by fine only. The court shall then proceed in the exercise of its original jurisdiction.

(6a)

Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular P.I., Sec. 26, Rule 114
Section 26. Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation.—An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation
of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The
court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the
trial of the case, (n)

RULE 113 – ARREST

Jen
Definition of Arrest, Sec. 1
Section 1. Definition of arrest. — Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in
order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. (1)

Jurisdiction over the person of the accused acquired:

Invalidity of arrest and detention can be cured by filing of information and
issuance of warrant of arrest
Larranaga v. CA, 287 SCRA 581 (1998)

Facts:
Petitioner Larranaga was charged with two counts of kidnapping and serious illegal
detention before the RTC of Cebu City. He was arrested and was detained without the filing of
the necessary Information and warrant of arrest, and was not accorded his right to preliminary
investigation. The petitioner alleged that he must be released and be subject to a regular
preliminary investigation. However, pending the resolution of the Court for the petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with writs of preliminary prohibitory and mandatory
injunction filed by the petitioner, RTC judge issued a warrant of arrest directed to the petitioner.

Issue:
1. Whether petitioner is entitled to a regular preliminary investigation.
2. Whether petitioner should be released from detention pending the investigation.

1. Yes. The prosecutors argue that petitioner is entitled only to an inquest investigation
under Section 7 of Rule 112 since he was lawfully arrested without a warrant under
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 7 of Rule 112 does not apply
in this case because some members of the Philippine National Police Criminal
Investigation Group (PNP CIG) went to the Center for Culinary Arts in Quezon City to
arrest petitioner, albeit without warrant.
 We reject the prosecutors' argument that petitioner was actually committing a crime at
the time of the arrest since kidnapping with serious illegal detention is a continuing
crime. There is no showing that at the time of the arrest on September 15, 1997,
Jacqueline Chiong was being detained by petitioner who was then residing in Quezon
City. Hence, petitioner may not be considered as continually committing the crime of
kidnapping with serious illegal detention at the time of the arrest.

Judge Ocampo of RTC Branch 7, Cebu City, and the state prosecutors assert that
petitioner is no longer entitled to a preliminary investigation because he had previously
waived his right to such investigation when he failed to appear during the preliminary
investigation set by the City Prosecutor in the afternoon of September 17, 1997 for an
inquest investigation. A waiver, whether express or implied, must be made in clear and
unequivocal manner. Mere failure of petitioner and his counsel to appear before the City
Prosecutor in the afternoon of September 17, 1997 cannot be construed as a waiver of
his right to preliminary investigation, considering that petitioner has been vigorously
invoking his right to a regular preliminary investigation since the start of the proceedings
before the City Prosecutor.

Our ruling is not altered by the fact that petitioner has been arraigned on October 14,
1997. The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused
fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Petitioner, in this
case, has been actively and consistently demanding a regular preliminary investigation
even before he was charged in court. Also, petitioner refused to enter a plea during the
arraignment because there was a pending case in this Court regarding his right to avail
of a regular preliminary investigation.[19] Clearly, the acts of petitioner and his counsel
are inconsistent with a waiver. Preliminary investigation is part of procedural due
process. It cannot be waived unless the waiver appears to be clear and informed.

2. No. The records show that on September 17, 1997, two informations were filed against
petitioner for kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Executive Judge Priscila Agana
issued a warrant of arrest on September 19, 1997. Petitioner was arrested on
September 22, 1997 by virtue of said warrant. We held in Sanchez v. Demetriou that the
filing of charges and the issuance of the warrant of arrest against a person invalidly
detained will cure the defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be
released because of such defect.

Josh
Also, by entering a plea on arraignment and participating in the trial
People v. Macam, 238 SCRA 306
(internet digest)
Facts: Accused was charged and prosecuted for robbery with homicide as guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. Defense assails the court decision contending the constitutional rights of the
accused were violated for subjecting them to a police line up at the hospital where they were
identified by the victims without the presence of their counsel and without any warrant.

Issue: Whether or not the constitutional rights of the accused were violated

Held: Although the accused were arrested without a warrant such defect was cured during the
proceeding when the defense failed to object on the issue during the initial proceedings before
the court. Having failed to assail the issue beforehand the accused is estopped to assail the
validity of their arrest as they further voluntarily submitted their self before the court by entering
the plea of not guilty instead of moving to quash the information before the court on ground of
an invalid arrest. It is also held that any identification of an uncounseled accused made in a
police line-up is inadmissible. HOWEVER, the prosecution did not present evidence regarding
appellant’s identification at the line-up. The witnesses identified the accused again in open
court. Also, accused did not object to the in-court identification as being tainted by illegal line-up.
The witnesses and victims positively identified the accused thereby further affirming the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. SC affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Arrest; how made, Sec. 2

Section 2. Arrest; how made. — An arrest is made by an actual restraint of a person to
be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.

No violence or unnecessary force shall be used in making an arrest. The person

arrested shall not be subject to a greater restraint than is necessary for his detention.
(2a)

Duty of arresting officer, Sec. 3

Section 3. Duty of arresting officer. — It shall be the duty of the officer executing the
warrant to arrest the accused and to deliver him to the nearest police station or jail
without unnecessary delay. (3a)

Execution of Warrant, Sec. 4

Section 4. Execution of warrant. — The head of the office to whom the warrant of arrest
was delivered for execution shall cause the warrant to be executed within ten (10) days
from its receipt. Within ten (10) days after the expiration of the period, the officer to
whom it was assigned for execution shall make a report to the judge who issued the
warrant. In case of his failure to execute the warrant, he shall state the reasons therefor.
(4a)
Gab
Time of making arrest, Sec. 6
On any day and at any time of the day or night
Section 6. Time of making arrest. — An arrest may be made on any day and at any time
of the day or night. (6)

Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant, Sec. 7

Officer need not have the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest
Section 7. Method of arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. — When making an arrest by
virtue of a warrant, the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the
arrest and of the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees
or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity to so inform him, or when the giving
of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the warrant in his
possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person arrested so
requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable. (7a)

Mallari v. CA, 265 SCRA 456

MALLARI v. CA (internet digest)
265 SCRA 456, G.R. No. 110569, December 9, 1996

FACTS
On December 27, 1990, Pat. Manipon and Pfc. Esguerra, who were both then
assigned at the Capas Police Station, received reliable information that appellant
Diosdado Mallari, who has a standing warrant of arrest for Homicide in 1989, was
seen at Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac. Immediately upon receipt of such information, with
personal knowledge of the existence of a standing warrant of arrest against appellant,
they proceeded to Sta. Rita, Capas, Tarlac. Upon reaching the place, the arresting
officers surrounded the house of appellant and arrested him. Thereupon, the arresting
officers searched him and found a homemade gun (paltik) with one M-16 live
ammunition. He was brought to the Capas Police Station where he was endorsed to
the chief investigator while the homemade gun and live ammunition were endorsed to
the property custodian.

At the time of the arrest and seizure of the gun and live ammunition, the officers did
not have with them a search and seize warrant. They did not possess the standing
warrant arrest for the Homicide case as well. However, they contended that they knew
that there was a standing warrant of arrest. And at such, they did not possess the said
warrant because they were in a hurry that if they will wait for the warrant officer, they
may not reach the accused to effect his arrest immediately. When they returned to
Capas Police Station, however, they reached the warrant officer and the warrant was
shown to Mallari.
After investigation, the petitioner was charged with the crime of Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunition. The trial court and the CA found him guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions.
He, however, insists that there was no standing warrant for his arrest, thereby making
the search and seizure invalid. He posits that the absence of the requisite warrant is
fatal and renders the search and seizure unlawful. He also claims that even assuming
that the handgun and ammunition had in fact been found in his possession, the
prosecution failed to prove that he had no license therefor and absent this essential
element of the crime of illegal possession of firearms, it was manifest error for the
Court of Appeals to uphold his conviction.

The Court of Appeals concluded that the search and seizure could be validly effected
as it was done on the occasion of a lawful warrantless arrest, particularly, while in the
act of committing the crime of illegal possession of firearms in the presence of the
arresting officers. Also, the Office of the Solicitor General did not attempt to point out
any evidence on record of petitioner’s non-possession of a license or permit for there
really is no such evidence. It relied on the theory that as the firearm involved is a
homemade gun or “paltik” and is illegal per se, it could not have been the subject of
license. This, according to the Solicitor General, dispenses with the necessity of
proving that petitioner had no license to possess the firearm.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not the arresting officer needs to have the warrant in his possession
at the time of the arrest
2. Whether or not there is a need to prove that there is in fact no license to possess
the firearm

RULING
1. No. The applicable provision is Section 7, Rule 113 which allows a police officer
to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest. The
rule allows a police officer to effect arrest without the warrant in his possession at
the time of the arrest. Thus, appellant’s arrest being lawful, the search and
seizure made incidental thereto is likewise valid, albeit conducted without a
warrant.

2. Yes. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the elements thereof, (a) the existence of the subject firearm
and (b) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the
corresponding license or permit to possess the same. The latter is a negative fact
which constitutes an essential ingredient of the offense of illegal possession, and
it is the duty of the prosecution not only to allege it but also to prove it beyond
reasonable doubt. In the case at bench, the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from the PNP that petitioner was not a licensee of the said firearm
 would have sufficed for the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of the crime of illegal possession. The absence of the foregoing
is fatal to the prosecution's case and renders petitioner's conviction erroneous.

The Court did not agree with the contention of the Solicitor General that since a
paltik is a homemade gun, it is illegally manufactured and cannot be issued a
license or permit, and is no longer necessary to prove that it is unlicensed. This
appears to be at first blush, a very logical proposition. However the Court did not
yield to it because nothing was said about such, that paltiks can in no case be
issued a license or permit and that proof that a firearm is a paltik dispenses with
proof that it is unlicensed. Hence, the accused was acquitted for insufficiency of
evidence.

RATIO
Sec. 8. Method of Arrest by officer by virtue of warrant. - When making an arrest by
virtue of a warrant the officer shall inform the person to be arrested of the cause of the
arrest and the fact that a warrant has been issued for his arrest, except when he flees
or forcibly resists before the officer has opportunity so to inform him or when the
giving of such information will imperil the arrest. The officer need not have the
warrant in his possession at the time of the arrest but after the arrest, if the person
arrested so requires, the warrant shall be shown to him as soon as practicable.

In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, the prosecution has the burden of
proving the elements thereof, (a) the existence of the subject firearm and (b) the fact
that the accused who owned or possessed it does not have the corresponding license
or permit to possess the same.

Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested, Sec. 14

Section 14. Right of attorney or relative to visit person arrested. — Any member of the
Philippine Bar shall, at the request of the person arrested or of another acting in his
behalf, have the right to visit and confer privately with such person in the jail or any other
place of custody at any hour of the day or night. Subject to reasonable regulations, a
relative of the person arrested can also exercise the same right. (14a)

Jen
Right to have competent and independent counsel, Sec. 12(1), Art. III, Constitution
SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
RULE 114 – BAIL

Jen
Right to bail, Sec. 13, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
SECTION 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right
to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

Bail defined, Sec. 1

Section 1. Bail defined. — Bail is the security given for the release of a person in
custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to guarantee his appearance before
any court as required under the conditions hereinafter specified. Bail may be given in the
form of corporate surety, property bond, cash deposit, or recognizance. (1a)

Bail, a matter of right, Sec. 4

Section 4. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody shall be
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient sureties, or released on recognize as
prescribed by law or this Rule (a) before or after conviction by the Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable
by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment. (4a)

Exceptions: 1. in offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua (or life imprison-

ment), when evidence of guilt is strong, Sec. 7;
Section 7. Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an
offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted
to bail when evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal
prosecution. (7a)

2. Right to bail not available in the military: Comendador v. De Villa, 200

SCRA 80 (1991)

Bail, when discretionary, Sec. 5

Section 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission
 to bail is discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial
court despite the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original
record to the appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the
accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application
for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellate court.

Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.

If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;

(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or

(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case. (5a)

Bail can be availed of only by person in custody of the law or deprived of his liberty
Comia v. Antona, 337 SCRA 656

Josh
Application for Bail/Petition for Bail/Motion for Admission to Bail

Hearing is mandatory: Docena-Caspe v. Judge Bugtas, 400 SCRA 37 (2003)

Doctrine: The refusal or failure of the prosecution to adduce evidence or to interpose objection
to a petition for bail will not dispense with the conduct of a bail hearing. Neither may reliance to
a previous order granting bail justify the absence of a hearing in a subsequent petition for bail,
more so where said order relied upon was issued without hearing and while the accused was at
large.

Facts:
The instant administrative case for gross ignorance of the law and incompetence against
respondent judge stemmed from a murder case filed against accused Celso Docil and Juan
Docil for the death of Lucio Docena. In her sworn complaint, complainant alleged that on
September 3, 1993, Judge Gorgonio T. Alvarez of the Municipal Trial Court of Taft, Eastern
Samar, conducted a preliminary investigation on the said murder case, and thereafter issued the
corresponding warrants of arrest. No bail was recommended for the two (2) accused.

Complainant further stated that the information for murder was filed with the RTC of Borongan,
Eastern Samar, Branch II, then presided by Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. The latter allegedly
granted a P60,000.00 bailbond each to both accused without conducting a hearing.

Subsequently, Provincial Prosecutor Vicente Catudio filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Borongan, Eastern Samar, Branch II, now presided by respondent Judge Arnulfo O. Bugtas, a
motion praying that an alias warrant of arrest be issued for the other accused, Juan Docil; and
that both accused be denied bail. Said motion was granted by the respondent Judge.
Thereafter, accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration praying that he be allowed to
post bail. The respondent Judge denied said motion. He explained that notwithstanding the
suspension of the imposition of the death penalty at the time the accused committed the
offense, bail for the crime of murder remains to be a matter of discretion.

Accused Celso Docil filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating his previous contentions.
Then, he filed a manifestation pointing out that on page 49 of the records is an order granting
him and his co-accused the recommended bail of P60,000.00. The court gave the prosecution
five (5) days within which to file a comment but the former failed to do so.

The respondent Judge issued a Resolution granting the said motion for reconsideration on the
basis of a previous order granting bail to the accused. On August 16, 2001, the complainant
filed the instant administrative case against the respondent Judge for granting bail to accused
Celso Docil without conducting a bail hearing.

Issue: WON a hearing for bail was required?

Ruling: YES. Jurisprudence is replete with decisions on the procedural necessity of a hearing,
whether summary or otherwise, relative to the grant of bail especially in cases involving offenses
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, where bail is a matter of
discretion. Under the present rules, a hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of
right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is a
matter of discretion hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence on the guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge.In order for the latter to properly exercise his
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong.

In Santos v. Ofilada, it was held that the failure to raise or the absence of an objection on the
part of the prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense with the requirement of a bail
hearing.

It is certainly erroneous for the respondent to rely on the order of Judge Paterno T. Alvarez. As a
responsible judge, he should have looked into the real and hard facts of the case before him
and ascertained personally whether the evidence of guilt is strong. To make things worse,
respondent Judge relied on the said July 22, 1994 order despite the fact that the same appears
to have been issued by his predecessor Judge also without a hearing and while the accused
was at large. In addition to the requirement of a mandatory bail hearing, respondent judge
should have known the basic rule that the right to bail can only be availed of by a person who is
in custody of the law or otherwise deprived of his liberty and it would be premature, not to say
incongruous, to file a petition for bail for someone whose freedom has yet to be curtailed.

In Basco v. Rapatalo,[16] the Court laid down the following rules which outlined the duties
of a judge in case an application for bail is filed:
(1) Notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation;
(2) Conduct a hearing of the application for bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is strong
for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its discretion;
(3) Decide whether the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary
of evidence of the prosecution;
(4) If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the approval of
the bailbond. Otherwise, petition should be denied.

Based on the above-cited procedure and requirements, after the hearing, the courts order
granting or refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. A
summary is defined as a comprehensive and usually brief abstract or digest of a text or
statement. Based on the summary of evidence, the judge formulates his own conclusion on
whether such evidence is strong enough to indicate the guilt of the accused.

In the instant case, it appears that when the respondent judge initially granted the prosecutions
motion praying that the accused be denied bail, no hearing was conducted.Irrespective of his
opinion on the strength or weakness of evidence of the accuseds guilt, he should have
conducted a hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence for the prosecution. The
importance of a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are
considered aspects of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its
absence will invalidate the grant or denial of bail.
 Prosecution must be notified of hearing (Sec. 18)

Section 18. Notice of application to prosecutor. — In the application for bail under
section 8 of this Rule, the court must give reasonable notice of the hearing to the
prosecutor or require him to submit his recommendation. (18a)

Hearing may be summary or otherwise

Prosecution has burden of proof (Sec. 8)
Section 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for bail
filed by a person who is in custody for the commission of an offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the prosecution has the burden of
showing that evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the bail hearing
shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial, but upon motion of either party,
the court may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead,
outside the Philippines, or otherwise unable to testify. (8a)

Evidence presented automatically reproduced at trial, but Court

may recall any witness
Gab
Provisional bail granted by SC: Enrile v. Salazar, G.R. No. 92163, June 5, 1990

ENRILE v. SALAZAR (internet digest, will read full text pa)

G.R. No. 92163/ JUN 5, 1990/ NARVASA, J.

FACTS
• Senate Majority Floor Leader Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested due to the warrant
issued by Hon. Jaime Salazar. The warrant was issued due to an information charging
Senator Enrile, spouses Panlilio and Gregorio Honasan with murder and frustrated
murder committed during the failed coup attempt on Nov. 29- Dec. 10, 1990

• Senator Enrile was detained and was not allowed to post for bail as provided by the
information and the arrest warrant. He was given over to the custody of the
Superintendent of the Northern Police District. He then filed a petition for habeas corpus
alleging that there was a violation of his Constitutional Rights. He claims that he was
held to answer for a non-existent crime, there was no complaint filed or a preliminary
investigation which denied him of due process, he has a right to bail, and the warrant
was issued without the judge personally determining if there is probable cause.

• Enrile also wished to abandon the doctrines in the case of Hernandez because
rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes and the doctrine can only be applicable if
offenses are committed in furtherance or, as a necessary means of the commission of
rebellion.

ISSUES
1. WON the Hernandez case is applicable
2. WON Enrile is charged with a crime that is not in the statutes book
3. WON Judge Salazar properly discharged his duties when issuing the warrant
4. WON the writ of habeas corpus was the proper vehicle for asserting the right to bail

HELD
1. Yes the Hernandez case is still applicable. The court said that the Hernandez case still
has the force of law. Hernandez remains binding doctrine operating to prohibit the
complexing of rebellion with any other offense committed on the occasion thereof, either
as a means necessary to its commission or as an unintended effect of an activity that
constitutes rebellion. Rebellion may not be complexed by murder. There is an apparent
need to restructure the law on rebellion, either to raise the penalty therefor or to clearly
define and delimit the other offenses to be considered as absorbed thereby, so that it
cannot be conveniently utilized as the umbrella for every sort of illegal activity
undertaken in its name.

2. Yes, technically speaking because the court has already ruled that rebellion cannot be
complexed by other offenses committed during the occasion. Thus, Enrile is only
punished by simple rebellion.

3. Yes. The petitioner’s contention that the judge was not able to thoroughly and
personally go through the records due to the brief period give to him (1 hour, 20 mins.
After filing of information) do not hold weight. There was no circumstance that would
presuppose the legal presumption that the official duty of the judge was regularly
performed.

4. No. The original jurisdiction to grant bail rests upon Judge Salazar. Enrile should have
filed a petition to Salazar in order to be admitted to bail. The proper remedy would be a
motion to quash before Judge Salazar. Directly filing to the SC circumvented or deprived
the trial court from exercising its jurisdiction.

OPINIONS
C.J. Fernan: There is a need to update Hernandez. It is not all encompassing due to the
changes in the society. There must be a distinction between acts or offenses that are
indispensable to the commission of rebellion and acts or offenses that are merely
necessary but not indispensable in the commission of rebellion. Indispensable acts
would form part of elements of rebellion thus it should be treated as one crime. If not
indispensable acts then it shall not be an element. This is when the crime can be treated
as complex.
 J. Guttierez: During Marcos regime, the crime of rebellion can be complexed due to PD
942 but during the Aquino Administration, she issued EO 187 which provides that
rebellion cannot be complexed. Hernandez is the binding law

Purpose of bail: to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial

Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, Aug. 18, 2015

JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), AND PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. (internet digest only)
G.R. No. 213847 | August 18, 2015 | Bersamin, J.

FACTS
● On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged petitioner Enrile and several
others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in
the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance
Fund (PDAF).
● On June 10, 2014 and June 16, 2014, petitioner filed his Omnibus Motion and
Supplemental Opposition praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should
probable cause be found against him.
● On July 3, 2014, after the motions were heard, Sandiganbayan issued its resolution
denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity
considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the
custody of the law.
● On the same day that the warrant for his arrest was issued, Enrile voluntarily
surrendered to Director Benjamin Magalong of the Criminal Investigation and Detection
Group (CIDG) in Camp Crame, Quezon City, and was later on confined at the Philippine
National Police (PNP) General Hospital following his medical examination.
● Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his
Motion to Fix Bail, both dated July 7, 2014, which were heard by the Sandiganbayan on
July 8, 2014. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post
bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt
was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only
be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his
age and physical condition must further be seriously considered.
● Sandiganbayan issued two resolutions denying petitioner’s Motion to Fix Bail and Motion
for Reconsideration dated July 14, 2014 and August 8, 2014, respectively.
● Petitioner then filed a Petition for Certiorari to assail and annul the resolutions issued by
the Sandiganbayan before the Supreme Court.
● Enrile claims that before judgment of conviction, an accused is entitled to bail as matter
of right; that it is the duty and burden of the Prosecution to show clearly and conclusively
that Enrile comes under the exception and cannot be excluded from enjoying the right to
 bail; that the Prosecution has failed to establish that Enrile, if convicted of plunder, is
punishable by reclusion perpetua considering the presence of two mitigating
circumstances – his age and his voluntary surrender; that the Prosecution has not come
forward with proof showing that his guilt for the crime of plunder is strong; and that he
should not be considered a flight risk taking into account that he is already over the age
of 90, his medical condition, and his social standing.

ISSUES
1. Whether bail may be granted as a matter of right or of discretion
2. Whether petitioner’s poor health justifies his admission to bail

RULING
1. Bail protects the right of the accused to due process and to be presumed innocent

In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved. The presumption of innocence is rooted in the guarantee of due process, and is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail, and further binds the court
to wait until after trial to impose any punishment on the accused.

It is worthy to note that bail is not granted to prevent the accused from committing
additional crimes. The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at
the trial, or whenever so required by the trial court. The amount of bail should be high
enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but it should be no
higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose. Thus, bail acts as a reconciling
mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before
or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial.

When bail is a matter of right or of discretion

The right to bail is expressly afforded by Section 13, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the
Constitution, viz.: x x x All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable
by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The
right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.

This constitutional provision is repeated in Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as
Follows:

Section 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life

imprisonment, not bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when
evidence of guilt is strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
 A capital offense in the context of the rule refers to an offense that, under the law
existing at the time of its commission and the application for admission to bail, may be
punished with death.

The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal
offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense
punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is
strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained
by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the
Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense,
or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the
evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is
strong, no right to bail shall be recognized.

As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court,
Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are
bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital
offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise,
bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any
offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua , or life imprisonment, or even prior
to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment
when evidence of guilt is not strong.

On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the
RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the
circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, as
follows:

(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed

the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional
pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on
bail; or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency
of the appeal.

2. In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier
mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of
the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national
commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to:

x x x uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of
every person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our
Constitution which provides: "The State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees full respect for human rights." The Philippines, therefore, has the
responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person to liberty and due
process, ensuring that those detained or arrested can participate in the proceedings
before a court, to enable it to decide without delay on the legality of the detention and
order their release if justified. In other words, the Philippine authorities are under
obligation to make available to every person under detention such remedies which
safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies include the right to be
admitted to bail.

This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the
worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those
charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing
showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
(2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances.

In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or
escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal disposition from the onset of
his indictment for plunder, formal or otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the
legal processes of this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years
ago when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated
murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of respect for the legal
processes, and was granted bail during the pendency of his trial because he was not
seen as a flight risk.

With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his long years of public
service, and history’s judgment of him being at stake, he should be granted bail.

The currently fragile state of Enrile’s health presents another compelling justification for
his admission to bail, but which the Sandiganbayan did not recognize.

Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime charged, should be
allowed independently of the merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration
is clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him
bail despite imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.
Granting bail to Enrile on the foregoing reasons is not unprecedented. The Court has
already held in Dela Rama v. The People’s Court:

x x x This court, in disposing of the first petition for certiorari, held the following:

x x x [U]nless allowance of bail is forbidden by law in the particular case, the illness of
the prisoner, independently of the merits of the case, is a circumstance, and the
humanity of the law makes it a consideration which should, regardless of the charge and
the stage of the proceeding, influence the court to exercise its discretion to admit the
prisoner to bail ;

xxx
Considering the report of the Medical Director of the Quezon Institute to the effect that
the petitioner "is actually suffering from minimal, early, unstable type of pulmonary
tuberculosis, and chronic, granular pharyngitis," and that in said institute they "have seen
similar cases, later progressing into advance stages when the treatment and medicine
are no longer of any avail;" taking into consideration that the petitioner’s previous petition
for bail was denied by the People’s Court on the ground that the petitioner was suffering
from quiescent and not active tuberculosis, and the implied purpose of the People’s
Court in sending the petitioner to the Quezon Institute for clinical examination and
diagnosis of the actual condition of his lungs, was evidently to verify whether the
petitioner is suffering from active tuberculosis, in order to act accordingly in deciding his
petition for bail; and considering further that the said People’s Court has adopted and
applied the well-established doctrine cited in our above-quoted resolution, in several
cases, among them, the cases against Pio Duran (case No. 3324) and Benigno Aquino
(case No. 3527), in which the said defendants were released on bail on the ground that
they were ill and their continued confinement in New Bilibid Prison would be injurious to
their health or endanger their life; it is evident and we consequently hold that the
People’s Court acted with grave abuse of discretion in refusing to release the petitioner
on bail.

It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Enrile will then enable him to
have his medical condition be properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate
preparation of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court
for the trial. On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial to finish before a
meaningful consideration of the application for bail can be had is to defeat the objective
of bail, which is to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial. There may
be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail – whose existence is either admitted by
the Prosecution, or is properly the subject of judicial notice – that the courts can already
consider in resolving the application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The Court
thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the interest of the People through
 ensuring his personal appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him the
guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.

A.M. No. 12-11-2-SC, Guidelines for Decongesting Holding Jails By Enforcing the
Rights of Accused Persons to Bail and to Speedy Trial (March 18, 2014)

A. THE RIGHT TO BAIL

Section 1. Duty of the court to fix the appropriate bail. – (a) The court shall, after finding
sufficient cause to hold the accused for trial, fix the amount of bail the latter may post for his
provisional release, taking into account the public prosecutor’s recommendation and any
relevant data that the court may find from the criminal information and the supporting
documents submitted with it, regarding the following:

(1) Financial ability of the accused to give bail;

(2) Nature and circumstances of the offense;
(3) Penalty for the offense charged;
(4) Character and reputation of the accused;
(5) Age and health of the accused;
(6) Weight of the evidence against the accused;
(7) Probability of the accused appearing in trial;
(8) Forfeiture of other bonds;
(9) Fact that accused was a fugitive from justice when arrested; and
(10) Pendency of cases in which the accused is under bond. The Department of Justice's
Bail Bond Guide shall be considered but shall not be controlling. In no case shall the court
require excessive bail.

Sec. 2. Fixing of the amount of bail. – Pending the raffle of the case to a regular branch of the
court, the accused may move for the fixing of the amount of bail, in which event, the Executive
Judge shall cause the immediate raffle of the case for assignment and the hearing of the
motion.

Sec. 3. When amount of bail may be reduced. – If the accused does not have the financial
ability to post the amount of bail that the court initially fixed, he may move for its reduction,
submitting for that purpose such documents or affidavits as may warrant the reduction he seeks.
The hearing of this motion shall enjoy priority in the hearing of cases.

Sec. 4. Order fixing the amount of bail inappealable. – The order fixing the amount of the bail
shall not be subject to appeal.

Sec. 5. Release after service of minimum imposable penalty. - The accused who has been
detained for a period at least equal to the minimum of the penalty for the offense charged
against him shall be ordered released, motu proprio or on motion and after notice and hearing,
on his own recognizance without prejudice to the continuation of the proceedings against him.
[Sec. 16, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and Sec. 5 (b) of R.A. 10389]

Sec. 6. Bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. –

(a) The hearing of the accused's motion for bail in offenses punishable by death, reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment shall be summary, with the prosecution bearing the burden of
showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The accused may at his option, if he wants the
court to consider his evidence as well, submit in support of his motion the affidavits of his
witnesses attesting to his innocence.

(b) At the hearing of the accused's motion for bail, the prosecution shall present its
witnesses with the option of examining them on direct or adopting the affidavits they
executed during the preliminary investigation as their direct testimonies.

(c) The court shall examine the witnesses on their direct testimonies or affidavits to ascertain
if the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. The court's questions need not follow any
particular order and may shift from one witness to another. The court shall then allow
counsels from both sides to examine the witnesses as well. The court shall afterwards hear
the oral arguments of the parties on whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong.

(d) Within forty-eight (48) hours after hearing, the court shall issue an order containing a
brief summary of the evidence adduced before it, followed by its conclusion of whether or
not the evidence of guilt is strong. Such conclusion shall not be regarded as a pre-judgment
on the merits of the case that is to be determined only after a full-blown trial.

Sec. 7. Frivolous complaints against judges. – A party or a lawyer who is guilty of filing a
frivolous administrative complaint or a petition for inhibition against a judge arising from the
latter's action on the application for bail may be appropriately sanctioned.

B. THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL

Sec. 8. Observance of time limits. – It shall be the duty of the trial court, the public or private
prosecutor, and the defense counsel to ensure, subject to the excluded delays specified in Rule
119 of the Rules of Court and the Speedy Trial Act of 1998, compliance with the following time
limits in the prosecution of the case against a detained accused:

(a) The case of the accused shall be raffled and referred to the trial court to which it is
assigned within three days from the filing of the information;
(b) The court shall arraign the accused within ten (10) days from the date of the raffle;
(c) The court shall hold the pre-trial conference within thirty (30) days after arraignment or
within ten (10) days if the accused is under preventive detention; provided, however, that
where the direct testimonies of the witnesses are to be presented through judicial
 affidavits, the court shall give the prosecution not more than twenty (20) days from
arraignment within which to prepare and submit their judicial affidavits in time for the
pre-trial conference;
(d) After the pre-trial conference, the court shall set the trial of the case in the pre-trial order
not later than thirty (30) days from the termination of the pre-trial conference; and
(e) The court shall terminate the regular trial within one hundred eighty (180) days, or the
trial by judicial affidavits within sixty (60) days, reckoned from the date trial begins, minus
the excluded delays or postponements specified in Rule 119 of the Rules of Court and
the Speedy Trial Act of 1998.

Sec. 9. Dismissal on ground of denial of the right to speedy trial. – The case against the
detained accused may be dismissed on ground of denial of the right to speedy trial in the event
of failure to observe the above time limits.

Sec. 10. Provisional dismissal. – (a) When the delays are due to the absence of an essential
witness whose whereabouts are unknown or cannot be determined and, therefore, are subject
to exclusion in determining compliance with the prescribed time limits which caused the trial to
exceed one hundred eighty (180) days, the court shall provisionally dismiss the action with the
express consent of the detained accused.

(b) When the delays are due to the absence of an essential witness whose presence cannot be
obtained by due diligence though his whereabouts are known, the court shall provisionally
dismiss the action with the express consent of the detained accused provided:

(1) the hearing in the case has been previously twice postponed due to the non-appearance
of the essential witness and both the witness and the offended party, if they are two
different persons, have been given notice of the setting of the case for third hearing,
which notice contains a warning that the case would be dismissed if the essential
witness continues to be absent; and
(2) there is proof of service of the pertinent notices of hearings or subpoenas upon the
essential witness and the offended party at their last known postal or e-mail addresses
or mobile phone numbers.

(c) For the above purpose, the public or private prosecutor shall first present during the trial the
essential witness or witnesses to the case before anyone else. An essential witness is one
whose testimony dwells on the presence of some or all of the elements of the crime and whose
testimony is indispensable to the conviction of the accused.

Sec. 11. Service of subpoena and notices through electronic mail or mobile phones. –
Subpoena and notices may be served by the court to parties and witnesses through electronic
mails (e-mail) or through mobile phone either through phone calls or through short messaging
service (SMS).
Sec. 12. Proof of service of notice of hearing or subpoena. – To ascertain the proper service of
notice of hearing or subpoena:

(a) The public prosecutor shall, during inquest or preliminary investigation, require the
complainant and his witnesses and, in proper cases, the police officers who witnessed
the commission of the crime subject of the investigation, to leave with him their postal
and e-mail addresses and mobile phone numbers for use in summoning them when they
need to appear at the hearings of the case.

(b) When requesting the court to issue a subpoena or subpoena duces tecum for their
witnesses, the parties shall provide the court with the postal and e-mail addresses and
mobile phone numbers of such witnesses.

(c) The service of notice of hearing or subpoena at the postal address, e- mail address, or
through mobile phone number shall be proved by any of the following:

(1) an officer's return or affidavit of service if done by personal service, or by registry

return card;
(2) printouts of sent e-mail and the acknowledgment by the recipient;
(3) printouts of electronic messages transmitted through the court's equipment or device
and the acknowledgment by the recipient; or
(4) reports of phone calls made by the court.

(d) The postal and e-mail addresses as well as the mobile phone numbers supplied by the
parties and their witnesses incident to court cases all be regarded as part of the judicial
processes in those cases. Consequently, any person who uses the same without proper
authority or for purposes other than sending of court notices shall be deemed guilty of
direct contempt and accordingly punished.

(e) In cases of police officers whose testimonies are essential to the prosecution of the case,
service of the notice of hearing or subpoena on them shall be made through the police
unit responsible for the arrest and prosecution of the accused, copy furnished the
Personnel Department of the Philippine National Police. It shall be the responsibility of
the head of that police unit to ensure the transmission of the notice or subpoena to the
addressee. Service upon the police unit shall be deemed service upon such police
officers.

(f) The court shall cause the service of a copy of the order of provisional dismissal upon the
offended party in the manner provided above.

Sec. 13. Report of government expert witnesses. – A certified copy of the report of a
government medical, chemical, or laboratory expert relating to a criminal case shall be
admissible as prima facie evidence of the truth of its contents. The personal appearance in court
of a witness who prepared the report shall be unnecessary unless demanded by the accused for
the purpose of cross-examination.

Sec. 14. Revival of cases provisionally dismissed. – The one or two-year period allowed for
reviving a criminal case that has been provisionally dismissed shall be reckoned from the
issuance of the order of dismissal. The dismissal shall become automatically permanent if the
case is not revived within the required period. Such permanent dismissal shall amount to an
adjudication of the case on the merits.

Sec. 15. Local Task Force Katarungan at Kalayaan. –

(a) The Court shall establish a Task Force Katarungan at Kalayaan in appropriate places for
the purpose of eliminating unnecessary detention. It shall be chaired by a Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Judge, with a Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court Judge as vice-chairman,
both to be appointed for a term of two years by the Executive Judge of the place. The
city or provincial prosecutor of the place or his representative and the local head of the
Public Attorney's Office or his representative shall be members of the Task Force. The
assistance of the local Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Office of the
Provincial Governor may be enlisted.

(b) The Task Force shall track and keep a record of the progress of the criminal cases of all
detained persons within their jurisdiction and ensure that such persons are accorded the
rights and privileges provided by law, the rules, and these guidelines.

(c) Each court shall maintain a "Detainees Notebook," that shall be supplied free by the
Office of the Court Administrator and shall contain (i) the full name of the accused; (ii)
the docket number and title of the case (iii) the kind of crime charged; (iv) the date his
detention began; (v) the date when his detention becomes equal to the minimum of the
imposable penalty; (vi) the date when his detention becomes equal to the maximum
imposable penalty; (vii) the date of arraignment; (viii) the date of pre-trial hearing or
conference; (ix) the first day of trial; (x) the statutory last day of trial if no excluded delays
or postponements are incurred; (xi) sufficient space for entering the progress of the
hearing of the case; and (xii) such other data as may be essential to the monitoring of his
or her case. One (1) copy of the notebook shall be attached to the record of the case
and other copy kept by the jail warden which copy shall be brought with the accused at
the hearing. The branch clerk of court shall update the two copies of the notebook at
every hearing by stating what action the court has taken in it, the next scheduled
hearing, and what action the court will further take on the case.

(d) The Task Force shall have access to all case records and information relating to detained
persons and shall advise the judges hearing their cases, when warranted, of the need
for them to act on any incident or situation that adversely affects the rights of detained
persons or subject them to undue or harsh treatment.
 (e) The Office of the Chief Justice shall exercise direct supervision over all such Task
Forces.

Forfeiture of bail, Sec. 21

When appearance of accused required
Section 21. Forfeiture of bond. — When the presence of the accused is required by the
court or these Rules, his bondsmen shall be notified to produce him before the court on
a given date and time. If the accused fails to appear in person as required, his bail shall
be declared forfeited and the bondsmen given thirty (30) days within which to produce
their principal and to show cause why no judgment should be rendered against them for
the amount of their bail. Within the said period, the bondsmen must:

(a) produce the body of their principal or give the reason for his non-production; and
(b) explain why the accused did not appear before the court when first required to do
so.

Failing in these two requisites, a judgment shall be rendered against the bondsmen,
jointly and severally, for the amount of the bail. The court shall not reduce or otherwise
mitigate the liability of the bondsmen, unless the accused has been surrendered or is
acquitted. (21a)

Bail to secure appearance of material witness, Sec. 14, Rule 119

Section 14. Bail to secure appearance of material witness. — When the court is satisfied,
upon proof or oath, that a material witness will not testify when required, it may, upon
motion of either party, order the witness to post bail in such sum as may be deemed
proper. Upon refusal to post bail, the court shall commit him to prison until he complies
or is legally discharged after his testimony has been taken. (6a)

RULE 115 – RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED

Jen
Sec. 14, Art. III, 1987 Constitution
Rights of accused at the trial, Sec. 1
A. Presumption of innocence
Rationale: to lighten and even reverse the heavy odds against the accused who
is confronted by the full panoply of State authority
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (En banc)
This presumption must be overcome with proof beyond reasonable doubt
People v. Villaran, 269 SCRA 630
Any doubt as to the guilt of the accused must be resolved in favor of the
constitutional presumption of innocence
Equipoise Rule: People v. Urzais, G.R. No. 207662, April 13, 2016