CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
G.R. No. 161434 March 3, 2004
MARIA JEANETTE C. TECSON and FELIX B. DESIDERIO, JR., petitioners, vs. The
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, RONALD ALLAN KELLY POE (a.k.a. FERNANDO
POE, JR.) and VICTORINO X. FORNIER, respondents.
x-----------------------------x
G.R. No. 161634 March 3, 2004
ZOILO ANTONIO VELEZ, petitioner, vs. RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, a.k.a.
FERNANDO POE, JR., respondent.
x-----------------------------x
G. R. No. 161824 March 3, 2004
VICTORINO X. FORNIER, petitioner, vs.HON. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
RONALD ALLAN KELLEY POE, ALSO KNOWN AS FERNANDO POE
JR., respondents.
Election Law; Disqualification Cases; Jurisdiction; Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court; COMELEC’s decision on a
disqualification case involving a presidential candidate could be elevated to, and could
well be taken cognizance of by, the Supreme Court.—Decisions of the COMELEC on
disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme Court per Rule 64 in an action
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article
IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads—“Each Commission shall decide by a majority
vote of all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the
date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted
for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum,
required by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party
within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof.” Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of
the same Constitution provides that judicial power is vested in one Supreme Court and
in such lower courts as may be established by law which power “includes the duty of
the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the Government.” It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up
in G.R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated to, and could well be taken cognizance of by,
this Court. A contrary view could be a gross denial to our people of their fundamental
right to be fully informed, and to make a proper choice, on who could or should be
elected to occupy the highest government post in the land.
Same; Same; Same; Presidential Electoral Tribunal; The omission in the 1935 and
1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-
presidential contests, has constrained the Supreme Court to declare as “not (being)
justiciable” controversies and disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and
qualifications of the President or Vice President; The statutory set-up under Republic
Act No. 1793 would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7
of the 1987 Constitution.—Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in
G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the
1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance
of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions
they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads: “The Supreme
Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its
rules for the purpose.” The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The
omission in the 1935 and the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole
judge of presidential and vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to
declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as “not (being) justiciable” controversies or disputes
involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice
President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact
Republic Act No. 1793, “An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral
Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-
Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of
Hearing the Same.” Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate
Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the
subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up,
nonetheless, would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7,
of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Election Contests; Quo Warranto; Words and Phrases;
Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to a post-election scenario;
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office.—Ordinary usage would characterize a “contest” in reference to
a postelection scenario. Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo
warranto which, although two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view,
i.e.,to dislodge the winning candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule
12, Rule 13, and Rule 14 of the “Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal”
promulgated by the Supreme Court en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this
premise.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
defined by Sec. 4, par. 7, of the 1987 Constitution, does not include cases directly
brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-
presidency before the elections are held; A quo warranto proceeding is generally
defined as being an action against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully
holds or exercises a public office.—The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of
the tribunal over contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
“President” or “Vice-President”, of the Philippines, and not of “candidates” for President
or Vice-President. A quo warranto proceeding is generally defined as being an action
1

against a person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public
office. In such context, the election contest can only contemplate a post-election
scenario. In Rule 14, only a registered candidate who would have received either the
second or third highest number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again
presupposes a post-election scenario. It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court, defined by Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not
include cases directly brought before it questioning the qualifications of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the elections are held.
Citizenship; Words and Phrases; Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was
that given by Aristotle, who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to
refer to a man who shared in the administration of justice and in the holding of an
office.—Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle,
who, sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the “citizen” to refer to a man who shared
in the administration of justice and in the holding of an office. Aristotle saw its
significance if only to determine the constituency of the “State”, which he described as
being composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence. The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other. In its ideal setting, a citizen was active
in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general
interest of society.
Same; Same; The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries,
from simply being limited to civil citizenship and then expanding to include political
citizenship, social citizenship, and an ongoing and final stage of development might
well be the internationalization of citizenship.—The concept of citizenship had
undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th century, the concept was limited, by
and large, to civil citizenship, which established the rights necessary for individual
freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty and justice. Its meaning expanded
during the 19th century to include political citizenship, which encompassed the right to
participate in the exercise of political power. The 20th century saw the next stage of the
development of social citizenship, which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to
economic well-being and social security. The idea of citizenship has gained expression
in the modern welfare state as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final
stage of development, in keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be
the internationalization of citizenship.
Same; Same; There was no such term as “Philippine citizens” during the Spanish
regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish subjects.”—There was no such term as
“Philippine citizens” during the Spanish regime but “subjects of Spain” or “Spanish
subjects.” In church records, the natives were called ‘indios’, denoting a low regard for
the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on citizenship became highly codified
during the 19th century but their sheer number made it difficult to point to one
comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain however, were made to
apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly extended by Royal Decrees.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Same; Same; Treaty of Paris; Upon the ratification of the Treaty of Paris, and pending
legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the
Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects, and although they did not become American
citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens”under American laws and were thus
issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the
protection of the United States.—The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine
history. Already in the state of decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede
her sole colony in the East to an upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted
principle of international law dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an
abrogation of all political laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which
would remain virtually intact. The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December
1898 between Spain and the United States. Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights
and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States
would be determined by its Congress—x x x Upon the ratification of the treaty, and
pending legislation by the United States Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants
of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish subjects. Although they did not become
American citizens, they, however, also ceased to be “aliens” under American laws and
were thus issued passports describing them to be citizens of the Philippines entitled to
the protection of the United States.
Same; Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as
the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress
of the United States in the Philippines.—The term “citizens of the Philippine Islands”
appeared for the first time in the Philippine Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as
the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first comprehensive legislation of the Congress
of the United States on the Philippines—“. . . . that all inhabitants of the Philippine
Islands continuing to reside therein, who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of
April, 1891, and then resided in said Islands, and their children born subsequent
thereto, shall be deemed end held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such
entitled to the protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris, December tenth
eighteen hundred and ninety eight.” Under the organic act, a “citizen of the Philippines”
was one who was an inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th
day of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant,
2) an inhabitant who was a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who
obtained Spanish papers on or before 11 April 1899.
Same; Jus Soli Principle; With respect to the status of children born in the Philippines
from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant
in the Philippines, weight was given to the view that the common law principle of jus
soli, otherwise known as the principle of territoriality, governed.—Controversy arose on
to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899 to 01 July 1902,
during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines. Weight was given
to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the common law
principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality, operative in
the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine Archipelago
within that period.
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Same; Philippine Bill of 1902; Jones Laws (Philippine Autonomy Act); Words and
Phrases; With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine
citizens” had for the first time crystallized; The word “Filipino” was used by William H.
Taft, the first Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention
of it in his slogan, “The Philippines for the Filipinos”; Under the Jones Law, a native-
born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April
1899 if he was (1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, (2) residing in the Philippines
on said date, and, (3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.—With the
adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of “Philippine citizens” had for the
first time crystallized. The word “Filipino” was used by William H. Taft, the first Civil
Governor General inthe Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his slogan,
“The Philippines for the Filipinos.” In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also known as
the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902, as so
amended by the Act of Congress in 1912—x x x Under the Jones Law, a native-born
inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April
1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April 1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on
said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen of some other country.
Same; Jus Sanguinis Principle; 1935 Constitution; The 1935 Constitution brought to an
end to any such link to the common law principle of jus soli by adopting, once and for
all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as the basis of Filipino citizenship.—While there
was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a mode of
acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link with
common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as being
the basis of Filipino citizenship.
Same; Same; 1973 and 1987 Constitutions; Seeking to correct the anomaly of women
automatically losing their Filipino citizenship and acquiring that of their foreign
husbands, resulting in discriminatory situations that effectively incapacitated the
women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate children and
requiring such children to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of
majority, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals
to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new
Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns.—Subsection (4), Article III, of the
1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law provisions at the time, which
provided that women would automatically lose their Filipino citizenship and acquire that
of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory situations that effectively
incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino citizenship to their legitimate
children and required illegitimate children of Filipino mothers to still elect Filipino
citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to correct this anomaly, as well
as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino women as equals to men, the
framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions of the new Constitution on
citizenship to reflect such concerns—x x x The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the
provisions of the 1973 Constitution, except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to
correct the irregular situation generated by the questionable proviso in the 1935
Constitution.
Same; Evidence; Public Documents; Birth Certificates; Marriage Certificates; Death
Certificates; Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage
certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of Fernando Poe,
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Jr., constitute prima facie proof of their contents.—Being public documents, the death
certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly,
and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie proof of their contents. Section
44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides: “Entries in official records. Entries in
official records made in the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines,
or by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie
evidence of the facts therein stated.” The trustworthiness of public documents and the
value given to the entries made therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official
duty in the preparation of the statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to
a breach of that duty, 3) the routine and disinterested origin of most such statements,
and 4) the publicity of record which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors
as might have occurred.
Same; Parent and Child; Paternity; Filiation; Acknowledgment; Under the Civil Code of
Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 8 December 1889 to 30 August 1950
when the Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to
establish filiation or paternity.—Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the
Philippines from 08 December 1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the
Civil Code of the Philippines took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish
filiation or paternity. Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary.
Judicial or compulsory acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of
the putative parent; voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a
will, or a public document. Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the
Civil Registry Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that—“In case of an illegitimate child,
the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn to jointly by the parents of the infant or
only by the mother if the father refuses. In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to
state or reveal in the document the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the
child, or to give therein any information by which such father could be identified.” In
order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary acknowledgment
of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or sworn to by the father.
The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as being an authoritative
document of recognition.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; The 1950 Civil
Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children into
voluntary, legal or compulsory; Unlike an action to claim legitimacy which would last
during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an
action to claim acknowledgment could only be brought during the lifetime of the
presumed parent.—The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary
recognition was required to be expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record or in any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place
in favor of full blood brothers and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or
judicially declared as natural. Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded
generally in cases when the child had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike
an action to claim legitimacy which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might
pass exceptionally to the heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment,
however, could only be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
3

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The growing trend to
liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to
break away from the traditional idea of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate
relationships within the family in favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child;
There is little, if any, to indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the
individual would also affect his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State;
Civil law has been defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those
which exist among members of society for the protection of private interests.—It should
be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or recognition of
illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea of keeping well
apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in favor of the greater
interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to merely govern the
private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to indicate that the
legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect his political rights
or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions on “citizenship”
could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the context of private
relations, the domain of civil law; particularly—Civil Law is that branch of law which has
for its double purpose the organization of the family and the regulation of property. It
has thus [been] defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the
relations of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those
which exist among members of a society for the protection of private interests.”
Same; The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law is best exemplified in
Article 15 of the Civil Code.—The relevance of “citizenship” or “nationality” to Civil Law
is best exemplified in Article 15 of the Civil Code, stating that—“Laws relating to family
rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding
upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad”—that explains the need to
incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found in different parts of the
Civil Code, such as on successional rights and family relations. In adoption, for
instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of his adoptive parents and
accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such legal fiction extended only
to define his rights under civil law and not his political status.
Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias
against illegitimacy; The distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy should remain
only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of
political law—the proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining a child’s
citizenship should be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes.—Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against
illegitimacy. This discriminatory attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and
property laws, which, while defining proprietary and successional rights of members of
the family, provided distinctions in the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In
the monarchial set-up of old Spain, the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth
were strictly according to bloodlines and the concern to keep these bloodlines
uncontaminated by foreign blood was paramount. These distinctions between
legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish Civil Code, and the invidious
discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code became the primary source of our
own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains and should remain only in the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on the domain of political law. The
proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should
thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for
civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or
paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to
personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
Same; Same; Evidence; Acts or Declarations About Pedigree; Requisites.—Section
39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides—“Act or Declaration about pedigree. The
act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable totestify, in respect to the pedigree
of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence
where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons
is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word ‘pedigree’ includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places
where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of
family history intimately connected with pedigree.” For the above rule to apply, it would
be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree
of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose
pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has
occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose
pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.
Same; Paternity; Filiation; DNA Testing; In case proof of filiation or paternity would be
unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which
examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any
physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to.—In case proof of filiation
or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain,
DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate
child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive
match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals,this Court has
acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing—“Parentage will still be resolved using
conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available.
Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification
and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research
Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability toconduct DNA
typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that
the DNA or a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other
from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed
to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA
test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes,
courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said,
that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of
situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress.”
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Same; Same; Legitimate and Illegitimate Children; Where jurisprudence regarded an
illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit of
the child; Providing neither conditions nor distinctions, the 1935 Constitution states that
among the citizens of the Philippines are “those whose fathers are citizens of the
Philippines.”—Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the
citizenship of its mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino
nationality for the illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the
mother had custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her
illegitimate child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter—perhaps the most significant consideration—is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are “those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.” There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
Same; Same; Same; The 1935 Constitution confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.—In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion
has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether
or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or
not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen
and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents
him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that
having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the
year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other
evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo
Pou would have benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine Bill had
effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend
to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which
regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or
illegitimate.
Citizenship; For purposes of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a
Filipino and whose mother is an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the
child to follow the citizenship of his putative father.—Petitioner Fornier never alleged
that Allan Poe was not the father of FPJ. By revolving his case around the illegitimacy
of FPJ, Fornier effectively conceded paternity or filiation as a non-issue. For purposes
of the citizenship of an illegitimate child whose father is a Filipino and whose mother is
an alien, proof of paternity or filiation is enough for the child to follow the citizenship of
his putative father, as advanced by Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the amici curiae. Since
paternity or filiation is in fact admitted by petitioner Fornier, the COMELEC committed
no grave abuse of discretion in holding that FPJ is a Filipino citizen, pursuant to
paragraph 3 of Section 1 of Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, which reads: Section 1.
The following are citizens of the Philippines: . . . (3) Those whose fathers are citizens
of the Philippines.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Citizenship is a treasured right conferred on those whom the state believes are
deserving of the privilege. It is a "precious heritage, as well as an inestimable
acquisition,"1 that cannot be taken lightly by anyone - either by those who enjoy
it or by those who dispute it.
Before the Court are three consolidated cases, all of which raise a single question of
profound importance to the nation. The issue of citizenship is brought up to challenge
the qualifications of a presidential candidate to hold the highest office of the land. Our
people are waiting for the judgment of the Court with bated breath. Is Fernando Poe,
Jr., the hero of silver screen, and now one of the main contenders for the presidency,
a natural-born Filipino or is he not?
The moment of introspection takes us face to face with Spanish and American colonial
roots and reminds us of the rich heritage of civil law and common law traditions, the
fusion resulting in a hybrid of laws and jurisprudence that could be no less than distinctly
Filipino.
Antecedent Case Settings
On 31 December 2003, respondent Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando
Poe, Jr. (hereinafter "FPJ"), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President
of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP)
Party, in the forthcoming national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ,
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to
be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and
his place of birth to be Manila.
Victorino X. Fornier, petitioner in G.R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier,
Petitioner, versus Hon. Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also
known as Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondents," initiated, on 09 January 2004, a petition
docketed SPA No. 04-003 before the Commission on Elections ("COMELEC") to
disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the
thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by
claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his
parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his
father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish
subject. Granting, petitioner asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he
could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate
child of an alien mother. Petitioner based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of
respondent on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a
certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no
such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after
the birth of respondent.
In the hearing before the Third Division of the COMELEC on 19 January 2004,
petitioner, in support of his claim, presented several documentary exhibits - 1) a copy
of the certificate of birth of FPJ, 2) a certified photocopy of an affidavit executed in
Spanish by Paulita Poe y Gomez attesting to her having filed a case for bigamy and
concubinage against the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, after discovering his
5

bigamous relationship with Bessie Kelley, 3) an English translation of the affidavit
aforesaid, 4) a certified photocopy of the certificate of birth of Allan F. Poe, 5) a
certification issued by the Director of the Records Management and Archives Office,
attesting to the fact that there was no record in the National Archives that a Lorenzo
Poe or Lorenzo Pou resided or entered the Philippines before 1907, and 6) a
certification from the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division of the National Archives
to the effect that no available information could be found in the files of the National
Archives regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe.
On his part, respondent, presented twenty-two documentary pieces of evidence, the
more significant ones being - a) a certification issued by Estrella M. Domingo of the
Archives Division of the National Archives that there appeared to be no available
information regarding the birth of Allan F. Poe in the registry of births for San Carlos,
Pangasinan, b) a certification issued by the Officer-In-Charge of the Archives Division
of the National Archives that no available information about the marriage of Allan F.
Poe and Paulita Gomez could be found, c) a certificate of birth of Ronald Allan Poe, d)
Original Certificate of Title No. P-2247 of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of
Pangasinan, in the name of Lorenzo Pou, e) copies of Tax Declaration No. 20844, No.
20643, No. 23477 and No. 23478 in the name of Lorenzo Pou, f) a copy of the certificate
of death of Lorenzo Pou, g) a copy of the purported marriage contract between
Fernando Pou and Bessie Kelley, and h) a certification issued by the City Civil Registrar
of San Carlos City, Pangasinan, stating that the records of birth in the said office during
the period of from 1900 until May 1946 were totally destroyed during World War II.
On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA No. 04-003 for lack of merit. Three
days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The
motion was denied on 06 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February
2004, petitioner assailed the decision of the COMELEC before this Court conformably
with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The
petition, docketed G. R. No. 161824, likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order,
a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or
execution of the COMELEC resolutions.
The other petitions, later consolidated with G. R. No. 161824, would include G. R. No.
161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, and Felix B. Desiderio, Jr., vs. The
Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan Kelley Poe (a.k.a. ‘Fernando Poe, Jr.’), and
Victorino X. Fornier," and the other, docketed G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio
G. Velez, vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr.," both challenging the
jurisdiction of the COMELEC and asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph
7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive
jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case.
Jurisdiction of the Court
In G. R. No. 161824
In seeking the disqualification of the candidacy of FPJ and to have the COMELEC deny
due course to or cancel FPJ’s certificate of candidacy for alleged misrepresentation of
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
a material fact (i.e., that FPJ was a natural-born citizen) before the COMELEC,
petitioner Fornier invoked Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code –
"Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy.
--- A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any
material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof
is false" –
in consonance with the general powers of COMELEC expressed in Section 52 of the
Omnibus Election Code -
"Section 52. Powers and functions of the Commission on Elections. In addition
to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the Constitution, the
Commission shall have exclusive charge of the enforcement and
administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections for the purpose
of ensuring free, orderly and honest elections" -
and in relation to Article 69 of the Omnibus Election Code which would
authorize "any interested party" to file a verified petition to deny or cancel the
certificate of candidacy of any nuisance candidate.
Decisions of the COMELEC on disqualification cases may be reviewed by the Supreme
Court per Rule 642 in an action for certiorari under Rule 65 3 of the Revised Rules of
Civil Procedure. Section 7, Article IX, of the 1987 Constitution also reads –
"Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any case
or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum, required
by the rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise
provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each
Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the
aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof."
Additionally, Section 1, Article VIII, of the same Constitution provides that judicial power
is vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
which power "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."
It is sufficiently clear that the petition brought up in G. R. No. 161824 was aptly elevated
to, and could well be taken cognizance of by, this Court. A contrary view could be a
gross denial to our people of their fundamental right to be fully informed, and to make
a proper choice, on who could or should be elected to occupy the highest government
post in the land.
6

In G. R. No. 161434 and G. R. No. 161634
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G. R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G. R. No. 161634, invoke
the provisions of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing
the jurisdiction of the COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in
urging the Supreme Court to instead take on the petitions they directly instituted before
it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and
the 1973 Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and
vice-presidential contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs.
Roxas,4 as "not (being) justiciable" controversies or disputes involving contests on the
elections, returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President. The
constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact Republic Act No.
1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear
and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-
President-Elect of the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same."
Republic Act 1793 designated the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the
Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal. Although the subsequent adoption
of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973 Constitution might have
implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless, would now
be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Ordinary usage would characterize a "contest" in reference to a post-election scenario.
Election contests consist of either an election protest or a quo warranto which, although
two distinct remedies, would have one objective in view, i.e., to dislodge the winning
candidate from office. A perusal of the phraseology in Rule 12, Rule 13, and Rule 14
of the "Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal," promulgated by the Supreme Court
en banc on 18 April 1992, would support this premise -
"Rule 12. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President of the Philippines.
"Rule 13. How Initiated. - An election contest is initiated by the filing of an
election protest or a petition for quo warranto against the President or Vice-
President. An election protest shall not include a petition for quo warranto. A
petition for quo warranto shall not include an election protest.
"Rule 14. Election Protest. - Only the registered candidate for President or for
Vice-President of the Philippines who received the second or third highest
number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-
President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Presidential Electoral Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of
the winner."
The rules categorically speak of the jurisdiction of the tribunal over contests relating to
the election, returns and qualifications of the "President" or "Vice-President", of the
Philippines, and not of "candidates" for President or Vice-President. A quo warranto
proceeding is generally defined as being an action against a person who usurps,
intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office. 5 In such context, the
election contest can only contemplate a post-election scenario. In Rule 14, only a
registered candidate who would have received either the second or third highest
number of votes could file an election protest. This rule again presupposes a post-
election scenario.
It is fair to conclude that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, defined by Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, would not include cases directly brought before
it, questioning the qualifications of a candidate for the presidency or vice-presidency
before the elections are held.
Accordingly, G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson, et al., vs.
Commission on Elections et al.," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez
vs. Ronald Allan Kelley Poe a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr." would have to be dismissed for
want of jurisdiction.
The Citizenship Issue
Now, to the basic issue; it should be helpful to first give a brief historical background on
the concept of citizenship.
Perhaps, the earliest understanding of citizenship was that given by Aristotle, who,
sometime in 384 to 322 B.C., described the "citizen" to refer to a man who shared in
the administration of justice and in the holding of an office.6Aristotle saw its significance
if only to determine the constituency of the "State," which he described as being
composed of such persons who would be adequate in number to achieve a self-
sufficient existence.7 The concept grew to include one who would both govern and be
governed, for which qualifications like autonomy, judgment and loyalty could be
expected. Citizenship was seen to deal with rights and entitlements, on the one hand,
and with concomitant obligations, on the other.8 In its ideal setting, a citizen was active
in public life and fundamentally willing to submit his private interests to the general
interest of society.
The concept of citizenship had undergone changes over the centuries. In the 18th
century, the concept was limited, by and large, to civil citizenship, which established
the rights necessary for individual freedom, such as rights to property, personal liberty
and justice.9 Its meaning expanded during the 19th century to include political
citizenship, which encompassed the right to participate in the exercise of political
power.10 The 20th century saw the next stage of the development of social citizenship,
which laid emphasis on the right of the citizen to economic well-being and social
security.11 The idea of citizenship has gained expression in the modern welfare state
7

as it so developed in Western Europe. An ongoing and final stage of development, in
keeping with the rapidly shrinking global village, might well be the internationalization
of citizenship.12
The Local Setting - from Spanish Times to the Present
There was no such term as "Philippine citizens" during the Spanish regime but
"subjects of Spain" or "Spanish subjects."13 In church records, the natives were called
'indios', denoting a low regard for the inhabitants of the archipelago. Spanish laws on
citizenship became highly codified during the 19th century but their sheer number made
it difficult to point to one comprehensive law. Not all of these citizenship laws of Spain
however, were made to apply to the Philippine Islands except for those explicitly
extended by Royal Decrees.14
Spanish laws on citizenship were traced back to the Novisima Recopilacion,
promulgated in Spain on 16 July 1805 but as to whether the law was extended to the
Philippines remained to be the subject of differing views among experts; 15 however,
three royal decrees were undisputably made applicable to Spaniards in the Philippines
- the Order de la Regencia of 14 August 1841, 16 the Royal Decree of 23 August 1868
specifically defining the political status of children born in the Philippine Islands, 17 and
finally, the Ley Extranjera de Ultramar of 04 July 1870, which was expressly made
applicable to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of 13 July 1870. 18
The Spanish Constitution of 1876 was never extended to the Philippine Islands
because of the express mandate of its Article 89, according to which the provisions of
the Ultramar among which this country was included, would be governed by special
laws.19
It was only the Civil Code of Spain, made effective in this jurisdiction on 18 December
1889, which came out with the first categorical enumeration of who were Spanish
citizens. -
"(a) Persons born in Spanish territory,
"(b) Children of a Spanish father or mother, even if they were born outside of
Spain,
"(c) Foreigners who have obtained naturalization papers,
"(d) Those who, without such papers, may have become domiciled inhabitants
of any town of the Monarchy."20
The year 1898 was another turning point in Philippine history. Already in the state of
decline as a superpower, Spain was forced to so cede her sole colony in the East to an
upcoming world power, the United States. An accepted principle of international law
dictated that a change in sovereignty, while resulting in an abrogation of all political
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
laws then in force, would have no effect on civil laws, which would remain virtually
intact.
The Treaty of Paris was entered into on 10 December 1898 between Spain and the
United States.21 Under Article IX of the treaty, the civil rights and political status of the
native inhabitants of the territories ceded to the United States would be determined by
its Congress -
"Spanish subjects, natives of the Peninsula, residing in the territory over which
Spain by the present treaty relinquishes or cedes her sovereignty may remain
in such territory or may remove therefrom, retaining in either event all their
rights of property, including the right to sell or dispose of such property or of
its proceeds; and they shall also have the right to carry on their industry,
commerce, and professions, being subject in respect thereof to such laws as
are applicable to foreigners. In case they remain in the territory they may
preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain by making, before a court of
record, within a year from the date of the exchange of ratifications of this
treaty, a declaration of their decision to preserve such allegiance; in default of
which declaration they shall be held to have renounced it and to have adopted
the nationality of the territory in which they reside.
Thus –
"The civil rights and political status of the native inhabitants of the territories
hereby ceded to the United States shall be determined by the Congress." 22
Upon the ratification of the treaty, and pending legislation by the United States
Congress on the subject, the native inhabitants of the Philippines ceased to be Spanish
subjects. Although they did not become American citizens, they, however, also ceased
to be "aliens" under American laws and were thus issued passports describing them to
be citizens of the Philippines entitled to the protection of the United States.
The term "citizens of the Philippine Islands" appeared for the first time in the Philippine
Bill of 1902, also commonly referred to as the Philippine Organic Act of 1902, the first
comprehensive legislation of the Congress of the United States on the Philippines -
".... that all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands continuing to reside therein,
who were Spanish subjects on the 11th day of April, 1891, and then resided
in said Islands, and their children born subsequent thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands and as such entitled to the
protection of the United States, except such as shall have elected to preserve
their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with the provisions of the
treaty of peace between the United States and Spain, signed at Paris,
December tenth eighteen hundred and ninety eight."23
Under the organic act, a "citizen of the Philippines" was one who was an inhabitant of
the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11 th day of April 1899. The term
"inhabitant" was taken to include 1) a native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was
8

a native of Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish papers on or
before 11 April 1899.24
Controversy arose on to the status of children born in the Philippines from 11 April 1899
to 01 July 1902, during which period no citizenship law was extant in the Philippines.
Weight was given to the view, articulated in jurisprudential writing at the time, that the
common law principle of jus soli, otherwise also known as the principle of territoriality,
operative in the United States and England, governed those born in the Philippine
Archipelago within that period.25 More about this later.
In 23 March 1912, the Congress of the United States made the following amendment
to the Philippine Bill of 1902 -
"Provided, That the Philippine Legislature is hereby authorized to provide by
law for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those natives of the
Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing provisions, the
natives of other insular possession of the United States, and such other
persons residing in the Philippine Islands who would become citizens of the
United States, under the laws of the United States, if residing therein."26
With the adoption of the Philippine Bill of 1902, the concept of "Philippine citizens" had
for the first time crystallized. The word "Filipino" was used by William H. Taft, the first
Civil Governor General in the Philippines when he initially made mention of it in his
slogan, "The Philippines for the Filipinos." In 1916, the Philippine Autonomy Act, also
known as the Jones Law restated virtually the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902,
as so amended by the Act of Congress in 1912 -
"That all inhabitants of the Philippine Islands who were Spanish subjects on
the eleventh day of April, eighteen hundred and ninety-nine, and then resided
in said Islands, and their children born subsequently thereto, shall be deemed
and held to be citizens of the Philippine Islands, except such as shall have
elected to preserve their allegiance to the Crown of Spain in accordance with
the provisions of the treaty of peace between the United States and Spain,
signed at Paris December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight and
except such others as have since become citizens of some other country;
Provided, That the Philippine Legislature, herein provided for, is hereby
authorized to provide for the acquisition of Philippine citizenship by those
natives of the Philippine Islands who do not come within the foregoing
provisions, the natives of the insular possessions of the United States, and
such other persons residing in the Philippine Islands who are citizens of the
United States, or who could become citizens of the United States under the
laws of the United States, if residing therein."
Under the Jones Law, a native-born inhabitant of the Philippines was deemed to be a
citizen of the Philippines as of 11 April 1899 if he was 1) a subject of Spain on 11 April
1899, 2) residing in the Philippines on said date, and, 3) since that date, not a citizen
of some other country.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
While there was, at one brief time, divergent views on whether or not jus soli was a
mode of acquiring citizenship, the 1935 Constitution brought to an end to any such link
with common law, by adopting, once and for all, jus sanguinis or blood relationship as
being the basis of Filipino citizenship -
"Section 1, Article III, 1935 Constitution. The following are citizens of the
Philippines -
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippine Islands at the time of the adoption
of this Constitution
"(2) Those born in the Philippines Islands of foreign parents who, before the
adoption of this Constitution, had been elected to public office in the Philippine
Islands.
"(3) Those whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and upon reaching
the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.
"(5) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
Subsection (4), Article III, of the 1935 Constitution, taken together with existing civil law
provisions at the time, which provided that women would automatically lose their
Filipino citizenship and acquire that of their foreign husbands, resulted in discriminatory
situations that effectively incapacitated the women from transmitting their Filipino
citizenship to their legitimate children and required illegitimate children of Filipino
mothers to still elect Filipino citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Seeking to
correct this anomaly, as well as fully cognizant of the newly found status of Filipino
women as equals to men, the framers of the 1973 Constitution crafted the provisions
of the new Constitution on citizenship to reflect such concerns -
"Section 1, Article III, 1973 Constitution - The following are citizens of the
Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of
this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the
Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five.
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
For good measure, Section 2 of the same article also further provided that –
9

"A female citizen of the Philippines who marries an alien retains her Philippine
citizenship, unless by her act or omission she is deemed, under the law to
have renounced her citizenship."
The 1987 Constitution generally adopted the provisions of the 1973 Constitution,
except for subsection (3) thereof that aimed to correct the irregular situation generated
by the questionable proviso in the 1935 Constitution.
Section I, Article IV, 1987 Constitution now provides:
"The following are citizens of the Philippines:
"(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the
adoption of this Constitution.
"(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines.
"(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority; and
"(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law."
The Case Of FPJ
Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses:
"No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of
age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten
years immediately preceding such election."
The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the
Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their
Philippine citizenship."27
The date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the
regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship
- naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis 28 – had been in vogue. Only two,
i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a "natural-born" citizen
of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs 29 (1912), did not last long.
With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs.
Secretary of Labor30 (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the
primary basis of citizenship by birth.
Documentary evidence adduced by petitioner would tend to indicate that the earliest
established direct ascendant of FPJ was his paternal grandfather Lorenzo Pou, married
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
to Marta Reyes, the father of Allan F. Poe. While the record of birth of Lorenzo Pou had
not been presented in evidence, his death certificate, however, identified him to be a
Filipino, a resident of San Carlos, Pangasinan, and 84 years old at the time of his death
on 11 September 1954. The certificate of birth of the father of FPJ, Allan F. Poe,
showed that he was born on 17 May 1915 to an Español father, Lorenzo Pou, and a
mestiza Español mother, Marta Reyes. Introduced by petitioner was an "uncertified"
copy of a supposed certificate of the alleged marriage of Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez on 05 July 1936. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley
reflected the date of their marriage to be on 16 September 1940. In the same certificate,
Allan F. Poe was stated to be twenty-five years old, unmarried, and a Filipino citizen,
and Bessie Kelley to be twenty-two years old, unmarried, and an American citizen. The
birth certificate of FPJ, would disclose that he was born on 20 August 1939 to Allan F.
Poe, a Filipino, twenty-four years old, married to Bessie Kelly, an American citizen,
twenty-one years old and married.
Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries
on the birth certificate of respondent and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only
conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents
would be that -
1. The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley;
2. FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939;
3. Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16
September, 1940;
4. The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and
5. At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years
old.
Would the above facts be sufficient or insufficient to establish the fact that FPJ is a
natural-born Filipino citizen? The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley,
the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of
public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in
evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC.
The birth certificate of FPJ was marked Exhibit "A" for petitioner and Exhibit "3" for
respondent. The marriage certificate of Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley was submitted as
Exhibit "21" for respondent. The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou was submitted by
respondent as his Exhibit "5." While the last two documents were submitted in evidence
for respondent, the admissibility thereof, particularly in reference to the facts which they
purported to show, i.e., the marriage certificate in relation to the date of marriage of
Allan F. Poe to Bessie Kelley and the death certificate relative to the death of Lorenzo
Pou on 11 September 1954 in San Carlos, Pangasinan, were all admitted by petitioner,
who had utilized those material statements in his argument. All three documents were
certified true copies of the originals.
10

Section 3, Rule 130, Rules of Court states that -
"Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of
inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other
than the original document itself, except in the following cases:
"x x x xxx xxx
"(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public office or is
recorded in a public office."
Being public documents, the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou, the marriage certificate
of Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelly, and the birth certificate of FPJ, constitute prima facie
proof of their contents. Section 44, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides:
"Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in the performance
of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of
the facts therein stated."
The trustworthiness of public documents and the value given to the entries made
therein could be grounded on 1) the sense of official duty in the preparation of the
statement made, 2) the penalty which is usually affixed to a breach of that duty, 3) the
routine and disinterested origin of most such statements, and 4) the publicity of record
which makes more likely the prior exposure of such errors as might have occurred. 31
The death certificate of Lorenzo Pou would indicate that he died on 11 September 1954,
at the age of 84 years, in San Carlos, Pangasinan. It could thus be assumed that
Lorenzo Pou was born sometime in the year 1870 when the Philippines was still a
colony of Spain. Petitioner would argue that Lorenzo Pou was not in the Philippines
during the crucial period of from 1898 to 1902 considering that there was no existing
record about such fact in the Records Management and Archives Office. Petitioner,
however, likewise failed to show that Lorenzo Pou was at any other place during the
same period. In his death certificate, the residence of Lorenzo Pou was stated to be
San Carlos, Pangasinan. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, it should be
sound to conclude, or at least to presume, that the place of residence of a person at
the time of his death was also his residence before death. It would be extremely
doubtful if the Records Management and Archives Office would have had complete
records of all residents of the Philippines from 1898 to 1902.
Proof of Paternity and Filiation
Under Civil Law.
Petitioner submits, in any case, that in establishing filiation (relationship or civil status
of the child to the father [or mother]) or paternity (relationship or civil status of the father
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
to the child) of an illegitimate child, FPJ evidently being an illegitimate son according to
petitioner, the mandatory rules under civil law must be used.
Under the Civil Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 08 December
1889 up until the day prior to 30 August 1950 when the Civil Code of the Philippines
took effect, acknowledgment was required to establish filiation or paternity.
Acknowledgment was either judicial (compulsory) or voluntary. Judicial or compulsory
acknowledgment was possible only if done during the lifetime of the putative parent;
voluntary acknowledgment could only be had in a record of birth, a will, or a public
document.32 Complementary to the new code was Act No. 3753 or the Civil Registry
Law expressing in Section 5 thereof, that -
"In case of an illegitimate child, the birth certificate shall be signed and sworn
to jointly by the parents of the infant or only by the mother if the father refuses.
In the latter case, it shall not be permissible to state or reveal in the document
the name of the father who refuses to acknowledge the child, or to give therein
any information by which such father could be identified."
In order that the birth certificate could then be utilized to prove voluntary
acknowledgment of filiation or paternity, the certificate was required to be signed or
sworn to by the father. The failure of such requirement rendered the same useless as
being an authoritative document of recognition.33 In Mendoza vs. Mella,34 the Court
ruled -
"Since Rodolfo was born in 1935, after the registry law was enacted, the
question here really is whether or not his birth certificate (Exhibit 1), which is
merely a certified copy of the registry record, may be relied upon as sufficient
proof of his having been voluntarily recognized. No such reliance, in our
judgment, may be placed upon it. While it contains the names of both parents,
there is no showing that they signed the original, let alone swore to its contents
as required in Section 5 of Act No. 3753. For all that might have happened, it
was not even they or either of them who furnished the data to be entered in
the civil register. Petitioners say that in any event the birth certificate is in the
nature of a public document wherein voluntary recognition of a natural child
may also be made, according to the same Article 131. True enough, but in
such a case, there must be a clear statement in the document that the parent
recognizes the child as his or her own."
In the birth certificate of respondent FPJ, presented by both parties, nowhere in the
document was the signature of Allan F. Poe found. There being no will apparently
executed, or at least shown to have been executed, by decedent Allan F. Poe, the only
other proof of voluntary recognition remained to be "some other public document." In
Pareja vs. Pareja,35 this Court defined what could constitute such a document as proof
of voluntary acknowledgment:
"Under the Spanish Civil Code there are two classes of public documents,
those executed by private individuals which must be authenticated by
notaries, and those issued by competent public officials by reason of their
11

office. The public document pointed out in Article 131 as one of the means by
which recognition may be made belongs to the first class."
Let us leave it at that for the moment.
The 1950 Civil Code categorized the acknowledgment or recognition of illegitimate
children into voluntary, legal or compulsory. Voluntary recognition was required to be
expressedly made in a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court of record or in
any authentic writing. Legal acknowledgment took place in favor of full blood brothers
and sisters of an illegitimate child who was recognized or judicially declared as natural.
Compulsory acknowledgment could be demanded generally in cases when the child
had in his favor any evidence to prove filiation. Unlike an action to claim legitimacy
which would last during the lifetime of the child, and might pass exceptionally to the
heirs of the child, an action to claim acknowledgment, however, could only be brought
during the lifetime of the presumed parent.
Amicus Curiae Ruben F. Balane defined, during the oral argument, "authentic writing,"
so as to be an authentic writing for purposes of voluntary recognition, simply as being
a genuine or indubitable writing of the father. The term would include a public
instrument (one duly acknowledged before a notary public or other competent official)
or a private writing admitted by the father to be his.
The Family Code has further liberalized the rules; Article 172, Article 173, and Article
175 provide:
"Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
"(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
"(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be
proved by:
"(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child;
or
"(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
"Art. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during
his or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die
during minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a
period of five years within which to institute the action.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
"x x x xxx x x x.
"Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged
parent."
The provisions of the Family Code are retroactively applied; Article 256 of the code
reads:
"Art. 256. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws."
Thus, in Vda. de Sy-Quia vs. Court of Appeals,36 the Court has ruled:
"We hold that whether Jose was a voluntarily recognized natural child should
be decided under Article 278 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Article 2260
of that Code provides that 'the voluntary recognition of a natural child shall
take place according to this Code, even if the child was born before the
effectivity of this body of laws' or before August 30, 1950. Hence, Article 278
may be given retroactive effect."
It should be apparent that the growing trend to liberalize the acknowledgment or
recognition of illegitimate children is an attempt to break away from the traditional idea
of keeping well apart legitimate and non-legitimate relationships within the family in
favor of the greater interest and welfare of the child. The provisions are intended to
merely govern the private and personal affairs of the family. There is little, if any, to
indicate that the legitimate or illegitimate civil status of the individual would also affect
his political rights or, in general, his relationship to the State. While, indeed, provisions
on "citizenship" could be found in the Civil Code, such provisions must be taken in the
context of private relations, the domain of civil law; particularly -
"Civil Law is that branch of law which has for its double purpose the
organization of the family and the regulation of property. It has thus [been]
defined as the mass of precepts which determine and regulate the relations
of assistance, authority and obedience among members of a family, and those
which exist among members of a society for the protection of private
interests."37
In Yañez de Barnuevo vs. Fuster,38 the Court has held:
12

"In accordance with Article 9 of the Civil Code of Spain, x x x the laws relating
to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of
persons, govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in
consequence, 'all questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the
validity or nullity of the matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and
wife, their support, as between them, the separation of their properties, the
rules governing property, marital authority, division of conjugal property, the
classification of their property, legal causes for divorce, the extent of the latter,
the authority to decree it, and, in general, the civil effects of marriage and
divorce upon the persons and properties of the spouses, are questions that
are governed exclusively by the national law of the husband and wife."
The relevance of "citizenship" or "nationality" to Civil Law is best exemplified in Article
15 of the Civil Code, stating that -
"Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad" -
that explains the need to incorporate in the code a reiteration of the Constitutional
provisions on citizenship. Similarly, citizenship is significant in civil relationships found
in different parts of the Civil Code,39 such as on successional rights and family
relations.40 In adoption, for instance, an adopted child would be considered the child of
his adoptive parents and accorded the same rights as their legitimate child but such
legal fiction extended only to define his rights under civil law41 and not his political
status.
Civil law provisions point to an obvious bias against illegitimacy. This discriminatory
attitude may be traced to the Spanish family and property laws, which, while defining
proprietary and successional rights of members of the family, provided distinctions in
the rights of legitimate and illegitimate children. In the monarchial set-up of old Spain,
the distribution and inheritance of titles and wealth were strictly according to bloodlines
and the concern to keep these bloodlines uncontaminated by foreign blood was
paramount.
These distinctions between legitimacy and illegitimacy were codified in the Spanish
Civil Code, and the invidious discrimination survived when the Spanish Civil Code
became the primary source of our own Civil Code. Such distinction, however, remains
and should remain only in the sphere of civil law and not unduly impede or impinge on
the domain of political law.
The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status
should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that
prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of
filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien
to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should
govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being
applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -
"Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person
deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person
related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it
occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two
persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word
`pedigree’ includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the
dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the
relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with
pedigree."
For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead
or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant
must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the
declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration.
Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie
Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove
the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e, living
together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house,
and as one family -
"I, Ruby Kelley Mangahas, of legal age and sound mind, presently residing in
Stockton, California, U.S.A., after being sworn in accordance with law do
hereby declare that:
"1. I am the sister of the late Bessie Kelley Poe.
"2. Bessie Kelley Poe was the wife of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"3. Fernando and Bessie Poe had a son by the name of Ronald Allan Poe,
more popularly known in the Philippines as `Fernando Poe, Jr.,’ or `FPJ’.
"4. Ronald Allan Poe `FPJ’ was born on August 20, 1939 at St. Luke's
Hospital, Magdalena Street, Manila.
"x x x xxx xxx
"7. Fernando Poe Sr., and my sister Bessie, met and became engaged while
they were students at the University of the Philippines in 1936. I was also
introduced to Fernando Poe, Sr., by my sister that same year.
"8. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister Bessie had their first child in 1938.
13

"9. Fernando Poe, Sr., my sister Bessie and their first three children, Elizabeth,
Ronald, Allan and Fernando II, and myself lived together with our mother at
our family's house on Dakota St. (now Jorge Bocobo St.), Malate until the
liberation of Manila in 1945, except for some months between 1943-1944.
"10. Fernando Poe, Sr., and my sister, Bessie, were blessed with four (4) more
children after Ronald Allan Poe.
"x x x xxx xxx
"18. I am executing this Declaration to attest to the fact that my nephew,
Ronald Allan Poe is a natural born Filipino, and that he is the legitimate child
of Fernando Poe, Sr.
"Done in City of Stockton, California, U.S.A., this 12th day of January 2004.
Ruby Kelley Mangahas Declarant DNA Testing
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals,42 this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing -
"Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the
modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of
the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis
Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat
(STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has
two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from
the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of
course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open
to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to
rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the
results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to
reject said result is to deny progress."
Petitioner’s Argument For Jurisprudential Conclusiveness
Petitioner would have it that even if Allan F. Poe were a Filipino citizen, he could not
have transmitted his citizenship to respondent FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child.
According to petitioner, prior to his marriage to Bessie Kelley, Allan F. Poe, on July 5,
1936, contracted marriage with a certain Paulita Gomez, making his subsequent
marriage to Bessie Kelley bigamous and respondent FPJ an illegitimate child. The
veracity of the supposed certificate of marriage between Allan F. Poe and Paulita
Gomez could be most doubtful at best. But the documentary evidence introduced by
no less than respondent himself, consisting of a birth certificate of respondent and a
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
marriage certificate of his parents showed that FPJ was born on 20 August 1939 to a
Filipino father and an American mother who were married to each other a year later, or
on 16 September 1940. Birth to unmarried parents would make FPJ an illegitimate
child. Petitioner contended that as an illegitimate child, FPJ so followed the citizenship
of his mother, Bessie Kelley, an American citizen, basing his stand on the ruling of this
Court in Morano vs. Vivo,43 citing Chiongbian vs. de Leo44 and Serra vs. Republic.45
On the above score, the disquisition made by amicus curiae Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, is
most convincing; he states -
"We must analyze these cases and ask what the lis mota was in each of them.
If the pronouncement of the Court on jus sanguinis was on the lis mota, the
pronouncement would be a decision constituting doctrine under the rule of
stare decisis. But if the pronouncement was irrelevant to the lis mota, the
pronouncement would not be a decision but a mere obiter dictum which did
not establish doctrine. I therefore invite the Court to look closely into these
cases.
"First, Morano vs. Vivo. The case was not about an illegitimate child of a
Filipino father. It was about a stepson of a Filipino, a stepson who was the
child of a Chinese mother and a Chinese father. The issue was whether the
stepson followed the naturalization of the stepfather. Nothing about jus
sanguinis there. The stepson did not have the blood of the naturalized
stepfather.
"Second, Chiongbian vs. de Leon. This case was not about the illegitimate
son of a Filipino father. It was about a legitimate son of a father who had
become Filipino by election to public office before the 1935 Constitution
pursuant to Article IV, Section 1(2) of the 1935 Constitution. No one was
illegitimate here.
"Third, Serra vs. Republic. The case was not about the illegitimate son of a
Filipino father. Serra was an illegitimate child of a Chinese father and a Filipino
mother. The issue was whether one who was already a Filipino because of
his mother who still needed to be naturalized. There is nothing there about
invidious jus sanguinis.
"Finally, Paa vs. Chan.46 This is a more complicated case. The case was
about the citizenship of Quintin Chan who was the son of Leoncio Chan.
Quintin Chan claimed that his father, Leoncio, was the illegitimate son of a
Chinese father and a Filipino mother. Quintin therefore argued that he got his
citizenship from Leoncio, his father. But the Supreme Court said that there
was no valid proof that Leoncio was in fact the son of a Filipina mother. The
Court therefore concluded that Leoncio was not Filipino. If Leoncio was not
Filipino, neither was his son Quintin. Quintin therefore was not only not a
natural-born Filipino but was not even a Filipino.
14

"The Court should have stopped there. But instead it followed with an obiter
dictum. The Court said obiter that even if Leoncio, Quintin's father, were
Filipino, Quintin would not be Filipino because Quintin was illegitimate. This
statement about Quintin, based on a contrary to fact assumption, was
absolutely unnecessary for the case. x x x It was obiter dictum, pure and
simple, simply repeating the obiter dictum in Morano vs. Vivo.
"x x x xxx xxx
"Aside from the fact that such a pronouncement would have no textual
foundation in the Constitution, it would also violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution not once but twice. First, it would make an illegitimate
distinction between a legitimate child and an illegitimate child, and second, it
would make an illegitimate distinction between the illegitimate child of a
Filipino father and the illegitimate child of a Filipino mother.
"The doctrine on constitutionally allowable distinctions was established long
ago by People vs. Cayat.47 I would grant that the distinction between
legitimate children and illegitimate children rests on real differences. x x x But
real differences alone do not justify invidious distinction. Real differences may
justify distinction for one purpose but not for another purpose.
"x x x What is the relevance of legitimacy or illegitimacy to elective public
service? What possible state interest can there be for disqualifying an
illegitimate child from becoming a public officer. It was not the fault of the child
that his parents had illicit liaison. Why deprive the child of the fullness of
political rights for no fault of his own? To disqualify an illegitimate child from
holding an important public office is to punish him for the indiscretion of his
parents. There is neither justice nor rationality in that. And if there is neither
justice nor rationality in the distinction, then the distinction transgresses the
equal protection clause and must be reprobated."
The other amici curiae, Mr. Justice Vicente Mendoza (a former member of this Court),
Professor Ruben Balane and Dean Martin Magallona, at bottom, have expressed
similar views. The thesis of petitioner, unfortunately hinging solely on pure obiter dicta,
should indeed fail.
Where jurisprudence regarded an illegitimate child as taking after the citizenship of its
mother, it did so for the benefit the child. It was to ensure a Filipino nationality for the
illegitimate child of an alien father in line with the assumption that the mother had
custody, would exercise parental authority and had the duty to support her illegitimate
child. It was to help the child, not to prejudice or discriminate against him.
The fact of the matter – perhaps the most significant consideration – is that the 1935
Constitution, the fundamental law prevailing on the day, month and year of birth of
respondent FPJ, can never be more explicit than it is. Providing neither conditions nor
distinctions, the Constitution states that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines." There utterly is no cogent justification to
prescribe conditions or distinctions where there clearly are none provided.
In Sum –
(1) The Court, in the exercise of its power of judicial review, possesses
jurisdiction over the petition in G. R. No. 161824, filed under Rule 64, in
relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. G.R. No. 161824
assails the resolution of the COMELEC for alleged grave abuse of discretion
in dismissing, for lack of merit, the petition in SPA No. 04-003 which has
prayed for the disqualification of respondent FPJ from running for the position
of President in the 10th May 2004 national elections on the contention that FPJ
has committed material representation in his certificate of candidacy by
representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.
(2) The Court must dismiss, for lack of jurisdiction and prematurity, the
petitions in G. R. No. 161434 and No. 161634 both having been directly
elevated to this Court in the latter’s capacity as the only tribunal to resolve a
presidential and vice-presidential election contest under the Constitution.
Evidently, the primary jurisdiction of the Court can directly be invoked only
after, not before, the elections are held.
(3) In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has
been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of
whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn,
depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would
have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino
citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of
Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in
1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year
1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of
any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death,
such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of
Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe,
father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose
fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate
or illegitimate.
(4) But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that
respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on
hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be
held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the
Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present
15
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been
material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs.
COMELEC,48 must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to DISMISS –

1. G. R. No. 161434, entitled "Maria Jeanette C. Tecson and Felix B.

Desiderio, Jr., Petitioners, versus Commission on Elections, Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe (a.k.a. "Fernando Poe, Jr.,) and Victorino X. Fornier,
Respondents," and G. R. No. 161634, entitled "Zoilo Antonio Velez, Petitioner,
versus Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, a.k.a. Fernando Poe, Jr., Respondent," for
want of jurisdiction.

2. G. R. No. 161824, entitled "Victorino X. Fornier, Petitioner, versus Hon.

Commission on Elections and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, also known as
Fernando Poe, Jr.," for failure to show grave abuse of discretion on the part
of respondent Commission on Elections in dismissing the petition in SPA No.
04-003.

No Costs.

SO ORDERED.

16

G.R. No. 221697 March 8, 2016
MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD S. POE-LLAMANZARES, Petitioners, vs. COMELEC
AND ESTRELLA C. ELAMPARO Respondents.
Election Law; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; The Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) cannot itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or
lack thereof of the candidate.—The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the
CoC of petitioner should be denied due course or cancelled “on the exclusive ground”
that she made in the certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the
ground should hedge in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into
the issue of the qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such
issue is yet undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot
itself, in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the
candidate.
Same; Disqualification of Candidates; As presently required, to disqualify a candidate
there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate
sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from
any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.”—Clearly, the amendment
done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an authorized proceeding
for determining before election the qualifications of candidate. Such that, as presently
required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration by a final judgment of a
competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified “is guilty of or found by the
Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the
Constitution.”
Same; Cancellation of Certificate of Candidacy; Misrepresentation; If a candidate
cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a
disqualification “provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of
candidacy (CoC) be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false
representations regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding
that he or she is not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by
which the falsity of the representation can be found.—Insofar as the qualification of a
candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are flipsides of one to the other. Both do
not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to
determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts of qualification must beforehand
be established in a prior proceeding before an authority properly vested with
jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may be by statute, by executive
order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal. If a candidate cannot be
disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering from a disqualification
“provided by law or the Constitution,” neither can the certificate of candidacy be
cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations regarding his or
her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is not qualified,
such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of the
representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-evident
facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such are,
anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of representation
can be determined.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Citizenship; Burden of Proof; The burden of proof was on private respondents to show
that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen.—At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions
regarding paternity is neither unknown nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family
Code of the Philippines has a whole chapter on Paternity and Filiation. That said, there
is more than sufficient evidence that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a
natural-born Filipino. Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents
to show that petitioner is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have
shown that both of petitioner’s parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a
foundling did not shift the burden to her because such status did not exclude the
possibility that her parents were Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a
high probability, if not certainty, that her parents are Filipinos.
Same; Foundlings; Presumptions; That a person with typical Filipino features is
abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines
is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there would be more than a ninety-nine percent
(99%) chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino, would indicate more
than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos.—
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner’s parents are the fact that
she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City. She also
has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond shaped
eyes and an oval face. There is a disputable presumption that things have happened
according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life. All of the
foregoing evidence, that a person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic
Church in a municipality where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly
Filipinos such that there would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the
province would be a Filipino, would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical
certainty, that petitioner’s parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on
which it is based are admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on
Evidence.
Same; Same; As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens.—As
a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935
Constitution’s enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in
the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 152 SCRA 284 (1987), this
Court held that: The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the organic law
and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary task in constitutional
construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the realization of the purpose of the
framers and of the people in the adoption of the Constitution. It may also be safely
assumed that the people in ratifying the Constitution were guided mainly by the
explanation offered by the framers.
Same; Same; Burden of Proof; The burden is on those who wish to use the constitution
to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution really intended to take
this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board marginalization.—The Solicitor
General makes the further point that the framers “worked to create a just and humane
society,” that “they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to impute upon
them a discriminatory intent against foundlings.” He exhorts that, given the grave
17

implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos, the Court
must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions “for an express
intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who wish to
use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the constitution
really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the board
marginalization.” We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against
foundlings. On the contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal
protection of the laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special
consideration are several provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which
provides that the “State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full
respect for human rights,” Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to “give
highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all
the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x”
and Article XV, Section 3 which requires the State to defend the “right of children to
assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of
neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their
development.” Certainly, these provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against
foundlings on account of their unfortunate status.
Same; Same; Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos.—Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are
Filipinos. These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee.
Rather, the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic
of such laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that “[l]aws relating to family
rights, duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad.” Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino.
Same; Same; Adoption; Republic Act (RA) No. 8043 entitled “An Act Establishing the
Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other
Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”), RA No.
8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino
Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all expressly
refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may
be adopted.—Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled “An Act
Establishing the Rules to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the “Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995”),
R.A. No. 8552, entitled “An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of
Filipino Children and For Other Purposes” (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption
Act of 1998) and this Court’s A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the “Rule on Adoption,” all
expressly refer to “Filipino children” and include foundlings as among Filipino children
who may be adopted. It has been argued that the process to determine that the child
is a foundling leading to the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and
the issuance of said certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which
make the foundling a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV,
Section 2 “Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship.” In
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
the first place, “having to perform an act” means that the act must be personally done
by the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the
child but by the authorities. Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of
the whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship,
or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother
under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it. In this instance, such issue is
moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a foundling, as evidenced by a
Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. The Decree of Adoption issued on 13 May
1974, which approved petitioner’s adoption by Jesusa Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan
Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife, Rosario Militar, as her “foundling
parents,” hence effectively affirming petitioner’s status as a foundling.
Same; Same; Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.—Foundlings are
likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international
law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local
legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted principles of international law, by
virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land
even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally accepted principles of
international law include international custom as evidence of a general practice
accepted as law, and general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
International customary rules are accepted as binding as a result from the combination
of two elements: the established, widespread, and consistent practice on the part of
States; and a psychological element known as the opinion juris sive necessitates
(opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that thepractice
in question is rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law requiring it. “General
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” are principles “established by a
process of reasoning” or judicial logic, based on principles which are “basic to legal
systems generally,” such as “general principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of
fairness and justice,” and the “general principle against discrimination” which is
embodied in the “Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against Discrimination
in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation.” These are the same core principles which underlie the
Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due process and equal protection
clauses of the Bill of Rights.
Same; Same; The common thread of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR), United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child (UNCRC) and
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) is to obligate the
Philippines to grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.—The
common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality must
be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both
of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old. The principles
found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
18

principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention on
Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling
is presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,” to wit: Article 14 A child
whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of birth. If the
child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the rules
applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the contrary is
proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.
(Underlining supplied) The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of
citizens of the country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United
Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness: Article 2 A foundling found in
the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be
considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing the nationality
of that State.
Same; Same; Foreign Judgments; Justice, fairness, equity and the policy against
discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights and which
are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right against enforced
disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were correctly considered as
“generally accepted principles of international law” under the incorporation clause.—
Our approach in Razon, Jr. v. Tagitis, 606 SCRA 598 (2009), and Mijares v. Ranada,
455 SCRA 397 (2005), effectively takes into account the fact that “generally accepted
principles of international law” are based not only on international custom, but also on
“general principles of law recognized by civilized nations,” as the phrase is understood
in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness, equity and the policy
against discrimination, which are fundamental principles underlying the Bill of Rights
and which are “basic to legal systems generally,” support the notion that the right
against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign judgments, were
correctly considered as “generally accepted principles of international law” under the
incorporation clause.
Same; Same; It is a generally accepted principle of international law to presume
foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the foundling is
found.—Petitioner’s evidence shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and
South America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its
citizen. Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty,
only thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six
(26) are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February
2016 Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice of
jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international
law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Same; Same; Passports; It has been pointed that the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only to citizens.
This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA, considers
foundlings as Philippine citizens.—Current legislation reveals the adherence of the
Philippines to this generally accepted principle of international law. In particular, R.A.
No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this Court’s Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to “Filipino
children.” In all of them, foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
adopted. Likewise, it has been pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings.
Passports are by law, issued only to citizens. This shows that even the executive
department, acting through the DFA, considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
Same; Same; Repatriation; Natural-born Citizens; Parreño v. Commission on Audit,
523 SCRA 390 (2007), is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship
(under Republic Act [RA] No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born citizenship.”—
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several
cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC, 678 SCRA 267 (2012), where
we described it as an “abbreviated repatriation process that restores one’s Filipino
citizenship x x x.” Also included is Parreño v. Commission on Audit, 523 SCRA 390
(2007), which cited Tabasa v. Court of Appeals, 500 SCRA 9 (2006), where we said
that “[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born
citizenship. Parreño v. Commission on Audit is categorical that “if petitioner reacquires
his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will . . . recover his natural-born
citizenship.”
Same; Natural-born Citizens; Congress saw it fit to decree that natural-born citizenship
may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not for the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to disagree with the Congress’ determination.—The COMELEC
construed the phrase “from birth” in the definition of natural citizens as implying “that
natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and continuous
from birth.” R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress’ sole prerogative
to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit to decree
that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost. It is not
for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress’ determination. More importantly,
COMELEC’s position that natural-born status must be continuous was already rejected
in Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 357 SCRA 545 (2001),
where the phrase “from birth” was clarified to mean at the time of birth: “A person who
at the time of his birth, is a citizen of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen
thereof.” Neither is “repatriation” an act to “acquire or perfect” one’s citizenship. In
Bengson III v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, this Court pointed out that
there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born citizen
and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens: It is apparent
from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution that there are
only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those who are
naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino, i.e., did
not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration
of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would
either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings
19

in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
Election Law; Commission on Elections; The Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
cannot reverse a judicial precedent.—The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial
precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And while we may always revisit a doctrine,
a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot be retroactively applied. In Carpio-
Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay, Jr., 774 SCRA 431 (2015),
where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it “should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or interpreting
the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal system of the
Philippines.” This Court also said that “while the future may ultimately uncover a
doctrine’s error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior to its
abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance thereupon should be respected.”
Civil Law; Adoption; One (1) of the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between
the biological parents and the adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse
of the adopter.”—It was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner
committed a falsehood when she put in the spaces for “born to” in her application for
repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled
the BI to presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the
data required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact — petitioner was legally adopted. One of
the effects of adoption is “to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adopter.” Under R.A.
No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate “attesting to the
fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)” and which certificate “shall not bear
any notation that it is an amended issue.” That law also requires that “[a]ll records,
books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential.” The law
therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as
that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of
strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that
she was an adoptee. Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner,
which it cannot make in the same case for cancellation of CoC, it resorted to
opinionatedness which is, moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by
COMELEC is wrapped in grave abuse of discretion.
Election Law; Presidential Candidates; Residence; The Constitution requires
presidential candidates to have ten (10) years residence in the Philippines before the
day of the elections.—The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten
(10) years’ residence in the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the
forthcoming elections will be held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident
of the Philippines prior to 9 May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested
information of “Period of Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016,” she put in “10 years 11 months” which according to her pleadings in these cases
corresponds to a beginning date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the
U.S. When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile,
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
which is the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1.
Residence or bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3.
an intention to abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of domicile,
one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and
definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically
be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or
at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of
residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
Same; Same; Same; Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire
Philippine citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the
years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.—It is
obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited by
the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be counted
only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken together
leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her U.S.
residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes from
the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their address
in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband resigning from
U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently relocate to the
Philippines and actually reestablished her residence here on 24 May 2005 (securing
T.I.N., enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here, constructing a
residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her husband getting
employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to reacquire Philippine
citizenship and her family’s actual continuous stay in the Philippines over the years, it
is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it was for good.
Same; Residence; Balikbayan Program; A closer look at Republic Act (RA) No. 6768
as amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows
that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must
leave after one (1) year.—The COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had
entered the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as
amended, otherwise known as the “An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program,” shows
that there is no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must
leave after one year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized
abroad and “comes or returns to the Philippines.” The law institutes a balikbayan
program “providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the
balikbayan to become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to
the country” in line with the government’s “reintegration program.” Obviously,
balikbayans are not ordinary transients. Given the law’s express policy to facilitate the
return of a balikbayan and help him reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh
conclusion to say in absolute terms that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That
visa-free period is obviously granted him to allow him to reestablish his life and
reintegrate himself into the community before he attends to the necessary formal and
legal requirements of repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did — she
reestablished life here by enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the
return of her husband and then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
20

Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy
(CoC) which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It was grave abuse of
discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 CoC as a binding and conclusive
admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her, yes, but it was
by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate’s mistake as
to period of residence made in a CoC was overcome by evidence. In Romualdez-
Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 300 (1995), the candidate mistakenly put seven (7)
months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one
year. We said that “[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.” The COMELEC ought
to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that
she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 CoC and the 2015 CoC both correctly stated the
pertinent period of residency.
Same; Misrepresentation; Disqualification of Candidates; The candidate’s
misrepresentation in his Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) must not only refer to a material
fact (eligibility and qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent
to mislead, misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate
ineligible.—The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an
intention to hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation.
Petitioner, moreover, has on her side this Court’s pronouncement that: Concededly, a
candidate’s disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily constitute
material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course to, and for
the cancellation of, a CoC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate’s
misrepresentation in his CoC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one’s qualifications to run for
public office. Poe-Llamanzares vs. Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No.
221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March 8, 2016
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions under Rule 64 in relation to Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court with extremely urgent application for an ex parte issuance of
temporary restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction
assailing the following: (1) 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Second Division; (2) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC En Banc, in SPA No. 15-001 (DC); (3) 11 December 2015 Resolution of the
COMELEC First Division; and ( 4) 23 December 2015 Resolution of the COMELEC En
Banc, in SPA No. 15-002 (DC), SPA No. 15-007 (DC) and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) for
having been issued without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction.
The Facts
Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares (petitioner) was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo by a certain Edgardo Militar
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
(Edgardo) on 3 September 1968. Parental care and custody over petitioner was passed
on by Edgardo to his relatives, Emiliano Militar (Emiliano) and his wife. Three days
after, 6 September 1968, Emiliano reported and registered petitioner as a foundling
with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City (OCR-Iloilo). In her Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, the petitioner was given the name "Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar." 1
When petitioner was five (5) years old, celebrity spouses Ronald Allan Kelley Poe
(a.k.a. Fenando Poe, Jr.) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (a.k.a. Susan Roces) filed a petition
for her adoption with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of San Juan City. On 13 May
1974, the trial court granted their petition and ordered that petitioner's name be
changed from "Mary Grace Natividad Contreras Militar" to "Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe." Although necessary notations were made by OCR-Iloilo on petitioner's
foundling certificate reflecting the court decreed adoption, 2 the petitioner's adoptive
mother discovered only sometime in the second half of 2005 that the lawyer who
handled petitioner's adoption failed to secure from the OCR-Iloilo a new Certificate of
Live Birth indicating petitioner's new name and the name of her adoptive
parents. 3 Without delay, petitioner's mother executed an affidavit attesting to the
lawyer's omission which she submitted to the OCR-Iloilo. On 4 May 2006, OCR-Iloilo
issued a new Certificate of Live Birth in the name of Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe.4
Having reached the age of eighteen (18) years in 1986, petitioner registered as a voter
with the local COMELEC Office in San Juan City. On 13 December 1986, she received
her COMELEC Voter's Identification Card for Precinct No. 196 in Greenhills, San Juan,
Metro Manila.5
On 4 April 1988, petitioner applied for and was issued Philippine Passport No.
F9272876 by the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). Subsequently, on 5 April 1993
and 19 May 1998, she renewed her Philippine passport and respectively secured
Philippine Passport Nos. L881511 and DD156616.7
Initially, the petitioner enrolled and pursued a degree in Development Studies at the
University of the Philippines8 but she opted to continue her studies abroad and left for
the United States of America (U.S.) in 1988. Petitioner graduated in 1991 from Boston
College in Chestnuts Hill, Massachusetts where she earned her Bachelor of Arts
degree in Political Studies.9
On 27 July 1991, petitioner married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares
(Llamanzares), a citizen of both the Philippines and the U.S., at Sanctuario de San
Jose Parish in San Juan City. 10 Desirous of being with her husband who was then
based in the U.S., the couple flew back to the U.S. two days after the wedding
ceremony or on 29 July 1991. 11
While in the U.S., the petitioner gave birth to her eldest child Brian Daniel (Brian) on 16
April 1992.12 Her two daughters Hanna MacKenzie (Hanna) and Jesusa Anika (Anika)
were both born in the Philippines on 10 July 1998 and 5 June 2004, respectively. 13
21

14
On 18 October 2001, petitioner became a naturalized American citizen. She obtained
U.S. Passport No. 017037793 on 19 December 2001. 15
On 8 April 2004, the petitioner came back to the Philippines together with Hanna to
support her father's candidacy for President in the May 2004 elections. It was during
this time that she gave birth to her youngest daughter Anika. She returned to the U.S.
with her two daughters on 8 July 2004. 16
After a few months, specifically on 13 December 2004, petitioner rushed back to the
Philippines upon learning of her father's deteriorating medical condition. 17 Her father
slipped into a coma and eventually expired. The petitioner stayed in the country until 3
February 2005 to take care of her father's funeral arrangements as well as to assist in
the settlement of his estate.18
According to the petitioner, the untimely demise of her father was a severe blow to her
entire family. In her earnest desire to be with her grieving mother, the petitioner and her
husband decided to move and reside permanently in the Philippines sometime in the
first quarter of 2005.19 The couple began preparing for their resettlement including
notification of their children's schools that they will be transferring to Philippine schools
for the next semester;20coordination with property movers for the relocation of their
household goods, furniture and cars from the U.S. to the Philippines;21 and inquiry with
Philippine authorities as to the proper procedure to be followed in bringing their pet dog
into the country.22 As early as 2004, the petitioner already quit her job in the U.S. 23
Finally, petitioner came home to the Philippines on 24 May 2005 24 and without delay,
secured a Tax Identification Number from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Her three
(3) children immediately followed25 while her husband was forced to stay in the U.S. to
complete pending projects as well as to arrange the sale of their family home there.26
The petitioner and her children briefly stayed at her mother's place until she and her
husband purchased a condominium unit with a parking slot at One Wilson Place
Condominium in San Juan City in the second half of 2005. 27 The corresponding
Condominium Certificates of Title covering the unit and parking slot were issued by the
Register of Deeds of San Juan City to petitioner and her husband on 20 February
2006.28 Meanwhile, her children of school age began attending Philippine private
schools.
On 14 February 2006, the petitioner made a quick trip to the U.S. to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings. 29 She travelled back
to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.30
In late March 2006, petitioner's husband officially informed the U.S. Postal Service of
the family's change and abandonment of their address in the U.S. 31 The family home
was eventually sold on 27 April 2006.32 Petitioner's husband resigned from his job in
the U.S. in April 2006, arrived in the country on 4 May 2006 and started working for a
major Philippine company in July 2006.33
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
In early 2006, petitioner and her husband acquired a 509-square meter lot in Corinthian
Hills, Quezon City where they built their family home34 and to this day, is where the
couple and their children have been residing. 35 A Transfer Certificate of Title covering
said property was issued in the couple's name by the Register of Deeds of Quezon City
on 1June 2006.
On 7 July 2006, petitioner took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225 or the Citizenship Retention and Re-
acquisition Act of 2003.36 Under the same Act, she filed with the Bureau of Immigration
(BI) a sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for
derivative citizenship on behalf of her three minor children on 10 July 2006. 37 As can
be gathered from its 18 July 2006 Order, the BI acted favorably on petitioner's petitions
and declared that she is deemed to have reacquired her Philippine citizenship while
her children are considered as citizens of the Philippines.38 Consequently, the BI issued
Identification Certificates (ICs) in petitioner's name and in the names of her three (3)
children. 39
Again, petitioner registered as a voter of Barangay Santa Lucia, San Juan City on 31
August 2006.40 She also secured from the DFA a new Philippine Passport bearing the
No. XX4731999.41 This passport was renewed on 18 March 2014 and she was issued
Philippine Passport No. EC0588861 by the DFA.42
On 6 October 2010, President Benigno S. Aquino III appointed petitioner as
Chairperson of the Movie and Television Review and Classification Board
(MTRCB).43 Before assuming her post, petitioner executed an "Affidavit of
Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States of America and Renunciation of
American Citizenship" before a notary public in Pasig City on 20 October 2010, 44 in
satisfaction of the legal requisites stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 9225.45 The following
day, 21 October 2010 petitioner submitted the said affidavit to the BI 46 and took her
oath of office as Chairperson of the MTRCB.47 From then on, petitioner stopped using
her American passport.48
On 12 July 2011, the petitioner executed before the Vice Consul of the U.S. Embassy
in Manila an "Oath/Affirmation of Renunciation of Nationality of the United States."49 On
that day, she accomplished a sworn questionnaire before the U.S. Vice Consul wherein
she stated that she had taken her oath as MTRCB Chairperson on 21 October 2010
with the intent, among others, of relinquishing her American citizenship. 50 In the same
questionnaire, the petitioner stated that she had resided outside of the U.S., specifically
in the Philippines, from 3 September 1968 to 29 July 1991 and from May 2005 to
present.51
On 9 December 2011, the U.S. Vice Consul issued to petitioner a "Certificate of Loss
of Nationality of the United States" effective 21 October 2010. 52
On 2 October 2012, the petitioner filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy
(COC) for Senator for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered "6 years and 6 months"
to the question "Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13,
2013."53 Petitioner obtained the highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator
on 16 May 2013. 54
22

On 19 December 2013, petitioner obtained Philippine Diplomatic Passport No.
DE0004530. 55
On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. 56 In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and
that her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. 57 The petitioner attached to
her COC an "Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship" subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015. 58
Petitioner's filing of her COC for President in the upcoming elections triggered the filing
of several COMELEC cases against her which were the subject of these consolidated
cases.
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. No. 221697
A day after petitioner filed her COC for President, Estrella Elamparo (Elamparo) filed a
petition to deny due course or cancel said COC which was docketed as SPA No. 15-
001 (DC) and raffled to the COMELEC Second Division. 59She is convinced that the
COMELEC has jurisdiction over her petition.60 Essentially, Elamparo's contention is
that petitioner committed material misrepresentation when she stated in her COC that
she is a natural-born Filipino citizen and that she is a resident of the Philippines for at
least ten (10) years and eleven (11) months up to the day before the 9 May 2016
Elections.61
On the issue of citizenship, Elamparo argued that petitioner cannot be considered as a
natural-born Filipino on account of the fact that she was a foundling. 62 Elamparo
claimed that international law does not confer natural-born status and Filipino
citizenship on foundlings.63 Following this line of reasoning, petitioner is not qualified to
apply for reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 for she is not a
natural-born Filipino citizen to begin with.64Even assuming arguendo that petitioner
was a natural-born Filipino, she is deemed to have lost that status when she became
a naturalized American citizen.65 According to Elamparo, natural-born citizenship must
be continuous from birth.66
On the matter of petitioner's residency, Elamparo pointed out that petitioner was bound
by the sworn declaration she made in her 2012 COC for Senator wherein she indicated
that she had resided in the country for only six ( 6) years and six ( 6) months as of May
2013 Elections. Elamparo likewise insisted that assuming arguendo that petitioner is
qualified to regain her natural-born status under R.A. No. 9225, she still fell short of the
ten-year residency requirement of the Constitution as her residence could only be
counted at the earliest from July 2006, when she reacquired Philippine citizenship
under the said Act. Also on the assumption that petitioner is qualified to reacquire lost
Philippine Citizenship, Elamparo is of the belief that she failed to reestablish her
domicile in the Philippines.67
Petitioner seasonably filed her Answer wherein she countered that:
After the parties submitted their respective Memoranda, the petition was deemed
submitted for resolution.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
(1) the COMELEC did not have jurisdiction over Elamparo's petition as it was
actually a petition for quo warranto which could only be filed if Grace Poe wins
in the Presidential elections, and that the Department of Justice (DOJ) has
primary jurisdiction to revoke the BI's July 18, 2006 Order;
(2) the petition failed to state a cause of action because it did not contain
allegations which, if hypothetically admitted, would make false the statement
in her COC that she is a natural-born Filipino citizen nor was there any
allegation that there was a willful or deliberate intent to misrepresent on her
part;
(3) she did not make any material misrepresentation in the COC regarding her
citizenship and residency qualifications for:
a. the 1934 Constitutional Convention deliberations show that
foundlings were considered citizens;
b. foundlings are presumed under international law to have been
born of citizens of the place where they are found;
c. she reacquired her natural-born Philippine citizenship under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225;
d. she executed a sworn renunciation of her American citizenship
prior to the filing of her COC for President in the May 9, 2016
Elections and that the same is in full force and effect and has not
been withdrawn or recanted;
e. the burden was on Elamparo in proving that she did not possess
natural-born status;
f. residence is a matter of evidence and that she reestablished her
domicile in the Philippines as early as May 24, 2005;
g. she could reestablish residence even before she reacquired
natural-born citizenship under R.A. No. 9225;
h. statement regarding the period of residence in her 2012 COC for
Senator was an honest mistake, not binding and should give way to
evidence on her true date of reacquisition of domicile;
i. Elamparo's petition is merely an action to usurp the sovereign right
of the Filipino people to decide a purely political question, that is,
should she serve as the country's next leader.68
23

On 1 December 2015, the COMELEC Second Division promulgated a Resolution
finding that petitioner's COC, filed for the purpose of running for the President of the
Republic of the Philippines in the 9 May 2016 National and Local Elections, contained
material representations which are false. The fallo of the aforesaid Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations, the instant Petition to Deny
Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy is hereby GRANTED. Accordingly,
the Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the May
9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad Sonora
Poe Llamanzares is hereby CANCELLED.69
Motion for Reconsideration of the 1 December 2015 Resolution was filed by petitioner
which the COMELEC En Banc resolved in its 23 December 2015 Resolution by
denying the same.70
Origin of Petition for Certiorari in G.R. Nos. 221698-700
This case stemmed from three (3) separate petitions filed by Francisco S. Tatad
(Tatad), Antonio P. Contreras (Contreras) and Amado D. Valdez (Valdez) against
petitioner before the COMELEC which were consolidated and raffled to its First
Division.
In his petition to disqualify petitioner under Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure,71 docketed as SPA No. 15-002 (DC), Tatad alleged that petitioner lacks the
requisite residency and citizenship to qualify her for the Presidency. 72
Tatad theorized that since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis, persons of unknown parentage, particularly foundlings, cannot be
considered natural-born Filipino citizens since blood relationship is determinative of
natural-born status.73 Tatad invoked the rule of statutory construction that what is not
included is excluded. He averred that the fact that foundlings were not expressly
included in the categories of citizens in the 193 5 Constitution is indicative of the
framers' intent to exclude them.74 Therefore, the burden lies on petitioner to prove that
she is a natural-born citizen.75
Neither can petitioner seek refuge under international conventions or treaties to support
her claim that foundlings have a nationality. 76 According to Tatad, international
conventions and treaties are not self-executory and that local legislations are necessary
in order to give effect to treaty obligations assumed by the Philippines. 77 He also
stressed that there is no standard state practice that automatically confers natural-born
status to foundlings.78
Similar to Elamparo's argument, Tatad claimed that petitioner cannot avail of the option
to reacquire Philippine citizenship under R.A. No. 9225 because it only applies to
former natural-born citizens and petitioner was not as she was a foundling.79
Referring to petitioner's COC for Senator, Tatad concluded that she did not comply with
the ten (10) year residency requirement.80 Tatad opined that petitioner acquired her
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
domicile in Quezon City only from the time she renounced her American citizenship
which was sometime in 2010 or 2011.81 Additionally, Tatad questioned petitioner's lack
of intention to abandon her U.S. domicile as evinced by the fact that her husband stayed
thereat and her frequent trips to the U.S.82
In support of his petition to deny due course or cancel the COC of petitioner, docketed
as SPA No. 15-139 (DC), Valdez alleged that her repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 did
not bestow upon her the status of a natural-born citizen.83 He advanced the view that
former natural-born citizens who are repatriated under the said Act reacquires only their
Philippine citizenship and will not revert to their original status as natural-born citizens.84
He further argued that petitioner's own admission in her COC for Senator that she had
only been a resident of the Philippines for at least six (6) years and six (6) months prior
to the 13 May 2013 Elections operates against her. Valdez rejected petitioner's claim
that she could have validly reestablished her domicile in the Philippines prior to her
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. In effect, his position was that petitioner did not
meet the ten (10) year residency requirement for President.
Unlike the previous COMELEC cases filed against petitioner, Contreras'
petition,85 docketed as SPA No. 15-007 (DC), limited the attack to the residency issue.
He claimed that petitioner's 2015 COC for President should be cancelled on the ground
that she did not possess the ten-year period of residency required for said candidacy
and that she made false entry in her COC when she stated that she is a legal resident
of the Philippines for ten (10) years and eleven (11) months by 9 May 2016.86 Contreras
contended that the reckoning period for computing petitioner's residency in the
Philippines should be from 18 July 2006, the date when her petition to reacquire
Philippine citizenship was approved by the BI.87 He asserted that petitioner's physical
presence in the country before 18 July 2006 could not be valid evidence of reacquisition
of her Philippine domicile since she was then living here as an American citizen and as
such, she was governed by the Philippine immigration laws. 88
In her defense, petitioner raised the following arguments:
First, Tatad's petition should be dismissed outright for failure to state a cause of action.
His petition did not invoke grounds proper for a disqualification case as enumerated
under Sections 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code.89 Instead, Tatad completely
relied on the alleged lack of residency and natural-born status of petitioner which are
not among the recognized grounds for the disqualification of a candidate to an elective
office.90
Second, the petitions filed against her are basically petitions for quo warranto as they
focus on establishing her ineligibility for the Presidency. 91 A petition for quo
warranto falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) and not the COMELEC.92
Third, the burden to prove that she is not a natural-born Filipino citizen is on the
respondents.93 Otherwise stated, she has a presumption in her favor that she is a
natural-born citizen of this country.
24

Fourth, customary international law dictates that foundlings are entitled to a nationality
and are presumed to be citizens of the country where they are found.94 Consequently,
the petitioner is considered as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines.95
Fifth, she claimed that as a natural-born citizen, she has every right to be repatriated
under R.A. No. 9225 or the right to reacquire her natural-born status.96 Moreover, the
official acts of the Philippine Government enjoy the presumption of regularity, to wit: the
issuance of the 18 July 2006 Order of the BI declaring her as natural-born citizen, her
appointment as MTRCB Chair and the issuance of the decree of adoption of San Juan
RTC.97 She believed that all these acts reinforced her position that she is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines.98
Sixth, she maintained that as early as the first quarter of 2005, she started
reestablishing her domicile of choice in the Philippines as demonstrated by her
children's resettlement and schooling in the country, purchase of a condominium unit
in San Juan City and the construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills.99
Seventh, she insisted that she could legally reestablish her domicile of choice in the
Philippines even before she renounced her American citizenship as long as the three
determinants for a change of domicile are complied with. 100She reasoned out that there
was no requirement that renunciation of foreign citizenship is a prerequisite for the
acquisition of a new domicile of choice.101
Eighth, she reiterated that the period appearing in the residency portion of her COC for
Senator was a mistake made in good faith.102
In a Resolution103 promulgated on 11 December 2015, the COMELEC First Division
ruled that petitioner is not a natural-born citizen, that she failed to complete the ten (10)
year residency requirement, and that she committed material misrepresentation in her
COC when she declared therein that she has been a resident of the Philippines for a
period of ten (10) years and eleven (11) months as of the day of the elections on 9 May
2016. The COMELEC First Division concluded that she is not qualified for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines. The dispositive portion of said
Resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it
hereby RESOLVES, to GRANT the Petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy
of MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective
position of President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May
2016 Synchronized Local and National Elections.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration seeking a reversal of the COMELEC First
Division's Resolution. On 23 December 2015, the COMELEC En Banc issued a
Resolution denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
Alarmed by the adverse rulings of the COMELEC, petitioner instituted the present
petitions for certiorari with urgent prayer for the issuance of an ex parte temporary
restraining order/status quo ante order and/or writ of preliminary injunction. On 28
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
December 2015, temporary restraining orders were issued by the Court enjoining the
COMELEC and its representatives from implementing the assailed COMELEC
Resolutions until further orders from the Court. The Court also ordered the
consolidation of the two petitions filed by petitioner in its Resolution of 12 January 2016.
Thereafter, oral arguments were held in these cases.
The Court GRANTS the petition of Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares and to
ANNUL and SET ASIDE the:
1. Resolution dated 1 December 2015 rendered through its Second Division,
in SPA No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary
Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares.
2. Resolution dated 11 December 2015, rendered through its First Division, in
the consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad,
petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares,
respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC) entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner,
vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA
No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez, petitioner, v. Mary Grace
Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent.
3. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,
upholding the 1 December 2015 Resolution of the Second Division.
4. Resolution dated 23 December 2015 of the Commission En Banc,
upholding the 11 December 2015 Resolution of the First Division.
The procedure and the conclusions from which the questioned Resolutions emanated
are tainted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The
petitioner is a QUALIFIED CANDIDATE for President in the 9 May 2016 National
Elections.
The issue before the COMELEC is whether or not the COC of petitioner should be
denied due course or cancelled "on the exclusive ground" that she made in the
certificate a false material representation. The exclusivity of the ground should hedge
in the discretion of the COMELEC and restrain it from going into the issue of the
qualifications of the candidate for the position, if, as in this case, such issue is yet
undecided or undetermined by the proper authority. The COMELEC cannot itself, in the
same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack thereof of the candidate.
We rely, first of all, on the Constitution of our Republic, particularly its provisions in
Article IX, C, Section 2:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
25

(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of
an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating to the
elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial, and city
officials, and appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving
elective barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the Commission on election contests
involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be final, executory, and
not appealable.
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting
elections, including determination of the number and location of polling places,
appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of voters.
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law enforcement agencies
and instrumentalities of the Government, including the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, for the exclusive purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties, organizations, or
coalitions which, in addition to other requirements, must present their platform
or program of government; and accredit citizens' arms of the Commission on
Elections. Religious denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those
which seek to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or
refuse to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported by
any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their agencies to
political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates related to elections
constitute interference in national affairs, and, when accepted, shall be an
additional ground for the cancellation of their registration with the Commission,
in addition to other penalties that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions in court for
inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute
cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting
election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize election
spending, including limitation of places where propaganda materials shall be
posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of election frauds, offenses,
malpractices, and nuisance candidacies.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or employee it has
deputized, or the imposition of any other disciplinary action, for violation or
disregard of, or disobedience to its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive report on the
conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, or recall.
Not any one of the enumerated powers approximate the exactitude of the provisions of
Article VI, Section 17 of the same basic law stating that:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral
Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices
of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining
six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the
party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral
Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
or of the last paragraph of Article VII, Section 4 which provides that:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-
President, and may promulgate its rules for the purpose.
The tribunals which have jurisdiction over the question of the qualifications of the
President, the Vice-President, Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives was made clear by the Constitution. There is no such provision for
candidates for these positions.
Can the COMELEC be such judge?
The opinion of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on
Elections,104 which was affirmatively cited in the En Banc decision in Fermin v.
COMELEC105 is our guide. The citation in Fermin reads:
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility
of candidates, the COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide
in Rule 25 § 1, the following:
Grounds for disqualification. - Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing
law or who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification
may be disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
26

The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be
supplied by a mere rule. Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action
which is a substantive matter which the COMELEC, in the exercise of its rule-making
power under Art. IX, A, §6 of the Constitution, cannot do it. It is noteworthy that the
Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving
the right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age,
residence and citizenship of voters. [Art. IX, C, §2(3)]
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into
grounds for disqualification is contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only
in their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings for "disqualification"
different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification" proceedings, as
already stated, are based on grounds specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election
Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an
individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the
start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and
the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent
from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does
not imply that he is not disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a
candidate for a public office and vice versa. We have this sort of dichotomy in our
Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications prescribed in §2
of the Law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of [the] disqualifications
provided in §4.
Before we get derailed by the distinction as to grounds and the consequences of the
respective proceedings, the importance of the opinion is in its statement that "the lack
of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by
a mere rule". Justice Mendoza lectured in Romualdez-Marcos that:
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for
determining before election the qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no
necessity for determining his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual
should be disqualified as a candidate for acts constituting election offenses (e.g., vote
buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial question which
should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification
is being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are
established, a candidate will not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his
favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he has been voted for and he has
won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
Second is the fact that the determination of a candidates' eligibility, e.g., his citizenship
or, as in this case, his domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the
beginning of the term of the office. This is amply demonstrated in the companion case
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
(G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the determination of
Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May
8, 1995. This is contrary to the summary character proceedings relating to certificates
of candidacy. That is why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a
ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its officers. The law is satisfied if candidates state
in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the position which they seek
to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election and
only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false
representations made in certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections
for President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives.
(R.A. No. 7166, § 15) The purpose is to preserve the prerogatives of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole judges" under the
Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.106
To be sure, the authoritativeness of the Romualdez pronouncements as reiterated
in Fermin, led to the amendment through COMELEC Resolution No. 9523, on 25
September 2012 of its Rule 25. This, the 15 February1993 version of Rule 25, which
states that:
Grounds for disqualification. -Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications
of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits
any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from
continuing as a candidate.107
was in the 2012 rendition, drastically changed to:
Grounds. - Any candidate who, in action or protest in which he is a party, is declared
by final decision of a competent court, guilty of, or found by the Commission to be
suffering from any disqualification provided by law or the Constitution.
A Petition to Disqualify a Candidate invoking grounds for a Petition to Deny to or Cancel
a Certificate of Candidacy or Petition to Declare a Candidate as a Nuisance Candidate,
or a combination thereof, shall be summarily dismissed.
Clearly, the amendment done in 2012 is an acceptance of the reality of absence of an
authorized proceeding for determining before election the qualifications of candidate.
Such that, as presently required, to disqualify a candidate there must be a declaration
by a final judgment of a competent court that the candidate sought to be disqualified "is
guilty of or found by the Commission to be suffering from any disqualification provided
by law or the Constitution."
Insofar as the qualification of a candidate is concerned, Rule 25 and Rule 23 are
flipsides of one to the other. Both do not allow, are not authorizations, are not vestment
of jurisdiction, for the COMELEC to determine the qualification of a candidate. The facts
of qualification must beforehand be established in a prior proceeding before an
27

authority properly vested with jurisdiction. The prior determination of qualification may
be by statute, by executive order or by a judgment of a competent court or tribunal.
If a candidate cannot be disqualified without a prior finding that he or she is suffering
from a disqualification "provided by law or the Constitution," neither can the certificate
of candidacy be cancelled or denied due course on grounds of false representations
regarding his or her qualifications, without a prior authoritative finding that he or she is
not qualified, such prior authority being the necessary measure by which the falsity of
the representation can be found. The only exception that can be conceded are self-
evident facts of unquestioned or unquestionable veracity and judicial confessions. Such
are, anyway, bases equivalent to prior decisions against which the falsity of
representation can be determined.
The need for a predicate finding or final pronouncement in a proceeding under Rule 23
that deals with, as in this case, alleged false representations regarding the candidate's
citizenship and residence, forced the COMELEC to rule essentially that since
foundlings108 are not mentioned in the enumeration of citizens under the 1935
Constitution,109 they then cannot be citizens. As the COMELEC stated in oral
arguments, when petitioner admitted that she is a foundling, she said it all. This borders
on bigotry. Oddly, in an effort at tolerance, the COMELEC, after saying that it cannot
rule that herein petitioner possesses blood relationship with a Filipino citizen when "it
is certain that such relationship is indemonstrable," proceeded to say that "she now has
the burden to present evidence to prove her natural filiation with a Filipino parent."
The fact is that petitioner's blood relationship with a Filipino citizen is
DEMONSTRABLE.
At the outset, it must be noted that presumptions regarding paternity is neither unknown
nor unaccepted in Philippine Law. The Family Code of the Philippines has a whole
chapter on Paternity and Filiation.110 That said, there is more than sufficient evider1ce
that petitioner has Filipino parents and is therefore a natural-born Filipino.
Parenthetically, the burden of proof was on private respondents to show that petitioner
is not a Filipino citizen. The private respondents should have shown that both of
petitioner's parents were aliens. Her admission that she is a foundling did not shift the
burden to her because such status did not exclude the possibility that her parents were
Filipinos, especially as in this case where there is a high probability, if not certainty, that
her parents are Filipinos.
The factual issue is not who the parents of petitioner are, as their identities are
unknown, but whether such parents are Filipinos. Under Section 4, Rule 128:
Sect. 4. Relevancy, collateral matters - Evidence must have such a relation to the fact
in issue as to induce belief in its existence or no-existence. Evidence on collateral
matters shall not be allowed, except when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish
the probability of improbability of the fact in issue.
The Solicitor General offered official statistics from the Philippine Statistics Authority
(PSA)111 that from 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
was 15,986 while the total number of Filipinos born in the country was 10,558,278. The
statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines in that decade is natural-born
Filipino was 99.83%. For her part, petitioner presented census statistics for Iloilo
Province for 1960 and 1970, also from the PSA. In 1960, there were 962,532 Filipinos
and 4,734 foreigners in the province; 99.62% of the population were Filipinos. In 1970,
the figures were 1,162,669 Filipinos and 5,304 foreigners, or 99.55%. Also presented
were figures for the child producing ages (15-49). In 1960, there were 230,528 female
Filipinos as against 730 female foreigners or 99.68%. In the same year, there were
210,349 Filipino males and 886 male aliens, or 99.58%. In 1970, there were 270,299
Filipino females versus 1, 190 female aliens, or 99.56%. That same year, there were
245,740 Filipino males as against only 1,165 male aliens or 99.53%. COMELEC did
not dispute these figures. Notably, Commissioner Arthur Lim admitted, during the oral
arguments, that at the time petitioner was found in 1968, the majority of the population
in Iloilo was Filipino.112
Other circumstantial evidence of the nationality of petitioner's parents are the fact that
she was abandoned as an infant in a Roman Catholic Church in Iloilo City.1âwphi1 She
also has typical Filipino features: height, flat nasal bridge, straight black hair, almond
shaped eyes and an oval face.
There is a disputable presumption that things have happened according to the ordinary
course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.113 All of the foregoing evidence, that a
person with typical Filipino features is abandoned in Catholic Church in a municipality
where the population of the Philippines is overwhelmingly Filipinos such that there
would be more than a 99% chance that a child born in the province would be a Filipino,
would indicate more than ample probability if not statistical certainty, that petitioner's
parents are Filipinos. That probability and the evidence on which it is based are
admissible under Rule 128, Section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence.
To assume otherwise is to accept the absurd, if not the virtually impossible, as the
norm. In the words of the Solicitor General:
Second. It is contrary to common sense because foreigners do not come to the
Philippines so they can get pregnant and leave their newborn babies behind. We do
not face a situation where the probability is such that every foundling would have a 50%
chance of being a Filipino and a 50% chance of being a foreigner. We need to frame
our questions properly. What are the chances that the parents of anyone born in the
Philippines would be foreigners? Almost zero. What are the chances that the parents
of anyone born in the Philippines would be Filipinos? 99.9%.
According to the Philippine Statistics Authority, from 2010 to 2014, on a yearly average,
there were 1,766,046 children born in the Philippines to Filipino parents, as opposed to
1,301 children in the Philippines of foreign parents. Thus, for that sample period, the
ratio of non-Filipino children to natural born Filipino children is 1:1357. This means that
the statistical probability that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born
Filipino is 99.93%.
From 1965 to 1975, the total number of foreigners born in the Philippines is 15,986
while the total number of Filipinos born in the Philippines is 15,558,278. For this period,
28
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
the ratio of non-Filipino children is 1:661. This means that the statistical probability that President:
any child born in the Philippines on that decade would be a natural born Filipino is [We] would like to request a clarification from the proponent of the amendment. The
99.83%. gentleman refers to natural children or to any kind of illegitimate children?

We can invite statisticians and social anthropologists to crunch the numbers for us, but
I am confident that the statistical probability that a child born in the Philippines would
be a natural born Filipino will not be affected by whether or not the parents are known.
If at all, the likelihood that a foundling would have a Filipino parent might even be higher
than 99.9%. Filipinos abandon their children out of poverty or perhaps, shame. We do
not imagine foreigners abandoning their children here in the Philippines thinking those
infants would have better economic opportunities or believing that this country is a
tropical paradise suitable for raising abandoned children. I certainly doubt whether a
foreign couple has ever considered their child excess baggage that is best left behind.
To deny full Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless just because
there may be a theoretical chance that one among the thousands of these foundlings
might be the child of not just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn't make any sense. Given the statistical certainty -
99.9% - that any child born in the Philippines would be a natural born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their birthright. There is no
reason why this Honorable Court should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice
the fundamental political rights of an entire class of human beings. Your Honor,
constitutional interpretation and the use of common sense are not separate disciplines.
Sr. Rafols:
To all kinds of illegitimate children. It also includes natural children of unknown
parentage, natural or illegitimate children of unknown parents.
Sr. Montinola:
For clarification. The gentleman said "of unknown parents." Current codes consider
them Filipino, that is, I refer to the Spanish Code wherein all children of unknown
parentage born in Spanish territory are considered Spaniards, because the
presumption is that a child of unknown parentage is the son of a Spaniard. This may
be applied in the Philippines in that a child of unknown parentage born in the Philippines
is deemed to be Filipino, and there is no need ...
Sr. Rafols:
There is a need, because we are relating the conditions that are [required] to be Filipino.
Sr. Montinola:
But that is the interpretation of the law, therefore, there is no [more] need for
amendment.

As a matter of law, foundlings are as a class, natural-born citizens. While the 1935 Sr. Rafols:
Constitution's enumeration is silent as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language The amendment should read thus:
which would definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and ambiguity in "Natural or illegitimate of a foreign father and a Filipino mother recognized by one, or
the enumeration with respect to foundlings, there is a need to examine the intent of the the children of unknown parentage."
framers. In Nitafan v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,114 this Court held that:
Sr. Briones:
The ascertainment of that intent is but in keeping with the fundamental The amendment [should] mean children born in the Philippines of unknown parentage.
principle of constitutional construction that the intent of the framers of the
organic law and of the people adopting it should be given effect. The primary Sr. Rafols:
task in constitutional construction is to ascertain and thereafter assure the The son of a Filipina to a Foreigner, although this [person] does not recognize the child,
realization of the purpose of the framers and of the people in the adoption of is not unknown.
the Constitution. It may also be safely assumed that the people in ratifying the
Constitution were guided mainly by the explanation offered by the framers.115 President:
Does the gentleman accept the amendment or not?
As pointed out by petitioner as well as the Solicitor General, the deliberations of the
1934 Constitutional Convention show that the framers intended foundlings to be Sr. Rafols:
covered by the enumeration. The following exchange is recorded: I do not accept the amendment because the amendment would exclude the children of
a Filipina with a foreigner who does not recognize the child. Their parentage is not
Sr. Rafols: For an amendment. I propose that after subsection 2, the following is unknown and I think those of overseas Filipino mother and father [whom the latter] does
inserted: "The natural children of a foreign father and a Filipino mother not recognized not recognize, should also be considered as Filipinos.
by the father.
President:
xxxx The question in order is the amendment to the amendment from the Gentleman from
Cebu, Mr. Briones.

29

Sr. Busion:
Mr. President, don't you think it would be better to leave this matter in the hands of the
Legislature?
Sr. Roxas:
Mr. President, my humble opinion is that these cases are few and far in between, that
the constitution need [not] refer to them. By international law the principle that children
or people born in a country of unknown parents are citizens in this nation is recognized,
and it is not necessary to include a provision on the subject exhaustively. 116
Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not because there was any
objection to the notion that persons of "unknown parentage" are not citizens but only
because their number was not enough to merit specific mention. Such was the
account,117 cited by petitioner, of delegate and constitution law author Jose Aruego who
said:
During the debates on this provision, Delegate Rafols presented an
amendment to include as Filipino citizens the illegitimate children with a
foreign father of a mother who was a citizen of the Philippines, and also
foundlings; but this amendment was defeated primarily because the
Convention believed that the cases, being too few to warrant the inclusion of
a provision in the Constitution to apply to them, should be governed by
statutory legislation. Moreover, it was believed that the rules of international
law were already clear to the effect that illegitimate children followed the
citizenship of the mother, and that foundlings followed the nationality of the
place where they were found, thereby making unnecessary the inclusion in
the Constitution of the proposed amendment.
This explanation was likewise the position of the Solicitor General during the 16
February 2016 Oral Arguments:
We all know that the Rafols proposal was rejected. But note that what was declined
was the proposal for a textual and explicit recognition of foundlings as Filipinos. And
so, the way to explain the constitutional silence is by saying that it was the view of
Montinola and Roxas which prevailed that there is no more need to expressly declare
foundlings as Filipinos.
Obviously, it doesn't matter whether Montinola's or Roxas' views were legally correct.
Framers of a constitution can constitutionalize rules based on assumptions that are
imperfect or even wrong. They can even overturn existing rules. This is basic. What
matters here is that Montinola and Roxas were able to convince their colleagues in the
convention that there is no more need to expressly declare foundlings as Filipinos
because they are already impliedly so recognized.
In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in terms of linguistic
efficiency and the avoidance of redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize
foundlings, as a class, as Filipinos under Art. IV, Section 1 (3) of the 1935 Constitution.
This inclusive policy is carried over into the 1973 and 1987 Constitution. It is appropriate
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
to invoke a famous scholar as he was paraphrased by Chief Justice Fernando: the
constitution is not silently silent, it is silently vocal. 118
The Solicitor General makes the further point that the framers "worked to create a just
and humane society," that "they were reasonable patriots and that it would be unfair to
impute upon them a discriminatory intent against foundlings." He exhorts that, given
the grave implications of the argument that foundlings are not natural-born Filipinos,
the Court must search the records of the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions "for an
express intention to deny foundlings the status of Filipinos. The burden is on those who
wish to use the constitution to discriminate against foundlings to show that the
constitution really intended to take this path to the dark side and inflict this across the
board marginalization."
We find no such intent or language permitting discrimination against foundlings. On the
contrary, all three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to equal protection of the
laws. All exhort the State to render social justice. Of special consideration are several
provisions in the present charter: Article II, Section 11 which provides that the "State
values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect for human rights,"
Article XIII, Section 1 which mandates Congress to "give highest priority to the
enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all the people to human
dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities x x x" and Article XV, Section
3 which requires the State to defend the "right of children to assistance, including proper
care and nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty,
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development." Certainly, these
provisions contradict an intent to discriminate against foundlings on account of their
unfortunate status.
Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that foundlings are Filipinos.
These laws do not provide that adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather,
the adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. The most basic of such
laws is Article 15 of the Civil Code which provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights,
duties, status, conditions, legal capacity of persons are binding on citizens of the
Philippines even though living abroad." Adoption deals with status, and a Philippine
adoption court will have jurisdiction only if the adoptee is a Filipino. In Ellis and Ellis v.
Republic,119 a child left by an unidentified mother was sought to be adopted by aliens.
This Court said:
In this connection, it should be noted that this is a proceedings in rem, which no court
may entertain unless it has jurisdiction, not only over the subject matter of the case and
over the parties, but also over the res, which is the personal status of Baby Rose as
well as that of petitioners herein. Our Civil Code (Art. 15) adheres to the theory that
jurisdiction over the status of a natural person is determined by the latter's nationality.
Pursuant to this theory, we have jurisdiction over the status of Baby Rose, she being a
citizen of the Philippines, but not over the status of the petitioners, who are
foreigners.120 (Underlining supplied)
Recent legislation is more direct. R.A. No. 8043 entitled "An Act Establishing the Rules
to Govern the Inter-Country Adoption of Filipino Children and For Other Purposes"
(otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995"), R.A. No. 8552, entitled
30

"An Act Establishing the Rules and Policies on the Adoption of Filipino Children and
For Other Purposes" (otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of 1998) and this
Court's A.M. No. 02-6-02-SC or the "Rule on Adoption," all expressly refer to "Filipino
children" and include foundlings as among Filipino children who may be adopted.
It has been argued that the process to determine that the child is a foundling leading to
the issuance of a foundling certificate under these laws and the issuance of said
certificate are acts to acquire or perfect Philippine citizenship which make the foundling
a naturalized Filipino at best. This is erroneous. Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-
born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." In the first place,
"having to perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by the citizen.
In this instance, the determination of foundling status is done not by the child but by the
authorities.121 Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child. Lastly, the process is
certainly not analogous to naturalization proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship,
or the election of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a Filipino mother
under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act to perfect it.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
principles which underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights. 129
Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("UDHR") has been interpreted by this Court as
part of the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the
State.130 Article 15 thereof states:
1. Everyone has the right to a nationality.
2. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the right to
change his nationality.
The Philippines has also ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child
(UNCRC). Article 7 of the UNCRC imposes the following obligations on our country:
Article 7

1. The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from
In this instance, such issue is moot because there is no dispute that petitioner is a birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and as far as possible, the right to
foundling, as evidenced by a Foundling Certificate issued in her favor. 122 The Decree know and be cared for by his or her parents.
of Adoption issued on 13 May 1974, which approved petitioner's adoption by Jesusa
Sonora Poe and Ronald Allan Kelley Poe, expressly refers to Emiliano and his wife,
Rosario Militar, as her "foundling parents," hence effectively affirming petitioner's status 2. States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in accordance with
as a foundling.123 their national law and their obligations under the relevant international instruments in
this field, in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.
Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law. Under the 1987 Constitution,
an international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by In 1986, the country also ratified the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an Rights (ICCPR). Article 24 thereof provide for the right of every child "to acquire a
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional nationality:"
mechanism such as local legislation.124 On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution, Article 24
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations.
Generally accepted principles of international law include international custom as
1. Every child shall have, without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language,
evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and general principles of law
religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right, to such measures of
recognized by civilized nations.125 International customary rules are accepted as
protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family, society
binding as a result from the combination of two elements: the established, widespread,
and the State.
and consistent practice on the part of States; and a psychological element known as
the opinionjuris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in the latter
element is a belief that the practice in question is rendered obligatory by the existence 2. Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have a name.
of a rule of law requiring it.126 "General principles of law recognized by civilized nations"
are principles "established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic, based on 3. Every child has the right to acquire a nationality.
principles which are "basic to legal systems generally," 127 such as "general principles
of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general principle
The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
against discrimination" which is embodied in the "Universal Declaration of Human
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the
present naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as amended, and R.A. No.
Convention Against Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111) Concerning
9139, both of which require the applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.
Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation." 128 These are the same core

31

The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the Philippines, are
generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the 1930
Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality Laws
under which a foundling is presumed to have the "nationality of the country of birth," to
wit:
Article 14
A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the country of
birth. If the child's parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by the
rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known.
A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory
of the State in which it was found. (Underlining supplied)
The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the country
where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness:
Article 2
A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting State shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be considered to have been born within the territory of parents possessing
the nationality of that State.
That the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention nor to the 1961
Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness does not mean that their principles are
not binding. While the Philippines is not a party to the 1930 Hague Convention, it is a
signatory to the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 15(1)
ofwhich131effectively affirms Article 14 of the 1930 Hague Convention. Article 2 of the
1961 "United Nations Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness" merely "gives
effect" to Article 15(1) of the UDHR.132 In Razon v. Tagitis, 133 this Court noted that the
Philippines had not signed or ratified the "International Convention for the Protection of
All Persons from Enforced Disappearance." Yet, we ruled that the proscription against
enforced disappearances in the said convention was nonetheless binding as a
"generally accepted principle of international law." Razon v. Tagitis is likewise notable
for declaring the ban as a generally accepted principle of international law although the
convention had been ratified by only sixteen states and had not even come into force
and which needed the ratification of a minimum of twenty states. Additionally, as
petitioner points out, the Court was content with the practice of international and
regional state organs, regional state practice in Latin America, and State Practice in the
United States.
Another case where the number of ratifying countries was not determinative is Mijares
v. Ranada, 134 where only four countries had "either ratified or acceded to"135 the 1966
"Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters" when the case was decided in 2005. The Court also pointed out
that that nine member countries of the European Common Market had acceded to the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Judgments Convention. The Court also cited U.S. laws and jurisprudence on
recognition of foreign judgments. In all, only the practices of fourteen countries were
considered and yet, there was pronouncement that recognition of foreign judgments
was widespread practice.
Our approach in Razon and Mijares effectively takes into account the fact that
"generally accepted principles of international law" are based not only on international
custom, but also on "general principles of law recognized by civilized nations," as the
phrase is understood in Article 38.1 paragraph (c) of the ICJ Statute. Justice, fairness,
equity and the policy against discrimination, which are fundamental principles
underlying the Bill of Rights and which are "basic to legal systems generally," 136 support
the notion that the right against enforced disappearances and the recognition of foreign
judgments, were correctly considered as "generally accepted principles of international
law" under the incorporation clause.
Petitioner's evidence137 shows that at least sixty countries in Asia, North and South
America, and Europe have passed legislation recognizing foundlings as its citizen.
Forty-two (42) of those countries follow the jus sanguinis regime. Of the sixty, only
thirty-three (33) are parties to the 1961 Convention on Statelessness; twenty-six (26)
are not signatories to the Convention. Also, the Chief Justice, at the 2 February 2016
Oral Arguments pointed out that in 166 out of 189 countries surveyed (or 87.83%),
foundlings are recognized as citizens. These circumstances, including the practice
of jus sanguinis countries, show that it is a generally accepted principle of international
law to presume foundlings as having been born of nationals of the country in which the
foundling is found.
Current legislation reveals the adherence of the Philippines to this generally accepted
principle of international law. In particular, R.A. No. 8552, R.A. No. 8042 and this
Court's Rules on Adoption, expressly refer to "Filipino children." In all of them,
foundlings are among the Filipino children who could be adopted. Likewise, it has been
pointed that the DFA issues passports to foundlings. Passports are by law, issued only
to citizens. This shows that even the executive department, acting through the DFA,
considers foundlings as Philippine citizens.
Adopting these legal principles from the 1930 Hague Convention and the 1961
Convention on Statelessness is rational and reasonable and consistent with the jus
sanguinis regime in our Constitution. The presumption of natural-born citizenship of
foundlings stems from the presumption that their parents are nationals of the
Philippines. As the empirical data provided by the PSA show, that presumption is at
more than 99% and is a virtual certainty.
In sum, all of the international law conventions and instruments on the matter of
nationality of foundlings were designed to address the plight of a defenseless class
which suffers from a misfortune not of their own making. We cannot be restrictive as to
their application if we are a country which calls itself civilized and a member of the
community of nations. The Solicitor General's warning in his opening statement is
relevant:
32

.... the total effect of those documents is to signify to this Honorable Court that those
treaties and conventions were drafted because the world community is concerned that
the situation of foundlings renders them legally invisible. It would be tragically ironic if
this Honorable Court ended up using the international instruments which seek to protect
and uplift foundlings a tool to deny them political status or to accord them second-class
citizenship.138
The COMELEC also ruled139 that petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under the
provisions of R.A. No. 9225 did not result in the reacquisition of natural-born citizenship.
The COMELEC reasoned that since the applicant must perform an act, what is
reacquired is not "natural-born" citizenship but only plain "Philippine citizenship."
The COMELEC's rule arrogantly disregards consistent jurisprudence on the matter of
repatriation statutes in general and of R.A. No. 9225 in particular.
140
In the seminal case of Bengson Ill v. HRET, repatriation was explained as follows:
Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality. This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a
naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen
before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a
natural-born Filipino.
R.A. No. 9225 is a repatriation statute and has been described as such in several
cases. They include Sobejana-Condon v. COMELEC141 where we described it as an
"abbreviated repatriation process that restores one's Filipino citizenship x x x." Also
included is Parreno v. Commission on Audit,142 which cited Tabasa v. Court of
Appeals,143where we said that "[t]he repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to
recover his natural-born citizenship. Parreno v. Commission on Audit144 is categorical
that "if petitioner reacquires his Filipino citizenship (under R.A. No. 9225), he will
... recover his natural-born citizenship."
The COMELEC construed the phrase "from birth" in the definition of natural citizens as
implying "that natural-born citizenship must begin at birth and remain uninterrupted and
continuous from birth." R.A. No. 9225 was obviously passed in line with Congress' sole
prerogative to determine how citizenship may be lost or reacquired. Congress saw it fit
to decree that natural-born citizenship may be reacquired even if it had been once lost.
It is not for the COMELEC to disagree with the Congress' determination.
More importantly, COMELEC's position that natural-born status must be continuous
was already rejected in Bengson III v. HRET145 where the phrase "from birth" was
clarified to mean at the time of birth: "A person who at the time of his birth, is a citizen
of a particular country, is a natural-born citizen thereof." Neither is "repatriation" an act
to "acquire or perfect" one's citizenship. In Bengson III v. HRET, this Court pointed out
that there are only two types of citizens under the 1987 Constitution: natural-born
citizen and naturalized, and that there is no third category for repatriated citizens:
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under the present Constitution
that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born and (2) those
who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized Filipino,
ie., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration
of a separate category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship,
subsequently reacquire it. The reason therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would
either be natural-born or naturalized depending on the reasons for the loss of their
citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the reacquisition thereof.
As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization proceedings
in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such, he
possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.146
The COMELEC cannot reverse a judicial precedent. That is reserved to this Court. And
while we may always revisit a doctrine, a new rule reversing standing doctrine cannot
be retroactively applied. In Morales v. Court of Appeals and Jejomar Erwin S. Binay,
Jr.,147 where we decreed reversed the condonation doctrine, we cautioned that it
"should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws of the Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the legal
system of the Philippines." This Court also said that "while the future may ultimately
uncover a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as good law prior
to its abandonment. Consequently, the people's reliance thereupon should be
respected."148
Lastly, it was repeatedly pointed out during the oral arguments that petitioner committed
a falsehood when she put in the spaces for "born to" in her application for repatriation
under R.A. No. 9225 the names of her adoptive parents, and this misled the BI to
presume that she was a natural-born Filipino. It has been contended that the data
required were the names of her biological parents which are precisely unknown.
This position disregards one important fact - petitioner was legally adopted. One of the
effects of adoption is "to sever all legal ties between the biological parents and the
adoptee, except when the biological parent is the spouse of the adoptee." 149 Under
R.A. No. 8552, petitioner was also entitled to an amended birth certificate "attesting to
the fact that the adoptee is the child of the adopter(s)" and which certificate "shall not
bear any notation that it is an amended issue."150 That law also requires that "[a]ll
records, books, and papers relating to the adoption cases in the files of the court, the
Department [of Social Welfare and Development], or any other agency or institution
participating in the adoption proceedings shall be kept strictly confidential."151 The law
therefore allows petitioner to state that her adoptive parents were her birth parents as
that was what would be stated in her birth certificate anyway. And given the policy of
strict confidentiality of adoption records, petitioner was not obligated to disclose that
she was an adoptee.
Clearly, to avoid a direct ruling on the qualifications of petitioner, which it cannot make
in the same case for cancellation of COC, it resorted to opinionatedness which is,
moreover, erroneous. The whole process undertaken by COMELEC is wrapped in
grave abuse of discretion.
33

On Residence
The tainted process was repeated in disposing of the issue of whether or not petitioner
committed false material representation when she stated in her COC that she has
before and until 9 May 2016 been a resident of the Philippines for ten (10) years and
eleven (11) months.
Petitioner's claim that she will have been a resident for ten (10) years and eleven (11)
months on the day before the 2016 elections, is true.
The Constitution requires presidential candidates to have ten (10) years' residence in
the Philippines before the day of the elections. Since the forthcoming elections will be
held on 9 May 2016, petitioner must have been a resident of the Philippines prior to 9
May 2016 for ten (10) years. In answer to the requested information of "Period of
Residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09, 2016," she put in "10 years
11 months" which according to her pleadings in these cases corresponds to a beginning
date of 25 May 2005 when she returned for good from the U.S.
When petitioner immigrated to the U.S. in 1991, she lost her original domicile, which is
the Philippines. There are three requisites to acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or
bodily presence in a new locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile.152 To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention
of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite
acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus
manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the
domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence
must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be
actual.153
Petitioner presented voluminous evidence showing that she and her family abandoned
their U.S. domicile and relocated to the Philippines for good. These evidence include
petitioner's former U.S. passport showing her arrival on 24 May 2005 and her return to
the Philippines every time she travelled abroad; e-mail correspondences starting in
March 2005 to September 2006 with a freight company to arrange for the shipment of
their household items weighing about 28,000 pounds to the Philippines; e-mail with the
Philippine Bureau of Animal Industry inquiring how to ship their dog to the Philippines;
school records of her children showing enrollment in Philippine schools starting June
2005 and for succeeding years; tax identification card for petitioner issued on July 2005;
titles for condominium and parking slot issued in February 2006 and their
corresponding tax declarations issued in April 2006; receipts dated 23 February 2005
from the Salvation Army in the U.S. acknowledging donation of items from petitioner's
family; March 2006 e-mail to the U.S. Postal Service confirming request for change of
address; final statement from the First American Title Insurance Company showing sale
of their U.S. home on 27 April 2006; 12 July 2011 filled-up questionnaire submitted to
the U.S. Embassy where petitioner indicated that she had been a Philippine resident
since May 2005; affidavit from Jesusa Sonora Poe (attesting to the return of petitioner
on 24 May 2005 and that she and her family stayed with affiant until the condominium
was purchased); and Affidavit from petitioner's husband (confirming that the spouses
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
jointly decided to relocate to the Philippines in 2005 and that he stayed behind in the
U.S. only to finish some work and to sell the family home).
The foregoing evidence were undisputed and the facts were even listed by the
COMELEC, particularly in its Resolution in the Tatad, Contreras and Valdez cases.
However, the COMELEC refused to consider that petitioner's domicile had been timely
changed as of 24 May 2005. At the oral arguments, COMELEC Commissioner Arthur
Lim conceded the presence of the first two requisites, namely, physical presence
and animus manendi, but maintained there was no animus non-revertendi.154 The
COMELEC disregarded the import of all the evidence presented by petitioner on the
basis of the position that the earliest date that petitioner could have started residence
in the Philippines was in July 2006 when her application under R.A. No. 9225 was
approved by the BI. In this regard, COMELEC relied on Coquilla v.
COMELEC,155 Japzon v. COMELEC156 and Caballero v. COMELEC. 157 During the
oral arguments, the private respondents also added Reyes v.
COMELEC.158 Respondents contend that these cases decree that the stay of an alien
former Filipino cannot be counted until he/she obtains a permanent resident visa or
reacquires Philippine citizenship, a visa-free entry under a balikbayan stamp being
insufficient. Since petitioner was still an American (without any resident visa) until her
reacquisition of citizenship under R.A. No. 9225, her stay from 24 May 2005 to 7 July
2006 cannot be counted.
But as the petitioner pointed out, the facts in these four cases are very different from
her situation. In Coquilla v. COMELEC,159 the only evidence presented was a
community tax certificate secured by the candidate and his declaration that he would
be running in the elections. Japzon v. COMELEC160 did not involve a candidate who
wanted to count residence prior to his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. With the
Court decreeing that residence is distinct from citizenship, the issue there was whether
the candidate's acts after reacquisition sufficed to establish residence. In Caballero v.
COMELEC, 161 the candidate admitted that his place of work was abroad and that he
only visited during his frequent vacations. In Reyes v. COMELEC,162 the candidate was
found to be an American citizen who had not even reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 9225 or had renounced her U.S. citizenship. She was disqualified on
the citizenship issue. On residence, the only proof she offered was a seven-month stint
as provincial officer. The COMELEC, quoted with approval by this Court, said that "such
fact alone is not sufficient to prove her one-year residency."
It is obvious that because of the sparse evidence on residence in the four cases cited
by the respondents, the Court had no choice but to hold that residence could be
counted only from acquisition of a permanent resident visa or from reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship. In contrast, the evidence of petitioner is overwhelming and taken
together leads to no other conclusion that she decided to permanently abandon her
U.S. residence (selling the house, taking the children from U.S. schools, getting quotes
from the freight company, notifying the U.S. Post Office of the abandonment of their
address in the U.S., donating excess items to the Salvation Army, her husband
resigning from U.S. employment right after selling the U.S. house) and permanently
relocate to the Philippines and actually re-established her residence here on 24 May
2005 (securing T.I.N, enrolling her children in Philippine schools, buying property here,
34

constructing a residence here, returning to the Philippines after all trips abroad, her
husband getting employed here). Indeed, coupled with her eventual application to
reacquire Philippine citizenship and her family's actual continuous stay in the
Philippines over the years, it is clear that when petitioner returned on 24 May 2005 it
was for good.
In this connection, the COMELEC also took it against petitioner that she had entered
the Philippines visa-free as a balikbayan. A closer look at R.A. No. 6768 as amended,
otherwise known as the "An Act Instituting a Balikbayan Program," shows that there is
no overriding intent to treat balikbayans as temporary visitors who must leave after one
year. Included in the law is a former Filipino who has been naturalized abroad and
"comes or returns to the Philippines." 163 The law institutes a balikbayan program
"providing the opportunity to avail of the necessary training to enable the balikbayan to
become economically self-reliant members of society upon their return to the
country"164in line with the government's "reintegration
program."165 Obviously, balikbayans are not ordinary transients.
Given the law's express policy to facilitate the return of a balikbayan and help him
reintegrate into society, it would be an unduly harsh conclusion to say in absolute terms
that the balikbayan must leave after one year. That visa-free period is obviously
granted him to allow him to re-establish his life and reintegrate himself into the
community before he attends to the necessary formal and legal requirements of
repatriation. And that is exactly what petitioner did - she reestablished life here by
enrolling her children and buying property while awaiting the return of her husband and
then applying for repatriation shortly thereafter.
No case similar to petitioner's, where the former Filipino's evidence of change in
domicile is extensive and overwhelming, has as yet been decided by the Court.
Petitioner's evidence of residence is unprecedented. There is no judicial precedent that
comes close to the facts of residence of petitioner. There is no indication in Coquilla v.
COMELEC,166 and the other cases cited by the respondents that the Court intended to
have its rulings there apply to a situation where the facts are different. Surely, the issue
of residence has been decided particularly on the facts-of-the case basis.
To avoid the logical conclusion pointed out by the evidence of residence of petitioner,
the COMELEC ruled that petitioner's claim of residence of ten (10) years and eleven
(11) months by 9 May 2016 in her 2015 COC was false because she put six ( 6) years
and six ( 6) months as "period of residence before May 13, 2013" in her 2012 COC for
Senator. Thus, according to the COMELEC, she started being a Philippine resident
only in November 2006. In doing so, the COMELEC automatically assumed as true the
statement in the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC as false.
As explained by petitioner in her verified pleadings, she misunderstood the date
required in the 2013 COC as the period of residence as of the day she submitted that
COC in 2012. She said that she reckoned residency from April-May 2006 which was
the period when the U.S. house was sold and her husband returned to the Philippines.
In that regard, she was advised by her lawyers in 2015 that residence could be counted
from 25 May 2005.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Petitioner's explanation that she misunderstood the query in 2012 (period of residence
before 13 May 2013) as inquiring about residence as of the time she submitted the
COC, is bolstered by the change which the COMELEC itself introduced in the 2015
COC which is now "period of residence in the Philippines up to the day before May 09,
2016." The COMELEC would not have revised the query if it did not acknowledge that
the first version was vague.
That petitioner could have reckoned residence from a date earlier than the sale of her
U.S. house and the return of her husband is plausible given the evidence that she had
returned a year before. Such evidence, to repeat, would include her passport and the
school records of her children.
It was grave abuse of discretion for the COMELEC to treat the 2012 COC as a binding
and conclusive admission against petitioner. It could be given in evidence against her,
yes, but it was by no means conclusive. There is precedent after all where a candidate's
mistake as to period of residence made in a COC was overcome by
evidence. In Romualdez-Marcos v. COMELEC,167 the candidate mistakenly put seven
(7) months as her period of residence where the required period was a minimum of one
year. We said that "[i]t is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has
satisfied the constitutions residency qualification requirement." The COMELEC ought
to have looked at the evidence presented and see if petitioner was telling the truth that
she was in the Philippines from 24 May 2005. Had the COMELEC done its duty, it
would have seen that the 2012 COC and the 2015 COC both correctly stated
the pertinent period of residency.
The COMELEC, by its own admission, disregarded the evidence that petitioner actually
and physically returned here on 24 May 2005 not because it was false, but only
because COMELEC took the position that domicile could be established only from
petitioner's repatriation under R.A. No. 9225 in July 2006. However, it does not take
away the fact that in reality, petitioner had returned from the U.S. and was here to stay
permanently, on 24 May 2005. When she claimed to have been a resident for ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months, she could do so in good faith.
For another, it could not be said that petitioner was attempting to hide anything. As
already stated, a petition for quo warranto had been filed against her with the SET as
early as August 2015. The event from which the COMELEC pegged the
commencement of residence, petitioner's repatriation in July 2006 under R.A. No.
9225, was an established fact to repeat, for purposes of her senatorial candidacy.
Notably, on the statement of residence of six (6) years and six (6) months in the 2012
COC, petitioner recounted that this was first brought up in the media on 2 June 2015
by Rep. Tobias Tiangco of the United Nationalist Alliance. Petitioner appears to have
answered the issue immediately, also in the press. Respondents have not disputed
petitioner's evidence on this point. From that time therefore when Rep. Tiangco
discussed it in the media, the stated period of residence in the 2012 COC and the
circumstances that surrounded the statement were already matters of public record and
were not hidden.
35

Petitioner likewise proved that the 2012 COC was also brought up in the SET petition
for quo warranto. Her Verified Answer, which was filed on 1 September 2015, admitted
that she made a mistake in the 2012 COC when she put in six ( 6) years and six ( 6)
months as she misunderstood the question and could have truthfully indicated a longer
period. Her answer in the SET case was a matter of public record. Therefore, when
petitioner accomplished her COC for President on 15 October 2015, she could not be
said to have been attempting to hide her erroneous statement in her 2012 COC for
Senator which was expressly mentioned in her Verified Answer.
The facts now, if not stretched to distortion, do not show or even hint at an intention to
hide the 2012 statement and have it covered by the 2015 representation. Petitioner,
moreover, has on her side this Court's pronouncement that:
Concededly, a candidate's disqualification to run for public office does not necessarily
constitute material misrepresentation which is the sole ground for denying due course
to, and for the cancellation of, a COC. Further, as already discussed, the candidate's
misrepresentation in his COC must not only refer to a material fact (eligibility and
qualifications for elective office), but should evince a deliberate intent to mislead,
misinform or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It must be
made with an intention to deceive the electorate as to one's qualifications to run for
public office.168
In sum, the COMELEC, with the same posture of infallibilism, virtually ignored a good
number of evidenced dates all of which can evince animus manendi to the Philippines
and animus non revertedi to the United States of America. The veracity of the events
of coming and staying home was as much as dismissed as inconsequential, the focus
having been fixed at the petitioner's "sworn declaration in her COC for Senator" which
the COMELEC said "amounts to a declaration and therefore an admission that her
residence in the Philippines only commence sometime in November 2006"; such that
"based on this declaration, [petitioner] fails to meet the residency requirement for
President." This conclusion, as already shown, ignores the standing jurisprudence that
it is the fact of residence, not the statement of the person that determines residence for
purposes of compliance with the constitutional requirement of residency for election as
President. It ignores the easily researched matter that cases on questions of residency
have been decided favorably for the candidate on the basis of facts of residence far
less in number, weight and substance than that presented by petitioner. 169 It ignores,
above all else, what we consider as a primary reason why petitioner cannot be bound
by her declaration in her COC for Senator which declaration was not even considered
by the SET as an issue against her eligibility for Senator. When petitioner made the
declaration in her COC for Senator that she has been a resident for a period of six (6)
years and six (6) months counted up to the 13 May 2013 Elections, she naturally had
as reference the residency requirements for election as Senator which was satisfied by
her declared years of residence. It was uncontested during the oral arguments before
us that at the time the declaration for Senator was made, petitioner did not have as yet
any intention to vie for the Presidency in 2016 and that the general public was never
made aware by petitioner, by word or action, that she would run for President in 2016.
Presidential candidacy has a length-of-residence different from that of a senatorial
candidacy. There are facts of residence other than that which was mentioned in the
COC for Senator. Such other facts of residence have never been proven to be false,
and these, to repeat include:
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
[Petitioner] returned to the Philippines on 24 May 2005. (petitioner's] husband however
stayed in the USA to finish pending projects and arrange the sale of their family home.
Meanwhile [petitioner] and her children lived with her mother in San Juan City.
[Petitioner] enrolled Brian in Beacon School in Taguig City in 2005 and Hanna in
Assumption College in Makati City in 2005. Anika was enrolled in Learning Connection
in San Juan in 2007, when she was already old enough to go to school.
In the second half of 2005, [petitioner] and her husband acquired Unit 7F of One Wilson
Place Condominium in San Juan. [Petitioner] and her family lived in Unit 7F until the
construction of their family home in Corinthian Hills was completed.
Sometime in the second half of 2005, [petitioner's] mother discovered that her former
lawyer who handled [petitioner's] adoption in 1974 failed to secure from the Office of
the Civil Registrar of Iloilo a new Certificate of Live Birth indicating [petitioner's] new
name and stating that her parents are "Ronald Allan K. Poe" and "Jesusa L. Sonora."
In February 2006, [petitioner] travelled briefly to the US in order to supervise the
disposal of some of the family's remaining household belongings.1a\^/phi1 [Petitioner]
returned to the Philippines on 11 March 2006.
In late March 2006, [petitioner's] husband informed the United States Postal Service of
the family's abandonment of their address in the US.
The family home in the US was sole on 27 April 2006.
In April 2006, [petitioner's] husband resigned from his work in the US. He returned to
the Philippines on 4 May 2006 and began working for a Philippine company in July
2006.
In early 2006, [petitioner] and her husband acquired a vacant lot in Corinthian Hills,
where they eventually built their family home.170
In light of all these, it was arbitrary for the COMELEC to satisfy its intention to let the
case fall under the exclusive ground of false representation, to consider no other date
than that mentioned by petitioner in her COC for Senator.
All put together, in the matter of the citizenship and residence of petitioner for her
candidacy as President of the Republic, the questioned Resolutions of the COMELEC
in Division and En Banc are, one and all, deadly diseased with grave abuse of
discretion from root to fruits.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions, to wit:
1. dated 1 December 2015 rendered through the COMELEC Second Division, in SPA
No. 15-001 (DC), entitled Estrella C. Elamparo, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent, stating that:
36
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
[T]he Certificate of Candidacy for President of the Republic of the Philippines in the
May 9, 2016 National and Local Elections filed by respondent Mary Grace Natividad
Sonora Poe-Llamanzares is hereby GRANTED.

2. dated 11 December 2015, rendered through the COMELEC First Division, in the
consolidated cases SPA No. 15-002 (DC) entitled Francisco S. Tatad, petitioner, vs.
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; SPA No. 15-007 (DC)
entitled Antonio P. Contreras, petitioner, vs. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-
Llamanzares, respondent; and SPA No. 15-139 (DC) entitled Amado D. Valdez,
petitioner, v. Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe-Llamanzares, respondent; stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to GRANT the petitions and cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES for the elective position of
President of the Republic of the Philippines in connection with the 9 May 2016
Synchronized Local and National Elections.

3. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 1 December

2015 Resolution of the Second Division stating that:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby

RESOLVES, to DENY the Verified Motion for Reconsideration of SENATOR MARY
GRACE NATIVIDAD SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES. The Resolution dated 11
December 2015 of the Commission First Division is AFFIRMED.

4. dated 23 December 2015 of the COMELEC En Banc, upholding the 11 December

2015 Resolution of the First Division.

are hereby ANNULED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner MARY GRACE NATIVIDAD
SONORA POE-LLAMANZARES is DECLARED QUALIFIED to be a candidate for
President in the National and Local Elections of 9 May 2016.

SO ORDERED.

37

G.R. No. L-30241 December 29, 1928
GREGORIO NUVAL, petitioner-appellant, vs. NORBERTO GURAY, ET
AL., respondents. NORBERTO GURAY, appelllee.
1. ELECTIONS; ELECTION LISTS, PETITION TO EXCLUDE VOTER FROM;
SUMMARY CHARACTER OF PROCEDURE.-
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Act No. 3387, is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not
appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the
capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first
instance.
2. ELECTIONS; "QUO WARRANTO".-
The judgment rendered in the case on the petition to cancel the respondent-
appellee's name in the election list is not conclusive and does not constitute res
judicata in the present quo warranto proceeding, as in the two cases, there is no
identity either of parties, or of the thing or matter litigated, or of issues or causes of
action.
This appeal was taken by the petitioner Gregorio Nuval from the judgment of the
Court of First Instance of La Union, upholding the defense of res judicata and
dismissing the quo warranto proceedings instituted by the said Gregorio Nuval
against Norbeto Guray and others, with costs against the petitioner.
In support of his appeal, the appellant assign the following alleged errors as
committed by the trial court in its judgment, to wit:
1. The lower court erred in holding that the judgment rendered upon
Gregorio Nuval's petition for the cancellation of Norbeto Guray's name on
the election list of Luna is conclude and constitutes res judiata in the present
case.
2. The trial court erred in not holding that Norbeto Guray at the time of his
election, was ineligible for the office of the residence in said municipality.
3. The lower court erred in not finding in its judgment that the petitioner is
entitled to hold the office in question.
In regard to the first assignment of error, the evidence adduced during the trial of the
case shows:
That on May 11, 1928, and within the period fixed by section 437 of the Administrative
Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, Gregorio Nuval filed, in civil case No. 1442 of
the Court of First Instance of La Union, in his dual capacity as a voter duly qualified
and registered in the election list of the municipality of Luna and as a duly registered
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
candidate for the office of municipal president of said municipality, a petition against
Norberto Guray asking for the exclusion of his name from the election list of said
municipality, not being a qualified voter of said municipality sine he had not resided
therein for six months as required by section 431 of the said Administrative Code.
Proceedings were had upon the petition in accordance with sections 437 and 438 of
the same Code, as amended by Act No. 3387, and Judge E. Araneta Diaz, rendered
judgment dismissing it because, in his opinion, Norberto Guray was a bona
fide resident of the municipality of Luna from Janury 1, 1927. As that order was not
appealable, Norberto Guray's name remained in the election list of the municipality of
Luna.
The general election having been held on June 5, 1928, Norbeto Guray was elected
to the office of municipal president of Luna by a plurality of votes, Gregorio Nuval
obtaining second place. On June 7, 1928, the municipal council of Luna, acting as the
municipal, Norberto Guray, elected to the office of municipal president of the said
municipality of Luna for the next triennium.
On June 18, 1928, Gregorio Nuval filed the present action of quo warranto as
provided in section 408 of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 3387,
asking that Norberto Guray be declared ineligible had a legal residence of one year
previuos to the election as required by section 2174 of the said Administrative Code
in order to be eligible to an elective municipal office.
The question to be solved under the first assignment of error is whether or not the
judgment rendered in the case of the petition for the exclusion of Norberto Guray's
name from the election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent the institution and
prosecution of an action in quo warranto, which is now before us.
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the Administrative Code, as amended by
Act. No. 3387 is of a summary character and the judgment rendered therein is not
appealable except when the petition is tried before the justice of the peace of the
capital or the circuit judge, in which case it may be appealed to the judge of first
instance, with whom said two lower judges have concurrent jurisdiction.
The petition for execution was presented by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as
qualified voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly registered candidate for the
office of the president of said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a registered
voter in the election list of said municipality. The present proceedings of quo
warranto was intreposed by Gregorio Nuval in his capacity as a registered candidate
voted for the office of municipal president of Luna, against Norberto Guray, as an
elected candidate for the same office. Therefore, there is no identity of parties in the
two cases, since it is not enough that there be an identity of persons, but there must
be an identity of capacities in which said persons litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code;
Bowler vs. Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p. 756, par. 1165.)
In said case for the petition for the exclusion, the object of the litigation, or the litigious
matter was the conclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from the election list of the
38

municipality of Luna, while in the present quo warranto proceeding, the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter in his exclusion or expulsion from the office to which
he has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, any identity in the object of the
litigation, or the litigious matter.
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause of action was that Norberto Guray
had not the six months' legal residence in the municipality of Luna to be a qualified
voter thereof, while in the present proceedings of quo warranto, the case of this action
is that Norberto Guray has not the one year's legal residence required for the
eligibility to the office of municipal president of Luna. Neither does there exist,
therefore, identity of causes of action.
In order that res judicata may exist the following are necessary: (a) Identity of parties;
(b) identity of things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino vs. Director of Lands, 39 Phil.,
850). And as in the case of the petition for exclusion and in the present quo
warranto proceeding, as there is no identity either of parties, or of things or litigious
matter, or of issues or causes of action, there is no res judicata.1awphi1.net
For the above considerations, the trial court erred in holding that the judgment
rendered in the case on the petition of Gregorio Nuval asking for the cancellation of
Norberto Guray's name in the election list of Luna is conclusive and constitutes res
judicata in the present case.
With respect to the second assignment of error, the evidence establishes the
following facts:
Up to June 27, 1922, Norberto Guray had resided in the municipality of Luna, his
birthplace, where he had married and had held the office of municipal treasurer. On
that date he was appointed municipal treasurer of Balaoan, Province of La Union. The
rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, to which Norberto Guray was subject as
such municipal treasurer, require that municipality treasurers live continuously in the
municipality where they perform they official duties, in order to be able to give an
account of their acts as such treasurers at any time. In order to qualify and be in a
position to vote as an elector in Balaoan in the general election of 1925, Norberto
Guray asked for the cancellation of his name in the election lists of Luna, where he
had voted in the general elections of 1922, alleging as a ground therefore the
following: "On the ground of transfer of any residence which took place on the 28th
day of June, 1922. My correct and new address is Poblacion, Balaoan, La Union;"
and in order to be registered in the subscribed affidavit Exhibit F-1 before the board of
election inspectors of precinct No. 1 of Balaoan, by virtue of which he was registered
as an elector of the said precinct, having made use of the right of suffrage in said
municipality in the general elections of 1925. In his cedula certificates issued by
himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan from the year 1923 to 1928, included, he
made it appear that his residence was the residential district of Balaoan. In the year
1926, his wife and children who, up to that time, had lived in the municipality of
Balaoan, went back to live in the town of Luna in the house of his wife's parents, due
to the high cost of living in that municipality. Norberto Guray used to go home to Luna
in the afternoons after office hours, and there he passed the nights with his family. His
children studied in the public school of Luna. In January, 1927, he commenced the
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
construction of a house of strong materials in Luna, which has not yet been
completed, and neither be nor his family has lived in it. On February 1, 1928,
Norberto Guray applied for and obtained vacation leave to be spent in Luna, and on
the 16th of the same month he filed his resignation by telegraph, which was accepted
on the same day, also by telegraph. Nothwithstanding that he was already provided
with a cedula by himself as municipal treasurer of Balaoan on January 31, 1928,
declaring him resident of said town, he obtained another cedula from the municipality
of Luna on February 20, 1928, which was dated January 15, 1928, in which it is
presented that he resided in the barrio of Victoria, municipality of Luna, Province of La
Union. On February 23, 1928, Norberto Guray applied for and obtained the
cancellation of his name in the election list of the municipality of Balaoan, and on April
14, 1928, he applied for registration as a voter in Luna, alleging that he had been
residing in said municipality for thirty years. For this purpose he made of the cedula
certificate antedated.
In view of the facts just related, the question arises whether or not Norberto Guray
had the legal residence of one year immediately prior to the general elections of June
5, 1928, in order to be eligible to the office of municipal president of Luna, Province of
La Union.
There is no question but that when Norberto Guray accepted and assumed the office
of municipal treasurer of Balaoan, La Union, he transferred his residence from the
municipality of Luna to that of Balaoan.
The only question to determine refers to the date when he once more established his
residence in the municipality of Luna.
It is an established rule that "where a voter abandons his residence in a state and
acquires one in another state, he cannot again vote in the state of his former
residence until he has qualified by a new period of residence" (20 Corpus Juris, p. 71,
par. 28). "The term 'residence' as so used is synonymous with 'domicile,' which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." (People vs. Bender, 144 N.
Y. S., 145.)
Since Norberto Guray abandoned his first residence in the municipality of Luna and
acquired another in Balaoan, in order to vote and be a candidate in the municipality of
Luna, he needed to reacquire residence in the latter municipality for the length of time
prescribed by the law, and for such purpose, he needed not only the intention to do
so, but his personal presence in said municipality.
By reason of his office as municipal treasurer of Balaoan and on account of the rules
of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose jurisdiction was such
municipality, Norberto Guray had to reside and in fact resided in said municipality until
the 6th of February, 1928 when he filed his resignation from his office, which was
accepted on the same date. The fact that his family moved to the municipality of Luna
in the year 1926 in order to live there in view of the high cost of living in balaoan; the
fact that his children studied in the public shool of said town; the fact that on
afternoons after hours he went home to the municipality of Luna and there passed the
39

night with his family, are not in themselves alone sufficient to show that from said year
he had transfered his residence to said municipality, since his wife and children lived
with his father-in-law, in the latter's house that only in the month of January, 1927, did
he begin the construction of a house of strong materials, which is not yet completed,
nor occupied by himself or his family, His aftrenoon tips to Luna, according to his own
explanation given to the provincial treasurer, were made for purpose of visiting his
sick father. His own act in recording in his cedula certificates for the years 1927 and
1928 issued by himself in his favor as municipal treasurer of Balaoan, that his place
of residene was that municipality, and in taking out a new cedula in the municipality of
Luna of February 20, 1928, and having the date of its issuance surreptitiuosly put
back to January 15 1928, show that until the date of his resignation he did not
consider himself as a resident of the municipality of Luna. The fact that his wife and
children lived in Luna not in his own house but in that of his wife's father since the
year 1926, cannot be looked upon as a change of residence, since a change of
residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the former (20 Corpus
Juris, p. 71) and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
The present case is different from that of Doctor Apacible cited by the appellee in his
brief. Doctor Apacible never had abandoned his legal residence in the Province of
Batangas, nothwithstanding that he had been living with his family in the City of
Manila, taking out his cedula certificates here, but he never exercised the right of
suffrage here. Norberto Guray abandoned his legal residencce in the municipality of
Luna, transferring it to the municipality of Balaoan by reason and an account of the
requirements of the rules of the provincial treasurer of La Union, under whose
jurisdiction is said municipality, exercising his right of suffrage in the
latter.1awphi1.net
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold in fact and in law
Norberto Guray only abandoned his legal residence in the Municipality of Balaoan,
and began to acquire another in the municipality of Luna from Febraury 16, 1928,
when he filed his resignation from the office of municipal treasurer of Balaoan which
he had been holding, and which resignation was accepted; and on being elected
municipal president of Luna in the general elections of June 5, 1928, he had not
reacquired the legal residence necessary to be validly elected to said office.
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the office of
municipal president of Luna is hereby held to be unlawful and quashed and, in
consequence, he has no right to take possession of said office, petitioner Gregorio
Nuval being the one legally elected to said office with a right to take possession
thereof, having secured second place in the election. With costs against the
respondent. So ordered.
Avanceña, C. J., Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Villamor, J., dissents.
RULING ON THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
February 1, 1929
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a motion praying for the reasons given that the judgment rendered in this case
on December 29, 1928 be reconsidered, and another rendered affirming the judgment
appealed from.
In regard to the grounds of the motion with reference to the defence of res judicata,
as the movant does not adduce any new argument in support thereof, and inasmuch
as this court has already discussed question at length, we find no sufficient reason to
grant the motion on said grounds.
As to the other grounds touching this court's holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one
who has been legally elected to the office of municipal president of Luna, La Union,
and entitled to take possession thereof, having received second place, we consider
them meritorious, for the reason that 408 of the Election Law, providing the remedy in
case a person not eligible should be elected to a provincial or municipal office, does
not authorize that it be declared who has been legally elected, thus differing from
section 479 of the law, which contains such an authorization, and for the reason,
furthermore, that section 477 of the said law provides that only those who have
obtained a plurality of votes, and have presented their certificates of candidacy may
be certified as elected to municipal offices. Elective offices are by nature different
from the appointive offices. The occupation of the first depends on the will of the
elector, while that of the second depends on the will of the authority providing for it.
In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by election, what is to be
determined is the eligibility of the candidate elect, while in quo warrantoproceedings
referring to offices filled by appointment, what is determined is the legality of the
appointment. In the first case when the person elected is ineligible, the court cannot
declare that the candidate occupying the second place has been elected, even if he
were eligible, since the law only authorizes a declaration of election in favor of the
person who has obtained a plurality of votes, and has presented his certificate of
candidacy. In the second case, the court determines who has been legally appointed
and can and ought to declare who is entitled to occupy the office.
In view of the foregoing, we are of opinion that the judgment rendered in this case on
December 29, 1928, should be, and is hereby, amended, eliminating from the
dispositive part thereof, the holding that Gregorio Nuval is the one who has been
legally elected, so as to read as follows:
By virtue whereof, the election of respondent-appellee Norberto Guray to the
office of Municipal president of Luna, is hereby declared unlawful and
quashed and, consequently, that he has no right to take possession of said
office, with costs against said respondent.
So ordered.
40

G.R. No. L-43314 December 19, 1935
A.L. VELILLA, administrator of the estate of Arthur Graydon Moody, plaintiff -
appellant, vs. JUAN POSADAS, JR., Collector of Internal Revenue, defendant-
appellee.
1. INHERITANCE TAX; DOMICILE OF TAXPAYER.-
To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must be a deliberate and provable
choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence in the place chosen, with a
declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed and permanent place of
abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence in the record' that M ever
established a new domicile in a foreign country.
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instant of manila in an action
to recover from the defendant-appellee as Collector of Internal Revenue the sum of
P77,018.39 as inheritance taxes and P13,001.41 as income taxes assessed against
the estate of Arthur G. Moody, deceased.
The parties submitted to the court an agreed statement of facts as follows:
I. That Arthur Graydon Moody died in Calcutta, India, on February 18, 1931.
II. That Arthur Graydon Moody executed in the Philippine Islands a will,
certified copy of which marked Exhibit AA is hereto attached and made a
part hereof, by virtue of which will, he bequeathed all his property to his only
sister, Ida M. Palmer, who then was and still is a citizen and resident of the
State of New York, United States of America.
III. That on February 24,1931, a petition for appointment of special
administrator of the estate of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody was filed
by W. Maxwell Thebaut with the Court of First Instance of Manila, the same
being designated as case No. 39113 of said court. Copy of said petition
marked Exhibit BB is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
IV. That subsequently or on April 10, 1931, a petition will of the deceased
Arthur Graydon Moody, and the same was, after hearing, duly probated by
the court in a decree dated May 5, 1931. Copies of the petition and of the
decree marked Exhibits CC and DD, respectively, are hereto attached and
made parts hereof.
V. That on July 14, 1931, Ida M. Palmer was declared to be the sole and
only heiress of the deceased Arthur Graydon Moody by virtue of an order
issued by the court in said case No. 39113, copy of which marked Exhibit EE
is hereto attached and made a part hereof; and that during the hearing for
the declaration of heirs, Ida M. Palmer presented as evidence a letter dated
February 28, 1925, and addressed to her by Arthur Graydon Moody, copy of
which marked Exhibit FF hereto attached and made part hereof.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
VI. That the property left by the late Arthur Graydon Moody consisted
principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under the
laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other personal properties,
as are more fully shown in the inventory of April 17, 1931, filed by the special
administrator with the court in said case No. 39113, certified copy of which
inventory marked Exhibit GG is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
This stipulation does not, however, cover the respective values of said
properties for the purpose of the inheritance tax.
VII. That on July 22, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue prepared for the
estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody an inheritance tax return, certified
copy of which marked Exhibit HH is hereto attached and made a part,
hereof.
VIII. That on September 9, 1931, an income tax return for the fractional
period from January 1, 1931 to June 30, 1931, certified copy of which
marked Exhibit 11 is hereto attached and made a part hereof, was also
prepared by the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the estate of the said
deceased Arthur Graydon Moody.1awphil.net
IX. That on December 3, 1931, the committee on claims and appraisals filed
with the court its report, certified copy of which marked Exhibit KK is hereto
attached and made a part hereof.
X. That on September 15, 1931, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed
to the attorney for the administratrix Ida M. Palmer a letter, copy of which
marked Exhibit LL is hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XI. That on October 15, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer answered the
letter of the Collector of Internal Revenue referred to in the preceding
paragraph. Said answer marked Exhibit MM is hereto attached and made a
part hereof.
XII. That on November 4, 1931, and in answer to the letter mentioned in the
preceding paragraph, the Bureau of Internal Revenue addressed to the
attorney for Ida M. Palmer another letter, copy of which marked Exhibit NN is
hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XIII. That on December 7, 1931, the attorney for Ida M. Palmer again replied
in a letter, marked Exhibit OO, hereto attached and made a part hereof.
XIV. That the estate of the late Arthur Graydon Moody paid under protest the
sum of P50,000 on July 22, 1931, and the other sum of P40,019.75 on
January 19, 1932, making assessment for inheritance tax and the sum of
P13,001.41 covers the assessment for income tax against said estate.
XV. That on January 21, 1932, the Collector of Internal Revenue overruled
the protest made by Ida M. Palmer through her attorney.
41

XVI. The parties reserve their right to introduce additional evidence at the
hearing of the present case.
Manila, August 15, 1933.
In addition to the foregoing agreed statement of facts, both parties introduced oral
and documentary evidence from which it appears that Arthur G. Moody, an American
citizen, came to the Philippine Islands in 1902 or 1903 and engaged actively in
business in these Islands up to the time of his death in Calcutta, India, on February
18, 1931. He had no business elsewhere and at the time of his death left an estate
consisting principally of bonds and shares of stock of corporations organized under
the laws of the Philippine Islands, bank deposits and other intangibles and personal
property valued by the commissioners of appraisal and claims at P609,767.58 and by
the Collector of Internal Revenue for the purposes of inheritance tax at P653,657.47.
All of said property at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the
Philippine Islands. So far as this record shows, he left no property of any kind located
anywhere else. In his will, Exhibit AA, executed without date in Manila in accordance
with the formalities of the Philippine law, in which he bequeathed all his property to
his sister, Ida M. Palmer, he stated:
I, Arthur G. Moody, a citizen of the United States of America, residing in the
Philippine Islands, hereby publish and declare the following as my last Will
and Testament . . ..
The substance of the plaintiff's cause of action is stated in paragraph 7 of his
complaint as follows:
That there is no valid law or regulation of the Government of the Philippine
Islands under or by virtue of which any inheritance tax may be levied,
assessed or collected upon transfer, by death and succession, of intangible
personal properties of a person not domiciled in the Philippine Islands, and
the levy and collection by defendant of inheritance tax computed upon the
value of said stocks, bonds, credits and other intangible properties as
aforesaid constituted and constitutes the taking and deprivation of property
without due process of law contrary to the Bill of Rights and organic law of
the Philippine Islands.
Section 1536 of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended) provides as follows:
SEC. 1536. Conditions and rate of taxation. — Every transmission by virtue
of inheritance, devise, bequest, gift mortis causa or advance in anticipation
of inheritance. devise, or bequest of real property located in the Philippine
Islands and real rights in such property; of any franchise which must be
exercised in the Philippine Islands, of any shares, obligations, or bonds
issued by any corporation or sociedad anonima organized or constituted in
the Philippine Islands in accordance with its laws; of any shares or rights in
any partnership, business or any personal property located in the Philippine
Islands shall be subject to the following tax:
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
xxx xxx xxx
It is alleged in the complaint that at the time of his death, Arthur G. Moody was a
"non-resident of the Philippine Islands". The answer, besides the general denial, sets
up as a special defense "Arthur G. Moody, now deceased, was and prior to the date
of his death, a resident in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, where he was
engaged actively in business." Issue was thus joined on the question: Where was the
legal domicile of Arthur G. Moody at the time of his death?
The Solicitor-General raises a preliminary objection to the consideration of any
evidence that Moody's domicile was elsewhere than in Manila at the time of his death
based on the proposition that as no such objection was made before the Collector of
Internal Revenue as one of the grounds of the protest against the payment of the tax,
this objection cannot be considered in a suit against the Collector to recover the taxes
paid under protest. He relies upon the decision in the case of W.C. Tucker vs. A.C.
Alexander, Collector (15 Fed. [21, 356). We call attention, however, to the fact that
this decision was reversed in 275 U.S., 232; 72 Law. ed., 256, and the case
remanded for trial on the merits on the ground that the requirement that the action
shall be based upon the same grounds, and only such, as were presented in the
protest had been waived by the collector. In the case before us no copy of the
taxpayer's protest is included in the record and we have no means of knowing its
contents. We think, therefore, the preliminary objection made on behalf of the
appellee does not lie.
We proceed, therefore, to the consideration of the question on the merits as to
whether Arthur G. Moody was legally domiciled in the Philippine Islands on the day of
his death. Moody was never married and there is no doubt that he had his legal
domicile in the Philippine Islands from 1902 or 1903 forward during which time he
accumulated a fortune from his business in the Philippine Islands He lived in the Elks'
Club in Manila for many years and was living there up to the date he left Manila the
latter part of February, 1928, under the following circumstances: He was afflicted with
leprosy in an advanced stage and been informed by Dr. Wade that he would be
reported to the Philippine authorities for confinement in the Culion Leper Colony as
required by the law. Distressed at the thought of being thus segregated and in
violation of his promise to Dr. Wade that he would voluntarily go to Culion, he
surreptitiously left the Islands the latter part of February, 1928, under cover of night,
on a freighter, without ticket, passport or tax clearance certificate. The record does
not show where Moody was during the remainder of the year 1928. He lived with a
friend in Paris, France, during the months of March and April of the year 1929 where
he was receiving treatment for leprosy at the Pasteur Institute. The record does not
show where Moody was in the interval between April, 1929, and November 26, 1930,
on which latter date he wrote a letter, Exhibit B, to Harry Wendt of Manila, offering to
sell him mis interest in the Camera Supply Company, a Philippine corporation, in
which Moody owned 599 out of 603 shares. In this letter, among other things, he
states: "Certainly I'll never return there to live or enter business again." In this same
letter he says:
I wish to know as soon as now (as to the purchase) for I have very recently decided
either to sell or put in a line of school or office supplies ... before I go to the necessary
42

investments placing any side lines, I concluded to get your definite reply to this ... I
have given our New York buying agent a conditional order not to be executed until
March and this will give you plenty of time ... anything that kills a business is to have it
peddled around as being for sale and this is what I wish to avoid. He wrote letters
dated December 12, 1930, and January 3, 1931, along the same line to Wendt. As
Moody died of leprosy less than two months after these letters were written, there can
be no doubt that he would have been immediately segregated in the Culion Leper
Colony had he returned to the Philippine Islands. He was, therefore, a fugitive, not
from justice, but from confinement in the Culion Leper Colony in accordance with the
law of the Philippine Islands.
There is no statement of Moody, oral or written, in the record that he had adopted a
new domicile while he was absent from Manila. Though he was physically present for
some months in Calcutta prior to the date of his death there, the appellant does not
claim that Moody had a domicile there although it was precisely from Calcutta that he
wrote and cabled that he wished to sell his business in Manila and that he had no
intention to live there again. Much less plausible, it seems to us, is the claim that he
established a legal domicile in Paris in February, 1929. The record contains no writing
whatever of Moody from Paris. There is no evidence as to where in Paris he had any
fixed abode that he intended to be his permanent home. There is no evidence that he
acquired any property in Paris or engaged in any settled business on his own account
there. There is no evidence of any affirmative factors that prove the establishment of
a legal domicile there. The negative evidence that he told Cooley that he did not
intend to return to Manila does not prove that he had established a domicile in Paris.
His short stay of three months in Paris is entirely consistent with the view that he was
a transient in Paris for the purpose of receiving treatments at the Pasteur Institute.
The evidence in the record indicates clearly that Moody's continued absence from his
legal domicile in the Philippines was due to and reasonably accounted for by the
same motive that caused his surreptitious departure, namely, to evade confinement in
the Cullion Leper Colony for he doubtless knew that on his return he would be
immediately confined, because his affliction became graver to us while he was absent
than it was on the day of his precipitous departure and he could not conceal himself in
the Philippines where he was well known, as he might do in foreign parts.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
surplus by the Camera Supply Company is clearly established by the evidence. The
appellant contends that this assessment in taxation: First, because the corporation
paid income tax on the same amount during the years it was accumulated as surplus;
second, that an inheritance tax on the same amount was assessed against the
estate, and third, the same amount is assessed as income of the estate. As to the
first, it appears from the collector's assessment, Exhibit 11, to the collector allowed
the estate a deduction of the normal income tax on said amount because it had
already been paid at the source by the Camera Supply Company. The only income
tax assessed against the estate was the additional tax or surtax that had not been
paid by the Camera Supply Company for which the estate, having actually received
the income, is clearly liable. As to the second alleged double taxation, it is clear that
the inheritance tax and the additional income tax in question are entirely distinct. They
are assessed under different statutes and we are not convinced by the appellant's
argument that the estate which received these dividends should not be held liable for
the payment of the income tax thereon because the operation was simply the
conversion of the surplus of the corporation into the property of the individual
stockholders. (Cf. U.S. vs. Phellis, 257 U.S., 171, and Taft vs. Bowers, 278 U.S.,
460.) Section 4 of Act No. 2833 as amended, which is relied on by the appellant,
plainly provides that the income from exempt property shall be included as income
subject to tax.
Finding no merit in any of the assignments of error of the appellant, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court, first, because the property in the estate of Arthur G. Moody
at the time of his death was located and had its situs within the Philippine Islands and,
second, because his legal domicile up to the time of his death was within the
Philippine Islands. Costs against the appellant.

Our Civil Code (art. 40) defines the domicile of natural persons as "the place of their
usual residence". The record before us leaves no doubt in our minds that the "usual
residence" of this unfortunate man, whom appellant describes as a "fugitive" and
"outcast", was in Manila where he had lived and toiled for more than a quarter of a
century, rather than in any foreign country he visited during his wanderings up to the
date of his death in Calcutta. To effect the abandonment of one's domicile, there must
be a deliberate and provable choice of a new domicile, coupled with actual residence
in the place chosen, with a declared or provable intent that it should be one's fixed
and permanent place of abode, one's home. There is a complete dearth of evidence
in the record that Moody ever established a new domicile in a foreign country.

The contention under the appellant's third assignment of error that the defendant
collector illegally assessed an income tax of P13,001.41 against the Moody estate is,
in our opinion, untenable. The grounds for this assessment, stated by the Collector of
Internal Revenue in his letter, Exhibit NN, appear to us to be sound. That the amount
of P59,986.69 was received by the estate of Moody as dividends declared out of
43

G.R. No. L-22041 May 19, 1966
MELECIO CLARINIO UJANO, petitioner and appellant, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, oppositor and appellee.
1. Citizenship; Residence is required in reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.-
One of the qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant shall
have resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization
[Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63].
2. Citizenship; Domicile; Residence; Term “residence” construed.-
The term “residence” in Commonwealth Act No. 63 has already been interpreted to
mean the actual or constructive permanent home otherwise known as legal residence
or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in
a country or state where he lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to
return after a temporary absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words,
domicile is characterized by animus manendi. “Residence” imports not only an intention
to reside in a f ixed place but also presence coupled with conduct indicative of such
intention (Yen vs. Republic, L-18885, Jan. 31, 1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). So
an alien who has been admitted into this country as a temporary visitor, either for
business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though actually present in this country
cannot be said to have established his domicile here because the period of his stay is
only temporary in nature and must leave when the purpose of his coming is
accomplished.
3. Citizenship; Reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.-
Since legal residence for six months is required for the reacquisition of Philippine
citizenship, the applicant should secure a quota for permanent residence here. A permit
for temporary residence would not be sufficient. He is not qualified to reacquire
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner seeks to reacquire his Philippine citizenship in a petition filed before the Court
of First Instance of Ilocos Sur.
Petitioner was born 66 years ago of Filipino parents in Magsingal Ilocos Sur. He is
married to Maxima O. Ujano with whom he has one son, Prospero, who is now of legal
age. He left the Philippines for the United States of America in 1927 where after a
residence of more than 20 years he acquired American citizenship by naturalization.
He returned to the Philippines on November 10, 1960 to which he was admitted merely
for a temporary stay. He owns an agricultural land and a residential house situated in
Magsingal, Ilocos Sur worth not less than P5,000.00. He receives a monthly pension
of $115.00 from the Social Security Administration of the United States of America. He
has no record of conviction and it is his intention to renounce his allegiance to the
U.S.A.1äwphï1.ñët
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
After hearing, the court a quo rendered decision denying the petition on the ground that
petitioner did not have the residence required by law six months before he filed his
petition for reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. Hence the present appeal.
The court a quo, in denying the petition, made the following comment: "One of the
qualifications for reacquiring Philippine citizenship is that the applicant 'shall have
resided in the Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization'
[Section 3(1), Commonwealth Act No. 63]. This 'residence' requirement in cases of
naturalization, has already been interpreted to mean the actual or constructive
permanent home otherwise known as legal residence or domicile (Wilfredo Uytengsu
vs. Republic of the Philippines, 95 Phil. 890). A place in a country or state where he
lives and stays permanently, and to which he intends to return after a temporary
absence, no matter how long, is his domicile. In other words domicile is characterized
by animus manendi. So an alien who has been admitted into this country as a
temporary visitor, either for business or pleasure, or for reasons of health, though
actually present in this country cannot be said to have established his domicile here
because the period of his stay is only temporary in nature and must leave when the
purpose of his coming is accomplished. In the present case, petitioner, who is presently
a citizen of the United States of America, was admitted into this country as a temporary
visitor, a status he has maintained at the time of the filing of the present petition for
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and which continues up to the present. Such
being the case, he has not complied with the specific requirement of law regarding six
months residence before filing his present petition."
We can hardly add to the foregoing comment of the court a quo. We find it to be a
correct interpretation [Section 3 (1) of Commonwealth Act No. 63] which requires that
before a person may reacquire his Philippine citizenship he "shall have resided in the
Philippines at least six months before he applies for naturalization." The word
"residence" used therein imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence coupled with conduct indicative of such intention (Yen vs. Republic,
L-18885, January 31,1964; Nuval vs. Guray, 52 Phil. 645). Indeed, that term cannot
refer to the presence in this country of a person who has been admitted only on the
strength of a permit for temporary residence. In other words, the term residence used
in said Act should have the same connotation as that used in Commonwealth Act No.
473, the Revised Naturalization Law, even if in approving the law permitting the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship our Congress has liberalized its requirement by
foregoing the qualifications and special disqualifications prescribed therein. The only
way by which petitioner can reacquire his lost Philippine citizenship is by securing a
quota for permanent residence so that he may come within the purview of the residence
requirement of Commonwealth Act No. 63.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
G.R. No. 88831 November 8, 1990
MATEO CAASI, petitioner, vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO C.
MIGUEL, respondents.
44

G.R. No. 84508 November 13, 1990
ANECITO CASCANTE petitioner, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and
MERITO C. MIGUEL, respondents.
1. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Miguel’s immigration to the United States in
1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines.-
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel’s immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he
did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he
entered the United States with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by
his application for an immigrant’s (not a visitor’s or tourist’s) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
2. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; Section 18, Article XI of the 1987
Constitution is not applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an
immigrant of the United States before he was elected to public office.-
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that “any public officer
or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law” is not
applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office, not “during his tenure” as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan.
3. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Waiver should be manifested
by some act or acts independent of and done prior to the filing his candidacy for
elective office in this country.-
To be “qualified to run for elective office” in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have “waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country.” Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of
his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior
waiver, he was “disqualified to run for any elective office.”
4. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Records of this case are
starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for election
as Municipal Mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988.-
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is
a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States, but the records of this case
are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for
election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that
he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
5. Election Law; Omnibus Election Code; His act of filing a certificate of candidacy for
elective office in the Philippines did not of itself constitute a waiver of his status as a
permanent resident or immigrant of the United States; Absent clear evidence that he
made an irrevocable waiver of that status, the conclusion is that he was disqualified to
run for said public office hence his election thereto was null and void.-
Miguel’s application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.
These two cases were consolidated because they have the same objective; the
disqualification under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the private
respondent, Merito Miguel for the position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan,
to which he was elected in the local elections of January 18, 1988, on the ground that
he is a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the United States of
America, not of Bolinao.
G.R. No. 84508 is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated January 13,
1988 of the COMELEC First Division, dismissing the three (3) petitions of Anecito
Cascante (SPC No. 87-551), Cederico Catabay (SPC No. 87-595) and Josefino C.
Celeste (SPC No. 87-604), for the disqualification of Merito C. Miguel filed prior to the
local elections on January 18, 1988.
G.R. No. 88831, Mateo Caasi vs. Court of Appeals, et al., is a petition for review of
the decision dated June 21, 1989, of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531
dismissing the petition for quo warranto filed by Mateo Caasi, a rival candidate for the
position of municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan, also to disqualify Merito Miguel
on account of his being a green card holder.
In his answer to both petitions, Miguel admitted that he holds a green card issued to
him by the US Immigration Service, but he denied that he is a permanent resident of
the United States. He allegedly obtained the green card for convenience in order that
he may freely enter the United States for his periodic medical examination and to visit
his children there. He alleged that he is a permanent resident of Bolinao, Pangasinan,
that he voted in all previous elections, including the plebiscite on February 2,1987 for
the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, and the congressional elections on May
18,1987.
45

After hearing the consolidated petitions before it, the COMELEC with the exception of
Commissioner Anacleto Badoy, Jr., dismissed the petitions on the ground that:
The possession of a green card by the respondent (Miguel) does
not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the
Philippines. On the contrary, inspite (sic) of his green card,
Respondent has sufficiently indicated his intention to continuously
reside in Bolinao as shown by his having voted in successive
elections in said municipality. As the respondent meets the basic
requirements of citizenship and residence for candidates to elective
local officials (sic) as provided for in Section 42 of the Local
Government Code, there is no legal obstacle to his candidacy for
mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan. (p. 12, Rollo, G.R. No. 84508).
In his dissenting opinion, Commissioner Badoy, Jr. opined that:
A green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant
of a foreign country and respondent having admitted that he is a
green card holder, it is incumbent upon him, under Section 68 of
the Omnibus Election Code, to prove that he "has waived his status
as a permanent resident or immigrant" to be qualified to run for
elected office. This respondent has not done. (p. 13, Rollo, G.R.
No. 84508.)
In G.R. No. 88831, "Mateo Caasi, petitioner vs. Court of Appeals and Merito Miguel,
respondents," the petitioner prays for a review of the decision dated June 21, 1989 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 "Merito C. Miguel, petitioner vs. Hon.
Artemio R. Corpus, etc., respondents," reversing the decision of the Regional Trial
Court which denied Miguel's motion to dismiss the petition for quo warranto filed by
Caasi. The Court of Appeals ordered the regional trial court to dismiss and desist
from further proceeding in the quo warranto case. The Court of Appeals held:
... it is pointless for the Regional Trial Court to hear the case
questioning the qualification of the petitioner as resident of the
Philippines, after the COMELEC has ruled that the petitioner meets
the very basic requirements of citizenship and residence for
candidates to elective local officials (sic) and that there is no legal
obstacles (sic) for the candidacy of the petitioner, considering that
decisions of the Regional Trial Courts on quo warranto cases under
the Election Code are appealable to the COMELEC. (p. 22, Rollo,
G.R. No. 88831.)
These two cases pose the twin issues of: (1) whether or not a green card is proof that
the holder is a permanent resident of the United States, and (2) whether respondent
Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the U.S.A.
prior to the local elections on January 18, 1988.
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Sec. 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this
Constitution allegiance at all times, and any public officer or
employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status
of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt
with by law.
In the same vein, but not quite, Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the
Philippines (B.P. Blg. 881) provides:
SEC. 68. Disqualifications ... Any person who is a permanent
resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said
person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant
of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement
provided for in the election laws. (Sec. 25, 1971, EC).
In view of current rumor that a good number of elective and appointive public officials
in the present administration of President Corazon C. Aquino are holders of green
cards in foreign countries, their effect on the holders' right to hold elective public office
in the Philippines is a question that excites much interest in the outcome of this case.
In the case of Merito Miguel, the Court deems it significant that in the "Application
for Immigrant Visa and Alien Registration" (Optional Form No. 230, Department of
State) which Miguel filled up in his own handwriting and submitted to the US Embassy
in Manila before his departure for the United States in 1984, Miguel's answer to
Question No. 21 therein regarding his "Length of intended stay (if permanently, so
state)," Miguel's answer was, "Permanently."
On its face, the green card that was subsequently issued by the United States
Department of Justice and Immigration and Registration Service to the respondent
Merito C. Miguel identifies him in clear bold letters as a RESIDENT ALIEN. On the
back of the card, the upper portion, the following information is printed:
Alien Registration Receipt Card.
Person identified by this card is entitled to reside
permanently and work in the United States."
(Annex A pp. 189-190, Rollo of G.R. No. 84508.)
Despite his vigorous disclaimer, Miguel's immigration to the United States in 1984
constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines. For he
did not go to the United States merely to visit his children or his doctor there; he
entered the limited States with the intention to have there permanently as evidenced
by his application for an immigrant's (not a visitor's or tourist's) visa. Based on that
application of his, he was issued by the U.S. Government the requisite green card or
authority to reside there permanently.
46

Immigration is the removing into one place from another; the act of
immigrating the entering into a country with the intention of residing
in it.
An immigrant is a person who removes into a country for the
purpose of permanent residence. As shown infra 84, however,
statutes sometimes give a broader meaning to the term
"immigrant." (3 CJS 674.)
As a resident alien in the U.S., Miguel owes temporary and local allegiance to the
U.S., the country in which he resides (3 CJS 527). This is in return for the protection
given to him during the period of his residence therein.
Aliens reading in the limited States, while they are permitted to
remain, are in general entitled to the protection of the laws with
regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil and
criminal responsibility.
In general, aliens residing in the United States, while they are
permitted to remain are entitled to the safeguards of the constitution
with regard to their rights of person and property and to their civil
and criminal responsibility. Thus resident alien friends are entitled
to the benefit of the provision of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
federal constitution that no state shall deprive "any person" of life
liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person the equal protection of the law, and the protection of this
amendment extends to the right to earn a livelihood by following the
ordinary occupations of life. So an alien is entitled to the protection
of the provision of the Fifth Amendment to the federal constitution
that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law. (3 CJS 529-530.)
Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which provides that "any public officer
or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an
immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law" is not
applicable to Merito Miguel for he acquired the status of an immigrant of the United
States before he was elected to public office, not "during his tenure" as mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan.
The law applicable to him is Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881),
which provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a
foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office
under this Code, unless such person has waived his status as
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws.'
Did Miguel, by returning to the Philippines in November 1987 and presenting himself
as a candidate for mayor of Bolinao in the January 18,1988 local elections, waive his
status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States?
To be "qualified to run for elective office" in the Philippines, the law requires that the
candidate who is a green card holder must have "waived his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of a foreign country." Therefore, his act of filing a certificate of
candidacy for elective office in the Philippines, did not of itself constitute a waiver of
his status as a permanent resident or immigrant of the United States. The waiver of
his green card should be manifested by some act or acts independent of and done
prior to filing his candidacy for elective office in this country. Without such prior
waiver, he was "disqualified to run for any elective office" (Sec. 68, Omnibus Election
Code).
Respondent Merito Miguel admits that he holds a green card, which proves that he is
a permanent resident or immigrant it of the United States, but the records of this case
are starkly bare of proof that he had waived his status as such before he ran for
election as municipal mayor of Bolinao on January 18, 1988. We, therefore, hold that
he was disqualified to become a candidate for that office.
The reason for Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code is not hard to find.
Residence in the municipality where he intends to run for elective office for at least
one (1) year at the time of filing his certificate of candidacy, is one of the qualifications
that a candidate for elective public office must possess (Sec. 42, Chap. 1, Title 2,
Local Government Code). Miguel did not possess that qualification because he was a
permanent resident of the United States and he resided in Bolinao for a period of only
three (3) months (not one year) after his return to the Philippines in November 1987
and before he ran for mayor of that municipality on January 18, 1988.
In banning from elective public office Philippine citizens who are permanent residents
or immigrants of a foreign country, the Omnibus Election Code has laid down a clear
policy of excluding from the right to hold elective public office those Philippine citizens
who possess dual loyalties and allegiance. The law has reserved that privilege for its
citizens who have cast their lot with our country "without mental reservations or
purpose of evasion." The assumption is that those who are resident aliens of a foreign
country are incapable of such entire devotion to the interest and welfare of their
homeland for with one eye on their public duties here, they must keep another eye on
their duties under the laws of the foreign country of their choice in order to preserve
their status as permanent residents thereof.
Miguel insists that even though he applied for immigration and permanent residence
in the United States, he never really intended to live there permanently, for all that he
wanted was a green card to enable him to come and go to the U.S. with ease. In
other words, he would have this Court believe that he applied for immigration to the
U.S. under false pretenses; that all this time he only had one foot in the United States
but kept his other foot in the Philippines. Even if that were true, this Court will not
47
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
allow itself to be a party to his duplicity by permitting him to benefit from it, and giving
him the best of both worlds so to speak.

Miguel's application for immigrant status and permanent residence in the U.S. and his
possession of a green card attesting to such status are conclusive proof that he is a
permanent resident of the U.S. despite his occasional visits to the Philippines. The
waiver of such immigrant status should be as indubitable as his application for it.
Absent clear evidence that he made an irrevocable waiver of that status or that he
surrendered his green card to the appropriate U.S. authorities before he ran for mayor
of Bolinao in the local elections on January 18, 1988, our conclusion is that he was
disqualified to run for said public office, hence, his election thereto was null and void.

WHEREFORE, the appealed orders of the COMELEC and the Court of Appeals in
SPC Nos. 87-551, 87-595 and 87-604, and CA-G.R. SP No. 14531 respectively, are
hereby set aside. The election of respondent Merito C. Miguel as municipal mayor of
Bolinao, Pangasinan is hereby annulled. Costs against the said respondent.

SO ORDERED.

48

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.
Election Law; Domicile; Residence; Words and Phrases; Residence, for the purpose
of meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.—A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC’S Second Division reveals
a startling confusion in the application of settled concepts of “Domicile” and
“Residence” in election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the
general proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous
with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept
of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate’s qualifications for election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of
residing or physical presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention
of returning there permanently.—Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that “[f]or the
exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural
persons is their place of habitual residence.” In Ong vs. Republic this court took the
concept of domicile to mean an individual’s “permanent home,” “a place to which,
whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.” Based on the
foregoing, domicile includes the twin elements of “the fact of residing or physical
presence in a fixed place” and animus manendi, or the intention of returning there
permanently.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile and Residence, Distinguished.—Residence, in
its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country.
The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence
involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has taken up his
abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure, business, or
health. If a person’s intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his intent is to
leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a
person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully
abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; As these concepts have evolved in our election
law, what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for
election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.—For political purposes the
concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of political
laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and
unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used
synonymously with domicile.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Constitutional Law; When the Constitution speaks
of “residence ” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.”—The deliberations of
the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions have
placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in
election law, it actually means only “domicile.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is the fact of residence, not a statement
in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in determining whether or not
an individual has satisfied the constitution’s residency qualification requirement.—It is
the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be
decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitution’s
residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes material only when
there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact
which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would be plainly ridiculous for
a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a certificate of
candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The honest mistake in the certificate of candidacy
regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of residence in a
congressional district if such fact is established by means more convincing than a
mere entry on a piece of paper.—Having been forced by private respondent to
register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead of petitioner’s claimed
domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her actual
residence in a space which required her period of stay in her legal residence or
domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8—the first requiring actual
residence and the second requiring domicile—coupled with the circumstances
surrounding petitioner’s registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing
down an unintended entry for which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake
should not, however, be allowed to negate the fact of residence in the First District if
such fact were established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece
of paper.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; An individual does not lose his domicile even if he
has lived and maintained residences in different places.—We have stated, many
times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has lived and
maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a
factual relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal
residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a
temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of residence. Thus, the
assertion by the COMELEC that “she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City
since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because she
became a resident of many places” flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which
this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for
election law purposes.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Domicile of Origin; A minor follows the domicile of his
parents.—A minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is
49

retained until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner’s
being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law.
This domicile was not established only when she reached the age of eight years old,
when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent’s
averments.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Requisites for a change of domicile.—Domicile of
origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate: 1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile; 2. A bona fide
intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one;
and 3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary
act of relinquishing former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with
one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).—In the absence of clear and
positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be deemed to
continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires
an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at
the same time. In the case at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent
plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to convince this court that an
abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of choice indeed occurred. To
effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing petitioner’s former
domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own choosing
(domicilium voluntarium).
Same; Same; Same; Same; Marriages; Husband and Wife; The presumption that the
wife automatically gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage
cannot be inferred from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.—In
this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin
by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil Code
concepts of “domicile” and “residence.” The presumption that the wife automatically
gains the husband’s domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot be inferred
from the use of the term “residence” in Article 110 of the Civil Code because the Civil
Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A survey of jurisprudence yields nothing
which would suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin
in favor of the husband’s choice of residence upon marriage.—A survey of
jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as
they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that
the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband’s
choice of residence upon marriage.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 of
the Civil Code refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.”—The duty to live together
can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This takes into
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the
wife should necessarily be with him in order that they may “live together.” Hence, it is
illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to “domicile” and not to “residence.”
Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where the wife is left in the domicile
while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of their (various)
residences.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; What petitioner gained upon marriage was
actual residence—she did not lose her domicile of origin.—Parenthetically when
Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged—by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code—to follow her husband’s actual
place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had
several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos
Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family’s
residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places as the
conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual residence. She
did not lose her domicile of origin.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Family Code; The common law concept of
“matrimonial domicile” appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our
jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New
Family Code.—On the other hand, the common law concept of “matrimonial domicile”
appears to have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after
the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision
(Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women’s rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses.
Same; Same; Same; The term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law.—Without as much belaboring
the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under the Civil Code)
and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife-the term
residence should only be interpreted to mean “actual residence.” The inescapable
conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when
petitioner married the former President in 1954, she kept her domicile of origin and
merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Same; Statutory Construction; Mandatory and directory provisions; It is a settled
doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is
generally construed to be merely directory.—It is a settled doctrine that a statute
requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally construed to be
merely directory, “so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the judgment
on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly
indicated it.”
50

Same; Same; Same; The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is
often made on grounds of necessity.—The difference between a mandatory and a
directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same view
held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino v. Cruz held that: The
difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on
grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public
by disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
Same; Jurisdiction; Electoral Tribunals; The HRET’s jurisdiction as the sole judge of
all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of members of
Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.—As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal’s supposed
assumption of jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner’s qualifications after the May 8,
1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET’S jurisdiction as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the elections return and qualifications of members of Congress
begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is
obvious that the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question. Romualdez-
Marcos vs. Commission on Elections, 248 SCRA 300, G.R. No. 119976 September
18, 1995
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and
suppress the mischief at which it is aimed.1 The 1987 Constitution mandates that an
aspirant for election to the House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less
than one year immediately preceding the election." 2 The mischief which this provision
— reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution — seeks to prevent is the
possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of
a community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that
community."3
Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the
position of Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election
Supervisor on March 8, 1995, providing the following information in item no. 8: 4
RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE
ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:
__________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent
Representative of the First District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position,
filed a "Petition for Cancellation and Disqualification"5 with the Commission on
Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the constitutional requirement for
residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs. Marcos lacked the
Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration
Record 94-No. 33497726 and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an
order be issued declaring (petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of
candidacy."7
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
changing the entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended
certificate.8 On the same day, the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed
petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate
of Candidacy on the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline
for the filing of the same having already lapsed on March 20, 1995.
The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy should have
been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.9
Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with
the COMELEC's Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was
likewise filed with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred
that the entry of the word "seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the
result of an "honest misinterpretation" 10 which she sought to rectify by adding the
words "since childhood" in her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that
"she has always maintained Tacloban City as her domicile or residence. 11 Impugning
respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was
intending to register as a voter in Tacloban City and run for
Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner immediately
opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that
"she is not a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. After respondent had registered as a voter in Tolosa
following completion of her six month actual residence therein,
petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of
Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and pursued
such a move up to the Supreme Court, his purpose being to
remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the congressional
election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other
Leyte Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative
district to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District, to
achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant
petition for the same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to
submit along with respondent for the judgment and verdict of the
electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995. 12
On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
by a vote of 2 to 1, 13 came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's
Petition for Disqualification in SPA 95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's
Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March 31, 1995; and 3) canceling her
original Certificate of Candidacy. 14 Dealing with two primary issues, namely, the
validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the
51

deadline for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one
year residency requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the
printed word "Seven" (months) was a result of an "honest
misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part and, therefore, an
amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical"
presence in Tolosa and not residence of origin or domicile in the
First Legislative District, to which she could have responded "since
childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her
domicile is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which
she always intended to return whenever absent and which she has
never abandoned. Furthermore, in her memorandum, she tried to
discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that she
has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since
childhood, although she only became a resident of the Municipality
of Tolosa for seven months. She asserts that she has always been
a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the First District, before
coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration
in Tolosa, respondent announced that she would be registering in
Tacloban City so that she can be a candidate for the District.
However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner wrote the
Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a
resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim
and instead implicitly acceded to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation
or honest mistake." Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks
for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of her Answer, she was quite
aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be Tacloban
City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her
Certificate of Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what
was asked was her actual and physical presence in Tolosa is not
easy to believe because there is none in the question that
insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of
Candidacy speaks clearly of "Residency in the
CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to
be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or
misinterpretation, therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment
may be made, she cited the case of Alialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA
957). The reliance of respondent on the case of Alialy is misplaced.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which
cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions
intended primarily to secure timely and orderly conduct of
elections." The Supreme Court in that case considered the
amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an
inconsequential deviation. The change in the number of years of
residence in the place where respondent seeks to be elected is a
substantial matter which determines her qualification as a
candidacy, specially those intended to suppress, accurate material
representation in the original certificate which adversely affects the
filer. To admit the amended certificate is to condone the evils
brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month
period of her residency in order to prolong it by claiming it was
"since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be committed
before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy
can be gleaned from her entry in her Voter's Registration Record
accomplished on January 28, 1995 which reflects that she is a
resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further
buttressed by her letter to the election officer of San Juan, Metro
Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for the cancellation of
her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The
dates of these three (3) different documents show the respondent's
consistent conviction that she has transferred her residence to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited period of
time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8,
1995 will only sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore,
cannot be persuaded to believe in the respondent's contention that
it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of
Candidacy cannot be admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it
is clear that respondent has not complied with the one year
residency requirement of the Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered
as synonymous with "domicile" which imports not only the intention
52

to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in-that place,
coupled with conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes
a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto
Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino, 96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-
Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case, when she
returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was
not Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus
revertendi is pointed to Metro Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of
the First District since childhood is nothing more than to give her a
color of qualification where she is otherwise constitutionally
disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts admitted
by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban
City, she continuously lived in Manila. In 1959, after her husband
was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San Juan, Metro
Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San
Miguel, Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978,
she served as member of the Batasang Pambansa as the
representative of the City of Manila and later on served as the
Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these
positions if she had not been a resident of the City of Manila.
Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of candidacy for the
office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994,
respondent wrote a letter with the election officer of San Juan,
Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her registration in
the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or
transferred to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest
that she could not have been a resident of Tacloban City since
childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy
because she became a resident of many places, including Metro
Manila. This debunks her claim that prior to her residence in
Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the First Legislative District of
Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to
make Tacloban her domicile. She registered as a voter in different
places and on several occasions declared that she was a resident
of Manila. Although she spent her school days in Tacloban, she is
considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez
vs. RTC (226 SCRA 408) the Court explained how one acquires a
new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1) residence or bodily
presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must
basically be animus manendi with animus non revertendi. When
respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later on in Manila, coupled
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is
deemed to have abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her
childhood and school days, as her place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must
likewise be conduct indicative of such intention. Respondent's
statements to the effect that she has always intended to return to
Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent
has not presented any evidence to show that her conduct, one year
prior the election, showed intention to reside in Tacloban. Worse,
what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa, she had
been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident
of the First District of Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a
resident of the First District of Leyte for more than one year,
petitioner correctly pointed out that on January 28, 1995
respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte. In doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration
Record that she resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a period of
six months. This may be inconsequential as argued by the
respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte.
But her failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District
of Leyte prior to her residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a
convincing proof that she had been a resident of the district for six
months only. 15
In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the
COMELEC en banc denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration 16 of the April 24,
1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified to run for the position of Member of the
House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte. 17 The Resolution
tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Commission RESOLVED to DENY it, no new substantial matters
having been raised therein to warrant re-examination of the
resolution granting the petition for disqualification. 18
On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's
proclamation should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest
number of votes in the congressional elections in the First District of Leyte. On the
same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and issued a second Resolution
directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event that she
obtains the highest number of votes. 19
53

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the
overwhelming winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of
Leyte held May 8, 1995 based on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of
Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged that the canvass showed that she
obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes received by
Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the
congressional seat of the First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution
suspending her proclamation, petitioner comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The
principal issues may be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of
the First District of Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the
May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in
disqualifying petitioner outside the period mandated by the
Omnibus Election Code for disqualification cases under Article 78
of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
assumed exclusive jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's
qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling
confusion in the application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in
election law. While the COMELEC seems to be in agreement with the general
proposition that for the purposes of election law, residence is synonymous with
domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake the concept of
domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of
determining a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives
as required by the 1987 Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
meeting the qualification for an elective position, has a settled meaning in our
jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the
fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual
residence." In Ong vs. Republic 20 this court took the concept of domicile to mean an
individual's "permanent home", "a place to which, whenever absent for business or for
pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances in the sense
that they disclose intent." 21Based on the foregoing, domicile includes the twin
elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual
to a certain place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community
or country. The essential distinction between residence and domicile in law is that
residence involves the intent to leave when the purpose for which the resident has
taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes such as pleasure,
business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence. 22 It is thus,
quite perfectly normal for an individual to have different residences in various places.
However, a person can only have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he
successfully abandons his domicile in favor of another domicile of choice.
In Uytengsu vs. Republic, 23 we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence"
is used to indicate a place of abode, whether permanent or
temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to
which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may
have a residence in one place and a domicile in another.
Residence is not domicile, but domicile is residence coupled with
the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man can have but
one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally
his place of domicile, but it is not by any means necessarily so
since no length of residence without intention of remaining will
constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the
peculiar criteria of political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law,
what has clearly and unequivocally emerged is the fact that residence for election
purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray, 24 the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with
domicile which imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal
presence in that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." 25 Larena
vs. Teves 26 reiterated the same doctrine in a case involving the qualifications of the
respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of Dumaguete, Negros
Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino, 27 held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place
54

28
where one is elected does not constitute loss of residence. So settled is the
concept (of domicile) in our election law that in these and other election law cases,
this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual from his permanent
residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change of
domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain
elective positions have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution
speaks of "residence" in election law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require
residence in the place not less than one year immediately
preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the
legislature? Is it actual residence or is it the concept of domicile or
constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of
the National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely
provides, among others, "and a resident thereof", that is, in the
district for a period of not less than one year preceding the day of
the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile. 29
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I
think Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that
"resident" has been interpreted at times as a matter of intention
rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the
proper time to go back to actual residence rather than mere
intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty
especially considering that a provision in the Constitution in the
Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as
enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it
should be by domicile and not physical residence. 30
In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 31 this Court concluded
that the framers of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to
the term residence in election law, regarding it as having the same meaning as
domicile. 32
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos
satisfied the residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987
Constitution? Of what significance is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy stating her residence in the First Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7)
months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to
be decisive in determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the
constitution's residency qualification requirement. The said statement becomes
material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate attempt to mislead,
misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It would
be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement
in a certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in
jotting the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification
requirement. The circumstances leading to her filing the questioned entry obviously
resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted petitioner to write down the
period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of residence in the
First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These circumstances
and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner
announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run
in the First District, private respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that
petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in
her place of actual residence in the First District, which is Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which
she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look at said
certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence
(Item No. 7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency
where a candidate seeks election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy.
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE
ELECTION:_________ Years and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence
in Leyte instead of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted
down her period of stay in her legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries
in Item 7 and Item 8 — the first requiring actual residence and the second requiring
domicile — coupled with the circumstances surrounding petitioner's registration as a
voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for which she
could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate
the fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more
convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper.
55

We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the
First District of Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed
Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains that "except for the time when (petitioner)
studied and worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she
continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in
the last few decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution,
petitioner, in 1959, resided in San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered
voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of her husband to the Philippine
presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In 1978 and
thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of
Metro Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a
resident of Metro Manila," the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile
even if he has lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it
bears repeating, implies a factual relationship to a given place for various purposes.
The absence from legal residence or domicile to pursue a profession, to study or to
do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not constitute loss of
residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled
jurisprudence in which this Court carefully made distinctions between (actual)
residence and domicile for election law purposes. In Larena vs. Teves, 33 supra, we
stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his
own house wherein he lives with his family in a municipality without
having ever had the intention of abandoning it, and without having
lived either alone or with his family in another municipality, has his
residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and
having been a candidate for various insular and provincial
positions, stating every time that he is a resident of the latter
municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino, 34 We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener
pastures," as the saying goes, to improve his lot, and that, of
course includes study in other places, practice of his avocation, or
engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen
who left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his
native town to cast his ballot but for professional or business
reasons, or for any other reason, he may not absent himself from
his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself
as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
give up or lose the opportunity to choose the officials who are to run
the government especially in national elections. Despite such
registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile or
residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the
explanation why the registration of a voter in a place other than his
residence of origin has not been deemed sufficient to constitute
abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of
birth. This strong feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth
must be overcome by positive proof of abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting
its proposition that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of
the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's
various places of (actual) residence, not her domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored
settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the deliberations of the
constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881). 35
What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of
petitioner's domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's
assailed Resolution: 36
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she
established her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She
studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938 to 1949
when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college
studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in
Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter,
she taught in the Leyte Chinese School, still in Tacloban City. In
1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the late speaker
Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives.
In 1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he
was still a congressman of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a
voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in
1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected
President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel,
Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were
abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991,
she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent ran for election as
President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of
San Juan, Metro Manila.
56

Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is
inescapable is that petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the
last four decades. None of these purposes unequivocally point to an intention to
abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte. Moreover, while petitioner was
born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her parents. She
grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established
residence in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her
husband's presidency, at the height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept
her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban,
celebrating her birthdays and other important personal milestones in her home
province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close
relatives held positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always
with either her influence or consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of
origin are part of the history and lore of the quarter century of Marcos power in our
country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S Resolutions, or the
majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew: the
fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's
domicile of origin because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He
avers that after leaving the place in 1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein
for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her domicile in said place by merely
expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained
until a new one is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in
Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile
was not established only when her father brought his family back to Leyte contrary to
private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate: 37
1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of
residence and establishing a new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of
origin should be deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all
three requirements can the presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a
change of residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment, and one cannot
have two legal residences at the same time. 38 In the case at bench, the evidence
adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness required to
convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of
relinquishing petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile
with one of her own choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of
origin by operation of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand
E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a clearly established distinction between the Civil
Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence." 39 The presumption that the wife
automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon marriage cannot
be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr.
Arturo Tolentino, writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile
and residence. Both terms imply relations between a person and a
place; but in residence, the relation is one of fact while in domicile it
is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence. 40
Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. — The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But
the court may exempt the wife from living with the husband if he
should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or
residence as they affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would
suggest that the female spouse automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of
the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889
which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije
su residencia. Los Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa
eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el marido transende su
residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted
article, which means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part
of the article clearly contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive
act of fixing a family home or residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further
strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido translade su residencia" in the same
provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his residence," referring to
another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a
fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from
57

one place to another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to
move his family, a circumstance more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of
the law to strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and
the wife bring into the marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could,
for the sake of family unity, be reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single
place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the
heading: RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article 109 which obliges the husband and wife
to live together, thus:
Art. 109. — The husband and wife are obligated to live together,
observe mutual respect and fidelity and render mutual help and
support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically
together. This takes into account the situations where the couple has many
residences (as in the case of the petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer
to any one of their residences, the wife should necessarily be with him in order that
they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art. 110 refers to
"domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where
the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons,
stays in one of their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile — Whether the word "residence" as used
with reference to particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is
a question of some difficulty, and the ultimate decision must be
made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with which the
word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other
times they are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical
presence of a person in a place. A person can have two or more
residences, such as a country residence and a city residence.
Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other hand,
domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important
thing for domicile is that, once residence has been established in
one place, there be an intention to stay there permanently, even if
residence is also established in some other
place. 41
In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife
during the marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
the question of a common matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized
certain situations 42 where the spouses could not be compelled to live with each other
such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a residence different from that of her
husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original domicile (apart from
being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs.Villareal 43 this Court held that
"[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her
husband during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for
divorce." 44 Note that the Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to
choose a new domicile in such an event. In instances where the wife actually opts,
.under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband either by taking new
residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife could
not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques
de Arroyo 45 the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not
within the province of the courts of this country to attempt to compel
one of the spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to,
the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the pair are
invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained.
But we are disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order,
enforcible (sic) by process of contempt, may be entered to compel
the restitution of the purely personal right of consortium. At best
such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of
those countries where the courts of justice have assumed to
compel the cohabitation of married people shows that the policy of
the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly
the Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of
conjugal rights at the instance of either husband or wife; and if the
facts were found to warrant it, that court would make a mandatory
decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other
and render conjugal rights. Yet this practice was sometimes
criticized even by the judges who felt bound to enforce such orders,
and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division
of the High Court of Justice, expressed his regret that the English
law on the subject was not the same as that which prevailed in
Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained
by the injured spouse, but could not be enforced by imprisonment.
Accordingly, in obedience to the growing sentiment against the
practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the remedy
of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal
rights can still be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve
in appropriate cases as the basis of an order for the periodical
payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one
court, so far as we can discover, has ever attempted to make a
58

preemptory order requiring one of the spouses to live with the
other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow
and live with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the
City of New Orleans. The decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36
La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the Civil Code of
Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was
decided many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been
fruitful even in the State of Louisiana. In other states of the
American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by process of
contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain
appears to have affirmed an order of the Audiencia Territorial de
Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital domicile, and in
the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and
to deliver to her husband, as administrator of the ganancial
property, all income, rents, and interest which might accrue to her
from the property which she had brought to the marriage. (113 Jur.
Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return
of the wife to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other
penalty than the consequences that would be visited upon her in
respect to the use and control of her property; and it does not
appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have
been followed by imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954,
petitioner was obliged — by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code — to follow her
husband's actual place of residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that
time, Mr. Marcos had several places of residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal
and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of these places Mr. Marcos did fix
as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any of these places
as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to
have been incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the
drafting of the Civil Code of 1950, into the New Family Code. To underscore the
difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and the Family Code drafters, the
term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely new provision
(Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the
intervening years by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement
between the spouses. 46
Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil
law (or under the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands
clear is that insofar as the Civil Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations
of husband and wife — the term residence should only be interpreted to mean "actual
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this unambiguous civil law
delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in 1954,
she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium
necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after
her marriage and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died,
petitioner's acts following her return to the country clearly indicate that she not only
impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of origin (assuming this was lost by
operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally expressed in her
letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission
to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make
them livable for the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland." 47 Furthermore,
petitioner obtained her residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in
her brother's house, an act which supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested
in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could not have gone straight to her home in
San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been previously looted by vandals.
Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of Metro Manila
merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female
spouse either reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the
subsistence of the marriage, it would be highly illogical for us to assume that she
cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her husband absent a positive
act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of the
marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this
court up to this point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties
weigh heavily in favor of a conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence
or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed
considering that the assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen
(14) days before the election in violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election
Code. 48 Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the election of
members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of
the Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified
time is generally construed to be merely directory, 49 "so that non-compliance with
them does not invalidate the judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended
such result it would have clearly indicated it." 50 The difference between a mandatory
and a directory provision is often made on grounds of necessity. Adopting the same
view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino vs. Cruz held
that: 51
59
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim petitioner as the duly elected
often determined on grounds of expediency, the reason being that Representative of the First District of Leyte.
less injury results to the general public by disregarding than
enforcing the letter of the law. SO ORDERED.

In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a

statute containing a limitation of thirty (30) days within which a
decree may be entered without the consent of counsel, it was held
that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from with
impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are
usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is
essential to effect the aim and purpose of the Legislature or some
incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the statute under
examination was construed merely to be directory.

The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained
from rendering a decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code
because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial
bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of having failed
to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.

In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to
Section 78 of B.P. 881, 52 it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose
jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case under Section 78 of
B.P. 881 even after the elections.

As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of

jurisdiction over the issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections,
suffice it to say that HRET's jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the
elections, returns and qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a
candidate has become a member of the House of Representatives. 53 Petitioner not
being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that the HRET at this
point has no jurisdiction over the question.

It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for
us to either to ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a
ground here. Surely, many established principles of law, even of election laws were
flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA regime. We renege on
these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves bending
established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly
deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes
of the past.

WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence

qualifications to run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of
Leyte, the COMELEC's questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and
May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE. Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to

60

G.R. No. L-12790 August 31, 1960
JOEL JIMENEZ, plaintiff-appellee, vs. REMEDIOS CAÑIZARES, defendant.
Republic of the Philippines, intervenor-appellant.
1. MARRIAGE; ITS NATURE AND SANCTITY; SECURITY AND STABILITY OF
STATE.-
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.
The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity
andpermanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it.
It is in the interest and duty of each and every member of the community to prevent
the bringing about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to
its destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the
parties.
2. MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT; IMPOTENCY; LONE TESTIMONY OF HUSBAND;
CASE AT BAR.-
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
to have been satisfactorily established because from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
3. MARRIAGE; WOMAN'S REFUSAL FOR PHYSICAL EXAMINATION; NOT
SUPPRESSION OF EVIDENCE.-
Although the wife's refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show
indifference on her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the
suppression of evidence could not arise or be inferred, because women of this
country are by nature coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical
examination unless compelled to by competent authority. This the court may do
without doing violence to and infringing upon her constitutional right. A physical
examination in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any offense.
She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. Impotency being an
abnormal condition should not be presumed.
4. MARRIAGE; ANNULMENT; PRESUMPTION OF POTENCY; HUSBAND'S LONE
TESTIMONY INSUFFICIENT.-
The presumption is in favor of potency. The lone testimony of the husband that his
wife is physically incapable of sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties
that have bound them together as husband and wife.
In a complaint filed on 7 June 1955 in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga the
plaintiff Joel Jimenez prays for a decree annulling his marriage to the defendant
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
Remedios Cañizares contracted on 3 August 1950 before a judge of the municipal
court of Zamboanga City, upon the ground that the office of her genitals or vagina
was to small to allow the penetration of a male organ or penis for copulation; that the
condition of her genitals as described above existed at the time of marriage and
continues to exist; and that for that reason he left the conjugal home two nights and
one day after they had been married. On 14 June 1955 the wife was summoned and
served a copy of the complaint. She did not file an answer. On 29 September 1956,
pursuant to the provisions of article 88 of the Civil Code, the Court directed the city
attorney of Zamboanga to inquire whether there was a collusion, to intervene for the
State to see that the evidence for the plaintiff is not a frame-up, concocted or
fabricated. On 17 December 1956 the Court entered an order requiring the defendant
to submit to a physical examination by a competent lady physician to determine her
physical capacity for copulation and to submit, within ten days from receipt of the
order, a medical certificate on the result thereof. On 14 March 1957 the defendant
was granted additional five days from notice to comply with the order of 17 December
1956 with warning that her failure to undergo medical examination and submit the
required doctor's certificate would be deemed lack of interest on her part in the case
and that judgment upon the evidence presented by her husband would be rendered.
After hearing, at which the defendant was not present, on 11 April 1957 the Court
entered a decree annulling the marriage between the plaintiff and the defendant. On
26 April 1957 the city attorney filed a motion for reconsideration of the decree thus
entered, upon the ground, among others, that the defendant's impotency has not
been satisfactorily established as required by law; that she had not been physically
examined because she had refused to be examined; that instead of annulling the
marriage the Court should have punished her for contempt of court and compelled
her to undergo a physical examination and submit a medical certificate; and that the
decree sought to be reconsidered would open the door to married couples, who want
to end their marriage to collude or connive with each other by just alleging impotency
of one of them. He prayed that the complaint be dismissed or that the wife be
subjected to a physical examination. Pending resolution of his motion, the city
attorney timely appealed from the decree. On 13 May 1957 the motion for
reconsideration was denied.
The question to determine is whether the marriage in question may be annulled on
the strength only of the lone testimony of the husband who claimed and testified that
his wife was and is impotent. The latter did not answer the complaint, was absent
during the hearing, and refused to submit to a medical examination.
Marriage in this country is an institution in which the community is deeply interested.
The state has surrounded it with safeguards to maintain its purity, continuity and
permanence. The security and stability of the state are largely dependent upon it. It is
the interest of each and every member of the community to prevent the bringing
about of a condition that would shake its foundation and ultimately lead to its
destruction. The incidents of the status are governed by law, not by will of the parties.
The law specifically enumerates the legal grounds, that must be proved to exist by
indubitable evidence, to annul a marriage. In the case at bar, the annulment of the
marriage in question was decreed upon the sole testimony of the husband who was
expected to give testimony tending or aiming at securing the annulment of his
marriage he sought and seeks. Whether the wife is really impotent cannot be deemed
61
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
to have been satisfactorily established, becase from the commencement of the
proceedings until the entry of the decree she had abstained from taking part therein.
Although her refusal to be examined or failure to appear in court show indifference on
her part, yet from such attitude the presumption arising out of the suppression of
evidence could not arise or be inferred because women of this country are by nature
coy, bashful and shy and would not submit to a physical examination unless
compelled to by competent authority. This the Court may do without doing violence to
and infringing in this case is not self-incrimination. She is not charged with any
offense. She is not being compelled to be a witness against herself. 1 "Impotency
being an abnormal condition should not be presumed. The presumption is in favor of
potency."2 The lone testimony of the husband that his wife is physically incapable of
sexual intercourse is insufficient to tear asunder the ties that have bound them
together as husband and wife.

The decree appealed from is set aside and the case remanded to the lower court for
further proceedings in accordance with this decision, without pronouncement as to
costs.

62

G.R. No. L-7487 December 29, 1913
CONSTANZA YAÑEZ DE BARNUEVO, plaintiff and appellant, vs. GABRIEL
FUSTER, defendant and appellant.
1. DIVORCE; JURISDICTION OF COURTS WHERE PARTIES LITIGANT ARE
SPANISH SUBJECTS, RESIDING IN THE PHILIPPINES AND MARRIED UNDER
THE ECCLESIASTICAL LAW.-
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have jurisdiction to try actions
for divorce (separation) when the parties litigant, one or both, are citizens or
residents, even though they are Spanish subjects and were married in accordance
with the ecclesiastical forms and ceremonies. (Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil.
Rep., 34; Ibañez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325.)
2. APPEAL; CONSIDERATION OF FINDINGS OF FACTS WHEN THE EVIDENCE
DOES NOT ACCOMPANY THE RECORD.-
When the evidence is not made a part of the record, the Supreme Court will accept as
true the facts admitted by the pleadings and found by the lower court in its decision,
even though a motion was made for a new trial in the lower court.
3. DIVORCE; ADULTERY; PUBLIC SCANDAL.-
When adultery is made the cause or ground for a divorce, it is not necessary to show
that the adultery had been accompanied by public scandal and contempt for the wife.
4. EVIDENCE; FOREIGN LAWS.-
Foreign laws cannot be proven by the affidavit of a person not versed in the law,
especially by ex parte affidavit which was not presented or received in evidence. A
foreign law may be proved by the certificate of the officer having in charge the
original, under the seal of the state or country. It may also be proved by an official
copy of the same, published under the authority of the particular state and purporting
to contain such law. (Secs. 300 and 301, Act No. 190.)
5. HUSBAND AND WIFE; CONJUGAL PROPERTY.-
All of the property belonging to a husband and wife shall be considered as conjugal
property, until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife.
(Art. 1407, Civil Code.)
6. HUSBAND AND WIFE; SEPARATION; ALIMONY.-
A husband and wife entered into a contract to live separately. The husband agreed to
pay to the wife a certain amount for her support (as alimony). In an action for divorce
the wife can not recover the arrears of payment, even though the payments had been
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
stipulated in the contract. Such an action must be maintained by the person who
actually f urnished the support.
On the 7th of February, 1875, Gabriel Fuster and Constanza Yañez were joined in a
Catholic or canonical marriage in the city of Malaga, Spain. In February of 1892,
Gabriel Fuster came to the Philippine Islands, settled, and acquired real and personal
property. Toward the middle of 1896, Constanza Yañez came to Manila, where her
husband was residing, and here lived with him in conjugal relations until the month of
April, 1899. On the 4th day of that month and year they made an agreement, in a
public document, by which they "resolved to separate and live apart, both consenting
to such separation, and by virtue thereof the husband authorized the wife to move to
Spain, there to reside in such place as the said lady pleases." (B. of E., p. 13.) In the
same document, the husband undertook to send his wife the sum of
300 pesetas monthly for her support, payable in Madrid, Spain, from the month of
June of the said year 1899. The husband complied with this obligation until August,
1899, after which time he ceased to make further payments.
In the beginning of March, 1909, the wife returned to the Philippines, but the husband
had absented himself therefrom in the early days of February of the same year. On
the 11th of March, 1909, the wife commenced divorce proceedings against her
husband, alleging as cause of action the adultery committed by him in or about the
year 1899 with a certain woman that she named in the complaint and with whom he
had lived and cohabited and by whom he had had two children. She prayed that she
be granted a decree of divorce; that the court order the separation of the properties of
the plaintiff and the defendant, to date from the date of the said decree; that the
conjugal society be therefore liquidated, and after the amount of the conjugal property
had been determined, that one-half thereof be adjudicated to her; furthermore, as to
the amount of pension owing for her support but not paid to her, that the defendant be
ordered to pay her the sum of 36,000 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 Spanish dollars,
which, reduced to Philippine currency at the rate of exchange on the date of the
complaint, amounted to P12,959.90.
The defendant denied that either he or his wife was a resident of the city of Manila, as
they had their domicile in Barcelona, Spain, and he alleged that both of them were
natives and subjects of Spain. He admitted that he was married to Constanza Yañez;
he also admitted having executed the document of the 4th of April, 1899, in which he
had undertaken to make an allowance for the support of his wife in Madrid, but he
denied the other paragraphs of the complaint. As a special defense with regard to the
allowance, he alleged: "That in or about the month of May, 1900, he wrote to his wife,
the plaintiff, instructing her to return to Manila, with a view of joining her husband and
being maintained by him in his own house; that the communication was ignored by
the plaintiff, who against the will of the defendant, continued to live separately from
him that from the year 1901, the defendant did not know her address; that since 1900,
the plaintiff has lived in comfort and has known where her husband resided; that the
plaintiff, during all of the time referred to, in addition to dispossing of valuable property
belonging to her husband, possessed and still possesses property of her own,
acquired by her, in greater amount than that owned by her husband; and that in any
case the action has prescribed by operation of law."(B. of E., pp. 7 and 8.) As to the
divorce, he admits that he had by the plaintiff two children that have died. He
expressly denied the contents of paragraph 5 of the complaint, relating to the charge
63

of adultery and also those of paragraphs 6, 7, and 8, concerning the possession of
real and personal property of the conjugal partnership, the statement of their amount,
and their qualification as being all conjugal property. As a special defense, he alleged
that prior to the year 1899 he conferred powers of attorney upon the plaintiff to
administer and collect property and credits pertaining to him to the value of about
200,000 pesos; that the plaintiff accepted and exercised the said power of attorney,
attached the property and collected the credits without ever having rendered any
account of them. As a special preferred defense, he alleged that neither the trial court
nor any other court in the Philippine Islands has jurisdiction over the subject matter of
the complaint, because, as to the allowance for support, since neither the plaintiff nor
the defendant are residents of Manila, or of any other place in the Philippine Islands,
the agreement upon the subject was neither celebrated, nor was it to be fulfilled, in
the Philippine Islands; and as to the divorce, because the action therefore ought to be
tried by the ecclesiastical courts. In conclusion, he prayed that the court find: That the
court was without jurisdiction over the two causes of action; that even if it had
jurisdiction, it could not order the payment of the sum claimed as arrears of alimony;
that, after all, the action with regard to this cause of action has prescribed; and as to
the prayer for a decree of divorce, the defendant should be acquitted, while on the
other hand the plaintiff should be required to render to the defendant an accounting,
supported by proofs, of her operations as his attorney and administratrix of his
property in Spain.
In deciding the case, the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila held itself to have
jurisdiction, decreed the suspension of life in common between the plaintiff and
defendant, ordered the latter to pay the former P5,010.17, directed that the communal
property be divided between the parties, with costs against the defendant, and in
event that the parties could not agree to the division, it was to be effected by
commissioners according to law.
Both parties appealed from this judgment, but notwithstanding the appeal, the
partition of the property, by means of commissioners, was proceeded with. These
latter, after various vicissitudes, rendered their report and account of the partition to
the court, who then rendered final judgment, from which, also, both parties appealed.
I. DEFENDANT'S APPEAL.
The first error assigned is the utter lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and of all other
courts of the Islands to try the case, either with regard to the fulfillment of the contract
to furnish alimony, or to decree a divorce or suspension of life in common between
the spouses: lack of jurisdiction over the persons and over the subject matter of the
litigation; and over the persons of the contending parties, because neither of the
spouses was a resident of the Philippines on the date of the complaint.
The lower court did not commit this error attributed to him. The defendant had not
proved that he had elsewhere a legal domicile other than that which he manifestly
had in the Philippines during the seventeen years preceding the date of the
complaint. On the contrary, it plainly appears, without proof to the contrary, that
during this not inconsiderable period, extending from the year 1892 until a month prior
to the arrival of his wife in the Philippines in March, 1909, he had constantly resided in
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
the said Islands, had kept open house, and had acquired in the city of Manila quite a
little real property which is now the object of the division of the conjugal society. It is
also plainly shown, without proof to the contrary, that his wife resided in this city of
Manila from the middle of 1896 until April, 1899, at which time she was permitted by
him to change her residence. It is affirmed by the defendant in point five of his answer
to the complaint, that in May, 1900, he sent a letter instructing the plaintiff to return to
Manila to live withher husband and to be supported by him in his house, but that the
plaintiff, against the will of the defendant, continued to live part from him. (B. of E., p.
7.) It is also affirmed in the said answer, that during all of the time referred to in the
complaint, and especially since 1900, the plaintiff knew where her husband resided.
(B. of E., p. 7.) It is also very evident that the contract, by virtue of which he
authorized his wife to move to Spain and reside there in such place as was agreeable
to her, was executed in these Islands, "in the city of Manila on the 4th of April, 1889,"
as is to be seen in the heading of the document. (B. of E., p. 12.) Finally, at page 11
of his brief, he says that the record shows him to be a Spanish subject, inscribed in
the consulate of his nation, and cities article 26 of the Civil Code, the Treaty of Paris
and the Philippine Bill.
Granting these facts, there can be no doubt that the defendant, although a Spanish
subject, was a resident of these Islands. Article 26 of the Civil Code that he cites itself
provides that "Spaniards who change their domicile to a foreign country, where they
may be considered as natives without other conditions than that of residents therein,
shall be required, in order to preserve the Spanish nationality, to state that such is
their wish before the Spanish diplomatic or consular agent, who must record them in
the registry of Spanish residents, as well as their spouses, should they be married,
and any children they may have." From this provision, which is the exclusive and
irrefutable law governing the defendant, we are to conclude that the domicile of the
defendant and the plaintiff is fully proven, irrespective of the Treaty of Paris. Without
this supposition of having acquired his domicile and residence in these Islands, he
could not have required his wife to return to live with him therein because this
requirement could only be based on articles 58 of the Civil Code of Spain, according
to which the wife is obliged to follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish his
residence, or on article 48 of chapter 5 of the Marriage Law in force in the Philippines,
which imposes upon the wife the duty of obeying her husband, living in his company,
or of following him to wherever he transfers his domicile or residence. And just
because he was absent for a month before his wife returned to the Philippines, he
cannot be understood to have surrendered his habitual domicile of more than
seventeen years, without having established any other afterwards, and without
making any declaration in legal form, before he absented himself, of it being his
intention to change his domicile, while at the same time he retains here his house,
real property and all manner of means of subsistence. Section 377 of the Code of
Civil Procedure leaves to the election of the plaintiff the bringing of a personal action
like the one at bar either in the place where the defendant may reside or be found, or
in that where the plaintiff resides.
The litigating spouses have gained not only domicile (domicilio) but also residence
(vecindad) in Manila. In this litigation the defendant claims that, born as he says in
Mallorca, in the Balearic Islands, he is not subject, in his marriage, to the rules
governing conjugal property, that are in force in the territories of Spain that are
governed by the common law of Castillo (as the Philippines in their day), because
64

they are opposed to the Foral Law in force in the said Islands and which is respected
by the Civil Code. Even if this defense could be sustained herein, paragraph 2 of
article 15 of the said Civil Code would be applicable. It provides: "For the purposes of
this article, residence (vecindad) will be acquired: By residence of ten years
in common law provinces or territories, unless before the termination of that time he
manifests his will to the contrary; or by a residence of two years, if the interested
person declares this to be his will . . . In any case, the wife will follow the condition of
her husband. . . ." On no occasion had the defendant manifested his will to the
contrary, not even as he was leaving, after a residence of seventeen years, a month
before the return of his wife to these Islands. On the contrary, when he inscribed
himself in the Spanish consulate, he declared his intention of continuing to reside in
the Islands as a Spaniard and not as a Mallorquin, subject as such to the common
law of Spain.
In an endeavor to demonstrate the lack of jurisdiction of the courts of these Islands
over the subject matter of the complaint that is to try an action for divorce between
two Catholic Spaniards, he alleges in his appeal: That both litigants are Spanish
subjects and that they contracted a Catholic marriage; that in accordance with article
9 of the Civil Code of Spain (the same as that of these Islands) the laws relating to
family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons,
govern Spaniards although they reside in a foreign country; that, in consequence, "all
questions of a civil nature, such as those dealing with the validity or nullity of the
matrimonial bond, the domicile of the husband and wife, their support, as between
them, the separation of their properties, the rules governing property, marital
authority, division of conjugal property, the classification of their property, legal
causes for divorce, the extent of the latter, the AUTHORITY to decree it, and, in
general, the civil effects of marriage and divorce upon the person and properties of
the spouses, are questions that are governed exclusively by the national law of the
husband and wife, and, in our case, by the Spanish law by virtue of article 9 as above
set out." (Brief, p. 12.) The appellant and defendant continues his argument, saying:
That by the express provision of article 80 of the Civil Code of Spain, "jurisdiction in
actions for divorce and nullification of canonical marriages lies with ecclesiastical
courts," while that of civil tribunals is limited to civil marriages; that this being so, the
action for divorce brought by the plaintiff in the cause does not fall within the
jurisdiction of the civil courts, according to his own law of persons, because these
courts ought to apply the Spanish law in accordance with the said article 9 of the Civil
Cod of Spain, and this Spanish law grants the jurisdiction over the present cause to
the ecclesiastical courts, in the place of which no tribunal of these Islands con
subrogate itself. Says this appellant: "If a law of a foreign country were of rigorous
application in a given case, a North American tribunal would have no jurisdiction upon
an ecclesiastical court and therefore the North American tribunal in applying it would
have to exercise a faculty which that law reserved to the ecclesiastical court." (Brief,
pp. 13, 14, and 15.)
Unless we take the question itself for granted, the foregoing reasoning cannot be
upheld. The question is precisely whether the courts of the Philippines are competent
or have jurisdiction to decree the divorce now on appeal, and it is taken for granted
that the power to decree it is one of the rights included in the personal statute, but
appellant does not prove by any law or legal doctrine whatever that the personal
statute of a foreigner carries with it, to whether he transfers his domicile, the authority
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
established by the law of his nation to decree his divorce, which was what he had to
demonstrate.
The authority of jurisdictional power of courts to decree a divorce is not comprised
within the personal status of the husband and wife, simply because the whole theory
of the statutes and of the rights which belong to everyone does not go beyond the
sphere of private law, and the authority and jurisdiction of the courts are not a matter
of the private law of persons, but of the public or political law of the nation. "The
jurisdiction of courts and other questions relating to procedure are considered to be of
a public nature and consequently are generally submitted to the territorial principle. . .
. All persons that have to demand justice in a case in which foreigners intervene,
since they can gain nothing by a simple declaration, should endeavor to apply to the
tribunales of the state which have coercive means (property situated in the territory)
to enforce any decision they may render. Otherwise, one would expose himself in the
suit to making useless expenditures which, although he won his case, would not
contribute to secure his rights because of the court's lack of means to enforce them."
(Torres Campos, "Elementos de Derecho International Privado," p. 108.) "Justice,"
says the same professor, "is a principle superior to that of nations, and it should
therefore be administered without taking into any account whatsoever the state to
which the litigants belong. . . . In order to foster their relations and develop their
commerce, all civilized nations are interested in doing justice, not alone to their own
people, but to those foreigners who contract within the country or outside of it juridical
ties which in some manner effect their sovereignty. (Ibid, p. 107.) Might its courts, in
some cases, in suits between foreigners residing in its territory, apply the personal
law of the parties, but abdicate their jurisdiction, refrain from administering justice
because the personal law of the foreigner gave the jurisdiction of the given case to
some court that is not the territorial one of the nation? This has never yet been
claimed in any of the theories regarding the conflict of laws arising out of questions of
nationality and domicile; it would be equivalent to recognizing extraterritorial law in
favor of private persons. The provisions of article 80 of the Civil Law of Spain is only
binding within the dominions of Spain. It does not accompany the persons of the
Spanish subject wherever he may go. He could not successfully invoke it if he resided
in Japan, in China, in Hongkong or in any other territory not subject to the dominion of
Spain. Foreign Catholics domiciled in Spain, subject to the ecclesiastical courts in
actions for divorce according to the said article 80 of the Civil Code, could not allege
lack of jurisdiction by invoking, as the law of their personal statute, a law of their
nation which gives jurisdiction in such a case to territorial courts, or to a certain court
within or without the territory of their nation.1awphi1.net
It is a question that has already been settled in two decisions of the Supreme Court
(Benedicto vs. De la Rama, 3 Phil. Rep., 34, and Ibañez vs. Ortiz, 5 Phil. Rep., 325).
In the present action for divorce the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila did not
lack jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, for, although Spanish Catholic
subjects, they were residents of this city and had their domicile herein.
The Courts of First Instance of the Philippine Islands have the power and jurisdiction
to try actions for divorce. That of the city of Manila did not lack jurisdiction by reason
of the subject matter of the litigation.
65

The second assignment of error is directed against the finding of the court that the
defendant had committed adultery with a certain woman in this city from the year
1899 until 1909; the third was against the finding that the adultery was accompanied
by public scandal and injured the dignity of his wife; and the fourth for having decreed
the divorce, suspension of the married life, and the separation of the properties of the
parties.
The evidence relating to the foregoing not being sent up on appeal, we are unable to
review it, so we accept the findings of the trial court.
There is a point of law regarding the claim that the adultery, even though it were
proven would not be a cause for divorce, because no public scandal resulted
therefrom nor was there contempt displayed for the wife. (Appellant's brief, p. 26.)
The facts must be accepted by this tribunal as they were found by the trial court,
since the evidence cannot be reviewed; moreover, the appellee affirms the contrary
and maintains that it is a proven fact, public and notorious, an assertion that the trial
court must have found to be proven. (Appellee's brief, p. 5.) In law, it is not necessary
that adultery, to be a cause for divorce, should be accompanied by public scandal
and contempt for the wife. There is no law that requires this. Law 2, title 9, of the
Fourth Partida does not require it.
The fifth and sixth assignments of error are directed against the finding of the trial
court that there exists conjugal property, a finding that the appellant maintains is
without foundation, and that which holds that the property in the hands of the receiver
(that sought to be divided) is conjugal property, a conclusion which the appellant
claims to be contrary to the law which should be applied to the case and according to
which, as alleged in the tenth assignment of error, the whole of the property should be
adjudicated to the defendant as being exclusively his.
Facts: The appellant affirms that he is a native of Mallorca in the Balearic Islands and
that is also the condition of his wife, the plaintiff. Law: That although the rule of the
Civil Code is that which legally governs conjugal property, yet at the same time it
admits, as an exception, the laws, usages, and customs of the Foral Law, according
to which, as applied in the Balearic Islands, the law of the family is that of the division
of property and that of conjugal property is not known; so that the property pertains
exclusively to the spouse who, by whatever title, has acquired it. In support of the
facts, appellant cites pages 27 to 37 and 39 to 41 in the bill of exceptions; and of the
law, the doctrinal authority of Manresa, Gutierrez, and Alcubilla.
The citation from pages 39 to 41 of the bill of exceptions, the only pertinent one, is but
an affidavit filed by the defendant in which, under oath, he himself testifies as to the
Foral Law in the Balearic Islands. The adverse party says with regard to this: "This
affidavit was never presented in proof, was never received by the trial judge, and
cannot seriously be considered as an effort to establish the law of a foreign
jurisdiction. Sections 300, 301 and 302 of the Code of Civil Procedure, now in force in
these islands, indicate the method by which the law of a foreign country may be
proved. We maintain that the affidavit of a person not versed in the law, which was
never submitted as proof, never received by the trial court, and which has never been
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
subjected to any cross-examination, is not a means of proving a foreign law on which
the defendant relies." (Brief, pp. 6 and 7.)
Furthermore, on the supposition that the defendant could invoke the Foral Law as the
law of his personal status in the matter of the regimen of his marriage, and that to
allege this he be considered as authorized by article 15 of the Civil Code, we have
said before, in dealing with his law of domicile, that paragraph 2 of this article 15 of
the Civil Code would be entirely adverse to his claim, and if it be advanced that there
is a similar Foral Law in the Philippines by virtue of paragraph 1 of the said article 15,
it might be said, though there is not at present any need to say it, that it is not in force.
The two findings attacked are in perfect accord with the law. All the property of the
marriage, says article 1407 of the Civil Code, shall be considered as conjugal
property until it is proven that it belongs exclusively to the husband or to the wife. No
proof has been submitted to this effect.
As seventh assignment of error it is alleged that the court below erred in holding in
the judgment that the plaintiff had brought to the marriage a dowry of 30,000 Spanish
dollars. But the defendant himself adds that the court made no order or decree
regarding the alleged dowry. On the other hand, the plaintiff, in her fourth assignment
of errors, claimed that the court erred in not confirming the report of the
commissioners which gave to the said plaintiff the sum of 30,000 Spanish dollars. It is
unnecessary to say anything further.
The eighth error consists in that the court below ordered the defendant to pay to the
plaintiff P56,010.17 Philippine currency, whereas the plaintiff had made no demand in
her complaint with respect to this sum; that no arrears of payment are owing for
alimony, even though payments had been stipulated in the contract, unless they are
claimed by the person who had furnished the actual support, and that alimony is due
only when it is necessary; so that, as the plaintiff has had no need of it for ten years,
nor has she stated who has furnished it, there is no reason for awaring her the
amount of the arrears for all that time; that as she has allowed ten years to elapse
before claiming it, her action prescribed in 1904, that is to say, after five years.
The plaintiff acknowledges that there is no petition or prayer in her complaint as to
this cause of action, but she considers that in equity such an omission can be
supplied.
Paragraph 3 of section 89 (90) of the Code of Civil Procedure determines one of the
requisites of the complaint: "A demand for the relief which the plaintiff claims." The
section goes on to say: "If the recovery of money or damages is demanded, the
amount demanded must be stated. If special relief, such as an order for the special
restitution of property, etc., the ground of demanding such relief must be stated and
the special relief prayed for. But there may be added to the statement of the specific
relief demanded a general prayer for such further or other relief as shall be deemed
equitable."
In the complaint of the case at bar the provisions of paragraph 2 of the said section
89 [90] are complied with by setting forth in its paragraphs 4 and 5 the relation of the
cause of action, that is, the contract of the 4th of April, 1899, by which the defendant
66

obligated himself to send to the plaintiff in Spain a certain amount of money monthly,
for her support, and the failure to comply with this obligation after the month of
August, 1899. Paragraph 6, as a consequence of the promise established in 4 and 5,
says as follows: "That the defendant Gabriel Fuster y Fuster actually owes the plaintiff
the sum of 36,100 Spanish pesetas, that is, 7,220 dollars, which, reduced at the
present rate of exchange, amounts to the sum of P12,959.90, Philippine currency."
(B. of E., p. 2.) In the case of default on the part of the defendant "the court shall
proceed to hear the plaintiff and his witnesses and assess the damages or determine
the other relief to which the plaintiff may be entitled, including the costs of the action,
and render final judgment for the plaintiff to recover such sum or to receive such other
relief as the pleadings and the facts warrant." The pleadings, not the prayer of the
complaint.
This court has recently decided that the pleadings, not the prayer, exactly, are the
essential part of a complaint.
It is not a question of alimony for the present, nor for the future, which constitutes the
first cause of action, but of certain sums stipulated in a contract. This contract is a law
for the contracting parties, a law which rises superior to those general laws which
regulate the nature of the subject matter of the contract (in the present case an
entirely voluntary one) and which govern judicial action.
An action arising out of a contract of this nature does not prescribe like all personal
ones, but, by the provisions of article 1964 of the Civil Code, after fifteen years. But
even though the provisions of article 1966 were applicable, by which an action to
compel the fulfillment of an agreement to pay alimony prescribes in five years, yet by
section 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, "when payment has been made upon any
demand founded upon contract . . . an action may be brought . . . after such payment.
. . ." And the parties admit that on the 18th of August, 1908, the plaintiff secured the
payment of 6,365.68 pesetas by virtue of the contract of April 4, 1899. So that from
August, 1908, until March, 1909, the date of the complaint, the said period of five
years had not elapsed.
The ninth assignment of error consists in that the court below erred in empowering
the receiver to proceed to the separation of the property and in appointing
commissioners to make the partition and distribution between the spouses, since the
principal question in this action hinges upon the classification of the property; that it
was erroneously classified as conjugal property, whereas all of it pertained to the
husband alone and should be adjudicated to him for the reason that, as it reiterated in
the tenth assignment of error, the conjugal partnership was not subject to the
provisions of the law governing conjugal property, because such provision are totally
foreign to the Foral Law of the Balearic Islands.
The action of the trial court, by the terms of section 184 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, was in accordance with law. The only question before this court is the
partition of real property. All that referred to in the second decision appealed from,
dated September 9, 1911, is urban real estate. Its classification as conjugal property
is in accordance with law, as is shown in the foregoing reasoning, and that no
consideration of the Foral Law enters into the question has also been demonstrated.
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
II. PLAINTIFF'S APPEAL.
As the trial court rendered judgment ordering the defendant to pay to the plaintiff only
P5,010.17, the petitioner here prays that the judgment be reversed and that in its
place this court order the defendant to pay to the plaintiff her claim of P12,959.90,
plus the additional sum which the alimony amounts to at the rate of P107.70 per
month, dating from the 1st of August, 1909, until the date of payment, with legal
interest upon the said P12,959.90 from the date of the filing of the complaint until the
date of payment, and, furthermore, legal interest upon each of the monthly payments
due after the filing of the complaint, and which will continue to become due until the
close of this litigation.
The trial court made the following findings: First, that the total amount of the alimony
owing to the plaintiff amounted to 34,200 pesetas; second, that of this sum the
plaintiff had collected in Madrid 6,365.68; third, that the remainder, that is, 27,834.32,
was equivalent to $5,566.86 Mexican currency; fourth, that the Mexican peso was
worth 90 centavos Philippine currency; fifth, that therefore the sum of $5,566.86
Mexican currency was equivalent to P5,010 Philippine currency; and finally, as there
was no evidence as to the kind of pesetas agreed upon, it was to be presumed that it
was that current at the time and place where the agreement was made, which was
Mexican pesetas.
In her appeal, the plaintiff contends that these findings are erroneous in that, firstly,
the parties had admitted that thepesetas referred to in the contract of the 4th of April,
1899, were Spanish, and in view of this admission the court was not empowered to
define them as being different from the kind admitted by the parties; secondly, if he
were so empowered, his interpretation should be governed by the terms of the law.
With regard to the first error, the plaintiff says that the statement is made in her
complaint that the defendant had obligated himself to pay her a "monthly pension for
her support of 300 Spanish pesetas, that is, 60 Spanish dollars, which, reduced to
Philippine currency, amounts to P107.70;" that the defendant had admitted this in hi
answer to the complaint, and that by his finding in a sense other than that accepted
and not refuted in the answer of the defendant, the court violated the provisions of
section 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
The court has not incurred this error, because it does not appear that the defendant in
his answer accepted the fact in the manner alleged in the complaint. The defendant
said that he admitted having made the agreement referred to in paragraph 4 of the
complaint, and that he stood upon its contents. The contents of the document to
which he refers is of the following tenor: "Mr. Fuster binds and obligates himself to
pay to his said wife the sum of 300 pesetas, monthly, payable de su cuenta in the city
and capital of Madrid, for her support. . . ." He did not therefore admit the matter of
the Spanish pesetas; that does not appear in the contents of the document — the
only thing he admitted in his answer.
As to the second error, the court did not commit it in applying the rule contained in
article 1287 of the Civil Code. "The usages or customs of the country shall be taken
into consideration in interpreting ambiguity in contracts. . . ." If in the contract the word
67
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
" pesetas," not being specific, was ambiguous, then it was in harmony with this
precept to interpret it as being the peseta then in use or current when and where the
agreement was made, Mexican being then the usual and current money in the
Philippines. Furthermore, the phrase de su cuenta clearly means that it was not
"Spanish pesetas" that the contracting parties had in mind, because if the agreement
had been a specific one to pay 300 Spanish pesetas in Madrid, everyone would of
course understand that the expense of following the fluctuations of change and of the
differences in value between the money current in the country, and the
Spanish pesetas, would have to be defrayed by the obligated party; whereas, if
nothing more than pesetas was mentioned, it was necessary to decide which party
should pay for the difference in value so that the 300 pesetas stipulated here should
be 300 Spanish pesetas paid in Madrid. Against the reasons of the court below for his
decision this court can offer no legal grounds. The rule of interpretation cited is the
one applicable and it supports the reasoning of the decision appealed from.

The appellant also alleges as error that the court did not adjudicate to her the 30,000
Spanish dollars which the commissioners proposed in their report. First she
characterizes this sum of 30,000 dollars as the dowry of the wife delivered to the
husband, then, later, as paraphernal property brought to the marriage.

According to the last instructions of the court to the commissioners, this amount of
30,000 dollars could not enter into the partition, and with reason. If, as was claimed, it
was inherited by the plaintiff from her uncle, it really constitutes paraphernal property
under article 1381. "Paraphernal property is that which the wife brings to the marriage
without being included in the dowry and that she may acquire after the creation of the
same without being added thereto." But it is a provision of article 1384 that "The wife
shall have the management of the paraphernal property unless she has delivered the
same to her husband, before a notary, in order that he may administer said property.
In such case the husband is obliged to create a mortgage for the value of the
personal property he may receive, or to secure said property, in the manner
established for the dowry property." Not even was there offered in evidence the public
deed of delivery, nor the equally public mortgage deed that is required by law. So
that, therefore, the necessary proof of the obligation to return paraphernal property as
here demanded does not exist.lawphil.net

The partition of property decreed in the judgment appealed from of the 9th of
September, 1911, should be and is hereby confirmed.

The two judgments appealed from are hereby affirmed, without special
pronouncement of costs in this instance.

68

G.R. No. 124862 December 22, 1998
FE D. QUITA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA
DANDAN, * respondents.
1. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; If there is a controversy before the
court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive
shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard
and decided as in ordinary cases.-
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
2. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws;
Divorce; If there is a question as to whether a wife was still a Filipino citizen at the
time of her divorce from her husband—the decedent—the trial court should conduct a
hearing to establish her citizenship.-
We note that in her comment to petitioner’s motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite
of the divorce they obtained. Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties
either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
3. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Husband and Wife; Conflict of Laws;
Divorce; Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law; Once proved that
a wife was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from her husband,
then she could very well lose her right to inherit from the latter.-
Then in private respondent’s motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court’s
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. Petitioner opposed the
motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. The trial court did
not grant private respondent’s prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her
motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were “Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines.” It main- tained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that
the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner’s citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her
right to inherit from Arturo.
4. Actions; Settlement of Estates; Succession; Forum Shopping; There is no forum
shopping where one petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent
petitions filed before other courts concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate
copies of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of the decedent.-
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping, the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must involve
the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also
be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. The present petition deals
with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3)
trial courts concern the issuance of new owner’s duplicate copies of titles of certain
properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare
the existence of forum shopping.
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on
18 May 1941. They were not however blessed with children. Somewhere along the
way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for divorce in San Francisco,
California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a
settlement of their conjugal properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment
of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a certain Felix Tupaz in the same
locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she married
for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong
filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of
administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor of the Philippine Trust
Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan),
claiming to be the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed Padlan, named in the children of
Arturo Padlan opposed the petition and prayed for the appointment instead of Atty.
Leonardo Casaba, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30
April 1973 the oppositors (Blandina and Padlan children) submitted certified
photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final judgment of divorce
between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole
surviving brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the
decedent and the distribution of his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October
1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children and Ruperto failed to
69

appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission
of the records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof,
after which, with or without the documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would
be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed period lapsed without the
required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escaño 1 which held that "a foreign divorce
between Filipino citizens sought and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil
Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in this
jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consecuently, it
expressed the view that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972.
Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial settlement of conjugal properties due to
lack of judicial approval. 3On the other hand, it opined that there was no showing that
marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that
the alleged Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children
with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that he was a brother of Arturo. On 27
November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs of
Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in
favor of the two intestate heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to
present proofs that the recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate
children, except Alexis who was recognized as his illegitimate child, had been made
in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial reconsideration
was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to
one-half of the estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other
half. 7 Private respondent was not declared an heir. Although it was stated in the
aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947,
their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his
previous marriage to petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of
the errors allegedly committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was
decided without a hearing, in violation of Sec. 1, Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which
provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of
the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal;
hence, on 11 September 1995 it declared null and void the 27 November 1987
decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and directed the remand of the
case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner
insists that there is no need because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for
resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to the decedent; and,
second, the issue as to who between petitioner and private respondent is the proper
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
hier of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present petition based
on establish facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent court is clear:
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the
deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled
under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6)
Padlan children to inherit from the decedent because there are proofs that they have
been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even recognizes them as heirs
of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy
remains as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after
the parties other than petitioner failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23
October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and distribution of
estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the
Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without
the documents, the issue on declaration of heirs would be deemed submitted for
resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioner's motion private respondent raised, among
others, the issue as to whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent
considering that she had secured a divorce in the U.S.A. and in fact had twice
remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite
of the divorce they obtained. 12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that
petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her divorce from Arturo. This
should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid
of documentary and testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties
either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead, the lower court perfunctorily
settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escaño.
Then in private respondent's motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower court's
decision she stressed that the citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the
ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the
motion but failed to squarely address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did
not grant private respondent's prayer for a hearing but proceeded to resolve her
motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San
Francisco, California, U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that
the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to the time of their marriage as the trial
court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioner's citizenship at the time of
their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when
their divorce was decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this
aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of their
70
 CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose her SO ORDERED.
right to inherit from Arturo.

Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioner's citizenship; 17 it did
not merit enlightenment however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding,
petitioner's citizenship is brought anew to the fore by private respondent. She even
furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate
title as well as the issuance of new owner's duplicate copy thereof before another trial
court. When asked whether she was an American citizen petitioner answered that she
was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply
memorandum to erase the uncertainty about her citizenship at the time of their
divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial court.
Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to
the trial court for further proceedings.

We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should
be limited only to the right of petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse.
Private respondent's claim to heirship was already resolved by the trial court. She and
Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and Arturo
was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the
beginning under Arts. 80 and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a
surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status presupposes a legitimate
relationship. 20

As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and a her counsel to be
declared in contempt of court and that the present petition be dismissed for forum
shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist the actions must
involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There
must also be identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present
petition deals with declaration of heirship while the subsequent petitions filed before
the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owner's duplicate copies of titles
of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to
declare the existence of forum shopping.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals

ordering the remand of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings and
declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita and Ruperto T.
Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its
previous decision by granting one-half (1/2) of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan
children, namely, Claro, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the
exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturo's brother Ruperto Padlan,
is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence
by the trial court should he limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving
spouse of Arturo Padlan.

The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss
the present petition for forum shopping is DENIED.

71

G.R. No. 124371 November 23, 2000
PAULA T. LLORENTE, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ALICIA F.
LLORENTE, respondents.
1. Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction
and our courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of them; Foreign laws must be
alleged and proved.-
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved. While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did
not admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was “referred back” to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
2. Civil Law; Conflict of Laws; Marriages; Divorce; The Court ruled that aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law; Only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces.-
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy
and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces
abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
The Case
The case raises a conflict of laws issue.
What is before us is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals 1 modifying
that of the Regional Trial Court, Camarines Sur, Branch 35, Iriga City 2 declaring
respondent Alicia F. Llorente (herinafter referred to as "Alicia"), as co-owners of
whatever property she and the deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente (hereinafter referred to
as "Lorenzo") may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years that they lived
together as husband and wife.
The Facts
The deceased Lorenzo N. Llorente was an enlisted serviceman of the United States
Navy from March 10, 1927 to September 30, 1957.3
On February 22, 1937, Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente (hereinafter referred to
as "Paula") were married before a parish priest, Roman Catholic Church, in Nabua,
Camarines Sur.4
Before the outbreak of the Pacific War, Lorenzo departed for the United States and
Paula stayed in the conjugal home in barrio Antipolo, Nabua, Camarines Sur. 5
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
On November 30, 1943, Lorenzo was admitted to United States citizenship and
Certificate of Naturalization No. 5579816 was issued in his favor by the United States
District Court, Southern District of New York.6
Upon the liberation of the Philippines by the American Forces in 1945, Lorenzo was
granted an accrued leave by the U. S. Navy, to visit his wife and he visited the
Philippines.7 He discovered that his wife Paula was pregnant and was "living in" and
having an adulterous relationship with his brother, Ceferino Llorente. 8
On December 4, 1945, Paula gave birth to a boy registered in the Office of the
Registrar of Nabua as "Crisologo Llorente," with the certificate stating that the child
was not legitimate and the line for the father’s name was left blank.9
Lorenzo refused to forgive Paula and live with her. In fact, on February 2, 1946, the
couple drew a written agreement to the effect that (1) all the family allowances
allotted by the United States Navy as part of Lorenzo’s salary and all other obligations
for Paula’s daily maintenance and support would be suspended; (2) they would
dissolve their marital union in accordance with judicial proceedings; (3) they would
make a separate agreement regarding their conjugal property acquired during their
marital life; and (4) Lorenzo would not prosecute Paula for her adulterous act since
she voluntarily admitted her fault and agreed to separate from Lorenzo peacefully.
The agreement was signed by both Lorenzo and Paula and was witnessed by Paula’s
father and stepmother. The agreement was notarized by Notary Public Pedro
Osabel.10
Lorenzo returned to the United States and on November 16, 1951 filed for divorce
with the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of San Diego.
Paula was represented by counsel, John Riley, and actively participated in the
proceedings. On November 27, 1951, the Superior Court of the State of California, for
the County of San Diego found all factual allegations to be true and issued an
interlocutory judgment of divorce.11
On December 4, 1952, the divorce decree became final. 12
In the meantime, Lorenzo returned to the Philippines.
On January 16, 1958, Lorenzo married Alicia F. Llorente in Manila. 13 Apparently,
Alicia had no knowledge of the first marriage even if they resided in the same town as
Paula, who did not oppose the marriage or cohabitation.14
From 1958 to 1985, Lorenzo and Alicia lived together as husband and wife. 15 Their
twenty-five (25) year union produced three children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all
surnamed Llorente.16
On March 13, 1981, Lorenzo executed a Last Will and Testament. The will was
notarized by Notary Public Salvador M. Occiano, duly signed by Lorenzo with
attesting witnesses Francisco Hugo, Francisco Neibres and Tito Trajano. In the will,
Lorenzo bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their three children, to wit:
72

"(1) I give and bequeath to my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO exclusively my residential
house and lot, located at San Francisco, Nabua, Camarines Sur, Philippines,
including ALL the personal properties and other movables or belongings that may be
found or existing therein;
"(2) I give and bequeath exclusively to my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and to my children,
Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal shares, all my real
properties whatsoever and wheresoever located, specifically my real properties
located at Barangay Aro-Aldao, Nabua, Camarines Sur; Barangay Paloyon, Nabua,
Camarines Sur; Barangay Baras, Sitio Puga, Nabua, Camarines Sur; and Barangay
Paloyon, Sitio Nalilidong, Nabua, Camarines Sur;
"(3) I likewise give and bequeath exclusively unto my wife Alicia R. Fortuno and unto
my children, Raul F. Llorente, Luz F. Llorente and Beverly F. Llorente, in equal
shares, my real properties located in Quezon City Philippines, and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 188652; and my lands in Antipolo, Rizal, Philippines,
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 124196 and 165188, both of the Registry
of Deeds of the province of Rizal, Philippines;
"(4) That their respective shares in the above-mentioned properties, whether real or
personal properties, shall not be disposed of, ceded, sold and conveyed to any other
persons, but could only be sold, ceded, conveyed and disposed of by and among
themselves;
"(5) I designate my wife ALICIA R. FORTUNO to be the sole executor of this my Last
Will and Testament, and in her default or incapacity of the latter to act, any of my
children in the order of age, if of age;
"(6) I hereby direct that the executor named herein or her lawful substitute should
served (sic) without bond;
"(7) I hereby revoke any and all my other wills, codicils, or testamentary dispositions
heretofore executed, signed, or published, by me;
"(8) It is my final wish and desire that if I die, no relatives of mine in any degree in the
Llorente’s Side should ever bother and disturb in any manner whatsoever my wife
Alicia R. Fortunato and my children with respect to any real or personal properties I
gave and bequeathed respectively to each one of them by virtue of this Last Will and
Testament."17
On December 14, 1983, Lorenzo filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iriga, Camarines
Sur, a petition for the probate and allowance of his last will and testament wherein
Lorenzo moved that Alicia be appointed Special Administratrix of his estate. 18
On January 18, 1984, the trial court denied the motion for the reason that the testator
Lorenzo was still alive.19
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
On January 24, 1984, finding that the will was duly executed, the trial court admitted
the will to probate.20
On June 11, 1985, before the proceedings could be terminated, Lorenzo died. 21
On September 4, 1985, Paula filed with the same court a petition 22 for letters of
administration over Lorenzo’s estate in her favor. Paula contended (1) that she was
Lorenzo’s surviving spouse, (2) that the various property were acquired during their
marriage, (3) that Lorenzo’s will disposed of all his property in favor of Alicia and her
children, encroaching on her legitime and 1/2 share in the conjugal property. 23
On December 13, 1985, Alicia filed in the testate proceeding (Sp. Proc. No. IR-755), a
petition for the issuance of letters testamentary.24
On October 14, 1985, without terminating the testate proceedings, the trial court gave
due course to Paula’s petition in Sp. Proc. No. IR-888.25
On November 6, 13 and 20, 1985, the order was published in the newspaper "Bicol
Star".26
On May 18, 1987, the Regional Trial Court issued a joint decision, thus:
"Wherefore, considering that this court has so found that the divorce decree granted
to the late Lorenzo Llorente is void and inapplicable in the Philippines, therefore the
marriage he contracted with Alicia Fortunato on January 16, 1958 at Manila is
likewise void. This being so the petition of Alicia F. Llorente for the issuance of letters
testamentary is denied. Likewise, she is not entitled to receive any share from the
estate even if the will especially said so her relationship with Lorenzo having gained
the status of paramour which is under Art. 739 (1).
"On the other hand, the court finds the petition of Paula Titular Llorente, meritorious,
and so declares the intrinsic disposition of the will of Lorenzo Llorente dated March
13, 1981 as void and declares her entitled as conjugal partner and entitled to one-half
of their conjugal properties, and as primary compulsory heir, Paula T. Llorente is also
entitled to one-third of the estate and then one-third should go to the illegitimate
children, Raul, Luz and Beverly, all surname (sic) Llorente, for them to partition in
equal shares and also entitled to the remaining free portion in equal shares.
"Petitioner, Paula Llorente is appointed legal administrator of the estate of the
deceased, Lorenzo Llorente. As such let the corresponding letters of administration
issue in her favor upon her filing a bond in the amount (sic) of P100,000.00
conditioned for her to make a return to the court within three (3) months a true and
complete inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, and credits, and estate which shall at
any time come to her possession or to the possession of any other person for her,
and from the proceeds to pay and discharge all debts, legacies and charges on the
same, or such dividends thereon as shall be decreed or required by this court; to
render a true and just account of her administration to the court within one (1) year,
73

and at any other time when required by the court and to perform all orders of this
court by her to be performed.
"On the other matters prayed for in respective petitions for want of evidence could not
be granted.
"SO ORDERED."27
In time, Alicia filed with the trial court a motion for reconsideration of the aforequoted
decision.28
On September 14, 1987, the trial court denied Alicia’s motion for reconsideration but
modified its earlier decision, stating that Raul and Luz Llorente are not children
"legitimate or otherwise" of Lorenzo since they were not legally adopted by
him.29 Amending its decision of May 18, 1987, the trial court declared Beverly Llorente
as the only illegitimate child of Lorenzo, entitling her to one-third (1/3) of the estate
and one-third (1/3) of the free portion of the estate.30
On September 28, 1987, respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals.31
On July 31, 1995, the Court of Appeals promulgated its decision, affirming with
modification the decision of the trial court in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that Alicia is declared as co-owner of whatever properties she and
the deceased may have acquired during the twenty-five (25) years of cohabitation.
"SO ORDERED."32
On August 25, 1995, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a motion for
reconsideration of the decision.33
On March 21, 1996, the Court of Appeals,34 denied the motion for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition.35
The Issue
Stripping the petition of its legalese and sorting through the various arguments
raised,36 the issue is simple. Who are entitled to inherit from the late Lorenzo N.
Llorente?
We do not agree with the decision of the Court of Appeals. We remand the case to
the trial court for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the will of the deceased.
The Applicable Law
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The fact that the late Lorenzo N. Llorente became an American citizen long before
and at the time of: (1) his divorce from Paula; (2) marriage to Alicia; (3) execution of
his will; and (4) death, is duly established, admitted and undisputed.
Thus, as a rule, issues arising from these incidents are necessarily governed by
foreign law.
The Civil Code clearly provides:
"Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
"Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
"However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person
whose succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the
property and regardless of the country wherein said property may be found."
(emphasis ours)
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged
and proved.37
While the substance of the foreign law was pleaded, the Court of Appeals did not
admit the foreign law. The Court of Appeals and the trial court called to the fore
the renvoi doctrine, where the case was "referred back" to the law of the decedent’s
domicile, in this case, Philippine law.
We note that while the trial court stated that the law of New York was not sufficiently
proven, in the same breath it made the categorical, albeit equally unproven statement
that "American law follows the ‘domiciliary theory’ hence, Philippine law applies when
determining the validity of Lorenzo’s will.38
First, there is no such thing as one American law.1ªwph!1 The "national law"
indicated in Article 16 of the Civil Code cannot possibly apply to general American
law. There is no such law governing the validity of testamentary provisions in the
United States. Each State of the union has its own law applicable to its citizens and in
force only within the State. It can therefore refer to no other than the law of the State
of which the decedent was a resident.39 Second, there is no showing that the
application of the renvoi doctrine is called for or required by New York State law.
74

The trial court held that the will was intrinsically invalid since it contained dispositions
in favor of Alice, who in the trial court’s opinion was a mere paramour. The trial court
threw the will out, leaving Alice, and her two children, Raul and Luz, with nothing.
The Court of Appeals also disregarded the will. It declared Alice entitled to one half
(1/2) of whatever property she and Lorenzo acquired during their cohabitation,
applying Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
The hasty application of Philippine law and the complete disregard of the will, already
probated as duly executed in accordance with the formalities of Philippine law, is
fatal, especially in light of the factual and legal circumstances here obtaining.
Validity of the Foreign Divorce
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.40 we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied
in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of
public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national law.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals,41 that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce
from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could
"very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,42 we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned
in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed.43 We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. Now,
the effects of this divorce (as to the succession to the estate of the decedent) are
matters best left to the determination of the trial court.
Validity of the Will
The Civil Code provides:
"Art. 17. The forms and solemnities of contracts, wills, and other public instruments
shall be governed by the laws of the country in which they are executed.
"When the acts referred to are executed before the diplomatic or consular officials of
the Republic of the Philippines in a foreign country, the solemnities established by
Philippine laws shall be observed in their execution." (underscoring ours)
CONFLICT OF LAWS CASES
The clear intent of Lorenzo to bequeath his property to his second wife and children
by her is glaringly shown in the will he executed. We do not wish to frustrate his
wishes, since he was a foreigner, not covered by our laws on "family rights and
duties, status, condition and legal capacity."44
Whether the will is intrinsically valid and who shall inherit from Lorenzo are issues
best proved by foreign law which must be pleaded and proved. Whether the will was
executed in accordance with the formalities required is answered by referring to
Philippine law. In fact, the will was duly probated.
As a guide however, the trial court should note that whatever public policy or good
customs may be involved in our system of legitimes, Congress did not intend to
extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. Congress specifically left the
amount of successional rights to the decedent's national law. 45
Having thus ruled, we find it unnecessary to pass upon the other issues raised.
The Fallo
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G. R. SP No. 17446 promulgated on July 31, 1995 is SET ASIDE.
In lieu thereof, the Court REVERSES the decision of the Regional Trial Court and
RECOGNIZES as VALID the decree of divorce granted in favor of the deceased
Lorenzo N. Llorente by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the
County of San Diego, made final on December 4, 1952.
Further, the Court REMANDS the cases to the court of origin for determination of the
intrinsic validity of Lorenzo N. Llorente’s will and determination of the parties’
successional rights allowing proof of foreign law with instructions that the trial court
shall proceed with all deliberate dispatch to settle the estate of the deceased within
the framework of the Rules of Court.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
75