Silverio v. Republic October 22, 2007 (GR. No.

174689)

petitioner: Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio

respondent: Republic of the Philippines

FACTS:

On November 26, 2002, Silverio field a petition for the change of his first name
“Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth
certificate in the RTC of Manila, Branch 8, for reason of his sex reassignment.
He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and
acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining
that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality.

The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of
Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex
alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this
petition.
ISSUE:

WON change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex
reassignment.

HELD:

No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases
where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or
write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The
petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name
compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery.
The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law
allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex
reassignment. The Court denied the petition.

Corpuz vs. Sto. Tomas Case Digest

G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010

FACTS:

Gerbert Corpuz, a former Filipino citizen but now a naturalized Canadian, married Daisylyn Sto. Tomas,
a Filipina. He soon left to Canada after their wedding due to work commitments. He returned to
Philippines on April 2005 only to find out Daisylyn has an affair with another man. Gerbert returned to
Canada to file a divorce that took effect on January 2006.

Two years later, he found another Filipina and wanted to marry her in the Philippines. He went to Pasig
City Registrar's Office to register his Canadian divorce decree but was denied considering that his
marriage with Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law, that the foregin divorce must be recognized
judicially by the Philippine court.

Gerbert subsequently filed at the Regional Trial Court a judicial recognition of foreign divorce but was
subsequently denied since he is not the proper party and according to Article 26 of the Civil Code, only a
Filipino spouse can avail the remedy.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Article 26 can also be applied to Corpuz' petition of recognition of the foreign divorce
decree

HELD:

The Court held that alien spouses cannot claim the right as it is only in favor of Filipino spouses. The
legislative intent of Article 26 is for the benefit of the clarification of the marital status of the Filipino
spouse.

However, aliens are not strip to petition to the RTC for his foreign divorce decree as it is a conclusive
presumption of evidence of the authenticity of foreign divorce decree with confirmity to the alien's
national law.

The Pasig City Registrar's Office acted out of line when it registered the foreign divorce decree without
judicial order recognition. Therefore, the registration is still deemed to be void.
Does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his
foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity
with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as
a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This Section states:

Santos vs. Santos

G.R. No. 187061, October 8, 2014

Statement of the Case:

In his petition for certiorari, petitioner Celerina J. Santos assails the Court of Appeals'
resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. Celerina filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud
and lack of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment
of the trial court's judgment declaring her presumptively dead.

Facts of the Case:

On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J.
Santos (Celerina) presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos
(Ricardo), had filed a petition for declaration of absence or presumptive death for the
purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo remarried on September 17, 2008.

Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents
in Cubao, Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also
inquired about her from other relatives and friends, but no one gave him any
information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years from the date of his Regional
Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed away.

Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October
2008 when she could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief,
or other appropriate remedies.

On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the
Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued
that she was deprived her day in court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true
residence, misrepresented to the court that she was a resident of Tarlac City. According
to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension, Congressional Avenue,
Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since 1989
until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was
deprived of any notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her
presumptively dead.
Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never
resided in Tarlac and never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also
claimed that it was not true that she had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware
that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon City. It was he who left the conjugal
dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina referred to a joint
affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false
allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over Ricardo's petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added
that the Office of the Solicitor General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not
furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.

The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing
Celerina's petition for annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy.
According to the Court of Appeals, the proper remedy was to file a sworn statement
before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in accordance with Article 42 of the
Family Code.

Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
Issue:

Whether or not Court of Appelas erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground
that the proper remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her
reappearance as stated in Article 42 of the Family Code

Ruling:

Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment,
order, or resolution has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for
relief or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the
petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.

This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to become
a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the
fraudulent acts pertain to an issue involved in the original action or where the acts
constituting the fraud were or could have been litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when
a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a party from having a real
contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission of the
controversy.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain
admissions, presumptions, and conditions.

The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four
consecutive years, coupled with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the
absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes a justification for a second marriage
during the subsistence of another marriage. The Family Code also provides that the
second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse
when he or she reappears. Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals
that the termination of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several
conditions: (1) the non-existence of a judgment annulling the previous marriage or
declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of the residence of the
parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent
marriage of the fact of reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either
be undisputed or judicially determined. The existence of these conditions means that
reappearance does not always immediately cause the subsequent marriage's
termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will cause the
termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the
Family Code are present. Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the
absent or presumptively dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has
already been annulled or has been declared a nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the
reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the subsequent spouses' residence;
(3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of reappearance is
disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such
fact of reappearance.

When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive

death, a presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second
marriage is legal. This presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital
relations with the first spouse. The second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed
valid. The burden of proof to show that the first marriage was not properly dissolved
rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.

The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the
status of the second marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed
that the other spouse was absent.
A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous
subsequent marriage may be considered valid when the following are present: (1) The
prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years; (2) The spouse present
has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already dead; (3) There
must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse; and (4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the
absent spouse.

A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court
declaration of presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the
spouse is already dead. The first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated.
Marriages contracted prior to the valid termination of a subsisting marriage are generally
considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent marriage contracted in good faith is
protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the subsequent marriage in bad
faith is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage void for
being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another
marriage still applies.

The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination
of the subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared
presumptively dead from availing other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact,
recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be terminated by filing "an action in
court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a declaration of dissolution
or termination of the subsequent marriage.

Celerina seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the
nullification of its effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy
because it will only terminate the subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the
declaration of her presumptive death and the subsequent marriage.

Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the

Family Code is valid until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered
legitimate, and the property relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same
as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by mere reappearance, the children of the
subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still be considered
legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.

However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed
solely by the husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in
interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the
second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.

Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of
nullifying the effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent
marriage, mere filing of an affidavit of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's
choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will, therefore, lie.

Disposition:

The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of
extrinsic fraud, grounds for nullity or annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of
the petition.

MULLER vs MULLER
IN RE: PETITION FOR SEPARATION OF PROPERTY;

G.R. No. 149615, August 29,2006

Doctrine:
He who seeks equity must do equity, and he who comes into equity must come with
clean hands.

Facts:

Petitioner Elena Buenaventura Muller and respondent Helmut Muller were married in
Hamburg, Germany on September 22, 1989. The couple resided in Germany at a house
owned by respondent’s parents but decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 1992. By this time, respondent had inherited the house in Germany from
his parents which he sold and used the proceeds for the purchase of a parcel of land in
Antipolo, Rizal at the cost of P528,000.00 and the construction of a house amounting to
P2,300,000.00. The Antipolo property was registered in the name of petitioner, Elena
Buenaventura Muller.

Due to incompatibilities and respondents alleged womanizing, drinking, and

maltreatment, the spouses eventually separated.

On September 26, 1994, respondent filed a petition for separation of properties before
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The court granted said petition. It also decreed
the separation of properties between them and ordered the equal partition of personal
properties located within the country, excluding those acquired by gratuitous title
during the marriage. With regard to the Antipolo property, the court held that it was
acquired using paraphernal funds of the respondent. However, it ruled that respondent
cannot recover his funds because the property was purchased in violation of Section 7,
Article XII of the Constitution.

The respondent elevated the case to the Court of Appeals, which reversed the decision of
the RTC. It held that respondent merely prayed for reimbursement for the purchase of
the Antipolo property, and not acquisition or transfer of ownership to him. It ordered
the respondent to REIMBURSE the petitioner the amount of P528,000.00 for the
acquisition of the land and the amount of P2,300,000.00 for the construction of the
house situated in Antipolo, Rizal.

Elena Muller then filed a petition for review on certiorari.

Issue:

Whether or not respondent Helmut Muller is entitled to reimbursement.

Ruling:

No, respondent Helmut Muller is not entitled to reimbursement.

Ratio Decidendi:

There is an express prohibition against foreigners owning land in the Philippines.

Art. XII, Sec. 7 of the 1987 Constitution provides: “Save in cases of hereditary
succession, no private lands shall be transferred or conveyed except to individuals,
corporations, or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain.”

In the case at bar, the respondent willingly and knowingly bought the property despite a
constitutional prohibition. And to get away with that constitutional prohibition, he put
the property under the name of his Filipina wife. He tried to do indirectly what the
fundamental law bars him to do directly.

With this, the Supreme Court ruled that respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the
ground of equity. It has been held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not
permit that to be done indirectly which, because of public policy, cannot be done
directly.

Mallilin v Jamesolamin

Facts:
Robert and Luz were married on September 6, 1972. They begot three (3) children.

On March 16, 1994, Robert filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of marriage.

Robert alleged that at the time of the celebration of their marriage, Luz was suffering
from psychological and mental incapacity and unpreparedness to enter into such marital
life and to comply with its essential obligations and responsibilities. Such incapacity
became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited clear
manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment,
and inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.

Luz filed her Answer with Counterclaim contesting the complaint. She averred that it
was Robert who manifested psychological incapacity in their marriage.

On May 8, 2000, while the case was pending before the trial court, Robert filed a
petition for marriage annulment with the Metropolitan Tribunal of First Instance for the
Archdiocese of Manila (Metropolitan Tribunal).

On October 10, 2002, the Metropolitan Tribunal handed down a decision declaring their
marriage invalid ab initio on the ground of grave lack of due discretion on the part of
both parties as contemplated by the second paragraph of Canon1095. This decision
was affirmed by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal (NAMT).

Prior to that, on September 20, 2002,the RTC had rendered a decision declaring the
marriage null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as
she failed to comply with the essential marital obligations.

Issue:
Whether to consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under
Article 36 is proper and controlling.

Ruling:
No.

To hold that annulment of marriages decreed by the NAMT under the second paragraph
of Canon 1095 should also be covered would be to expand what the lawmakers did not
intend to include. What would prevent members of other religious groups from invoking
their own interpretation of psychological incapacity? Would this not lead to multiple, if
not inconsistent, interpretations?

To consider church annulments as additional grounds for annulment under Article 36

would be legislating from the bench.1âwphi1 As stated in Republic v. Court of Appeals
and Molina,20 interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines are given great respect by our courts, but they are not controlling or
decisive.

BRIGIDO B. QUIAO, Petitioner,

vs.
RITA C. QUIAO, KITCHIE C. QUIAO, LOTIS C. QUIAO, PETCHIE C.
QUIAO, represented by their mother RITA QUIAO, Respondents.
G.R. No 176556 July 4, 2012
REYES, J.:

Facts:
Petitioner Brigido Quiao was married to respondent Rita Quiao in 1977 and got four
children. They had no separate properties prior to their marriage.

In 2000, Rita filed a complaint against Brigido for legal separation for cohabiting with
another woman. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a decision in 2005 declaring the
legal separation of the parties pursuant to Article 55, thereby awarding the custody of
their three minor children in favor of Rita, who is the innocent spouse.

The properties accrued by the spouses shall be divided equally between them subject
to the respective legitimes of their children; however, Brigido’s share of the net profits
earned by the conjugal partnership shall be forfeited in favor of their children in
accordance to par. 9 of Article 129 of the Family Code.

A few months thereafter, Rita filed a motion for execution, which was granted by the
trial court. By 2006, Brigido paid Rita with regards to the earlier decision; the writ
was partially executed.

After more than nine months, Brigido filed a motion for clarification asking the RTC
to define “Nets Profits Earned.” In answer, the court held that the phrase denotes “the
remainder of the properties of the parties after deducting the separate properties of
each of the spouses and debts.”

Upon a motion for reconsideration, it initially set aside its previous decision stating
that net profit earned shall be computed in accordance with par. 4 of Article 102 of the
Family Code. However, it later reverted to its original Order, setting aside the last
ruling.

Issue:
Whether or not the offending spouse acquired vested rights over ½ of the properties in
the conjugal partnership.

Held:
In the case at bar, since it was already established by the trial court that the spouses
have no separate properties, there is nothing to return to any of them.

The listed properties are considered part of the conjugal partnership. Thus, ordinarily,
what remains in the listed properties should be divided equally between the spouses
and/or their respective heirs. However, since the trial court found the petitioner the
guilty party, his share from the net profits of the conjugal partnership is forfeited in
favor of the common children, pursuant to Article 63(2) of the Family Code.

So, as not to be confused, like in the absolute community regime, nothing will be
returned to the guilty party in the conjugal partnership regime, because there is no
separate property which may be accounted for in the guilty party’s favor.

Republic v Cantor

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,v. MARIA FE ESPINOSA

CANTOR, Respondent.

FACTS:

The respondent and Jerry were married on September 20, 1997. They lived together as
husband and wife in their conjugal dwelling in Agan Homes, Koronadal City, South
Cotabato. Sometime in January 1998, the couple had a violent quarrel. Thereafter, Jerry
left their conjugal dwelling and this was the last time that the respondent ever saw him.
Since then, she had not seen, communicated nor heard anything from Jerry or about his
whereabouts.

On May 21, 2002, or more than four (4) years from the time of Jerrys disappearance,
the respondent filed before the RTC a petition for her husbands declaration of
presumptive death. She claimed that she had a well-founded belief that Jerry was
already dead. Despite inquiries from her mother-in-law, her brothers-in-law, her sisters-
in-law, as well as her neighbors and friends, but to no avail. In the hopes of finding
Jerry, she also allegedly made it a point to check the patients directory whenever she
went to a hospital. All these earnest efforts, the respondent claimed, proved futile,
prompting her to file the petition in court.

The RTC issued an order granting the respondents petition and declaring Jerry
presumptively dead.

The CA through a petition for certiorari filed by the petitioner, Republic of the Philippines
affirmed in toto the latters order, thus:

The petitioner brought the matter via a Rule 45 petition before this Court . It maintains
that although judgments of trial courts in summary judicial proceedings, including
presumptive death cases, are deemed immediately final and executory (hence, not
appeal able under Article 247 of the Family Code), this rule does not mean that they are
not subject to review oncertiorari.

Likewise, petitioner posited that the respondent did not have a well-founded belief to
justify the declaration of her husbands presumptive death. It claims that the respondent
failed to conduct the requisite diligent search for her missing husband pursuant to the
strict standard under Article 41 of the Family Code.

ISSUES:

Whether the respondent had a well-founded belief that Jerry is already dead.

HELD: The decision of the Court of Appeals is overruled.

CIVIL LAW - existence of well-founded belief

Before a judicial declaration of presumptive death can be obtained, it must be shown

that the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive years and the present
spouse had a well-founded belief that the prior spouse was already dead. Under Article
41 of the Family Code, there are four (4) essential requisites for the declaration of
presumptive death:

1. That the absent spouse has been missing for four consecutive years, or two
consecutive years if the disappearance occurred where there is danger of death
under the circumstances laid down in Article 391, Civil Code;

2. That the present spouse wishes to remarry;

3. That the present spouse has a well-founded belief that the absentee is dead;
and

4. That the present spouse files a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee.Republic v. Nolasco, G.R. No. 94053, March
17, 1993
In the case at bar, the respondents "well-founded belief" was anchored on her alleged
"earnest efforts" to locate Jerry by inquiries and through the patients directory when she
went to the hospital.

These efforts, however, fell short of the "stringent standard" and degree of
diligence required by jurisprudence for the following reasons: (1) the respondent did
not actively look for her missing husband. She did not purposely undertake a diligent
search for her husband as her hospital visits were not planned nor primarily directed to
look for him; (2) she did not report Jerrys absence to the police nor did she seek
the aid of the authorities to look for him;

(3) she did not present as witnesses Jerrys relatives or their neighbors and
friends, who can corroborate her efforts to locate Jerry. Worse, these persons, from
whom she allegedly made inquiries, were not even named; (4) there was no other
corroborative evidence to support the respondents claim that she conducted a
diligent search. Neither was there supporting evidence proving that she had a
well-founded belief other than her bare claims that she inquired from her friends
and in-laws about her husbands whereabouts.

The application of this stricter standard becomes even more imperative if we

consider the States policy to protect and strengthen the institution of marriage.
Since marriage serves as the familys foundationand since it is the states policy to
protect and strengthen the family as a basic social institution, marriage should
not be permitted to be dissolved at the whim of the parties. In interpreting and
applying Article 41, this is the underlying rationale to uphold the sanctity of
marriage.Arroyo, Jr. v. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 96602 and 96715, November
19, 1991.

MINORU FUJIKI v. MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, GR No. 196049, 2013-06-26

Facts:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines[2] on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit
well with petitioner's parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to
Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
physical abuse from
Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.[3]
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.[4] On
14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay and
Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of the
Philippines;[5] and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of
Marriage between Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).
the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
The RTC cited the following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC)
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered.
The... petitioner contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of
the Family Code of the Philippines[11] on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition
by Philippine courts.[12]
Issues:
Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
Ruling:
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must...
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to... the rules of evidence.
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground
of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is
fully... consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void
from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article
349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence of the Japanese
Family Court judgment... in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to
Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition.
Principles:
Civil Law

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and
legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must...
determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.[60] Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are... binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment... affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of
such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the... foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to... the rules of evidence.

LLAVE V. REPUBLIC

G.R. No. 169766, [March 30, 2011]

PROCEDURAL HISTORY:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the Decision dated August 17, 2004 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 61762 and its subsequent Resolution
dated September 13, 2005, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 89 declaring petitioner Estrellita Juliano-Llave s
(Estrellita) marriage to Sen. Mamintal A.J. Tamano (Sen. Tamano) as void ab initio.
FACTS:

Around 11 months before his death, Sen. Tamanomarried Estrellita twice – initially
under the Islamic laws and tradition on May 27, 1993 in Cotabato City and,
subsequently, under a civil ceremony officiated by an RTC Judge at Malabang, Lanao
del Sur on June 2, 1993. In their marriage contracts, Sen. Tamano s civil status was
indicated as “divorced”. Since then, Estrellita has been representing herself to the whole
world as Sen. Tamano s wife, and upon his death, his widow.

On November 23, 1994, private respondents Haja Putri Zorayda A. Tamano (Zorayda)
and her son Adib Ahmad A. Tamano (Adib), in their own behalf and in behalf of the rest
of Sen. Tamano s legitimate children with Zorayda, filed a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City for the declaration of nullity of marriage between Estrellita and Sen.
Tamano for being bigamous. The complaint alleged that Sen. Tamano married Zorayda
on May 31, 1958 under civil rites, and that this marriage remained subsisting when he
married Estrellita in 1993.

ISSUE:

Whether the marriage between Estrellita and the late Sen. Tamano was bigamous.

HELD:

Yes. The civil code governs the marriage of Zoraydaand late Sen. Tamano; their
marriage was never invalidated by PD 1083. Sen. Tamano s subsequent marriage
to Estrellita is void ab initio.

RATIO:

The marriage between the late Sen. Tamano and Zorayda was celebrated in 1958,
solemnized under civil and Muslim rites. The only law in force governing marriage
relationships between Muslims and non-Muslims alike was the Civil Code of 1950,
under the provisions of which only one marriage can exist at any given time. Under the
marriage provisions of the Civil Code, divorce is not recognized except during the
effectivity of Republic Act No. 394 which was not availed of during its effectivity.

As far as Estrellita is concerned, Sen. Tamano s prior marriage to Zorayda has

been severed by way of divorce under PD 1083, the law that codified Muslim
personal laws. However, PD 1083 cannot benefit Estrellita. Firstly, Article 13(1)
thereof provides that the law applies to “marriage and divorce wherein both
parties are Muslims, or wherein only the male party is a Muslim and the marriage
is solemnized in accordance with Muslim law or this Code in any part of the
Philippines.” But Article 13 of PD 1083 does not provide for a situation where the
parties were married both in civil and Muslim rites.”
 REPUBLIC v. LIBERTY D. ALBIOS, GR No. 198780, 2013-10-16
Facts:
On October 22, 2004, Fringer, an American citizen, and Albios were married before Judge
Ofelia I. Calo of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 59, Mandaluyong City (MeTC)
On December 6, 2006, Albios filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of nullity[4] of her
marriage with Fringer. She alleged that immediately after their marriage, they separated and
never lived as husband and wife because they never really had any... intention of entering
into a married state or complying with any of their essential marital obligations. She
described their marriage as one made in jest and, therefore, null and void ab initio.
S... ummons was served on Fringer but he did not file his answer. On September 13, 2007,
Albios filed a motion to set case for pre-trial and to admit her pre-trial brief.
At the pre-trial, only Albios, her counsel and the prosecutor appeared.
Fringer did not attend the hearing despite being duly notified of the schedule.
the RTC declared the marriage void ab initio
The RTC was of the view that the parties married each other for convenience only
. Giving credence to the testimony of Albios, it stated that she contracted Fringer to enter
into a marriage to enable her to acquire American citizenship; that in consideration thereof,
she agreed... to pay him the sum of $2,000.00... she did not pay him the $2,000.00 because
he never processed her petition for... citizenship.
the OSG filed an appeal before the CA.
the CA affirmed the RTC ruling which found that the essential requisite of consent was
lacking.
.
Issues:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in
consideration of $2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
Ruling:
The marriage is valid

The Court resolves in the negative

In 1975, the seminal case of Bark v. Immigration and Naturalization Service,[15] established
the principal test for determining the presence of marriage fraud in immigration cases. It
ruled that a "marriage is a sham if the bride and groom did not... intend to establish a life
together at the time they were married." This standard was modified with the passage of the
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendment of 1986 (IMFA), which now requires the couple to
instead demonstrate that the marriage was not "entered into for... the purpose of evading
the immigration laws of the United States." The focus, thus, shifted from determining the
intention to establish a life together, to determining the intention of evading immigration
laws.
Based on the above, consent was not lacking between Albios and Fringer. In fact, there
was real consent because it was not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and
the... beneficial and inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing
impaired their ability to do so. That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by
their conscious purpose of acquiring American citizenship through marriage. Such plainly
demonstrates that they... willingly and deliberately contracted the marriage. There
was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with the
requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete
understanding of the legal tie that would be... created between them, since it was that
precise legal tie which was necessary to accomplish their goal.

DE MESA V. ACERO

Family Home

DOCTRINE:

Rules on constitution of family homes, for purposes of exemption from execution:

First, family residences constructed before theeffectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988 must be constituted as a family home either judicially or extrajudicially
in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code in order to be exempt from
execution;

Second, family residences constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 are automatically deemed to be family homes and thus exempt from
execution from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries
actually resides therein;

Third, family residences which were not judicially orextrajudicially constituted as

a family home prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, but were existing thereafter,
are considered as family homes by operation of law and are prospectively entitled to the
benefits accorded to a family home under the Family Code.

The settled rule is that the right to exemption or forced sale under Article 153 of the
Family Code is a personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and as such, it must
be claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself before the sale of the property at
public auction. It is not sufficient that the person claiming exemption merely alleges
that such property is a family home. This claim for exemption must be set up and
proved to the Sheriff.
FACTS:

Araceli De Mesa is married to Ernesto De Mesa.They purcahsed a parcel of land located

in Meycauayan, Bulacan. A house was contracted in the said property, which became
their family home. A year after, Arceli contracted a loan in the amount of P100,000
from Claudio Acero, which was secured by a mortgage on the said parcel of land and
house. Araceli issued a check for the payment of the loan. When Aceropresented the
check to the bank it was dishonored because the checking account was already
closed. Acero demanded payment. However, Spouses De Mesa still failed to
pay. Acero filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 in the RTC. The RTC acquitted the
Spouses but ordered them to pay Acero P100,000 plus legal interest. A writ of execution
was issued to levy on the said property.

The house and lot was sold in the public auction and Acero was the
highest bidder. Acero leased the property to Juanito Oliva, who defaulted payment for
several years. Oliva contends that the Acero spouses are not the owners of the property.

The MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course to Spouses Acero’s complaint and
ordering the Spouses De Mesa and Oliva to vacate the subject property. Spouses De
Mesa contend that they are the rightful owners of the property. The MTC also stated
that from the time a Torrens title over the subject property was issued in Claudio’s name
up to the time the complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the
validity of the levy made by the Sheriff, the regularity of the public sale that was
conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of Acero’s Torrens title that was resultantly
issued.

Spouses De Mesa filed an action to nullify the TCT issued to Acero. Spouses De Mesa
contend that the subject property is a family home, which is exempt from execution
under the Family Code and, thus, could not have been validly levied upon for purposes
of satisfying the writ of execution. RTC dismissed the complaint. CA affirmed RTC’s
decision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the subject property, as a family home, may be subject to execution in
this case.

HELD:

YES, the subject property is family home but is subject to execution.In general,
the family home is exempt from execution. However, the person claiming this privilege
must assert it at the time it was levied or within a reasonable time thereafter.

RATIO:
For the family home to be exempt from execution,distinction must be made as to what
law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied
with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege.

Here, the subject property became a family residence sometime in January 1987 when
Spouses De Mesa got married. There was no showing, however, that the same was
judicially or extrajudicially constituted as a family home in accordance with the
provisions of the Civil Code. Still, when the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988,
the subject property became a family home by operation of law and was thus
prospectively exempt from execution. The petitioners were thus correct in asserting that
the subject property was a family home.

Despite the fact that the subject property is a family home and, thus, should have
been exempt from execution, Spouses De Mesa should have asserted the subject
property being a family home and its being exempted from execution at the time it was
levied or within a reasonable time thereafter. They are stopped from claiming
the exemption of the property from execution.

RAMOS V. PANGILINAN et. Al

FAMILY HOME

DOCTRINE:

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made
as to what law applies based on when it was constituted and
what requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor or his
successors claiming such privilege and on both instances,
the exemption must be proved.

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M. Ramos Electric, Inc., a
company owned by Ernesto M. Ramos (Ramos), the patriarch of herein petitioners. The
labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the company to pay the respondents’ back-wages,
separation pay, 13th month pay & service incentive leave pay. The decision became final
and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy Sheriff of the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in Ramos’
name situated in Pandacan.

Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home, hence, exempt from
execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and the company moved to quash the
writ of execution. Respondents argued that it is not the family home there being another
one in Antipolo and that the Pandacan address is actually the business address. The
motion was denied and the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC. Ramos and the
company appealed to the Court of Appeals during the pendency of which Ramos died
and was substituted by herein petitioners.

The appellate court, in denying petitioners’ appeal, held that the Pandacan property
was not exempted from execution, for while “Article 153 of the Family Code
provides that the family home is deemed constituted on a house and lot from the time it
is occupied as a family residence, it did not mean that the article has a retroactive effect
such that all existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family
homes at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code.”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid

HELD:

YES.

RATIO:

The general rule is that the family home is a real right which is gratuitous, inalienable
and free from attachment, constituted over the dwelling place and the land on which it is
situated, which confers upon a particular family the right to enjoy such properties,
which must remain with the person constituting it and his heirs. It cannot be seized by
creditors except in certain special cases.

For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinction must be made as to what
law applies based on when it was constituted and what requirements must be complied
with by the judgment debtor or his successors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets
of rules are applicable.

If the family home was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before
August 3, 1988, then it must have been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as
provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of the Civil Code. Meanwhile,
extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles 240 to 242..

On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988, there is no need to constitute extra judicially or judicially, and
the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and lasts as long as any of its
beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover, the family home should
belong to the absolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one
spouse, its constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not
exceed certain amounts depending upon the area where it is located. Further,
the debts incurred for which the exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155
for which the family home is made answerable must have been incurred after August 3,
1988. In both instances, the claim for exemption must be proved.

In the present case, since petitioners claim that the family home was
constituted prior to August 3, 1988, or as early as 1944, they must comply
with the procedure mandated by the Civil Code. There being absolutely no
proof that the Pandacan property was judicially or extra judicially
constituted as the Ramos’ family home, the law protecting the family
home cannot apply thereby making the levy upon the Pandacan property
valid.

ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG VS JOANNE RODGIN DIAZ (DNA)

FACTS:
The Estate of Rogelio Ong opposed on the CA order directing the Estate and Joanne Rodgin
Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of the minor Joanne. Trial court formerly
rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the illegitimate child of Rogelio Ong with Jinky
Diaz, and ordering him to support the child until she reaches the age of majority. Rogelio died
during the pendency of the case with the CA. The Estate filed a motion for reconsideration with
the CA. They contended that a dead person cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that "DNA
paternity testing, as current jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective
method of settling the present paternity dispute."

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done despite the death of Rogelio.

RULING:
Yes.
The death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the application of DNA testing for as long as
there exist appropriate biological samples of his DNA. New Rules on DNA Evidence allows the
conduct of DNA testing by using biological samples--organic material originating from the
person's body, ie., blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic
materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be

difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the
illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. (People
vs Umanito, citing Tecson vs Comelec 424 SCRA 277)

Briones vs Miguel (child custody of illegitimate child)

Republic vs. Dayot
GR No. 175581, March 28, 2008

FACTS:

Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In
lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together
for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina
Pascual. They were both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board.
Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint
on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended
that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they
executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.

HELD:

CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at
the time they executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa
started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of
their marriage on November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding
in the Supreme Court.

The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and
invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit
relating to the period of Jose and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their
marriage as an exception to the requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere
irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be
deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s marriage
is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised
any time.

Bangayan vs Bangayan

In September 1979, Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre. In 1982, while Alegre
was outside the Philippines, Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go.
Sally’s father was against this. In order to appease her father, Sally convinced Benjamin to
sign a purported marriage contract in March 1982.
In 1994, the relationship between Sally and Benjamin soured. Sally filed a bigamy case
against Benjamin. Benjamin on the other hand filed an action to declare his alleged
marriage to Sally as non-existent. To prove the existence of their marriage, Sally presented
a marriage license allegedly issued to Benjamin.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Sally and Benjamin is bigamous.
HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:
1. That the offender has been legally married.
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code.
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage.
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
In this case, the fourth element is not present. The marriage license presented by Sally
was not authentic as in fact, no marriage license was ever issued to both parties in
view of the alleged marriage. The marriage between them was merely in jest and
never complied with the essential requisites of marriage. Hence, there is no
bigamous marriage to speak of.

ABBAS VS ABBAS

In January 1993, Syed Azhar Abbas was invited to the house of Felicitas Goo, mother of
Gloria Goo. He said he was asked to participate in a ceremony which was meant to
welcome him to the Philippines (Abbas is a Pakistani). He said he did not know that the
ceremony was actually his marriage with Gloria Goo.
Later, Gloria filed a bigamy case against Abbas. Abbas allegedly married a certain Maria
Corazon Buenaventura.
To avoid the bigamy case, Abbas filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Gloria Goo.
To prove the validity of their marriage, Gloria presented a marriage contract signed by
Abbas as well as the solemnizing officer who celebrated their marriage. The marriage
contract contained the alleged marriage license issued to Abbas.
Abbas presented a certification issued by the Local Civil Registrar which states that the
marriage license, based on its number, indicated in the marriage contract was never issued
to Abbas but to someone else.
The RTC ruled in favor of Abbas. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC on the
ground that there was no diligence to search for the real source of the marriage license
issued to Abbas (for it could be that the marriage license was issued in another
municipality).

ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between Abbas and Goo is void ab initio.
HELD: Yes. Their marriage lacked one of the essential requisites of marriage which is
the issuance of a valid marriage license.
The Court of Appeals is wrong in reversing the RTC. The Local Civil registrar’s certification
enjoyed probative value as her duty was to maintain records of data relative to the issuance
of a marriage license. There is a presumption of regularity of official acts in favor of
the local civil registrar. Gloria was not able to overcome this presumption hence it
stands to favor Abbas.
The fact that Abbas did sign the marriage contract does not make it conclusive that there
was in fact a valid marriage license issued to him nor does it cure the fact that no marriage
license was issued to Abbas. Article 4 of the Family Code is clear when it says, “The
absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage void ab initio.”
Article 35(3) of the Family Code also provides that a marriage solemnized without a license
is void from the beginning.

Enrico vs Heirs of Sps. Eulogio & Trinidad Medinaceli

G.R. No. 173614, September 28, 2007

FACTS:

The heirs of Spouses Eulogio and Trinidad Medinaceli filed with the RTC, an action for
declaration of nullity of marriage of Eulogio and petitioner Lolita D. Enrico, alleging
that Eulogio and Trinidad were married in June 1962 and begot seven children, herein
respondents. On May 1, 2004, Trinidad died. On August 26, 2004, Eulogio married
petitioner before the Municipal Mayor of Lal-lo, Cagayan without the requisite of a
marriage license. Eulogio passed away six months later. They argued that Article 34 of
the Family Code, which exempts a man and a woman who have been living together for
at least five years without any legal impediment from securing a marriage license, was
not applicable to petitioner and Eulogio. Respondents posited that the marriage
of Eulogio to Trinidad was dissolved only upon the latters death, or on 1 May 2004,
which was barely three months from the date of marriage of Eulogio to petitioner.
Therefore, petitioner and Eulogio could not have lived together as husband and wife for
at least five years. To further their cause, respondents raised the additional ground of
lack of marriage ceremony due to Eulogios serious illness which made its
performance impossible.

In the Answer, petitioner maintained that she and Eulogio lived together as husband
and wife under one roof for 21 years openly and publicly; hence, they were exempted
from the requirement of a marriage license. She further contended that the marriage
ceremony was performed in the Municipal Hall of Lal-lo, Cagayan, and solemnized by
the Municipal Mayor. As an affirmative defense, she sought the dismissal of the action
on the ground that it is only the contracting parties while living who can file an action
for declaration of nullity of marriage.

ISSUES:
Whether of or not the heirs may validly file the declaration of nullity of
marriage between Eulogio and Lolita

RULING:

No. Administrative Order No. A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, effective March 14, 2003, covers
marriages under the Family Code of the Philippines does not allow it. The marriage of
petitioner to Eulogio was celebrated on August 26, 2004 which falls within the ambit of
the order. The order declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void
marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. But it does not mean that the
compulsory or intestate heirs are already without any recourse under the law. They can
still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the Rationale of the Rules
on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages, Legal Separation and Provisional Orders, compulsory or intestate heirs
can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not in a proceeding
for declaration of nullity, but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.

Morigo vs People (no actual marriage ceremony performed)

GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but
after receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts.
They got married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition
for divorce in Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He
subsequently filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no
marriage ceremony. Morigo was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of
arraignment since the civil case pending posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo
pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner
contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete
before his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:

Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just
merely signed a marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the
nullity of his marriage when he contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he
did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.
 KALAW VS FERNANDEZ

In 1994, Valerio “Tyrone” Kalaw filed a petition to have his marriage with Ma. Elena
Fernandez be annulled on the ground that Elena is psychologically incapacitated. The RTC,
after hearing the expert witnesses testify in court, eventually granted the petition, but on
appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the said decision. Tyrone appealed to the Supreme
Court. In September 2011, the Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the CA. Tyrone filed
a motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not the September 2011 decision (657 SCRA 822) should be reversed.
HELD: Yes.
Trial court’s findings of facts should be given due weight
The SC ruled that it misappreciated the findings made by the RTC when the SC reviewed
the case in September 2011. The SC ruled that the findings and evaluation by the RTC as
the trial court deserved credence because it was in the better position to view and examine
the demeanor of the witnesses while they were testifying. The position and role of the trial
judge in the appreciation of the evidence showing the psychological incapacity were not to
be downplayed but should be accorded due importance and respect. Therefore, it was not
proper for the SC to brush aside the opinions tendered by Dr. Cristina Gates, a
psychologist, and Fr. Gerard Healy on the ground that their conclusions were solely based
on the Tyrone’s version of the events. The conclusions reached by the two expert witnesses
because they were largely drawn from the case records and affidavits, and should not
anymore be disputed after the RTC itself had accepted the veracity of the Tyrone’s factual
premises.
Respondent could also establish the psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse
The plaintiff in an annulment case under Article 36 carries the burden to prove the nullity of
the marriage, however, the respondent, as the defendant spouse, could also establish the
psychological incapacity of the plaintiff spouse if the respondent raised the matter in her/his
answer. The courts are justified in declaring a marriage null and void under Article 36 of the
Family Code regardless of whether it is the petitioner or the respondent who imputes the
psychological incapacity to the other as long as the imputation is fully substantiated with
proof. Indeed, psychological incapacity may exist in one party alone or in both of them, and
if psychological incapacity of either or both is established, the marriage has to be deemed
null and void.
Elena’s excessive mahjong sessions is indicative of her psychological incapacity
In the September 2011 ruling, the SC noted that all the children of Tyrone and Elena
testified that although their parents have differences, both took good care of them.
However, upon closer look at the testimonies of the children, it was shown that Elena was
too addicted to mahjong that she would even bring her children to her mahjong sessions
which were so frequent and would last from early in the afternoon to past midnight. The fact
that the Elena brought her children with her to her mahjong sessions did not only point to
her neglect of parental duties, but also manifested her tendency to expose them to a culture
of gambling. Her willfully exposing her children to the culture of gambling on every occasion
of her mahjong sessions was a very grave and serious act of subordinating their needs for
parenting to the gratification of her own personal and escapist desires. This revealed her
wanton disregard for her children’s moral and mental development.

Santos vs CA
FACTS:

Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in
1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple
lived with Julia’s parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and
was named as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things
aside from the interference of Julia’s parents into their family affairs.

Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouel’s pleas to dissuade her. Seven months
after her departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of
her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent
a training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia
but all his efforts were of no avail.

Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family
Code. He argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5
years are circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married
life.

ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.

HELD:

The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the
most serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time
the marriage is celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present
situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers
to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.

MERCADO VS TAN

In April 1976, Dr. Vincent Mercado married Ma. Thelma Oliva. But in June 1991, Mercado
married a second time. He married a certain Consuelo Tan.
In October 1992, Tan filed a bigamy case against Mercado.
In November 1992, Mercado filed an action to have his first marriage with Oliva be
declared void ab initio under Article 36 of the Family Code (psychological incapacity).
In January 1993, the prosecutor filed a criminal information for bigamy against Mercado.
In May 1993, Mercado’s marriage with Oliva was declared void ab initio. Mercado now
sought the dismissal of the bigamy case filed against him. He contended that since his first
marriage was declared void ab initio, there was no first marriage to speak of, hence, his
“second” marriage with Tan was actually his first marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not Mercado is correct.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are as follows:

1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent,
the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
All the elements are present when Mercado married Tan. When he married Tan, his first
marriage was still subsisting and was not declared void. In fact, Mercado only filed an action
to declare his first marriage void after Tan filed the bigamy case. By then, the crime of
bigamy had already been consummated.
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity of a void previous
marriage must be obtained before a person can marry for a subsequent time. Absent that
declaration a person who marries a second time shall be guilty of bigamy.

CAPILI VS PEOPLE OF THE PHILS

In September 1999, James Capili married Karla Medina. But then, just three months later in
December 1999, he married another woman named Shirley Tismo.
In 2004, Karla Medina filed an action for declaration of nullity of the second marriage
between Capili and Tismo. In June 2004, Tismo filed a bigamy case against Capili.
Before a decision can be had in the bigamy case, the action filed by Karla Medina was
granted and Capili’s marriage with Tismo was declared void by reason of the subsisting
marriage between Medina and Capili. Thereafter, Capili filed a motion to dismiss in the
bigamy case. He alleged that since the second marriage was already declared void ab initio
that marriage never took place and that therefore, there is no bigamy to speak of.
The trial court agreed with Capili and it dismissed the bigamy case. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals reversed the dismissal and remanded the case to the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not a declaration of nullity of the second marriage avoids a prosecution
for bigamy.

HELD: No. The elements of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been legally married;
2. That the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code;
3. That he contracts a second or subsequent marriage;
4. That the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
When Capili married Tismo, all the above elements are present. The crime of bigamy was
already consummated. It is already immaterial if the second (or first marriage, see Mercado
vs Tan) was subsequently declared void. The outcome of the civil case filed by Karla
Medina had no bearing to the determination of Capili’s guilt or innocence in the bigamy
case because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first
marriage be subsisting at the time the second marriage is contracted. He who contracts a
second marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of
being prosecuted for bigamy.
The Supreme Court also notes that even if a party has reason to believe that his first
marriage is void, he cannot simply contract a second marriage without having such
first marriage be judicially declared as void.