G.R. No. 90478. November 21,1991.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT), petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBA YAN, BIENVENIDO R.
TANTOCO, JR. and DOMINADOR R. SANTIAGO, respondents.
FACTS:
Private respondents Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Jr. and Dominador R. Santiago—
together with Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Bienvenido R. Tantoco, Sr.,
Gliceria R. Tantoco, and Maria Lourdes Tantoco-Pineda—are defendants in Civil
Case No. 0008 of the Sandiganbayan. On July 27, 1989 Tantoco and Santiago
filed with the Sandiganbayan a pleading denominated “Interrogatories to Plain-
tiff,"16 and on August 2,1989, an “Amended Interrogatories to Plaintiff"17 as well
as a Motion for Production and Inspection of Documents. The PCGG filed an
opposition thereto: motion requires leave of court; do not name the particular
individuals to whom they are propounded; it deals with factual matters in which will
be part of PCGG.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the pleading interrogaries to plaintiff, as well as the motion for
production and inspection of documents is valid?
RULING:
YES, it is valid. The various modes or instruments of discovery are meant to serve
(1) as a device, along with the pre-trial hearing under Rule 20, to narrow and
clarify the basic issues between the parties, and (2) as a device for ascertaining
the facts relative to those issues. The evident purpose is, to repeat, to enable the
parties, consistent with recognized privileges, to obtain the fullest possible
knowledge of the issues and facts before civil trials and thus prevent that said
trials are carried on in the dark. To this end, the field of inquiry that may be
covered by depositions or interrogatories is as broad as when the interrogated
party is called as a witness to testify orally at trial. The inquiry extends to all facts
which are relevant, whether they be ultimate or evidentiary, excepting only those
matters which are privileged. The objective is as much to give every party the
fullest possible information of all the relevant facts before the trial as to obtain
evidence for use upon said trial.
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
G.R. No. 182356. December 4, 2013.
DRA. LEILA A. DELA LLANA, petitioner, vs. REBECCA BIONG, doing
business under the name and style of Pongkay Trading, respondent.
FACTS:
On March 30, 2000, at around 11:00 p.m., Juan dela Llana was driving a 1997
Toyota Corolla car along North Avenue, Quezon City.4 His sister, Dra. dela Llana,
was seated at the front passenger seat while a certain Calimlim was at the
backseat.5 Juan stopped the car across the Veterans Memorial Hospital when the
signal light turned red. A few seconds after the car halted, a dump truck containing
gravel and sand suddenly rammed the car’s rear end, violently pushing the car
forward. Due to the impact, the car’s rear end collapsed and its rear windshield
was shattered. Glass splinters flew, puncturing Dra. dela Llana. Apart from these
minor wounds, Dra. dela Llana did not appear to have suffered from any other
visible physical injuries. She suffered mild to moderate pain of her neck and
shoulder. Thus she consulted a specialist. Yet despite the surgery, she became
incapacitated filed a complaint for damages. The presented evidence are: First,
pictures of her damaged car show that the collision was strong. She posits that it
can be reasonably inferred from these pictures that the massive impact resulted in
her whiplash injury. Second, Dr. Milla categorically stated in the medical
certificate that Dra. dela Llana suffered from whiplash injury. Third, her testimony
that the vehicular Dra. dela Llana further asserts that the medical certificate has
probative value.
ISSUE:
Whether or not joel’s reckless driving is the proximate cause of dela Llana’s illness
as supported by 3 evidence presented?
Ruling:
NO, the SC ruled that in civil cases, a party who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it. He who alleges has the burden of proving his allegation by
preponderance of evidence or greater weight of credible evidence. The
reason for this rule is that bare allegations, unsubstantiated by evidence, are not
equivalent to proof. In short, mere allegations are not evidence. In the present
case, the burden of proving the proximate causation between Joel’s negligence
and Dra. dela Llana’s whiplash injury rests on Dra. dela Llana. She must establish
by preponderance of evidence that Joel’s negligence, in its natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produced her whiplash
injury, and without which her whiplash injury would not have occurred.
Page 1
[No. 28607. February 21, 1929]
PRATS & COMPANY, a registered partnership, plaintiff and appellant, vs.
PHOENIX INSURANCE COMPANY, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT, a
corporation, defendant and appellee.
FACTS:
This action was instituted in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila by
Prats & Co., a mercantile partnership, for the purpose of recovering from the
Phoenix Insurance Co., of Hartford, Connecticut, the sum of P117,800.60, with
interest, by reason of a loss alleged to have been sustained by the plaintiff, on
August 21, 1924, from a fire, it being alleged that said loss was covered by policy
of insurance No. 600217, for the sum of P200,000, issued by the defendant
company to the plaintiff. For answer, the defendant, Phoenix Insurance Co.,
admitted the issuance of the policy of insurance but, by way of special def ense,
alleged, among other things, that the fire in question had been set by the plaintiff,
or with its connivance, and that the plaintiff had submitted under oath to the
defendant a fraudulent claim of loss, in contravention of the express terms of the
policy. Upon hearing the cause the trial court absolved the defendant from the
complaint with respect to the obligation created by the policy which was the
subject of the suit, but ordered the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of
P11,731.93, with interest from the filing of the complaint, upon account of moneys
received from salvage sales, conducted by the defendant, of remnants of the
insured stock. From this judgment the plaintiff appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence submitted by Phoenix assurance is admissible?
RULING:
YES. The court commends the maintenance of a liberal attitude on the part of trial
judges in the matter of admission of proof. The practice of excluding evidence on
doubtful objections to its materiality, or relevancy, or technical objections to the
questions, should be avoided. In a case of any intricacy it is impossible for a judge
of first instance, in the early stages of the development of the proof, to know with
any certainty whether testimony is relevant or not; and where there is no indication
of bad faith on the part of the attorney offering the evidence, the court may as a
rule safely accept the testimony upon the statement of the attorney that the proof
offered will be connected later. Moreover, it must be remembered that in the heat
of the battle over which he presides a judge of first instance may possibly fall into
error in judging of the relevancy of proof where a fair and logical connection is in
fact shown. When such a mis-take is made and the proof is erroneously ruled out,
the Supreme Court, upon appeal, often finds itself embarrassed and possibly
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
unable to correct the effects of the error with:out returning the case for a new
trial,—a step which this court is always very loath to take. On the other hand, the
admission of proof in a court of first instance, even if the question as to its form,
materiality, or relevancy is doubtful, can never result in much harm to either
litigant, because the trial judge is supposed to know the law; and it is its duty,
upon final consideration of the case, to distinguish the relevant and material from
the irrelevant and immaterial. If this course is followed and the cause is
prosecuted to the Supreme Court upon appeal, this court then has all the material
before it necessary to make a correct judgment.
No. L-29039. November 28, 1969.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, vs. HON. FELINO D. ABALOS,
Judge of the Court of First Instance, Branch II, 16th Judicial District, and
MOHAMMAD USSAM DAMBONG, respondents.
FACTS:
On or about March 9, 1966, an information was filed with said court, presided over
by respondent Judge, accusing Mohammad Ussam Dambong, Nikki Dambong,
Amiril Hahissi and Ahmad Intoman, of the crime of double murder upon Abdulhadi
Maoludani and Maoludani Habissi, When multiple frustrated murder upon the
persons of Sarahani Maoludani, Marajuko Maoludani and Abdulrasid Maoludani,
allegedly committed on February 6, 1961, in Guimba Asin, municipality of
Panamao, province of Sulu. When the case was called for trial, the prosecution
introduced evidence tending to show that defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong
had, on February 6, 1961, gone to the place aforementioned, accompanied by his
co-defendants, and then fired at and killed Maoludani Habissi and Abdulhadi
Maoludani, as well as shot and wounded the other persons named in the
information. After the reception of said evidence for the prosecution, the defense
proceeded with the presentation of its own evidence, in the course of which,
defendant Mohammad Ussam Dambong testified that the casualties and the
injuries adverted to above were due to shots f ired, not by him, but by Abdulkadil
Habbisi, because, as a police sergeant in the performance of his duty, he
(Mohammad Ussam Dambong) had merely fired late the air, to stop a fight
between two (2) groups of persons, to one of which the victims belonged. The
defense having, thereafter, completed the introduction of its evidence, on April 24,
1968, the prosecution called March Andi as rebuttal witness.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony as rebuttal evidence be admitted before the court?
Page 2
RULING:
YES, The evidence of the accused that it was AH who killed and wounded the
persons mentioned in the information was a new matter not covered directly by
the evidence for the prosecution It is true that if it was the accused who caused
the deaths and the injuries alleged, it would follow that AH was ot the author
thereof. The prosecution was entitled, however. as a matter of strict legal right, to
introduce positive evidence to this effect, instead of relying upon a mere inference
from its evidence in chief.
G.R. No. 96492.November 26, 1992.*
ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners,
vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA
DELOS REYES, respondents.
FACTS:
Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of
Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay
Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area of 23,000 square meters and 19,000
square meters, respectively. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were
tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela
Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded
him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984,
Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her
daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the
instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus
violating her tenancy rights.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the affidavit of eufrocina and efren be admitted although the
affiants were not presented and be subject to cross-examination?
RULING:
YES, it is admissible as evidence. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the
‘Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory
character.’ The same provision states that ‘In the hearing, investigation and
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
determination of any question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may
be allowed and are admissible in evidence.’ Moreover, in agrarian cases, the
quantum of evidence required is no more than substantial evidence. This
substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section 18, P.D. No. 946 which took
effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613, January 26, 1989). In
Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined
what substantial evidence is: ‘Substantial evidence does not necessarily import
preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that
there is contrary evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate
court cannot substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in
determining wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.’”
PEOPLE VS TURCO (2000)
FACTS:
Escelea Tabada and appellant Rodegelio Turco were neighbors in lower Begang,
Isabela, Basilan, their houses being only about sixty (60) meters apart (p. 6 and p.
8, t.s.n.; August 19, 1996). Escelea was then staying with her father, Alejandro
and her deaf grandmother, Perseveranda (p. 9, id). She was twelve (12) years
and six (6) months old at the time of incident, having been born on December 3,
1982 (p. 3, id).
The nightmare of Escelea began in the evening of July 1995. At around seven
o'clock (7:00 p.m.) in the evening, Escelea, after (pp. 11-12, id) [sic]. She was
accompanied by a certain Cory Macapili, the granddaughter of her neighbor,
Leonora Cabase (p. 13, id).
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony and medico legal certificate would be enough
evidence to convict the accused?
RULING:
YES. Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person
recounts details of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape.
the "sweetheart story" was a mere concoction of accused-appellant in order to
exculpate himself from criminal liability. In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15
[1998]), we held that the sweetheart theory of the accused was unavailing and
Page 3
self-serving where he failed to introduce love letters, gifts, and the like to attest to
his alleged amorous affair with the victim. Admissibility of evidence is determined
by its relevance and competence and is therefore an affair of logic and law. A
medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of rape.
KNAPP v STATE (1997)
FACTS:
Appellant appeals from a judgment in the above-entitled cause, under which he
stands convicted of murder in the first degree. Error is assigned on the overruling
of a motion for a new trial.
Appellant, as a witness in his own behalf, offered testimony tending to show a
killing in self-defense. He afterwards testified, presumably for the purpose of
showing that he had reason to fear the deceased, that before the killing he had
heard that the deceased, who was the marshal of Hagerstown, had clubbed and
seriously injured an old man in arresting him, and that he died a short time
afterwards. On appellant’s being asked, on cross-examination, who told him this,
he answered: “Some people around Hagerstown there. I can’t say as to who it
was now.” The State was permitted, on rebuttal, to prove by a physician, over the
objection and exception of the defense, that the old man died of senility and
alcoholism, and that there were no bruises nor marks on his person. Counsel for
appellant contend that it was error to admit this testimony; that the question was
whether he had, in fact, heard the story, and not as to its truth or falsity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellants testimony be admissible as evidence?
RULING:
YES. Relevancy is that which conduces to the proof of a pertinent hypothesis.” In
Stevenson v. Stewart (1849), 11 Pa. 307, it was said: “The competency of a
collateral fact to be used as the basis of legitimate argument, is not to be
determined by the conclusiveness of the inferences it may afford in reference to
the litigated fact. It is enough if these may tend, in a slight degree, to elucidate the
inquiry, or to assist, though remotely, to a determination probably founded in
truth.” We are of opinion that the testimony referred to was competent. While
appellant’s counsel are correct in their assertion that the question was whether
appellant had heard a story to the effect that the deceased had offered serious
violence to the old man, yet it does not follow that the testimony complained of did
not tend to negative the claim of appellant as to what he had heard. One of the
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
first principles of human nature is the impulse to speak the truth. “This principle,”
says Dr. Reid, whom Professor Greenleaf quotes at length “has a powerful
operation, [168 Ind. 157] even in the greatest liars; for where they lie once they
speak truth a hundred times.”
G.R. No. 155208. March 27, 2007.*
NENA LAZALITA** TATING, petitioner, vs. FELICIDAD TATING MARCELLA,
represented by SALVADOR MARCELLA, CARLOS TATING, and the COURT
OF APPEALS, respondents.
FACTS:
The present case arose from a controversy involving a parcel of land denominated
as Lot 56 of Subdivision plan Psd31182, located at Abelarde St., Cadiz City,
Negros Occidental. The subject lot, containing an area of 200 square meters, was
owned by Daniela Solano Vda. de Tating (Daniela) as evidenced by Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT). On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property
to her granddaughter, herein petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating (Nena). The contract
of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Daniela in favor of Nena.4 Subsequently, title over the subject property was
transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax
purposes and paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973,
1975 to 1986 and 1988.6 However, the land remained in possession of Daniela.
On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn statement claiming that she
had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement between her
and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter
to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose
of helping her defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did
not secure any loan nor mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of
Nena cancelled and the subject property reconveyed to her.
Daniela died on July 29, 19888 leaving her children as her heirs, namely: Ricardo,
Felicidad, Julio, Carlos and Cirilo who predeceased Daniela and was represented
by herein petitioner.
In a letter dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died
they discovered the sworn statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and,
as a consequence, they are demanding from Nena the return of their rightful
shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela.9 Nena did not reply.
ISSUE:
Page 4
Whether or not sworn statement is admissible as evidence?
RULING:
NO. There is no issue in the admissibility of the subject sworn statement.
However, the admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of
evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence
while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its
tendency to convince and persuade. Thus, a particular item of evidence may be
admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial evaluation within the
guidelines provided by the rules of evidence. It is settled that affidavits are
classified as hearsay evidence since they are not generally prepared by the affiant
but by another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements,
which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them.
LOPEZ v HEESEN (1961)
FACTS:
Appellant, Jesse G. Lopez, originally filed suit against appellee, Robert Heesen,
alleging that on October 15, 1958, Heesen unlawfully, violently, maliciously and
feloniously assaulted and shot appellant with a shotgun, thereby inflicting
dangerous and painful wounds and injuries to appellant, causing him great bodily
and mental pain and anguish, all to his damage in the total sum of $80,000, which
included $25,000 punitive damages.
Appellee, Heesen, answered denying the allegations of the complaint and
thereafter appellant filed a demand for jury trial. It was also alleged that on
October 14, 1958, appellee, Sears, sold to appellee, Heesen, one of said Higgins
Model 51 hunting rifles; that said rifle was negligently designed or manufactured
by appellee, Sears, in that the safety mechanism moved readily and in a
dangerous manner from a "safe" to a "fire" position. In addition, it was alleged that
the rifle in this dangerous condition known to appellee, Sears, was sold to
appellee, Heesen, with the knowledge that it would be used for hunting purposes
and that appellee, Sears, negligently failed to warn appellee, Heesen, of the
dangerous and defective condition of the rifle.
ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony can be admitted as evidence?
RULING:
YES. "It is true that in trials by jury it is their province to determine the ultimate
facts, and that the general rule is that witnesses are permitted to testify to the
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
primary facts within their knowledge, but not to their opinions. And it is also true
that this has at times led to the statement that witnesses may not give their
opinions upon the ultimate facts which the jury are to decide, because that would
supplant their judgment and usurp their province. But such a statement is not to
be taken literally. It but reflects the general rule, which is subject to important
qualifications, and never was intended to close any reasonable avenue to the truth
in the investigation of questions of fact. Besides, the tendency of modern
decisions is not only to give as wide a scope as is reasonably possible to the
investigation of such questions, but also to accord to the trial judge a certain
discretion in determining what testimony has a tendency to establish the ultimate
facts, and to disturb his decision admitting testimony of that character only when it
plainly appears that the testimony had no legitimate bearing upon the questions at
issue and was calculated to prejudice the minds of the jurors. * * *"
Applying the above principles we hold that the testimony as to the reputation of
Fabrique Nationale, who manufacture the safety device on the Higgins Model 51,
and the reputation of Marlin Firearms Company, Weatherby Corporation, Colt
Firearms Company and Jefferson Corporation, who manufacture rifles which have
the same modified leaf safety device as the Higgins Model 51, was relevant to the
issue of whether the safety device on the Higgins Model 51 was unsafe or safe,
and *454 that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
STATE v BALL (1960)
FACTS:
The facts, briefly, as the jury could find them were that about 2:30 in the afternoon
of October 15, 1958, two colored men, one of them tall and the other short,
entered the Krekeler Jewelry Store at 1651 South 39th Street. The taller man
spent ten or fifteen minutes selecting and buying a cigarette lighter, he also talked
about buying and looked at watches and rings. As the taller man looked at jewelry
and made his purchase the shorter man looked in the cases and moved about in
the store. Later in the day, about 5:50, as John Krekeler was placing rings and
watches in the safe preparatory to closing the store two men entered, one of them
tall and the other short, and Krekeler immediately recognized them as the two
men who had been in the store at 2:30, especially the taller man. He recognized
the taller man's narrow-brimmed, tall hat, brown jacket, gray stirt and particularly a
scar on his face. The shorter man started to walk behind the counter and as
Krekeler intercepted him he "drew a long barreled blue .38 and stuck it in my
face." Both men followed Krekeler, the shorter man with the gun in "his back,"
directing him to the watch repair department and finally into the rest room in the
rear of the store. He was told not to turn around and stood facing the wall. He
Page 5
could hear jewelry being dumped into a bag and the "jingle" of the cash register.
The two men left Krekeler in the rest room and after hearing the door slam he
called the police. The two men had taken watches and rings of the stipulated
value of $4,455.21 and $140 in cash from the register. Krekeler identified the
appellant from pictures, and three weeks later, after his capture, in a hospital and
upon the trial positively identified him as the taller of the two holdup men.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the items or evidence obtained are material and relavant to the
case and be considered as admissible?
RULING:
NO. It is said that the introduction of these exhibits was "immaterial and irrelevant,
neither tended to prove nor disprove any of the issues involved in this case; that
said money as seized at the time of the arrest was neither identified by Mr.
Krekeler nor by any other person as the money which was allegedly stolen from
the A. L. Krekeler & Sons Jewelry Company on the 15th day of October, 1958;
that said evidence was considered by this jury to the prejudice of this defendant
convincingly..
G.R. No. 123546. July 2, 1998.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOERAL GALLENO,
accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Evelyn Obligar Garganera is the 5-year old daughter of Rosita Obligar Garganera
who had to leave the province to find work in Manila after separating from her
husband. Evelyn, together with her younger brother, 3-year old Eleazar, was thus
left under the care and custody of their uncle, Emeterio Obligar, and aunt,
Penicola Obligar.
Less than a kilometer away from their place of residence lived accused-appellant,
19-year old Joeral Galleno, known well to Evelyn’s family due to his frequent visits
at the Obligars’ abode as he was paying court to Emeterio’s eldest child, Gina.
On August 16, 1994, Emeterio and Penicola left their residence to work at the
sugarcane plantation owned by Magdalena Dasibar. Their three children had all
earlier left for school. The only persons left in the house were niece Evelyn and
nephew Eleazar.
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
At around 4 o’clock in the afternoon, accused-appellant was on his way to his Lola
Esing to have his pants tailored. Since it was drizzling, he passed by the Obligars’
residence and found the two children left to themselves. The prosecution and the
defense presented conflicting versions on what occurred at said residence.
However, the result is undisputed. Evelyn sustained a laceration in her vagina
which resulted in profuse, and to our mind, life-threatening bleeding due to her
tender age.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence presented by Dr. Landa (testimony) is relevant to the
case and thus admissible?
RULING:
NO.
Section 4, Rule 128 of the Rules of Court provides that “(e)vidence must have
such a relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or non-
existence.” This simply means that relevancy is determinable by the rules of logic
and human experience (Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. II, 1988 ed.,
p. 434). There is no precise and universal test of relevancy provided by law.
However, the determination of whether particular evidence is relevant rests largely
at the discretion of the court, which must be exercised according to the teachings
of logic and everyday experience. the trial court’s conclusions find support in the
testimony of accused-appellant’s own witness, Dr. Lourdes Lañada (who was
earlier presented during the trial as a prosecution witness), who testified that a
laceration is caused by a blunt instrument and that a fingernail is not a blunt but a
sharp instrument ----- the wicked fleeth even when no man pursueth, but the
innocent are as bold as a lion
G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RICO CALUMPANG and
JOVENAL OMATANG, appellants.
FACTS:
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he was at Talay,
Pamplona, Negros Oriental, walking home to Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona.
He was with his neighbors, the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their
way, they stopped at the store of Ana Andagan, located near the Pamplona
Coconut Plantation, and decided to have some beer. Magno added that Santiago
Page 6
saw appellants drinking tuba inside Ana’s store, and offered them a glass of beer,
but appellants refused. Santiago just drank the glass of beer he was offering.4
After that, Magno and the spouses left the store and took a shortcut through the
coconut plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants were planning
something sinister because they followed too closely and were concealing
something at their backs. Magno cautioned Santiago, but the latter just told him
not to worry about appellants.5 Magno and the spouses simply continued walking
for another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow waterway that let water
from the river into the plantation. Magno removed his slippers and started to cross
ahead of the spouses. Santiago and Alicia stayed slightly behind because
Santiago had to remove his shoes. When Magno had crossed five feet of the
waterway, Magno turned around to wait for his companions and saw appellants
attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked Santiago on the
head and stabbed his abdomen. At the same time, appellant Omatang attacked
Alicia.7
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away. After 50 meters,
he reached Alexander Ebias’s house. He asked Alexander for a torch then
continued walking towards Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. After a kilometer,
however, he saw the house of his cousin Rolando Retada.8 He decided to spend
the night there.9
Magno further testified that he did not tell either Alexander or Rolando about what
he saw at the waterway because he was afraid. Magno added that he left
Rolando’s house around 6:30 the next morning to report the incident at the
municipal hall in the poblacion of Pamplona, but was arrested for questioning by
members of the Philippine Army on his way out of the store of Picio Yan, where he
had to attend to some personal business. Magno declared that he did not report to
them that appellants killed the spouses.10 It was only after he was turned over to
the police authorities of Pamplona and brought to the police station that he
reported what he saw the day before at the waterway in the plantation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Magno’s testimony is relevant and thus admissible as
evidence?
RULING:
NO, Several portions of Magno’s testimony are unworthy of belief. There seems to
be no explanation as to why appellants ignored Magno and did not chase him
considering that he was only five feet away when he allegedly got an unobstructed
view of appellants murdering the spouses. Likewise, it makes no sense why, if it
were true that he was running away for fear that appellants might also attack him,
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
Magno chose to run only a short distance of only 50 meters, and while still unsure
that appellants did in fact not run
after him, Magno took the time to stop by Alexander Ebias’s house, called out to
Alexander, asked for some dried coconut leaves, and made a torch to light his
path. Magno’s actions were certainly not the actions of someone seeking to avoid
peril to his life. The lighted torch and the noise he made calling out to Alexander
would have revealed his location to the very people he said he was running from.
Magno’s claim that he intended to go to the authorities and report that he saw
appellants kill the spouses is far from credible, considering that he did not do so,
even for the sake of exonerating himself right away when members of the
Philippine Army arrested him for questioning. Well settled is the rule that evidence
to be believed must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but
must be credible in itself—such as the common experience and observation of
mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances.
KASTIGAR v U.S. 1972
FACTS:
Petitioners were subpoenaed to appear before a United States grand jury in the
Central District of California on February 4, 1971. The Government believed that
petitioners were likely to assert their Fifth Amendment privilege. Prior to the
scheduled appearances, the Government applied to the District Court for an order
directing petitioners to answer questions and produce evidence before the grand
jury under a grant of immunity conferred pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-6003.
Petitioners opposed issuance of the order, contending primarily that the scope of
the immunity provided by the statute was not coextensive with the scope of the
privilege against self-incrimination, and therefore was not sufficient to supplant the
privilege and compel their testimony. The District Court rejected this contention,
and ordered petitioners to appear before the grand jury and answer its questions
under the grant of immunity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the U.S. government may compel testimony from an unwilling
witness who invokes the 5th amendment by the grant of immunity?
RULING:
YES. The United States can compel testimony from an unwilling witness who
invokes the Fifth Amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination by
conferring immunity, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 6002, from use of the compelled
Page 7
testimony and evidence derived therefrom in subsequent criminal proceedings, as
such immunity from use and derivative use is coextensive with the scope of the
privilege and is sufficient to compel testimony over a claim of the privilege.
Transactional immunity would afford broader protection than the Fifth Amendment
privilege, and is not constitutionally required. In a subsequent criminal
prosecution, the prosecution has the burden of proving affirmatively that evidence
proposed to be used is derived from a legitimate source wholly independent of the
compelled testimony.
GALMAN v. PAMARAN (1985)
FACTS:
On August 21, 1983, a crime unparalleled in repercussions and ramifications was
committed inside the premises of the Manila International Airport (MIA) in Pasay
City. Former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., an opposition stalwart who was
returning to the country after a long sojourn abroad, was gunned down to death.
To determine the facts and circumstances surrounding the killing and to allow a
free, unlimited and exhaustive investigation of all aspects of the tragedy,1 P.D.
1886 was promulgated creating an ad hoc Fact Finding Board which later became
more popularly known as the Agrava Board.2 Pursuant to the powers vested in it
by P.D. 1886, the Board conducted public hearings wherein various witnesses
appeared and testified and/or produced documentary and other evidence either in
obedience to a subpoena or in response to an invitation issued by the Board.
Among the witnesses who appeared, testified and produced evidence before the
Board were the herein private respondents General Fabian C. Ver, Major General
Prospero Olivas,3 Sgt. Pablo Martinez, Sgt. Tomas Fernandez, Sgt. Leonardo
Mojica, Sgt. Pepito Torio, Sgt. Prospero Bona and AIC Aniceto Acupido.
Subsequently, they were convicted of the crime (murder) imputed against the
accused before the Sandiganbayan. The accused counter arguments are: that its
admission will be in derogation of his constitutional right against self-incrimination
and violative of the immunity granted by P.D. 1886.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimonies given by the 8 private respondents who did not
invoke the rights against self-incrimination are admissible as evidence?
RULING:
No, P.D. 1886 which created the Agrava Board was enacted not only to determine
the facts surrounding the killing of former Senator Benigno S. Aquino, Jr., but also
identify the culprits for their consequent prosecution. Sec. 5 of P.D. 1886
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
compelled respondent Generals Ver and Olivas to be witnesses against
themselves as P.D. 1886 gave them no choice but to testify under pain of being
declared in contempt of court. Fact that the Constitution did not use the word
“custodial investigation” shows that it did not entirely adopt The Miranda doctrine.
Use of word “confession” in Art. 4, Sec. 20 does not connote the idea that it covers
only police investigations.— Inasmuch as Generals Ver and Olivas were called
before the Agrava Board as suspects in the killing of Sen. Aquino, they should
have been forewarned of their right to remain silent and to counsel no differently
as any person being investigated by the NBI or any police agency.— The right not
to be compelled to be a witness against himself may be invoked not only in
criminal proceedings but also in all other types of suits, including forfeiture cases.
What is controlling is not the character of the suit but the nature of the
proceedingsThe fact that Sec. 20, Art. IV of the Constitution deleted the phrase “in
a criminal case” shows that the right to remain silent applies to the Agrava Board
hearings although its proceedings is not in its strictest sense criminal. THUS-The
respondent Generals Ver and Olivas were denied due process of law in the
Agrava Board hearings. Immunity statutes may be generally classified into two:
one, which grants “use immunity”; and the other,
which grants what is known as “transactional immunity.” The distinction between
the two is as follows: “Use immunity” prohibits use of witness’ compelled testimony
and its fruits in any manner in connection with the criminal prosecution of the
witness. On the other hand, “transactional immunity” grants immunity to the
witness from prosecution for an offense to which his compelled testimony relates.
P.D. 1886 grants only “use immunity,” but not “transactional immunity.” Hence,
dictates of fair play demand that Generals Ver and Olivas should have been
informed of their rights to remain silent by the Agrava Board.— The view that the
right to remain silent must be invoked before the Agrava Board to prevent use of
testimony made thereat is wrong. To save P.D. 1886 from unconstitutionality it
must be brought within the fundamental law. In view of the sanctions imposed by
P.D. 1886 to a person who refused to testify at the Agrava Board, the witness
summoned thereat cannot be compelled to answer unless immunity from suit is
offered him.
No. L-69809. October 16,1986.*
EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his ciient
Manuel Montebon were in the living room of complainant’s residence discussing
Page 8
the terms for the withdrawal of thecomplaint for direct assauit which they filed with
the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they had
decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to
Laconic .
“That same inorning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to
his office and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his
regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. According to the
request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the
problem When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear
personally the proposed conditions for the settlement Appeilant heard complainant
enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the complaint for direct
assault”
ISSUES: Whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices
in Section 1 of the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would
constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using
a telephone line?
RULING:
NO. The phrase “any other device or arrangement” in R.A, 4200 known as Anti-
Wire Tapping Law does not cover an extension line.—The law refers to a “tap” of
a wire or cable or the use of a “deviee or arrangement” for the purpose of secretly
overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a
physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or
arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An
extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,
dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the
use thereof cannot be considered as “tapping” the wire or cable of a telephone
line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just
happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction
that in order to deterrniiss the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses
and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isoiated
expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in ftxing the
meaning of any of its parts. The phrase “device or arrange ment” in the Anti-Wire
Tapping Law should be interpreted to comprehend instruments of the same or
similar nature used to tap, intercept or record a telephone conversation, not an
extension line. A person calling another by phone may safely presume that the
other may have an extension line and runs the risk of being heard by a 3rd party.
Framers of R.A. 4200 were more concemed with penalizing the act of recording a
telephone conversation than merely listening thereto. Mere act of listening to a
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
telephone conversation in an extension line is not punished by
AntiWiretappingLaw.
G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995.*
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.
FACTS:
A civil case for damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that the private respondent, Ester S.
Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter’s office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a “hostile and furious mood” and in a manner offensive to
petitioner’s dignity and personality,” contrary to morals, good customs and public
policy.”1
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and
sought moral damages, attorney’s fees and other expenses of litigation in the
amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable
at the trial court’s discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was
culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioner’s recording of the event and alleging that the said act of
secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private respondent filed a criminal
case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled “An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related
violations of private communication, and other purposes.”
ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 4200 penalizes the taping of a private communication and not
a private conversation?
RULING:
NO.
Even a person privy to a communication who records his private conversation with
another without the knowledge of the latter will qualify as a violator under Section
1 of R.A. 4200. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
The mere allegation that an individual made a secret reco rding of a private
communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
Page 9
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. The contention that the phrase “private G.R. Nos. 157294-95. November 30, 2006.*
communication” in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include “private conversations”
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word “communication” to a point of absurdity. JOSEPH VICTOR G. EJERCITO, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (SPECIAL
DIVISION) and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:
MAMBA vs. GARCIA (2001)
The present petition for certiorari under Rule 65 assails the Sandiganbayan
FACTS: Resolutions dated February 7 and 12, 2003 denying petitioner Joseph Victor G.
Ejercito’s Motions to Quash Subpoenas Duces Tecum/Ad Testificandum, and
at about 7 o’clock in the morning of the following day, October 30, Bulatao met the Resolution dated March 11, 2003 denying his Motion for Reconsideration of the
NBI operatives in the house of Francisco Mamba, Sr., former representative of the first two resolutions.
3rd District of Cagayan, where the entrapment was planned. Bulatao was given a
tape recorder to record his conversation with whoever will receive the money. At 9 The three resolutions were issued in Criminal Case No. 26558, “People of the
a.m., Bulatao went to the Municipal Trial Court and waited for his case to be Philippines v. Joseph Ejercito Estrada, et al.,” for plunder, defined and penalized
called. At 10:30 a.m., respondent went out of his chambers and talked to SPO2 in R.A. 7080, “AN ACT DEFINING AND PENALIZING THE CRIME OF
Jonathan Santos and SPO4 Carlos Poli, representatives of P/Sr. Inspector PLUNDER.”
Salvador in the preliminary investigation. Respondent then called Bulatao and led
In above-stated case of People v. Estrada, et al., the Special Prosecution Panel1
him and the two police officers to the office of the MTC court personnel. Inside,
filed on January 20, 2003 before the Sandiganbayan a Request for Issuance of
respondent asked Bulatao if he had the money with him. When he answered in
Subpoena Duces Tecum for the issuance of a subpoena directing the President of
the affirmative, respondent took them to his chambers and left them there as he
Export and Industry Bank (EIB, formerly Urban Bank) or his/her authorized
proceeded to his sala. After handing the money to the police officers, Bulatao went
representative to produce the following documents during the hearings scheduled
out of respondent’s chambers. Upon his signal, the NBI operatives waiting outside
on January 22 and 27, 2003:Bank accounts; receipts; orders; cards;ledgers; and
respondent’s court then rushed to the judge’s chambers and arrested the two
other pertinent documents.
police officers after recovering 11 pieces of P500.00 marked bills in their
possession
ISSUE:
ISSUES:
Whether or not the said documents obtained shall be admissible as evidence
under RA1405?
Whether or not the recorded conversation between Bulatao and SPO2 and SPO4
can be an admissible evidence?
RULING:
RULING:
NO. Where Congress has both established a right and provided exclusive
remedies for its violation, the courts would be encroaching upon the prerogatives
NO. The Investigating Judge’s reliance on the tape-recorded conversation
of Congress were they to authorize a remedy not provided for by statute—absent
between Bulatao and the two police officers is erroneous. The recording of private
a specific reference to an exclusionary rule, it is not appropriate for the courts to
conversations without the consent of the parties contravenes the provisions of
read such a provision into the act; R.A. No. 1405 nowhere provides that an
Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wire Tapping Law, and renders
unlawful examination of bank accounts shall render the evidence obtained
the same inadmissible in evidence in any proceeding. The law covers even those
therefrom inadmissible in evidence.
recorded by persons privy to the private communications, as in this case. Thus,
the contents of the tape recorder cannot be relied upon to determine the
culpability of respondent judge.

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 10

G.R. No. 193861. March 14, 2012.*
PAULITA “EDITH” SERRA,1 petitioner, vs. NELFA T. MUMAR, respondent.
FACTS:
At around 6:30 in the evening of 3 April 2000, there was a vehicular accident
along the National Highway in Barangay Apopong, General Santos City, which
resulted in the death of Armando Mumar (Mumar), husband of respondent Nelfa
T. Mumar (respondent).
Based on the evidence presented before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
General Santos City, one Armando Tenerife (Tenerife) was driving his Toyota
Corolla sedan on the National Highway heading in the direction of Polomolok,
South Cotabato. Tenerife noticed the van owned by petitioner Paulita “Edith” Serra
(petitioner) coming from the opposite direction, which was trying to overtake a
passenger jeep, and in the process encroached on his lane. The left side of the
sedan was hit by the van, causing the sedan to swerve to the left and end up on
the other side of the road. The van collided head on with the motorcycle, which
was about 12 meters behind the sedan on the outer lane, causing injuries to
Mumar, which eventually led to his death.
On the other hand, petitioner denied that her van was overtaking the jeepney at
the time of the incident. She claimed that the left tire of Tenerife’s sedan burst,
causing it to sideswipe her van. Consequently, the left front tire of the van also
burst and the van’s driver, Marciano de Castro (de Castro), lost control of the
vehicle. The van swerved to the left towards Mumar’s motorcycle. The impact
resulted in the death of Mumar.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner testimony is credible?
RULING:
NO.
The Court has previously held that evidence to be worthy of credit, must not only
proceed from a credible source but must, in addition, be credible in itself. The
evidence must be natural, reasonable and probable as to make it easy to believe.
No better test has yet been found to determine the value of the testimony of a
witness than its conformity to the knowledge and common experience of mankind.
Rarely does it happen that the investigating officer personally witnesses an
accident that he investigates, yet this does not mean that his observations are not
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
valid. A traffic investigator’s training and experience allow him to determine how
an accident occurred even without witnessing the accident himself. In this case,
Abdullatip had been a traffic investigator for nine years. Even if he arrived at the
scene after the accident, he saw the vehicles in their relative positions as a result
of the accident. His experience, as well as his evaluation of the statements from
various witnesses, guided him in assessing who was at fault. In any case, the
presumption of regularity in the exercise of functions is in his favor and therefore
his report must be given credence.
G.R. No. 175924. March 14, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ERLAND SABADLAB y
BAYQUEL, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
AAA was then walking at around noon of March 12, 2002 on Dapitan Street in
Makati City, proceeding towards MA Montessori to fetch her employer’s son who
was studying there. Suddenly, a man (later identified as Sabadlab) grabbed her by
the shoulder and ordered her to go with him. She recognized him to be the man
who had persistently greeted her every time she had bought pandesal at 5 o’clock
am near her employer’s house in the past two weeks. Alarmed, she refused to do
his bidding, but Sabadlab poked a gun at her throat. Two other men whom she did
not recognize joined Sabadlab at that point. They forced her into the backseat of a
parked car, and one of Sabadlab’s cohorts blindfolded her with a handkerchief.
The car moved forward, and stopped after twenty minutes of travel. Still
blindfolded, she was brought out of the car. Sabadlab said that he would remove
her clothes. Sabadlab then undressed her, leaving only the blindfold on her. One
of them tied her hands behind her back. Sabadlab began kissing her body from
the neck downwards. Although blindfolded, she knew that it was Sabadlab
because his cohorts were calling out his name as he was kissing her body. Then
they made her lie flat on the ground with her hands still tied behind her back.
Sabadlab raped her in that position. The others took their turns in raping her after
Sabadlab. To prevent her from shouting for help, Sabadlab stuffed her mouth with
crumpled newspapers. The three ravished her again and again, that she could not
remember the number of times they did so.
At around 3:00 o’clock pm, Sabadlab and his cohorts returned a blindfolded AAA
by car back to Dapitan Street, but let her go only after sternly warning that they
would surely kill her if she told anyone about the rapes. Once they left, she
proceeded to MA Montessori to fetch her ward. She waited there until 5:30 pm.
Page 11
Upon her arrival at the house, AAA’s employer noticed the kiss marks on her
neck. AAA at first lied about the kiss marks, but she ultimately disclosed the rapes
because her irritated employer slapped and boxed her on the stomach to force her
to disclose.
On March 13, 2002, her employer brought AAA to the Makati Police Station to
report the rapes. AAA underwent medico-legal examination.
ISSUE: Whether or not AAA testimony is credible despite lapses and
inconsistencies?
RULING:
YES. The supposed inconsistencies dwelled on minor details or collateral matters
that the CA precisely held to be badges of veracity and manifestations of
truthfulness due to their tendency of demonstrating that the testimony had not
been rehearsed or concocted. It is also basic that inconsistencies bearing on
minor details or collateral matters should not adversely affect the substance of the
witness’ declaration, veracity, or weight of testimony. The only inconsistencies that
might have discredited the victim’s credible testimony were those that affected or
related to the elements of the crime. Alas, that was not true herein. The task of
assigning values to the testimonies of witnesses and of weighing their credibility is
best left to the trial judge by virtue of the first-hand impressions he derives while
the witnesses testify before him.
G.R. No. 157177. February 11, 2008.*
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, petitioner, vs. JESUSA P. REYES and
CONRADO B. REYES, respondents.
FACTS:
On December 7, 1990 at around 2:00 p.m., plaintiff Jesusa Reyes together with
her daughter, Joan Reyes, went to BPI Zapote Branch to open an ATM account,
she being interested with the ongoing promotions of BPI entitling every depositor
with a deposit amounting to P2,000.00 to a ticket with a car as its prize to be
raffled every month.
She was accommodated, in lieu of the bank manager Mr. Nica-sio, by Cicero
Capati (Pats) who was an employee of the bank and in charge of the new
accounts and time deposits characteristically described as having homosexual
inclinations. They were entertained by Capati and were made to sit at a table
occupied by a certain Liza.
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
Plaintiff informed Capati that they wanted to open an ATM account for the amount
of P200,000.00, P100,000.00 of which shall be withdrawn from her exiting savings
account with BPI bank which is account no. 0233-2433-88 and the other
P100,000.00 will be given by her in cash.
Capati allegedly made a mistake and prepared a withdrawal slip for P200,00.00 to
be withdrawn from her existing savings account with said bank and the plaintiff
Jesusa Reyes believing in good faith that Capati prepared the papers with the
correct amount signed the same unaware of the mistakes in figures.
While she was being entertained by Capati, her daughter Joan Reyes was filling
up the signature cards and several other forms.
Minutes later after the slips were presented to the teller, Capati returned to where
the plaintiff was seating and informed the latter that the withdrawable balance
could not accommodate P200,000.00.
Plaintiff explained that she is withdrawing the amount of P100,000.00 only and
then changed and correct the figure two (2) into one (1) with her signature super-
imposed thereto signifying the change, afterwhich the amount of P100,000.00 in
cash in two bun-dles containing 100 pieces of P500.00 peso bill were given to
Capati with her daughter Joan witnessing the same. Thereafter Capati prepared a
deposit slip for P200,000.00 in the name of plaintiff Jesusa Reyes with the new
account no. 0235-0767-48 and brought the same to the teller’s booth.
After a while, he returned and handed to the plaintiff her duplicate copy of her
deposit to account no. 0235-0767-48 reflecting the amount of P200,000.00 with
receipt stamp showing December 7, as the date.
Plaintiff and daughter then left.
On December 14, 1990, Mrs. Jesusa received her express teller card from said
bank.
Thereafter on December 26, 1990, plaintiff left for the United States (Exhs. “T,”
“U”- “U-1”) and returned to Manila on January 31, 1991 (Exhs. “V”-“V-1”).
When she went to her pawnshop, she was made aware by her statement of
account sent to her by BPI bank that her ATM account only contained the amount
of P100,000.00 with interest.
She then sent her daughter to inquire, however, the bank manager assured her
that they would look into the matter.
On February 6, 1991, plaintiff instructed Efren Luna, one of her employees, to
update her savings account passbook at the BPI with the folded deposit slip for
Page 12
P200,000.00 stapled at the outer cover of said passbook. After presenting the
passbook to be updated and when the same was returned, Luna noticed that the
deposit slip stapled at the cover was removed and validated at the back portion
thereof.
Thereafter, Luna returned with the passbook to the plaintiff and when the latter
saw the validation, she got angry.
Plaintiff then asked the bank manager why the deposit slip was validated,
whereupon the manager assured her that the matter will be investigated into.
When no word was heard as to the investigation made by the bank, Mrs. Reyes
sent two (2) demand letters.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the respondent Jesusa made an initial deposit of 200k with respect
to the credibility of evidence present to support it – data on the bank machine?
RULING:
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by
preponderance of evidence, or that evidence which is of greater weight or is more
convincing than that which is in opposition to it. For a better perspective on the
calibration of the evidence on hand, it must first be stressed that the judge who
had heard and seen the witnesses testify was not the same judge who penned the
decision. Thus, not having heard the testimonies himself, the trial judge or the
appellate court would not be in a better position than this Court to assess the
credibility of witnesses on the basis of their demeanor. Hence, to arrive at the
truth, we thoroughly reviewed the transcripts of the witnesses’ testimonies and
examined the pieces of evidence on record. Great evidentiary weight is given to
the teller’s tape, considering that it is inserted into the bank’s computer terminal,
which records the teller’s daily transactions in the ordinary course of business, and
there is no showing that the same had been purposely manipulated to prove the
bank’s claim.
G.R. No. 160811. April 18, 2008.*
RICKY BASTIAN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
On April 24, 1995, at around 11:00 p.m., Lorna Bandiola went to Solido
Elementary School in Nabas, Aklan to fetch her children Lorena and Lorsen who
were attending a dance party.3 On her way inside the campus, she saw petitioner
Ricky Bastian, together with co-accused Albino Layasan, Roque Prado and
Renato Prado. The trio were seated on the concrete fence of the school.4
Lorna did not mind them as she proceeded to the dance hall.5 Upon reaching the
hall, she learned that the party was still in progress. She decided to while the time
and waited for her children. When the affair ended at around 2:00 a.m., Lorna left
the school premises with Lorena and Lorsen in tow.
While on their way out of the campus, Lorna saw her son-in-law John Ronquillo,
the victim, about ten (10) arms-stretch ahead of them. Apparently, he also went to
the dance party and was about to go home.6 It was at that point when Lorna saw
petitioner step ahead of his co-accused. Unexpectedly, petitioner drew a gun and
shot Ronquillo on the head. The victim fell instantaneously. Petitioner continued
shooting while Ronquillo lay sprawled on the ground.7
Lorna heard petitioner’s co-accused saying, “He is dead already,” before the
group ran away.8 She trembled with fear and had to be helped by Lorena and
Lorsen in going out of the school campus.9
After receiving a dispatch report regarding the shooting incident at the school
grounds, Police Officers Jose Roño, Elmer Villanueva and Ramie Zomil
immediately proceeded to the crime scene. The investigating team arrived at
around 2:50 a.m. They found the dead body of John Ronquillo on the ground, face
up. When they checked the body, they recovered one (1) bullet slug on the
ground, near the back of the victim.
The victim’s cadaver was later turned over to the Joy Funeral Parlor in Solido,
Nabas, Aklan. There, Dr. Gloria Boliver of the Municipal Health Office conducted a
post-mortem autopsy.
Then the complaint against the accused foregoes. But NPA claim the
responsibility over the said incident.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is credibility on the testimony made by nemelyn tulio is
admissible RULING:
YES. Even assuming, ex gratia argumenti, that the testimony of Nemelyn Tulio
can be discarded, petitioner’s conviction founded on the positive declarations of
eyewitness Lorna Bandiola still stands on terra firma. The rule is well-entrenched
in this jurisdiction that in determining the value and credibility of evidence,
Page 13
witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. The testimony of only one witness, if
credible and positive, is sufficient to convict. – side note --That the New People’s
Army allegedly publicly claimed responsibility for the killing of the victim is beside
the point. It is not binding on the Court. It does not preclude the Court from
determining the real killer in accordance with the rule of evidence and settled
jurisprudence.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 112262. April 2, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARMANDO
RODRIGUEZ CAMAT and WILFREDO TANYAG DEL ROSARIO, accused-
appellants.
FACTS:
About 9:00 oclock in the evening of September 1, 1985, Nelson Sinoy and
Gonzalo Penalver, both members of the Philippine Marine(s) stationed at Fort
Bonifacio, Makati, Metro Manila, were walking along Quirino Avenue, Paranaque,
Metro Manila. They had just come from Camp Claudio where they attended a
birthday party. They were in civilian clothes.
While walking along Quirino Avenue, they noticed two persons trailing them
closely, about ten meters away. The place was well-lighted. Gonzalo Penalver
was carrying a clutch bag, containing a Sanwa electric tester (Exhibit 1). They
crossed the street ostensibly to avoid the two men following them.
On(e) of them, Wilfredo del Rosario rushed to Nelson Sinoy and kicked the latter.
Armando Camat followed del Rosario and pulled out a knife and stabbed Nelson
Sinoy. Gonzalo Penalver kicked Camat who in turn stabbed the former, hitting him
at the right rib. When Penalver kicked Camat he became outbalanced. Wilfredo
del Rosario then grabbed the clutch bag from him (Penalver).
Realizing they were at the losing end, Sinoy and Penalver ran away. With the aid
of somebody who identified himself as a policeman, they were brought to the San
Juan de Dios Hospital.
Nelson Sinoy died at the San Juan de Dios Hospital despite the efforts of Dr.
Vittorio Pantig to save him. Dr. Pantig conducted an exploratory lapar(o)tomy on
the abdomen of Nelson Sinoy and found massive bleeding in the abdominal
cavity, and partial damage to the kidney, pancreas and the diaphragm. He tried to
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
control the bleeding but despite blood transfusion, the blood pressure of the
patient went down to zero.
Gonzalo Penalver was transferred to the AFP Medical Center on September 2,
1985 after his wound was already sutured at the San Juan de Dios Hospital. At
the AFP Medical Center, Dr. Benedicto Mina took care of the patient. He gave
blood transfusion to the patient. The patient was discharged from the hospital only
on March 15, 1986.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of Penalver is credible to convict the accused?
RULING:
YES. It is well settled that the testimony of a single eyewitness, if found convincing
and trustworthy by the trial court, is sufficient to support a finding of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. (People vs. Catubig, 195 SCRA 505) We also see no reason to
deviate from the trial courts observation that Penalvers testimony bore the
attributes of truth, having been delivered in a candid and straightforward manner.
We have scrupulously examined the testimony of Penalver and we find the same
to be categorical and candid, untainted by inconsistencies, contradictions or
evasions. It creditably chronicles the material details in the commission of the
crimes in question, and should accordingly be given full credence.
It bears repeating that findings of the trial court pertaining to the credibility of
witnesses deserve great respect since it had the opportunity to hear and observe
their demeanor as they testified on the witness stand and, therefore, it was in a
better position to discern if such witnesses were telling the truth or not based on
their deportment while testifying.
There was no evidence of any ulterior or evil motive on the part of Penalver that
might have led him to give fabricated testimony against appellants. He, and even
appellant Camat, declared in open court that they did not know each other before
the gruesome incident happened on September 1, 1985. Having no motive to
testify falsely, his positive testimony is sufficient for conviction. When there is no
evidence indicating that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motive, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony
is entitled to full faith and credit.
Page 14
G.R. No. 188132. February 29, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROSEMARIE MAGUN
DAYAO y ALEJANDRO alias “ROSE,” accused-appellant.
FACTS:
For review of the Court is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated December
19, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR. No. 02899, which affirmed the Joint Decision2 dated
June 27, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 267, in
Criminal Case Nos. 14061-D and 14062-D. In the said cases, accused-appellant
Rosemarie Magundayao y Alejandro alias Rose was found guilty of the crimes of
illegal sale and possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride, more popularly
known as shabu, under Sections 5 and 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. The
accused was caught under buy-bust operation conducted by the police authorities.
And a defense, the accused argued that the testimony made by PO3 Aragao and
PO2 Memoracion are contradicting - as to how the team leader PNP Chief Paat
received the information disclosed by the informant.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the testimony of PO3 and PO2 is still credible despite its lapses
and inconsistencies?
RULING:
YES.
As regards the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of PO2 Memoracion and
PO3 Arago, the Court finds the same unpersuasive. People v. Lazaro states that
“[f]or a discrepancy or inconsistency in the testimony of a witness to serve as
basis for acquittal, it must refer to the significant facts vital to the guilt or innocence
of the accused for the crime charged. An inconsistency which has nothing to do
with the elements of the crime cannot be a ground for the acquittal of the
accused.”
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
G.R. No. 144405. February 24, 2004.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. FERDINAND MATITO y
TORRES, a.k.a. “FREDDIE,” appellant.
FACTS:
On October 16, 1998, around 10:30 in the evening, in San Roque, Hagonoy,
Bulacan, Filomena7 Raymundo heard gunshots just moments after her husband
Mariano Raymundo, Jr. had stepped out of their house to go to the backyard to
attend to his quails. As the shots came from the direction where Mariano was,
Filomena rushed to the kitchen door and, upon opening it, saw Mariano who was
about to come in. He was pressing his hands on his shoulder which was bloodied
and bleeding. Once inside the house, Filomena asked Mariano what happened
and who did it to him. Mariano replied: ‘Binaril ako ni Pareng Freddie. Binaril ako
ni Pareng Freddie.’ Mariano pushed Filomena away from the door when she tried
to look outside. Filomena again asked Mariano who shot him, but Mariano’s voice
by then was barely audible.
“Filomena and her two (2) daughters whom she had awakened, called out to their
neighbors for help. Mariano was boarded on a tricycle and rushed to the Divine
World Hospital where he was pronounced dead.
ISSUE: Whether or not circumstantial evidence may be considered as the sole
basis of the accused criminal conviction?
RULING:
YES.
Circumstantial evidence is defined as that evidence that “indirectly proves a fact in
issue through an inference which the factfinder draws from the evidence
established. Resort thereto is essential when the lack of direct testimony would
result in setting a felon free.” It is not a weaker form of evidence vis-à-vis direct
evidence. Cases have recognized that in its effect upon the courts, the former may
surpass the latter in weight and probative force. To warrant a conviction based on
circumstantial evidence, the following requisites must concur: (1) there is more
than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the inferences are derived are
proven; and (3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. The totality of the evidence must constitute
an unbroken chain showing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
First, narrating how her husband, before he died, had identified his killer,
Page 15
Second, the victim’s daughter narrated how appellant had spoken with her that
fateful evening.
Third, a bitter quarrel ensued between the victim and appellant when the latter’s
water supply was cut off by the former, the barangay tanod, and the secretary of
the Homeowner’s Association.
Fourth, when asked by his neighbors (including the victim) to widen the right of
way along his premises–which he, together with his father, had enclosed with
barbed wire–appellant refused to do so.
Fifth, there was a bitter quarrel between the daughters of appellant and the victim.
Sixth, nitrate powder was conclusively proven to be present on the cast taken from
the right hand of appellant.
G.R. No. 199877. August 13, 2012.*
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y
ORBISTA, accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Sumulong testified that: (a) he was an accounting staff of San Sebastian Allied
Services, Inc. (San Sebastian); (b) on May 31, 2001 and at around 9:00 in the
morning, he withdrew the amount of P230,000.00 from the Metrobank-Mabini
Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San Sebastian; (c) in
going to the bank, he rode a pick-up and was accompanied by Virgilio Manacob
(Manacob), Jeff Atie (Atie) and Joselito Bautista (Bautista); (d) he placed the
amount withdrawn in a black bag and immediately left the bank; (e) at around
10:30 in the morning, while they were at the intersection of Mercedes and Market
Avenues, Pasig City, Lara suddenly appeared at the front passenger side of the
pick-up and pointed a gun at him stating, “Akin na ang pera, iyong bag, nasaan?”;
(f) Bautista, who was seated at the back, shouted, “Wag mong ibigay”; (g) heeding
Bautista’s advice, he threw the bag in Bautista’s direction; (h) after getting hold of
the bag, Bautista alighted from the pick-up and ran; (i) seeing Bautista, Lara ran
after him while firing his gun; (j) when he had the chance to get out of the pick-up,
he ran towards Mercedes Plaza and called up the office of San Sebastian to relay
the incident; (k) when he went back to where the pick-up was parked, he went to
the rear portion of the vehicle and saw blood on the ground; (l) he was informed
by one bystander that Bautista was shot and the bag was taken away from him;
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
(m) when barangay officials and the police arrived, he and his two (2) other
companions were brought to the police station for investigation; (n) on June 7,
2001, while on his way to Barangay Maybunga, Pasig City, he saw Lara walking
along Dr. Pilapil Street, Barangay San Miguel, Pasig City; (o) he alerted the police
and Lara was thereafter arrested; and (p) at the police station, he, Atie and
Manacob identified Lara as the one who shot and robbed them of San Sebastian’s
money.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient evidence to convict Lara?
RULING:YES.
Well-settled is the rule that direct evidence of the commission of the crime is not
the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt.
Even in the absence of direct evidence, conviction can be had if the established
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain, consistent with each other and to the
hypothesis that the accused is guilty, to the exclusion of all other hypothesis that
he is not. Under Section 4, Rule 133 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure,
circumstantial evidence sufficed to convict upon the concurrence of the following
requisites: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
1. While the vehicle was at the intersection of Mercedes and Market Avenues,
Pasig City, appellant suddenly emerged and pointed a gun at prosecution witness
Sumulong, demanding from him to produce the bag containing the money[.]
2. Prosecution witness Sumulong threw the bag to the victim who was then seated
at the backseat of the vehicle.
3. The victim alighted from vehicle carrying the bag.
4. Appellant chased and fired several shots at the victim.
5. The victim sustained several gunshot wounds.
6. The police officers recovered from the scene of the crime six deformed empty
shells.
G.R. No.127154. July 30, 2002.*
Page 16
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ROLDAN A.
OCHATE alias “Boy,” accused-appellant.
FACTS:
Around 5:15 in the afternoon of September 26, 1994, Rowena Albiso and her
older brother Roseller were walking together on their way home from school at
Tampilisan, Zamboanga del Norte. Upon reaching the house of the barangay
captain, which is about twenty (20) meters from their school, Rowena stopped and
went to the communal water pump to wash her food container and her slippers.
Roseller went home ahead of her sister.1 On his way home, he passed by the hut
of accused Roldan Ochate where he saw the latter in the yard tucking a scythe on
his waist.2 When Roseller arrived home, their father, Romulo, asked for the
whereabouts of Rowena. Roseller told Romulo that his sister was not yet home.
Romulo then went to meet Rowena. However, he was unable to find her. Romulo
and Roseller thereafter went to the house of the accused who is their neighbor but
finding no one there, they proceeded to report the incident to barangay
councilman and acting barangay captain Crisanto Montano.3 Montano, in turn,
sought the assistance of some of the men in the barangay in order to find
Rowena. The search was conducted the whole evening of September 26, 1994 to
no avail. It was only around eight o’clock the following morning that the group
found Rowena in a ricefield about fifty meters from Ochate’s house.4 She was
already dead. The medico-legal officer who later examined the cadaver reported
that the cause of death was hemorrhagic shock due to deep and penetrating
incised wounds in the neck and abdomen.5 Suspecting that Ochate was the
culprit, police officers as well as other members of the barangay went to see
Ochate at his house but they were not able to find him. It was only on September
29, 1994 that a certain Bienvenido Pantallano, a member of the CAFGU, was able
to locate Ochate and he took Ochate in his custody and brought him to the Chief
of Police of Tampilisan.6
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused may be convicted of a crime rape with homicide
based on the circumstantial evidence presented before the court?
RULING:
NO. ACQUITTED. – the evidences presented is not enough to convict the felon.
Jurisprudence instructs that where the circumstances obtaining in a case are
capable of two inferences, one of which is consistent with the presumption of
innocence while the other may be compatible with the finding of guilt, the court
must acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty and, therefore, is insufficient to support a judgment of conviction.
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
After a careful review of the entire evidence presented, we find that a combination
of the foregoing circumstances is insufficient to convict appellant of rape with
homicide. Said circumstances do not lead to a fair and reasonable conclusion that
accused-appellant, to the exclusion of all others, is the person guilty of the offense
charged. Appellant’s indifference to the events that happened in their barangay
beginning
September 26, 1994 up to the time of his arrest on September 29, 1994 may lend
support to the suspicion of the barangay and police authorities that he is the
author of the crime. But then, mere suspicion, no matter how strong it may be, is
not sufficient to sustain conviction.20 Law and jurisprudence demand proof
beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his life, liberty, or
even property.21 Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the accused to be
presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption
nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be established by the
prosecution.22 The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to
take “a more than casual consideration” of every circumstances or doubt proving
the innocence of the accused.
In his testimony, Crisanto Montano admitted that accused-appellant was
considered a suspect because he did not join the search for the missing girl.24
Appellant testified that he did not participate in the search because he was busy
drying copra.25 It cannot be contradicted that such passive reaction is susceptible
to different interpretations. Indeed, it may be construed as an indication of guilt;
but, it may also be interpreted as mere indifference or even downright insensibility.
Moreover, there was no evidence presented to show that after Roseller left his
sister to wash her food container and slippers at the communal water pump,
appellant was seen with her. Furthermore, the testimony of Roseller that he saw
appellant along the road on his way home is not sufficient to support the
conclusion that it was appellant who committed the crime. At best, it is mere
conjecture or speculation which the Court will not subscribe to.
G.R. Nos. 147773-74. February 18, 2008.*
DENNIS MANGANGEY, GABRIEL WANASON, and ANSELMO FORAYO,
petitioners, vs. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division) and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Sometime in October 1986, the Municipality of Paracelis, Mountain Province
undertook the widening and partial relocation of the Banilag-Minoli Road. The
Page 17
project was awarded to private contractor Leon Acapen. The description of the suspect that the witness falsified the truth or that his observations were
work to be done and the terms of the contract included, among others: inaccurate.

“1. Roadways and Drainage excavation (removal of slides and overbreaks) [for]
1,800 cubic meters at P18.00/cu.m.; and 2. Roadways and Drainage Excavation
(widening and construction) for 4.010 cubic meters at P20.00/cu.m. x x x PEOPLE v MENDOZA (2005)

Quantities given above are only approximate and payments of the work shall be FACTS:
based on the quantities actually accomplished and completed which shall be
measured and determine[d] accurately and shall be accepted by the Municipal The father of the accused is charged with the crime attempted rape against her
Mayor.” The project was allegedly completed on December 8, 1986 as shown in daughter. Her daughter testified that she was undressed, kissed, touched in the
the Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance dated December 8, 1986. The breast, punched her in the stomach and rape her unconsciously, and threatened
certificate was prepared and signed by Construction and Maintenance Foreman to be kill if somebody would knew what had happened to her. As defense, her
Dennis Mangangey, petitioner herein, who attested that he personally inspected father argued as an alibi, that she always came late, dating several men, and just
the project and that it was 100% completed in accordance with the agreed using him to her caprice.
specifications. In another Certificate of Inspection and Acceptance, with the same
date, the signatories, namely: Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator ISSUE:
Gabriel Wanason, petitioner herein, as the
Whether or not the denial made by the accuse can quit him from criminal liability?
54Mayor’s representative; Municipal Revenue Clerk Anselmo Forayo, petitioner
RULING:
herein, as the Treasurer’s representative; and Bernardo Acapen (now deceased),
as the Engineer’s representative, all attested that they personally inspected the
NO. Denial is essentially the weakest form of defense it can never overcome an
work done by Leon and found the work in accordance with the approved program
affirmative testimony particularly when it comes from the mouth of the credible
of work. The Government subsequently issued a check for PhP 106,970 as
witness.
payment for the project.2 In February 1989, a certain Simon Naigsan wrote to the
Regional Office of the Commission of Audit (COA) and complained about the
anomalies in the construction of the road. The COA Regional Director directed
Technical Audit Specialist Engr. Hospicio Angluben to conduct an actual site
TAN v. PACURIBOT
inspection. As an offshoot of the affidavit/report and for failure to complete the
Banilag-Minoli Road, provincial officers Engineer Dionisio Padua, Senior Civil 540 SCRA 246; Dec. 14, 2007
Engineer Francisco Tigcangay, and Paracelis Municipal Treasurer Tomas Pocyao,
and project contractor Leon were charged before the Sandiganbayan in an FACTS:
Information4 dated August 14, 1991, alleging that they conspired with evident bad
faith to defraud the government in 55violation of Section 3(e)5 of Republic Act No. Judge Pacuribot was charged with rape and acts of lasciviousness Sherlita Tan
3019 also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Information was and by Johanna
docketed as Crim. Case No. 17007.
Villafranca.
ISSUE: Whether or not corroborative evidence is necessary in the present case?
Ms. Tan was deceived twice by Judge Pacuribot when he offered to take her to
RULING: the bus terminal but instead

NO. We have reviewed the records and we agree with the Sandiganbayan that the brought her to a motel where he ravished her. Not contented, he rented a room in
testimony of Angluben was credible, consistent and categorical in contrast with the the house of Ms. Tan
testimony of Mangangey, and there is no need to corroborate Angluben’s
testimony. Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 18

wherein he would order Miss Tan to go to his room when her husband was not
around. Further, Judge Pacuribot during office hours would also request Miss
Tan’s presence in his chamber where respondent would sexually harass her even
in the presence of another person.
Ms. Villafranca was also deceived by the said Judge when he made her believe
that they were going to go outfor dinner but instead brought her in a motel in
Butuan City where he ravished her and took a nude picture of her. The respondent
used such picture to blackmail Ms. Villafranca and would threaten her that in the
event she would refuse to submit to his lustful desires, he would send the picture
to her family. After the incident, the respondent would order her to bring food at his
rented room and would subsequently rape her.
Furthermore, the respondent ordered the complainant to send sweet text
messages and write love letters and greeting cards to him and even ordered her
to file an annulment case against her husband.
Both charges were denied by Judge Pacuribot. Moreover, He claimed that delay in
the filing of the charges against him casted doubt to the truthfulness of their claim
and that if they were truly raped by him why did they not refuse at all but instead
continued to submit themselves to him. He alleged that the charges imputed
against him were complainants’ tool of revenge.
ISSUE/s:
Whether or not denial can prevail over positive testimony of the witness.
Whether or not the delay in the filing of the charges against him casted doubts to
the truthfulness of their claim.
Whether or not inconsistencies of the witness’ testimony affects the credibility of
the witness.
HELD:
NO. Mere denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of a witness. A mere
denial, like alibi, is a self-serving negative evidence, which cannot be accorded
greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters. As between a categorical testimony that rings the truth on one
hand, and bare denial on the other, the former is generally held to prevail.
NO. Delay in the filing of charges does not necessarily undermine the credibility of
witnesses. The Supreme Court has deemed delay justified when there is fear of
reprisal, social, humiliation, familiar considerations and economic reasons.
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
As held in People vs. Espino delay in the commission of rape is not an indication
of fabricated charge. Many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges
against the rapist, for they
prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the
world or risk the offender’s making good on his threats. This is understandable,
considering the inbred modesty of Filipinas and their aversion to the public
disclosure of matters affecting their honor.
NO. Minor and trivial discrepancies which might have been caused by the natural
fickleness of memory, even tend to strengthen, rather than weaken the credibility
of the witness, for they shake off the suspicion of a rehearsed testimony. As held
in Simbajon v. Esteban the Supreme Court said that No married woman would cry
sexual assault, subject herself and her family to public scrutiny and humiliation,
and strain her marriage in order to perpetuate a falsehood.
=============================================
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NUEVA
570 SCRA 449; Nov. 03, 2008
FACTS:
On Dec. 29, 2000, in Caloocan City, Metro Manila, Dante Nueva hit Virgiio
Revollido, Jr. with a piece of wood on the head and stabbed at the back and
chest, which eventually caused his death. Of the 3 accused,
Dante was the only one apprehended.
The prosecution presented witnesses.
Alfonso Bacar, Jr. testified during trial that at around 10pm of that same day, he
was standing outside the Great Taste Bakery located on 4th Ave. East, Caloocan
City, when he saw a person coming from M.H. Del Pilar chased by another. Upon
reaching 4th Ave. , the person being chased passed in front of Dante and another.
He was immediately stabbed at the back by another (John Doe). The appellant,
Dante, pulled out a knife and likewise stabbed the victim. Afterwards, the 3
accused ran towards M.H. Del Pilar.
On cross-examination, Alfonso narrated that he was more or less 7 to 8 arms
length away from the place of the incident, and that place was well-lighted.
Dante testified that in that same evening, he was at work as bouncer at Yellow
Submarine, that was from 10pm to 3am. He does not know of any untoward or
stabbing incident in his working place.
Page 19
RTC convicted Dante, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Murder,
qualified by treachery and is sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
CA affirmed the RTC decision with modification.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that it
was Dante who killed the victim
Whether or not Dante’s claim of the defenses of denial and alibi stands
HELD:
NO. A distinguishing feature of this case is the presence of an eyewitness Alfonso
who provided positive identification of the appellant.
Time and again, we have ruled that the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left
to the determination of the trial court because it had the unique advantage of
having personally observed the witnesses, their demeanor, conduct, and attitude.
As a consequence, we have considered the the trial courts assessment of the
credibility of witnesses to be binding except when the lower court had patently
overlooked facts and circumstances of
weight and influence that could alter the results of the case.
We carefully scrutinized the records of this case and found no reason to disbelieve
Alfonsos straightforward narration of the events surrounding the death of the
victim. Nor did we see anything on record showing any improper motive that would
lead Alfonso to testify as he did.
NO. To be believed, denial must be supported by strong evidence of non-
culpability; otherwise, it is purely self-serving.[30] Alibi, on the other hand, is one
of the weakest defenses in a criminal case and should be rejected when the
identity of the accused is sufficiently and positively established by the
prosecution.[31] For the appellants defense of alibi to prosper, he should have
proven that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the
crime when it was committed. By physical impossibility we refer to the distance
and the facility of access between thesitus criminis and the place where he says
he was when the crime was committed.
The appellant fails this test as he insisted that he was at the Yellow Submarine
working as a bouncer at the time of the stabbing incident. By his own admission,
the Yellow Submarine is only 30 to 40 meters from the
MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence|
Great Taste Bakery. This short distance does not render it physically impossible
for the appellant to have been
at the place where the victim was attacked.
Aside from being inherently weak, the appellants alibi cannot prevail over the
positive identification made by
Alfonso that the appellant was one of the victims assailants.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BARO
388 SCRA 75; June 05, 2002
FACTS:
On December 17, 1997, Roda Ongotan filed a complaint for 3 counts of rape
against Ernie Baro.
It was alleged that he raped her on January 5, 1995, March 5, 1995 and April 16,
1996, in her bedroom
(2 armslength wide and 1½ armslength long). Roda, along with her parents, 8
other siblings and 1 uncle occupied the 2nd floor of the house.
Complainant described each rape as follows: the appellant enters her room,
covers her mouth with a handkerchief, threatens to kill her if she shouted, pulls
down her underwear, pokes a balisong at her, and inserts his penis into her
vagina and she couldn’t remember how long the appellant’s penis was inside her.
Medico-legal officer Dr. Freyra found lacerations in Roda’s hymen, opined that
these lacerations could have been caused by any hard blunt object like an erect
male organ.
Accused-appellant Baro pleaded not guilty to all three charges. His set up the
defense of alibi that he was engaged in copra farming in Catubig, Northern Samar
prior to November 15, 1996, when he came to Manila with his wife and 3 kids to
find work upon the request and invitation of his niece (Roda’s mom).
RTC found Baro guilty of 3 counts of rape; reclusion perpetua for each count. The
RTC found that the
Medico-legal report and testimony of Dr. Freyra bolstered Roda’s claim that she
had experienced violent
Page 20
sexual intercourse at a young age. Also, Accused’s alibi and denial cannot prevail (1) The complaint was filed more than 2 years after the first rape and more than a
over the positive testimony year after the third one

and identification of complainant. allegedly occurred. Her explanation for the delay was the threat of the appellant to
kill her, but she reported
ISSUE/s:
the incident while he was still residing with her family because she no longer
Whether or not the complainant’s testimony is credible wanted to ruin her life. (2) He

Whether or not the accused’s alibi is a plausible excuse
HELD:
NO. While it is true that the complainant’s testimony may be the sole basis for
convicting the accused in a
rape case, the complaining witness’ testimony must be credible.
was not much older than her brothers. It was not shown whether he was her
benefactor or whether he
exercised discipline over her. Presumptions of moral ascendancy cannot and
should not prevail over the
constitutional presumption of innocence. (3) The report merely indicated healed
lacerations were found. They

In reviewing rape cases, this Court has always been guided by the following were not proven to have been caused by the alleged rapes. (4) She reported the
principles: (a) an accusation of second rape first and even

rape can be made with facility – while it may be difficult for the prosecution to asked what he wanted from her. Considering the cramped space and quietness of
prove, it is usually more the night, the faintest cry

difficult for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (b) in view of the from her would have been heard by one or more of her family members. Each
intrinsic nature of the crime in rape was described in a very

which only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant uniform and even seemingly systematic manner which raises the suspicion that
must be scrutinized with her testimony had been

extreme caution; and (c) the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its coached, rehearsed or contrived.
own merits – it cannot be
YES. On each of the dates of the alleged rapes, Baro stated that he was in
allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense. Catubig, Northern Samar. It

A review of the records of the case creates reasonable doubt as to accused’s guilt would take 24 hours for a bus to travel from Catubig to Manila. It would be highly
because of: (1) delay in filing unlikely for him to take the

the complaint, (2) failure of the prosecution to prove accused’s moral ascendancy 24-hr bus ride to Manila, commit the act and then return by Catubig by taking
over complainant, (3) lack of another 24-hr bus ride. No

support from the records for the RTC’s finding of violent sexual intercourse, and evidence was adduced by the prosecution to prove that appellant was indeed in
(4) discrepancies in the Manila when the alleged

complainant’s testimony. rapes were committed (no testimony from mom/siblings).

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 21

An alibi is the plea of having been somewhere other than at the scene of the crime Upon arriving at the target area, the informant pointed out Bautista to the team.
at the time of its Bautista was then

commission. Contrary to the common notion, alibi is not always a weak defense. standing in front of a house. PO2 Tayag and the informant then approached
But to be valid for purposes Bautista even as the rest of the

of exoneration from a criminal charge, the defense of alibi must be so airtight that team took up positions nearby. The informant introduced PO2 Tayag to Bautista
it would admit of no as biyahero ng shabu, after

exception.
In order for it to prosper, it must be demonstrated that the person charged with the
crime was not only
somewhere else when the offense was committed, but was so far away that it
would have been physically
impossible to have been at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission. The
reason is that no person can be in two places at the same time.
which the informant left PO2 Tayag and Bautista alone to themselves. PO2 Tayag
told Bautista: Cesar, pakuha
ng piso. Bautista drew a plastic sachet from his pocket and handed it to PO2
Tayag, who in turn handed
the P100.00 bill buy-bust money to Bautista. PO2 Tayag then turned his cap
backwards as the pre-arranged
signal to the back-up members. The latter rushed forward and arrested Bautista.
Upon informing Bautista of
his constitutional rights, SPO1 Ybaez frisked him and found in his pocket six other
plastic sachets, while PO2

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BAUTISTA Caragdag seized the buy-bust money from Bautistas hand. The team brought
Bautista and the seized plastic
666 SCRA 518; Feb. 22, 2012
sachets back to the police station.
FACTS:
Bautista denied the charge. He claimed that on April 25, 2003, at around 6:00
Two separate informations was filed against Cesar Bautista charging him with a p.m., he and his wife,
violation of Sec. 5 and
Rosario, were in their house cutting cloth to be made into door mats when PO2
a violation of Sec. 11 (3) of RA 9165. Tayag and two others barged

On April 25, 2003, an informant went to the Caloocan Police Station to report the in; that when he asked what they wanted, they told him that it was none of his
peddling of illegal business; that the three

drugs by Bautista on Kasama St., Brgy. 28, Caloocan City. A team was formed to introduced themselves as policemen and ordered him to go with them; that they
conduct a buy-bust operation forced him to go with them,

against Bautista. PO2 Tayag, designated as the poseur-buyer, was given a with PO2 Tayag hitting him on the nape; that as they were walking on the road,
P100.00 bill as buy-bust money, on they demanded money from

which he placed his initials ALT. him, but he told them that he had none; and that he was brought to and detained
at the Caloocan City Jail.

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 22

ISSUE: invited by Ferdinand Rabadon, who was drinking beer inside Adela's Restaurant,
to join him. Rabago obliged.
Whether or not the denial and defense of frame-up stands
Later, Rabadon borrowed Rabago's motorcycle which he used in going to the bus
HELD: terminal to check if

NO. Bautistas denial and defense of frame-up were given no consideration due to his wife had already arrived from Zamboanga. Upon his return, Rabadon invited
their being selfserving Rabago to Five Doors Disco

and uncorroborated. We declare such treatment warranted. He did not present but the latter opted to go home. Rabadon, who was still on the motorcycle holding
Rosario, his wife, to its handle bars, offered to

corroborate his claim of being framed up although she was supposed to have drive Rabago home.
been around at the time of his
When Rabago was about to mount the motorcycle, he was pushed by one Ming
arrest. He did not also adduce evidence to substantiate his story of being falsely Basila, causing him to
incriminated in a frame-up by
fall on his buttocks, after which Basila shot Rabadon twice at the back. While
competent evidence. His claim thereon did not prevail over the positive Rabadon was already lying down
identification of him by PO2 Tayag as
with his leg pinned by the motorcycle, appellant shot him three (3) times.
the drug pusher he had transacted with. As the Court sees it, he was not even
sincere in claiming frame-up, for Rabago ran away, but after noticing that appellant and Basila [had] left the scene,
he returned and saw
he did not formally charge the policemen for the supposed frame-up and extortion
committed against him. Rabadon dying and gasping for breath.

Verily, defenses of frame-up and extortion are not looked upon with favor due to During the hearing of the case, Rabago explained that he did not divulge the
their being conveniently identities of the assailants

concocted and usually asserted by culprits arrested for violations of R.A. No. for fear of his life He claimed that some policemen in Alaminos, Pangasinan [were]
9165. members of the Aguila

Gang which kill[ed] people. The gang [was] allegedly led by one Ramon Navarro,
appellant's brother.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NAVARRO
The NBI interrogated Rabago. He named appellant Noel Navarro and Ming Basila
297 SCRA 331; Oct. 07, 1998 as the authors of

FACTS: Rabadon's killing.

On January 5, 1991, around 9:00 in the evening, Jose Rabago went to Enoc Dr. Francisco Viray, who autopsied Rabadon's cadaver, found five (5) gunshot
Theater located at wounds and concluded

Poblacion, Alaminos, Pangasinan to view some stationary pictures exhibited that the immediate cause of death [was] "cardio-respiratory arrest; antecedent
outside the theater. He was cause: brain injury and

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 23

underlying cause: gunshot wounds. which he has already voluntarily waived.

RTC found the appellant guilty of murder, based on Jose Rabago's testimony as a
prosecution witness,
MANUFACTURERS HANOVER TRUST v. GUERRERO
which it found to be positive, credible and sufficient to support a judgment of
conviction. 397 SCRA 709; Feb. 19, 2003

ISSUE/s: FACTS:

Whether or not there is credibility and sufficiency of the prosecution’s evidence Respondent Rafael Ma. Guerrero filed a complaint for damages against petitioner
Bank for allegedly:
Whether or not the defense of alibi stands
(a) illegally withheld taxes charged against interests on his checking account with
HELD: the Bank; (b) a returned

YES. It must be stressed also that Rabago's testimony was compatible with the check worth USS18,000.99 due to signature verification problems; and (c)
findings of Dr. Francisco E. unauthorized conversion of his

Viray, the medicolegal officer who autopsied the victim's body. Rabago said that account.
Rabadon had been shot five
The Bank claimed that by stipulation Guerrero’s account is governed by New York
times, once in the nape and four times in other parts of his body. Such details of and this law does
his testimony as a
not permit any claim except actual damages. The Bank filed a Motion for Partial
prosecution witness, aside from the fact that no ill motive or bias was ascribed to Summary Judgment seeking
him by the appellant, lends
to dismiss the claims for consequential, nominal, temperate, moral and exemplary
earmarks of truth to said testimony. damages.

NO. While the appellant denied that he killed Ferdinand Rabadon, he did not offer The affidavit of Alyssa Walden, a New York attorney, supported the Bank’s claim
any evidence to prove that Guerrero’s bank

his assertion; instead, his testimony focused on the circumstances surrounding his account stipulated that the governing law is New York law and that this law bars
alleged illegal arrest and all of the claims except actual

subsequent detention. damages. The Philippine Consular Office in NY authenticated the Walden
affidavit.
Faced with the detailed, clear and consistent testimony of Jose Rabago, against
whom no ill motive was The CA sustained the RTC orders denying the motion for partial summary
judgment. Even if the Walden
imputed, Appellant Navarro, whom the former pointed to as one of the killers of
Ferdinand Rabadon, cannot affidavit is used for purpose of summary judgment, the Bank must still comply with
the procedure prescribed
escape conviction merely by issuing an unsubstantiated denial and resorting to
constitutional guarantees by the Rule 132, Sec. 241.

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 24

ISSUE:

Whether or not there are genuine issues of fact that necessitate formal trial PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RULLEPA

HELD: 398 SCRA 567; March 05, 2003

YES. A genuine issue means an issue of fact which calls for the presentation of FACTS:
evidence as
On November 20, 1995, as Gloria was about to set the table for dinner at her
distinguished from an issue which is fictitious or contrived so as not to constitute a house in Quezon City,
genuine issue for trial.
Cyra May, then only three and a half years old, told her, “Mama, si Kuya Ronnie
Walden affidavit shows that the facts and material allegations as pleaded by the lagay niya titi niya at sinaksak
parties are disputed and
sa puwit at sa bibig ko.”
there are substantial triable issues necessitating a formal trial. Resolution of
whether a foreign law allows only “Kuya Ronnie” is accused-appellant Ronnie Rullepa, the Buenafes’ house boy,
who was sometimes left with
the recovery of actual damages is a question of fact as far as the trial court is
concerned since foreign laws do Cyra May at home.

not prove themselves in our courts. Gloria asked Cyra May how many times accused- appellant did those things to
her, to which she
Foreign laws are not a matter of judicial notice. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proven. The answered many times. Pursuing, Gloria asked Cyra May what else he did to her,
and Cyra May indicated the
conflicting allegations as to whether New York law or Philippine law applies to
Guerreros claims present a room where accused-appellant slept and pointed at his pillow.

clear dispute on material allegations which can be resolved only by a trial on the When accused-appellant returned, Buenafe and Gloria verified from him whether
merits. The Walden affidavit what Cyra May had

cannot be considered as proof of New York law on damages not only because it is told them was true. Ronnie readily admitted doing those things but only once, at
self-serving but also because 4:00 p.m. of November 17,

it does not state the specific New York law on damages. 1995 or three days earlier. Unable to contain her anger, Gloria slapped accused-
appellant several times.
Guerrero cannot be said to have admitted the averments in the Banks motion for
partial summary judgment The spouses waited until the following morning to bring accused-appellant to
Camp Karingal where he
and the Walden affidavit just because he failed to file an opposing affidavit. The
Bank still had the burden of admitted the imputations against him, on account of which he was detained.
Gloria’s sworn statement was
proving New York law and jurisprudence even if Guerrero did not present an
opposing affidavit. then taken.

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 25

RTC QC rendered judgment, finding Ronnie Rullepa guilty beyond reasonable the crime itself. Be it remembered that the proof of the victim’s age in the present
doubt of rape, and case spells the difference

accordingly sentenced to death. between life and death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in imposing the supreme penalty of death upon BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK v. CTA
Rullepa
330 SCRA 507; April 12, 2000
HELD:
FACTS:
YES. Here, reasonable doubt exists. A mature three and a half-year old can easily
be mistaken for an Petitioner had a total refundable amount of P297,492 inclusive of the P112,491.00
being claimed as tax
underdeveloped seven-year old.The appearance of the victim, as object evidence,
cannot be accorded much refund in the present case. However, petitioner declared in its 1989 Income Tax
Return that the said total
weight and, following Pruna, the testimony of the mother is, by itself, insufficient.
refundable amount of P297,492.00 will be applied as tax credit to the succeeding
As it has not been established with moral certainty that Cyra May was below taxable year.
seven years old at the time
On Oct. of 1990, petitioner filed written claim for refund in the amount of
of the commission of the offense, accused-appellant cannot be sentenced to P112,491.00 w/ respondent
suffer the death penalty.Only the
CIR alleging that it did not apply the 1989 refundable amount of P297,492.00
penalty of reclusion perpetua can be imposed upon him. (including P112,491.00) to its

As the alleged age approaches the age sought to be proved, the person’s 1990 Annual Income Tax Return or other tax liabilities due to the alleged business
appearance, as object evidence losses it incurred for the

of her age, loses probative value. Doubt as to her true age becomes greater and, same year.
such doubt must be resolved
Without waiting for CIR to act on the claim for refund, petitioner filed a petition for
in favor of the accused. This is because in the era of modernism and rapid growth, review with CTA,
the victim’s mere physical
seeking the refund of P112,491.00.
appearance is not enough to gauge her exact age. For the extreme penalty of
death to be upheld, nothing but CTA dismissed the petition on the ground that petitioner failed to present as
evidence its Corporate
proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
must be substantiated. Verily, Annual ITR for 1990 to establish the fact that petitioner had not yet credited the
amount of P297,492.00
the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but likewise proved with equal
certainty and clearness as (inclusive of the amount P112,491.00 which is the subject of the present
controversy) to its 1990 income tax

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 26

liability. against the claimant. However, petitioner has established its claim. Petitioner may
have failed to strictly
Petitioner calls the attention of the Court, to a Decision rendered by the Tax Court
in CTA Case No. comply with the rules of procedure; it may have even been negligent but these
circumstances, should not
4897, involving its claim for refund for the year 1990. In that case, the Tax Court
held that "petitioner suffered compel the Court to disregard undisputed fact: that petitioner suffered a net loss in
1990, and that it could not
a net loss for the taxable year 1990” Respondent, however, urges this Court not to
take judicial notice of the have applied the amount claimed as tax credits.

said case.

CA affirmed decision of the CTA. LANDBANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BANAL

ISSUE: 434 SCRA 543; July 20, 2004

Whether or not the Court can take judicial notice of such case FACTS:

HELD: Spouses Vicente and Leonidas Banal, respondents, are the registered owners of
agricultural land
YES. As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of
the records of other situated in San Felipe, Basud, Camarines Norte. A portion of the land was
compulsorily acquired by the DAR
cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court,
and notwithstanding the fact pursuant to R.A. No. 6657, as amended, known as the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law of 1988.
that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending before the same
judge." Respondents rejected the valuation of petitioner hence a summary administrative
proceeding was
Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice
of matters ought to be conducted before the PARAD to determine the valuation of the land. Eventually,
the PARAD rendered its
known to judges because of their judicial functions. In this case, the Court notes
that a copy of the Decision in Decision affirming the Landbank’s valuation.

CTA Case No. 4897 was attached to the Petition for Review filed before this Dissatisfied with the Decision of the PARAD, respondents filed with the RTC a
Court. Significantly, respondents petition for

do not claim at all that the said Decision was fraudulent or nonexistent. Indeed, determination of just compensation.
they do not even dispute the
In determining the valuation of the land, the trial court based the same on the facts
contents of the said Decision, claiming merely that the Court cannot take judicial established in
notice thereof.
another case pending before it.
Respondents argue that tax refunds are in the nature of tax exemptions and are to
be construed

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 27

ISSUE: The RTC failed to observe the above provisions. While the determination of just
compensation involves
Whether or not the Court erred in taking judicial notice of the average production
figures in another the exercise of judicial discretion, however, such discretion must be discharged
within the bounds of the
case pending before it and applying the same to the present case without
conducting a hearing and without law. Here, the RTC wantonly disregarded R.A. 6657, as amended, and its
implementing rules and regulations.
the knowledge or consent of the parties
(DAR Administrative Order No. 6, as amended by DAR Administrative Order
HELD: No.11).

YES. We find that the CA and the RTC erred in determining the valuation of the
subject land.
PIGAO v. RABANILLO
Well-settled is the rule that courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the
contents of the 488 SCRA 546; May 02, 2006

records of other cases even when said cases have been tried or are pending in
the same court or before the
same judge. They may only do so “in the absence of objection” and “with the
knowledge of the opposing
party,” which are not obtaining here. Furthermore, the Rules of Court shall apply to
all proceedings before the
Special Agrarian Courts. In this regard, Section 3, Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
on Evidence is explicit on the
FACTS:
In 1947, the late Eusebio Pigao and his family, settled on a government lot owned
by PHHC. A contract
to sell was entered into by Eusebio and PHHC.
In 1959, Eusebio executed a deed of assignment of rights over one-half of the
property in favor of
respondent who proceeded to occupy the front half portion.

necessity of a hearing before a court takes judicial notice of a certain matter, thus: In 1970, Eusebio executed a deed of mortgage over the same half-portion of the
property in favor of
“SEC. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. – During the trial, the court, on
its own initiative, or on respondent. In 1973, title was issued in Eusebio’s name over the entire property.

request of a party, may announce its intention to take judicial notice of any matter In 1978, respondent executed an affidavit of adverse claim over the front half
and allow the parties to be portion of the lot

heard thereon. registered in Eusebio’s name. This affidavit was duly annotated on said title. On
June 17, 1979, Eusebio
“After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on its own
initiative or on request of a died.and was survived by his children, herein petitioners.

party, may take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard In 1988, the Office of the Register of Deeds of QC was gutted by fire, petitioners
thereon if such matter is were issued a

decisive of a material issue in the case.”

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 28

reconstituted title in the name of Eusebio which no longer carried the annotation of thereof. What they submitted to this Court was a copy of a conditional contract to
the adverse claim of sell between a certain

respondent. Armando Bernabe and the PHHC pertaining to a lot located at 94 K-5th St.,
Kamuning, Quezon City to prove
In 1992, the subject lot was included in the extrajudicial settlement of Eusebio’s
estate and a new title the existence of the aforementioned condition.

was issued for the entire lot in the name of petitioners. Respondent continued to Respondent objects to this attempt of petitioners to seek admission of evidence
occupy the front half portion which was presented

through his tenant, Gil Ymata. neither during trial nor on appeal.

On January 29, 1996, petitioners filed a case in the RTC of Quezon City against ISSUE:
respondent and Ymata
Whether or not the said conditional contract to sell between Armando Bernabe
wherein they sought to quiet their title over the entire lot and to recover and PHHC may be
possession of the front half
given judicial notice
portionThe
HELD:
RTC ruled in favor of petitioners
NO. We cannot take cognizance of this document – the conditional contract to sell
CA reversed the RTC decision in favor of respondent. between Bernabe

Petitioners’ contend that when the final deed of sale was issued by PHHC in favor and the PHHC alleged to be the pro-forma contract used by PHHC with its
of Eusebio in 1973, applicants - which petitioners are

this deed contained a prohibition against the alienation of the lot that the applicant presenting for the first time. This document is not among the matters the law
agree “(d) not to sell, mandatorily requires us to take

assign, encumber, mortgage, lease, sublet or in any other manner affect his right judicial notice of. Neither can we consider it of public knowledge nor capable of
under this contract, at any unquestionable

time, in any manner whatsoever, in whole or in part, without first obtaining the demonstration nor ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions.
written consent of the We have held that:

Corporation." To support their claim, they request this Court to take judicial notice Matters of judicial notice have three material requisites: (1) the matter must be one
of the fact that the proforma of common and general

conditional contracts-to- sell between PHHC and applicants. Petitioners failed to knowledge; (2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or
present during the trial uncertain; and (3) it must be

the conditional contract to sell between Eusebio and PHHC which they claimed known to be within the limits of jurisdiction of the court. The power of taking
that they did not have a copy judicial notice is to be exercised

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 29

by courts with caution. Care must be taken that the requisite notoriety exists and of the case so respondent should have been given the chance to scrutinize the
every reasonable doubt on document and object to it

the subject should be promptly resolved in the negative. during the trial of the case. It is too late to present it now when nothing prevented
petitioners from
Consequently, for this document to be properly considered by us, it should have
been presented during trial introducing it before.

and formally offered as evidence. Otherwise, we would be denying due process of

law to respondent.
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply
marked for identification; it must GR. No. 152375; Dec. 16, 2011

be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it FACTS:
or cross-examine the
On July 22, 1987, the petitioner through the PCGG, filed a complaint (Civil Case
witness called upon to prove or identify it. A formal offer is necessary since judges No. 0009)
are required to base their
against respondents for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and
findings of fact and judgment only — and strictly — upon the evidence offered by damages before the
the parties at the trial. To
Sandiganbayan.
allow a party to attach any document to his pleading and then expect the court to
consider it as evidence may The petitioner alleged, that the respondents illegally manipulated the purchase of
the major
draw unwarranted consequences. The opposing party will be deprived of his
chance to examine the document shareholdings of Cable and Wireless Limited in ETPI, which shareholdings
respondents Jose Africa and Manuel
and object to its admissibility. The appellate court will have difficulty reviewing
documents not previously Nieto, Jr. held for themselves and, through their holdings and the corporations
they organized, beneficially for
scrutinized by the court below. The pertinent provisions of the Revised Rules of
Court on the inclusion on respondents Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos.

appeal of documentary evidence or exhibits in the records cannot be stretched as Civil Case No. 0009 is the main case subject of the present petition. Civil Case
to include such pleadings or No. 0009 spawned numerous

documents not offered at the hearing of the case. incidental cases, among them, Civil Case No. 0130

Besides, this document does not even pertain to the lot and parties involved here. On April 1, 1998, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution partly denying to
Accordingly, it is neither adopt the testimonies

relevant nor material evidence. But even assuming that it were, then it would on oral deposition of Maurice V. Bane and Rolando Gapud as part of its evidence
substantially affect the outcome in Civil Case No. 0009 for the

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 30

reason that said deponents according to the [petitioner] are not available for cross- Judicial notice is the cognizance of certain facts that judges may properly take and
examination in this Court act on without proof

by the [respondents]. because these facts are already known to them. Put differently, it is the
assumption by a court of a fact
The petitioner did not in any way question the 1998 resolution, and instead made
its Formal Offer of without need of further traditional evidentiary support. The principle is based on
convenience and expediency
Evidence on December 14, 1999. Significantly, the Bane deposition was not
included as part of its offered in securing and introducing evidence on matters which are not ordinarily capable
of dispute and are not bona
exhibits.
fide disputed.
On August 21, 2000, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a resolution (2000
resolution) denying the In adjudicating a case on trial, generally, courts are not authorized to take judicial
notice of the contents of the
petitioners 2nd motion.
records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in
On the matter of the [Bane deposition], [its] admission is done through the the same court, and
ordinary formal offer of
notwithstanding that both cases may have been tried or are actually pending
exhibits wherein the defendant is given ample opportunity to raise objection on before the same judge. This rule
grounds provided by law.
though admits of exceptions.
The petitioner also claims that since the Bane deposition had already been
previously introduced and As a matter of convenience to all the parties, a court may properly treat all or any
part of the original record of
admitted in Civil Case No. 0130, then the Sandiganbayan should have taken
judicial notice of the Bane a case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge
deposition as part of its evidence.
of, and absent an objection from, the adverse party, reference is made to it for that
ISSUE: purpose, by name and

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan was correct in not taking judicial notice of the number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
Bane deposition as original record of the

part of its evidence former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives at the court's
direction, at the request or
HELD:
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case
YES. The issue before us does not involve the applicability of the rule on then pending.
mandatory taking of judicial
Courts must also take judicial notice of the records of another case or cases,
notice; neither is the applicability of the rule on discretionary taking of judicial where sufficient basis exists in the
notice seriously pursued.

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 31

records of the case before it, warranting the dismissal of the latter case. part. Hence, the complainants contend that the respondent judge erred in taking
judicial notice on matters he

purported to be a public knowledge based merely on the account of the

STATE PROSECUTORS v. MURO newspaper publication that the Pres.

236 SCRA 505; Sept. 19, 1994 has lifted the foreign exchange restriction.

FACTS: ISSUE:

The state prosecutors who are members of the DOJ Panel of Prosecution filed a Whether or not Judge Muro commited grave abuse of discretion in taking judicial
complaint against notice on the

respondent Judge Muro on the ground of ignorance of the law, grave misconduct statement of the president lifting the foreign exchange restriction published in the
and violation of the newspaper as basis for

provisions in the Code of Judicial Conduct. dismissing the case

The case at bar involves the prosecution of the 11 charges against Imelda Marcos
in violation of the
Central Bank Foreign Exchange Restriction in the Central Bank Circular 960. The
respondent judge dismissed all
11 cases solely on the basis of the report published from the 2 newspapers
(Inquirer and Daily Globe), which
the judge believes to be reputable and of national circulation, that the Pres. of the
Philippines lifted all foreign
exchange restrictions.
The respondent’s decision was founded on his belief that the reported
announcement of the Executive
Department in the newspaper in effect repealed the CB 960 and thereby divested
the court of its jurisdiction
to further hear the pending case thus motu propio dismissed the case.
HELD:
YES. When the President’s statement was published in the newspaper, the
respondent judge admitted
of not having seen the official text of CB circular 1353 thus it was premature for
him to take judicial notice on
this matter which is merely based on his personal knowledge and is not based on
the public knowledge that
the law requires for the court to take judicial notice of.
The doctrine of judicial notice rests on the wisdom and discretion of the courts.
The power to take judicial
notice is to be exercised by courts with caution; care must be taken that the
requisite notoriety exists; and
every reasonable doubt on the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative.

He further contends that the announcement of the President as published in the
newspaper has made
such fact a public knowledge that is sufficient for the judge to take judicial notice
which is discretionary on his
Generally speaking, matters of judicial notice have three material requisites:
(1) the matter must be one of common and general knowledge;
(2) it must be well and authoritatively settled and not doubtful or uncertain; and

(3) it must be known to be within the limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 32

The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially When Orlando died intestate in the Philippines, petitioner filed with the RTC a
known is that of notoriety. Petition for the issuance of

Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
records and facts of general estate. While the case was

notoriety. pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of the children of Orlando from
his first marriage, filed a
In this case, respondent judge, in the guise of exercising discretion and on the
basis of a mere similar petition with the RTC. The two cases were consolidated.

newspaper account which is sometimes even referred to as hearsay evidence Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition filed by the respondent on the
twice removed, took judicial ground of litis

notice of the supposed lifting of foreign exchange controls, a matter which was not pendentia. Respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
and cannot be considered person qualified to file the

of common knowledge or of general notoriety. Worse, he took cognizance of an petition. Respondent further alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed
administrative regulation against petitioner by Felicitas

which was not yet in force when the order of dismissal was issued. Amor contending that petitioner contracted a second marriage to Orlando despite
having been married to one
Jurisprudence dictates that judicial notice cannot be taken of a statute before it
becomes effective. The reason Eusebio Bristol.

is simple. A law which is not yet in force and hence, still inexistent, cannot be of RTC acquitted petitioner of bigamy and ruled that since the deceased was a
common knowledge capable divorced American citizen,

of ready and unquestionable demonstration, which is one of the requirements and that divorce was not recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage
before a court can take judicial between him and petitioner

notice of a fact. was not valid. The RTC took note of the action for declaration of nullity then
pending filed by Felicitas Amor

against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending action to be a

VDA. DE CATALAN v. CATALAN-LEE prejudicial question in

665 SCRA 487; Feb. 08, 2012 determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy. The RTC also found that
petitioner had never been
FACTS:
married to Bristol.
Orlando B. Catalan, a naturalized American citizen,allegedly obtained a divorce in
the United States RTC dismissed the Petition for the issuance of letters of administration filed by
petitioner and granted
from his first wife, Felicitas Amor. He then contracted a second marriage with
petitioner Merope Enriquez.

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 33

that of private respondent. RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Moreover, the burden of proof lies with the “party who alleges the existence of a
Eusebio Bristol was valid and fact or thing necessary in the

subsisting when she married Orlando. The RTC held that petitioner was not an prosecution or defense of an action.” In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
interested party who proving the material

may file said petition. allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of
CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.
proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
ISSUE: It is well-settled in our

Whether or not the divorce obtained abroad by Orlando may be recognized under jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
Philippine other facts, they must be

jurisdiction. alleged and proved.

HELD: It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of
Orlando’s divorce under the
YES. Under the principles of comity, Philippine jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased.
Thus, there is a need to
spouse of foreign nationality. Aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to
establish the fact of divorce.
provided they are valid according to their national law. Nonetheless, the fact of
divorce must still first be

proven by the divorce decree itself. The best evidence of a judgment is the
CALAMBA STEEL CENTER v. CIR
judgment itself.
457 SCRA 482; April 28, 2005
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a FACTS:

foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks for
the officer having legal use by

custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and household
must be (a) accompanied by a appliances.

certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine In it's amended Corporate Annual ITR on June 4, 1996 it declared a net taxable
foreign service stationed in the income of

foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount of
office. P3,311,559.00. It also reported

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 34

quarterly payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of tried or pending in the same court, even when those cases were heard or are
P2,328,747.26 and actually pending before the

P1,082,108.00, respectively. same judge. However, this rule admits of exceptions, as when reference to such
records is sufficiently made
The contention of the petitioner in this case filed in 1997, that it is entitled to a
refund. The refund was without objection from the opposing parties:

purportedly due to income taxes withheld from it, and remitted in its behalf, by the . . . [I]n the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a
withholding agents. Such court may properly treat all

withheld tax, as per petitioners 1997 return, were not utilized in 1996 since due to or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read into the
it's income/loss positions record of a case pending before

for the three quarters of 1996. it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and
In denying petitioners refund, the CA reasoned out that no evidence other than
that presented before number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the
original record of the
the CTA was adduced to prove that excess tax payments had been made in 1995.
From the inception of the former case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's
direction, at the request or
case to the formal offer of its evidence, petitioner did not present its 1996 income
tax return to disclose its with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case
then pending.
total income tax liability, thus making it difficult to determine whether such excess
tax payments were utilized Prior to rendering its Decision on January 12, 2000, the CTA was already well
aware of the existence of
in 1996.
another case pending before it, involving the same subject matter, parties and
ISSUE: causes of action. Because of

Whether or not the CA and CTA failed to have taken judicial notice of the 1996 the close connection of that case with the matter in controversy, the CTA could
final adjustment return have easily taken judicial

HELD: notice of the contested document attached in that other case.

YES. The CA and CTA could have taken judicial notice of the 1996 final Furthermore, there was no objection raised to the inclusion of the said 1996 final
adjustment return which had adjustment return in

been attached in CTA Case No. 5799. Judicial notice takes the place of proof and petitioners Reply to Comment before the CA. Despite clear reference to that
is of equal force. return, a reference made with

As a general rule, courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents the knowledge of respondent, the latter still failed to controvert petitioners claim.
of records in other cases The appellate court should

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 35

have cast aside strict technicalities and decided the case on the basis of such the owners and operators of businesses under Sec. 1 to cease and desist from
uncontested return. Verily, it had operating their businesses

the authority to take judicial notice of its records and of the facts [that] the record within 6 months from the date of effectivity of the ordinance. These were the
establishes. Pandacan oil depots of Shell and

Section 2 of Rule 129 provides that courts may take judicial notice of matters x x x Caltex.
ought to be known to
In 2002, the City of Manila and the Department of Energy (DOE) entered into a
judges because of their judicial functions. If the lower courts really believed that memorandum of
petitioner was not entitled to
understanding (MOU) with the oil companies. They agreed that the scaling down
a tax refund, they could have easily required respondent to ascertain its veracity of the Pandacan Terminals
and accuracy[30] and to prove
was the most viable and practicable option. The Sangguniang Panlungsod ratified
that petitioner did not suffer any net loss in 1996. the MOU in Resolution No.

Petitioner in this case offered documentary and testimonial evidence that 97. In the same resolution, the Sanggunian declared that the MOU was effective
extended beyond two taxable years, only for a period of six

because the excess credits in the first (1995) taxable year had not been used up months starting 25 July 2002, which period was extended up to 30 April 2003.
during the second
In March 2007, The SC ruled that respondent had the ministerial duty under the
(1996) taxable year, and because the claim for the refund of those credits had Local Government
been filed during the third
Code (LGC) to enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the governance of the
(1997) taxable year. Its final adjustment return was instead attached to its Reply to city, including Ordinance No.
Comment filed before the
8027. After the SC promulgated its Decision, Chevron), Petron and Shell and the
CA. Republic of the Philippines,

SJS v. ATIENZA represented by the DOE, sought to intervene and ask for a reconsideration of the
decision.
545 SCRA 92; Feb. 13, 2008
The Respondent oil companies assert that respondent judicially admitted that
FACTS: Ordinance 8027 was

On November 20, 2001, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Manila enacted repealed by Ordinance No. 8119.
Ordinance No. 8027 and
ISSUE:
Atienza passed it the following day.
Whether or not respondent judicially admitted that Ordinance No. 8027 was
Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the area described therein from industrial to repealed by Ordinance
commercial and directed
No. 8119 in civil case no. 03-106379

HELD:

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 36

NO. While it is true that a party making a judicial admission cannot subsequently Ofelia Felix with a prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment. It was alleged
take a position therein that the Spouses

contrary to or inconsistent with what was pleaded, the aforestated rule is not purchased tubs of assorted fish. It was also alleged that the Felix Spouses still
applicable here. Respondent had an outstanding obligation

made the statements regarding the ordinances in civil case nos. 03-106379 and after deducting their total payment from their aggregate purchases. Respondent
06-115334 which are not the prayed that judgment be

same as this case before us. To constitute a judicial admission, the admission rendered in their favor ordering the spouses to pay them their unpaid obligation
must be made in the same case and attorney’s fees.

in which it is offered. RTC granted the prayer for a writ of preliminary attachment on a bond of P1.13M.

Hence, respondent is not estopped from claiming that Ordinance No. 8119 did not The Sheriff levied and took custody of some of the personal properties of the Felix
supersede spouses and served

Ordinance No. 8027. On the contrary, it is the oil companies which should be a copy of the writ, summons, and complaint at their residence through the sister of
considered estopped. They rely Ofelia Herrera-Felix, Ma.

on the argument that Ordinance No. 8119 superseded Ordinance No. 8027 but, at Luisa Herrera. According to the Sheriffs Return, Ofelia Herrera-Felix was out of
the same time, also impugn the country, as per the

its (8119s) validity. We frown on the adoption of inconsistent positions and distrust
any attempt at clever
positioning under one or the other on the basis of what appears advantageous at
the moment. Parties cannot
take vacillating or contrary positions regarding the validity of a statute or
ordinance. Nonetheless, we will look
into the merits of the argument of implied repeal.
information relayed to him by Ma. Luisa Herrera.
The Felix Spouses, through Atty. Celestino C. Juan, filed a motion praying for an
extension of time to
file their answer to the complaint. Said motion was granted. However, the spouses
failed to file their answer
to the complaint and were declared in default. The court rendered a decision in
favor of the respondent

ordering the spouses to pay their outstanding obligation.

HERRERA-FELIX v. CA The decision of the trial court became final and executory after the Felix Spouses
failed to appeal the
436 SCRA 87; Aug. 11, 2004
same.
FACTS:
ISSUE:
On March 11, 1993, respondent filed a complaint for sum of money against the
Spouses Restituto and Whether or not the Court acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the defendant
Spouses

HELD:

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 37

YES. The contentions of the petitioner have no merit. to the lawful owner thereof.

The court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by service of the Defendants, on the other hand, claim that they are in exclusive possession over
complaint and the disputed land and

summons on him, either by personal service or by substituted service or by extra- his claim of ownership was based on sale by estate of late Pedro Clemeña y
territorial service thereof or Conde to his predecessor-ininterest.

by his voluntary personal appearance before the court or through counsel. In this RTC ruled declaring petitioners absolute owners of the land and directing
case, the petitioner respondents to respect

appeared before the court, through counsel, and filed a motion for extension of petitioners’ possession.
time to file her answer to the
Later, the RTC reconsidered its decision and found that contending parties failed
complaint which the trial court granted. She even admitted in the said motion that to prove their
she was served with a copy
respective claims of ownership and therefore the land in question still belongs to
of the complaint as well as the summons. The admissions made in a motion are the original owner, the
judicial admissions which are
estate of the late Pedro Clemeña y Conde.
binding on the party who made them. Such party is precluded from denying the
same unless there is proof of Respondents appealed to the CA which affirmed the RTC’s resolution of the issue
relating to the two
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made
(2) parcel of land but reversed the ruling on ownership of land and proceeded to
By filing the said motion, through counsel, the petitioner thereby submitted herself award respondents
to the jurisdiction
compensatory damages of their deprived shares of possession.
of the trial court.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject land was in the possession of petitioners

HEIRS OF CLEMENA v. HEIRS OF BIEN
HELD:
501 SCRA 405; Sept. 11, 2006
NO. The petition is devoid of merit. Petitioners' predecessor Pedro Clemeña y
FACTS: Conde alleged in his

Petitioner filed a case before the RTC which they claim ownership over a land. answer that the land declared in TD 5299 was in his exclusive possession. That
Defendants was long statement, insofar as it

before been terminated as administrator to the estate of Pedro Clemeña y Conde confirmed the allegation in the complaint that petitioners' predecessor had
who deliberately continued retained possession of the land in

to occupy and usurp possession and use of the disputed land and refused to question, took on the character of a judicial admission contemplated in Section 4,
relinquish possession of the same Rule 129 of the Rules of

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 38

Court: TAN v. RODIL

An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of proceedings in
the same case, does
not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it was
made through
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A judicial admission conclusively binds the party making it. He cannot thereafter
contradict it. The
exception is found only in those rare instances when the trial court, in the exercise
of its discretion and
because of strong reasons to support its stand, may relieve a party from the
consequences of his admission.
511 SCRA 162; Dec. 16, 2006
FACTS:
Rodil Enterprises filed a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed against Luciano
Tan, alleging that under
a Contract of Sublease, Tan bound himself to pay P13,750.00 as monthly rentals.
However, Tan refused to pay
the rentals from September 1997 up to the time of the filing of the Complaint.
On 27 June 2000, the MeTC issued an Order, recognizing an agreement entered
into in open court by
Luciano Tan and Rodil Enterprises. The Order, inter alia, declared, thus:

An admission made in a pleading can not be controverted by the party making On second call, the parties and counsel agreed in principle in open court to the
such admission; and all proof following terms to put an end

submitted by him contrary thereto or inconsistent therewith should simply be to this civil case for ejectment between them:
ignored by the court, whether
1.) that [Luciano Tan] will pay P440,000.00 representing rentals from September,
objection is interposed by the opposite party or not. 1997 up to the present,

Petitioners' newly-contrived assertion that they were never in possession of the which is the outstanding obligation of [Luciano Tan] as of June, 2000, on or before
land cannot hold up against June 30, 2000; and

these pronouncements. As substituting defendants, they were bound by the 2.) [Luciano Tan] will pay the monthly rentals computed at P13,750.00 on or
admission of Pedro Clemeña y before the 5th day of each month

Conde, their predecessor in the litigation.26 Without any showing that the after June 30, 2000.
admission was made through
Tan filed a Motion to Allow Defendant to Deposit Rentals, averring therein that he
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made, petitioners cannot now had agreed to pay
contradict it.
all the rentals due on the subject premises and to pay the subsequent monthly
rentals as they fall due; that

the rentals in arrears from September 1997 amounted to P467,500.00; and in line
with his good faith in

dealing with Rodil Enterprises, he would like to deposit the aforesaid amount, and
the subsequent monthly

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 39

rentals as they fall due. He prayed that he be allowed to deposit the Managers a debt but offers to pay the same for the purpose of buying peace and avoiding
Check for the amount of litigation, the offer of

P467,500.00, made payable to the City Treasurer of Manila.
The MeTC rendered a Decision in favor of Rodil Enterprises.
According to the MeTC, an offer of compromise is not an admission of any liability,
and is not
admissible in evidence against the offeror, the court cannot overlook the frank
representations by Luciano
Tan's counsel of the former's liability in the form of rentals, coupled with a
proposal to liquidate.
Petitioner posits that the aforesaid admission, made in open court, and then,
reiterated in his Motion to Allow
Defendant to Deposit Rentals, cannot be taken as an admission of his liability,
citing Section 27, Rule 130 of
the Rules of Court, which states, inter alia, that an offer of compromise in a civil
case is not a tacit admission of
liability.
settlement is inadmissible. If in the course thereof, the party making the offer
admits the existence of an
indebtedness combined with a proposal to settle the claim amicably, then, the
admission is admissible to
prove such indebtedness. Indeed, an offer of settlement is an effective admission
of a borrowers loan balance.
In the case at bar, the MeTC and the Court of Appeals properly appreciated
petitioners admission as an
exception to the general rule of inadmissibility. The petitioner did not contest the
existence of the sublease,
and his counsel made frank representations anent the former's liability in the form
of rentals. This expressed
admission was coupled with a proposal to liquidate. The Motion to Allow
Defendant to Deposit Rentals was as
an explicit acknowledgment of petitioners liability on the subleased premises. The
existence of the Contract of

ISSUE: Lease, dated 18 October 1999 was not denied by petitioner.

Whether or not the admission of Tan, made in open court and reiterated in his
PHILIPPINE CHARTER INSURANCE v. CENTRAL COLLEGES
Motion to Allow
666 SCRA 540; Feb. 22, 2012
Defendant to Deposit Rentals be taken as an admission of his liability
FACTS:
HELD:
On May 16, 2000, Central Colleges of the Philippines (CCP), an educational
YES. The general rule is an offer of compromise in a civil case is not an admission
institution, contracted the
of liability. It is not
services of Dynamic Planners and Construction Corporation (DPCC) to be its
admissible in evidence against the offeror.
general contractor for the
To determine the admissibility or non-admissibility of an offer to compromise, the
construction of its five (5)-storey school building at No. 39 Aurora Boulevard, QC.
circumstances of the
The Phase 1 of the project was completed without issue. The Phase 2 of the
case and the intent of the party making the offer should be considered. Thus, if a
project, however, encountered
party denies the existence of

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 40

numerous delays. When CCP audited DPCC on July 25, 2003, only 47% of the the Rules of Court provides:
work to be done was actually
Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
finished. the course of the

In a letter addressed to DPCC and PCIC, CCP informed them of the breach in the proceedings in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be
contract and its plan to contradicted only by

claim on the construction bonds. Due to DPCCs inability to complete the project showing that it was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was
on time, it decided to made.

terminate its contract with the latter and to continue the construction on its own.
CCP filed a complaint with request for arbitration before the CIAC against DPCC
and PCIC. CIAC
rendered a decision in favor of CCP.
On June 29, 2007, the CA affirmed with modification CIACs earlier decision.
A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings; (b) during the trial,
either by verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. It is
an established principle
that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party
himself and binds the person

PCIC moved for the reconsideration of the said decision, but the CA disposed of it who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru palpable
with a denial. PCIC mistake, no amount of

argues that the CA erred in sustaining the award of P692,890.74 representing rationalization can offset it.
Performance Bond PCIC-46172
Since CCP, through its President, judicially admitted that it is no longer interested
because the obligation guaranteed by said performance bond was already in pursuing PCIC-46172, the
completed, therefore, no liability
scope of its claim will just be confined to Surety Bond No. PCIC-45542 and
should attach against the said bond. Performance Bond No. PCIC-45541.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CA erred in sustaining the award representing the

CUENCO v. TALISAY SPORTS COMPLEX
Performance Bond
566 SCRA 616; July 30, 2009
HELD:
FACTS:
YES. It is clear from the testimony of Crispino P. Reyes, CCPs President, that the
school no longer wants Petitioner leased from respondent a property to be operated as a cockpit. The
lease was for a period of
to collect on Performance Bond PCIC 46172 (with a value of P692,890.74). This
statement before the arbitral 2 yrs., but was subsequently renewed to 4 yrs.

tribunal is a judicial admission effectively settling the issue with respect to PCIC Upon expiration of the contract, respondent company conducted a public bidding
46172. Section 4, Rule 129 of for the lease of the

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 41

property. Petitioner participated in the bidding. The lease was eventually awarded
to another bidder.
Thereafter, petitioner formally demanded, through several demand letters, for the
return of his deposit in the
sum of P500, 000.00. It, however, all remained unheeded.
Thus, petitioner filed a Complaint for sum of money maintaining that respondents
acted in bad faith in
withholding the amount of the deposit without any justifiable reason.
In their Answer, respondents countered that petitioner caused physical damage to
the leased premises
and the cost of repair and replacement of materials amounted to more than
P500,000.00.
The RTC issued a Pre-trial Order in which respondent admitted that there is no
inventory of damages. The
respondents later offered an inventory which was admitted by the said trial court.
on the respondents.
Section 4, Rule 129 of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in
the course of the proceedings
in the same case, does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only
by a showing that it was
made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
A party may make judicial admissions in (1) the pleadings, (2) during the trial, by
verbal or written
manifestations or stipulations, or (3) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. The
stipulation of facts at the
pre-trial of a case constitutes judicial admissions. The veracity of judicial
admissions require no further proof
and may be controverted only upon a clear showing that the admissions were
made through palpable mistake

The RTC ruled favorably for the petitioner. or that no admissions were made. Thus, the admissions of parties during the pre-
trial, as embodied in the pretrial
The CA reversed said decision.
order, are binding and conclusive upon them.
ISSUE:
Respondents did not deny the admission made by their counsel, neither did they
Whether or not a judicial admission is conclusive and binding upon a party making claim that the same was
the admission.
made through palpable mistake. As such, the stipulation of facts is incontrovertible
HELD: and may be relied upon by

YES. Obviously, it was on Coronado's testimony, as well as on the documentary the courts. The pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt therein
evidence of an alleged may not be brushed aside in

property inventory conducted on June 4, 1998, that the CA based its conclusion the process of decision-making. Otherwise, the real essence of compulsory pre-
that the amount of damage trial would be rendered

sustained by the leased premises while in the possession of petitioner exceeded inconsequential and worthless. Furthermore, an act performed by counsel within
the amount of petitioner's the scope of a "general or

deposit. This contradicts the judicial admission made by respondents' counsel implied authority" is regarded as an act of the client which renders respondents in
which should have been binding estoppel. By estoppel is

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 42

meant that an admission or representation is conclusive upon the person making it Josefina filed a Motion for Reconsideration, insisting that under Section 4, Rule
and cannot be denied or 129 of the Revised

disproved as against the person relying thereon. Rules of Court, an admission need not be proved.

Thus, respondents are bound by the admissions made by their counsel at the pre- Aggrieved, Josefina filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA,
trial. Accordingly, the CA alleging that the RTC

committed an error when it gave ample evidentiary weight to respondents' acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction
evidence contradictory to the in declaring that she failed

judicial admission. to prove the fact of her marriage to Jose.

In its Decision the CA reversed the ruling of the trial court. It held that Teresita had
already admitted
ALFELOR v. HALASAN
(both verbally and in writing) that Josefina had been married to the deceased, and
486 SCRA 451; March 31, 2006 under Section 4, Rule 129

FACTS: of the Revised Rules of Evidence, a judicial admission no longer requires proof.
Because of the adverse
The children and heirs of the late spouses Telesforo and Cecilia Alfelor filed a
Complaint for Partition decision, Joshua and Maria Katrina Alfelor filed the instant petition, assailing the
ruling of the appellate court.
before the RTC of Davao City. Among the plaintiffs were Teresita Sorongon and
her two childrenwho claimed ISSUE:

to be the surviving spouse of Jose Alfelor. Whether or not the first wife of the decedent should be allowed to intervene in an
action for partition
Respondent Josefina H. Halasan filed a Motion for Intervention claiming that she
was the surviving involving the share of the deceased husband in the estate of his parents.

spouse of Jose. HELD:

Teresita testified before the RTC narrating that while she did not know Josefina
personally, she knew
that her husband had been previously married to her but the two did not live
together as husband and wife.
Judge Renato A. Fuentes issued an Order denying the motion and dismissed her
complaint, ruling that
respondent was not able to prove her claim.
YES. the first wife is allowed to intervene in the action.
The fact of the matter is that Teresita Alfelor and her co-heirs, petitioners herein,
admitted the
existence of the first marriage in their Reply- in-Intervention filed in the RTC.
Likewise, when called to
testify, Teresita admitted several times that she knew that her late husband had
been previously married to

another. This admission constitutes a deliberate, clear and unequivocal statement;

made as it was in the

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 43

course of judicial proceedings, such statement qualifies as a judicial admission. A result, a Supplemental Memorandum of Agreement was entered into by the
party who judicially admits a petitioner and LHUILLIER .

fact cannot later challenge that fact as judicial admissions are a waiver of proof. A Thereafter, petitioner incurred a 300,000 loan balance with Metropolitan Bank and
judicial admission also Trust Company. After

removes an admitted fact from the field of controversy. The allegations, offsetting the amount of P300,00 with some of the accounts that petitioner had
statements or admissions contained with AMANCOR, the amount

in a pleading are conclusive as against the pleader. A party cannot subsequently which remained due to the petitioner was P199,888.89. Since AMANCOR failed to
take a position contrary of or pay, petitioner filed a

inconsistent with what was pleaded. complaint for collection of a sum of money. Court thereafter ordered AMANCOR to
pay petitioner

P199,888.89 plus interest.

ATILLO III v. CA
The court absolved LHUILLIER.
266 SCRA 596; Jan. 23, 1997
The petitioner appealed claiming that respondent Lhuillier made a judicial
FACTS: admission of his personal

AMANCOR a corporation then owned and controlled by petitioner Florentino L. liability in his Answer.
Atillo III, contracted a
ISSUE:
loan in the amount of P1,000,000 with Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company,
secured by real estate Whether or not respondent Lhuillier made a judicial admission

properties. HELD:

Before the said loan could be paid, petitioner entered into a MOA with respondent NO. Petitioner claims that LHUILLIER made a judicial admission of his personal
Michell Lhuillier liability in his Answer

(LHUILLIER) whereby the latter bought shares of stock in AMANCOR. As a wherein he stated that:
consequence of the foregoing
"3.11. In all the subject dealings, it was between plaintiff and Lhuillier personally
transaction, petitioner and LHUILLIER each became owner of 47% of the without the official
outstanding shares of stock of
participation of Amancor, Inc.
AMANCOR while the officers of the corporation owned the remaining 6%.
xxx xxx xxx
Due to the need for more capital to support the business operations of
3.14 . Since the board of Amancor, Inc. did not formally ratify nor acceded (sic) to
AMANCOR, petitioner and LHUILLIER
the personal
executed another MOA by virtue of which LHUILLIER undertook to invest
agreement between plaintiff and Lhuillier through no fault of the latter, the
additional capital in AMANCOR. As a
corporation is not bound and the

MARCELO, Ma. Costa Rica B.|Evidence| Page 44

actionable documents are, at most, unenforceable insofar as the subject claim of fact made. The latter exception allows one to contradict an admission by denying
plaintiff is concerned.” that he made such an

And on the basis of such admission, petitioner contends that the decision of the admission.
respondent court absolving
Here, petitioner appears to have taken the admissions made by LHUILLIER in
LHUILLIER of personal liability is manifest error for being contrary to law, paragraph 3.11 of his Answer
particularly Section 4 of Rule 129 of
"out of context".
the Rules of Court which provides that:
Prescinding from the foregoing, it is clear that in spite of the presence of judicial
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a party in the course of the proceedings admissions in a party's
in the same case,
pleading, the trial court is still given leeway to consider other evidence presented.
does not require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it This rule should apply with
was made through
more reason when the parties had agreed to submit an issue for resolution of the
palpable mistake or that no such admission was made." trial court on the basis of

Petitioner would want to further strengthen his contention by adverting to the the evidence presented. As distinctly stated in the stipulation of facts entered into
consistent pronouncement of during the pre-trial

this Court that: "x x x an admission made in the pleadings cannot be controverted conference, the parties agreed that the determination of LHUILLIER's liability shall
by the party making such be based on the

admission and are conclusive as to him, and that all proofs submitted by him Memoranda of Agreement designated as ANNEXES "A", "B" and "C" of the
contrary thereto or inconsistent Complaint. Thus, the trial court

therewith, should be ignored, whether objection is interposed by the party or not x correctly relied on the provisions contained in the said Memoranda of Agreement
x x." when it absolved LHUILLIER

We find petitioner's contention to be without merit and the reliance on the general of personal liability for the obligation of AMANCOR to petitioner.
rule regarding
doubt.
judicial admissions enunciated by the abovementioned provision of law and
jurisprudence misplaced.

As provided for in Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, the general rule
that a judicial admission is

conclusive upon the party making it and does not require proof admits of two
exceptions: 1) when it is shown

that the admission was made through palpable mistake, and 2) when it is shown
that no such admission was in

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