Setting Aside an Arbitral Award

It is unambiguous that the parties cannot appeal against an arbitral award as to its
merits and courts may not act as appeal courts and question on merits of the
arbitral award. As per observation of court `` an arbitrator is a judge appointed by
the parties and as such an award passed by him is not to be lightly interfered with’’.
However, the law allows certain remedies against exceptional errors like award
against public policy, substantive provisions of law, or the provisions of the Act or
against the terms of the contract or being patently illegal or being so unfair and
unreasonable so as to shock the conscience of the court.

Earlier under the repealed 1940 Act three remedies were available against the
Award modification, remission and setting aside. These remedies have been put
against under the 1996 Act into two categories.

Section 34 provides that an arbitral award may be set aside by a court on certain
grounds specified therein. These grounds are:
1. Incapacity of party.

2. Arbitration agreement not being valid.

3. Party not given proper notice of arbitral proceeding.

4. Nature of dispute not falling within the terms of submission to arbitration.

5. Arbitral procedure not being in accordance with the agreement.

Section 34 (2) (b) mentions two more grounds which are left with the court itself to
decide whether to set aside the arbitral award.
1. Dispute is not capable of settlement by arbitral process.

2. Award is in conflict with public policy on India.

Section 34 of the Act is based on the section 34 of the UNCITRAL model law and
the scope of the provisions for setting aside the award is far less than it was under
the section 30 or 33 of the 1940 Act.

In Municipal Corp. of Greater Mumbai v. Prestress Products (India) [i], the

court held that the new Act was brought to into being with the express
Parliamentary objective of curtailing judicial intervention. Thus, section 34
significantly reduces the extent of potential challenge to an award.

“10. The avowed objective of Parliament in enacting the Act of 1996 is to

reduce judicial intervention by providing for a speedy and expeditious
process of arbitration as a means to alternative dispute resolution. The
raison d’etre for A.D.R is to obviate the delays attendant upon normal
litigative remedies. The whole process of arbitration as an effective
instrument of A.D.R will become moribund and stultified if excessive judicial
intervention leads to those very delays which the law was intended to avoid.
Judicial intervention under the Act of 1996 hence must be confined strictly
to what legislature permits.

11. The ground on which an Arbitral Award can now be challenged under
the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 can broadly be classified thus:

(a) Matters invalidating the arbitration agreement, the appointment of

arbitrator, lack of notice of the arbitral proceedings or matters
whereby a party was otherwise unable to present his case [sub-
clause (i), (ii) and (iii) of clause (a), Section 34 (2)];

(b) If the Award deals with disputes not covered by the terms of
submission to arbitration or matters beyond the scope thereof
[Section 34 (2) (a) (iv)];

(c) If the composition of the Arbitral Tribunal or arbitral procedure, was

not in accordance with Part 1 or with the agreement of the parties
[Section 34 (2) (a) (v)];
 (d) If the subject matter of the dispute is not capable of settlement by
arbitration under the law for the time being in force [Section 34 (2) (b)
(i)].

(e) If the Arbitral Award is in conflict with the public policy of India
[Section 34 (2) (b) (ii)]

12. The public policy defense which is suggested by section 34 (2) (b) (ii)
of the Act came up for consideration before the Division Bench of this court
in the Vijaya Bank Case. The Division Bench, held after referring to the
observations of the Supreme court in Renusagar Power Co. Ltd. v.
General Electric Co. that while it was not possible to attempt a definition of
the exact meaning of the expression ``public policy’’ this much was clear,
that ``whatever be the width of the expression it does not include a
mere contravention of law’’.

13. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 was thus enacted with an
express Parliamentary objective of curtailing judicial intervention. The
grounds for challenge which were available in the earlier Act have been
substantially curtailed and a challenge can now be preferred only on one of
the ground available under Sections 12,13,16 and 34 of the Arbitration and
Conciliation Act 1996.

14. However, at the present stage it would be material to note that even
under the earlier Act of 1940, it was trite law that the reasonableness of
the reasons given by the Arbitrator cannot be challenged and that
Arbitrator is the sole judge of the quality as well as of the quantity of
evidence. Consequently, it was held by the Supreme Court that it was not
for the court to take upon the task of being a judge of the evidence before
the Arbitrator. The Court was required to approach the Award with a desire
to support it, if that is reasonably possible, rather than to destroy the Award
by calling it illegal, Bijendra Nath Srivastava V. Mayank Srivastava AIR
1995 SC 2562 [ii].
It is necessary for the aggrieved party to make and application under section 34
stating the grounds for challenge. There is no special format prescribed for making
an application under section 34 of the act except it has to be a written statement
within the period of limitation.
In Sanshin Chemical Industry V. Oriental Carbons & Chemicals Ltd. [iii] there
arose a dispute between the parties regarding the decision of the joint Arbitration
Committee relating to venue of arbitration. The Apex Court held that a decision on
the question of venue will not be either an award or an interim section 34 of the
Act. The Supreme Court observed in this case:
`` Besides bearing in mind the object behind the Arbitration and Conciliation
Act 1996, as has been indicated by this court in the case of Konkan Railway
Corpn Ltd. & Ors V. Mehul Construction Co. [2000] 7 SCC 201 [iv], which
is in consonance with the UNCITRA model law, it would not be conducive to
interpret the decision of the Joint Arbitration Committee with regard to the
venue to be an interim award, conferring a right to challenge to an aggrieved
person under section 34 of the Act.
Mr. Desai’s (Appellant’s Counsel) contention that the question of venue is of
utmost importance, since the arbitral proceedings will be conducted in
accordance with the rules applicable to the place where the arbitration
proceedings is conducted and consequently denial of a right to appeal
against the same is never contemplated of requires consideration. It is
undoubtedly true that if the arbitration is to be held in India, then the
proceeding will be conducted in accordance with the rules applicable in India
and if the arbitration is to be held in Japan, it has to be conducted in
accordance with the rules of Japan Commercial Arbitration Association and
as such the decision on question of venue is of utmost importance. But the
further contention that aggrieved party has no right to assail the same, once
the said decision is not assailed at this stage does not appear to be correct.
The ultimate arbitral award could be assailed on the grounds indicated in
sub-section (2) of section 34 and an erroneous decision on the question of
venue, which ultimately affected the procedure that has been followed in the
arbitral proceedings could come within the sweep of section 34 (2) and as
such cannot be said that an aggrieved party has no remedy at all’’.
In Brijendra Nath V. Mayank [Supra], the court held that where the parties have
acted upon the arbitral award during the pendency of the application challenging
its validity and it would amount to estoppel against attacking the award.
An award which is set aside no longer remains enforceable by law. The parties are
restored to their former position as to their claims in the dispute. Setting aside an
award means that it is rejected as invalid. The award is voided and the matter
becomes open for decision again. The parties become free to go back to arbitration
or to have the matter decided through court.

INCAPACITY OF PARTIES
If a party to arbitration is not capable of looking after his own interests and he is
not represented by a person who can protect his interests, the award will not be
binding on him and may be set aside on his application.
If a minor or a person of unsound mind is a party he must be properly represented
by a proper guardian otherwise the award would be liable to set aside. Such a
person is not capable of binding himself by a contract and therefore, an award
under a contract does not bind him.
Section 9 of the 1996 Act enables him to apply to the court for appointment of a
guardian for minor or person of unsound mind for the purpose of arbitral
proceedings. The ground for incapacity would cease to be available when the
incompetent person is represented by a guardian.

INVALIDITY OF AGREEMENT
The validity of an agreement can be challenged on any of the grounds on which
the validity of a contract may be challenged. In cases where the arbitration clause
is contained in a contract, the arbitration clause will be invalid if the contract is
invalid.
In State of UP v. Allied Construction [v] the court held that the validity of an
agreement has to be tested on the basis of the law to which the parties have
subjected it. Where there is no such indication, the validity would be examined
according to the law which is in force.
Under a contract entered into by and between the appellant (State of UP)
and the respondent (Allied Constructions), the respondent undertook
construction of bridge-cum-fall at Munda Khera Scope at the estimated cost
of Rs. 37.2 Lakhs. While the work was in progress, the work area was
flooded.
The respondent – contractor herein filed a claim on account of loss
sustained by him due to flooding of the work area. Ultimately, the matter was
referred to an arbitrator. The arbitrator gave an award for payment of a sum
of Rs. 12.55 Lakhs along with interest. The respondent filed the award for
being made rule of the court. The appellant herein filed a petition, inter alia,
on the ground that the arbitrator has misconducted the proceedings, in as
much as the force majeure clause contained in the clause 47 disentitled the
respondent from making any claim which was on account of unprecedented
rain. The said objection was rejected, and the award was made as the rule
of the court. The appellant thereafter filed a first appeal from order before
the High Court and the same was dismissed. Thus, appellant appealed
before Supreme Court.
The appellant herein did not lead any evidence before the arbitrator that the
rain as a result of which the loss was sustained by the respondent was
unprecedented and in fact it was an act of God. In absence of such an
evidence the arbitrator as well as the High Court has recorded a finding of
fact that the flood which has caused loss to the respondent was not due to
unprecedented rain and therefore clause 47 of the Agreement was not
attracted.
Any award made by an arbitrator can only be set aside only if one or other
term specified in Sections 30 or 33 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 is attracted.
It was within his jurisdiction to interpret clause 47 of the Agreement having
regard to the fact-situation obtaining therein. It is submitted that an award
made by an arbitrator may be wrong either on law or on fact and error of law
on face of it could not nullify an award. The award is a speaking one. The
arbitrator has assigned sufficient and cogent reasons in support thereof.
Interpretation of a contract, it is trite, is a matter for arbitrator to determine
(see M/s Sudarshan Trading Co. v The Government of Kerala AIR
(1989) SC 890 [vi]). Section 30 of the Arbitration Act, 1940 providing for
setting aside an award is restrictive in its operation.
Unless one or the other condition contained in section 30 is satisfied an
award cannot be set aside. The arbitration is a judge chosen by the parties
and his decision is final. The court is precluded from reappraising the
evidence. Even in a case where the award contains reason, the interference
there with would still be not available within the jurisdiction of the court,
unless of course, the reasons are totally perverse, or the judgment is based
on wrong proposition of law. An error apparent on the face of the records
would not imply closer scrutiny of the merits of the documents and materials
on record. Once it is found that the view of the arbitrator is a plausible one,
the court will refrain itself from interfering [see UP State Electricity Board
v. Sarsole Chemicals Ltd. [2001] 3 SCC 397 [vii] and ISPAT Engineering
& Foundry Works B.S. City Bokaro [2001] 6 SCC 347] [viii].
NOTICE NOT GIVEN TO PARTIES
Section 34 (2) (a) (iii) permits challenge to an award if the party was not given
proper notice of the appointment of an arbitrator, or the party was not given proper
notice of the arbitral proceedings, or the party was for some reasons unable to
present his case.
Under section 23 (i) the Arbitral Tribunal has to determine the time within which
the statements must be filed. This determination must be communicated to the
parties by a proper notice section 24 (2) mandates that the parties shall be given
sufficient advance notice of any hearing or meeting of the Tribunal for the purpose
of inspection of documents, goods or other property.
It for any good reason a party is prevented from appearing and presenting his case
before the tribunal, the award shall be liable to be set aside as the party will be
deemed to have been deprived of an opportunity of being heard the principle of
natural justice.
In Dulal Poddar v. Executive Engineer, Dona Canal Division [ix], the court held
that appointment of an arbitrator at the behest of the appellant without sending
notice to the respondent, exparte award given by the arbitrator was illegal and
liable to be set aside.
The appellant who was a contractor entered into an agreement with the
respondents for carrying on construction of a canal. The agreement provided
that in case of any dispute arising under the contract, the matter would be
decided by an Arbitrator who would be the Superintending Engineer.
Disputes and differences having been arisen between the parties, the
Arbitration Agreement was invoked by the appellant pursuant whereto the
respondent herein appointed the Superintending Engineer as the Arbitrator.
The said Arbitrator passed an interim award. Inspite of several requests
made by the appellant herein the Arbitrator did not consider his claims and
pass a final award.
The appellant herein, thereafter filed an application under section 8 of the
Arbitration Act, 1940 in the court of Subordinate Judge. It appears that the
said court appointed a retired Chief Engineer as an Arbitrator without issuing
a notice to the respondent. When the respondents came to know about the
appointment of the said Arbitrator, they filed a revision petition before the
High Court challenging the appointment of the said arbitrator as illegal. In
the revision petition no order of stay however was passed and as a result of
 that the said Arbitrator proceeded to make an ex-parte award. In the
meantime, when the Civil Revision Petition came up for hearing before the
High Court, it with view that since an award has already been made by the
Arbitrator, it would be open to the respondents to challenge the appointment
of the Arbitrator by means of an objection under section 30 of the Act before
the Civil Court. Accordingly, the respondent filed an objection before the Civil
Court. The Civil Court reflected the said objection. The respondents,
thereafter preferred an appeal against the said order of the Civil Court before
the High Court. The High Court allowed the said appeal and set aside the
appointment of the Arbitrator as well as the award given by the Arbitrator.
The Contractor filed the appeal in Supreme Court against the High Court
judgment by means of special leave petition. The Supreme Court agreed
with the view of the High Court as it does not suffer from any legal infirmity.
It is not disputed that no notice at all was sent to the respondent before
appointing Arbitrator. It is also not disputed that the award given by the
Arbitrator was an ex-parte one. Furthermore, such an award which have
been made by the Arbitrator have been passed without giving an opportunity
of hearing to the respondents therein, was illegal and void. Hence the appeal
was dismissed.
In Vijay Kumar v. Bathinda Central Co-operative Bank and ors. [x], the court
observed ``It is a typical case of where the Arbitrator misconducted the
proceedings and also misconducted himself.
Arbitrator held the first and only hearing on May 17, 2010. No points for settlement
or issues were framed. The bank filed four affidavits of its employees. Appellant
was not given opportunity to cross-examine them. He was denied opportunity to
produce evidence. A complete go bye was given to the provisions of law,
procedure and rules of justice. It would be thus seen that appellant was unable to
present his case.

AWARDS BEYOND SCOPE OF REFERENCE

The reference of a dispute under an agreement defines the limits of the authority
and jurisdiction of the Arbitrator. If the Arbitrator had assumed jurisdiction not
possessed by him, the award to the extent to which it is beyond the Arbitrator’s
jurisdiction would be invalid and liable to be set aside.
Section 34 (2) (a) (iv) of the Act provides that an arbitral award is liable to be set
aside if it deals with a dispute not contemplated by the reference, or not falling
within the terms of the reference or it contains a decision in matters beyond the
reference.
In Gautam Construction & Fisheries Ltd. V. National Bank of Agriculture and
Rural Development [xi], the Supreme Court modified the award to the extent that
the rate of construction meant for ground floor could not be applied to the
construction of basement area.
The appellant M/s, Gautam Constructions & Fisheries Ltd., and the 1st
respondent National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development Bombay,
entered into an agreement for the sale and the purchase of office
accommodation measuring 48,000 square feet of built up area together with
land at the rate of Rs. 400/- per square feet of built up area Rs. 250/- per
square feet for amenities, extra works, fittings etc.
Dispute arose between the parties as to the actual amount to be paid, though
the building had been completed and handed over and payments had been
made. Appellant made additional claim of Rs. 48.36 Lakhs and respondent
also made counter claim of Rs. 85.68 Lakhs. The matter war referred to the
arbitrator who passed an Award on 24.05.1990. Arbitrator allowed for the
basement portion also at the rate of Rs. 400/- sqm with interest @ 18% p.a.
from the date of submission of the bill and rejected all counterclaim.
The Supreme Court made following observations ``we are of the view that
though no exception could be taken to the decision directing payment by the
1st respondent (Bank) for the area of 12090 sqm, the award of the sum at
the rate of Rs. 150/- seem to us to be unwarranted and unjustified, having
regard to the very terms of the contract which provided for the payment at
the rate of Rs. 250/- per sqft and an additional sum of Rs. 150/- for amenities
of the nature mentioned therein. The basement portion meant only for car
parking cannot be equated to the regular office portion of the ground and
other floors agreed to be constructed with all stipulated amenities and
though the claim of Rs. 400/- on behalf of the appellant seem to be for
fetched and unwarranted on the terms of the contract, the reasonable rate
at which the appellant could claim for reimbursement in respect of the
basement area for car parking constructed in lieu of the initially agreed stilt
portion for the very same purpose of car parking only, at the rate of Rs. 250/-
and nothing more since for the said portion, if at all the rate agreed under
the principal agreement at Rs. 250/- will apply and could alone be allowed.
In Rajinder Kishan Kumar v. Union of India [viii], a matter under a writ petition
was referred to arbitration. The writ petition confined no claim of compensation for
damage to potentiality of the land because of the opposite party discharging
effluents and slurry to the land. The award of such compensation was held to be
outside the scope of reference hence liable to be set aside.
The appellants filed a writ petition in the High Court of Punjab and Haryana
against the respondents. The case in the writ petition, briefly stated was that
the writ petitioners were owners of agricultural lands at Gaddiwara in
Panipat. The second respondent, the National Fertilizer Limited, had
installed a plant for manufacture of fertilizers in the vicinity, the second
respondent had constructed a ``Kutcha’’ bund around the original pond and
was using it for depositing effluents. The bund was made of earth which
breached due to the excessive pressure of the effluents and the
accumulation of burnt ash. The result was that effluent had escaped from
the pond and had damaged the writ petitioners’ standing crops, mango
gardens and residential properties. There had been loss of soil from 6 inch
to 2 feet, on their lands which had made then unfit for cultivation until such
time they were reclaimed. The second respondent had not done anything to
redress the grievances of the petitioners. The writ petition prayed for a
direction to the second respondents to close its plant until effluent disposed
arrangements were made and to pay the damages of Rs. One crore for
destruction of residential houses, crops, and mango gardens. The
respondent No. 2 may be directed to reclaim the agricultural land unfit for
cultivation. The matter was referred to arbitration where arbitration ward was
made for Rs. 77,19,800/- for ``potential loss of land’’. However, the court
concluded that the award falls outside the scope of reference to arbitration
and is not in relation to a dispute contemplated thereby. Thus, ward was set
aside.
Section 16 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act 1996 provides that the initial
decision as to jurisdiction lies with the Tribunal. The Party should immediately
object as to the excess of jurisdiction. If the Tribunal rejects the objection, the
aggrieved party may apply under section 34 (2) (a) (iv) for setting aside on the
grounds of excess of jurisdiction.
An arbitrator cannot go contrary to the terms of the contract. Where the terms of
the contract are not clear or unambiguous, the arbitrator gets the power to interpret
them. In State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co. [xiii], a majority of
claims were against the terms of the contract.
ILLEGALITY IN ARBITRAL PROCEDURE
Section 34 (2) (a) (v) provides that an award can be challenged if the composition
of the Tribunal was not in accordance with the agreement, or the procedure agreed
to by the parties was not followed in the conduct of the proceedings, or in the
absence of agreement as to procedure the procedure prescribed by the Act was
not followed.
Failure to follow the agreed procedure or the procedure prescribed by the Act is a
procedural misconduct. If the arbitral tribunal does not adhere to the stipulated
procedure then it tantamount to misconduct of Arbitrator.
Section 12 (3) (a) provides that an arbitrator may be challenged there is justifiable
doubt as to his independence or impartiality. Section 13 says if the challenge is not
successful and the award is made, the party challenging the arbitrator may apply
to the court under section 34 for setting aside the award.
In State Trading Corp. v. Molasses Co. the Bengal Chamber of Commerce
[xiv], a permanent arbitral institution did not allow a company to be represented
by its law officer, who was full time employee of the company. The court held that
it was not only misconduct of the arbitrator but also misconduct of arbitration
proceedings.
In ONGC Ltd v. Saw Pipes [xv] the Supreme Court held that in exercising
jurisdiction the Arbitral Tribunal cannot act in breach of some provisions of
substantive law or the provisions of the Act. In the above case, the losses caused
by delay were deducted from the supplier’s bill. The direction of the Arbitral
Tribunal that such deduction should be refunded with interest was held to be
neither in accordance with law, nor contract. The award was set aside to that
extent.
In Union of India v. Om Prakash Baldev Krishna [xvi], it was held that a non-
reasoned award is liable to be set aside by the court as contemplated by section
31 (3) which requires that arbitral award shall state reasons upon which it is based
unless mutually agreed by parties.
Some other examples of misconduct of proceedings are proceeding ex-parte
without sufficient cause; denial of opportunities to parties; acting against the
mandate given to the arbitration under the agreement; failure refusal to consider
counter-claim of the respondent etc.

DISPUTE NOT ARBITRABLE

The existence of an arbitral dispute is a condition precedent for exercise of power
by an arbitrator. Only matters of difference between the parties leading to litigation
which affect their private rights can be referred to arbitration.
Matters of criminal nature, insolvency proceedings and matters of public rights
cannot be decided by arbitration.
The Delhi High Court held in PNB Finance Ltd. v. Shital Prasad Jain [xvii] that
specific performance of an act cannot be granted in an arbitration proceeding. The
Supreme Court did not approve the view point of Delhi High Court. The Court held
that the right to specific performance of an agreement of sale deals with contractual
rights and it is certainly open to the parties to agree to refer the issue relating to
specific performance to arbitration.

AWARD AGAINST PUBLIC POLICY

Section 34 (2) (b) (ii) provides that an application for setting aside an arbitral award
can be made if the arbitral award is in conflict with the public policy of India.
The explanation to clause (b) clarifies that an award obtained by fraud or corruption
would also be an award against the public policy of India. An award obtained by
suppressing fact, by misleading or deceiving the arbitrator, by bucking the
arbitrator, by exerting pressure on the arbitrator etc. would be liable to be set aside.
Public Policy is not the policy of an executive authority. It connotes some matter
which concerns the public good or the public interest. Public Policy is equivalent
to the `Policy is Indian Law’. Therefore any acts that have a mischievous tendency
so as to be injurious to the interest of the state or the public or against justice and
morality is stated to be against `Public Policy’ or against the `Policy of Indian Law’.
After the 2015 Amendment courts have refrained from giving a wider
interpretations of `Public Policy’ or interfering with the merits of the case. In the
November 2017 Supreme Court Judgment of Venture Global Engineering LLC
and Ors v. Tech Mahindra Ltd. and Ors [xviii]. The court observed-
``The Award of an arbitral Tribunal can be set aside only on the grounds
specified in section 34 of the AAC Act and on no other grounds. The court
cannot act as an Appellate Court to examine the merits of the claim, nor it
can examine the merits of the claim by entering in a factual arena like an
Appellate Court.’’
The award can only be set aside, if the award is contrary to substantive provisions
of law, if it is patently illegal, or so unfair and unreasonable as to shock the
conscience of the court as being against the public policy of India.

LIMITATION FOR FILING APPLICATION

Section 34 (3) provides that an application for setting aside an arbitral award must
be made within 3 months of receiving the award or disposition of application by the
arbitral tribunal.
The importance of this section is emphasized by section 36 which provides that
the award become enforceable as soon as the limitation period under section 34
expires.
The proviso to section 34 allows the party a further period of 30 days after the
expiry of three months the court is satisfied that the party was prevented by a
sufficient cause from making the application. No application for setting aside the
award can be entertained by the court after the expiry of these additional thirty
days.
In National Aluminum Co. Ltd. v. Precast Fabrication (p) Ltd. [xix],
proceedings were instituted before the Supreme Court under the wrong belief that
it had jurisdiction in the matter of setting aside. Time spent in bonafide prosecution
of an application in wrong forum was held by Supreme Court to be sufficient cause
for condonation of delay.
In Union of India v. Shring Construction (P) Ltd. [xx], sometime was lost in
challenging the award in a writ court which was declared to be not maintainable
because the petitioner had his remedy under section 34 by the proceeding before
the District Judge. The District Judge was then approached along with an
application for condonation of delay. He rejected it as time barred. The Supreme
Court held that the District Judge should have decided whether the application was
within time after excluding the period lost in a wrong court.
In Union of India v. Microwave Communication Ltd. [xxi] the Delhi High Court
noted that in contradiction with section 5, section 4 ``does not enlarge the period
of limitation but it only enables the party to file any suit, application etc. on the
reopening day of the court if the court is closed on a day when limitation expires’’.
As there was no overlap of any sort between section 4 and section 34 (3) the court
held that section 4 would apply in cases where there was not any lack of diligence
on the part of the applicant. Interestingly the court also held that section 4 was
applicable even to situations where the proviso to section 34 (3) was attracted- i.e.
the thirty day condonation period.
A bare reading of section 34 (3) read with the proviso makes it abundantly clear
that the application for setting aside the award will have to be made within 3
months. The period can further be extended on sufficient cause being shown, by
another period of thirty days but not thereafter. Section 29 (2) of the Limitation Act,
provides that when any special statute prescribes certain period of limitation as
well as provision for extension up to specified time limit on sufficient cause being
shown, then the period of limitation prescribed under the special law shall prevail
and to that extent the provisions of the limitation Act shall stand excluded. The
provisions of section 5 of the Limitation Act would not be applicable because of the
provisions of section 29 92) of the Limitation Act.

i. Municipal corp. of Greater Mumbai v. Prestress Products (India) 2003 (3)

Bom CR 117 26.08.2002 – D. Chandrachu
ii. Bijendra Nath Srivastava v. Mayank Srivastava 1994 SCC (6) 117
10.08.1994 – S. Agrawal
iii. Sanshin Chemical Industry v. Oriental Carbons and Chemicals 2001 (I)
SCR – 1101 16.02.2001 - G.B. Pattanaik.
iv. Konkan Railway Corpn. Ltd. & Ors V. Mehul Construction Co. [2000] 7
SCC 201 21.08.2000 - G.B. Pattanaik
v. State of U.P Allied Constructions [2003] 7 SCC 396 31.07.2003 –
V.N.Khare
vi. Government of Kerala and anr. V. V.P. Jolly [1989] AIR (1989) SC 890
15.11.1991 – J Rao
vii. UP State Electricity Board v. Sassole Chemicals Ltd. [2001] 3 SCC 397
viii. ISPAT Engineering v. Foundry Works B.S. City Bokaro v. Steel Authority
of India Ltd [2001] 6 SCC 347
ix. Dulal Poddar v. Executive Engineer, Dona Canal Division [ 2003] sup (5)
SCR 484 12.11.2003 - V.N.Khare
x. Vijay Kumar v. Bathinda Central Co-operative Bank and Ors. [2013] FAO
No. 2161 08.05.2013 - Nawab Singh
xi. Gautam Construction & Fisheries Ltd. v. Natonal Bank of Agriculture and
Rural Development AIR [2000] SC 3018 28.07.2000 - Doriswamy Raju
xii. Rajinder Kishan Kumar v. Union of India AIR [1999] SC 463
xiii. State of Rajasthan v. Nav Bharat Construction Co. [2005] SC 4430
04.10.2005 - S.N. Variava
xiv. State Trading Corp v. Molasses Co. The Bengal Chamber of Commerce
AIR [1981] CAL 440 23.07.1981 - S.K.Choudhary
xv. ONGC Ltd. v. Saw Pipes Ltd. AIR [2003] SC 2629 17.04.2003 - M.B.
Shah
xvi. Union of India v. Om Prakash Baldev Krishna AIR [2000] J & K 79
22.03.1999 - O Sharma
xvii. Punjab National Bank Finance v. Shital Prasad Jain 19 [1981] DLT 368
19.02.1981 – J.Jain
xviii. Venture Global Engineering LLC and Ors v. Tech Mahindra Ltd. and Ors
[2017] 01.11.2017 – J. Chelameswar
xix. National Aluminium Co. Ltd. v. Precast Fabrication Pvt. Ltd. [2003] SCC
2522 – S.Hegde
xx. Union of India v. Shring Construction (P) Ltd. [ 2006] 8 SCC 18
17.10.2006 – A.K.Mathur
xxi. Union of India v. Microwave Communication Ltd. [2010] DLT 503
01.12.2010 – G.P.Mittal