Pavitt 2014

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Group Research
An Interactive Input−Process−Output Model of Social Influence in

Decision-Making Groups
Charles Pavitt
Small Group Research published online 25 August 2014
DOI: 10.1177/1046496414548353
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DOI: 10.1177/1046496414548353
of Social Influence in sgr.sagepub.com
Decision-Making Groups
Charles Pavitt1
Abstract
The first goal of this article is to demonstrate that the dichotomy between
informational and normative influence in group decision making is long
outdated and should be replaced with a distinction among compliance,
comparison, and argumentation influence processes. The second goal of
this article is to use this distinction as the basis for a literature review of
the impact of various input factors on social influence during small group
discussion. The third goal of this article is to present the Simplified Model
of Group Social Influence Processes, an interactive input–process–output
model relevant to decision-making groups. The article ends with a discussion
of the implications of this model for future research and further model
development.
Keywords
communication, conformity, information sharing/nonsharing, majority
influence, minority influence
The goal of this article is to distinguish between three social influence pro-
cesses (argumentation, comparison, and compliance) in small decision-
making groups while proposing an interactive input–process–output (IPO)
1University of Delaware, Newark, USA

Corresponding Author:
Charles Pavitt, University of Delaware, 250 Pearson Hall, Newark, DE 19716, USA.
Email: chazzq@udel.edu

2 Small Group Research
model integrating these processes. The formalization of the basic IPO model
harkens back to independent proposals by Gouran (1973) in communication
and Hackman and Morris (1975) in psychology. In it, a communicator’s rel-
evant cognitions (including beliefs, attitudes, motives, goals, emotions, per-
sonality traits), when activated by contextual factors including previous
discussion content (input), influence that communicator’s subsequent mes-
sage (process), affecting a second communicator’s cognitions (output).
Research consistent with this model is prevalent in business administration
(e.g., Weisband, 1992), communication (e.g., Pavitt, 1994), and psychology
(e.g., Kelly & McGrath, 1985). An interactive version of the model includes
mutual feedback loops, in which that second person applies his or her cogni-
tions (input) in planning a response (process), impacting the first person’s
cognitions (output), message plan (input), message (process), and so on.
Such models require some understanding of what occurs during communica-
tive episodes, which is the case in this context.
A large proportion of the research germane to this model is the product of
paradigms relevant to (a) the group polarization effect, the tendency for dis-
cussion groups to make more extreme decisions than their average member
would have made otherwise; and (b) the hidden profile, in which information
jointly known by group members as a whole favors one option but that known
uniquely by individual members implies a different choice. These paradigms
are founded on four assumptions. First, proposal options are known by the
members of the group before discussion. Second, group members enter dis-
cussion having used their stock of decision-relevant information to formulate
a prediscussion preference for a particular option. Third, these members
leave discussion with a postdiscussion preference that may have changed as
a consequence of discussion. Fourth, the group reaches a decision by, in
effect, combining individual postdiscussion preferences. Social influence
occurs when individual member prediscussion and postdiscussion prefer-
ences differ and/or when the group decision differs from the average of mem-
bers’ prediscussion preferences.1 These assumptions often do not reflect
occurrences during real-world group decision making, particularly as pro-
posal options are frequently not common knowledge before the fact.
Nonetheless, many aspects of the model should still be relevant in those
circumstances.
Central to the model are three social influence processes that, although
intertwined in practice, are independent in theory. Argumentation processes
lead group members to discuss their decision-relevant knowledge and to be
influenced by the knowledge voiced by other members. Comparison pro-
cesses lead group members to voice their decision preferences and to be
influenced by hearing one another’s preferences. These latter two terms are

Pavitt 3
borrowed from the two central theories explaining group polarization, per-
suasive arguments theory (Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974) and social compari-
son theory (Baron, Dion, Baron, & Miller, 1971). Compliance processes lead
group members to voice the decision preferences they believe will gain them
social approval in their group. Compliance processes differ from both argu-
mentation and comparison in that there is only lip service to the majority
view and no actual preference change.
This article begins with a discussion of the bases for distinguishing among
these processes. It continues with an examination of input factors influencing
these processes’ strength and direction. Next, it models the influence of these
processes in terms of the mutual causal relationship between discussion and
group member option preferences and any resulting group decision. It ends
with limitations that motivate further work.
The Basis for the Distinction Among Social

Influence Processes
Research predating the group polarization and hidden profile paradigms sug-
gested three empirical generalizations concerning group social influence.
First, group discussion usually leads to convergence of members’ prefer-
ences. Second, group decisions reflect this convergence. Third, when a group
minority exists, it normally changes its preferences toward the majority’s.
Most subsequent work has been consistent with all three. In fact, the group
polarization effect is primarily a statistical artifact resulting from minorities
conforming to more extreme majorities (Boster, Mayer, Hunter, & Hale,
1980; Davis, Kerr, Sussmann, & Rissman, 1974; Ohtsubo, Masuchi, &
Nakanishi, 2002).
Asch’s (1951) well-known findings, in which a significant proportion of
participants hearing confederates state decision preferences in obvious con-
tradiction with available visual evidence voiced those heard preferences,
were critical in differentiating compliance processes from actual persuasion.
Less well known are the results of subsequent participant interviews. Some
admitted parroting the majority view although believing it false, exhibiting
compliance as defined here. Others believed their observations to be wrong
given the confederate judgments, equating to true influence. Using a wide
variety of tasks, Crutchfield (1955) replicated Asch’s experimental and inter-
view findings. In Deutsch and Gerard’s (1955) extension, judgments made
publicly were more affected by confederate reports than anonymous judg-
ments, revealing what they called normative influence (compliance). In addi-
tion, anonymous judgments were often in error when compared with Asch’s
highly accurate control conditions. Deutsch and Gerard attributed this latter
finding to actual persuasion, which they called informational influence.

However, participants in these and comparable (M. Sherif, 1935) studies

were restricted to statements of preferences and barred from discussion of
supportive reasons, obviating the possibility of argumentation processes.
Group polarization and hidden profile research permitted both preference and
argument exchange, which allowed for distinguishing comparison from argu-
mentation processes. Evidence supporting persuasive arguments theory
(Ebbesen & Bowers, 1974; Vinokur & Burnstein, 1974) and revealing that
information known by one group member alone can influence others
(Winquist & Larson, 1998) is consistent with argumentation process accounts.
Findings favoring the social comparison explanation for group polarization
(Baron et al., 1971) and the common knowledge effect, in which jointly
known information holds sway over member preferences in lieu of what is
newly learned during discussion (Gigone & Hastie, 1993), are in line with
comparison process explanations. Compliance processes are uncommon in
these research paradigms, as private and public prediscussion preferences are
usually identical.
Although influence via social comparison and argumentation have been
considered competitive explanations, evidence in favor of both is sufficiently
strong that a general account for group social influence must include both
plus the proviso that each member originally prefers the option with the
greatest amount of known supportive evidence. Boster and Mayer’s (1984)
phase model, in which group members first exchange prediscussion prefer-
ences, motivating comparison-based influence, and second, the reasons for
them, fueling argumentation-founded influence, is supported in published
research (Dennis, 1996) and unpublished reanalysis of my own data (Pavitt,
1994; Pavitt & Aloia, 2009). Winquist and Larson’s (1998) parallel process
model distinguished circumstances in which each form of influence takes
precedence over the other. These models are too simple, as both processes are
intertwined. Comparison processes influence argumentation, as arguments
are more effective when attributed to the majority, and argumentation pro-
cesses affect comparison, as the expression of argument reinforces the per-
ception of a group member’s preference. In addition, pressure toward
cognitive consistency can turn what was originally verbal compliance into
true preference change (Festinger, 1957).
Factors Influencing Social Influence Processes

Situational Factors
Task type. Group decision tasks differ in the extent to which the decision can
be compared with a demonstrably correct answer. Most generally, the more

Pavitt 5
demonstrable the group decision, the more that argumentation processes and
less that comparison processes will be engaged (Huang & Wei, 2000; Kaplan,
1989; see Mesmer-Magnus & DeChurch, 2009, for a relevant meta-analysis),
as measured by the proportion of statements providing task-relevant informa-
tion versus individual preferences (Kaplan & Miller, 1987; Kelly, Jackson, &
Hutson-Comeaux, 1997; Pavitt & Aloia, 2009). Relatively more demonstra-
ble decisions also result in participants placing more value on informational
items in contrast with items reflecting normative judgments (Kaplan, Schae-
fer, & Zinkiewicz, 1994). Describing a hidden profile task as having a
demonstrable answer (i.e., as a problem to be solved rather than a judgment
to be made) increased the discussion of diagnostic information (Stasser &
Stewart, 1992).
There is no evidence allowing for the specific contribution of task demon-
strability to compliance processes at this time. Finally, task should moderate
several other factors discussed below.
Time pressure. According to the attentional focus model (Karau & Kelly,

1992), the presence of optimal time for decision making encourages the full
discussion of issues and the opportunity for argumentative influence. Time
scarcity, in contrast, results in pressures for compliance and influence
through comparison processes. Time pressure increases the proportion of
task-relevant comments at the expense of relationally oriented talk (Karau
& Kelly, 1992; Kelly & McGrath, 1985) and of preference-relevant utter-
ances in lieu of the informational-influence-relevant (Kelly et al., 1997).
During hidden profile studies, groups under time pressure will work faster,
as measured by the number of informational items mentioned per minute,
but fewer items in total will emerge, with these effects accentuated by task
complexity (Kelly & Karau, 1999; Kelly & Loving, 2004; Parks & Cowlin,
1995).
Schachter’s (1951; see also Festinger & Thibaut, 1951; Sampson &
Brandon, 1964) classic work detailing group response to deviance implies
that increased time pressure leads to greater attempts by group majorities to
gain compliance from deviants. It is believed that these appeals begin as
argumentation processes but end as attempts at verbal compliance. Although
there is evidence that these attempts subside with extreme time pressure as
the group gives up the effort, it is sensible to hypothesize compliance pro-
cesses as greatest when deadlines approach.
Karau and Kelly (1992) also noted that time scarcity will tend to accentu-
ate already existing group structures, moderating the impact of time on com-
munication utilization. Relevant examples will be discussed below.

Group Factors
Prediscussion preference distribution. Boster and Mayer’s (1984) phase model
and reanalysis of our own data (Pavitt, 1994; Pavitt & Aloia, 2009) imply
that, after preference exchange, discussion of relevant information is less
likely when groups are initially unanimous, precluding argumentation pro-
cesses. In contrast, disagreeing minorities motivate the search for relevant
information (Nemeth & Wachtler, 1983; Schulz-Hardt, Frey, Lüthgens, &
Moscovici, 2000; C. M. Smith, Tindale, & Dugeni, 1996). Nemeth (1986)
argued that the assumption of the majority’s correctness underlies its influ-
ence on a minority (comparison processes). In contrast, minority influence
occurs when this assumption is dropped, resulting in increased information
exchange (argumentation processes). Information exchange is greatest when
each group member begins with a differing preference (Brodbeck, Kerschre-
iter, Mojzisch, Frey, & Schulz-Hardt, 2002; SchulzHardt, Brodbeck,
Mojzisch, Kerschreiter, & Frey, 2006). Groups beginning in disagreement
provide a greater number of written reasons for their decision than groups
starting in unanimity (Propp, 1997).
The presence of larger minorities increases their persuasiveness and
unwillingness to give in to majorities (Asch, 1951), and their presence
requires more discussion to reach a decision (Wood, Lundgren, Ouellette,
Busceme, & Blackstone, 1994). The persuasiveness of large minorities fails
when the relative faction size approaches equality (Nemeth, Wachtler, &
Endicott, 1977), with the ideal minority size for successful persuasion about
half the majority’s. Wood et al. (1994) also noted that minority influence was
more effective in more demonstrable tasks (perceptual judgments rather than
opinions); this is no surprise given its relevance to argumentative influence.
Spiral of silence theory and research (Noelle-Neumann, 1993) supports
the notion that people perceiving themselves as in the minority are less likely
to voice their opinions than the majority. Noelle-Neumann interpreted this
tendency in terms of compliance processes, but Asch’s (1951) findings imply
that comparison processes are also at work.
Group cohesiveness. Although traditionally treated as a unitary concept,

research (Back, 1951) implies otherwise. Relational-based cohesiveness,
founded on the basis of interpersonal attraction among group members, leads
to more equal, relationally positive, and task-irrelevant talk among group
members and fewer overt attempts at social influence than task-based cohe-
siveness resulting from the potential of the group to reach goals unattainable
by individual members (Castaño, Watts, & Tekleab, 2013; Tziner, 1982). In
meta-analyses (Beale, Cohen, Burke, & McLendon, 2003; Mullen & Copper,
1994), task-based cohesiveness has been consistently associated with better

Pavitt 7
group performance, but findings for relational-based cohesiveness has not,

particularly in real-world groups. Groups with task-oriented goals or norms
exchange more preferences and information and are more disagreeable than
groups with relational-oriented goals or norms (M. L. M. Henningsen, Hen-
ningsen, Cruz, & Morrill, 2003; Postmes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). Finally,
in Schachter’s (1951) study of conformity pressure, attempts at persuading
deviants were greatest in groups composed of interested participants discuss-
ing a relevant topic than the opposite. It follows that compliance processes
are also more prominent in groups with high task-based cohesiveness, and
that these processes are accentuated under time pressure.
Leader style. When groups have an assigned or elected leader, that leader’s
style can result in an atmosphere more or less conducive to information and
preference exchange. Overly directive leaders discouraging open discussion
and explicitly favoring a pet proposal result in fewer proposals and less infor-
mation exchange than nondirective leaders (Flowers, 1977; Larson, Foster-
Fishman, & Franz, 1998; Leana, 1985). This tendency often results in social
influence consistent with the directive leader’s desires, although Cruz, Hen-
ningsen, and Smith’s (1999) groups brought up information disfavored by
their directive leaders. It follows that directive leadership is conducive to
compliance processes and participative leadership to argumentation pro-
cesses. Although more uncertain, the levels of free discussion and freedom of
expression with participative leadership imply that comparison processes
also flourish.
In a review, Peterson (1997) distinguished between process directiveness
(the extent to which leaders encourage discussion of alternative proposals)
and outcome directiveness (the extent to which leaders advocate a favored
position). The studies cited above conflated these two, with directive leaders
low on the former and high on the latter and nondirective leaders the oppo-
site. Peterson presented experimental and real-world evidence that distinc-
tions in process leadership alone were responsible for differences in observer
ratings and/or member perceptions of process and decision quality, although
outcome directiveness was associated with persuasiveness in an experimental
simulation.
Leader style is moderated by the influence of time, as a group’s tendency to
accept directive leadership is accentuated in circumstances of time scarcity due
to the increase in attentional focus on task completion (Karau & Kelly, 1992).
Personal Factors
Status. Status can be viewed in terms of an assigned position giving a person
legitimate power within a formal organization (Altman, Valenzi, & Hodgetts,

1985) or as a by-product associated with characteristics such as sex, race,

age, and occupation (Webster & Driskell, 1978). In either case, it generally
operates within discussion groups both directly, with higher conformity to
those of high status, and indirectly, with high-status individuals more likely
to contribute to discussion and those contributions more likely to be accepted
by other group members (Bass & Wurster, 1953a, 1953b; Larson, Chris-
tensen, Abbott, & Franz, 1996; Saunders, Robey, & Vaverek, 1994; Weis-
band, Schneider, & Connolly, 1995).
Research relevant to expectation states theory (Berger, Fisek, Norman, &
Zelditch, 1977) demonstrates that status differences (i.e., military rank) are
associated with influence in dyads. Sex and race have historically worked as
predicted, with men more talkative and influential than women in mixed-sex
groups except when the topic is female-sex-typed (Lockheed, 1985; Propp,
1995; Smith-Lovin, Skvoretz, & Hudson, 1986), and Caucasian Americans
more verbally active and less prone to social influence than African Americans
in mixed-race groups (E. G. Cohen, 1972; Katz & Benjamin, 1960). Whether
these tendencies have diminished over time is unknown. Differences in age
(Freese & Cohen, 1973) and educational standing (e.g., 4-year college stu-
dent vs. junior college student vs. high school student; Moore, 1968) have
behaved likewise.
Assigned leadership alone does not confer status and influence (Carter,
Haythorn, Shriver, & Lanzetta, 1951; Mortensen, 1966), particularly if its
basis is task-irrelevant (Berger et al., 1977), or if group members have knowl-
edge about the task and one another’s abilities (Webster & Driskell, 1978).
Although having their greatest impact on compliance processes, high-status
members are more likely to offer information of which only they are aware,
inconsistently with the common knowledge effect and relevant to argumenta-
tion influence (Larson, Christensen, Franz, & Abbott, 1998; Savadori, Van
Swol, & Sniezek, 2001). Finally, status should have less impact in more
demonstrable decision situations, as group members will be more likely to
ignore a high-status member’s lead and utilize objective criteria (Kirchler &
Davis, 1986).
Demonstrated expertise. Expectation states research suggests that perceived

expertise leads nonexperts to conform to the expert’s opinion (Berger et al.,
1977; Hemphill, 1961; Marak, 1964). High participation in discussion can
lead to credibility and influence judgments when group members evaluate
that participation as valuable (Gintner & Lindskold, 1975; Riecken, 1958).
Demonstrated competence can also counteract cultural status markers, with
high participating females influential in otherwise male groups if their par-
ticipation is judged as in the group’s best interest (Ridgeway, 1982), if they

Pavitt 9
show competence (Bradley, 1980; Schneider & Cook, 1995), or if group

members are aware of their relevant past experience (Wittenbaum, 1998).
The influence of race (E. G. Cohen & Roper, 1972) and age (Freese & Cohen,
1973) can also be superseded by perceptions of relevant expertise.
Relevant knowledge decreases the effects of status on participation and
influence (Dubrovsky, Kiesler, & Sethna, 1991; Hollingshead, 1996). Those
with relevant expertise are less susceptible to the common knowledge effect
than other group members (Larson, Foster-Fishman, & Franz, 1998;
Wittenbaum, 1998, 2000), with their increased discussion of uniquely known
information implying greater argumentative influence. Knowledge of spe-
cialized information means expertise in that domain and increases its likeli-
hood of disclosure (Fraidin, 2004; Stasser, Stewart, & Wittenbaum, 1995).
Relevant expertise has a greater effect on discussion-based influence than
sheer talk time (Bottger, 1984). Relevant expertise should mean more influ-
ence in more demonstrable tasks, as experts can indicate the better option. In
Franz and Larson (2002), experts identified as such mentioned more informa-
tion than nonexperts, particularly when the task was described as having an
objectively correct answer rather than not.
I wish to distinguish pure status effects, affecting compliance processes as
members wish to display their leader’s preference, from pure expertise
effects, influencing argumentation processes given the data the expert pres-
ents to group members and comparison processes as group members may
trust the expert’s preference. Status effects are accentuated by the absence of,
and expertise effects by the presence of, task demonstrability. Nonetheless,
status and expertise are real-world conflated, as high-status people talk more
and so often present more relevant information to the group, and expertise
provides status.
Talkativeness. Although intertwined with status and expertise, overall talk-

ativeness is a consequential individual difference on its own (Bonito & Hol-
lingshead, 1997). Callaway, Marriott, and Esser (1985) determined that
groups with members above the sample median in dominance made more
agreement and disagreement statements, reported more attempted and suc-
cessful influence attempts, and made more accurate judgments than groups
below the sample median. The first option advocated in discussion usually
ends up the group’s choice (McGuire, Kiesler, & Siegel, 1987), and individ-
ual member preferences shift toward the first advocate when that advocate is
self-selected rather than preassigned (Weisband, 1992). The latter finding is
probably a function of talkativeness, as the most talkative member is likely to
be the first to voice an option preference. There is some evidence that group
members who enter discussion with the same task-relevant knowledge as

other members are more talkative (Sargis & Larson, 2002), judged as more
influential, and are less susceptible to social influence than those who shared
the least (Kameda, Ohtsubo, & Takezawa, 1997). This tendency may not hold
when group members are aware that those not sharing knowledge items with
the other members are equally competent (Larson, Sargis, Elstein, &
Schwartz, 2002). Differences in group size will moderate the effect of talk-
ativeness on group process. Researchers (reviewed in Bonito & Hollings-
head, 1997) are in agreement that a group’s most talkative member will hog
about 40% of the total talk time in groups from 3 to 10 members, with the
others accorded ever smaller proportions of the floor as group size increases.
The implication is that particularly talkative members are relatively more
influential in larger groups than in smaller. This relationship will be further
moderated by time scarcity; based on Isenberg (1981), Karau and Kelly
(1992) hypothesized that the resulting pressure for task completion might
increase the tendency for the talkative to dominate the floor.
It follows that the presence of talkative members would influence argu-
mentation processes. Although past research offers insufficient rationale, it is
likely that pure talkativeness also affects comparison processes. Talkativeness
should not be associated with compliance processes independently of mem-
ber status.
Needs for cognition and approval. A. R. Cohen (1957) defined need for cogni-
tion (NFC) as the desire to understand ambiguous situations, while noting
high NFCs to spontaneously consider persuasive arguments whereas low
NFCs required outside prompting. Petty and Cacioppo (1986) reinterpreted
NFC as the tendency to engage in effortful cognitive activity. Cacioppo,
Petty, Feinstein, and Jarvis (1996) concluded that NFC is associated with
recall of recently observed information and consistency of attitudes with that
information. High NFCs making individual decisions are less susceptible to
framing biases, implying a more rational approach to their problem, and
undertake more thorough information searches than lows, with this tendency
moderated by situational cues (Bailey, 1997; Levin, Huneke, & Jasper, 2000;
S. M. Smith & Levin, 1996). In the group context, Petty and Cacioppo sum-
marized an unpublished conference paper by themselves and Kasmer in
which high NFCs were less prone to social loafing while brainstorming (rep-
licated by B. N. Smith, Kerr, Markus, & Stasson, 2001, in a perceptual test).
High NFCs engaged in two-person mock juries were more persuasive and
perceived by their partners as providing more and higher quality arguments
favoring their viewpoint than lows (Shestowsky, Wegener, & Fabrigar, 1998),
and as offering more information during group discussion common among
group members, although surprisingly not more information unique to them
(D. D. Henningsen & Henningsen, 2004).

Pavitt 11
Need for approval (NFA), the characteristic tendency to seek positive

regard from other people, probably influences compliance tendencies.
Crowne and Marlowe (1964) observed those high in NFA as more likely to
state agreement with the voiced group majority in Asch-type studies, particu-
larly if a confederate reporting the correct perception is verbally criticized by
the other confederates and then complies with them. Although likely a case of
compliance rather than comparison processes, there were no postexperiment
interviews to gauge participant motivations. Other compliance-relevant evi-
dence includes Baseheart’s (1971) observations that high NFAs were only
persuaded more than low NFAs when messages implied others’ agreement or
disagreement, and Martin and Greenstein’s (1983) discovery that high but not
low NFAs were influenced by others’ status. D. D. Henningsen and
Henningsen (2004) noted NFA as positively associated with the repetition of
shared information and negatively associated with the repetition of unshared
information, what would be expected from people wishing to seek others’
approval.
In summary, high NFCs are more likely to engage in argumentation pro-
cesses whereas low NFCs, in the words of Cacioppo et al. (1996), are prone
to “rely on others (e.g. celebrities and experts) . . . or social comparison pro-
cesses” (p. 198), along with compliance. Those high in NFA would be more
likely than those low to comply and shy away from argumentation processes.
I would hesitate to offer a comparison process hypothesis for NFA at this
time.
Table 1 summarizes the circumstances under which the aforementioned
input factors have their greatest effect on argumentation, comparison, and
compliance processes during group discussion. As indicated, there are
instances in which factors are proposed to have no or, at this time, unknown
influence on given processes.
The Simplified Model of Group Social Influence

Processes
The Simplified Model of Social Influence Processes deserves that title due to
a set of seven simplifying assumptions under which it is operative. Four of
these assumptions were proposed at the beginning of this article: (a) That
group members enter discussion aware of all proposals, (b) that group mem-
bers enter discussion having formulated a prediscussion preference for one of
the proposals, (c) that group members leave discussion with a possibly
changed postdiscussion preference, and (d) that the group combines its mem-
bers’ postdiscussion preferences into a decision. Fifth, group discussion con-
sists solely of items of information and statements of individual preferences,

Table 1. Conditions in Which Input Factors Have the Greatest Impact on
Argumentation, Comparison, and Compliance Processes.
Input factors Argumentation Comparison Compliance
Task type High demonstrable Low demonstrable Unknown

Time pressure Medium High High
Prediscussion preference Substantial disagreement General agreement General agreement
distribution
Group cohesiveness Task based Task based Task based
Accentuated by Time pressure
Leader process High High Low
directiveness
Leader outcome Low Low High
directiveness
High-status member Absent Absent Present
Accentuated by Low demon task
Demonstrated expertise Present Present Absent
Accentuated by High demonstrable task High demonstrable task
Member talkativeness High High? No impact
Accentuated by Large group size, particularly
under high time pressure
Individual need for High Low Low
cognition
Individual need for Low Unknown High
approval
Note. ? refers to High as being a reasonable hypothesis with no present support.
ignoring procedural, relational, and irrelevant utterances. Sixth, the factors

discussed in the literature review govern the tendency for statements to con-
tribute information or signal preference. Seventh, most of these factors
remain consistent through discussion, with exceptions including changed dis-
tributions of individual member preferences, the intervention of time pres-
sure, and the imposition of a high-status member’s preference.
Discussion begins with the exchange of prediscussion preferences (Boster
et al., 1980; Dennis, 1996). If unanimity is discovered, it is decisive, and,
although discussion of options may continue, for our purposes, the decision
process ends at that point. Absence of unanimity motivates the discussion of
information items, activating argumentation processes. Any obvious majority
triggers comparison and compliance processes, with its relative strength
dependent on the size of the majority. If a high-status member declares an
option preference, compliance processes are activated.
As individual group members generally contribute items of information
consistent with their prediscussion preference (Pavitt, 1994), the proportion

Pavitt 13
of members supporting various options can be gauged by the option for

which each member argues (Lemus, Seibold, Flanagan, & Metzger, 2004;
McPhee, Poole, & Seibold, 1981; Meyers & Brashers, 1998). Mention of
information items, either known before discussion or newly thought of, adds
both knowledge supporting the relevant option and the perception that the
communicator favors that option. If in support, the majority viewpoint will be
buttressed by argumentation and comparison processes in tandem. Minority
members may hesitate to talk, resulting in a self-fulfilling prophecy reinforc-
ing the majority viewpoint.
Argumentation processes can affect member support for various options.
If new items supporting the minority appear, argumentation processes favor
them and comparison processes weaken. If not superseded by comparison
and compliance processes, sufficient information favoring an originally dis-
preferred option can change prediscussion preferences. The majority switch-
ing favor from one option to another will change what is benefited by
comparison processes. Analogously, if a majority forms in a previously
evenly split group, comparison processes come into play. Explicit statements
of preference can occur at any later time, either strengthening or weakening
comparison processes depending on whether for the majority or minority
option. As argument credibility is affected by the side it supports, argumenta-
tion processes can be affected in turn.
With neither perceived majority nor pressure to comply with a high-status
member, argumentation processes prevail. High-status member interjections
short-circuit argumentation processes and, if group members voice support
for the leader’s preferred proposal, the (perhaps illusionary) appearance of a
majority can strengthen comparison processes. Finally, time pressure
increases the importance of compliance and comparison processes relative to
argumentation.
The move to final decision is reflected in discussion content. Decision
options lacking significant group favor drop by the wayside, leaving those
options with the most support (Hoffman, 1979; Scheidel & Crowell, 1964).
The group usually chooses the option with the strongest voiced support
across the entire group (Brodbeck et al., 2002; Hoffman, 1979; Hollingshead,
1996; Kelly & Karau, 1999; Kim, 1997; Meyers, Brashers, & Hanner, 2000;
Winquist & Larson, 1998), particularly when favored by the majority of indi-
vidual comments (Lemus et al., 2004; McPhee et al., 1981; Meyers &
Brashers, 1998). Although the option with majority approval at the outset of
discussion is normally chosen, the following circumstances are conducive to
minority influence: a task with a highly demonstrable solution argued for by
a minority about half the size of the majority and including members who are
particularly talkative, high status, or expert in the relevant topic. Minority

Beginning Middle End
Other
factors Informaon Informaon
affecng exchange exchange
argumentaon
processes
Preference Preference Preference Preference

distribuon distribuon distribuon distribuon
Other
factors Preference Preference Preference
affecng exchange exchange exchange
comparison
processes If
unanimous
Group
decision
Factors
affecng
compliance
processes
(when
relevant)
Time
pressure
(when
relevant)
Figure 1. Interactions among discussion exchange and preference distribution for
group across discussion.
influence is also encouraged by consistency in the arguments they offer

(Gebhardt & Meyers, 1995; Meyers et al., 2000).
Figures 1 and 2 are intended to diagram aspects of the Simplified Model
as implied by differing perspectives. Figure 1 takes a macro-level view of the
process by which the overall implications of the model would be played out
in group discussion across the entire length of decision making. Beginning
with original preference exchange, this figure highlights the interplay of
information and preference exchange and distribution of preferences among
members as they impact one another during the rest of the discussion, culmi-
nating in the final group decision. Figure 2 zeroes in on the specific factors
impacting the model-relevant thoughts and comments of an individual group
member from speaking turn to speaking turn. In this figure, output factors
affect a group member’s interpretation of the previous group discussion con-
tribution whereas input factors influence a member’s decisions concerning
when and what to contribute. Solid arrows displayed under the Process labels
represent actual information and preference statements; intermittent lines
under the output and input labels indicate the analogous psychological por-
tions of the respective argumentation and comparison/compliance processes.
Crisscross arrows between the processes signify the psychological influence

Pavitt 15
Process Output Input Process
Need for cognion

Need for cognion
Own experse
Informaon Item Informaon Item
Preference distribuon Preference distribuon

Task-based cohesiveness Task-based cohesiveness
Task demonstrability Talkaveness
Preference Item Preference Item
Others’ experse
Own status
Others’ status
Own direcve leadership
Others’ direcve leadership
Need for approval
Need for approval
Time pressure
Time pressure
Figure 2. Interactions among discussion exchange and input variables for
individual members across speaking turns.
each process has on the other. Variables listed at the top affect processing of
information items, those at the bottom preference items, and those in the
middle both. The diagrammed process repeats itself for every discussant dur-
ing each discussion contribution by any member. To maintain simplicity in
both figures, I have not included the direction (i.e., positive vs. negative) of
the relationships, which can be found in Table 1 and the following list of
theoretical propositions.
Propositions
The Simplified Model of Social Influence Processes implies a set of theoreti-
cal propositions relevant to the preponderance of information statements
indicative of argumentation processes and preference statements representing
comparison and/or compliance processes during discussion. I distinguish
between propositions in which the causal factor is an input variable versus a
process variable. Within these two categories, I further divide the set into two
types: static propositions, which include factors that are present at the begin-
ning of group discussion and remain fairly constant throughout that discus-
sion, and dynamic propositions, which concern factors that undergo change
as discussion continues. I have sequenced the propositions consistently with
the order in which the relevant factors are described in this article. The term

pure is used when referring to the impacts of talkativeness, status, and exper-
tise on preference and information statements independently of one another,
ignoring the fact that the three are inseparable in practice.
Input Variable Propositions

Static Proposition 1: Higher task demonstrability favors the relative
prevalence of information statements.
Dynamic Proposition 1: Increased time pressure heightens the relative
occurrence of preference statements.
Dynamic Proposition 2: Greater perceived unanimity in preferred options
results in a greater relative amount of preference statements.
Static Proposition 2: A larger emphasis on task-based over relation-based
cohesiveness encourages both information and preference statements.
Dynamic Proposition 3: Increased time pressure accentuates the impact
of task-based cohesiveness on preference statements.
Static Propositions 3a and 3b: (a) More leader process directiveness
leads to more numerous information and preference statements; (b) more
leader outcome directiveness results in the opposite.
Dynamic Proposition 4: Greater time pressure augments the respective
impacts of leader process and outcome directiveness on information and
preference statements.
Static Proposition 4: Increased pure status of a group member favors
Static Proposition 5: Higher task demonstrability counteracts the effect
of increased pure group member status on the preponderance of prefer-
ence statements.
Static Proposition 6: Greater pure member expertise encourages infor-
mation statements.
Static Proposition 7: Higher task demonstrability amplifies the impact of
pure member expertise on information.
Dynamic Proposition 5: Perceived agreement with the group majority
encourages pure talkativeness.
Dynamic Proposition 6: More pure talkativeness increases the propor-
tion of information and preference statements.
Static Proposition 8: Increased group size accentuates the impact of one
member’s pure talkativeness on information and preferences.
Dynamic Proposition 7: More time pressure enlarges the effect of one
member’s pure talkativeness on information and preferences.
Static Propositions 9a and 9b: (a) Greater NFC increases the prevalence
of information statements; (b) greater NFA increases the prevalence of

Pavitt 17
Process Variable Propositions

Dynamic Propositions 8a and 8b: Increased discussion favoring the
majority’s favored option encourages preference statements; more favor-
ing the minority’s favored option encourages information statements.
Dynamic Proposition 9: The formation of a majority from a previously
evenly split group encourages preference statements.
Dynamic Proposition 10: Increases in preference and information state-
ments reinforce one another.
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

There are a number of factors not included herein that undoubtedly affect
group social influence processes. Some of these factors can be called errors
of commission, or unrealistic simplifications made in the presentation. One
such error is treating all input variables as equally important when they most
certainly are not. Although some are included, a second is underestimating
the presence of interactions among input variables. A third is assuming that
all possible options are known to all members before discussion. A fourth is
supposing that members have had the chance to form prediscussion prefer-
ences. Regarding the latter, evidence is mixed concerning how argumentation
and comparison processes differ between groups with and without this oppor-
tunity. Mojzisch and Schulz-Hardt (2010) and Reimer, Reimer, and Hinsz
(2007) noted more information exchange and Reimer et al. noted less prefer-
ence exchange in the former condition, but Pavitt and Aloia (2009) discov-
ered the opposite, with the inconsistency in results likely due to task
differences. Fifth, the presumption in this presentation that preference change
is a result of group discussion rather than individual thought processes is
unproven (Hewes, 1986). Sixth, most of the reported findings are from exper-
imental groups performing free discussion and may not generalize to organi-
zational groups using some form of formal discussion agenda as a guide.
Other factors ignored here could be labeled as errors of omission, or addi-
tional input variables deserving attention. First, culture is likely a relevant
input variable (Bonito & Hollingshead, 1997), with collectivists probably
more influenced by comparison and compliance factors and less by argumen-
tation items than individualists. Second, the strength of arguments on top of
sheer amount may determine the influence of majorities on minorities (Limon
& Boster, 2001). Third, individual differences in open-mindedness as a con-
sequence of topic involvement might impact individual persuasion (C. Sherif,
Sherif, & Nebergall, 1965). A fourth error of omission is the specific role
played by various forms of argumentation in influence processes. There is
significant research linking argument-relevant discussion content to social

influence (e.g., Gebhardt & Meyers, 1995; Lemus et al., 2004; Meyers et al.,
2000), but it is impossible from this work to discern the extent to which argu-
mentation versus comparison processes are involved, as Lemus et al. (2004)
noted when discussing their findings.
Future research is required to correct many of these commission/omission
errors. In addition, we really do not know much about either the process by
which communication patterns and individual member preferences change
over the course of discussion or how these changes interact with one another.
The examination of these dynamic patterns would require methods differing
from the present-day norm, in which preferences are measured before and
after discussion and related to communication content for the discussion as a
whole. For one example, manipulations can occur part way through a discus-
sion (e.g., a high-status member suddenly voices support for one option; the
group unexpectedly learns that decision time is scarce), with comparisons
between information and preference statements made before and after the
manipulation. Measurement of member preference among options, con-
ducted both publicly and privately, can occur at specified times during the
discussion, such as before and after manipulations of the type just proposed,
with the proviso that the necessary interruptions in discussion flow might
disrupt the processes under examination. Two other possibilities are described
in Waldron and Cegala (1992). In one, group members would interact with
one another electronically while verbalizing their concurrent thoughts about
the discussion; in the other, group members individually observe a recording
of a previous discussion in which they were involved and report their memo-
ries of their concurrent thoughts. In both cases, the reported thoughts of each
member would be temporally matched to group discussion content in tran-
scripts of the discussions. All of these possibilities would benefit from col-
laborations among researchers from multiple disciplines, in particular pairing
those with expertise in experimental research with those skilled in content
analysis.
Even so, given that comparison and argumentation processes reinforce
one another and that verbal compliance can turn into true persuasion, teasing
apart the individual impacts of each component may be beyond present-day
methodology. In this case, computer simulation provides an alternative route
for exploring the implications of this model. A good role model is Stasser’s
(1988) DISCUSS simulator, which is founded on many of the same presump-
tions concerning prediscussion information and the dissemination of that
information during discussion as the present model.
Despite its errors of commission and omission, I hope that the Simplified
Model of Group Social Influence reflects a more realistic account of group
discussion processes than past efforts. Perhaps future research using alterna-
tives to the group polarization and hidden profile paradigms, adopting either

Pavitt 19
the methodological proposals made here or others yet to be imagined, may

someday allow for the relaxation of some or all of the simplifying assump-
tions behind the model and inspire more realistic replacements for it.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publi-
cation of this article.
Note
1. Social influence also occurs when messages consistent with an individual’s pref-
erence reinforce that preference. The model encompasses this circumstance as
well as preference change.
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Author Biography
Charles Pavitt is a professor in the Department of Communication at the University
of Delaware, United States. He enjoys doing scholarly work relevant to small group
and interpersonal communication, communication theory, and (in his spare time)
baseball.

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An Interactive Input−Process−Output Model of Social Influence in

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>> OnlineFirst Version of Record - Aug 25, 2014

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1University of Delaware, Newark, USA

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The Basis for the Distinction Among Social

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However, participants in these and comparable (M. Sherif, 1935) studies

Factors Influencing Social Influence Processes

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Time pressure. According to the attentional focus model (Karau & Kelly,

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Group cohesiveness. Although traditionally treated as a unitary concept,

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group performance, but findings for relational-based cohesiveness has not,

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1985) or as a by-product associated with characteristics such as sex, race,

Demonstrated expertise. Expectation states research suggests that perceived

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show competence (Bradley, 1980; Schneider & Cook, 1995), or if group

Talkativeness. Although intertwined with status and expertise, overall talk-

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Need for approval (NFA), the characteristic tendency to seek positive

The Simplified Model of Group Social Influence

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Task type High demonstrable Low demonstrable Unknown

Note. ? refers to High as being a reasonable hypothesis with no present support.

ignoring procedural, relational, and irrelevant utterances. Sixth, the factors

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of members supporting various options can be gauged by the option for

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Beginning Middle End

Preference Preference Preference Preference

influence is also encouraged by consistency in the arguments they offer

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Process Output Input Process

Need for cognion

Informaon Item Informaon Item

Preference distribuon Preference distribuon

Preference Item Preference Item

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Input Variable Propositions

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Process Variable Propositions

Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research

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the methodological proposals made here or others yet to be imagined, may

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

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Crutchfield, R. S. (1955). Conformity and character. American Psychologist, 10, 191-

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Need for cognion

Informaon Item Informaon Item

Preference distribuon Preference distribuon