G.R. No.
L-21809 January 31, 1966 not extinguish the usufruct, hence, the surviving
GIL P. POLICARPIO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
JOSE V. SALAMAT, ET AL., defendants.
VICENTE ASUNCION, ET AL., defendants-
appellants.
In a duly probated last will and testament of one
Damasa Crisostomo, she gave the naked ownership
of a fishpond owned by her to her sister Teodorica de
la Cruz while its usufruct to the children of her
cousins Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and Canuto
Lorenzo. The fishpond is situated at a barrio of
Hagonoy, Bulacan.
The children of Antonio Perez, Patricia Vicente and
Canuto Lorenzo turned out to be fourteen, namely:
Maria, Pio, Fructuosa, Graciano, Vicente, Victoria,
Teodora, and Juan, all surnamed Perez, Apolonio
Lorenzo, Bonifacio Lorenzo, Vicente Asuncion,
Francisco Lorenzo, Leoncio Perez and Servillano
Perez. On the other hand, Teodorica de la Cruz, the
naked owner, bequeathed in her will all her rights to
the fishpond to Jose V. Salamat.
The fourteen usufructuaries leased the fishpond first
to one Gil P. Policarpio who used to give them
proportionately the usufruct corresponding to them.
During the term of the lease, however, three of the
usufructuaries died, namely, Francisco Lorenzo,
Leoncio M. Perez and Servillano Perez, and so, upon
their death, both the naked owner and the remaining
usufructuaries claimed the shares corresponding to
the deceased usufructuaries in the amount of
P10,714.26. Because of these conflicting claims, the
lessee withheld said amount.
Subsequently, on May 31, 1962, the surviving
usufructuaries leased the fishpond to one Batas Riego
de Dios who, after executing the contract of lease,
came to know of the existing conflicting claims, and
not knowing to whom of the claimants the shares of
the deceased usufructuaries should be paid, said
lessee was also constrained to withhold the
corresponding part of the usufruct of the property. So
on November 15, 1962, the two lessees commenced
the present action for interpleader against both the
naked owner and surviving usufructuaries to compel
them to interplead and litigate their conflicting
claims.
Defendant Jose V. Salamat avers as special defense
that he is the successor-in-interest of Teodorica de la
Cruz and as such he is entitled to the shares
corresponding to the three deceased usufructuaries
inasmuch as the usufruct in their favor was
automatically extinguished by death and became
merged with the naked owner.
The surviving usufructuaries, on the other hand,
adhere to the theory that since the usufructuaries
were instituted simultaneously by the late Damasa
Crisostomo, the death of the three usufructuaries did
usufructuaries are entitled to receive the shares
corresponding to the deceased usufructuaries, the
usufruct to continue until the death of the last
usufructuary.
When the case was called for hearing, the parties
agreed to submit the case for decision upon the
submission of their respective memoranda
considering that the issue involved was purely legal
in nature, and on March 29, 1963, the trial court
rendered decision the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:
Wherefore, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring defendant Jose V. Salamat entitled
to the sum of P10,714.25 representing the
shares of the three deceased usufructuaries
in the lease rental due from plaintiff Gil
Policarpio, ordering the latter to deliver to
said defendant the aforesaid amount; and
likewise declaring said defendant Jose V.
Salamat entitled to share with the eleven
usufructuaries in the proceeds of the lease
contract executed by them with plaintiff
Batas Riego de Dios, ordering the latter to
deliver to him such amount as would be
equivalent to the shares of the three
deceased usufructuaries, with the parties
bearing their own costs and expenses of
litigation.
The surviving usufructuaries took the present
appeal. 1äwphï1.ñët
The important issue to be determined is whether the
eleven surviving usufructuaries of the fishpond in
question are the ones entitled to the fruits that would
have corresponded to the three deceased
usufructuaries or the naked owner Jose V. Salamat.
Appellants argue that it is the surviving
usufructuaries who are entitled to receive the shares
of the deceased by virtue of Article 611 of the Civil
Code which provides "A usufruct constituted in favor
of several persons living at the time of its constitution
shall not be extinguished until the death of the last
survivor." On the other hand, appellee contends that
the most a usufruct can endure if constituted in favor
of a natural person is the lifetime of the usufructuary,
because a usufruct is extinguished by the death of
the usufructuary unless a contrary intention clearly
appears (Article 603, Civil Code). Hence, appellee
argues, when the three usufructuaries died, their
usufructuary rights were extinguished and whatever
rights they had to the fruits reverted to the naked
owner.
If the theory of appellee in the sense that the death
of the three usufructuaries has the effect of
consolidating their rights with that of the naked
owner were correct, Article 611 of the Civil Code
would be superfluous, because Article 603 already
provides that the death of the usufructuary
extinguishes the usufruct unless the contrary
appears. Furthermore, said theory would cause a
partial extinction of the usufruct, contrary to the
provisions of Article 611 which expressly provides
that the usufruct shall not be extinguished until the
death of the last survivor. The theory of appellee
cannot, therefore, be entertained.
The well-known Spanish commentators on the
counterpart of Article 611 we have copied above
which implicitly provides that the share of a
usufructuary who dies in the meantime inures to the
benefit of the surviving usufructuaries, also uphold
the view we here express. Thus, the following is their
comment on the matter:
Al comentar el articulo 469 (now Art. 564)
hablamos, entre formas de constitucion del
usufructo, del disfrute simultaneo y sucesivo.
Ninguna duda cabe, puesto que el derecho
de acrecer es aplicable a los
usufructuarios, segun el Art. 987 (now Art.
1023), sobre la no extincion del usufructo
simultaneo, hasta la muerte de la ultima
persona que sobreviva. . . .
. . . Al referirse . . . el articulo 521 (now Art.
611) al usufructo constituido en provecho de
varias personas vivas al tiempo de su
constitucion, parece referirse al usufructo
simultaneo. Sin embargo, es indudable que
se refiere tambien al sucesivo, puesto que en
esta especie de usufructs el segundo
usufructuario no entra en el disfrute, salvo
expresion en contrario, hasta la muerte del
primero, y es claro que al morir el ultimo
llamado, se extingue el usufructo, que es
precisamente lo que ordena el presente
articulo. (Manresa, Comentarios al Codigo
Civil Español, 1931, Tomo IV, par. 486).
. . . refiriendonos al caso de muerte natural,
ha de tenerse presente que si son muchos los
llamados el usufructo simultaneamente,
muerto uno, su porcian acrece a los demas, a
no ser que el testador exprese lo contrario, o
se infiriera asi del titulo en que se constituye
el usufructo, para lo cual puede verse la
doctrina de la ley 33, tit. I, lib. VII del Digesto,
que habla del derecho de acrecer en el
usufructo, y el tit. IV del mismo libro, en que
se proponen algunos casos de excepcion.—El
usufructo constituido en provecho de varias
personas vivas al tiempo de su constitucion,
no extinguira hasta la muerte de la ultima
que sobreviviere. Cod. Civ. art. 521. (Del Viso,
Lecciones Elementales de Derecho Civil,
sexta edicion, Tomo I, p. 86.)
Si a varios usufructuarios se les lega la
totalidad de una herencia; o una misma parte
de ella, se da el derecho de acrecer cuando
una de ellos muere despues del testador,
sobreviviendo otro y otros?—Como dice la
obra anotado, el Digesto admitio, segun un
texto de Paulo, la solucion afirmativa, y
Pothier reprodujo dicha doctrina.
La jurisprudencia del Tribunal Supreme
español ha admitido y sancionado tambien en
la sentencia de 29 de marzo de 1905, aunque
no por aplicacion del derecho de acrecer, y si
por aplicacion de la voluntad presunta del
testador, que babiendose legado el usufructo
vitalicio del remanente du sus bienes, por
partes iguales, a dos hermanas, debe
entenderse que ellas, o cualquiera de las dos
que sobreviviere a la otra, habia de disfrutar
dicho usufructo, no constituyendo la
separacion de partes sino una prevision del
testador, para el arreglo del usufructo total
durante la vida de los dos usufructuarios.
(Colin and Capitant, Curso Elemental del
Derecho Civil, 1957, Tomo VIII, pp. 605-606)
It, therefore, appears that the Spanish commentators
on the subject are unanimous that there is accretion
among usufructuaries who are constituted at the
same time when one of them dies before the end of
the usufruct. The only exception is if the usufruct is
constituted in a last will and testament and the
testator makes a contrary provision. Here there is
none. On the contrary, the testatrix constituted the
usufruct in favor of the children of her three cousins
with the particular injunction that they are the only
ones to enjoy the same as long as they live, from
which it can be implied that, should any of them die,
the share of the latter shall accrue to the surviving
ones. These provisions of the will are clear. They do
not admit of any other interpretation.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is reversed.
The eleven surviving usufructuaries are hereby
declared to be entitled to the shares of the three
deceased usufructuaries and, hence, as a corollary,
appellees Gil P. Policarpio and Batas Riego de Dios are
hereby ordered to pay to them the money withheld
by them respectively representing the shares of the
deceased usufructuaries. No costs.
Policarpio v. Salamat
L-218091, Jan. 31, 1966
FACTS: In her will, a testatrix constituted a usufruct
(over her properties) in favor of the children of her
three cous-ins. The will also provided that the said
children are the only ones to enjoy the same as long
as they live. Now then, if any of them subsequently
dies, who will get his share?
HELD: From the above-cited proviso in the will, it can
be inferred that the share of the heir who
subsequently dies shall ACCRUE to the surviving
ones. Said proviso is clear enough, and does not
admit of any other interpretation.
MANUEL TORRES, petitioner-appellant and
LUZ LOPEZ DE BUENO, appellant,
vs.
MARGARITA LOPEZ, opponent-appellee.
 G.R. No. L-24569 26 February 1926
FACTS: On January 3,1924, the testator Thomas
Rodriquez, who was 76 years of age and was in
feeble health for a long time, made his will where he
made his cousin Vicente Lopez and his daughter Luz
Lopez de Bueno as the only and universal heir of his
properties. The probate of the will was opposed by
Margarita Lopez, cousin and nearest relative of the
deceased. The ground cited for the opposition was
that the testator lacked mental capacity, she claimed
that at time of the execution of the supposed will, the
deceased was suffering from senile dementia and
was under guardianship.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testator was mentally
capacitated during the execution of the will.
RULING: The deceased testator had mental capacity
to make his will during its execution. The Supreme
Court held that at the time of the making of the will,
the testator may be of old age, may have been
physically decrepit, may have been week of intellect,
have suffered a loss of memory, had a guardian over
his person and property and may have been
eccentric, but he still possessed that spark of reason
and of life, that strength of mind to form a fixed
intention, and to summon his enfeebled thoughts to
enforce that intention which the law terms
“testamentary capacity.”
(b) that the provisions for fideicommissary
substitutions are also invalid because the first heirs
are not related to the second heirs or substitutes
within the first degree, as provided in Article 863 of
the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over
real property in the Philippines in favor of Wanda
Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article
III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the
proposed partition of the testator's interest in the
Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow
Marcelle and the appellants, violates the testator's
express win to give this property to them
Nonetheless, the lower court approved the project of
partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this
order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this
Court.
ISSUE:Whether or not the testamentary dispositions
in favor of the heirs are valid and how should the
estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez be partitioned.
RULING: YES.The dispositions to the widow, Marcelle
Demoron de Ramirez as compulsory heir is valid.The
Court also upheld the usufruct in favor of Wanda
because a usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest
title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is
proscribed by the Constitution.Hence the estate of
the deceased shall be distributed as follows:
One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;

TESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE EUGENIO RAMIREZ,
MARIA LUISA PALACIOS,
Administratrix, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
MARCELLE D. VDA. DE RAMIREZ, ET AL.,
oppositors, JORGE and ROBERTO
RAMIREZ, legatees, oppositors- appellants.
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to
Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked ownership and
the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple
substitution in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and
Horace V. Ramirez.
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of
the court a quo. No special pronouncement as to
costs.

G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982

FACTS: J
ose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died
in Spain on December 11, 1964, with only his widow,
Marcelle Demoron de Ramirez as compulsory heir. His
will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria
Luisa Palacios was appointed administratrix of the
estate.The administratrix submitted a project of
partition as follows: the property of the deceased is to
be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the
widow 'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her
legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go to
Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad."
Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the free portion is
charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining
two-thirds (2/3) with a usufruct in favor of Wanda, the
companion of the deceased.
Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of
partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions for
vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski
with respect to the widow's usufruct and in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with
respect to Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the
first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the testator;