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Case Digests in Civil Procedure

A Compilation
This is a compilation of digests of cases in Civil Procedure based on the Civil Procedure
Course Outline AY 2009 - 2010 made by the Legal Resource Center
 Aquinas University Professional Schools
College of Law
LEGAL RESOURCE CENTER
Legazpi City

CASE DIGESTS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

JURISDICTION Ruling: with the corporation. The question of

THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 153886. January 14, 2004.]
MEL V. VELARDE, petitioner, vs.
LOPEZ, INC., respondent.
Facts:
Lopez filed a collection suit against
Velarde, while the latter filed a
counterclaim, claiming that as the
General Manager of Sky Vision (a
subsidiary company of the
respondent), he was entitled to
retirement benefits, unpaid salaries
and incentives, shares and similar
benefits after he was supposedly
coerced into retirement. Lopez filed a
motion to dismiss for want of
jurisdiction. He asserts that the
counterclaims, being money claims
arising from a labor relationship, falls
within the exclusive competence of the
NLRC. Petitioner, on the other hand,
alleges that due to the tortuous
manner that he was coerced into
retirement, it is the RTC and not the
NLRC which has jurisdiction over his
counterclaims.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
over the counterclaims.
3|CASES DIGESTS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE
In determining which has jurisdiction
over a case, the averments of the
complaint/counterclaim, taken as a
whole, are considered. XXX At the
heart of petitioner's counterclaim is his
alleged forced retirement which is also
the basis of his claim for, among other
things, unpaid salaries, unpaid
incentives, reasonable return on the
stock ownership plan, and other
benefits from a subsidiary company of
the respondent.
Section 5(c) of P.D. 902-A (as
amended by R.A. 8799, the Securities
Regulation Code) applies to a corporate
officer's dismissal. For a corporate
officer's dismissal is always a corporate
act and/or an intra-corporate
controversy and that its nature is not
altered by the reason or wisdom which
the Board of Directors may have in
taking such action.
With regard to petitioner's claim for
unpaid salaries, unpaid share in net
income, reasonable return on the stock
ownership plan and other benefits for
services rendered to Sky Vision,
jurisdiction thereon pertains to the
Securities Exchange Commission even
if the complaint by a corporate officer
includes money claims since such
claims are actually part of the
prerequisite of his position and,
therefore, interlinked with his relations
remuneration involving a person who is
not a mere employee but a stockholder
and officer of the corporation is not a
simple labor problem but a matter that
comes within the area of corporate
affairs and management, and is in fact
a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code.
While petitioner's counterclaims were
filed on December 1, 1998, the second
challenged order of the trial court
denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration of the denial of its
motion to dismiss was issued on
October 9, 2000 at which time P.D.
902-A had been amended by R.A. 8799
(approved on July 19, 2000) which
mandated the transfer of jurisdiction
over intra-corporate controversies,
subject of the counterclaims, to RTCs.
But even if the subject matter of the
counterclaims is now cognizable by
RTCs, the filing thereof against
respondent is improper, it not being
the real party-in-interest, for it is
petitioner's employer Sky Vision,
respondent's subsidiary. It cannot be
gainsaid that a subsidiary has an
independent and separate juridical
personality, distinct from that of its
parent company, hence, any claim or
suit against the latter does not bind the
former and vice versa.
AQ - LRC
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 131286. March 18, 2004.]
JOSE LAM, petitioner, vs. ADRIANA
CHUA, respondent.
Facts:
Adriana Chua filed an annulment case
against his husband Jose Lam on the
ground of psychological incapacity.
However, Chua later on asked for the
reopening of the case, and was allowed
to present new evidence of Lam’s
previous marriages with other women.
During the proceeding, she verbally
asked for support of their son from
Lam. The Trial judge asked for the
prayer to be handwritten on the
pleadings of Chua, without any formal
amendment being made thereon. The
case was decided in favor of Chua and
the prayer for support was likewise
granted. Lam now questions the
propriety of the grant of support
arguing that there was already a
provision for support of the child as
embodied in the decision of the Makati
RTC wherein he and Adriana agreed to
contribute P250,000.00 each to a
common fund for the benefit of the
child.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court has
acted with jurisdiction on the granting
of support.
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judgment beyond the allegations with the petitioner on the ground of

Ruling:
There is no merit to the claim of Jose
that the compromise agreement
between him and Adriana, as approved
by the Makati RTC and embodied in its
decision dated February 28, 1994 in
the case for voluntary dissolution of
conjugal partnership of gains, is a bar
to any further award of support in
favor of their child John Paul. The
provision for a common fund for the
benefit of their child John Paul, as
embodied in the compromise
agreement between herein parties
which had been approved by the
Makati RTC, cannot be considered final
and res judicata since any judgment
for support is always subject to
modification, depending upon the
needs of the child and the capabilities
of the parents to give support.
However, it is serious error for the trial
court to have rendered judgment on
issue not presented in the pleadings as
it was beyond its jurisdiction to do so.
The amendment of the petition to
reflect the new issues and claims
against Jose was, therefore,
indispensible so as to authorize the
court to act on the issue of whether the
marriage of Jose and Adriana was
bigamous and the determination of the
amount that should have been
awarded for the support of John Paul.
When the Trial Court rendered
contained in the copy of the petition
served upon Jose, the Pasay RTC had
acted in excess of its jurisdiction and
deprived Lam of due process.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 145370. March 4, 2004.]
MARIETTA B. ANCHETA, petitioner,
vs. RODOLFO S. ANCHETA,
respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner Marietta Ancheta filed a
petition against the respondent for the
dissolution of their conjugal
partnership and judicial separation of
property with a plea for support and
support pendente lite. At that time, the
petitioner was renting a house at No.
72 CRM Avenue cor. CRM Corazon, BF
Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro
Manila. A Compromise Agreement was
entered into where certain properties
including the resort Munting Paraiso
were adjudicated to Marietta and her
children.
Respondent filed a petition for the
declaration of nullity of his marriage
psychological incapacity. Although the
respondent knew that the petitioner
was already residing at the resort
Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona,
Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his
petition that the petitioner was residing
at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM
Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las
Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may
be served with summons." The clerk of
court issued summons to the petitioner
at the address stated in the petition.
The sheriff served the summons and a
copy of the petition by substituted
service on the petitioner's son,
Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his
residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
The petitioner failed to file an answer
to the petition. The trial court, upon
motion, declared the petitioner in
default and declared their marriage
void ab initio. Almost four years after,
the petitioner filed a petition for the
annulment of the Order, alleging that
the order of the trial court in favor of
the respondent was null and void (1)
for lack of jurisdiction over her person;
and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud
perpetrated by the respondent.
Issue:
Whether or not the Trial Court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.
Ruling:
Jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court
over the person of the defendant either
by his voluntary appearance in court
and his submission to its authority or
by service of summons. The service of
summons and the complaint on the
defendant is to inform him that a case
has been filed against him and, thus,
enable him to defend himself. He is,
thus, put on guard as to the demands
of the plaintiff or the petitioner.
Without such service in the absence of
a valid waiver renders the judgment of
the court null and void. Jurisdiction
cannot be acquired by the court on the
person of the defendant even if he
knows of the case against him unless
he is validly served with summons.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141423. November 15,
2000.]
MELINA P. MACAHILIG, petitioner,
vs. The Heirs of GRACE M.
MAGALIT, respondents.
Facts:
Bernardo Macahilig, deceased husband
of petitioner, contested Pepito

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Magalit’s, deceased husband of Dr.
Grace M. Magalit, application for
fishpond Registration claiming that for
20 years, he had been in actual
possession of the five-hectare area
included in Magalit's application. It was
found that Macahilig was merely a
laborer of Magalit. Hence, the same
was denied by the BFAR Director and
the Office of the President upon
appeal. For failure to vacate the
premises upon Order, Magalit
instituted a case in the RTC of Kalibo,
Aklan, for the issuance of a Writ of
Execution. Deputy Provincial Sheriff of
Aklan implemented the Writ issued on
October 30, 1985. The heirs of Magalit
filed on August 6, 1990, a "Motion for
Correction of the Implementation of
the Decision of the Court of Appeals..."
In that Motion, they prayed that the
trial court properly implement said IAC
Decision by ordering Spouses Macahilig
to turn over to her the possession of
the Lot. Dr. Magalit contended that the
Writ of Execution was not satisfied,
because the spouses had refused to
give up the fishpond in question. The
trial court ruled in favor of Magalit and
the same was sustained by the CA
upon appeal by Macahilig.
Macahilig now questions the
jurisdiction of the trial court to order
the execution of the decision rendered
by the IAC. Macahilig contends that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over
the res.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquire
jurisdiction over the lot in question.
Ruling:
Yes, the trial court acquired jurisdiction
over the lot in question.
Jurisdiction over the res is acquired
either (a) by the seizure of the
property under legal process, whereby
it is brought into actual custody of the
law; or (b) as a result of the institution
of legal proceedings, in which the
power of the court is recognized and
made effective. In the latter condition,
the property, though at all times within
the potential power of the court, may
not be in the actual custody of said
court. The trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the disputed lot by
virtue of the institution of the Petition
for a Writ of Execution filed by the
respondents' predecessors in interest.
Without taking actual physical control
of the property, it had an impliedly
recognized potential jurisdiction or
potential custody over the res. This
was the jurisdiction which it exercised
when it issued the Writ of Execution
directing the surrender of Lot 4417 to
Dr. Magalit.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 144934. January 15, 2004.]
ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S.
RIVERA, and JOSE S. RIVERA,
petitioners, vs. FIDELA DEL
ROSARIO (deceased and
substituted by her co-
respondents), and her children,
OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA,
ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO
and ELOISA, all surnamed DEL
ROSARIO, respondents.
Facts:
Respondents were the registered
owners of a parcel of land. By virtue of
an SPA, Fidela mortgaged the land to
Mariano Rivera. They executed Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage and a Kasunduan
(Agreement to Sell). Although Fidela
intended to sign only the Kasunduan
and the Real Estate Mortgage, she
inadvertently affixed her signature on a
Deed of Absolute Sale that was made
by Mariano’s lawyer. From then, the
Riveras represented themselves to be
the new owner of the land and
negotiated with the land’s tenant
Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the
latter's tenurial right. When Nieto
refused to relinquish his tenurial right
over 9,000 sq. m. of the land, the
Riveras offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in
exchange for the surrender.
Respondents filed a complaint in the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, asking
that the Kasunduan be rescinded for
failure of the Riveras to comply with its
conditions, with damages. They also
sought the annulment of the Deed of
Absolute Sale on the ground of fraud,
the cancellation of the new TCT’s, and
the reconveyance to them of the entire
property. The RTC decided in favor of
the respondents, which when appealed
was upheld by the CA with
modifications.
Petitioners now question the
jurisdiction of the court a quo.
Petitioners contend that jurisdiction
was not validly acquired because the
filing fees respondents paid was only
P1,554.45 when the relief sought was
reconveyance of land that was worth
P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan.
They contend that respondents should
have paid filing fees amounting to
P12,183.70. Petitioners also contend
that the trial court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because it
involves an agricultural tenant. They
insist that by virtue of Presidential
Decree Nos. 316 and 1038, it is the
Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB) that has
jurisdiction.
Issue:
Whether or not the trial court acquired
jurisdiction over the case, despite an
alleged deficiency in the amount of

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filing fees paid by respondents and through this petition, attempting to Facts:
despite the fact that an agricultural support their position with the opinion Whether or not the action is incapable
tenant is involved in the case. and certification of the Clerk of Court Petitioners filed a complaint before the of pecuniary estimation and is thus
of another judicial region. Needless to RTC for the annulment of deed of sale cognizable by the RTC.
Ruling: state, such certification has no bearing and partition, alleging that their son-
on the instant case. in-law, respondent Teofredo, sold to Ruling:
Yes, the RTC acquired jurisdiction over them a portion of his 150-square
the case. Jurisdiction was validly Further, the DARAB has exclusive meter parcel of land in Talisay, Cebu In determining whether an action is
original jurisdiction over cases for a consideration of P15,000.00, but one the subject matter of which is not
acquired over the complaint. In Sun
involving the rights and obligations of despite demands, Teofredo refused to capable of pecuniary estimation this
Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v.
persons engaged in the management, partition the lot between them. Court has adopted the criterion of first
Asuncion, this Court ruled that the
cultivation and use of all agricultural Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss, ascertaining the nature of the principal
filing of the complaint or appropriate
lands covered by the Comprehensive insisting that the action is one for action or remedy sought. If it is
initiatory pleading and the payment of
Agrarian Reform Law. However, the annulment of title, and since the primarily for the recovery of a sum of
the prescribed docket fee vest a trial
cause of action in this case is primarily assessed value of the property as money, the claim is considered capable
court with jurisdiction over the subject
against the petitioners, as stated in the complaint is P15,000.00, of pecuniary estimation, and whether
matter or nature of the action. If the
indispensable parties, for rescission of it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction the jurisdiction is in the municipal
amount of docket fees paid is
the Kasunduan and nullification of the of the MTC. Petitioners opposed the courts or in the courts of first instance
insufficient considering the amount of
Deed of Sale and the TCTs issued motion to dismiss, alleging that the would depend on the amount of the
the claim, the clerk of court of the
because of them. Feliciano Nieto was subject matter is incapable of claim. However, where the basic issue
lower court involved or his duly
impleaded merely as a necessary pecuniary estimation, therefore is is something other than the right to
authorized deputy has the
party, stemming from whatever rights cognizable by the RTC. The trial court recover a sum of money, where the
responsibility of making a deficiency
he may have acquired by virtue of the dismissed the complaint for lack of money claim is purely incidental to, or
assessment. The party filing the case
agreement between him and the jurisdiction. Petitioners filed a Motion a consequence of, the principal relief
will be required to pay the deficiency,
Riveras and the corresponding TCT for Reconsideration which was denied. sought, this Court has considered such
but jurisdiction is not automatically
issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial Petitioners maintain that the complaint actions as cases where the subject of
lost.
courts that have jurisdiction over the filed before the Regional Trial Court is the litigation may not be estimated in
case. for the annulment of deed of sale and terms of money, and are cognizable
Here it is beyond dispute that
partition, and is thus incapable of exclusively by courts of first instance
respondents paid the full amount of
pecuniary estimation. Respondents, on (now Regional Trial Courts).XXX
docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of
FIRST DIVISION the other hand, insist that the action is
Court of the Regional Trial Court of
[G.R. No. 149554. July 1, 2003.] one for annulment of title and since the In the case at bar, the principal
Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, where
SPOUSES JORGE J. HUGUETE and assessed value of the property as purpose of petitioners in filing the
they filed the complaint. If petitioners
YOLANDA B. HUGUETE, petitioners, stated in the complaint is P 15,000.00, complaint was to secure title to the 50-
believed that the assessment was
vs. SPOUSES TEOFREDO AMARILLO it falls within the exclusive jurisdiction square meter portion of the property
incorrect, they should have questioned
EMBUDO and MARITES HUGUETE- of the Municipal Trial Court. which they purchased from
it before the trial court. Instead,
EMBUDO, respondents. respondents. Petitioners' cause of
petitioners belatedly question the
Issue: action is based on their right as
alleged underpayment of docket fees
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purchaser of the 50-square meter
portion of the land from respondents.
They pray that they be declared
owners of the property sold. Thus,
their complaint involved title to real
property or any interest therein. The
alleged value of the land which they
purchased was P15,000.00, which was
within the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial
Court. The annulment of the deed of
sale between Ma. Lourdes Villaber-
Padillo and respondents, as well as of
TCT No. 99694, were prayed for in the
complaint because they were
necessary before the lot may be
partitioned and the 50-square meter
portion subject thereof may be
conveyed to petitioners.
Petitioners' argument that the present
action is one incapable of pecuniary
estimation considering that it is for
annulment of deed of sale and partition
is not well-taken. As stated above, the
nature of an action is not determined
by what is stated in the caption of the
complaint but by the allegations of the
complaint and the reliefs prayed for.
Where, as in this case, the ultimate
objective of the plaintiffs is to obtain
title to real property, it should be filed
in the proper court having jurisdiction
over the assessed value of the
property subject thereof.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 154184. July 8, 2003.]
TEODORA A. CAPACETE and
RODOLFO CAPACETE, petitioners,
vs. VENANCIA BARORO,
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT
CABUYAO, LAGUNA * and
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF LAGUNA
stationed at BIÑAN, LAGUNA,
respondents.
Facts:
This case arose from an unlawful
detainer case filed by respondent
Venancia Baroro and her husband
against petitioners contending that the
latter took possession of the disputed
property by mere tolerance from them.
The Municipal Trial Court (MTC) ruled
in favor of respondent and her
husband. Subsequently, petitioners
filed a complaint against respondent
with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
accion reivindicatoria, annulment of
decision and quieting of title which was
decided by the trial court in favor of
respondent. Respondent moved for the
issuance of a writ of execution, which
was granted by the RTC. Consequently,
petitioners filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) a petition to annul the
judgment on the ground that it was
rendered with extrinsic or collateral
fraud. However, the CA dismissed the
petition, and denied the subsequent
motion for reconsideration. Hence, this
appeal where petitioners contend that
the writ of execution should be deemed
void as the RTC has no jurisdiction to
issue it. They argue that the power of
the court is limited to either upholding
or setting aside the validity of the
decision of the MTC.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction
to issue the writ of execution.
Ruling:
Petitioners' contention that the writ of
execution issued by the RTC is void for
lack of jurisdiction does not hold water.
We do not agree that the RTC is
circumscribed solely to either
upholding or setting aside the validity
of the decision of the MTC and that it is
the latter court which has the authority
to direct their ejectment. The
complaint filed by the petitioners was
not only for annulment of the MTC
decision; it was also for accion
reivindicatoria and quieting of title.
This is unmistakable from the
allegations made therein. The RTC was
consequently not restricted to
determining the validity of the MTC
decision. It may, as it correctly did,
decide on the issue of who, between
petitioners and respondent Baroro,
owns the disputed land as ownership is
the crux of the matter in an accion
reivindicatoria and quieting of title.
Perforce, the RTC has the power to
direct the ejectment of the petitioners
and order them to vacate the disputed
land. Accion reivindicatoria is a remedy
seeking the recovery of ownership and
includes the jus possidendi, jus utendi,
and jus fruendi as well. It is an action
whereby a party claims ownership over
a parcel of land and seeks recovery of
its full possession. As the RTC found
that respondent Baroro owns the
disputed land, it can also adjudicate its
possession in her favor. The writ,
therefore, was issued well within its
authority.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 155713 May 5,
2006]
MILAGROS G. LUMBUAN, Petitioner,
vs. ALFREDO A. RONQUILLO,
Respondent.
Facts:
Lumbuan leased to respondent a lot for
a period of 3 years with monthly
rentals and a stipulation that it will be
exclusively used for the respondent’s
food business. However, respondent
later on used it as his residence
without the petitioner’s consent. He
also failed to pay the increase in
rentals. Despite repeated demands,
respondent refused to pay and vacate
the premises. Petitioner referred the
matter to the Brgy. Chairman’s office
but the parties failed to arrive at a
settlement. The Brgy. Chairman then

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issued a Certificate to File Action.
Petitioner filed against respondent an
action for Unlawful Detainer. The MeTC
decided in favor of petitioner but the
same was set aside by the RTC which
directed the parties to go back to the
Lupon Chairman or the Punong Brgy.
On appeal, CA reversed the decision of
RTC and ordered the dismissal of the
ejectment case for being prematurely
filed. According to the appellate court,
when the mandatory mediation and
conciliation in the barangay level has
not been complied with, the court
should dismiss the case and not just
remand the case to the court of origin.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
gravely erred in dismissing the
complaint for the alleged failure of the
parties to comply with the mandatory
mediation and conciliation proceedings
in the barangay level.
Ruling:
In this case, the Lupon/ Pangkat
Chairman and Lupon/Pangkat
Secretary signed the Certificate to File
Action stating that no settlement was
reached by the parties. While
admittedly no Pangkat was constituted,
it was not denied that the parties met
at the office of the Brgy. Chairman for
possible settlement. Although no
Pangkat was formed, there was
substantial compliance with law. Under
Sec. 412 (a) of RA 7160 (Katarungang
Pambarangay), the confrontation
before the Lupon Chairman or the
Pangkat is sufficient compliance with
the precondition for filing the case in
court. This is true notwithstanding the
mandate of Sec. 410 (b) of the same
law that the Brgy. Chairman shall
constitute a Pangkat if he fails in his
mediation efforts. Sec. 410 (b) should
be read together with Sec. 412, as well
as the circumstances obtaining in and
peculiar to the case. On this score, it is
significant that the Brgy. Chairman or
Punong Brgy. is herself the Chairman
of the Lupon under the LGC.
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-00-1332. February 16,
2004.]
RODRIGO Q. TUGOT, complainant,
vs. Judge MAMERTO Y.
COLIFLORES, respondent.
Facts:
Complainant is one of the plaintiffs in
an ejectment case which was
dismissed by the respondent judge. It
was found that the respondent judge
conducted the preliminary conference
more than two years after the filing of
the last answer which, according to
Section 8 of Rule 70, shall be held
"[n]ot later than thirty (30) days after
the last answer is filed."
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent judge
should be held administratively liable.
Ruling:
Respondent judge failed to
demonstrate the required competence
in administering an ejectment case. It
must be noted that unlawful detainer
and forcible entry cases are covered by
summary procedure because they
involve the disturbance of the social
order which must be restored as
promptly as possible. Accordingly,
technicalities or details of procedure
should be carefully avoided. It must be
emphasized that the adoption of the
Rule on Summary Procedure is part of
the commitment of the judiciary to
enforce the constitutional right of
litigants to a speedy disposition of their
cases. It was promulgated for the
purpose of achieving "an expeditious
and inexpensive determination of
cases." Any member of the judiciary
who causes the delay sought to be
prevented by the Rule 15 is
sanctionable.
The present respondent has failed to
abide by the provisions of the Rule on
Summary Procedure. He has thereby
undermined the wisdom behind it and
diminished respect for the rule of law.
He thus becomes administratively
liable under Rule 140 Section 9, which
sanctions violations of Supreme Court
Rules.
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. No. MTJ-99-1184. March 2,
2000.]
AMPARO S. FARRALES and ATTY.
RAUL S. SISON, complainants, vs.
JUDGE RUBY B. CAMARISTA,
respondent.
Facts:
Complainants filed an Ejectment/
Unlawful Detainer Case which was
raffled to the court presided over by
the respondent judge. In the first case,
therein defendant, on June 22, 1994,
filed her responsive pleading. On
January 25, 1995, respondent, motu
proprio issued an order referring the
case for conciliation to the barangay
chairman. After a year, the case
remained uncalendared for hearing. On
February 2, 1996, the plaintiff
(complainant herein) filed a motion to
set aside the order of January 25,
1995, and to set the case for
preliminary conference, which was
denied by respondent. Subsequently,
the parties submitted themselves to
conciliation but no settlement was
reached. There being no clarificatory

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hearing set, the case was deemed
submitted for decision as of October,
1996. On February 27, 1997, plaintiff
filed a motion for early decision.
However, despite repeated follow-ups,
the case remained undecided. When
still no decision was rendered,
complainant Sison (plaintiff's counsel)
wrote respondent on July 18, 1997
requesting that a decision be rendered
in the case. Still, the case remained
unresolved.
Herein complainants contend that the
delay in the disposition of the
abovestated cases was a result of
respondent's lack of basic knowledge
of the 1991 Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure and/or her ignorance of the
law. They likewise question
respondent's act of referring the case
to the barangay level for conciliation
when the parties actually reside in
barangays of different
cities/municipalities.
Issue:
Whether or not there was a violation of
the Rules on Summary Procedure on
the part of the respondent judge.
Ruling:
The Rule on Summary Procedure
clearly and undoubtedly provides for
the period within which judgment
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should be rendered. Section 10 thereof
provides:
SECTION 10. Rendition of judgment.
— Within thirty (30) days after receipt
of the last affidavits and position
papers, or the expiration of the period
for filing the same, the court shall
render judgment. However, should the
court find it necessary to clarify certain
material facts, it may, during the said
period, issue an order specifying the
matters to be clarified, and require the
parties to submit affidavits or other
evidence on the said matters within ten
(10) days from receipt of said order.
Judgment shall be rendered within
fifteen (15) days after the receipt of
the last clarificatory affidavits, or the
expiration of the period for filing the
same.
The court shall not resort to the
clarificatory procedure to gain time for
the rendition of the judgment.
Section 8 thereof, which provides the
contents of the record of the
preliminary conference, includes a
statement as to —
c) Whether, on the basis of the
pleadings and the stipulations and
admissions made by the parties,
judgment may be rendered without the
need of further proceedings, in which
event the judgment shall be rendered
within thirty (30) days from issuance of
the order;
It is thus very clear that the period for the CA because there was no cause of
rendition of judgment in cases falling action at the time of the filing of the
under summary procedure is thirty complaint.
days. This is in keeping with the spirit
of the rule which aims to achieve an Issue:
expeditious and inexpensive
determination of the cases falling Whether or not the accrual of a cause
thereunder. The jurisprudential of action during the pendency of the
direction consistently taken by the case cure a complaint that lacks a
Court adheres to the rule that failure to cause of action at the time it was filed.
decide a case within the required
period is not excusable and constitutes Ruling:
gross inefficiency.
Cause of action, as defined in Section
2, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, is the act or omission by
CIVIL ACTIONS which a party violates the right of
another. Its essential element are as
FIRST DIVISION
follows:
[G.R. No. 161135. April 8, 2005.]
1. A right in favor of the
SWAGMAN HOTELS AND TRAVEL,
plaintiff by whatever
INC., petitioner, vs. HON. COURT
means or by whatever law
OF APPEALS, and NEAL B.
it arises or is created;
CHRISTIAN, respondents.
2. An obligation on the part of
the named defendant to
Facts:
respect or not violate such
right; and
Petitioner Corporation obtained loans
3. Act or omission on the part
from respondent Neal B. Christian, as
of such defendant in
evidenced by three promissory notes.
violation of the right of the
While the payment of the principal
plaintiff or constituting a
loans was not yet due and
breach of the obligation of
demandable, Christian filed a complaint
the defendant to the
for a sum of money and damages
plaintiff for which the latter
against the Corporation. Two of the
may maintain an action for
promissory notes matured during the
recovery of damages or
pendency of the case. The corporation
other appropriate relief.
contends that the action should have
been dismissed by the trial court and
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It is, thus, only upon the occurrence of
the last element that a cause of action
arises, giving the plaintiff the right to
maintain an action in court for recovery
of damages or other appropriate
relief… [i]t thus follows that a
complaint whose cause of action has
not yet accrued cannot be cured or
remedied by an amended or
supplemental pleading alleging the
existence or accrual of a cause of
action while the case is pending. Such
an action is prematurely brought and
is, therefore, a groundless suit, which
should be dismissed by the court upon
proper motion seasonably filed by the
defendant. The underlying reason for
this is that a person should not be
summoned before the public tribunals
to answer for complaints which are
immature.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 157447. April 29, 2005.]
NEMENCIO C. EVANGELISTA, et. al,
petitioners, vs. CARMELINO M.
SANTIAGO, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioners pray for the reversal of the
CA decision affirming the RTC Order
which dismissed their complaint for the
Declaration of Nullity of the Original
Certificate of Title and other titles in
the name of respondent Santiago over
parcels of land which petitioners allege
to have been occupied and possessed
by them by virtue of a Deed of
Assignment executed by a certain
Ismael Favila who claimed to be one of
the heirs of Don Hermogenes
Rodriguez. According to the Deed, the
Subject Property was part of a vast
land that was awarded by the Queen of
Spain to Don Rodriguez. Respondent
claims, on the other hand, that the
petitioners had no legal capacity to file
the complaint and thus, the complaint
stated no cause of action.
Issue:
[1] Whether or not the petitioners had
no legal capacity to sue.
[2] Whether or not the petitioners are
the real parties-in-interest.
Ruling:
[1] The petitioners had the legal
capacity to sue. Lack of legal capacity
to sue means that the plaintiff is not in
the exercise of his civil rights, or does
not have the necessary qualifications
to appear in the case, or does not have
the character or representation he
claims… The term “lack of capacity to
sue” should not be confused with the
term “lack of personality to sue.” While
the former refers to the plaintiff’s
general disability to sue, such as on
account of minority, insanity,
incompetence, lack of juridical
personality or any other general
disqualifications of a party, the latter
refers to the fact that the plaintiff is
not the real party-in-interest.
Correspondingly, the first can be a
ground for a motion to dismiss based
on the ground of lack of legal capacity
to sue; whereas the second can be
used as a ground for a motion to
dismiss based on the fact that the
complaint, on the face thereof,
evidently states no cause of action.
[2] The petitioners are not the real
parties in interest. Petitioners failed to
allege any other basis for their titles in
their Complaint aside from possession
of the Subject Property from time
immemorial, which the Court was able
to controvert; and the Spanish title
which is already ineffective to prove
ownership over the Subject Property
by virtue of the applicable provisions of
P.D No. 892. Therefore, without legal
or equitable title to the Subject
Property, the petitioners lacked the
personality to file an action for removal
of a cloud on, or quieting of, title and
their complaint was properly dismissed
for failing to state a cause of action.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 127210. August 7, 2003.]
ALVIN TAN, petitioner, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS and ARTHUR DY
GUANI, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Guani, as agent of
Guani Marketing Inc., bought a
Mercedez Benz from petitioner Tan
through a lease-financing agreement
with CIFC, of which Tan was Assistant
Manager. Less than two years after,
the Bureau of Customs seized the
vehicle forhaving been imported
without payment of dues and taxes.
The BOC filed a case against Guani as
possessor of the vehicle. Private
respondent thus filed a complaint for
damages and attorney’s fees against
petitioner which was granted by the
trial court and affirmed by the CA. Tan
now questions the aptness of the
decision, contending that private
respondent did not have the legal
personality to file the complaint, he
being merely the agent of Guani
Marketing which was the lessee of the
vehicle.
Issue:
Whether or not private respondent
Guani is the real party-in-interest.
Ruling:
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure requires that every

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action must be prosecuted and
defended in the name of the real
party-in-interest. A real party in
interest is the party who stands to be
benefitted or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit. “Interest” within the
meaning of the Rule means material
interest, an interest in issue ad to be
affected by the decree, as
distinguished from mere interest in the
question involved, or a mere incidental
interest. This means that the action
must be brought by the person who,
by substantive law, possesses the right
sought to be enforced.
Private respondent merely acted as
agent of Guani Marketing, lessee of the
vehicle. He is thus not the real party in
interest- plaintiff to prosecute the case.
It is the corporation, which is a
juridical person with a personality
separate and distinct from its individual
stockholders and from that of its
officers who manage and run its
affairs, that is the real party in
interest.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 160261. NOVEMBER 10,
2003.]
ERNESTO B. FRANCISCO, JR., vs.
NAGMAMALASAKIT NA MGA
MANANANGGOL NG MGA
MANGGAGAWANG PILIPINO, INC.
[CONSOLIDATED CASES]
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Issue:
Facts:
Whether or not the petitioners have a
Former President Joseph Estrada filed standing to file the instant petitions.
an impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario Davide and seven Ruling:
Associate Justices. The House
Committee on Justice ruled that the There is a difference between the rule
first impeachment complaint was on real party in interest and the rule on
sufficient in form but voted to dismiss standing, for the former is a concept of
the same for being insufficient in civil procedure while the latter has
substance. Four months and three Constitutional underpinnings. Xxx the
weeks after the filing of the first question on standing is whether such
impeachment complaint, the second parties have alleged such a personal
impeachment complaint was filed by stake in the outcome of the
Representatives Teodoro and controversy as to assure that concrete
Fuentebella against Chief Justice adverseness which sharpens the
Hilario Davide. Thus arose the instant presentation of issues upon which the
petitions against the House of court so largely depends for
Representatives, most of which illumination of difficult Constitutional
petitions contend that the filing of the questions. Xxx on the other hand, the
second impeachment complaint is question as to real party in interest is
unconstitutional as it violates Section 5 whether he is “the party who would be
of Article XI of the Constitution. benefitted or injured by the judgment,
or the party entitled to the avails of the
Intervenor Atty. Jaime Soriano, in suit.
praying for the dismissal of the
petitions, contends that petitioners While rights personal to the Chief
have no standing since only the Chief Justice may have been injured by the
Justice has sustained and will sustain alleged unconstitutional acts of the
direct personal injury. The Solicitor House of Representatives, none of the
General, on the other hand, contends petitioners asserts a violation of the
that petitioners do have standing as personal rights of the Chief Justice. On
taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, the contrary, they invariably invoke the
legislators in cases involving vindication of their own rights which
paramount public interest and were supposedly violated by the
transcendental importance. alleged unconstitutional acts of the
House of Representatives.
AQ - LRC
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 150159. July 25, 2003.]
TERESITA VILLAREAL MANIPOR,
LAILANIE VILLAREAL MACANDOG,
RODELO VILLAREAL, ELY
VILLAREAL, NOELITO VILLAREAL
and LUISITO VILLAREAL, as
represented by his attorney-in-
fact, TERESITA VILLAREAL
MANIPOR, petitioners, vs.
SPOUSES PABLO & ANTONIA
RICAFORT, respondents.
Facts:
Respondent spouses instituted an
action before the Regional Trial Court
of Makati City for annulment of
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 199241
in the name of spouses Renato and
Teresita Villareal covering a parcel of
land located in Makati City. In the
course of the proceedings, both parties
entered into a compromise settlement.
The trial court approved the parties'
compromise agreement in a judgment
promulgated on July 30, 1999. As
siblings of Renato and co-heirs to the
disputed lot, petitioners sought the
annulment of the compromise
judgment. According to petitioners, the
compromise judgment was null and
void because they were not impleaded
as parties-defendants despite the fact
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that they were co-heirs of Renato and
indispensable parties therein.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are
indispensible parties to the civil case.
Ruling:
In the instant case, the Court held
that, for purposes of action for
annulment of TCT No. 199241, the only
indispensable party-defendant was
Renato and his wife. He was the
registered owner of the lot and was
conclusively presumed, for all intents
and purposes, to be its owner in fee
simple. A certificate of registration
accumulates in one document a precise
and correct statement of the exact
status of the fee held by its owner,
which, in the absence of fraud, is the
evidence of title showing exactly the
owner's real interest over the property
covered thereby. Renato thus had the
authority to bind the lot to the
exclusion of all others and his
participation, as party-defendant in the
civil case, was sufficient for the trial
court to validly exercise its jurisdiction.
Hence, the non-inclusion of petitioners
as parties-defendants will not affect
the final determination of the said civil
case, because they were not the
registered owners of the subject lot.
Moreover, petitioners have admitted
that they donated and caused
registration of the subject lot to Renato
and thus, would have no more rightful
interest, inchoate or otherwise, that
would be affected by the assailed
compromise judgment. Petition denied.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 141970. September 10,
2001.]
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST
COMPANY, petitioner, vs. Hon.
FLORO T. ALEJO, in His Capacity as
Presiding Judge of Branch 172 of
the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela; and SY TAN SE,
represented by his Attorney-in-
Fact, SIAN SUAT NGO,
respondents.
Facts:
Spouses Raul and Cristina Acampado
obtained loans from petitioner, as
security for which they mortgaged their
land covered by TCT No. V-41319.
Petitioner extrajudicially foreclosed the
mortgage when the spouses Acampado
defaulted in the payment of their loans
and, at the foreclosure sale, the
mortgaged property was sold to
petitioner as the highest bidder. When
the spouses failed to redeem the
property within the reglementary
period, title to the property was
consolidated to the petitioner. When
petitioner presented the Affidavit of
Consolidation of Ownership before the
Register of Deeds, it was informed of
the existence of an RTC decision in
Civil Case No. 4930-V-96, which
annulled TCT No. 41319. Said case, a
complaint for declaration of nullity of
TCT No. V-41319, was filed by private
respondent Sy Tan Se against the
spouses Acampado. Petitioner was not,
however, made a party to the said
case nor was it notified of its existence
despite being the registered mortgagee
of the real property covered by the title
sought to be annulled. Petitioner’s
petition for annulment of the RTC
decision was dismissed by the CA.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioner is
entitled to ask for the annulment of the
RTC Decision, petitioner not having
been impleaded as an indispensible
party to the case.
Ruling:
In a suit to nullify an existing Torrens
Certificate of Title (TCT) in which a real
mortgage is annotated, the mortgagee
is an indispensable party. Evidently,
petitioner is encompassed within the
definition of an indispensable party;
thus, it should have been impleaded as
a defendant.
"An indispensable party is a party who
has such an interest in the controversy
or subject matter that a final
adjudication cannot be made, in his
absence, without injuring or affecting
that interest[;] a party who has not
only an interest in the subject matter
of the controversy, but also has an
interest of such nature that a final
decree cannot be made without
affecting his interest or leaving the
controversy in such a condition that its
final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good
conscience. It has also been considered
that an indispensable party is a person
in whose absence there cannot be a
determination between the parties
already before the court which is
effective, complete, or equitable.
Further, an indispensable party is one
who must be included in an action
before it may properly go forward. A
person is not an indispensable party,
however, if his interest in the
controversy or subject matter is
separable from the interest of the
other parties, so that it will not
necessarily be directly or injuriously
affected by a decree which does
complete justice between them."
The joinder of indispensable parties to
an action is mandated by Section 7,
Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all
subsequent actuations of the court null
and void, for want of authority to act,
not only as to the absent parties but

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even as to those present." "The
evident aim and intent of the Rules
regarding the joinder of indispensable
and necessary parties is a complete
determination of all possible issues, not
only between the parties themselves
but also as regards to other persons
who may be affected by the judgment.
A valid judgment cannot even be
rendered where there is want of
indispensable parties."
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 160053. August 28, 2006.]
SPS. RENATO & ANGELINA LANTIN,
petitioners, vs. HON. JANE AURORA
C. LANTION, Presiding Judge of the
Regional Trial Court of Lipa City,
Fourth Judicial Region, Branch 13,
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK,
ELIZABETH C. UMALI, ALICE
PERCE, JELEN MOSCA, REGISTER
OF DEEDS FOR LIPA CITY,
BATANGAS, THE CLERK OF COURT
and EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
BATANGAS, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioners Renato and Angelina Lantin
obtained loans from respondent
Planters Development Bank and
executed several real estate mortgages
and promissory notes to cover the
loans. They defaulted on the payments
so respondent bank foreclosed the
mortgaged lots and were later on sold
at a public auction where the
respondent bank was the winning
bidder. On November 8, 2003,
petitioners filed against Planters
Development Bank and its officers
Elizabeth Umali, Alice Perce and Jelen
Mosca (private respondents), a Ruling:
Complaint for Declaration of Nullity
and/or Annulment of Sale and/or
Mortgage, Reconveyance, Discharge of
Mortgage, Accounting, Permanent
Injunction, and Damages with the RTC
of Lipa City, Batangas. Petitioners
alleged that only their peso loans were
covered by the mortgages and that
these had already been fully paid,
hence, the mortgages should have
been discharged. They challenged the
validity of the foreclosure on the
alleged non-payment of their dollar
loans as the mortgages did not cover
those loans.
Private respondents moved to dismiss
the complaint on the ground of
improper venue since the loan
agreements restricted the venue of any
suit in Metro Manila. The respondent
judge dismissed the case for improper
venue. Petitioners sought
reconsideration. They argued that the
trial court in effect prejudged the
validity of the loan documents because
the trial court based its dismissal on a
venue stipulation provided in the
agreement.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent judge
committed grave abuse of discretion
when she dismissed the case for
improper venue.
At the outset, we must make clear that
under Section 4 (b) of Rule 4 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the
general rules on venue of actions shall
not apply where the parties, before the
filing of the action, have validly agreed
in writing on an exclusive venue. The
mere stipulation on the venue of an
action, however, is not enough to
preclude parties from bringing a case
in other venues. The parties must be
able to show that such stipulation is
exclusive. In the absence of qualifying
or restrictive words, the stipulation
should be deemed as merely an
agreement on an additional forum, not
as limiting venue to the specified place.
Clearly, the words "exclusively" and
"waiving for this purpose any other
venue" used in the mortgages and
promissory notes executed by the
parties are restrictive and used
advisedly to meet the requirements.
Petitioners claim that effecting the
exclusive venue stipulation would be
tantamount to a prejudgment on the
validity of the loan documents. We
note however that in their complaint,
petitioners never assailed the validity
of the mortgage contracts securing
their peso loans. They only assailed the
terms and coverage of the mortgage
contracts. What petitioners claimed is
that their peso loans had already been
paid thus the mortgages should be
discharged, and that the mortgage
contracts did not include their dollar
loans. In our view, since the issues of
whether the mortgages should be
properly discharged and whether these
also cover the dollar loans, arose out of
the said loan documents, the
stipulation on venue is also applicable
thereto. Considering all the
circumstances in this controversy, we
find that the respondent judge did not
commit grave abuse of discretion, as
the questioned orders were evidently in
accord with law and jurisprudence.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 126603. June 29, 1998.]
ESTRELLITA J. TAMANO, petitioner,
vs. HON. RODOLFO A. ORTIZ,
Presiding Judge, RTC-Br. 89,
Quezon City, HAJA PUTRI
ZORAYDA A. TAMANO, ADIB A.
TAMANO and the HON. COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Senator Mamintal Tamano married
private respondent Zorayda in civil
rites. Their marriage supposedly

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remained subsisting until his death.
Prior to his death, Tamano also
married petitioner Estrellita in civil
rites. After the death of the Senator,
Zorayda filed a Complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage of
Tamano and Estrellita on the ground
that it was bigamous. Petitioner filed a
motion to dismiss the case alleging
that the RTC of Quezon City was
without jurisdiction over the subject
and nature of the action. The lower
court denied the motion to dismiss and
ruled that the case was properly
cognizable by the RTC of Quezon City
since Estrellita and Tamano were
married in accordance with the Civil
Code and not exclusively in accordance
with PD No. 1083 or the Code of
Muslim Personal laws. The motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied;
hence, this petition before the
Supreme Court. The case was,
however, referred to the Court of
Appeals. The Court of Appeals,
likewise, denied the motion to dismiss.
The petitioner now comes before the
Supreme Court reiterating her earlier
argument that it is the shari'a court
and not the Regional Trial Court which
has jurisdiction over the subject and
nature of the action.
Issue:
Whether or not the shari’a court is the
proper venue for the case and not the
RTC.
Ruling:
Under The Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, Regional Trial Courts have
jurisdiction over all actions involving
the contract of marriage and marital
relations. Personal actions, such as the
instant complaint for declaration of
nullity of marriage, may be
commenced and tried where the
plaintiff or any of the principal plaintiffs
resides, or where the defendant or any
of the principal defendants resides, at
the election of the plaintiff. There
should be no question by now that
what determines the nature of an
action and correspondingly the court
which has jurisdiction over it are the
allegations made by the plaintiff in this
case. In the complaint for declaration
of nullity of marriage filed by private
respondents herein, it was alleged that
Estrellita and Tamano were married in
accordance with the provisions of the
Civil Code. Never was it mentioned
that Estrellita and Tamano were
married under Muslim laws or PD No.
1083. Interestingly, Estrellita never
stated in her Motion to Dismiss that
she and Tamano were married under
Muslim laws. That she was in fact
married to Tamano under Muslim laws
was first mentioned only in her Motion
for Reconsideration.
Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
was not divested of jurisdiction to hear
and try the instant case despite the
allegation in the Motion for
Reconsideration that Estrellita and
Tamano were likewise married in
Muslim rites. This is because a court's
jurisdiction cannot be made to depend
upon defenses set up in the answer, in
a motion to dismiss, or in a motion for
reconsideration, but only upon the
allegations of the complaint.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter of
a case is determined from the
allegations of the complaint as the
latter comprises a concise statement of
the ultimate facts constituting the
plaintiff's causes of action.
[G.R. No. L – 18726. August 31,
1966.]
THOMAS M. GONZALEZ, plaintiff
and appellant, vs. DEMETRIO B.
ENCARNACION and VENANCIO H.
AQUINO, defendant and appellees.
Facts:
Gonzales filed with the CIF of Cagayan
a complaint for damages against
Encarnacion, a resident of Cavite, who
allegedly caused the filing of a pleading
against him in Civil case N- 151,
containing words and expressions
which are highly libelous, derogatory
and scurrilous to his worth, integrity
and honor. Encarnacion filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint, alleging that
it states no cause of action and that
the venue is improperly laid and/or the
court has no jurisdiction. The CIF
dismissed the complaint for improper
venue.
Gonzales takes the position that his
venue is not improperly laid because
under Art. 360 of the RPC, as amended
by RA 1289, a civil action for damages
in cases of written defamation may be
filed in the court of first instance of the
province where the offended party
resides. On the other hand, the
defendants contend that the complaint
should have been filed in Civil case N-
151 of the CIF of Cavite because under
the aforesaid provision, the court
where the criminal or civil action is first
filed acquires jurisdiction to the
exclusion of other courts.
Issue:
Whether or not the CIF of Cagayan
erred in dismissing the complaint for
improper venue.
Ruling:
Civil actions for damages in cases of
written defamation “shall” be filed with
the Court of First Instance of the
province or city in which “any of the
accused or any of the offended parties

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resides.” In other words, the plaintiff is
limited in his choice of venue to the
Court of First Instance of his residence
or to that of any of the accused.
Plaintiff may not file the action
elsewhere, unless the libel is published,
circulated, displayed, or exhibited in a
province or city wherein neither the
offender nor the offended party
resides, in which case “the civil or
criminal actions may be brought in the
court of First Instance thereof.” The
verb “may” is permissive. Hence, it
does not necessarily imply a complete
abrogation of the general rule laid
down in the preceding sentence except
insofar as it broadens the [2]
alternatives therein set forth, by giving
the plaintiff a third choice of venue…
[i]ndeed, when the libelous
imputations has not been published or
circulated in the locality wherein either
of the parties resides, the offended
party may not wish to initiate the
action therein, for the same would
have the effect of giving additional
publicity to the derogatory statements
and increasing harm to complainant.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 146594. June 10, 2002.]
REBECCA T. CABUTIHAN,
petitioner, vs. LANDCENTER
CONSTRUCTION & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner filed an action for specific
performance with damages against the
respondent before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City praying, inter alia,
that the respondent be ordered to
execute the necessary deeds of
transfer and conveyance of a portion of
a property situated in Kay-biga,
Parañaque, Metro Manila covered
under TCT No. S-30409, corresponding
to 36.5 percent of its total area, as
compensation for the undertakings she
and her companions had performed
and accomplished in favor of the
respondent. The RTC, however,
dismissed the complaint on grounds of
improper venue, non-joinder of
necessary parties, and nonpayment of
the proper docket fees. Maintaining
that the action is in personam, not in
rem, petitioner alleges that the venue
was properly laid. The fact that "she
ultimately sought the conveyance of
real property" not located in the
territorial jurisdiction of the RTC of
Pasig is, she claims, an anticipated
consequence and beyond the cause for
which the action was instituted. On the
other hand, the RTC ruled that since
the primary objective of petitioner was
to recover real property — even though
her Complaint was for specific
performance and damages — her
action should have been instituted in
the trial court where the property was
situated. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the RTC of Pasig City is
the proper venue for the case.
Ruling:
The petition is meritorious. Sections 1
and 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court
provide an answer to the issue of
venue. Actions affecting title to or
possession of real property or an
interest therein (real actions), shall be
commenced and tried in the proper
court that has territorial jurisdiction
over the area where the real property
is situated. On the other hand, all
other actions, (personal actions) shall
be commenced and tried in the proper
courts where the plaintiff or any of the
principal plaintiffs resides or where the
defendant or any of the principal
defendants resides. In the present
case, petitioner seeks payment of her
services in accordance with the
undertaking the parties signed. Breach
of contract gives rise to a cause of
action for specific performance or for
rescission. If petitioner had filed an
action in rem for the conveyance of
real property, the dismissal of the case
would have been proper on the ground
of lack of cause of action.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 127692. March 10, 2004.]
FORTUNATO GOMEZ and AURORA
GOMEZ, petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, ADOLFO TROCINO and
MARIANO TROCINO, respondents.
Facts:
Some time in 1975, the spouses Jesus
and Caridad Trocino mortgaged two
parcels of land covered by TCT Nos.
10616 and 31856 to Dr. Clarence
Yujuico. The mortgage was
subsequently foreclosed and the
properties sold at public auction on
July 11, 1988, and before the expiry of
the redemption period, the spouses
Trocino sold the property to petitioners
on December 12, 1989, who in turn,
redeemed the same from Dr. Yujuico.
The spouses Trocino, however, refused
to convey ownership of the properties
to petitioners, hence, the complaint.
The RTC decided the case in favor of
petitioners, however the CA annuled
the decision upon appeal for failure of
the court to acquire jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendant as they
were not validly served with summons.
Petitioners now contend that the CA
erred in its decision because the action
they filed was one in rem where
jurisdiction over the persons of the
defendant is not necessary.
Issue:

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Whether or not the action filed by
petitioner spouses is one in rem or one
in personam.
Ruling:
Contrary to petitioners' belief, the
complaint they filed for specific
performance and/or rescission is not
an action in rem. While it is a real
action because it affects title to or
possession of the two parcels of land
covered by TCT Nos. 10616 and
31856, it does not automatically follow
that the action is already one in rem.
In a personal action, the plaintiff seeks
the recovery of personal property, the
enforcement of a contract or the
recovery of damages. In a real action,
the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real
property, or, as indicated in section
2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an
action affecting title to real property or
for the recovery of possession, or for
partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of a mortgage on, real
property.
An action in personam is an action
against a person on the basis of his
personal liability, while an action in
rem is an action against the thing
itself, instead of against the person.
Hence, a real action may at the same
time be an action in personam and not
necessarily an action in rem. The
objective sought in petitioners'
complaint was to establish a claim
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against respondents for their alleged
refusal to convey to them the title to
the two parcels of land that they
inherited from their father, Jesus
Trocino, who was one of the sellers of
the properties to petitioners. Hence, to
repeat, Civil Case No. CEB-11103 is an
action in personam because it is an
action against persons, namely, herein
respondents, on the basis of their
personal liability. As such, personal
service of summons upon the
defendants is essential in order for the
court to acquire of jurisdiction over
their persons.
PLEADINGS
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 136100. July 24, 2000.]
FELIPE G. UY, petitioner, vs. THE
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Facts:
The Land Bank of the Philippines filed
before the Metropolitan Trial Circuit
Court (MTCC) of Iloilo City a complaint
for unlawful detainer against Felipe Uy.
The bank claimed ownership of two
parcels of land and the two-storey
house built thereon, and sought the
ejectment of the petitioner, the
occupant of the premises. The original
owner of the properties was Tia Yu. Yu
authorized Gold Motor Parts
Corporation to mortgage the same as
security for a loan from Land Bank.
Unfortunately, Gold Motors defaulted,
hence, Land Bank foreclosed the
properties. Before the foreclosure took
effect, Felipe Uy already occupied the
house built on the lands. For Yu's
failure to pay the materials used in the
construction of the house, Uy was
allowed to occupy the house and apply
the rental thereon to the balance of Tia
Yu's debt on the materials. The terms
of their agreement were later put into
writing in a lease contract. The MTCC
rendered its judgment in favor of Uy.
Land Bank appealed to the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), which affirmed the
decision of the MTCC in toto. Land
Bank filed in the Court of Appeals (CA)
a motion for extension of time to file a
petition for review. The CA allowed
only a 15-day extension, but Land
Bank failed to file its petition within the
extension granted. Instead, Land Bank
filed its petition beyond the extended
period with an accompanying
manifestation. The CA granted the
manifestation and motion, and
admitted the petition. Thereafter, the
CA rendered a decision reversing the
lower court's decision. Felipe Uy filed a
petition for review of the CA decision
with the Supreme Court. The Court
first denied the petition due to lack of
certification against forum shopping
and lack of verification. After thorough
explanation, the Court granted the
second motion for reconsideration of
petitioner and required respondent to
AQ - LRC
comment thereon. In its Comment,
respondent submits that the Court
should not have reinstated the petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the motion for
reconsideration should have been
dismissed for lack of certification
against forum shopping and lack of
verification.
Ruling:
The requirement regarding verification
of a pleading is formal,
jurisdictional. Such requirement is
not
simply a condition affecting the form of
pleading, the non-compliance of which
does not necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. Verification
is simply intended to secure an
assurance that the allegations in the
pleading are true and correct and not
the product of the imagination or a
matter of speculation, and that the
pleading is filed in good faith. The
court may order the correction of the
pleading if verification is lacking or act
on the pleading although it is not
verified, if the attending circumstances
are such that strict compliance with the
rules may be dispensed with in order
that the ends of justice may thereby be
served. The lack of certification against
forum shopping, on the other hand, is
generally not curable by the
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submission thereof after the filing of
the petition. Section 5, Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court provides that the failure
of petitioner to submit the required
documents that should accompany the
petition, including the certification
against forum shopping, shall be
sufficient ground for the dismissal
thereof. In some cases, though, this
Court deemed the belated filing of the
certification as substantial compliance
with the requirement. In the case at
bar, the apparent merits of the
substantive aspects of the case should
be deemed as a "special circumstance"
or "compelling reason" for the
reinstatement of the petition. That
counsel for petitioner filed the
"verification/certification" before
receipt for the resolution initially
denying the petition also mitigates the
oversight. In any event, this Court has
the power to suspend its own rules
when, as in this case, the ends of
justice would be served thereby.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 128550. March 16, 2000.]
DIGITAL MICROWAVE
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ASIAN
HIGH TECHNOLOGY
CORPORATION, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Asian High
Technology Corp. filed a complaint
against petitioner Digital Microwave
Corp. for a sum of money and
damages before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City. Petitioner moved
for the dismissal of the complaint. The
trial court denied the motion, as well
as the motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner then initiated a special civil
action for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals for alleged grave abuse of
discretion of the trial court. However,
the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition for failure to comply with
Revised Circular No. 28-91, as
amended by Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. The circular requires
petitions filed before the Court of
Appeals to be accompanied by a sworn
certification against forum shopping
signed by the petitioner himself. The
petitioner's certification was signed by
the counsel, thus the dismissal by the
Court of Appeals. The motion for
reconsideration having been denied,
the petitioner sought the reversal of
the ruling by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner contends that in the case of
a corporation as petitioner, the
certification against forum shopping
may be signed by a natural person
authorized to do so and with
knowledge of the required facts. The
authorized person may be anyone
authorized by the corporation, not
necessarily an officer thereof. In such a
case, petitioner argues, the counsel of
record has the authority to execute the
certification on behalf of the
corporation
Issue:
Whether or not the counsel of
petitioner corporation may validly sign
the certification against forum
shopping in behalf of the latter.
Ruling:
If we follow petitioner's line of
reasoning, then the requirement in
Revised Circular No. 28-91 that
petitioner himself must make the
certification against forum shopping
would have been rendered useless. The
reason the certification against forum
shopping is required to be
accomplished by petitioner himself is
because only the petitioner himself has
actual knowledge of whether or not he
has initiated similar actions or
proceedings in different courts or
agencies. Even his counsel may be
unaware of such fact.
We disagree with petitioner that a
corporation cannot possibly hope to
comply with the requirement laid down
by Revised Circular No. 28-91 because
it is a juridical entity and not a natural
person. If this were so, then it would
have been impossible for a corporation
to do anything at all. Needless to say,
this is the reason why corporations
have directors and officers, to
represent it in its transactions with
others. The same is true for the
certification against forum shopping. It
could easily have been made by a duly
authorized director or officer of the
corporation. "Utter disregard of the
rules cannot justly be rationalized by
harking on the policy of liberal
construction."
EN BANC
[G.R. NOS. 79937-38. FEBRUARY 13,
1989.]
SUN INSURANCE OFFICE, LTD., E.B.
PHILIPPS AND D.J. WARBY,
petitioners, vs. HON. MAXIMIANO
C. ASUNCION and MANUEL CHUA
UY PO TIONG, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Sun Insurance Office, Ltd.
filed a complaint or the consignation of
a premium refund on a fire insurance
policy with a prayer for the judicial
declaration of its nullity against private
respondent Manuel Uy Po Tiong.
Private respondent was declared in
default for failure to file the required
answer within the reglementary period.
Private respondent filed a complaint in
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
for the refund of premiums and the
issuance of a writ of preliminary

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attachment. Petitioners allege that
while it may be true that private
respondent had paid the amount of
P182,824.90 as docket fee and
considering that the total amount
sought to be recovered in the amended
and supplemental complaint is
P64,601,623.70 the docket fee that
should be paid by private respondent is
P257,810.49, more or less. Not having
paid the same, petitioners contend that
the complaint should be dismissed and
all incidents arising therefrom should
be annulled.
Issue:
Whether or not the court has acquired
jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
The Court rules as follows:
1. It is not simply the filing of the
complaint or appropriate initiatory
pleading, but the payment of the
prescribed docket fee, that vests a trial
court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action. Where
the filing of the initiatory pleading is
not accompanied by payment of the
docket fee, the court may allow
payment of the fee within a reasonable
time but in no case beyond the
applicable prescriptive or reglementary
period.
2. The same rule applies to
permissive counterclaims, third-party
claims and similar pleadings, which
shall not be considered filed until and
unless the filing fee prescribed therefor
is paid. The court may also allow
payment of said fee within a
reasonable time but also in no case
beyond its applicable prescriptive or
reglementary period.
3. Where the trial court acquires
jurisdiction over a claim by the filing of
the appropriate pleading and payment
of the prescribed filing fee but,
subsequently, the judgment awards a
claim not specified in the pleading, or if
specified the same has been left for
determination by the court, the
additional filing fee therefor shall
constitute a lien on the judgment. It
shall be the responsibility of the Clerk
of Court or his duly authorized deputy
to enforce said lien and assess and
collect the additional fee.
WHEREFORE, the petition is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Clerk
of Court of the court a quo is hereby
instructed to reassess and determine
the additional filing fee that should be
paid by private respondent considering
the total amount of the claim sought in
the original complaint and the
supplemental complaint as may be
gleaned from the allegations and the
prayer thereof and to require private
respondent to pay the deficiency, if
any.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 85909. February 9, 1993.]
TERESITA C. GERALES, CESAR
DELA FUENTE, MARCELA GOLDING,
MARIA VERGARA and PERLITO
TRIGERO, petitioners, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, ENRIQUE E.
PIMENTEL, and LETICIA FIDELDIA,
respondents.
Facts:
A car owned by Leticia Fideldia, then
driven by Enrique E. Pimentel, hit a
car, owned by Teresita Gerales then
driven by Cesar Dela Fuente; with
Marcela Golding, Maria Vergara and
Perlito Trigero as passengers at San
Jose, San Fernando, Pampanga.
Private respondent Enrique E. Pimentel
was charged before the Municipal Trial
Court of San Fernando, Pampanga with
the crime of Damage to Property with
Multiple Physical Injuries thru Reckless
Imprudence. During the pendency of
the criminal case, petitioners filed a
civil case for Damages in the Regional
Trial Court of Bataan against Enrique E.
Pimentel and Leticia Fideldia. This civil
case is based on the same incident for
which private respondent, Enrique E.
Pimentel was charged in the criminal
case. After filing of the civil case, but
before service of summons to the
private respondents, the parties were
able to settle amicably. They duly
executed and signed a “Release of
Claim”. The Criminal Case was
dismissed upon motion and
presentation of the Affidavit of
Desistance. Respondent Enrique E.
Pimentel wrote a letter addressed to
the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Bataan informing the court of
the settlement. After receipt of
respondent Pimentel's letter, the
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Balanga Bataan issued an
order declaring the private respondents
in default and thereupon ordering them
to pay damages to herein petitioners.
The CA reversed the RTC decision.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court
erred in reversing the decision of the
RTC.
Ruling:
Under the factual setting of the case,
the trial court ought to have
considered the letter of respondent
Enrique E. Pimentel as a responsive
pleading even if it lacks the formalities
required by law. Undoubtedly, the
letter made mention of the fact that
the parties mutually settled the case,
which allegation may be deemed as an
averment of an affirmative defense and
if proven in a preliminary hearing
pursuant to Section 5, Rule 16, would

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constitute a meritorious defense of
private respondents which would bar
petitions from recovering damages
from the former as the claim or
demand set forth in plaintiffs'
(petitioners') pleading had been paid or
extinguished. Pleadings as well as
remedial laws should be liberally
construed in order that the litigant may
have ample opportunity to prove their
respective claims, and possible denial
of substantial justice, due to
technicalities, may be avoided.
Litigations should as much as possible
be decided on the merits and not on
technicality. Technicality, when it
deserts its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes its great
hindrance and chief enemy, deserves
scant consideration from courts, and
because there is no vested right in
technicalities, in meritorious cases, a
liberal, not literal interpretation of the
rules becomes imperative and
technicalities should not be resorted to
in derogation of the intent and purpose
of the rules, which is the proper and
just determination of a litigation. In the
light of the foregoing, it is evident that
indeed the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion in declaring private
respondents in default, and in denying
their petition for relief from judgment.
Consequently, the validity of the order
of default and all the proceedings that
transpired subsequent thereto cannot
be sustained.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 89114. December 2, 1991.]
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO, JR.,
petitioner, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD
GOVERNMENT, MATEO A. T.
CAPARAS, AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, respondents.
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines,
represented by the PCGG and assisted
by the OSG, filed an action against
Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez, et al."
for reconveyance, reversion,
accounting, restitution and damages.
Petitioner filed a motion for bill of
particulars which was denied by the
Sandiganbayan on the ground that
what petitioner was asking were mere
evidentiary facts. Petitioner filed a
motion for reconsideration but the
same was denied. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan
erred in denying the motion for a bill of
particulars.
Ruling:
The Sandiganbayan erred in denying
the motion for a bill of particulars. A
complaint is defined as a concise
statement of the ultimate facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause or
causes of action. Like all other
pleadings allowed by the Rules of
Court, the complaint shall contain in a
methodical and logical form a plain,
concise and direct statement of the
ultimate facts on which the plaintiff
relies for his claim, omitting the
statement of mere evidentiary facts.
Its office, purpose or function is to
inform the defendant clearly and
definitely of the claims made against
him so that he may be prepared to
meet the issues at the trial. The
complaint should inform the defendant
of all the material facts on which the
plaintiff relies to support his demand;
it should state the theory of a cause of
action which forms the bases of the
plaintiff's claim of liability.
The rules on pleading speak of two (2)
kinds of facts: the first, the "ultimate
facts", and the second, the "evidentiary
facts." "The term 'ultimate facts' as
used in Sec. 3, Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court, means the essential facts
constituting the plaintiff's cause of
action. A fact is essential if it cannot be
stricken out without leaving the
statement of the cause of action
insufficient. . . ." Ultimate facts are
important and substantial facts which
either directly form the basis of the
primary right and duty, or which
directly make up the wrongful acts or
omissions of the defendant. The term
does not refer to the details of
probative matter or particulars of
evidence by which these material
elements are to be established. It
refers to principal, determinate,
constitutive facts, upon the existence
of which, the entire cause of action
rests," while the term "evidentiary
fact" are those facts which are
necessary for determination of the
ultimate facts; they are the premises
upon which conclusions of ultimate
facts are based.
The allegations in the complaint are
deficient in that they merely articulate
conclusions of law and presumptions
unsupported by factual premises.
Hence, without the particulars prayed
for in petitioner's motion for a bill of
particulars, it can be said the petitioner
cannot intelligently prepare his
responsive pleading and for trial.
Furthermore, the particulars prayed
for, such as, names of persons, names
of corporations, dates, amounts
involved, a specification of property for
identification purposes, the particular
transactions involving withdrawals and
disbursements, and a statement of
other material facts as would support
the conclusions and inferences in the
complaint, are not evidentiary in
nature. On the contrary, those
particulars are material facts that

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should be clearly and definitely averred
in the complaint in order that the
defendant may, in fairness, be
informed of the claims made against
him to the end that he may be
prepared to meet the issues at the
trial.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 87434. August 5, 1992.]
PHILIPPINE AMERICAN GENERAL
INSURANCE CO., INC. and TAGUM
PLASTICS INC., petitioners, vs.
SWEET LINES INC., DAVAO
VETERANS ARRASTRE AND PORT
ERVICES INC., and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
A maritime suit was commenced by
petitioner against private respondents,
seeking recovery of the cost of the lost
or damaged shipment plus damages
allegedly due to defendants’
negligence. Before trial, a compromise
agreement was entered into by the
parties, causing the dismissal by the
trial court of the suit. The trail court
thereafter rendered judgment in favor
of petitioners. On appeal, the
respondent court reversed the decision
of the trial court on the ground of
prescription, based upon the bills of
lading covering their transaction. The
petitioners thus question the propriety
of such reversal, contending that such
bills of lading should not have been
given weight since it was not offered in
evidence by the private respondents.
Issue:
Whether or not the respondent court
erred in reversing the trial court’s
decision.
Ruling:
The respondent court committed no
reversible error. As petitioners are
suing upon SLI’s contractual obligation
under the contract of carriage as
contained in the bills of lading, such
bills of lading can be categorized as
actionable document which under the
Rules must be properly pleaded either
as causes of action or defenses, and
the genuineness and due execution of
which are deemed admitted unless
specifically denied by the adverse
party. The rules on actionable
documents cover and apply to both a
cause of action or defense based on
said documents.
Petitioner’s failure to specifically deny
the existence, much less the
genuineness and due execution, of the
instruments in question amounts to an
admission. Judicial admissions, verbal
or written, made by the parties in the
pleadings or in the course of the trial
or other proceedings in the same case
are conclusive, no evidence being
required to prove the same, and
cannot be contradicted unless shown to
have been made through palpable
mistake or that no such admission was
made. Moreover, when the due
execution and genuineness of an
instrument are deemed admitted
because of the adverse party’s failure
to make a specific denial thereof, the
instrument need not be formally
presented in evidence for it may be
considered an admitted fact.
Even granting that petitioner’s
averment in their reply amounts to a
denial, it has the procedural earmarks
of what is in the law of pleadings called
a negative pregnant, that is, a denial
pregnant with the admission of the
substantial facts in the pleading
responded to which are not squarely
denied. It is in effect an admission of
the averment it is directed to. Thus,
while petitioners objected to the
validity of such agreement for being
contrary to public policy, the existence
of the bills of lading and said
stipulations were nevertheless
impliedly admitted by them.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. L – 47847. JULY 31, 1981.]
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
MANUELA PASTOR, respondents.
Facts:
Private respondent Pastor filed with the
CIF of Batangas an application for
confirmation of imperfect title over 13
lots situated in Gulod and Pallocan,
Batangas City. The Director of Lands
filed an opposition to the application.
Pastor presented, together with other
evidences, a certification that said lots
were declared public land in a cadastral
case and the other lots were subject of
a decision in a cadastral proceeding.
The CIF rendered a decision awarding
said lots to Pastor. Hence, petitioner
appealed the same to the CA with the
contention that the lower court erred in
awarding said lots to Pastor who
herself adduced evidence that said lots
were public land and were subject to a
previous cadastral proceeding. The CA
affirmed in toto the decision of the CIF,
hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether or not the decision rendered
in the Cadastral proceedings
constitutes res judicata as to the
nature of the lots in question, thus a
bar to private respondent’s application.
Ruling:
We find no legal basis to uphold the
foregoing contentions of petitioner. It
is clear from evidence on record that in
the proceedings had before the CIF of
Batangas, acting as land registration

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court, the oppositor Director of Lands,
petitioner herein, did not interpose any
objection nor set up the defense of res
judicata with respect to the lots in
question. Such failure on the part of
the Director of Lands is a procedural
infirmity which cannot be cured on
appeal. Sec. 2, Rule 9, Revised rules of
Court of 1964 provides that “defenses
and objections not pleaded either in a
motion to dismiss or in the answer are
deemed waived…” Thus, the defense of
res judicata when not set up either in a
motion to dismiss or in an answer, is
deemed waived. It cannot be pleaded
for the first time at the trial or on
appeal.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 138822. JANUARY 23,
2001.]
EVANGELINE ALDAY, petitioner, vs.
FGU INSURANCE CORPORATION,
respondent.
Facts:
Respondent filed a complaint against
petitioner, alleging that the latter owed
them a sum of money incurred by the
petitioner in the course of her work as
insurance agent of the respondent.
Petitioner filed her answer and by way
of counterclaim, asserted her right for
the payment of a sum representing
commissions and bonuses. Petiitoner
also prayed for the award of damages
for the allegedly unfounded action by
the respondents. Respondent filed a
motion to dismiss petitioner’s
counterclaim, contending that the trial
court never acquired jurisdiction over
the same because of petitioner’s non-
payment of docket fees. Petitioner thus
asked the respondent court to declare
her counterclaim as exempt from
payment of docket fees since it is
compulsory and that respondent be
declared in default for having failed to
answer such counterclaim. The trial
court, as sustained by the Court of
Appeals, granted respondent’s motion,
finding that the counterclaim was
merely permissive. Hence this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the counterclaim of the
petitioner is compulsory or permissive
in nature.
Ruling:
In Valencia v. Court of Appeals [263
SCRA 275, 1996], this Court capsulized
the criteria or tests that may be used
in determining whether a counterclaim
is compulsory or permissive,
summarized as follows:
1. Are the issues of fact and
law raised by the claim and
counterclaim largely the
same?
2. Would res judicata bar a
subsequent suit on
defendant’s claim absent
the compulsory
counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same
evidence support or refute
plaintiff’s claim as well as
defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation
between the claim and
counterclaim?
Another test, applied in the more
recent case of Quintanilla v. Court of
Appeals [279 SCRA 397, 1997], is the
“compelling test of compulsoriness”
which requires a “logical relationship
between the claim and the
counterclaim, that is, where conducting
separate trials of the respective claims
of the parties would entail a substantial
duplication of effort and time by the
parties and the court.”
Tested against the abovementioned
standards, petitioner’s counterclaim for
commissions, bonuses and premium
reserves is merely permissive. The
evidence required to prove petitioner’s
claims differs from that needed to
establish respondent’s demands for the
recovery of cash accountabilities from
petitioners such as cash advances and
cost of premiums. The recovery of
respondent’s claims is not contingent
or dependent upon petitioner’s
counterclaim, such that conducting
separate trials will not result in the
substantial duplication of the time and
effort of the court and the parties.
However, petitioner’s claims for
damages are compulsory.
There is no need for the petitioner to
pay docket fees for her compulsory
counterclaim. On the other hand, in
order for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over her permissive
counterclaim, petitioner is bound to
pay the prescribed fees. The
compulsory counterclaim of petitioner
is reinstated.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. L- 29673. NOVEMBER 12,
1987.]
THE VISAYAN PACKING
CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. THE
REPARATIONS COMMISSION and
THE COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents.
Facts:
A "Contract of Conditional Purchase
and Sale of Reparation Goods" was
entered into between petitioner and
the private respondent REPACOM. Prior
to the due date of the first installment,
REPACOM sent VISPAC a written
reminder thereof. Petitioner’s response
was to file two (2) special civil actions
for declaratory relief, alleging
ambiguity in the contract between it

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and REPACOM consisting in the
agreement's failure to clearly state the
precise time when the obligation to pay
the first installment of the price would
arise. On the other hand, when VISPAC
subsequently failed, despite several
demands, to pay the first installment of
the price on what REPACOM deemed to
be the due date, the latter instituted
an ordinary civil action for collection
thereof. VISPAC moved to dismiss this
collection suit on the ground of the
pendency of the declaratory relief
actions, arguing that until and unless
the latter were resolved, no cause of
action could be deemed to exist in
favor of REPACOM for collection of said
first installment. The motion to dismiss
was denied. Here, petitioner’s
contention is that it was error on the
Appellate Court's part to have affirmed
the Trial Court's decision for the
collection of the first installment of the
price due from it under its contract
with REPACOM, because that money
claim should have been set up as a
compulsory counterclaim in the
declaratory relief action, and since
REPACOM had not done this, but had
instead set it up in a separate suit, the
claim had thereby become barred.
Issue:
Whether or not the claim of the private
respondents have become barred for
not being set up as a counterclaim.
Ruling:
It is indeed the rule, embodied in
Section 4, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court,
that a counterclaim not set up shall be
barred if it arises out of or is
necessarily connected with the
transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter of the opposing party's
claim and does not require for its
adjudication the presence of third
parties of whom the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction. In other words, a
compulsory counterclaim cannot be
made the subject of a separate action
but should be asserted in the same suit
involving the same transaction or
occurrence giving rise to it. The
omission is not however irremediable
or irreversibly fatal. The Rules provide
that when a pleader fails to set up a
counterclaim through oversight,
inadvertence, or excusable negligence,
or when justice requires, he may, by
leave of court, set up the counterclaim
or cross-claim by amendment before
judgment.
Where the counterclaim is made the
subject of a separate suit, it may be
abated upon a plea of auter action
pendant or litis pendentia, and/or
dismissed on the ground of res
adjudicata. There is nothing in the
nature of a special civil action for
declaratory relief that proscribes the
filing of a counterclaim based on the
same transaction, deed or contract
subject of the complaint. A special civil
action is after all not essentially
different from an ordinary civil action,
which is generally governed by Rules 1
to 56 of the Rules of Court, except that
the former deals with a special subject
matter which makes necessary some
special regulation. But the identity
between their fundamental nature is
such that the same rules governing
ordinary civil suits may and do apply to
special civil actions if not inconsistent
with or if they may serve to
supplement the provisions of the
peculiar rules governing special civil
actions.
Ideally, in the case at bar, the separate
action for collection should have been
dismissed and set up as a compulsory
counterclaim in the declaratory relief
suits, by way of an amended answer.
This was not done. The actions
proceeded separately and were decided
on the merits. The final verdict was
that the declaratory relief suits
instituted by VISPAC were
unmeritorious, quite without
foundation and, in the light of all the
relevant facts, appear to have been
initiated by VISPAC merely to obstruct
and delay the payment of the
installments clearly due from it,
payment of which was decreed in the
collection suit. Under the
circumstances, and taking account of
the not inconsiderable length of time
that the case at bar has been pending,
it would be to do violence to
substantial justice to pronounce the
proceedings fatally defective for breach
of the rule on compulsory
counterclaims. Rules of procedure are
after all laid down in order to attain
justice. They cannot be applied to
prevent the achievement of that goal.
Form cannot prevail over substance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed
for lack of merit, with costs against the
petitioner.
EN BANC
[G.R. NO. 105751. JUNE 30, 1993.]
B.A. FINANCE CORPORATION,
petitioner, v. RUFINO CO,
HIGHLINE MERCANTILE INC.,
LUCITA VELOSO YAP, CLOVERLEAF
SUPERMARKET, INC., SAN ANDRES
COMMERCIAL and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner BA Finance Corporation
brought this action to recover a sum of
money arising from a credit
accommodation in the form of a
discounting line which it granted to
defendant Rufino Co, and from certain
suretyship agreements executed in its
favor by his co-defendants Highline
Mercantile, Inc., Lucita Veloso Yap,
Cloverleaf Supermarket, Inc., and San

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Andres Commercial. After defendants'
Amended Answer to Complaint with There is merit in the petition. The
Compulsory Counterclaim was counterclaim of private respondents is
admitted, the case was set for Pre-Trial not merely permissive but compulsory
Conference. For various reasons, in nature. Clearly, the same evidence
however, the conference was needed to sustain the counterclaim of
repeatedly reset. Petitioner’s counsel private respondents would also refute
failed to attend the Pre-Trial the cause of action in petitioner's
Conference. Consequently, defendants complaint. The rule is that a relief under the circumstances.
moved for dismissal of the case compulsory counterclaim cannot
without prejudice. The motion was "remain pending for independent
granted. The trial court denied the adjudication by the court." This is
motion of private respondents, because a compulsory counterclaim is
prompting them to elevate the order of auxiliary to the proceeding in the
denial to the Court of Appeals which original suit and merely derives its
reversed the questioned order and jurisdictional support therefrom. Thus,
directed the trial court to set the it necessarily follows that if the trial
reception of their evidence on their court no longer possesses jurisdiction
counterclaim. Its motion for to entertain the main action of the
reconsideration having been denied, case, as when it dismisses the same,
petitioner instituted the instant then the compulsory counterclaim
petition. Petitioner contends that the being ancillary to the principal
dismissal of the complaint carries with controversy, must likewise be similarly
it the dismissal of the counterclaim. dismissed since no jurisdiction remains
Private respondents, on the other for the grant of any relief under the
hand, claim that their compulsory counterclaim.
counterclaim should not have been
included in the dismissal. The Rules of Court provides a remedy
to recover on defendant's counterclaim
Issue: if plaintiff moves to dismiss the case.
Under Sec. 2, Rule 17, defendant may
Does the dismissal of the complaint for raise objection to the dismissal of the
nonappearance of plaintiff at the pre- complaint; in such case, the trial court
trial, upon motion of defendants, carry may not dismiss the main action.
with it the dismissal of their
compulsory counterclaim? However, we are not unaware of the
seeming unfairness, if not harshness,
Ruling: of the application of the Rule herein
enunciated — that dismissal of the
complaint for failure to prosecute
automatically carries with it dismissal
of the compulsory counterclaim — to a
defendant who may be compelled to
hire counsel to protect him in a
frivolous complaint. Equity and justice
dictate that he be accorded adequate
Henceforth, for the guidance of Bench
and Bar, if any of the grounds to
dismiss under Sec. 3, Rule 17, of the
Rules of Court arises, the proper
recourse for a defendant who desires
to pursue his compulsory counterclaim
in the same proceeding is not to move
for the dismissal of the complaint;
instead, he should only move to have
plaintiff declared non-suited on the
complaint so that the latter can no
longer present his evidence thereon,
and simultaneously move that he be
declared as in default on the
compulsory counterclaim, and reserve
the right to present evidence ex parte
on his counterclaim. This will enable
defendant who was unjustly haled to
court to prove his compulsory
counterclaim, which is intertwined with
the complaint, because the trial court
retains jurisdiction over the complaint
and of the whole case. The non-
dismissal of the complaint, the non-suit
notwithstanding, provides the basis for
the compulsory counterclaim to remain
active and subsisting. But the
procedure above stated, unfortunately,
was not adopted by private
respondents herein in the court below,
hence, we reverse the Court of Appeals
and sustain the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is
GRANTED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 104609. JUNE 30, 1993.]
PHILIP LEE GO AND SPECIFIQUE
GARMENTS MANUFACTURING,
INC., petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS and CLOVER
MANUFACTURING CORP.,
respondents.
Facts:
Denim materials deliveries were made
by Clover Manufacturing Corporation to
Philip Go. The delivery receipts and
packing lists, indicated Go as the
"customer" and were duly
acknowledged by his employees. Of
the total purchase of P949,783.22,
only the price for the first delivery in
the amount of P146,109.50 was paid
to Clover. Demand for the balance was
made on Go but to no avail. Clover
filed a complaint against the petitioners
for the said balance. A writ of
preliminary attachment was issued but
was later on lifted after the filing by
the defendants of a counterbond.
In their answer to the complaint, Go
alleged that he had bought the denim

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materials from William Lim, to whom
he had made full payment, in cash for
the first delivery and by check
subsequently encashed for the next
four deliveries. Lim was no impleaded
by Go in a third party complaint.
Issue:
Whether or not the denim materials
were bought by Go from Lim or from
Clover.
Ruling:
The issue in this case is a factual one
which this Court will not touch upon.
However, the Court is convinced that
the trial and respondent courts did not
err in holding that the denim materials
were purchased by Go directly from
Clover and not from William Lim. The
first thought that occurs to the Court is
why, if Go had really paid Lim the full
value of the five deliveries, the latter
was not impleaded by the plaintiffs in a
third-party complaint under Rule 6,
Section 12, of the Rules of Court. This
rule states:
Sec. 12. Third-party complaint.
— A third-party complaint is a claim
that a defending party may, with leave
of court, file against a person not a
party to the action, called the third-
party defendant, for contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or any other
relief, in respect of his opponent's
claim.
The circumstance that Go and Lim
might have been close friends
(although this is not established in the
record) was no impediment to Go's
filing the third-party complaint for the
protection of his interests.
The Court cannot overstress the fact
that Go should have sued William Lim
in a third-party complaint instead of
merely using him as a defense witness.
Whatever their relations might have
been before, Go could not have failed
to realize that he was being made to
pay the amount of more than three
quarters of a million pesos which he
says he had already paid to William
Lim. His forbearance against Lim is
difficult to understand. The only
plausible explanation is that, as the
private respondent claims, Go had not
paid the balance of the purchase price
either to Clover or to William Lim.
We sustain the finding of the
respondent court that the petitioners
are liable for the balance of the articles
sold by Clover and not to William Lim
as the petitioners contend, but directly
to the petitioners themselves.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
[G.R. NO. L-18911. APRIL 27, 1967.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
plaintiff, vs. CLEOFE RAMOS, et. al.,
defendants. CLEOFE RAMOS, et.al.,
third-party plaintiffs-appellants,
vs. FELIPE ASUNCION, et.al., third-
party defendants- appellees.
Facts:
Plaintiff Republic filed a complaint
against defendants for the annulment
of the registration of a lot in the name
of defendants, alleging that the same
is part of the public domain, and for an
order prohibiting defendants from
further excavating the Wawang
Dapdap River, as well as for recovery
of damages occasioned by such illegal
excavations and appropriation of the
public domain. Defendants filed their
answer with counterclaim, denying the
alleged illegal excavations and
constructions, but admitting that they
are the registered owners of the lot in
question. With leave of court,
defendants filed a third-party
complaint against third-party
defendants, alleging that it is the latter
who have illegally appropriated
through artificial and illegal means
portions of the river, with the same
causing the property of the third-party
plaintiffs to become shallower and
narrower. Third-party defendants filed
a motion to dismiss the third-party
complaint, which was sustained by the
lower court and the CA, upon
reconsideration. Hence this appeal.
Issue:
Whether the dismissal of the third-
party complaint is proper.
Ruling:
The order dismissing the third-party
complaint is proper.
A third-party defendant may not be
impleaded if the effect would be to
introduce a new and separate
controversy into the action. Matters
which should be threshed out
separately, cannot be joined to the
original action by means of a third-
party complaint. Plaintiff’s causes of
action against defendants are
unrelated to those of the latter against
third-party defendants. It is not alleged
how those circumstances stated in the
pleadings could affect plaintiff’s cause
of actions against defendants, or
render third-party defendants liable for
“contribution, indemnity, subrogation
or any other relief” in respect of
plaintiff’s claim. The allowance of a
third-party complaint is predicated on
the need for expediency and the
avoidance of unnecessary lawsuits. But
it should not be considered as an
excuse for indiscriminately filing any
claim which a defendant may have
against a third-party defendant
although unrelated to the main action.

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[SECOND DIVISION]
[G.R. NO. 160242. May 17, 2005.]
ASIAN CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS,
respondents
Facts:
Monark Equipment Corporation (MEC)
filed a complaint for a sum of money
with against the Asian Construction
and Development Corporation (ACDC)
alleging that ACDC leased generator
sets, mobile floodlighting systems and
several other equipments from MEC,
the rentals of which ACDC failed to pay
despite several demands. ACDC filed a
motion to file and admit answer with
third party complaint against Becthel
Overseas Corporation. In its answer,
ACDC admitted its indebtedness to
MEC but alleged that all the
equipments they leased were used for
Becthel’s projects and that ACDC
remained unpaid by Becthel for their
services, resulting in their non-
payment of the lease rentals to MEC.
MEC opposed the motion of ACDC on
the ground that the defendant already
admitted its principal obligation to MEC
and that the transaction between ACDC
and MEC, on one hand, and between
ACDC and Becthel, on the other hand,
are independent transactions. The RTC
denied the motion of ACDC, sustained
by the CA on appeal. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether a third party complaint is
proper.
Ruling:
The petition has no merit. The purpose
of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court is to permit a defendant to
assert an independent claim against a
third party which he would otherwise
assert in another action, thus
preventing multiplicity of suits. A
prerequisite to the exercise of such
right is that some substantive basis for
a third-party claim be found to exist,
whether the basis be one of indemnity,
subrogation, contribution or other
substantive right. The bringing of a
third party defendant is proper if he
would be liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant or both for all or part of the
plaintiff’s claim against the original
defendant, although the third party
defendant’s liability arises out of
another transaction.
The defendant may implead another as
third-party defendant (a) on an
allegation of liability of the latter to the
defendant for contribution, indemnity,
subrogation or any other relief; (b) on
the ground of direct liability of the
third-party defendant to the plaintiff;
or (c) the liability of the third-party
defendant to both the plaintiff and the
defendant. There must be a causal
connection between the claim of the
plaintiff in his complaint and a claim for
contribution, indemnity or other relief
of the defendant against the third-
party defendant.
In a case, the Court made out the
following tests: (1) whether it arises
out of the same transaction on which
the plaintiff’s claim is based; or
whether the third-party claim, although
arising out of another or different
contract or transaction, is connected
with the plaintiff’s claim; (2) whether
the third-party defendant would be
liable to the plaintiff or to the
defendant for all or part of the
plaintiff’s claim against the original
defendant, although the third-party
defendant’s liability arises out of
another transaction; and (3) whether
the third-party defendant may assert
any defenses which the third-party
plaintiff has or may have to the
plaintiff’s claim.
The third-party complaint does not
have to show with certainty that there
will be recovery against the third-party
defendant, and it is sufficient that
pleadings show possibility of recovery.
In determining the sufficiency of the
third-party complaint, the allegations
in the original complaint and the third-
party complaint must be examined. A
third-party complaint must allege facts
which prima facie show that the
defendant is entitled to contribution,
indemnity, subrogation or other relief
from the third-party defendant.
In this case, the claims of the
respondent, as plaintiff in the RTC,
against the petitioner as defendant
therein, arose out of the contracts of
lease and sale; such transactions are
different and separate from those
between Becthel and the petitioner as
third-party plaintiff for the construction
of the latter’s projects, where the
equipment leased from the respondent
was used by the petitioner. The
controversy between the respondent
and the petitioner, on one hand, and
that between the petitioner and
Becthel, on the other, are thus entirely
distinct from each other.
[G.R. NO. L- 24103. AUGUST 10,
1967.]
BEATRIZ G. VDA DE DIOS, plaintiff-
appellee, vs. LEANDRO BALAGOT,
petitioner- appellant, vs. J.M.
TUASON & CO., INC. AND PEDRO
DEUDOR, oppositors-appellees.
Facts:
An action for recovery of possession of
land was filed by De Dios against
Balagot, alleging that the latter failed

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and refused to vacate a lot which she
bought from J.M. Tuason & Co. Balagot
filed an answer with a counterclaim,
alleging that he had bought the land
from Pedro Deudor, the successor-in-
interest of the original owner of the
land, and that pursuant to an
agreement between J.M Tuason & Co.,
and the Deudor heirs, his right over
the land in question has preference
over the sale in favor of the plaintiff.
After the case was scheduled for
hearing, defendant filed a motion for
leave to file a third party complaint
against J.M Tuason & Co., and Pedro
Deudor, for payment of the value of
the lot and house he constructed
thereon, in case of eviction. De Dios
opposed the motion, stating that a
third party complaint, to enforce a
warranty of eviction, should have been
filed before filing the answer. The
motion was denied. On appeal to CA,
the appeal was certified to the SC since
the CA found the same to involve pure
questions of law.
Issue:
Whether the order denying the
admission of the third-party complaint
can be appealed from at this stage of
the proceeding.
Ruling:
[The SC ruled that the third-party
complaint against JM Tuason & Co was
inadmissible because there is no
relationship of vendor-vendee between
the latter and Balagot]
As to the admissibility of the order
disallowing the third-party complaint
against Pedro Deudor, suffice it to
reiterate that the same would finally
dispose of defendant’s right to enforce
his warranty against eviction, since a
separate action for the same, without
having thus summoned to suit the
vendor, would not prosper (Article
1558, CC). After said disallowance,
nothing further was left to be done in
the court a quo, as regards defendant’s
right to enforce against Deudor the
warranty of eviction. Said denial was
therefore appealable.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 120384. JANUARY 13,
2004.]
PHILLIPINE EXPORT AND FOREIGN
LOAN GUARANTEE CORPORATION,
petitioner-appellant, vs.
PHILIPPINE INFRASTRUCTURES,
INC. et. al., respondent-appellees
Facts:
Petitioner issued five separate Letters
of Guarantee in favor of Philippine
National Bank as security for various
credit accommodations extended by
PNB to respondent. When PNB called
on the guarantees made by the
petitioner, respondents refused to
settle their obligation thus, petitioner
filed a complaint for collection of a sum
of money against respondents.
Respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground that the complaints
states no cause of action since it does
not allege any damages caused to the
petitioner. Such motion was dismissed
and hearing on the merits ensued.
Petitioner presented a debit memo
issued by the PNB, showing that the
latter was paid by the National
Treasurer in behalf of the petitioner
corporation. Consequently, petitioner
filed a Motion to Amend Complaint to
Conform to Evidence pursuant to
Section 5, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules
of Court. The motion was denied and
the case was dismissed. The same was
denied on reconsideration.
Issue:
Whether the denial of the Motion to
Amend Complaint to Conform to
Evidence is proper.
Ruling:
The denial of the Motion is not proper.
It should be stressed that the
amendment was sought after petitioner
had already presented evidence,
particularly the testimony of its
treasury department manager and the
debit memo from PNB proving that
petitioner had paid PNB in the amount
pursuant to its guarantees accorded to
respondent. Evidently, respondent’s
failure to object to the evidence at the
time it was presented in court is fatal
to their cause inasmuch as whatever
perceived defect the complained had
was cured by the introduction of
petitioner’s evidence proving actual
loss sustained by petitioner due to its
payment to PNB. Thus, the contention
of respondents that the amendment
would introduce a subsequently
acquired cause of action as there was
none at the time the original complaint
was filed, is not tenable. Verily, it was
patently erroneous on the part of the
trial court not to have allowed the
amendments as to make the complaint
conform to petitioner’s evidence that
was presented without any objection
from the respondents.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 153777. APRIL 15, 2005.]
PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK,
petitioner, vs. LZK HOLDINGS and
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondent.
Facts:
LHDC entered into a loan agreement
with PDB whereby the former was
extended a credit accommodation to
finance the construction of its building.

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To secure the loan, LHDC executed a
real estate mortgage in favor of PDB.
For failure to pay the loan, PDB
foreclosed the lot and the property was
sold to it as the highest bidder. LHDC
filed a complaint against PDB alleging
that the mortgage and its foreclosure
was void. PDB filed its answer with
counterclaim. LHDC filed a Motion for
Leave to file a supplemental complaint
to cover occurrences subsequent to the
original complaint. PDB opposed the
supplemental complaint and urgent
motion arguing that what goes against
its admission is the fact that the
supplemental matters involved therein
would bring into the case new causes
of action, distinct from the original
complaint. The court admitted the
supplemental complaint.
Issue:
Whether the admission of the
supplemental complaint is proper.
Ruling:
The admission of the supplemental
complaint is proper.
As its very name denotes,
supplemental pleading only serves to
bolster or adds something to the
primary pleading. A supplemental
exists side by side with the original. It
does not replace that which it
supplements. Moreover,
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supplemental pleading assumes that
the original pleading is to stand and
that the issues joined with the original
pleading remained an issue to be tried
in the action. It is but a continuation of
the complaint. Its usual office is to set
up new facts which justify, enlarge or
change the kind of relief with respect
to the same subject matter as the
controversy referred to in the original
complaint. The purpose of the
supplemental pleading is to bring into
the records new facts which will
enlarge or change the kind of relief to
wich the plaintiff is entitled; hence any
supplemental facts which further
develop the original right of action, or
extend to vary the relief, are available
by way of supplemental complaint even
though they themselves constitutes a
right of action. The parties may file
supplemental pleadings only to supply
deficiencies in aid of an original
pleading but not to introduce new and
independent causes of action.
By its supplemental complaint, the
respondent merely enlarged its original
causes of action on account of events
which transpired after the filing of the
original complaint and prayed for
a additional reliefs. The principal and
core issues raised by the parties in
their original pleadings remain the
same. There is no showing on record
that the petitioner would be prejudiced
by the admission of the supplemental
a complaint. After all, the petitioner has
the right to file a supplemental answer
to the supplemental complaint,
conformably to Section 7, Rule 11of
the Revised Rules of Court. The trial
court cannot, thus be faulted for
admitting the respondent’s
supplemental complaint.
[THIRD DIVISION]
[G.R. NO. 141180. JANUARY 11,
2005.]
GERTRUDES TEH, petitioner, vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.
Facts:
Petitioner was convicted of estafa by
the MTCC, Branch 2 of Davao City. On
appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTCC
decision. Petitioner then elevated the
matter to the CA which the CA
however dismissed the petition for
being insufficient in form, not being
accompanied by duplicate original or
certified true copies of the documents
and material parts of the record that
would support the allegations.
Moreover, there was no written
explanation why service of the petition
was not done personally. Petitioner
filed a motion for reconsideration but
was denied by the Appellate Court.
Hence, the instant petition. Petitioner
submits that the Court of Appeals erred
in holding that she failed to comply
with Section 2, Rule 42 and Section 11,
AQ - LRC
Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in dismissing the petition for
review.
Ruling:
The Court of Appeals did not commit
any error. Section 2, Rule 42 of the
Rules provides:
"SEC. 2. Form and contents. –
The petition shall be filed in seven (7)
legible copies, with the original copy
intended for the court being indicated
as such by the petitioner, and shall (a)
state the full names of the parties to
the case, without impleading the lower
courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate
the specific material dates showing
that it was filed on time; (c) set forth
concisely a statement of the matters
involved, the issues raised, the
specification of errors of fact or law, or
both, allegedly committed by the
Regional Trial Court, and the reasons
or arguments relied upon for the
allowance of the appeal; (d) be
accompanied by clearly legible
duplicate originals or true copies of the
judgments or final orders of both lower
courts, certified correct by the clerk of

court of the Regional Trial Court, the
requisite number of plain copies
thereof and of the pleadings and other
material portions of the record as
would support the allegations of the
petition.
We note that petitioner herself admits
that the only documents attached to
the petition in CA-G.R. CR No. 23482
were certified true copies of the
Decisions of the RTC and the MTCC.
There were no copies of the pleadings
filed below or other material portions
of the record which would support the
allegations in the petition. Indeed, this
is contrary to Section 2, Rule 42
quoted above.
Further, Section 11, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads:
"SEC. 11. Priorities in modes of
service and filing. – Whenever
practicable, the service and filing of
pleadings and other papers shall be
done personally. Except with respect to
papers emanating from the court, a
resort to other modes must be
accompanied by a written explanation
why the service or filing was not done
personally. A violation of this Rule may
be cause to consider the paper as not
filed."
Again, petitioner admits that she failed
to comply with the above provision.
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She contends, however, that no
prejudice was caused to the parties by
her non-compliance. Clearly, petitioner
violated both provisions quoted above
which warrants the dismissal of her
petition by the Court of Appeals.
[THIRD DIVISION]
[G.R. NO. 141255. JUNE 21, 2005.]
LUCIANO ELLO, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
This is a petition for certiorari assailing
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dismissing outright the petition for
review filed by spouses Luciano and
Gaudiosa Ello, petitioners herein, on
the ground that they failed to
incorporate therein the affidavit of
proof of service required under Section
11 in relation to Section 13, Rule 13 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. In their motion for
reconsideration, petitioners averred
that they failed to append to their
petition the affidavit of service due to
an excusable oversight considering the
time constraint in filing the petition
with its voluminous annexes; that they
have a meritorious case; and that
there would be a denial of substantial
justice if their petition would be
dismissed merely by reason of
technicality. Citing previous rulings of
this Court that procedural rules should
be liberally construed in order to
promote substantial justice, petitioners
prayed that the affidavit of proof of
service attached to their motion be
admitted and that their petition be
given due course. Still unconvinced,
the Court of Appeals, in its Resolution
dated October 8, 1999, denied
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration,
Petitioners now allege that the said
court “acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction” by persisting in dismissing
their petition for review “solely on
technical grounds without regard
whatsoever to the substantial merit of
their cause and the resulting injustice
that could be created thereby.” They
pray that the challenged Resolutions be
annulled and that their petition be
given due course.
Issue:
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely
abused its discretion it dismissing the
petitioner’s petition for review on
technical grounds.
Ruling:
Sections 3 and 5, Rule 13 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
prescribe two modes of filing and
service of pleadings, motions, notices,
orders, judgments and other papers.
However, Section 11 of Rule 13
AQ - LRC
requires that “whenever practicable,”
the filing of pleadings and other papers
in court, as well as the service of said
papers on the adverse party or his
counsel, must be done “personally.”
But if such filing and service were
through a different mode, the party
concerned must submit a “written
explanation” why they were not done
personally.
The requirement under Section 11 is
mandatory. Any violation of this Rule
may be cause for the court to consider
the paper as not filed. However, such
discretionary power of the court must
be exercised properly and reasonably,
taking into account the following
factors: (1) “the practicability of
personal service;” (2) “the importance
of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein;” and (3) “the
prima facie merit of the pleading
sought to be expunged for violation of
Section 11.”
We thus take this opportunity to clarify
that under Section 11, Rule 13 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, personal
service and filing is the general rule,
and resort to other modes of service
and filing, the exception. Henceforth,
whenever personal service or filing is
practicable, in light of the
circumstances of time, place and
person, personal service or filing is
mandatory. Only when personal
service or filing is not practicable may
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resort to other modes be had, which
must then be accompanied by a
written explanation as to why personal
service or filing was not practicable to
begin with. In adjudging the
plausibility of an explanation, a court
shall likewise consider the importance
of the subject matter of the case or the
issues involved therein, and the prima
facie merit of the pleading sought to be
expunged for violation of Section 11.
Significantly, Gabriel Manasan’s
affidavit of service shows that the
petition for review was filed with the
Court of Appeals in Manila through
registered mail. This mode of filing is
permitted under Section 11 of Rule 13
since it s obviously impractical for
petitioners and their counsel, who are
all residents of Cagayan de Oro City, to
personally file their petition in Manila.
As to the service of copies of the
petition, Manasan personally served
the same on respondents’ counsel and
the RTC in Cagayan de Oro City, thus
fully complying with Section 11.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 140158. January 29, 2001.]
FERNANDO T. BALTAZAR,
petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS, HON. ISAGANI PALAD,
Presiding Judge, Branch 53, RTC,
Guagua, Pampanga, and CATALINA
BAGASINA, respondents.
Facts:
Petitioner Fernando Baltazar and
private respondent Catalina Bagasina
were both candidates for the position
of municipal mayor of Sasmuan,
Pampanga petitioner was declared the
duly elected mayor of the municipality.
On June 29, 1998, private respondent
filed with the Regional Trial Court of
Guagua, Pampanga, an election
protest. Summons was served on
petitioner on July 7, 1998. Thereafter,
petitioner filed with the trial court his
Answer with Counter-Protest. Private
respondent filed a Motion To Expunge
From The Records Of this Case
Protestee's Answer And Counter-
Protest on the ground that the same
was filed out of time or three (3) days
beyond the five-day reglementary
period. Petitioner in this petition for
certiorari seeks the reversal of the
COMELEC En Banc Resolution which
sustained the trial court's ruling to
strike out petitioner's Answer with
Counter-Protest on the ground that the
same was filed out of time. Petitioner
insisted that his Answer with Counter
Protest was filed on July 13, 1998 as
shown by the Certification issued by
the Philpost Mail Management
Corporation, not on July 14, 1998, the
date stamped in the registry receipt,
nor on July 15, 1998, the date
postmarked in the envelope, which
contained the answer.
Issue:
Whether or not the COMELEC gravely
abused its discretion when it sustained
the trial court's ruling to strike out
petitioner's Answer with Counter-
Protest on the ground that the same
was filed out of time.
Ruling:
A close scrutiny of the record shows
that the envelope which contained
petitioner's Answer with Counter-
Protest was filed postmarked July 15,
1998. It is, therefore, clear that the
pleading was filed three (3) days
beyond the five-day reglementary
period within which to file the same,
considering that summons was served
on him on July 7, 1998. Petitioner did
not present the Operations Manager
who issued the certification to testify
on the document and overcome the
presumption, despite being given the
opportunity to do so.
It would be a legal absurdity for the
Court to allow a mere certification,
whose author has not been presented
to testify on its veracity, to overthrow
the evidentiary value of an
uncontroverted documentary exhibit
such as the Registry Receipt and the
postmark actually stamped on the
envelope itself to prove the actual date
of mailing of the pleading.
Consequently, since petitioner's
Answer with Counter-Protest was filed
out of time, the trial court correctly
declared that it had no jurisdiction over
the same.
The rule prescribing the ten-day period
is mandatory and jurisdictional and the
filing of an election protest beyond the
period deprives the court of jurisdiction
over the protest. The rule is not a mere
technicality but an essential
requirement, the non-compliance of
which would oust the court of
jurisdiction over the case.
[SECOND DIVISION]
[A.M. NO. RTJ-04-1886. MAY 16,
2005.]
ALFREDO G. BOISER, complainant,
vs. JUDGE JOSE Y. AGUIRRE, JR.,
respondent.
Facts:
Complainant Alfredo Boiser was the
plaintiff in an ejectment case filed
before the MTC of Himamaylan City,
Negros Occidental. The MTC rendered a
decision in favor of complainant. The
case was appealed to the RTC of
Negros Occidental, Branch 55.
Defendant-appellant Salvador Julleza
filed a motion to release bond on the
ground that the MTC of Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental had already resolved

29 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E AQ - LRC

the writ of preliminary injunction
without mentioning the applicant’s
liability. Respondent judge granted the
motion. Complainant alleged that the
issuance by respondent judge of the
Order is indicative of his ignorance of
the law considering that the motion did
not state that he was furnished a copy
of the motion thereby depriving him of
his right to due process. He also
averred that the motion was a mere
scrap of paper for failure to state the
time and date of hearing.
Issue:
Whether the respondent judge
committed gravely erred in issuing the
questioned orders.
Ruling:
Respondent judge had ignored a
fundamental rule. He acted too
precipitately in granting defendant’s
motion despite the absence of the
requirements prescribed by the Rules
of Court.
The Rules of Court requires that every
motion must be set for hearing by the
movant, except those motions which
the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse
party. The notice of hearing must be
addressed to all parties and must
specify the time and date of the
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hearing, with proof of service. Sections
4, 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules
on Civil Procedure provide:
xxx
SEC. 5. Notice of hearing.- The
notice of hearing shall be addressed to
all parties concerned, and shall specify
the time and date of the hearing which
must not be later than ten (10) days
after the filing of the motion.
SEC. 6. Proof of service
necessary.- No written motion set for
hearing shall be acted upon by the
court without proof of service thereof.
It appears that the Motion to Release
Bond was defective as it did not have a
proper notice of hearing. The date and
time of the hearing were not specified.
Neither complainant nor his counsel
was furnished a copy thereof. These
were never controverted by respondent
judge.
A motion without notice of hearing is
pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It
presents no question which the court
could decide. The court has no reason
to consider it and the clerk has no right
to receive it. The rationale behind the
rule is plain: unless the movant sets
the time and place of hearing, the
court will be unable to determine
whether the adverse party agrees or
objects to the motion, and if he
objects, to hear him on his objection,
since the rules themselves do not fix
any period within which he may file his
reply or opposition. The objective of
the rule is to avoid a capricious change
of mind in order to provide due process
to both parties and ensure impartiality
in the trial.
Also, without proof of service to the
adverse party, a motion is nothing but
an empty formality deserving no
judicial cognizance. The rule mandates
that the same shall not be acted upon
by the court. Proof of service is
mandatory.
[THIRD DIVISION]
[G.R. NO. 143646. April 4, 2001.]
SPOUSES HENRY G. LIM,
petitioners, vs. PEPITO M. VERA
CRUZ, respondent.
Facts:
A complaint for quieting of title,
annulment and damages was filed by
Vera Cruz against Lim. Vera Cruz
caused the annotation of a notice of lis
pendens at the back of the Transfer
Certificate of Title. A motion to cancel
notice of lis pendens was filed by
petitioner on the ground that said
notice was designed solely to molest
them/or it is not necessary to protect
respondent's rights. The same was
opposed by respondent insisting that
AQ - LRC
the notice of lis pendens was recorded
in order to protect his right over the
property covered by the TCT and to
avoid sale of property pending the
execution of the judgment in the case.
Respondent judge issued an order
cancelling the notice of lis pendens
annotated at the back of the TCT upon
the posting by petitioner of an
indemnity bond. Petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was denied. On appeal,
the CA set aside the order of the trial
court canceling the notice of lis
pendens. Hence, this petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
erred in holding that the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in
cancelling the notice of lis pendens.
Ruling:
Petitioners' contention lacks merit.
Petitioners claim that the notice of lis
pendens practically covers his entire
land covered by the TCT and thus
molests his right as an owner.
Lis pendens has been conceived to
protect the real rights of the party
causing the registration thereof. With
the lis pendens duly recorded, he could
rest secure that he would not lose the
property or any part of it. For such
notice serves as a warning to a
prospective purchaser or incumbrancer
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that the particular property is in
litigation; and that he should keep his
hands off the same unless of course,
he intends to gamble on the results of
the litigation. Based on this principle as
well as the express provisions of Sec.
14, Rule 13 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, as amended, only the
particular property subject of litigation
is covered by the notice of lis pendens.
In this case, only the 200 square meter
portion of the entire area is embraced
by the notice of lis pendens. In causing
the annotation of such notice,
respondent's aim is to protect his right
as an owner of this specific area. Thus,
the ruling of the trial court that the
notice of lis pendens is tantamount to
an unlawful dispossession and
restriction of petitioners' right of
dominion over the entire lot covered by
the TCT is, therefore, an erroneous
conclusion.
Pursuant to Section 14, Rule 13 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, earlier quoted, courts can
cancel a notice of lis pendens only on
two grounds: a) after a proper showing
that the notice is for the purpose of
molesting the adverse party; or b) it is
not necessary to protect the interest of
the party who caused it to be recorded.
For purposes of annotating a notice of
lis pendens, there is nothing in the
rules which requires the party seeking
annotation to show that the land
31 | C A S E S D I G E S T S I N C I V I L P R O C E D U R E
belongs to him. In fact, there is no
requirement that the party applying for
the annotation of the notice must
prove his right or interest over the
property sought to be annotated.
Hence, even on the basis of an
unregistered deed of sale, a notice of
lis pendens may be annotated on the
title. And such annotation can not be
considered as a collateral attack
against the certificate of title. This is
based on the principle that the
registration of a notice of lis pendens
does not produce a legal effect similar
to a lien. It does not create a right or
lien. It only means that a person
purchases or contracts on the property
in dispute subject to the result of the
pending litigation.
SUMMONS
[FIRST DIVISION]
ASIAVEST LIMITED, petitioner, vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ANTONIO
HERAS,respondents.
[G.R. NO. 128803. SEPTEMBER 25,
1998.]
Facts:
Asiavest sought to enforce a Hong
Kong judgment against private
respondent Heras, ordering the latter
to pay Asiavest a sum of money. The
RTC ruled in favor of Asiavest but was
reversed by the CA after finding that
the Hong Kong Courts never acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Heras
through valid summons. It was shown
that Heras was a resident of Quezon
City but stayed and maintained a
business in Hong Kong at the time of
the filing of the complaint. The
summons was served through
substituted service at Heras’ QC
address. The CA held that the
summons should have been personally
served in Hong Kong and that a notice
sent outside the state to a non-
resident is unavailing to give
jurisdiction in action against him
personally for money recovery.
Issue:
WON summons was validly served
upon Heras so as to confer the Hong
Kong court jurisdiction over his person.
Ruling:
The summons was not validly served
on Heras by the Hong Kong Court;
hence its judgment cannot be
enforceable here in the Philippines.
Since the foreign (HK) rules on service
of summons were not duly proved at
the trial, it is presumed to be the same
as the rules here in the Philippines
which applies according to whether the
action is one in rem or quasi in rem. An
action in personam is an action against
a person on the basis of his personal
liability, while an action quasi in rem is
AQ - LRC
one against the thing itself wherein an
individual is just named as defendant
in order to subject his interest over the
property to an obligation or lien. In
actions in personam, jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is
necessary before the court can try the
case, but not in actions in rem where
only jurisdiction over the res is
necessary, the service of summons
merely being for due process
requirements.
The case at bar is an action in
personam. Sections 7 and 8, Rule 14 of
our Rules of Court provides for how
summons may be validly acquired over
resident defendants. However, in an
action in personam wherein the
defendant is a non-resident who does
not voluntarily appear in court,
personal service of summons within
the State is essential to acquire
jurisdiction over his person. This
method of service is possible if such
defendant is physically present in the
country, if not, the court cannot
acquire jurisdiction over his person and
cannot validly try and decide the case
against him. Since Heras was not a
resident of HK and the action against
him was one in personam, summons
should have been personally served on
him in HK. The extraterritorial service
in the Philippines is invalid and did not
confer upon the HK court jurisdiction
over the person of Heras. It follows
that the HK court judgment cannot be
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given force and effect here in the
Philippines for having been rendered
without jurisdiction.
[THIRD DIVISION]
CRISOSTOMO REBOLLIDO, et.al.,
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
AND PEPSICO, INC., respondents.
[G.R. NO. 81123. FEBRUARY 28,
1989.]
Facts:
An accident occurred between a vehicle
owned by petitioners and a truck
owned by Pepsi Cola, giving rise to an
action for damages. Summons for the
defendant Pepsi Cola was served and
was received by one Nenette Sison
who represented herself to be an
authorized person to receive the same
as she was the secretary of Pepsi
Cola’s legal department. The case was
decided in favor of petitioners. When
the judgment became final and
executory, petitioners filed for a
motion for execution, a copy of which
was received by private respondent
Pepsico, Inc., a foreign corporation
which held offices in the country to
settle the debts, liabilities and
obligations of Pepsi Cola in preparation
for the latter’s expected dissolution.
Pepsico opposed the judgment for
execution on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, questioning the validity of
the service of summons to a mere
clerk. It invoked Sections 13 and 14,
Rule 14 of the Rules of Court on the
service of summons to private
domestic and foreign corporations. The
CA granted the petition.
Issue:
WON the court validly served to
Pepsico, through a clerk, the summons
necessary to vest over it jurisdiction
over the corporation.
Ruling:
Summons was validly served through a
mere clerk by virtue of the rule on
substantial compliance. The Rules of
Court on the service of summons upon
a private domestic corporation is also
applicable to a dissolved corporation.
Thus, service upon a dissolved
corporation may be made through the
president, manager, secretary, cashier,
agent or any of its directors. As held in
one case, although a clerk is not
authorized to receive a summons and
complaint, if it appears that the
summons and complaint were in fact
received by the corporation through
said clerk, the court shall rule that
there is substantial compliance with
the rules on service of summons. The
purpose of said rule is to assure
summons on the corporation had
thereby been attained. The need for
speedy justice must prevail over a
technicality. Whomsoever Miss Sison
was acting for in receiving the
summons, there is no question that the
notice of the action was promptly
delivered either to Pepsi Cola or
Pepsico with whom she is admittedly
connected.
[SECOND DIVISION]
CIPRIANO M. LAZARO, petitioner,
vs. RURAL BANK OF FRANCISCO
BALAGTAS, INC., respondent.
[G.R. NO. 139895. AUGUST 15, 2003.]
Facts:
Two separate cases for collection of a
sum of money were filed by
respondent bank RFBI against
petitioner Lazaro. Summonses were
served at petitioner’s address at
Valenzuela City. For failure to answer,
petitioner was declared in default in
both cases and judgment was rendered
against him. A writ of execution was
issued and served on petitioner at his
actual residence at Quezon City. Lazaro
sought annulment of judgment from
the CA which dismissed the same. In
this petition, Lazaro maintains that he
was not validly served with summons
under Section 7, Rule 14 which
requires that service be done by
leaving copies of the summons at the
defendant’s residence.
Issue:
WON petitioner was validly served with
summons.
Ruling:
Petitioner was validly served with
summons by the court. Section 6 of
Rule 14, Rules of Court, lays the rule
that summons must be personally
served on the defendant. Said
provision requires that summons,
whenever practicable, be served
personally to the defendant, or if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by
tendering it to him. Service to be done
personally does not mean that service
is possible only at the defendant’s
actual residence. It is enough that the
defendant is handed a copy of the
summons in person by anyone
authorized by law. Substituted service
under Section 7 of Rule 14 relied upon
by petitioner does not apply in this
case. The sheriff’s certificate of service
of summons is prima facie evidence of
the facts therein set out. The burden is
on the petitioner to overcome the
presumption of regularity of
performance of official functions by the
sheriff. Such he did not successfully do
here.
[SECOND DIVISION]
FILOMENA DOMAGAS, petitioner,
vs. VIVIAN LAYNO JENSEN,
respondent.
[G.R. NO. 158407. JANUARY 17,
2005.]
Facts:

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Petitioner Domagas filed an action for
forcible entry against respondent
Layno. The summons and the
complaint were not served on the
respondent because the latter was
apparently out of the country. The
sheriff left the summons with Layno’s
brother who received the same. The
court rendered judgment against Layno
and order her to vacate the lot in
question. When the corresponding writ
of execution was served, respondent
filed a complaint for the annulment of
the judgment, alleging that summons
was not validly served to her thorugh
her brother who was never authorized
to receive the same for her and who
was merely there to collect the rentals
from the lessee of Layno’s house while
she was in Norway. The RTC, affirmed
by the CA ruled in Layno’s favor.
Issue:
WON Layno was validly served with
summons through substituted service.
Ruling:
No, Layno was not validly served with
summons. Considering that she was in
Norway, the summons and the
complaint may only be validly servd on
her through substituted service under
Section 7 of Rule 14 of the Rules of
Court. Strict compliance with the mode
of service is required in order that the
court may acquire jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. In a case, the
court held that the term “dwelling
house” or “residence” are generally
held to refer to the time of service. It
refers to the place where the person
named in the summons is living at the
time the service is made, even though
he may be temporarily out of the
country at the time. It is, thus, the
service of summons intended for the
defendant that must be left with a
person of suitable age and discretion
residing in the house of the defendant.
There is no showing that the house
where the sheriff found Layno’s brother
was the latter’s residence or that of
respondent. As it turned out even, the
occupant of the house was a mere
lessee and Laynos’ brother was just
collecting rentals. The service of
summons at a place where he was a
visitor is not considered to have been
left at the residence or place or abode,
where he has another place at which
he ordinarily stays and to which he
intends to return.
[FIRST DIVISION]
ERLINDA R. VELAYO-FONG,
petitioner, vs., SPOUSES RAYMOND
and MARAI HEDY VELAYO,
respondents.
[G.R. NO. 155488. DECEMBER 6,
2006.]
Facts:
Respondents filed an action for
damages against petitioner for
maliciously instituting a criminal
complain before the NBI and a petition
before the SEC which prevented them
from leaving the country, paralyzing all
their business transactions. The case
was decided in favor of respondents.
Petitioner now questions the validity of
the judgment, contending that the
court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her person as she was not validly
served with summons. She insists that
she should have been extra-territorially
served with summons as she was a
non-resident defendant, pursuant to
Section 17, Rule 14, Rules of Court.
Issue:
WON petitioner should have been
extra-territorially served with
summons for being a non-resident
defendant.
Ruling:
No. Under Section 17, Rule 14, Rules
of Court, when the defendant is a non
resident and he is not found in the
country, summons may be served
extra territorially. There are only four
instances when extra-territorial service
of summons is proper, namely: (a)
when the action involves the personal
status of the plaintiffs; (b) when the
action relates to a property within the
Philippines, in which the defendant
claims a lien or interest, actual or
contingent; (c) when the relief
demanded in the action consists in
excluding, in whole or in part, in
excluding the defendant from any
interest in the property and; (d) when
the defendant’s property has been
attached within the Philippines. In
these instances, service of summons
may be effected by (a)personal service
out of the country, with leave of court;
(b) publication, also with leave or; (c)
any other manner deemed sufficient by
the court.
Thus, extrajudicial service of summons
applies only in cases in rem or quasi in
rem and not in actions in personam
such as the case at bar. Where the
action is in personam and the
defendant is a non resident, personal
service of summons must be had by
handing a copy thereof to the
defendant in person, or if he refuses,
by tendering it to him. Such was done
in this case. Petitioner’s bare
allegations of non-service are not
sufficient. The certificate of service is
prima facie evidence of the facts set
out therein. Regularity is presumed
and evidence against it must be clear
and convincing.
[FIRST DIVISION]
FLORENTINO GONZALES, EDGARDO
SANTOS, LEOPOLDO ROSETE,
FELINA VICTORIA and CRISTETA
DELA CRUZ, petitioners,

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vs.BALIKATAN KILUSANG BAYAN
SA PANANALAPI, INCORPORATED,
respondent.
[G.R. No. 150859. March 28, 2005]
Facts:
Petitioner Florentino Gonzales obtained
a loan with the other petitioners as co-
makers. When petitioner Gonzales
failed to pay despite repeated written
demands, respondent filed a case for
sum of money and damages.
Summons were thereafter served. On
the scheduled hearing, defendants
appeared but because they failed to file
their answer to the complaint, the
court declared them in default. MTC, as
affirmed by the RTC and CA, rendered
its decision finding for the respondent
and against the petitioners. In this
petition, the validity of the judgment
by default is being assailed for lack of
jurisdiction, the petitioners allegedly
not having been properly served with
summons.
Issue:
WON the petitioners have not been
properly served with summons, thus
making the judgment against them
void.
Ruling:
Petitioners should be reminded of the
provision in the Rules of Court that a
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defendant’s voluntary appearance in an
action shall be equivalent to service of
summons. Further, the lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant may be waived either
expressly or impliedly. When a
defendant voluntarily appears, he is
deemed to have submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court. If he does
not wish to waive this defense, he
must do so seasonably by motion, and
object thereto.
As the records would show, summons
and copies of the complaint were
served on the petitioners. The
petitioners appeared before the court
on the scheduled hearing, as evidenced
by their signatures in the minutes.
Their voluntary appearance cured the
defect, if any, in the service of
summons.
[THIRD DIVISION]
PH CREDIT CORPORATION,
petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS
and CARLOS M. FARRALES,
respondents.
[G.R. No. 109648. November 22,
2001]
Facts:
PH Credit Corp., filed a case against
Pacific Lloyd Corp., Carlos Farrales,
Thomas H. Van Sebille and Federico C.
Lim, for a sum of money. After service
of summons upon the defendants, they
failed to file their answer within the
reglementary period, hence they were
declared in default. PH Credit Corp.,
was then allowed to present its
evidence ex-parte. Judgment was
rendered in their favor. Personal and
real properties of defendant Carlos M.
Farrales were levied and sold at public
auction wherein PH Credit Corp. was
the highest bidder. The CA declared
null and void (a) the auction sale of
Respondent Ferrales' real property and
(b) the Writ of Possession issued in
consequence thereof. It held that the
liability of Farrales was merely joint
and not solidary. Consequently, there
was no legal basis for levying and
selling Farrales' real and personal
properties in order to satisfy the whole
obligation.
Petitioner contends that because
private respondent did not question the
joint and solidary nature of his liability
in his (a) Motion to Quash Levy
Execution, (b) Urgent Motion to Order
Sheriff to Suspend Sale on Execution,
and (c) Motion to Declare Certificate of
Sale Null and Void, he cannot now
raise it as an objection. Petitioner
argues that the "Omnibus Motion Rule"
bars private respondent's belated
objection.
Issue:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals
disregarded the basic policy of avoiding
multiplicity of motions.
AQ - LRC
Ruling:
The Rules of Court requires that all
available objections to a judgment or
proceeding must be set up in an
Omnibus Motion assailing it; otherwise,
they are deemed waived. In the case
at bar, the objection of private
respondent to his solidary liability
became available to him, only after his
real property was sold at public
auction. At the time his personal
properties were levied and sold, it was
not evident to him that he was being
held solely liable for the monetary
judgment rendered against him and his
co-respondents. That was why his
objections then did not include those
he asserted when his solidary liability
became evident.
Prior to his Omnibus Motion, he was
not yet being made to pay for the
entire obligation. Thus, his objection to
his being made solidarily liable with the
other respondents was not yet
available to him at the time he filed the
Motions referred to by petitioner. Not
being available, these objections could
not have been deemed waived when
he filed his three earlier Motions, which
pertained to matters different from
those covered by his Omnibus Motion.
True, the Omnibus Motion Rule
requires the movant to raise all
available exceptions in a single
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opportunity to avoid multiple

piecemeal objections. But to apply that
statutory norm, the objections must
have been available to the party at the
time the Motion was filed.

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