Colonial Politics: Towards Complete Autonomy

The Democratic Administration of Harrison and Wilson completed its eight years in office, in March
1921, without fulfilling its long-standing commitment to Philippine independence. In December 1920,
after nearly eight years as President and just after his party had been decidedly defeated in the elections,
Wilson made his only recommendation to Congress in favor of Philippine independence. This Congress
was, however, Republican-controlled and as expected, it did not respond to the President’s suggestions for
independence legislation.
The Wood-Forbes Mission
In March 1921, the succeeding Republican Administration of Warren G. Harding sought to verify
Filipino preparedness for independence in view of the rapid Filipinization that took place during the
Harrison administration. Harrison, believing that rapid and complete Filipinization of the government was
essential if the Filipinos were to learn to maintain a fully independent government in the future, allowed
the Filipinos to assume almost complete management of their political and economic affairs, even to the
point of sacrificing efficiency and good government.
A special investigation mission led by two old Philippine-hands-former Governor General W.
Cameron Forbes and Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood—was appointed to look into Philippine affairs. The Wood-
Forbes Mission spent four months in the Philippines, at the conclusion of which a lengthy report was
submitted to the president which reflected in very clear terms the situation in the Philippines at the end of
Harrison’s tenure. It also reflected very clearly the Philippine policy of the Republican Party which was
unsympathetic to any proposal involving America’s withdrawal from the Philippines in the near future.
The Wood-Forbes Mission report indicted the previous regime for many of the problems noted in
the investigation, and viewed the government as “not reasonably free from those underlying causes which
result in the destruction of government.” Among the criticisms were: lack of a sufficient press which
would insure a sound public opinion; mistakes in finances; delay in administration of justice; the need for
good teachers both in lower schools and in the higher institutions of learning; and inadequate treatment
and care of cultural minorities. It recommended that “the present general status of the Philippine Islands
continue until the people have had time to absorb and thoroughly master the powers already in their
hands.”
The Administration of Leonard Wood (1921-1927)
The choice of Leonard Wood as Governor-General demonstrated that President Harding accepted
the Wood-Forbes Mission’s recommendations as to Philippine policy and that he looked to Wood to
remedy the unfortunate conditions pointed out in the Mission’s report. It is, indeed, unfortunate that Wood
became Governor-General so soon after the completion of his mission, a difficulty which he himself had
foreseen, and which situation undoubtedly colored his relations with the Filipino politicians whose
performance he had just indicted. After an initial period marked by amicable relations and cooperation,
the administration of Governor Wood was marked by vigorous political agitation—the most intense in
Philippine-American relations since the end of the Filipino-American War.
Wood was unlike Harrison. He took the position that the Jones Law—the organic act operating in
the Philippines—could not be modified except by action of the US Congress itself, and that no subsequent
legislation or executive action on the part of the Governor-General or the President of the United States,
working in conjunction with the Philippine Legislature, could operate to change this fundamental law.
Fully cognizant of Wood’s political philosophy, the Filipino leaders were on guard against expected
“encroachments” on their powers by the Governor-General.
Wood vs. the Filipino Politicos
On July 17,1923, Manila’s Metropolitan dailies headlined the resignation of all the Filipino
members of the Governor Wood’s Cabinet, thus precipitating the “Cabinet Crisis” which brought the
Philippines to the focus of the US government and public attention. Nationalistic feelings were aroused by
holding up the Governor and the enemy of Philippine autonomy and independence.
The open break between Wood and the Filipino leaders led by Senate President Quezon was not
unexpected. Since assuming his position as Governor-General, Wood had let it be known that unlike his
predecessor, he was bent on exercising the powers of his office after the manner of an American chief
executive—and definitely not as an impotent figurehead. He was determined to govern and to assume
active leadership to remedy the maladministration which he had found in the country. His determination
to truly govern was met by the Filipino leaders with counter-offensives, for they interpreted this as a
threat to the autonomy they already enjoyed. Accustomed as they were to playing a dominant role during
the previous Harrison Administration, they desired supremacy in insular affairs, and no interference from
the Governor-General expect in matters directly affecting the interests of the United States in the
Philippines.
Wood not only found himself unable to sympathize with the desire of the Filipino nationalists for
an increasing measure of self-government, but he also opposed independence, except perhaps in the very
distance future. The American government, he explained, would not consider any extension of further
autonomy until the weaknesses pointed out in the Wood-Forbes Mission Report had been corrected.
Complete independence would not be opposed, he said, if the Filipinos were “Industrially strong and
could defend themselves and hold their country.” He advised the Filipinos to cooperate wholeheartedly in
making the government efficient, for in so doing, they would strengthen their plea for independence. In
the meantime, he insisted on attempting to persuade the Filipinos to postpone the issue of independence or
to forget it altogether.
In addition to differences of opinion on the operation of the Jones Law and the prerogatives
exercised by the Governor-General, there was an equally significant circumstance which brought the
“crisis”—and that was political situation confronting Quezon. Quezon, in 1922, was having trouble
assuring his ascendancy among his own followers and political rivals within the Nacionalista Party. After
launching his bid for supremacy by breaking away from Osmeña’s Partido Nacionalista, Quezon found
his leadership none too secure—especially with the enhanced strength of his minority Democratas after
the elections of 1922. In order to dominate the legislature, Quezon reconciled with Osmeña’s
Nacionalistas, a move his followers considered an “outrageous betrayal of the people’s trusts.” Faced with
a rebellious segment of his party and a resurgent Democrata Party, Quezon needed an issue to strengthen
his leadership and his party. The Governor-General got himself caught in the web of Filipino partisan
politics and this, combined with the highly emotional issue of independence, magnified tensions with
Governor Wood.
The Conley Case and the Cabinet Crisis
Wood’s action in a police matter known as the Conley Case provided Quezon with an issue, and he
used it to bring on the “Cabinet Crisis.” By engineering this crisis, Quezon succeeded in electrifying an
electorate which promptly supported the Quezon-Osmeña coaltion.
The controversy arose over charges of misconduct in office filed against an American named Ray
Conley, chief of the vice-squad of the Secret Service Branch of the Manila Police Department. Charges
had been made against Conley from time to time, apparently in retaliation for his efficient crusade against
organized crime in Manila.
In 1922, charges, including the keeping of a mistress and the making of certain false statements
relating to her, were presented by a local attorney to the Prosecuting Attorney of the City of Manila who
after a thorough investigation, found no ground to proceed. The charges were then repeated to the
Director of the Civil Service who refused to take any action because of the manifest connection of
Conley’s accusers with gambling elements in Manila.
The charges were then sent to the Office of the Governor, on July 17, 1922, and the office referred
them the next day to the Mayor of Manila, Ramon J. Fernandez, for investigation. The papers were not
returned by the Mayor until December 28. During this period, a most exhaustive investigation was
conducted, under the Mayor’s orders, by were instigated by gamblers in order to get rid of Conley, who
was making the gambling business unprofitable. The Mayor, in returning the papers to Governor Wood,
made no comment other than to invite attention to the findings of the Chief of Police. The Governor-
General accordingly dismissed the charges.
Subsequently, the Secretary of the Interior, Jose P. Laurel, who had confirmed Conley’s
appointment to the police force, received numerous complaints that Conley had received bribes from the
gamblers in Manila. Mayor Fernandez and Secretary Laurel, expressing the belief that they had
conclusive proof that Conley had been taking bribes, secured the approval of the Governor-General to
suspend Conley and file charges against him if they had evidence. They were insistent upon an
administrative investigation to be conducted in their own departments, but Wood insisted that the case be
submitted to the Court of First Instance to give Conley a fair trial.
After a prolonged trial, the court found that charges were not sustained and dismissed them.
Though the court acquitted Conley, in its decision it had stated that the detective’s record was not free
from doubts and suspicions. Secretary Laurel seized upon this statement and requested again that Wood
appoint a committee to investigate Conley administratively.
At first objecting, the Governor subsequently appointed a Committee on Investigation instructed
to investigate the Manila Police Department in general. The Committee, in preliminary report,
recommended Conley’s reinstatement, whereupon the Governor endorsed the immediate compliance by
Secretary Laurel of Conley’ reinstatement. Secretary Laurel transmitted the wish of the Governor-General
to the City Mayor, requesting compliance, while he tendered his resignation in protest to Conley’s
reinstatement. Upon receipt of Laurel’s endorsement, the Mayor left his office without complying with the
request, and then subsequently submitted his own resignation. The Chief of Police reinstated Conley, who
was subsequently retired.
Accusing the Governor with having meddled with a dictated details of Philippine government
which should have been left entirely to the Filipino officials, the President of the Senate (Manuel L.
Quezon), the Speaker of the House (Manuel A. Roxas), and all the Filipino Secretaries tendered their
resignations as a members of the Council of State and as a heads of Departments on July 17,1923.
With the resignations of the Department Secretaries, the Undersecretaries promptly took over the
positions and administered the Departments till the end of Wood’s term in 1927, for the Senate refused to
confirm the Governor’s appointments to vacancies in the Cabinet.
In presenting the Filipino side, the Legislature explained that “it was a protest against the
encroachment by the Governor-General on the constitutional rights already enjoyed by the Filipinos and
against the usurpation of power in direct violation of existing laws. “Wood appointed an accusing finger at
Quezon and his followers. Quezon, who was concerned about his political future, “became impatient and
provoked” the Cabinet Crisis. Be that as it may, Quezon succeeded in making resignation episode a
“national issue,” raising various issues to stir public sentiment against the Governor’s administration.
The Chasm created by the Cabinet Crisis was never really bridged during the remained years of
Wood’s administration. The major issue remained the delineation of executive and legislative powers, or
the autonomy of the Filipino people versus the powers of the Governor-General as the representative of
American sovereignty.
The Governor’s Veto Power
The veto power of the Governor Wood, in the eyes of the Filipino leaders, was being excessively
exercised, “on the most flimsy motives.” Governor Wood’s veto record showed the following: From
October1923 to February 1924, the Sixth Philippine Legislature passed 217 bills and concurrent
resolutions, out of which 46 were vetoed, the bills not having been presented until after the adjournment
of the Legislature so that, Wood commented, conference with a view to modification or correction of error
was possible. In the first session of the Seventh Legislature in 1925, twenty-four out of seventy-two bills
were vetoed; and in the second session in 1926, the Legislature passed 122 bills, out of which 44 were
vetoed. Harrison vetoed only five measures in seven years in office.
Not only did the Governor exercise liberally his power to veto bills passed by the Legislature, but
he even went to the extent of altering measures already passed by the Legislature, and then affixing his
signature after the alteration was made. The Filipino leaders were also annoyed that Wood should veto
bills of local interest and insisted that before the Governor-General acted unfavorably on any bill, their
views must be heard.
Nearly all vetoes, Wood explained, were due to serious defects or unconstitutional provisions. This
unsatisfactory condition was largely due to the rushing through of a large number of bills during the last
hours of session, without opportunity being given for their careful consideration. This delay, Wood
maintained, occurred every year and often prevented desirable legislation from being approved. In some
instances, Wood was convinced that the Filipino leaders deliberately showered him with impracticable
legislation to draw his vetoes and thus given them fresh opportunity to charge him with “despotism.”
The Board of Control Controversy
Wood was determined to get the government out of business, the government of Harrison’s time
having created and controlled stocks in various government corporations through the Board of Control.
Wood was convinced that the Board was illegal because the Governor-General occupied a minority
position in it (in violation of the Organic Act with placed supreme executive control in the hands of the
Governor-General), and sohe could never get the consent of the two Filipino members (the Senate
President and the House Speaker) to get the government out of business.
There were two fundamental reasons advanced by Wood for getting the government out of
business; first, that the Philippine treasury needed the money invested in the business enterprises to spend
it for the greater benefit of the public; and second, that governments were not qualified, in any nation of
the world, to conduct business or engage in any industries which would compete with private initiative.
Wood was unhappy with the graft and mismanagement which he saw and felt that the only hope for the
enterprises was to put them in the hands of the experienced American businessmen.
The Filipino leaders, on the other hand, wished the continuance of the companies and a share in
their management through the Board of Control, for to them, acceptance of the Governor’s policy would
have meant domination by American capital, a situation which might prejudice their campaign for
independence. All efforts toward amicable settlement proved futile.
 By early1926, Governor Wood had reached the end of his patience with the “perfectly impossible”
Board of Control and was eager to get rid of the dominating control in it of Quezon and Roxas. On
November 9, 1926, acting upon opinions received from American officials in Washington, he abolished
the Board of Control, thus removing what he saw as the most serious encroachment on the executive
power in the Philippines. The order provided that thereafter, all duties of the Board of Control would be
exercised by the Governor-General.
The Philippine Supreme Court upheld the legality of the action of the Governor-General and the
US Supreme Court sustained the decision.
Leonard Wood: In Retrospect
Leonard Wood’s tenure as Governor-General of the Philippines was marked by deadlock and
political strife, with the Filipino poloticos led by Quezon openly challenging the authority of the
American representative in Manila. The friction grew out of the Governor’s program to restore American
supervision and control, particularly who thought it was greatly exacerbated by the clash between the
personal ambitions of the Filipino political leaders and Wood’s desire to exercise what he saw as “the
inherent rights of the Governor-General.” And because the contest was hopelessly enmeshed in the
consuming emotional issue of independence, the political rancor was fanned by distrust and prejudice.
Any Governor-General who was sent to the Philippines after Harrison probably would have found
the Filipino leaders particularly difficult to handle, unless he went as far as Harrison did in allowing the
Filipinos a generous share in the direction of their affairs. Wood was of a different mind—he was
convinced that the Filipinos had taken an enormous stride backward during the Harrison Administration.
He found the Philippine Government bogged down in a major financial crisis riddled with inefficiency,
graft, and nepotism. He, therefore, saw it as his responsibility to reform the “critical situation” and restore
the country to an efficient and orderly government worthy of American sponsorship. He probably had the
right prescription for the Philippines—honesty in government and a tight administration but his approach
was hardly the most effective one. Contentious and imperial, he showed a little consideration for the
sensitive feelings of the Filipinos, for whom self-esteem, personal honor, and that incomprehensible (to
the Westerner) worship the “face” were important matters. Governor Wood’s experience all his life had
been that of an administrator with absolute authority, concerned with results, he might have gotten on
better in the Philippines. But so forceful a personality, so powerful a will, such devotion to results
produced compelling power. And the Filipino leaders reacted against that power of intervention in ther
affairs.
Wood’s political philosophy and economic views, his military background (thirty years in the
military), his personality as well as his physical condition, all contributed to his troubles in the
Philippines. It would not be fair and accurate, however, to speak as if the only responsibility was Wood’s.
The Filipino leaders, especially Quezon, must share in the burden for the state of affairs during Wood’s
tenure in the Philippines.
Partisan politics undoubtedly had much to do with the “crisis” which clouded most of Governor
Wood’s term. Quezon’s lust for power (in the struggle to win supremacy over Osmeña’s leadership) and
his various maneuvers to shore up his sometimes faltering leadership made him difficult to deal with.
After 1923, Quezon exaggerated his dissatisfaction with many aspects of the administration of Governor
Wood for his own political needs.
Perhaps the situation in Manila would not have been what it was had Wood faced a man unlike
Quezon. Quezon was a proud, volatile, charismatic personality, with a tremendous capacity to manipulate
people and events and to mobilize them to serve his needs. In 1923, he found the “supreme moment” he
needed to establish his leadership. So he turned an otherwise trivial matter into a national issue and
succeeded in setting himself up as the heroic champion of the Filipino nationalism. Having launched the
attack on Wood, he found it politically useful to disagree with the Governor-General on almost every
fundamental issue affecting the Philippines. The Governor-General unwittingly helped him by stubbornly
resisting him and insisting on his rights.
It also did not help that, to the Filipinos, Governor Wood was not an endearing personality. He was
not simpatico. Except to his close friends, he was a very frigid personality, who for the most part wore the
look of seriousness, if not severity.
Though at bottom there was, indeed, much politics in the confrontation between Wood and the
Filipino leaders, that was certainly not all of it.
A serious bone of contention between Wood and the Filipino leaders was, of course, the issue of
independence. Wood opposed Philippine independence and bitterly resented the agitation for it by the
nationalistic politicos. It was impossible, he said, to even think of independence when conditions were so
unsatisfactory and the Filipino leaders were totally lacking in qualities for leadership. He believed that
America undertook a responsibility towards the Philippines, and it was futile for the Filipinos to wish for
independence until America’s “noble task” had been completed. He possessed an exalted vision of the
future of the Philippines and was baffled that the Filipino leaders did not have the same consuming
passion as he had for devotion to duty, service to country, and the highest ideals of public morality.
By consistently arguing against Filipino capacity and character, Wood offended Filipino pride, for
the argument implied (unintended perhaps) a natural white superiority unacceptable to the Filipinos. As an
ardent nationalist himself, Wood failed to understand the aspirations of “backward peoples” for self-
government, for to him the greatest blessing such people could receive was American rule over them.
Wood failed to realize that after over two decades of progressive autonomy, it was unrealistic to expect
the Filipinos to agree to a prolonged postponement of independence, unless there was a definite
declaration from the United States that independence would come, say, in 25 or 50 years, while in the
meantime, steps were taken to assure them that they were progressing towards independence. It was even
more unreal to expect that Filipinos would elect self-government under foreign tutelage in preference to
complete independence. For the United States had consciously set about to encourage Philippine
nationalism and through political, economic, and educational devices, had advanced the desires as well as
the means for its expression.
No doubt Wood’s opposition to independence was due also to what he sincerely believed was the
Filipino position. He was accepted that the Filipino all wanted independence, but believed they were
willing to a backward step (in relation to insular autonomy) and did not seek to turn the Philippines over
to interests which would exploit them and keep them permanently.
It is unfortunate that Quezon and his colleagues felt themselves forced to maintain a false and
insincere position when they insisted in complete, immediate, and absolute independence politically and
financially (this is probably symptomatic of the indirection which often characterizes Philippine society).
But they were compelled to take that position because no declaration of definite policy was forthcoming
from Washington, and party politics dictated that they espouse the independence cause to enable them to
keep their hold on the people.
Wood, as a consequence, dismissed the independence movement as the agitation of a handful of
self-interested political leaders, and this apparent distaste for the current generation of politicians did not
go well with the Filipino leaders. It was Wood’s wish that the United States would hold the Philippines
until a young and clearer-visioned class of leaders had succeeded to power. Perhaps it would have made
for more constructive relations had Wood accepted the force of the independence sentiment, however
unreasonable it might have seemed to him, and then tried to work out the problems with the Filipino
leaders in a matter that would not have been embarrassing for the politicos.
In addition to opposing the movement towards independence, Wood also opposed any further
concessions with regards to autonomy. So long as the irregularities that had been pointed out by the
Wood-Forbes Report remained uncorrected. Yet it would be unfair to say that Governor Wood reversed
the movement towards autonomy. He could not have done so—for while he wanted a modification of the
Jones Law, he could only recommend such action. Congress gad the prerogative of taking action, and did
not do so. So Wood, in running the government, was also limited by the Jones Law.
Besides political matters, the Filipino leaders disagreed with Wood on another fundamental
issue—on economic policy affecting the disposition of the public domain and the administration of
government-owned corporations. Governor Wood stressed the need for economic development as a
prerequisite to a stable government (which in turn was a prerequisite to independence) and favored
attracting foreign, or specifically, American, capital to develop the country. The Filipinos were afraid that
foreign capital would mean exploitation by foreigners and would nullify the economic policy established
by the Legislature “for the protection of the rights and interests of the Filipino people in the development
of the resources of the islands.” So they opposed the liberalization of land laws to accommodate tropical
plantations (which would be foreign-financed and –owned) and the sale of government-owned businesses
to foreign interests.
Despite his shortcomings of body and mind, few would deny that Governor Wood was an able and
devoted administrator. He worked hard and he knew the Philippines as few knew the country. Few would
doubt that he was sincerely interested in the welfare and interests of the Philippines and the Filipinos,
while, understandably enough, he also sought to work for American interests. Though Filipino leaders
resented his unbending refusal to accede to their many efforts to undermine American control of the
executive branch as Harrison had allowed them to, they recognized sincerity and honesty and had a high
respect for his administrative ability. Many conceded that in spite of controversy, in spite of a serious
illness, he had given the Filipinos a tradition of service in government and a loyalty to duty which where
unmatched.
Despite the problems of his administration, especially after 1923, there was sufficient cooperation
between Filipino and American elements to allow for some advances in government—such as in the
rehabilitation of finances, advances in health and sanitation, efforts at infrastructure, and general
economic prosperity. Wood governed the Philippine after 1923 without any serious disruptions to
governmental functions, in spite of the publicly avowed Filipino policy of non-cooperation.
The Administration of Henry L. Stimson: Cooperation Restored
Henry L. Stimson was inaugurated Governor-General of the Philippines on March 1, 1928. Fully
cognizant of the controversies his predecessor had gotten himself involved in, Stimson had determined to
re-establish a working relationship with the Filipino leaders to remove the ill-feelings left over from the
Wood administration. Stimson consciously followed a different path. He seemed better able to understand
the uses of power in dealing with dependent peoples. Thus, he was willing to compromise to win the
confidence of the Filipino leaders. At the same time, he was firm in asserting his rights as Chief
Executive.
Stimson steered away from the emotional independence issue and concentrated on political or
administrative cooperation, while forthrightly expressing his view that only that would “save the Islands
from the danger of immediate independence.” In the meantime, he favored a greater degree of autonomy,
for he sympathized with the Filipino demand for more responsibility.
 Stimson had only one year in the Philippines, but this year was generally characterized by very
cordial relations between the Filipino and American elements in government and society. In fact, the first
complete Cabinet since July 1923 was named.
Stimson proceeded with the necessary stepes for the creation of machinery for the restoration of
“regular and responsible cooperation between the legislative and executive branches of the Philippine
Government.” Among them were the provision of technical advisors and assistants to the Governor-
General through the Belo Act; the appointment of a Cabinet nominated by the Governor-General, after
conference with the leaders of the majority party in the Legislature; and the revival of the Council of
States.
Stimson also established a “new era” for the Philippines by a change of emphasis as to the
prerequisites for independence—from the previous stress upon fitting the Filipinos for independence and
sovereignty through training and responsibility in the political sphere, to an emphasis upon economic and
industrial development of the Philippines’ natural resources as a sound basis for her independence.
Stimson was, however, able to implement only a portion of his economic program because of the genuine
and natural fear of Filipinos of exploitation by foreign capital. Philippine land laws, for instance, were not
amended to allow for large landholdings.
Nonetheless, at the end of his year’s experience in the Philippines, Stimson was pleased at the
“general mental change” he had discerned among the Filipino leaders who had begun to consider the
“economic foundations of their political problems” and had come to realize that economic development
could actually aid their aspirations for self-government.
Probably the most significant achievement of Stimson’s year in the Philippines was “the cessation
of the period of acrimonious deadlock” and the substitution of cooperation and friendly feelings between
the American authority and Filipino leadership. This Stimson was able to accomplish because he
understood what was necessary in order that the sensitive Filipinos would not be “provoked into fanatical
outbursts.”
Henry L. Stimson’s successors—Dwight F. Davis (1929-1932), Theodore Roosevelt, Jr. (1932-
1933) and Frank Murphy (1933-1935) all got along quite well with the Filipino politicians.