API 521 - Pressure-relieving and Depressuring Systems:

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Considerations to ensure safe and reliable relief system operation

Numerous process safety-related incidents left an indelible mark on the refining and
processing industry. The fatalities and multi-million dollar costs associated with these
disasters serve as a lasting reminder that safety should be a core value of all plants.
Relief systems often play a role in these plant incidents and are the last lines of
defence against catastrophic overpressure scenarios.
Over the last few years, the American Documentation or standard instrumentation to stop the
Petroleum Institute (API) has made Documentation is a key part of proper overpressure event. One of the learnings
significant changes to its 521 standard, pressure relief system maintenance, but from the numerous incidents is that the
“Pressure-relieving and Depressuring often neglected due to constraints on time industry should not rely solely on operators
Systems.” This document is the and personnel needed to keep it updated. or potentially unreliable instrumentation
standard by which companies are held API 521 contains information on to eliminate an overpressure scenario.
accountable. The Occupational Safety common examples and guidelines for
& Health Administration (OSHA) does relief system documentation, such as: The section says that if the source pressure
consider API 521 to be Recognised • List of overpressure scenarios can exceed the relief device set pressure,
and Generally Accepted Good • Relief load calculations then overfilling must be included in
Engineering Practice (RAGAGEP) for • Protected equipment or the relief system analysis. The pressure
pressure relief system design. system documentation relief device is one method of ensuring
• References used in the relief study, overpressure protection for the vessel.
Refineries and processing plants may such as process unit capacity or
find that their relief system design heat and material balances API 521 also discusses other methods to
basis isn’t in line with the changes • PRD (Pressure Relief Device) deal with liquid overfilling, like installing
indicated by the latest editions of API documentation a safety instrumented system (SIS). The
521 standard, of which the 6th edition • Installation documentation document cautions the user that all modes
was published in January 2014. of operation including start-up/shutdown
These are critical pieces of information or other non-routine operations should be
We’ve identified below some key areas that many facilities may not have readily evaluated. The user must also look at the
that have changed in the latest editions available unless a detailed relief system risks involved in using operator response
of the API 521 standard, including items evaluation has been performed recently. or the availability of instrumentation
that are directly related to numerous that is required for SIS response.
previous plant safety incidents. These are Overfilling
some of the points that Lloyd’s Register This section provides guidance on Check Valves
find operators have typically missed when addressing overfilling for process or Previous industry practices used to rely on
evaluating their relief system design basis. surge vessels. Previously, industry practice a single check valve to prevent reverse flow
involved relying on operator intervention of a high pressure fluid to a lower pressure

Working together
for a safer world
system. This section of the new standard
discusses latest guidelines on considering
check valve leakage and failure.
Overpressure due to reverse flow is
discussed for three conditions, normal
check valve leakage, severe check valve
leakage or a complete check valve failure.
The section cautions the user against
taking credit for more than two check
valves in series, and discusses techniques for
estimating relief loads from a reverse flow.
A common situation in a refinery where
reverse flow may occur is in a hydrotreating
reactor loop. If the liquid feed pump
shuts down, high pressure recycle gas can
backflow and overpressure the feed drum.
Inlet Control Devices and Bypass Valves
This section discusses the scenario where
one inlet control valve is to be considered
fully open, regardless of the control
valve failure position. This is because
opening of the control valve can be
caused either by an instrument failure
or a mis-operation. The section also
discusses guidelines for systems containing
multiple inlets and outlets, and ways to
estimate relief rates for these scenarios.
Previous industry practices did not put
much importance on bypass valves for
control valves. This section discusses latest
guidelines on inadvertent opening of
bypass valves while the control valve is
operating. When sizing the relief system, a
scenario where both the bypass valve and
the control valve are wide open should be
considered, unless there are administrative
controls in place for the bypass valve.
Furthermore, if the incoming pressure
exceeds the hydrotest pressure of the
protected equipment, the administrative
controls may not be appropriate due
to the risk of loss of containment.
The section also discusses other situations
where liquid is usually let down from a
high pressure vessel into a low pressure
system. If a loss of liquid level occurs in
the higher pressure vessel, large volumes
of vapor could flow into the low pressure
system, causing rapid rise in pressure.
For more information on how we can help you ensure safe and reliable
relief system operation please visit : www.lr.org/energy, contact us at
assetintegrity@lr.org or call +1 281 675 3100
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These scenarios are also known as “vapor
breakthrough” or “gas blowby”.
One example where this type of failure is
commonly seen is the interface between
high and low pressure separators in a
process. Loss of liquid upstream due
to failure open of the control valve
or opening of the bypass valve could
result in gas breakthrough which may
overpressure the downstream system.
Double Jeopardy and Latent Failure
These sections discuss the criteria for
double jeopardy and latent failures.
Simultaneous occurrence of two or more
unrelated causes of overpressure is known
as double jeopardy, and should not be
considered a basis for relief design. Latent
failures, on the other hand, are considered
a single event and therefore should be
considered in the overpressure analysis.
For example, instrumentation may
exist in process systems to function in
such way as to prevent overpressure.
However, latent failure could occur in
the instrumentation; therefore, the
nonresponsive instrumentation during
a separate overpressure cause should
not be considered double jeopardy.
Vacuum Relief
This section provides guidance on vacuum
relief for pressure vessels. It provides
examples of causes of vacuum including
vapor removal by a pump/compressor or
equipment designed to pull a vacuum,
condensation of vapor such as cooling
of a vessel after steamout, physical or
chemical absorption, and other factors.
The section offers protection measures
such as operating procedures, mechanical
design for full vacuum, relief system
design, or instrumented systems. The user
is cautioned that operating procedures
are not fool proof and should be used
in conjunction with risk evaluation.
Vapor Depressuring
This section provides guidance on uses
for depressuring systems. Often these
are used to reduce the failure potential
for scenarios involving overheating such
as fire; however, they can also be used
when vapor is generated from density
change or liquid flash. Methodologies
for calculating the amount of vapor
to be removed are provided.
Dynamic Simulation
This section discusses guidelines on when
dynamic simulation is useful in pressure
relief system design. The most common
application is in analysing flare systems
but can be used as an alternative method
for calculating relief requirements as
conventional steady state methods are
sometimes conservative and may lead to
oversized relief and/or flare systems design.
Jet Fires
This section discusses protection
from jet fire exposure. Pressure relief
devices are typically ineffective to
protect against jet fires as failure often
occurs due to localized overheating.
This section suggests other methods
of protection such as fireproofing,
depressuring systems, and prevention
of leaks through proper maintenance.
Disposal Systems
The topics discussed in this section of the
standard include system arrangement
and design load, piping, disposal to
flare or atmosphere and details for
knockout drums and seal drums.
The system arrangement and design
load section contains information on
single/multiple disposal systems and
guidelines for establishing design loads
for the disposal system. The section
on piping discusses backpressure,
pressure drop calculation methods,
acoustic fatigue and reaction forces.
The section on disposal to flare talks about
system designs, sizing, purging, knockout
and seal drums. The section on disposal
to atmosphere discusses consideration in
discharging hydrocarbons to atmosphere,
potential hazards of flammable mixtures,
noise levels, air pollution and disposal
through a common vent stack.
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