mentioned journals and ledgers" as part of the documentation requirements for registration of a newly-
organized local union. 4

In a Resolution dated 6 July 1994, public respondent DOLE Undersecretary, Bienvenido Laguesma, set aside the
Order of the Med Arbiter, holding that the requirement to submit books of account applies only to labor
organizations already existing for at least a year. Undersecretary Laguesma ordered the holding of a certification
election at petitioner's establishment with the following as choices: (1) the Union; and (2) no union. He also took
note of the Union's submission of one sheet of paper captioned a "Statement of Income and Expenses for the
month ended September 28, 1993." This "Statement" contained only one entry: "Cash on hand — P590.00;" the
sheet was certified correct by the Union secretary, attested by the Union president and duly subscribed. 5

Petitioner's motion for reconsideration therefrom having been unsuccessful, it is now before the Court on Petition
for Certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order (TRO), seeking annulment of the Resolution and Order
of the public respondent DOLE Undersecretary as products of grave abuse of discretion. 6

In a Resolution dated 19 October 1994, the Court required the respondents to comment upon the Petition. On 9
November 1994, after the Union had filed its Comment and prior to the filing of public respondent's Comment, the
Court issued a TRO upon petitioner's posting of a sufficient cash bond. 7 This notwithstanding, the certification
election was conducted on 10 November 1994 in the presence and under the supervision of DOLE representation
officers. 8 Of the fifty-eight (58) votes validly cast, the Union obtained fifty-three (53) votes. 9

In a Manifestation dated 17 November 1994, the Union prayed that the main Petition should be considered moot
and academic since the results of the certification election showed that an "overwhelming majority" of the
employees had chosen it to be their collective bargaining representative vis-a-vis management. 10 Upon the other
hand, in a Manifestation and Motion dated 25 November 1994, the Company moved that public respondents be
"admonished" for hastily conducting the certification election, "just to accommodate" the
Union. 11 The Court required public and private respondents to comment on the Company's Manifestation and Motion.
12

Pending receipt of such comments, the Court will deal with the merits of the Petition for Certiorari, that is, whether
or not the Undersecretary's decision to grant the Union's petition for a certification election constituted a grave
abuse of discretion correctible on certiorari.

In its Petition for Certiorari, the Company contends that the statement of income and expenses submitted by the
Union is actually an annual financial statement which is required, under Articles 234 and 241(1-1) of the Labor
Code, to be submitted by unions organized and existing for a period of at least one year or more prior to the filing
of their application for registration as a legitimate labor organization. Having reference to ordinary accounting
practice, the Company continues, such document cannot possibly be the "books of account" demanded both by
the Progressive Development Corporation case and by Section 3, Rule 2 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the
Labor Code, as a prerequisite for due registration of a newly organized union affiliated with a federation. 13

Undersecretary Laguesma, through the Solicitor-General, on the other hand, contends that submission of the
statement of income and expenses is "substantial compliance" with the requirements of the law for the
registration of labor organizations because a newly organized union like the private respondent, which had been
operating for just four (4) months prior to the filing of its application for registration with the BLR, was in no
position to submit books of account, for "it (had) no daily transaction to be entered everyday in the books except
the receipt of union dues from its members which are remitted to it only during certain periods of time." 14
Undersecretary Laguesma argues further that the juridical existence of the Union as a legitimate labor
organization had commenced from the moment its application for registration was approved; "its subsequent non-
compliance with the requirements of the Labor Code relative to the keeping of books of account, if at all, would
only be a ground for the cancellation of its registration." Until such due cancellation is made, Laguesma argues,
the Union is not to be prevented from exercising its rights, powers and privileges as a legitimate labor
organization. 15

The Union, in its own Comment on the Petition, adds that the DOLE Undersecretary's factual findings and
administrative interpretation of the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules, an area within his special expertise
and arrived at by him after "a thorough and extensive examination of the entire records of the case," is entitled to
great respect by the courts and "should no longer be subject to the review of this Honorable Supreme Court." 16

Deliberating upon the present Petition for Certiorari, the Court considers that petitioner Company has shown that
public respondent DOLE Undersecretary had indeed committed a grave abuse of discretion, amounting to an act
without or in excess of jurisdiction, in rendering his assailed Resolution and Order granting the Petition for the
holding of a certification election.

The principal issue here posed is whether books of account, consisting of ledgers, journals and other accounting
books, form part of the mandatory documentation requirements for registration of a newly organized union
affiliated with a federation, or a local or chapter of such a federation, as a legitimate labor organization.

The above issue was addressed several years ago and answered in the affirmative by this Court in Progressive
Development Corporation v. Secretary, DOLE. 17 There, the Court said:

In the case of union affiliation with a federation, the documentary requirements are found in Rule II Section 3(e),
Book V of the Implementing Rules, which we again quote as follows:

(c) The local or chapter of a labor federation or national union shall have and maintain a constitution and by-laws,
set of officers and books of accounts. For reporting purposes, the procedure governing the reporting of
independently registered unions, federations or national unions shall be observed.

Since the "procedure governing the reporting of independently registered unions" refers to the certification and
attestation requirements contained in Article 235, paragraph 2, it follows that the constitution and by-laws, set of
officers and books of accounts submitted by the local and chapter must likewise comply with these requirements.
The same rationale for requiring the submission of duly subscribed documents upon union registration exists in
the case of union affiliation. Moreover, there is greater reason to exact compliance with the certification and
attestation requirements because, as previously mentioned, several requirements applicable to independent
union registration are no longer required in the case of the formation of a local or chapter. The policy of the law in
conferring greater bargaining power upon labor unions must be balanced with the policy of providing preventive
measures against the commission of fraud.

A local or chapter therefore becomes a legitimate labor organization only upon submission of the following to the
BLR:

1) A chapter certificate within 30 days from its issuance by the labor federation or national union, and

2) The constitution and by-laws, a statement on the set of officers and the books of accounts all of which are
certified under oath by the secretary or treasurer, as the case may be, of such local or chapter, and attested to by
its president.

Absent compliance with these mandatory requirements, the local or chapter does not become a legitimate labor
organization.

In the case at bar, the failure of the secretary of PDEU-Kilusan to certify the required documents under oath is
fatal to its acquisition of a legitimate status.

xxx xxx xxx 18

(Emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied.)

Non-submission of such books of account certified by and attested to by the appropriate officer is a ground which
the employer can invoke legitimately to oppose a petition for certification election filed by the local or chapter
concerned.

Although the federation with which the Union is affiliated submitted documents purporting to show that the latter
had offered books of account to support its (the Union's) application for registration as a legitimate labor
organization, what had been actually submitted to the BLR by the Union was a mere "financial statement," 19 a
generous description considering the sheet of paper in fact submitted by the Union.

Books of account are quite different in their essential nature from financial statements. In generally accepted
accounting practice, the former consist of journals, ledgers and other accounting books (which are registered with
the Bureau of Internal Revenue) containing a record of individual transactions wherein monies are received and
disbursed by an establishment or entity; entries are made on such books on a day-to-day basis (or as close
thereto as is possible). Statements of accounts or financial reports, upon the other hand, merely summarize such
individual transactions as have been set out in the books of account and are usually prepared at the end of an
accounting period, commonly corresponding to the fiscal year of the establishment or entity concerned. 20
Statements of account and financial reports do not set out or repeat the basic data (i.e., the individual transactions) on
which they are based and are, therefore, much less informative sources of cash flow information. Books of account are
kept and handled by bookkeepers (employees) of the company or agency; financial statements may be audited
statements, i.e., prepared by external independent auditors (certified public accountants).

It is immaterial that the Union, having been organized for less than a year before its application for registration
with the BLR, would have had no real opportunity to levy and collect dues and fees from its members which need
to be recorded in the books of account. Such accounting books can and must be submitted to the BLR, even if
they contain no detailed or extensive entries as yet. The point to be stressed is that the applicant local or chapter
must demonstrate to the BLR that it is entitled to registered status because it has in place a system for
accounting for members' contributions to its fund even before it actually receives dues or fees from its members.
The controlling intention is to minimize the risk of fraud and diversion in the course of the subsequent formation
and growth of the Union fund.

The public respondent Undersecretary thus acted arbitrarily in disregarding the plain terms of the Omnibus
Implementing Rules (Section 3(e), Rule III Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code), and as well
the rule laid down by this court in the Progressive Development Corporation case. The statutory and regulatory
provisions defining the requirements of registration of legitimate labor organizations are an exercise of the
overriding police power of the State, designed for the protection of workers against potential abuse by unions and
federations of unions that recruit them. 21 This purpose is obviously defeated if the registration requirements are
relaxed arbitrarily by the very officials supposed to administer such requirements and registered status extended to an
organization not entitled to such status, as in the case at bar.

The Court is not closing its eyes to the certification election actually, if precipitately, held in this case
notwithstanding the prior issuance of the temporary restraining order of this Court. So far as the record of this
case is concerned, that certification election was held in the presence of representatives of the DOLE and
presumably reflected the free and democratic will of the workers of petitioner Company. The Court will not set
aside that will, in the absence of compelling reasons to do so.

Nevertheless, private respondent Union must comply with all the requirements of registration as a legitimate labor
organization before it may enjoy the fruits of its certification election victory and before it may exercise the rights
of a legitimate labor organization. Registration is a condition sine qua non for the acquisition of legal personality
by a labor organization and the exercise of the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor
organizations. 22

We hold, therefore, that private respondent Union must submit its books of account certified under oath by its
treasurer and attested to by its president before such Union may demand recognition by the Company as
exclusive bargaining agent of the members of the bargaining unit and before the Union may exercise any of the
rights pertaining to such an agent.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the Petition for Certiorari for having become moot and
academic and to LIFT the Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court dated 9 November 1994. However,
private respondent Union is hereby ENJOINED from exercising the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor
organization and duly authorized collective bargaining representative UNTIL it shall have submitted the required
books of account, duly certified and attested, with the Bureau of Labor Relations.

This Resolution shall be without prejudice to the liability, if any, which public and private respondents may have
incurred in connection with their alleged failure to comply with the Court's Temporary Restraining Order dated 9
November 1994. The Court hereby REITERATES its Resolution dated 18 January 1995 requiring public and
private respondents to comment on the petitioner Company's Manifestation and Motion dated 25 November 1994
within ten (10) days from notice hereof.

Romero, Melo, Vitug and Francisco, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 50.

2 205 SCRA 802 (1992); Rollo, p. 55.

3 Rollo, p. 65.

4 Id., p. 69.

5 Id., pp. 41 and 73-74.

6 Id., pp. 2, 80-81.

7 Id., pp. 82, 92 and 96.

8 Id., p. 106.

9 Id.

10 Id., pp. 100-101.

11 Id., pp. 112-113.

12 Id., p. 125-A.

13 Id., pp. 11-12.

14 Id., pp. 129-A and 130.

15 Id., p. 130.

16 Id., pp. 98-99.

17 205 SCRA 802 (1992).

18 205 SCRA 812-813.

19 Id., pp. 21 and 41.

20 See, e.g., Consolidated Mines, Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, et al., 58 SCRA 618, 636-637 (1974).

21 PAFLU v. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 40, 45 (1969).

22 Id.

Effect, Pending Petition, Cancellation Trade Union Registration

Assn. of CA Employees v. Ferrer-Calleja, 203 SCRA 596 [1991]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 94716 November 15, 1991

ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES (ACAE), petitioner,

vs.
HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA, in her capacity as Director, Bureau of Labor Relations, and UNION OF
CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE COURT OF APPEALS (UCECA), respondents.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:p

We are asked in this petition to ascertain the power, if any, of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE),
more specifically the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), to supervise the activities of government employees; in
this case, unions of judiciary personnel who serve in the Court of Appeals.

The question of power is quite significant. Hitherto, the BLR has concentrated on labor relations in the private
sector. Its enforcement machinery and the mass of law and jurisprudence governing its functions are entirely
geared to the handling of the peculiar problems arising in private employment. In this case, the BLR has tasked
itself to intervene not only in a quarrel between two groups of government employees but more important, in a
quarrel between employees working for an independent branch of government, the Judiciary.

The two issues raised in this petition are: (1) whether or not the respondent Bureau of Labor Relations acted with
grave abuse of discretion when it granted the petition for certification election to determine the certified bargaining
agent to represent the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals; and (2) whether or not a petition for
cancellation of registration of the union requesting for a certification election is a bar to the resolution of a prior
petition for certification election.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

On April 4, 1990, the respondent Union of Concerned Employees of the Court of Appeals (UCECA), a registered
union filed a petition for accreditation and/or certification election with the Bureau of Labor Relations (docketed as
BLR Case No. 4-11-90) alleging that the petitioner, Association of Court of Appeals Employees (ACAE) which is
the incumbent bargaining representative, no longer enjoys the support of the majority of the rank-and-file
employees. The UCECA alleged that there was a mass resignation of ACAE members on April 14, 1989.

On May 10, 1990, the ACAE filed its Comment and/or Opposition. It stated that the listing by the ACAE of its
membership at three hundred three (303) employees was a product of fraud. It charged the UCECA with
misrepresentation, forgery and perjury in attaching to its (UCECA) petition, a copy of the names of members
some of which were twice listed, written without consent or unsigned, and some of the signatures of which were
forged. In addition, the petitioner alleged that some of the UCECA members, upon learning of the fraudulent act,
resigned from the union.

In its reply, the UCECA stated that its registry book was not smeared with fraud and claimed that any mistakes
were only clerical errors.

On June 18, 1990, petitioner ACAE filed a Petition for Cancellation of Certificate of Registration of the UCECA in
BLR Case No. 6-19-90 on the ground of fraud and misrepresentation by UCECA in obtaining its Registration
Certificate No. 159 and in preparing its Registry Book of members. On June 28, 1990, the ACAE moved for
deferment of the resolution of the case of BLR 4-11-90 pending the case of BLR 6-19-90.

On July 16, 1990, the UCECA filed a motion to dismiss BLR 6-19-90 for being dilatory, to which ACAE replied
that the maxim of res ipsa loquitur should be applied as the "fraudulent documents submitted by UCECA speak
for themselves."

On July 30, 1990, the Bureau of Labor Relationsruled that BLR 6-19-90 (cancellation proceedings) is not a bar to
the holding of a certification election. It granted the UCECA's prayer for a certification election. The BLR found
that UCECA was supported by three hundred three (303) or forty (40%) percent of the seven hundred sixty two
(762) rank-and-file employees of the court. ACAE's motion for reconsideration was denied.

On August 21, 1990, the respondent Bureau conducted a pre-election conference.

Feeling that it was being stampeded into participating in a certification election, ACAE filed this petition for
certiorari and prohibition. We issued a temporary restraining order effective August 29, 1990.

The first question that arises is the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor Relations to handle disputes among
associations of employees working for the judiciary.

There is no question that government employees may organize provided the purposes behind such organization
are legitimate.

No less than the Bill of Rights specifically identifies government employees as having the right of self-
organization. It provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions,
associations, or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged. (Article III, 1987 Constitution)

In the provisions governing the Civil Service Commission, we find:

Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the
Government, including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees.

xxx xxx xxx

(Article IX-B, Section 2 (1) and (5), Constitution)

The article on Social Justice and Human Rights adds:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law. They shall be entitled to security
of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage. They shall also participate in policy and decision-making
processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law. (Article XIII, Section 3, 1st and 2nd
paragraphs)

xxx xxx xxx

The issue of what governs and who supervises unions of government employees is of more than passing
concern especially when those who organize and hope to engage in certain forms of concerted action are court
employees.

Government personnel find themselves in an equivocal and ambivalent position. They have a right but it is not
clear to what extent they may exercise it. Congress has not legislated as yet on the complicated problems arising
from unionism in government as distinguished from unionism in the private sector. Obviously, the same rules do
not and cannot apply under the present state of the law. A major re-ordering of government, notably its civil
service laws and budgetary and fiscal procedures would result if Congress, in enacting the laws required by the
constitutional provisions, gives exactly the same rights and privileges to all workers in the public and private
sectors.

At present, the terms and conditions of employment in the government service are governed by law, not by the
relative strengths of management and labor as they hammer out mutually acceptable terms across the collective
bargaining table. Paradoxically, all the representatives of "labor" and "management" in government are
employees. At the same time, everybody forms part of the "owner" of the enterprise, the sovereign people. The
qualifications and eligibilities of civil servants, their appointment and promotion, standardization of salaries,
disciplinary actions, fringe benefits, and retirement gratuities, among others, are governed by statutes, rules, and
established principles which are the products of decades of experience, not to mention borrowings from civil
service systems abroad.

The provisions of civil service law on the terms and conditions of employment including the regulation of labor-
management relations in the government sector, unless Congress decides to amend or repeal them, form part of
the response to any requests or demands of organized groups of government personnel. Any understanding
between the top officials of a government agency and the union which represents the rank-and-file is subordinate
to the law governing the particular issue or situation.

We emphasize the above because in ascertaining what agency should supervise certification elections in the
public sector, we limit the determination strictly to the question before us — the holding of certification elections.
Jurisdiction over questions which may arise after the certified bargaining representative flexes its muscles and
engages in concerted action will have to await the filing of more appropriate cases and, hopefully, the enactment
of applicable legislation.

The Constitution provides that the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining, and peaceful
concerted activities, including the right to strike, are guaranteed provided these are in accordance with law. There
is reference to the need for a law governing the procedures incident to self-organization.

What is the law which governs certification elections in the Court of Appeals?

The Solicitor General argues that the applicable law is Executive Order No. 180 issued on June 1, 1987 entitled
"Providing Guidelines for the Exercise of the Right to Organize of Government Employees; Creating a Public
Sector Labor-Management Council; and for Other Purposes."

The pertinent provisions of Executive Order No. 180 are:

SECTION 7. Government employees' organizations shall register with the Civil Service Commission and the
Department of Labor and Employment. The application shall be filed with the Bureau of Labor Relations of the
Department which shall process the same in accordance with the provisions of the Labor Code of the Philippines
as amended. Applications may also be filed with the Regional Offices of the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall immediately transmit the said applications to the Bureau of Labor Relations within three
(3) days from receipt thereof.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 8. Upon approval of the application, a registration certification shall be issued to the organization
recognizing it as a legitimate employees' organization with the right to represent its members and undertake
activities to further and defend its interest. The corresponding certificates of registration shall be jointly approved
by the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and Secretary of Labor and Employment.

xxx xxx xxx

SECTION 10. The duly registered employees' organization having the support of the majority of the employees in
the appropriate organizational unit shall be designated as the sole and exclusive representative of the
employees.

SECTION 11. A duly registered employees' organization shall be accorded voluntary recognition upon a showing
that no other employees' organization is registered or is seeking registration, based on records of the Bureau of
Labor Relations, and that the said organization has the majority support of the rank-and-file employees in the
organizational unit.

SECTION 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate
organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election
and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organization
unit. (Rollo, pp. 235-237)

It is obvious that Executive Order No. 180 is at best a stop gap measure for a limited purpose. Certain provisions
and procedures in the Labor Code were engrafted into a decree governing the entirely novel situation of unionism
in the governmental sector. Enacted a little over one month and a half before Congress reconvened after the
revolutionary government was replaced by the present government, it unfortunately lacks a legislative record,
parliamentary debates, and the insights that only the elected representatives of all the people can bring to bear in
the regulation of a complicated and sensitive relationship.

The petitioner questions the validity of Executive Order No. 180 but limits its challenge to an alleged violation of
the separation of powers doctrine. The argument is self-defeating because, followed to its logical conclusion, only
this Court would have the power to supervise certification elections in the Court of Appeals. The task is not for us
and we certainly have no intention to undertake it.

It is the function of this Court, and we will not hesitate to exercise the power, to regulate all activities of Judges
and court personnel, the Supreme Court included, to the end that the independence, effectiveness, and integrity
of the judiciary as mandated by the Constitution are not impaired or compromised. It is axiomatic, for example,
that any demands of court employees for higher compensation or improved facilities must be viewed in the
context of the fiscal autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution to the Judiciary. (Constitution, Article VIII, Section
3). Neither DOLE, the Civil Service Commission (CSC), nor any other agency would have jurisdiction to
adjudicate such claims. And since unresolved legal questions commenced elsewhere are ultimately decided by
us, the final decision on all such questions would still be with this Court.

All this does not mean that the separation of powers doctrine requires us to supervise the details of self-
organization activities in the courts. In the same way that CSC validly conducts competitive examinations to grant
requisite eligibilities to court employees, we see no constitutional objection to DOLE handling the certification
process in the Court of Appeals, considering its expertise, machinery, and experience in this particular activity.
Executive Order No. 180 requires organizations of government employees to register with both CSC and DOLE.
This ambivalence notwithstanding, the CSC has no facilities, personnel, or experience in the conduct of
certification elections. The BLR has to do the job.

Executive Order No. 180 states that certificates of registration of the legitimate employee representatives must be
jointly approved by the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary. Executive Order No. 180 is not too helpful in
determining whose opinion shall prevail if the CSC Chairman and the DOLE Secretary arrive at different
conclusions. At any rate, we shall deal with that problem when it occurs. Insofar as power to call for and
supervise the conduct of certification elections is concerned, we rule against the petitioner.

One final point on the petitioner's objection to the jurisdiction of the BLR. ACAE cannot persuasively challenge
the validity of Executive Order No. 180 because its very personality to bring this suit is premised on its having
organized under the same executive order. The first paragraph of the petition reads:

1. Petitioner ASSOCIATION OF COURT OF APPEALS EMPLOYEES, ACAE for brevity, is an association of

government employees duly organized and existing under and by virtue of Executive Order No. 180, duly
accredited as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees of the Court of Appeals, with office
address at the Court of Appeals Compound, M. Orosa Street, Ermita, Manila. (Rollo, p. 2)

The petitioner argues that the respondent UCECA failed to prove that it no longer enjoys the support of the rank-
and-file employees. ACAE claims that it has 395 members. It states that if the fraudulently entered names
numbering 88 are all deducted from the 303 listed names for UCECA, there would actually be 215 members only
left. Even assuming, therefore, that the petitioning union has satisfied the required percentage of signatures
(20%) according to section of Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government
Employees to Self-Organization, no election can be had if the incumbent bargaining representative still has the
clear majority.

It is precisely because the respondent union has been questioning the majority status of the petitioner that a
petition for certification election was filed. Nowhere in the rules is there a further requirement for a petitioning
union to prove the lack of a majority status of the incumbent representative or who among its listed members are
not actually affiliated with it. What is merely required for a petition for certification election to be granted is the
filing of a verified petition which is supported by the signatures of at least twenty (20%) percent of the covered
employees. It is also essential that it is not filed within one (1) year from the date a declaration of a previous final
certification election result was issued.

The BLR has satisfied itself that the private respondent has faithfully complied with the bare requirements for the
petition. It is a well-settled rule that "a certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that the term is
ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact finding character." (Associated Labor
Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 179 SCRA 127 [1989]; Philippine Telegraph and Telephone Corporation v. NLRC,
183 SCRA 451 [1990]) Thus, the technical rules of evidence do not apply if the decision to grant it proceeds from
an examination of the sufficiency of the petition as well as a careful look into the arguments contained in position
papers and other documents.

The public respondent has found the petition to be sufficient in form and substance there being compliance with
the twenty (20%) percent support signatures. The factual findings of the Bureau of Labor Relations on this matter
appear to be supported by substantial evidence and we, accordingly, accord them great weight and respect. They
shall not be disturbed by the Court in the absence of proof of reversible error. (See Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, 162 SCRA 426 [1988]; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v. Ferrer-Calleja, 180
SCRA 749 [1989]) On the basis of its findings, it was only proper for the public respondent to order the holding of
a certification election which is mandatorily required by Section 12, Executive Order No.180:

Section 12. Where there are two or more duly registered employees' organizations in the appropriate
organizational unit, the Bureau of Labor Relations shall, upon petition, order the conduct of a certification election
and shall certify the winner as the exclusive representative of the rank-and-file employees in said organizational
unit." (Underscoring Supplied)

Even assuming there were fraudulently included names or signatures, respondent UCECA would still have
complied with the twenty (20%) percent requirement. The remaining membership, i.e. 215, alleged by petitioner
ACAE constitutes twenty eight (28%) percent of the rank-and-file court employees.

The result of the certification election shall determine who between the petitioner and the private respondent is
telling the truth. As we have ruled in Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja,
(supra):
Whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular union represents the majority of the rank-and-file employees,
in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of a certification election is the most dramatic method of
determining the employee's choice of their bargaining representative. It is the appropriate means whereby
controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees
themselves. (At page 431)

The petitioner likewise argues that the certification proceedings should be suspended pending its petition for the
cancellation of union registration of the UCECA.

The records show that UCECA was registered with the Civil Service Commission on March 16, 1990. (Rollo, p.
45) When the said union was organized, some of its members allegedly used to be members of the ACAE who
tendered mass resignations on August 14, 1989 and on September 29, 1989. (Rollo, pp. 27-35) On January 30,
1990, the officers of ACAE, in Board Resolution No. 8 resolved that the resignations tendered were irregular and
must be accomplished individually. (Rollo, p. 55) Thereafter, for some reasons, some of the listed members in the
Registry Book of the UCECA wrote individual letters to UCECA in April, 1990 either questioning the inclusion of
their names or tendering their resignations.

On June 18, 1990, the petitioner herein filed its petition to cancel the union registration of UCECA. The act of the
petitioner in charging commissions of fraud and misrepresentation against UCECA only after realizing the rising
membership of the latter and the subsequent petition for certification election raises grave suspicions as to
whether or not it wants to subvert the right of the employees to determine the proper exclusive representative or
agent now that they are given two unions from which to choose. Assuming for the sake of argument that the
petitioner ACAE had lawful grounds to challenge the existence of the UCECA, it should have done so, soon after
the date it had notice or knowledge of the registration of the latter to protect its own interests and not at a later
time when its bargaining position was already at the risk of being lost.

At any rate, the Court applies the established rule correctly followed by the public respondent that an order to
hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration
certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition,
it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order directing a cancellation.

It is the policy of the State in protecting the rights of labor to ensure and maintain industrial peace. For this
reason, all employees of an appropriate bargaining unit shall be given an opportunity to organize and to
determine which labor organization should be their exclusive bargaining representative. Hence, a petition for
certification election filed by an interested labor organization shall be dealt with accordingly, with a view to
attaining this objective. This is especially true when it involves the ultimate respect for and protection of the rights
of government employees. In granting to employees in the civil service the right to organize, a procedure has
been enacted to allow them to select what union shall be the recognized representative for all those in one
agency, i.e., a certification election. (Sections 5, 6 and 12; Executive Order No. 180; Sections 3 and 4, Rule V
and Rule VI, Rules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Government Employees to Self-Organization)

The freedom of choice given to workers is a constitutional right. Therefore, the holding of a certification election,
being a statutory policy, should not be circumvented. (Associated Trade Unions-ATU v. Noriel, 89 SCRA 264
[1979]; Philippine Airlines Employees' Association (PALEA) v. Ferrer-Calleja, supra; Airtime Specialists, Inc. v.
Ferrer-Calleja, supra)

WHEREFORE, the petitioner having failed to show grave abuse of discretion committed by the public
respondent, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed orders of the public respondent are AFFIRMED.
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on August 29, 1990 is LIFTED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J. (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Bidin, Davide, Jr., and Romero, JJ., concur.

Progressive Dev’t. Corp. v. Laguesma, 271 SCRA 593 [1998]

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 115077 April 18, 1997

PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION-PIZZA HUT, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, in his capacity as Undersecretary of Labor, and NAGKAKAISANG
LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWA (NLM)-KATIPUNAN, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:

On July 9, 1993, Nagkakaisang Lakas ng Manggagawa (NLM)-Katipunan (respondent Union) filed a petition for
certification election with the Department of Labor (National Capital Region) in behalf of the rank and file
employees of the Progressive Development Corporation (Pizza Hut) docketed as NCR Case No. NCR-OD-M-
9307-020. 1

Petitioner filed on August 20, 1993, a verified Motion to Dismiss the petition alleging fraud, falsification and
misrepresentation in the respondent. Union's registration making it void and invalid. The motion specifically
alleged that: a) respondent Union's registration was tainted with false, forged, double or multiple signatures of
those who allegedly took part in the ratification of the respondent Union's constitution and by-laws and in the
election of its officers that there were two sets of supposed attendees to the alleged organizational meeting that
was alleged to have taken place on June 26, 1993; that the alleged chapter is claimed to have been supported by
318 members when in fact the persons who actually signed their names were much less; and b) while the
application for registration of the charter was supposed to have been approved in the organizational meeting held
on June 27, 1993, the charter certification issued by the federation KATIPUNAN was dated June 26, 1993 or one
(1) day prior to the formation of the chapter, thus, there were serious falsities in the dates of the issuance of the
charter certification and the organization meeting of the alleged chapter.

Citing other instances of misrepresentation and fraud, petitioner, on August 29, 1993, filed a Supplement to its
Motion to Dismiss, 2 claiming that:

1) Respondent Union alleged that the election of its officers was held on June 27, 1993; however, it appears from
the documents submitted by respondent union to the BIR-DOLE that the Union's constitution and by-laws were
adopted only on July 7, 1993, hence, there was no bases for the supposed election of officers on June 27, 1993
because as of this date, there existed no positions to which the officers could be validly elected;

2) Voting was not conducted by secret ballot in violation of Article 241, section (c) of the Labor Code;

3) The Constitution and by Laws submitted in support of its petition were not properly acknowledged and
notarized. 3

On August 30, 1993, petitioner filed a Petition 4 seeking the cancellation of the Union's registration on the grounds of
fraud and falsification, docketed as BIR Case No. 8-21-83. 5 Motion was likewise filed by petitioner with the Med-Arbiter
requesting suspension of proceedings in the certification election case until after the prejudicial question of the Union's
legal personality is determined in the proceedings for cancellation of registration.

However, in an Order dated September 29, 1993, 6 Med-Arbiter Rasidali C. Abdullah directed the holding of a
certification election among petitioner's rank and file employees. The Order explained:
. . . Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut is a legitimate labor organization in contemplation of law and
shall remain as such until its very charter certificate is canceled or otherwise revoked by competent authority. The
alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in connection with the issuance of the charter certificate are
collateral issues which could be properly ventilated in the cancellation proceedings. 7

On appeal to the office of the Secretary of Labor, Labor Undersecretary Bienvenido E. Laguesma in a Resolution
dated December 29, 1993 8 denied the same.

A motion for reconsideration of the public respondent's resolution was denied in his Order 9 dated January 27,
1994, hence, this special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court where the principal issue
raised is whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order
to conduct a certification election among petitioner's rank and file employees, considering that: (1) respondent Union's
legal personality was squarely put in issue; (2) allegations of fraud and falsification, supported by documentary
evidence were made; and (3) a petition to cancel respondent Union's registration is pending with the regional office of
the Department of Labor and Employment. 10

We grant the petition.

In the public respondent's assailed Resolution dated December 29, 1993, the suggestion is made that once a
labor organization has filed the necessary documents and papers and the same have been certified under oath
and attested to, said organization necessarily becomes clothed with the character of a legitimate labor
organization. The resolution declares:

Records show that at the time of the filing of the subject petition on 9 July 1993 by the petitioner NLM-
KATIPUNAN, for and in behalf of its local affiliate Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa ng Pizza Hut, the latter has been
clothed with the status and/or character of a legitimate labor organization. This is so, because on 8 July 1993,
petitioner submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), this Department, the following documents: Charter
Certificate, Minutes of the Organizational Meeting, List of Officers, and their respective addresses, financial
statement, Constitution and By-Laws (CBL, and the minutes of the ratification of the CBL). Said documents
(except the charter certificate) are certified under oath and attested to by the local union's Secretary/Treasurer
and President, respectively.

As to the contention that the certification election proceedings should be suspended in view of the pending case
for the cancellation of the petitioner's certificate of registration, let it be stressed that the pendency of a
cancellation case is not a ground for the dismissal or suspension of a representation proceedings considering
that a registered labor organization continues to be a legitimate one entitled to all the rights appurtenant thereto
until a final valid order is issued canceling such registration. 11

In essence, therefore, the real controversy in this case centers on the question of whether or not, after the
necessary papers and documents have been filed by a labor organization, recognition by the Bureau of Labor
Relations merely becomes a ministerial function.

We do not agree.

In the first place, the public respondent's views as expressed in his December 29, 1993 Resolution miss the
entire point behind the nature and purpose of proceedings leading to the recognition of unions as legitimate labor
organizations. Article 234 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 234. Requirements of registration. — Any applicant labor organization, association or group of unions or
workers shall acquire legal personality and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to
legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the certificate of registration based on the following requirements:

(a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee;

(b) The names of its officers, their addresses, the principal address of the labor organization, the minutes of the
organizational meetings and the list of the workers who participated in such meetings;
(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining
unit where it seeks to operate;

(d) If the applicant union has been in existence for one or more years, copies of its annual financial reports; and

(e) Four (4) copies of the constitution and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification,
and the list of the members who participated in it.

A more than cursory reading of the aforecited provisions clearly indicates that the requirements embodied therein
are intended as preventive measures against the commission of fraud. After a labor organization has filed the
necessary papers and documents for registration, it becomes mandatory for the Bureau of Labor Relations to
check if the requirements under Article 234 have been sedulously complied with. If its application for registration
is vitiated by falsification and serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and
the supporting documents, a labor organization should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization.
And if a certificate of recognition has been issued, the propriety of the labor organization's registration could be
assailed directly through cancellation of registration proceedings in accordance with Articles 238 and 239 of the
Labor Code, or indirectly, by challenging its petition for the issuance of an order for certification election.

These measures are necessary — and may be undertaken simultaneously — if the spirit behind the Labor
Code's requirements for registration are to be given flesh and blood. Registration requirements specifically afford
a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or fly-by-night
unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or use the labor organization for illegitimate ends. 12 Such
requirements are a valid exercise of the police power, because the activities in which labor organizations, associations
and unions of workers are engaged directly affect the public interest and should be protected. 13

Thus, in Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, 14 we held:

The controversy in this case centers on the requirements before a local or chapter of a federation may file a
petition for certification election and be certified as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of the petitioner's
employees.

xxx xxx xxx

But while Article 257 cited by the Solicitor General directs the automatic conduct of a certification election in an
unorganized establishment, it also requires that the petition for certification election must be filed by a legitimate
labor organization . . .

xxx xxx xxx

. . . The employer naturally needs assurance that the union it is dealing with is a bona-fide organization, one
which has not submitted false statements or misrepresentations to the Bureau. The inclusion of the certification
and attestation requirements will in a marked degree allay these apprehensions of management. Not only is the
issuance of any false statement and misrepresentation or ground for cancellation of registration (see Article 239
(a), (c) and (d)); it is also a ground for a criminal charge of perjury.

The certification and attestation requirements are preventive measures against the commission of fraud. They
likewise afford a measure of protection to unsuspecting employees who may be lured into joining unscrupulous or
fly-by-night unions whose sole purpose is to control union funds or to use the union for dubious ends.

xxx xxx xxx

. . . It is not this Court's function to augment the requirements prescribed by law in order to make them wiser or to
allow greater protection to the workers and even their employer. Our only recourse is, as earlier discussed, to
exact strict compliance with what the law provides as requisites for local or chapter formation.

xxx xxx xxx

The Court's conclusion should not be misconstrued as impairing the local union's right to be certified as the
employees' bargaining agent in the petitioner's establishment. We are merely saying that the local union must
first comply with the statutory requirements in order to exercise this right. Big federations and national unions of
workers should take the lead in requiring their locals and chapters to faithfully comply with the law and the rules
instead of merely snapping union after union into their folds in a furious bid with rival federations to get the most
number of members

Furthermore, the Labor Code itself grants the Bureau of Labor Relations a period of thirty (30) days within which
to review all applications for registration. Article 235 provides:

Art. 235. Action on application. — The Bureau shall act on all applications for registration within thirty (30) days
from filing.

All requisite documents and papers shall be certified under oath by the secretary or the treasurer of the
organization, as the case may be, and attested to by its president.

The thirty-day period in the aforecited provision ensures that any action taken by the Bureau of Labor Relations is
made in consonance with the mandate of the Labor Code, which, it bears emphasis, specifically requires that the
basis for the issuance of a certificate of registration should be compliance with the requirements for recognition
under Article 234. Since, obviously, recognition of a labor union or labor organization is not merely a ministerial
function, the question now arises as to whether or not the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion
in affirming the Med-Arbiter's order in spite of the fact that the question of the Union's legitimacy was squarely put
in issue and that the allegations of fraud and falsification were adequately supported by documentary evidence.

The Labor Code requires that in organized and unorganized 15 establishments, a petition for certification election
must be filed by a legitimate labor organization. The acquisition of rights by any union or labor organization, particularly
the right to file a petition for certification election, first and foremost, depends on whether or not the labor organization
has attained the status of a legitimate labor organization.

In the case before us, the Med-Arbiter summarily disregarded the petitioner's prayer that the former look into the
legitimacy of the respondent. Union by a sweeping declaration that the union was in the possession of a charter
certificate so that "for all intents and purposes, Sumasaklaw sa Manggagawa sa Pizza Hut (was) a legitimate
labor organization." 16 Glossing over the transcendental issue of fraud and misrepresentation raised by herein
petitioner, Med-Arbiter Rasidali Abdullah held that:

The alleged misrepresentation, fraud and false statement in connection with the issuance of the charter certificate
are collateral issues which could be ventilated in the cancellation proceedings. 17

It cannot be denied that the grounds invoked by petitioner for the cancellation of respondent Union's registration
fall under paragraph (a) and (c) of Article 239 of the Labor Code, to wit:

(a) Misrepresentation, false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution
and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members who took part in the
ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto, the minutes of ratification, the list of members
who took part in the ratification;

xxx xxx xxx

(c) Misrepresentation, false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers, minutes of the election
of officers, the list of voters, or failure to submit these documents together with the list of the newly elected-
appointed officers and their postal addresses within thirty (30) days from election.

xxx xxx xxx

The grounds ventilated in cancellation proceedings in accordance with Article 239 of the Labor Code constitute a
grave challenge to the right of respondent Union to ask for certification election. The Med-Arbiter should have
looked into the merits of the petition for cancellation before issuing an order calling for certification election.
Registration based on false and fraudulent statements and documents confer no legitimacy upon a labor
organization irregularly recognized, which, at best, holds on to a mere scrap of paper. Under such circumstances,
the labor organization, not being a legitimate labor organization, acquires no rights, particularly the right to ask for
certification election in a bargaining unit.

As we laid emphasis in Progressive Development Corporation Labor, 18 "[t]he employer needs the assurance that
the union it is dealing with is a bona fide organization, one which has not submitted false statements or
misrepresentations to the Bureau." Clearly, fraud, falsification and misrepresentation in obtaining recognition as a
legitimate labor organization are contrary to the Med-Arbiter's conclusion not merely collateral issues. The invalidity of
respondent Union's registration would negate its legal personality to participate in certification election.

Once a labor organization attains the status of a legitimate labor organization it begins to possess all of the rights
and privileges granted by law to such organizations. As such rights and privileges ultimately affect areas which
are constitutionally protected, the activities in which labor organizations, associations and unions are engaged
directly affect the public interest and should be zealously protected. A strict enforcement of the Labor Code's
requirements for the acquisition of the status of a legitimate labor organization is in order.

Inasmuch as the legal personality of respondent Union had been seriously challenged, it would have been more
prudent for the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to have granted petitioner's request for the suspension of
proceedings in the certification election case, until the issue of the legality of the Union's registration shall have
been resolved. Failure of the Med-Arbiter and public respondent to heed the request constituted a grave abuse of
discretion.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is GRANTED and the Resolution and Order of the
public respondent dated December 29, 1993 and January 24, 1994, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE.

The case is REMANDED to the Med-Arbiter to resolve with reasonable dispatch petitioner's petition for
cancellation of respondent Union's registration.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, Bellosillo and Vitug, JJ., concur.

Hermosisima, Jr., J., is on leave.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 32-34.

2 Id., at 40-44.

3 Id., at 48-51.

4 Id., at 45-47.

5 Ibid.

6 See Note 3.

7 Id., at 50.

8 Id., at 25-20.

9 Id., at 30-31.

10 Id., at 9-10.
11 Id., at 28-29.

12 Progressive Development Corporation vs. Secretary, Department of Labor and Employment, 205 SCRA 802
(1992).

13 Philippine Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Secretary of Labor, 27 SCRA 41 (1969).

14 See Note 12.

15 For unorganized establishments, Article 257 of the Labor Code provides:

Art. 257. Petitions in unorganized establishments — In any establishment where there is no certified bargaining
agent, a certification election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a
legitimate labor organization (emphasis supplied).

16 Rollo, p. 50.

17 Ibid.

18 See Note 12.

Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Pacific Plastic v. Laguesma, 267 SCRA 303 [1997]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111245 January 31, 1997

SAMAHAN NG MANGGAGAWA SA PACIFIC PLASTIC, petitioner,

vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO LAGUESMA, Undersecretary of labor, and MALAYANG NAGKAKAISANG
MANGGAGAWA NG PACIFIC PLASTIC, respondents,

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a special civil action for certiorari to set aside the resolution, dated May 14, 1993, of respondent
Undersecretary of Labor and the order of the Med-Arbiter of January 31, 1993, dismissing the election protest of
petitioner Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic (SAMAHAN) and upholding the election of respondent
Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Pacific Plastic (MNMPP) as the sole and exclusive bargaining
representative of the rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic Corporation.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner SAMAHAN and respondent MNMPP are labor unions of rank and file employees at the Pacific Plastic
Corporation (PPC) in Valenzuela, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1990, MNMPP filed a Petition for Certification
Election, alleging that there were more or less 130 rank and file employees at the PPC whom it was seeking to
represent. 1 SAMAHAN countered by seeking the cancellation of MNMPP's union registration. As a result, MNMPP's
petition to be certified as the bargaining agent was dismissed. MNMPP appealed to the Secretary of Labor who, on
March 5, 1991, reversed the decision of the Med-Arbiter and ordered the holding of a certification election among the
rank and file employees of the PPC. The PPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but its motion was denied.
Accordingly, the representation officer of the Secretary of Labor held a pre-election conference on May 6, 1991, during
which the PPC was required to submit the list of its rank and file employees based on the company payroll three (3)
months prior to the filing of the petition. As respondent company failed to submit the list, it was given a stern warning by
the Department of Labor (DOLE) that should it fail to appear at the next conference on June 3, 1991, the list to be
submitted by petitioner MNMPP would be used as basis for determining the eligible voters. 2 But the PPC again failed
to appear at the conference, prompting the Department of Labor Industrial Relations Division (DOLE-IRD) to issue a
final warning. 3

Petitioner SAMAHAN also failed to appear at the June 3, 1991 conference. On June 18, 1991, it moved to defer
the conference, alleging that proceedings for the cancellation of union registration of MNMPP were still pending
resolution before the Med-Arbiter which constitute a prejudicial question and that there existed a collective
bargaining agreement between PPC and SAMAHAN which was a bar to the certification election. 4

MNMPP opposed the motion, contending that the cancellation case had already been finally decided by the
DOLE and that the execution of the subject CBA during the pendency of the representation case did not bar the
holding of a certification election. 5

On August 23, 1991, the DOLE-IRD summoned respondent company once more, reiterating its warning that
should the company fail to submit the list of its rank and file employees, the list to be submitted by private
respondent MNMPP and petitioner SAMAHAN would be adopted as the list of qualified voters and the company's
right to the exclusion proceedings would be deemed waived. 6

But again PPC did not comply with the DOLE order. Meanwhile, on September 23, 1991, SAMAHAN and
MNMPP agreed to hold the certification election on October 29, 1991 on the basis of the list of employees
submitted by MNMPP, without prejudice to the submission by petitioner SAMAHAN of its own list on October 17,
1991. 7 Thereafter, they agreed to postpone election to await the list of employees requested from the Social Security
System. 8

On September 10, 1992, upon motion of MNMPP, the certification election was finally set for October 6, 1992.
But SAMAHAN objected despite its agreement with MNMPP on September 23, 1991 to hold an election using the
list furnished by the SSS. 9 It also objected to the participation of a third labor union, Kalipunan ng Manggagawang
Pilipino (KAMAPI) which in the meantime had filed a motion for intervention. Thereafter, SAMAHAN filed a
Manifestation/Motion that it was not participating in the certification election and asked that the certification election
held on the same day be nullified for the following reasons: (1) it did not receive notice of the certification as required
by law; (2) its opposition to KAMAPI's motion to intervene and it is opposition to setting the date of the certification
election had not been resolved; (3) there were discrepancies in the list of voters submitted by the SSS; and (4)
SAMAHAN's President moved to strike out his signature at the back of the official ballot. 10

The certification election was held on October 6, 1992. Over SAMAHAN's objection KAMAPI was allowed to
participate. The following were results of the election: 11

No. of Eligible Voters 98

Malayang Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic 56
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Pacific Plastic 2
Kalipunan ng Manggagawang Pilipino 0
No. Union 1
No. of Spoiled Ballots cast 3
Total no. of Votes Cast 62

On October 9, 1992, SAMAHAN protested the result of the certification election alleging the same grounds
alleged by it in its Manifestation/Motion of October 6, 1992. On October 15, 1992, MNMPP opposed the petition
raising the following arguments: (1) that the mere filing of a motion for intervention will not suspend the holding of
a certification election under Rule V, §5 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code; (2) that the results
of the election showed that intervenor was resoundingly repudiated by the employees; (3) that it failed to specify
the alleged discrepancies in the list of employees furnished by the SSS; and (4) that matters not raised during the
election are deemed waived pursuant to Rule V, §3 of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code. 12
In his order dated January 31, 1993, the Med-Arbiter, Tomas F. Falconitin, dismissed the election protest of
SAMAHAN and upheld the election of MNMPP as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all rank and file
employees at the PCC. On March 12, 1993, SAMAHAN appealed to the Secretary of Labor. It argued that its
opposition to KAMAPI's Motion for Intervention should first be resolved before a certification election could be
held and that the contract-bar rule should be applied. In addition, it contended that the use of the SSS list was in
violation of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code which prescribe the use of the company payroll as
basis for the voter's list.

On May 14, 1993, Undersecretary Bienvenido Laguesma denied the appeal of SAMAHAN and affirmed the
decision of the Med-Arbiter. SAMAHAN moved for a reconsideration, but its motion was denied on July 29, 1993.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

Petitioner contends:

1. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is null and void on the ground that only 62 out of 130
employees participated in the activity.

2. The SSS lists indicating 98 covered employees cannot be used as substitute for three (3) monthly payrolls (sic)
required for the purpose of determining the qualified voters and the majority vote needed in an election.

3. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma committed a serious error amounting to lack of jurisdiction in upholding the
election of respondent officer's (sic) despite the absence of majority support which is 65 out of 130 admitted
members in the bargaining unit.

4. Hon. Bienvenido Laguesma had abused his discretion in sustaining the med-arbiter despite the absence of any
legal or factual support when he could otherwise declare failure of an election, thereby constituting his acts to
have been done in excess of his authority amounting to lack of jurisdiction, and therefore his resolution and order
issued pursuant thereof are considered to be null and void. 13

The petition has no merit.

First. The certification election held on October 6, 1992 is valid Art. 256 of the labor Code provides that in order to
have a valid election, at least a majority of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The
certification election results show that more than a majority, i.e, 62 out of a total of 98 eligible voters included in
the list of employees obtained from the SSS, cast their votes. Hence, the legal requirement for a valid election
was met.

The bone of contention actually concerns the propriety of utilizing the list of employees furnished by the SSS as
basis for determining the total number of eligible voters in the bargaining unit. Petitioner claims that, according to
the Implementing Rules, the basis for the list of eligible voters should have been the payroll three (3) months
preceding the filing of the petition for certification election and that if this was done the 62 votes cast would be
short of the majority because, instead of only 98 employees, as shown in the SSS list, there were actually 130 as
alleged in MNMPP's petition for certification election.

The contention is without merit. As petitioner itself says, the figure 130 is based on the allegation that MNMPP
made in its petition for certification election that it was supported by at least 25% of the members of the
bargaining unit. 14 Such statement was a mere approximation of the size of the bargaining unit that the petitioning
union seeks to represent and cannot be used against MNMPP for this reason.

It should ideally be the payroll which should have been used for the purpose of the election. However, the
unjustified refusal of a company to submit the payroll in its custody, despite efforts to make it produce it,
compelled resort to the SSS list as the next best source of information. After all, the SSS list is a public record
whose regularity is presumed. In Port Workers Union of the Philippines (PWUP) v. Undersecretary of Labor and
Employment, 15 this Court underscored the policy of the Labor Code of encouraging the holding of a certification election as the definitive and certain
way of ascertaining the choice of employees as to the labor organization in a collective bargaining unit. In Trade Unions of the Philippines and Allied Services
World Federation of Trade Unions v. Laguesma, 16 we reiterated this policy thus:

It bears stressing that no obstacle must be placed to the holding of certification elections, for it is a statutory
policy that should not be circumvented. We have held that whenever there is doubt as to whether a particular
union represents the majority of the rank and file employees, in the absence of a legal impediment, the holding of
a certification election is the most democratic method of determining the employees' choice of their bargaining
representative. It is the appropriate means whereby controversies and disputes on representation may be laid to
rest, by the unequivocal vote of the employees themselves. Indeed, it is the keystone of industrial democracy.

Insistence on the application of the Omnibus Implementing Rules could defeat this policy. Worse, it could
facilitate fraud by employers who can easily suppress the payroll to prevent certification elections from being
held. This Court has therefore consistently adhered to the principle announced in U.E. Automotive Employees v.
Noriel 17 that where it concerns the weight to be accorded to the wishes of the majority as expressed in an election conducted fairly and honestly, certain
provisions that may be considered mandatory before the voting takes place become thereafter merely directory in order that the wishes of the electorate
prevail. Considering all the arguments presented above, we find no substantial reason to nullify the certification election conducted on October 6, 1992 on the
basis of a mere technicality which finds no justification considering the facts of the case nor upon close examination of the true intent of the law to remove all
impediments to the conduct of certification elections.

At all events petitioner must be deemed to have waived the objection based on this ground, considering that this
objection was raised for the first time in petitioner's appeal from the decision of the Med-Arbiter dismissing
petitioner's protest. 18 Even then, petitioner's objection to the use of the SSS list was not that this was contrary to the
requirement of the Implementing Rules that the payroll three (3) months prior to the filing of the petition should be used
but rather that the list contained some discrepancy 19 — an allegation which petitioner failed to substantiate.

At the latest, petitioner's objection to the use of the SSS should have been raised during the elections and
formalized in its election protest. We agree with private respondent MNMPP in its Opposition to SAMAHAN's
election protest dated October 15, 1992 that under the Implementing Rules, grounds of protests not raised before
the close of the proceedings and duly formalized within five (5) days after the close of the election proceedings
are deemed waived. 20

Second. Petitioner's contention in its Motion for Deferment of Pre-election Conference was that the CBA between
it and the PPC signed during the pendency of the representation proceedings, rendered the certification election
moot and academic. Rule V, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, §4 provides:

The representation case shall not, however, be adversely affected by a collective bargaining agreement
registered before or during last 60 days of a subsisting agreement or during the pendency of the representation
case.

This rule was applied in the case of ALU-TUCP v. Trajano 21 where we held that the representation case will not be
adversely affected by a CBA registered before or during the freedom period or during the pendency of the
representation case. In ALU v. Calleja, 22 we also held that a CBA, which was prematurely renewed, is not a bar to the
holding of a certification election. Hence, the CBA entered into between petitioner and PPC during the pendency of the
representation case and after the filing of the petition for certification election on August 24, 1990, cannot possibly
prejudice the certification election nor render it moot.

Third. With respect to petitioner's claim 23 that the proceedings for the cancellation of MNMPP's union registration
was a prejudicial question, suffice it to say that as held in Association of Court of Appeals Employees vs. Calleja, 24 a
certification election can be conducted despite pendency of a petition to cancel the union registration certificate. For the
fact is that at the time the respondent union filed its petition for certification, it still had the legal personality to perform
such act absent an order directing its cancellation.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED

Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Rollo, p. 16.

2 Id., p.52.
3 Ibid.

4 Rollo, pp. 24-26.

5 Id., p.52.

6 Id., pp. 23 and 53.

7 Id., p. 53.

8 Ibid.

9 Id., p. 54.

10 Id., pp.28 & 54

11 Id., p. 54.

12 Id., pp. 35-38.

13 Id., pp. 10-11.

14 Id., p. 109.

15 207 SCRA 329 (1992)

16 233 SCRA 565 (1994)

17 74 SCRA 72 (1976)

18 Rollo, p.47.

19 Id., p32.

20 Id., p. 38; Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, Rule VI, §§3-4.

21 172 SCRA 49 (1989).

22 179 SCRA 127 (1989).

23 Rollo, pp. 24-25.

24 203 SCRA 596(1991)

Decertification
S.S. Ventures Inc. v. S.S. Ventures Labor Union, 559 SCRA 435 [2008]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 161690 July 23, 2008

S.S. VENTURES INTERNATIONAL, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
S.S. VENTURES LABOR UNION (SSVLU) and DIR. HANS LEO CACDAC, in His capacity as Director of the
Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR), Respondents.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Petitioner S.S. Ventures International, Inc. (Ventures), a PEZA-registered export firm with principal place of
business at Phase I-PEZA-Bataan Export Zone, Mariveles, Bataan, is in the business of manufacturing sports
shoes. Respondent S.S. Ventures Labor Union (Union), on the other hand, is a labor organization registered with
the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) under Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003.

On March 21, 2000, the Union filed with DOLE-Region III a petition for certification election in behalf of the rank-
and-file employees of Ventures. Five hundred forty two (542) signatures, 82 of which belong to

______________________

* Additional member as per Special Order No. 509 dated July 1, 2008.
terminated Ventures employees, appeared on the basic documents supporting the petition.

On August 21, 2000, Ventures filed a Petition1 to cancel the Union’s certificate of registration invoking the
grounds set forth in Article 239(a) of the Labor Code.2 Docketed as Case No. RO300-0008-CP-002 of the same
DOLE regional office, the petition alleged the following:

(1) The Union deliberately and maliciously included the names of more or less 82 former employees no longer
connected with Ventures in its list of members who attended the organizational meeting and in the
adoption/ratification of its constitution and by-laws held on January 9, 2000 in Mariveles, Bataan; and the Union
forged the signatures of these 82 former employees to make it appear they took part in the organizational
meeting and adoption and ratification of the constitution;

(2) The Union maliciously twice entered the signatures of three persons namely: Mara Santos, Raymond
Balangbang, and Karen Agunos;

(3) No organizational meeting and ratification actually took place; and

(4) The Union’s application for registration was not supported by at least 20% of the rank-and-file employees of
Ventures, or 418 of the total 2,197-employee complement. Since more or less 82 of the 5003 signatures were
forged or invalid, then the remaining valid signatures would only be 418, which is very much short of the 439
minimum (2197 total employees x 20% = 439.4) required by the Labor Code.4

In its Answer with Motion to Dismiss,5 the Union denied committing the imputed acts of fraud or forgery and
alleged that: (1) the organizational meeting actually took place on January 9, 2000 at the Shoe City basketball
court in Mariveles; (2) the 82 employees adverted to in Ventures’ petition were qualified Union members for,
although they have been ordered dismissed, the one-year prescriptive period to question their dismissal had not
yet lapsed; (3) it had complied with the 20%-member registration requirement since it had 542 members; and (4)
the "double" signatures were inadvertent human error.

In its supplemental reply memorandum6 filed on March 20, 2001, with attachments, Ventures cited other
instances of fraud and misrepresentation, claiming that the "affidavits" executed by 82 alleged Union members
show that they were deceived into signing paper minutes or were harassed to signing their attendance in the
organizational meeting. Ventures added that some employees signed the "affidavits" denying having attended
such meeting.

In a Decision dated April 6, 2001, Regional Director Ana C. Dione of DOLE-Region III found for Ventures, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Viewed in the light of all the foregoing, this office hereby grants the petition. WHEREFORE, this office resolved to
CANCEL Certificate of Registration No. [RO300-00-02-UR-0003] dated 28 February 2000 of respondent S.S.
Ventures Labor Union-Independent.

So Ordered.7

Aggrieved, the Union interposed a motion for reconsideration, a recourse which appeared to have been
forwarded to the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). Although it would later find this motion to have been belatedly
filed, the BLR, over the objection of Ventures which filed a Motion to Expunge, gave it due course and treated it
as an appeal.

Despite Ventures’ motion to expunge the appeal,8 the BLR Director rendered on October 11, 2002 a decision9 in
BLR-A-C-60-6-11-01, granting the Union’s appeal and reversing the decision of Dione. The fallo of the BLR’s
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of Director Ana C. Dione dated 6 April 2001 is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. S.S. Ventures Labor Union-Independent shall remain in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations.

SO ORDERED.10

Ventures sought reconsideration of the above decision but was denied by the BLR.

Ventures then went to the Court of Appeals (CA) on a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the recourse docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 74749. On October 20, 2003, the CA rendered a Decision,11 dismissing Ventures’ petition.
Ventures’ motion for reconsideration met a similar fate.12

Hence, this petition for review under Rule 45, petitioner Ventures raising the following grounds:

I.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN DISREGARDING THE SUBSTANTIAL
AND OVERWHELMING EVIDENCE ADDUCED BY THE PETITIONER SHOWING THAT
RESPONDENT UNION PERPETRATED FRAUD, FORGERY, MISREPRESENTATION AND
MISSTATEMENTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE ADOPTION AND RATIFICATION OF ITS
CONSTITUTION AND BY-LAWS, AND IN THE PREPARATION OF THE LIST OF MEMBERS
WHO TOOK PART IN THE ALLEGED ORGANIZATIONAL MEETING BY HOLDING THAT:

A.

THE 87 AFFIDAVITS OF ALLEGED UNION MEMBERS HAVE NO EVIDENTIARY WEIGHT.

B.

THE INCLUSION OF THE 82 EMPLOYEES IN THE LIST OF ATTENDEES TO THE JANUARY

9, 2000 MEETING IS AN INTERNAL MATTER WITHIN THE AMBIT OF THE WORKER’S RIGHT
TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND OUTSIDE THE SPHERE OF INFLUENCE (OF) THIS OFFICE
(PUBLIC RESPONDENT IN THIS CASE) AND THE PETITIONER.

II.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN IGNORING AND DISREGARDING THE
BLATANT PROCEDURAL LAPSES OF THE RESPONDENT UNION IN THE FILING OF ITS
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION AND APPEAL.
 A.

BY GIVING DUE COURSE TO THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE

RESPONDENT UNION DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT WAS FILED BEYOND THE
REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

B.

BY ADMITTING THE APPEAL FILED BY ATTY. ERNESTO R. ARELLANO AND HOLDING

THAT THE SAME DOES NOT CONSTITUTE FORUM SHOPPING UNDER SUPREME COURT
CIRCULAR NO. 28-91.

III.

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED RECKLESSLY AND IMPRUDENTLY, GRAVELY ABUSED ITS

DISCRETION AND EXCEEDED ITS JURISDICTION IN INVOKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT TO SELF-ORGANIZATION AND ILO CONVENTION NO. 87 TO JUSTIFY THE MASSIVE
FRAUD, MISREPRESENTATION, MISSTATEMENTS AND FORGERY COMMITTED BY THE
RESPONDENT UNION.13

The petition lacks merit.

The right to form, join, or assist a union is specifically protected by Art. XIII, Section 314 of the Constitution and
such right, according to Art. III, Sec. 8 of the Constitution and Art. 246 of the Labor Code, shall not be abridged.
Once registered with the DOLE, a union is considered a legitimate labor organization endowed with the right and
privileges granted by law to such organization. While a certificate of registration confers a union with legitimacy
with the concomitant right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit, the registration may
be canceled or the union may be decertified as the bargaining unit, in which case the union is divested of the
status of a legitimate labor organization.15 Among the grounds for cancellation is the commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Art. 239(a)16 of the Labor Code, such as fraud and misrepresentation in connection with the
adoption or ratification of the union’s constitution and like documents. The Court, has in previous cases, said that
to decertify a union, it is not enough to show that the union includes ineligible employees in its membership. It
must also be shown that there was misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud in connection with the application
for registration and the supporting documents, such as the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws
or amendments thereto and the minutes of ratification of the constitution or by-laws, among other documents.17

Essentially, Ventures faults both the BLR and the CA in finding that there was no fraud or misrepresentation on
the part of the Union sufficient to justify cancellation of its registration. In this regard, Ventures makes much of,
first, the separate hand-written statements of 82 employees who, in gist, alleged that they were unwilling or
harassed signatories to the attendance sheet of the organizational meeting.

We are not persuaded. As aptly noted by both the BLR and CA, these mostly undated written statements
submitted by Ventures on March 20, 2001, or seven months after it filed its petition for cancellation of registration,
partake of the nature of withdrawal of union membership executed after the Union’s filing of a petition for
certification election on March 21, 2000. We have in precedent cases18 said that the employees’ withdrawal from
a labor union made before the filing of the petition for certification election is presumed voluntary, while
withdrawal after the filing of such petition is considered to be involuntary and does not affect the same. Now then,
if a withdrawal from union membership done after a petition for certification election has been filed does not
vitiate such petition, is it not but logical to assume that such withdrawal cannot work to nullify the registration of
the union? Upon this light, the Court is inclined to agree with the CA that the BLR did not abuse its discretion nor
gravely err when it concluded that the affidavits of retraction of the 82 members had no evidentiary weight.

It cannot be over-emphasized that the registration or the recognition of a labor union after it has submitted the
corresponding papers is not ministerial on the part of the BLR. Far from it. After a labor organization has filed the
necessary registration documents, it becomes mandatory for the BLR to check if the requirements under Art.
23419 of the Labor Code have been sedulously complied with.20 If the union’s application is infected by falsification
and like serious irregularities, especially those appearing on the face of the application and its attachments, a
union should be denied recognition as a legitimate labor organization. Prescinding from these considerations, the
issuance to the Union of Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-0003 necessarily implies that its
application for registration and the supporting documents thereof are prima facie free from any vitiating
irregularities.

Second, Ventures draws attention to the inclusion of 82 individuals to the list of participants in the January 9,
2000 organizational meeting. Ventures submits that the 82, being no longer connected with the company, should
not have been counted as attendees in the meeting and the ratification proceedings immediately afterwards.

The assailed inclusion of the said 82 individuals to the meeting and proceedings adverted to is not really fatal to
the Union’s cause for, as determined by the BLR, the allegations of falsification of signatures or
misrepresentation with respect to these individuals are without basis.21 The Court need not delve into the
question of whether these 82 dismissed individuals were still Union members qualified to vote and affix their
signature on its application for registration and supporting documents. Suffice it to say that, as aptly observed by
the CA, the procedure for acquiring or losing union membership and the determination of who are qualified or
disqualified to be members are matters internal to the union and flow from its right to self-organization.

To our mind, the relevancy of the 82 individuals’ active participation in the Union’s organizational meeting and the
signing ceremonies thereafter comes in only for purposes of determining whether or not the Union, even without
the 82, would still meet what Art. 234(c) of the Labor Code requires to be submitted, to wit:

Art. 234. Requirements of Registration.—Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality and
shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of the
certificate of registration based on the following requirements:

xxxx

(c) The names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of all the employees in the bargaining
unit where it seeks to operate.

The BLR, based on its official records, answered the poser in the affirmative. Wrote the BLR:

It is imperative to look into the records of respondent union with this Bureau pursuant to our role as a central
registry of union and CBA records under Article 231 of the Labor Code and Rule XVII of the rules implementing
Book V of the Labor Code, as amended x x x.

In its union records on file with this Bureau, respondent union submitted the names of [542] members x x x. This
number easily complied with the 20% requirement, be it 1,928 or 2,202 employees in the establishment. Even
subtracting the 82 employees from 542 leaves 460 union members, still within 440 or 20% of the maximum total
of 2,202 rank-and-file employees.

Whatever misgivings the petitioner may have with regard to the 82 dismissed employees is better addressed in
the inclusion-exclusion proceedings during a pre-election conference x x x. The issue surrounding the
involvement of the 82 employees is a matter of membership or voter eligibility. It is not a ground to cancel union
registration. (Emphasis added.)

The bare fact that three signatures twice appeared on the list of those who participated in the organizational
meeting would not, to our mind, provide a valid reason to cancel Certificate of Registration No. RO300-00-02-UR-
0003. As the Union tenably explained without rebuttal from Ventures, the double entries are no more than
"normal human error," effected without malice. Even the labor arbiter who found for Ventures sided with the
Union in its explanation on the absence of malice.22

The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-
organization. Accordingly, we can accord concurrence to the following apt observation of the BLR: "[F]or fraud
and misrepresentation [to be grounds for] cancellation of union registration under Article 239 [of the Labor Code],
the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a
majority of union members."23 1avvphi1
In its Comment, the Union points out that for almost seven (7) years following the filing of its petition, no
certification election has yet been conducted among the rank-and-file employees. If this be the case, the delay
has gone far enough and can no longer be allowed to continue. The CA is right when it said that Ventures should
not interfere in the certification election by actively and persistently opposing the certification election of the
Union. A certification election is exclusively the concern of employees and the employer lacks the legal
personality to challenge it.24 In fact, jurisprudence frowns on the employer’s interference in a certification election
for such interference unduly creates the impression that it intends to establish a company union.25

Ventures’ allegations on forum shopping and the procedural lapse supposedly committed by the BLR in allowing
a belatedly filed motion for reconsideration need not detain us long. Suffice it to state that this Court has
consistently ruled that the application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases may be relaxed to serve the
demands of substantial justice.26 So it must be in this case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution dated October 20, 2003 and January 19,
2004, respectively, of the CA are AFFIRMED. S.S. Ventures Labor Union shall remain in the roster of legitimate
labor organizations, unless it has in the meantime lost its legitimacy for causes set forth in the Labor Code. Costs
against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CONSUELO YNARES-
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was
assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Division Chairperson’s Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes

1 Rollo, pp. 68-77.

2 Art. 239. GROUNDS FOR CANCELLATION OF UNION REGISTRATION. x x x (a) Misrepresentation, false
statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments
thereto, the minutes of ratification, and the list of members who took part in the ratification.

3 Per the Union, 542 union members signed the petition for certification election.

4 Rollo, p. 71.

5 Id. at 78-82.

6 Id. at 118-120.

7 Id. at 127.

8 Id. at 144-145.

9 Id. at 146-154.

10 Id. at 86.

11Id. at 52-59. Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. De Los Santos and concurred in by Associate Justices
B.A. Adefuin-De La Cruz (now retired) and Jose C. Mendoza.

12 Per CA Resolution dated January 19, 2004.

13 Rollo, pp. 11-12.

14Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor x x x organized and unorganized x x x. It shall guarantee
the rights of all workers in self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiation, and peaceful concerted
activities x x x.

15 2 Azucena, The Labor Code 197-198 (6th ed., 2007).

16 Supra note 2.

17Air Philippines Corporation v. Bureau of Labor Relations, G.R. No. 155395, June 22, 2006, 492 SCRA 243,
250.

18Oriental Tin Can Labor Union v. Secretary of Labor and Employment, G.R. Nos. 116751 & 116779, August 28,
1998, 294 SCRA 640; La Suerte Cigar and Cigarette Factory v. Director of Bureau of Labor Relations, No. L-
55674, July 25, 1983, 123 SCRA 679.

19Art. 234. Requirements of registration.—Any applicant labor organization x x x shall acquire legal personality
and shall be entitled to the rights and privileges granted by law to legitimate labor organizations upon issuance of
the certificate of registration based on the following requirements: (a) Fifty pesos (P50.00) registration fee; (b)
The names of its officers, x x x the minutes of the organizational meetings and the list of the workers who
participated in such meetings; (c) the names of all its members comprising at least twenty percent (20%) of the
employees in the bargaining unit where it seeks to operate; (d) x x x; and (e) Four (4) copies of the constitution
and by-laws of the applicant union, minutes of its adoption or ratification, and the list of the members who
participated in it.

20 Progressive Development Corp.-Pizza Hut v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 115077, April 18, 1977, 271 SCRA 593,
599.

21 Rollo, pp. 153-154.

22 Id. at 127.

23 Id. at 152.

24 Oriental Tin Can Labor Union, supra note 18, at 650.

25San Miguel Foods, Inc.-Cebu B-Meg Feed Plant v. Laguesma, G.R. No. 116172, October 10, 1996, 263 SCRA
68, 82.

26Fiel v. Kris Security Systems, Inc., G.R. No. 155875, April 3, 2003, 400 SCRA 533, 536; El Toro Security
Agency, Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 114308, April 18, 1996, 256 SCRA 363, 366.

PART SIX: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCESS, PROCEDURES AND ISSUES

Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179 [1986]
United Employees Union of Gelmart Industries, Phils. v. Noriel, 67 SCA 267 [1975]
Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179 [1986]
Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 171 [1998]
Luzon Dev’t. bank v. Assn. of Luzon Dev’t. Bank Employees, 249 SCRA 162 [1995]
Kiok Loy v. NLRC, 141 SCRA 179 [1986]
Caltex Refinery Employees Assn. v. Brillantes, 179 SCRA 218 [1997]
Navarro III v. Damasco, 246 SCRA 260 [1995]
LLMG Chemicals v. Secretary of Labor, 356 SCRA 577 [2001]
Contents
Grievance Procedure
Elizalde Rope Factory Inc. v. CIR, 8 SCRA 567 [1963]
Colegio de San Juan de Letran v. Association of Employees and Faculty of Letran, G.R. No.
141471 [2000]
Union of Filipino Employees – Drug, Food, and Allied Industries Union v. Nestle, G.R. No. 158930
[2008]

PART SIX: COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: PROCESS, PROCEDURES AND ISSUES G

r
Registration (cont’n) o
Contract Beneficiaries u
New Pacific Timber and Supply v. NLRC, 328 SCRA 404 [2000] p
Minutes of Negotiation
Samahan ng Mangagawa sa Top Form Manufacturing v. NLRC, 295 SCRA 171 [1998]
Caltex Refinery Employees Assn. v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218 [1998] 3
Contract Administration and Enforcement R
Nature of Contract i
Davao Integrated v. Abarquez, 220 SCRA 197 [1993] v
Kimberly Clark Phils. v. Lorredo, 226 SCRA 639 [1993] e
Grievance Procedure r
Caltex Refinery employees Assn. v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218 [1997 a
 ,
Contract Infirmity
Associated Labor Unions v. Calleja, 173 SCRA 179 [1989] N
Contract Duration and Renewals o
Mindanao Terminal and Brokerage Service, Inc. v. Confessor, 272 SCRA 161 [1997] San
v
Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Confessor, 262 SCRA 81 [1996]
CBA and 3rd Party Applicability e
CBA and Disaffiliation l
Effect Expiry y
New Pacific Timber v. NLRC, 328 SCRA 404 [2000] n
PART SEVEN: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE
Introductory Concepts
Nueva Ecija Electric v. NLRC, 323 SCRA 86 [2000] C
Sterling Products Int’l. Inc. v. Sol, 7 SCRA 446 [1963] o
r
Caltex Filipino Managers and SUperviros Assn. v. CIR, 44 SCRA 350 [1972]
p
Republic Savings bank v.CIR, 21 SCRA 226 [1967] [see Fernando, J., concurring opinion]
Unfair Labor Practice: Employer and Labor Organization Acts Violating Right of Self-Organization u
University of Sto. Tomas Faculty Union v. University of Sto. Tomas 584 SCRA 648 [2009] z
Illustrative Cases ,
Phil. Steam Navigation Co. v. Phil. Maritime Officers guild, 15 SCRA 174 [1965]
The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees Assn. v. Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 M
[1971] a
The Insular Life Co. Ltd. Employees Assn. v. Insular Life Insurance Co. Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 [1971] g
The Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees Assn. v. Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 d
[1971] a
Phil. Blooming Mills Employees Org. v. phil. Blooming Mills Co., 17 SCRA 1077 [1968]
l
CLLC GE Gochangco Employees Assn. v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 656 [1988] e
Visayas Stevedore Trans. Co. v. CIR, 19 SCRA 426 [1967] n
Bondoc v. CIR, 169 SCRA 379 [1989] a
Wise and Co. Inc. v. Wise and Co. Inc. Employees Union, NATU, 178 SCRA 536 [1989]

L
o
r
e
n
z
o
,

J
a
m
e
s

P
i
a
n
s
a
y
,

R
a
v
i
e

A
u
s
t
r
i
a
,

J
a
n
e

G
r
o
u
p
4
D
e

l
o
s

S
a
n
t
o
s
,

K
a
t
r
i
n
a

V
e
l
a
n
t
e
,

F
e
r
n
a
n
d
o

N
a
m
e
,

A
n
 g
e
l
i

C
o
r
p
u
z
,

M
a
r
i
a

G
i
p
a
l
,

W
i
l
m
a
r
k
PART SEVEN: UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE G
r
Company Domination (cont’n) o
Progressive Dev’t. Corp. v. CIR, 80 SCRA 434 [1978] u
Carmel Craft Corp. v. NLRC, 186 SCRA 393 [1990] p
Itogon Suyoc Mines Inc. v. Baldo, 12 SCRA 599 [1964]
5
Rural Bank of Alminos Union v. NLRC, 317 SCRA 699 [1999]
San Miguel Corp. Employees Union v. Bersamira, 186 SCRA 496 [1990] L
Unfair Labor Practice: Employer and Labor Organization Acts Violative of a
Balmar Farms Inc. v. NLRC, 202 SCRA 648 [1991] s
Alba Patio de Makati v. Alba Patio de Makati Employees Assn., 128 SCRA 253 [1984] a
Asuncion Bros. Co. v. CIR, 163 SCRA 596 [1988] l
General Milling Corporation c. CA G.R. No. 146728 [2004] a
Motive, Conduct and Proof ,
Visayan Bicycle Manufacturing Co. Inc. v. Nat’l. Labor Union, 14 SCRA 5 [1965]
S
Totality of Conduct Rule and Effect of Failure of Act h
Royal Undergarment Corp. of the Phil. v. CIR, 185 SCRA 278 [1990] a
n
Enforcement, Remedies and Sanctions t
American President Lines v. Clave, 114 SCRA 826 [1982] e
De Leon v. NLRC, 358 SCRA 274 [2001] e

V
i
l
l
Nat’l Labor Union v. CIR, 116 SCRA 417 [1982] a
Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. NLRC, 210 SCRA 277 [1992] r
Peter Paul Phils. v. NLRC, 222 SCRA 288 [1993 u
CLLC Gochangco Workers Union v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 655 [1988] see p. 668 e
CLLC GE Gochangco Workers Union v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 656 [1988] l
Union of Supervisors (“RB) NATU v. Sec. of Labor, 128 SCRA 442 ,
Far Eastern University v. CIR, 5 SCRA 1082
General Electric Co. Employees Assoc. v. CIR, 70 SCRA 193 F
Phil. Engineering Corp. v. CIR, 41 SCRA 89 r
Sta. Cecilia Sawmills Inc. v. CIR, 11 SCRA 56 a
n
Lexal Laboratories v. National Chemical Industries Workers Union, 25 SCRA 668 c
Capital Garments Corp. v. Ople, 117 SCRA 473 h
Flexo Manufacturing Corp. v. NLRC,. 135 SCRA 145 e
s
c
a

M
a
l
a
b
u
y
o
c
,

J
o
s
e

S
e
ñ
o
r
a
,

A
n
g
e
l
a

S
a
l
a
m
e
r
o
,

J
a
y

G
r
o
u
p
6
D
i
s
t
u
r
a
,

B
o
r
j

Z
o
r
i
l
l
a
,

B
a
r
r
y

C
a
d
e
l
i
n
a
,

A
n
g
e
l
i
t
a

G
a
r
g
o
l
e
s
,

K
i
m
b
e
r
l
y

S
a
n
t
i
a
g
o
,

M
a
r
i
e
l
l
e

V
a
l
e
n
z
u
e
l
a
,

B
e
n
i
g
 n
o
PART EIGHT: UNION SECURITY G
r
Guijarno v. CIR, 52 SCRA 307 [1973] o
Caltex Refinery Employees v. Employees, 279 SCRA 218 [1997] u
Manila Mandarin Employees Union v. NLRC, 154 SCRA 368 [1987] p
Malayang Samahan sa Greenfields v. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428 [2000]
Manila Cordage Co. v. CIR, 78 SCRA 398 [1977 1
Guijarno v. CIR, 52 SCRA 307 [1973]
Liberty Cotton Mills Workers Union v. Canizares, 211 SCRA 361 [1992] S
ABS-CBN Supervisors v. ABS-CBN, 304 SCRA 489 [1999] i
o
PART NINE: UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES c
Basis of Rights to Engage in Concerted Activities h
BLTB v. NLRC, 212 SCRA 792 [1992] i
Association of Independent Unions in The Philippines v. NLRC 305 SCRA 218 ,
Bisig ng Mangagawa v. NLRC, 226 SCRA 499 [1993]
J
e
r
i
c
Great Pacific Life Employees v. Great Pacific Life, 303 SCRA 113 [1999] o
Strike Activity
Interphil Laboratories Employees Union- FFW v. Interphil Laboratories G.R. No. 142824 [2001]
Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 [1995] P
l
Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 [1995] a
n
Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 [1995]
a
Elizalde Rope Factory v. SSS, 4 SCRA 512 [1962] d
PT & T Corp. v. NLRC, 251 SCRA 21 [1995] a
Shell Oil Workers Union v. Shell Co. Phils., 39 SCRA 276 [1971] ,
Consolidated Labor Assn. of the Phil. v. Marsman and Co., 11 SCRA 589 [1964]
Rizal Cement Workers Union v. CIR, 6 SCRA 841 [1962] A
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 [1991] n
n
Malayang Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Greenfield v. Ramos, 326 SCRA 428 [2000] a
Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines v. Sulpicio Lines, 426 SCRA 379 [2004]
Capitol Medical Center v. NLRC, G.R. No. 147080 [2005]
M
a
n
g
a
l
l
e
n
o
,
R
i
z
z
a

M
a
m
a
s
a
b
u
l
o
d
,

H
u
s
s
e
i
n

S
e
i
n
i
s
t
e
r

J
a
y
m
e
,

J
o
m
a
r
n
i
n
o

G
r
o
u
p

2
E
b
a
j
a
n
,

J
e
n

L
a
t
o
s
a
,

J
a
n
i
n
e
S
a
n
d
o
v
a
l
,

A
n
t
h
o
n
y

D
o
m
a
n
i
c
o
,

J
a
k
e

S
u
d
l
a
,

C
a
r
l
o
t
a

D
e

L
 e
o
n
,

J
o
s
e
p
h
u
s

PART NINE: UNION CONCERTED ACTIVITIES G

r
Legal Strikes Purpose and Means Test (cont’n) o
Reliance Surety and Insurance Co. v. NLRC, 193 SCRA 365 [1991] u
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 [1991] p
Almira v. BF Goodrich Phils. Inc., 58 SCRA 120 [1974]
Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc. – NAFLU v. Sulpicio Lines, 426 SCRA 379 3
[2004]
Hotel Enterprise of the Philippines Inc. (HEPI) v. Samahang Manggagawa sa Hyatt – National R
Union of Workers in Hotel, Restaurant Industries, 588 SCRA 497 [2009] i
v
Allied Banking Corp. v. NLRC, 258 SCRA 724 [1996] e
Jackbilt Industries v. Jackbilt Employees Workers Union-NAFLU-KMU, 581 SCRA 291 [2008] r
a
Lapanday Workers Union v. NLRC, 248 SCRA 95 [1995] ,
First City Interlink Transport CO. In. v. Confessor, 272 SCRA 124 [1997
Club Filipino Inc. v. Bautista, 592 SCRA 471 N
Complex Electronics Employees v. NLRC, 310 SCRA 403 [1999] o
v
e
l
SSS v. SSS Supervisors Union, 117 SCRA 746 [1982] y
Phil. Interfashion Inc. v. NLRC, 117 SCRA 659 [1982] n
Slow Down as Concerted Activity
Interphil Laboratories Employees v. Inetrphil, 372 SCRA 658 [2001]
C
Picketing o
Insular Life Assurance Co. Ltd. Employees v. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37 SCRA 244 [1971] r
Nestle Phils. Inc. v. Sanchez, 154 SCRA 542 p
Phil. Commercial and Industrial Bank v. Philnabank Employees Assn., 105 SCRA 314 [1981] u
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa sa Cuizon Hotel v. Libron, 124 SCRA 448 [1983] z
Liwayway Publishing Co. Inc. v. Permanent Concrete Workers Union, 108 SCRA ,

Role of Peace officers During Strikes and Picketing M

a
PART TEN: EMPLOYER LOCKOUT OR COUNTER MEASURE TO UNION CONCERTED g
ACTIVITY d
Philtread Tire and Rubber Corporation v. NLRC, 216 SCRA 805 [1993] a
l
PART ELEVEN: LABOR INJUNCTION e
PAL v. NLRC, 287 SCRA 672 [1998] n
HSBC v. NLRC, 370 SCRA 193 [2001] a
Ilaw at Buklod ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 198 SCRA 586 [1991]

L
o
r
e
n
z
o
,

J
a
m
e
s

P
i
a
n
s
a
y
,

R
a
v
i
e

A
u
s
t
r
i
a
,

J
a
n
e
G
r
o
u
p

D
e

l
o
s

S
a
n
t
o
s
,

K
a
t
r
i
n
a

V
e
l
a
n
t
e
,

F
e
r
n
a
n
d
o

N
a
m
e
,

A
n
g
e
l
i

C
o
r
p
u
z
,

M
a
r
i
a

G
i
p
a
l
,
 W
i
l
m
a
r
k

PART ELEVEN: LABOR INJUNCTION G

Role of Labor Arbiter (cont’n) r
Nestle Phils. Inc. v. NLRC, 195 SCRA 340 [1991] o
Bisig ng Manggagawa v. NLRC, 226 SCRA 499 [1991] u
Dinio v. Laguesma, 273 SCRA 109 [1997] p

PART TWELVE: ALTERNATIVES TO USE OF ECONOMIC FORCE CONCILIATION AND 5

ARBITRATION AS MODES OF LABOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Caltex Refinery Employees Assn. v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218 [1998] L
GTE Directors Corp. v. GTE Directors Corp, Employees Union, 197 SCRA 452 [1991] a
Government Insurance System v. GSIS Employees Association, 157 SCRA 236 s
a
Process Initiation – Certification Dispute l
Initiation Party a
Secretary DOLE ,
President
Union of Filipino Employees v. Nestle Phils., 192 SCRA 396 [1990] S
h
Office of the President a
Manila Cordage Co. v. CIR , 37 SCRA 288 [1971] n
Arbitration Agencies t
St. Scholastica’s College v. Torres, 210 SCRA 565 [1992] e
Effect of Certification and Violation of Order e
Telefunken v. Court of Appeal, 348 SCRA 565 [2000] Baguio Colleges
Foundation v. NLRC, 222 SCRA 604 [1993] Maranaw Hotels v. Court of V
Appeals, 215 SCRA 591 i
l
l
a
r
San Juan de Dios Educational Foundation Employees Union - AFW v. San Juan de Dios Educational u
Foundation G.R. No. 143341 [2004] e
Caltex Refinery Employees Assn. v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 172 [1997] l
MERALCO v. Quisumbing, 326 SCRA 172 [1999] ,
United CMC textiles Workers Union v. Clave, 115 SCRA 894 [1982]
Caltex Employees Assn v. Brillantes, 279 SCRA 218 [1998] F
Luzon Development bank v. Assn of Development bank Employees. 249 SCRA 162 [1995] r
Chung Fu v. Court of Appeal, 206 SCRA 545 a
Eternity Employees Worker Union v. Voluntary Arbitration, 189 SCRA 752 [1990] n
Manila Central Line Corp v. Manila Central Line Free Worker Union, 290 SCRA 690 [1998] c
Oceanic Bic Division (FFW) v. Romero, 24 SCRA 392 h
Citibank Philippines Employees Union-NATU v. Minister of Labor and Employees, 97 SCRA 52 e
Mantrades/FMMC Division Employees and Workers Union v. Bacunang, 144 SCRA 424 s
PART II: LABOR RELATIONS LAW – PUBLIC SECTOR c
Manila Public School Teacher Assn v. Laguio, 200 SCRA 232 [1991] a
Jacinto v. Court of Appeals, 281 SCRA 657 [1997]
M
a
l
a
b
u
y
o
c
,

J
o
s
e

S
e
ñ
o
r
a
,

A
n
g
e
l
a

S
a
l
a
m
e
r
o
,

J
a
y
G
r
o
u
p

6
D
i
s
t
u
r
a
,

B
o
r
j

Z
o
r
i
l
l
a
,

B
a
r
r
y

C
a
d
e
l
i
n
a
,

A
n
g
e
l
i
t
a

G
a
r
g
o
l
e
s
,

K
i
m
b
e
r
l
y

S
a
n
t
i
a
g
o
,

M
a
r
i
e
l
l
e

V
a
l
e
n
z
 u
e
l
a
,

B
e
n
i
g
n
o

i Rollo, pp. 32-34.

ii Id., at 37-38.
iii Id., at 16.
iv Underscoring supplied.
v 141 SCRA 179, 186 (1986).
vi The Bradman Co., Inc. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 78 SCRA 10, 15 (1977).
vii 118 SCRA 422 (1982).
viii Article
232. Prohibition on Certification Election. -- The Bureau shall not entertain any petition for certification election or
any other action which may disturb the administration of duly registered existing collective bargaining agreements
affecting the parties except under Articles 253, 253-A and 256 of this Code.
ix Pier 8 Arrastre and Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Roldan-Confesor, 241 SCRA 294, 307 (1995).
x National Congress of Unions in the Sugar Industry of the Philippines vs. Ferrer-Calleja, 205 SCRA 478, 485 (1992).
xi Ibid.

xii Supra; note 6.

xiii G.R. No 128483, Association of Concerned Employees of Colegio (ACEC) vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et
al.
xiv Philippine Singapore Transport Services, Inc. vs. NLRC, 277 SCRA 506, 512 (1997).
xv Samar II Electric Cooperative, Inc. vs. NLRC, 270 SCRA 290, 295 (1997).
xvi Rollo, p. 45.
xvii Id., at 46.