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Heirs of Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes v Mijares, 410 SCRA 97 (2003) Art.166.

Art.166. Unless the wife has been declared a non compos mentis or a spendthrift, or is under civil
interdiction or is confined in a leprosarium, the husband cannot alienate or encumber any real
FACTS: property of the conjugal partnership without the wife’s consent. If she refuses unreasonably to
 Vicente and Ignacia were married in 1960 but had been separated de facto since 1974. give her consent, the court may compel her to grant the same…
 In 1984, Ignacia learned that Vicente sold a property (lot) to spouses Mijares for P40,000
on 1983. Art. 173. The wife may, during the marriage and within ten years from the transaction
 She also found out that Vicente misrepresented her in the MTC declaring that she died on questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered into without
March 22, 1982 and that the heirs left are him and the 5 minor children. her consent, when such consent is required, or any act or contract of the husband which tends to
 On September 1983, the court granted guardianship over the minor children to Vicente defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal partnership property. Should the wife fail to
and authorized the latter to sell the estate of Ignacia on October 1983. exercise this right, she or her heirs after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of
 On August 9, 1984, Ignacia, through her counsel, sent a letter to respondent spouses
property fraudulently alienated by the husband.
demanding the return of her ½ share in the lot.
 Failing to settle the matter amicably, Ignacia filed on June 4, 1996 a complaint for In the case at bar, it is clear that the lot is a conjugal property of Ignacia and Vicente. Therefore,
annulment of sale against respondent spouses.
the sale of said lot to the Mijares spouses, without the knowledge and consent of Ignacia Reyes, is
 In their answer, respondent spouses claimed that they are purchasers in good faith and
voidable. The action to annul the sale made on 1983 was filed on 1986 which is within the
that the sale was valid because it was duly approved by the court.
 Vicente Reyes, on the other hand, contended that what he sold to the spouses was only prescriptive period under Article 173.
his share.
 On February 15, 1990, the court a quo rendered a decision declaring the sale of lot void The Court finds that respondent spouses are not purchasers in good faith. They already know
with respect to the share of Ignacia. It held that the purchase price of the lot was about the discrepancies and irregularities in the death certificate presented by Vicente. The said
P110,000.00 and ordered Vicente to return ½ thereof or P55,000.00 to respondent errors should have prompted them to question the sale and pertaining documents.
 Ignacia filed a motion for modification of the decision praying that the sale be declared In this case, the Supreme Court held that the Deed of Sale executed by Vicente and respondents
void in its entirety and that the respondents be ordered to reimburse to her the rentals they was annulled. The guilty husband is asked to pay damages to Mijares spouses and to his children
collected on the apartments built on Lot No. 4349-B-2 computed from March 1, 1983. (petitioners).
 Both Ignacia Aguilar-Reyes and respondent spouses appealed the decision to the Court of
Appeals. Pending the appeal, Ignacia died and she was substituted by her compulsory

Abalos vs. Macatangay

Issue: Whether or not the sale is valid, void or merely voidable?
439 SCRA 649 – Civil Law – Law on Sales – Option – Earnest Money
HELD: Articles 166 and 173 of the Civil Code, the governing laws at the time the assailed sale
was contracted, provide:
Arturo and Esther Abalos were husband and wife. They own a parcel of land in Makati. On June
2, 1988, Arturo, armed with a purported Special Power of Attorney, executed a Receipt and
Memorandum of Agreement in favor of GalicanoMacatangay, Jr. in which Arturo acknowledged
he received a P5k check from Galicano as earnest money to be deducted from the purchase price
and that Arturo binds himself to sell the land to Galicano within 30 days from receipt of the P5k.
The purchase price agreed upon was P1.3 M. However, the P5k check was dishonored due to
Apparently however, Esther and Arturo were having a rocky relationship. Esther executed a SPA
in favor of her sister and that she is selling her share in the conjugal property to Galicano. It was
alleged that that the RMOA is not valid for Esther’s signature was not affixed thereto. And that
Esther never executed a SPA in favor of Arturo. Galicano informed the couple that he has
prepared a check to cover the remainder of the amount that needs to be paid for the land. He
demanded that the land be delivered to him. But the spouses failed to deliver the land. Galicano
sued the spouses.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a contract of sale between Arturo and Galicano. Whether or not
the subsequent agreement between Galicano and Esther is binding and that it cured the defect of
the earlier contract between Arturo and Galicano.
HELD: No. No matter how the RMOA is looked upon, the same cannot be valid. At best, the
agreement between Arturo and Galicano is a mere grant of privilege to purchase to Galicano. The
promise to sell is not binding to Arturo for there was actually no consideration distinct from the
price. Be it noted that the parties considered the P5k as an earnest money to be deducted from the
purchase price.
Assuming arguendo that it was a bilateral promise to buy and sell, the same is still not binding for
Galicano failed to render a payment of legal tender. A check is not a legal tender.
Still assuming arguendo, that the P5k was an earnest money which supposedly perfected a
respondents. G.R. No. 102330. November 25, 1998.
contract of sale, the RMOA is still not valid for Esther’s signature was not affixed. The property is
conjugal and under the Family Code, the spouses’ consents are required. Further, the earnest
money here is not actually the earnest money contemplated under Article 1482 under the Civil QUISUMBING, J
The subsequent agreement between Esther and Galicano did not ratify the earlier transaction FACTS: Petitioner, the legal wife of private respondent Eusebio Francisco (Eusebio) by his
between Arturo and Galicano. A void contract can never be ratified. second marriage filed a suit for damages and for annulment of general power of attorney
authorizing Conchita Evangelista (Eusebio’s daughter in his first marriage) to administer the
house and lot together with the apartments allegedly acquired by petitioner and Eusebio during
their conjugal partnership. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of private respondents due
to petitioner’s failure to establish proof that said properties were acquired during the existence of
the second conjugal partnership, or that they pertained exclusively to the petitioner. As such, the
CA ruled that those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and that he has the capacity to
administer them.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's
ruling that the properties, subject matter of controversy, are not conjugal but the capital properties
of Eusebio exclusively.

RULING: SC resolved the issue of the nature of the contested properties based on the provisions
of the New Civil Code. Indeed, Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil Code have been repealed
by the Family Code of the Philippines. Nonetheless, SC cannot invoke the new law in this case
without impairing prior vested rights pursuant to Article 256 in relation to Article 105 (second
paragraph) of the Family Code. Accordingly, the repeal of Articles 158 and 160 of the New Civil
Code does not operate to prejudice or otherwise affect rights which have become vested or
accrued while the said provisions were in force.

HELD: Petition is denied. The Decision of the CA is affirmed.

Ching v. CA, 423 SCRA 356, February 23, 2004

FACTS: Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI) obtained two loans from the Allied
Banking Corporation (ABC). (PBMCI) Executive Vice-President Alfredo Ching executed a
continuing guaranty with the ABC for the payment of the said loan. The PBMCI defaulted in the
payment of all its loans so ABC filed a complaint for sum of money against the PBMCI. Trial
court issued a writ of preliminary attachment against Alfredo Ching requiring the sheriff of to
attach all the properties of said Alfredo Ching to answer for the payment of the loans.
Encarnacion T. Ching, wife of Alfredo Ching, filed a Motion to Set Aside the levy on attachment
allegeing inter alia that the 100,000 shares of stocks levied on by the sheriff were acquired by her
and her husband during their marriage out of conjugal funds. Petitioner spouses aver that the
source of funds in the acquisition of the levied shares of stocks is not the controlling factor when
invoking the presumption of the conjugal nature of stocks under Art. !21 and that such
presumption subsists even if the property is registered only in the name of one of the spouses, in benefited. The private respondent was burdened to establish that such benefit redounded to the
this case, petitioner Alfredo Ching. According to the petitioners, the suretyship obligation was not conjugal partnership.
contracted in the pursuit of the petitioner-husband’s profession or business.

ISSUE: WON 100,000 shares of stocks may be levied on by the sheriff to answer for the loans
guaranteed by petitioner Alfredo Ching

HELD: No. [G.R. No. L-55322. February 16, 1989.]

RATIO: The CA erred in holding that by executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship MOISES JOCSON, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS,
agreement with the private respondent for the payment of the PBMCI loans, the petitioner-
husband was in the exercise of his profession, pursuing a legitimate business.

The shares of stocks are, thus, presumed to be the conjugal partnership property of the petitioners.
The private respondent failed to adduce evidence that the petitioner-husband acquired the stocks The present controversy concerns the validity of three (3) documents executed by Emilio Jocson
with his exclusive money. during his lifetime. These documents purportedly conveyed, by sale, to her daughter,
AgustinaJocson-Vasquez what apparently covers almost all of his properties, including his one-
third (1/3) share in the estate of his wife. Petitioner Moises Jocson assails these documents and
prays that they be declared null and void and the properties subject matter therein be partitioned
The appellate court erred in concluding that the conjugal partnership is liable for the said account between him and Agustina as the only heirs of their deceased parents.
Petitioner claimed that the properties mentioned in Exhibits 3 and 4 are the unliquidated conjugal
properties of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete which the former, therefore, cannot validly
Article 121 provides: The conjugal partnership shall be liable for: (1) All debts and obligations
sell. It is the position of petitioner that since the properties sold to AgustinaJocson-Vasquez under
contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership, and those contracted by the Exhibit 3 were registered in the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete," the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind the partnership. certificate of title he presented as evidence (Exhibits "E", to "J", pp. 4-9, Records) were enough
proof to show that the properties covered therein were acquired during the marriage of their
For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the husband alone, parents, and, therefore, under Article 160 of the Civil Code, presumed to be conjugal properties.
there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses.
The trial court sustained the foregoing contentions of petitioner. On the other hand the Court of
In this case, the private respondent failed to prove that the conjugal partnership of the petitioners Appeals reversed the decision. Hence, this appeal.
was benefited by the petitioner-husband’s act of executing a continuing guaranty and suretyship
agreement with the private respondent for and in behalf of PBMCI. The contract of loan was ISSUE:
between the private respondent and the PBMCI, solely for the benefit of the latter. No W/N the properties are conjugal properties.
presumption can be inferred from the fact that when the petitioner-husband entered into an
accommodation agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be
NO. Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that: "All property of the marriage is presumed to foreclosed all the mortgaged properties. PNB as the highest bidder, purchased the lots, and
belong to the conjugal partnership; unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband subsequently sold the same to the Vitugs and the Fajardos.
or to the wife." Article 160 he must first present proof that the disputed properties were acquired
during the marriage of Emilio Jocson and Alejandra Poblete. The certificates of title, however, Meanwhile, Donata executed a contract of lease for a lot covered by TCT-2887-R to her
upon which petitioner rests his claim is insufficient. The fact that the properties were registered in sons Pragmacio and Maximo Vitug. After a few years, the same brothers filed an action for
the name of "Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete" is no proof that the properties were partition and reconveyance with damages in the CFI Pampanga against the PNB, the Vitugs, the
acquired during the spouses' coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two Fajardos, and Marcelo Mendiola, the special administrator of Donata’s intestate estate. They
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms one claimed that the 30 parcels of land form part of the conjugal property of the spouses Donata and
already existing (See Torela vs. Torela, supra). It may be that the properties under dispute were Clodualdo and they claim a share interest of 2/11 of 1/2 thereof. They assailed the mortgage of
acquired by Emilio Jocson when he was still a bachelor but were registered only after his said properties to the PNB and the subsequent public auction. They invoked the Vitug vs.
marriage to Alejandra Poblete, which explains why he was described in the certificates of title as Montemayor case where the SC ruled on the conjugal nature of the 30 parcels of land.
married to the latter.
ISSUES: (1) Can the PNB rely merely on the Torrens Certificate of Title covering
Donata’s properties for the processing of the respective mortgage loan applications?
(2) Is the earlier action for reconveyance and partition concerning the 30 lots real
actions and binding upon the PNB by virtue of the Vitug vs. Montemayor decision?

RULING: (1) Yes. The PNB had sufficient reason to rely on the Torrens Certificate of
Title of the mortgaged properties. The SC ruled that in processing the loan applications, the PNB
had the right to rely upon the face of the certificate of title. Clearly, it appears that Donata (a
widow) owns the properties and the PNB had no reason to doubt her status and ownership. The
PNB also found no liens or encumbrances covering the properties. The clean facts reasonably
cancel the need to make further inquiry.
The Court applied the well-known rule in jurisdiction that a person has a right to
rely upon the face of the Torrens Certificate of Title when dealing with a registered land. It is not
necessary to inquire beyond its face, except when such person has an actual knowledge of facts
and circumstances that would prompt him to inquire further. The Court ruled that a Torrens title
“concludes all controversy over ownership of the land covered by a final degree of registration”
and upon such registration, the person is assured of ownership without going to court or sitting “at
the veranda of his house” to avoid the fear of losing his land.
(2) No. The SC maintained that although actions for recovery of real property and for
partition are real actions, they are actions in personam which are binding only upon the persons
Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals who are parties thereto. The PNB is not a party in the cited case and is therefore not bound by the
G.R. No. L-57757 decision. In addition, there is no showing that the PNB was aware of the case decision when it
31 August 1987 extended the mortgage loan involving the subject properties. The court settled that if the PNB
knew that said properties were conjugal, it would not have approved the mortgage application
without securing the consent of the its co-owners. Therefore, the PNB is considered as a purchaser
FACTS: DonataMontemayor is the administrator of 30 parcels of land of her late husband for value in good faith when it sold the foreclosed properties at a public auction.
ClodualdoVitug who died intestate. Several portions of such land (TCT-2289, TCT-2887, and
TCT-2888) were mortgaged to PNB as security for certain loans availed by Salvador Vitug, The complaint is dismissed.
Salvador Jaramilla and Pedro Bacani, respectively. The loans were never paid so the bank
 On that date, the sale proceeded anyway, and the property of Nieves de Lozano which has been
levied upon was sold to the judgment creditor, as the highest bidder, for the amount of P4,175.12,
the balance of the judgment debt.


Whether or not the judgment debt could be satisfied from the proceeds of the properties sold at
public auction in view of the presumption that it is conjugal in character although in the of only
one of the spouses.


The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property acquired during the marriage.
G.R. No. L-21533 June 29, 1967 But in the instant case there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired and
hence the fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative. Furthermore, appellant
HERMOGENES MARAMBA, plaintiff-appellant, himself admits in his brief that the property in question is paraphernal.
NIEVES DE LOZANO, ET AL., defendants-appellees. The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code to property acquired during the marriage.
But in the instant case there is no showing as to when the property in question was acquired and
Facts: hence the fact that the title is in the wife’s name alone is determinative. Furthermore, appellant
himself admits in his brief that the property in question is paraphernal.
 ÑOn November 3, 1948, the plaintiff filed an action against the defendant Nieves de Lozano and
her husband Pascual Lozano for the collection of a sum of money.
 On June 23, 1959, the court rendered a judgment in favor of Maramba and ordered Lozanos to
pay the total sum of Three Thousand Five Hundred Pesos and Seven Centavos (P3,500.07), with
legal interest thereon from date of the filing of the instant complaint until fully paid.
 On August 18, 1960 levy was made upon a parcel of land in the name of Nieves de Lozano. The
notice of sale at public auction was published in accordance with law and scheduled for
September 16, 1960.
 On that date, however, defendant Nieves de Lozano made a partial satisfaction of the judgment in
the amount P2,000.00, and requested for an adjournment of the sale to October 26, 1960. On
October 17, 1960, she filed amended motion, dated October 14, alleging that on November 11,
1952, during the pendency of the case, defendant Pascual Lozano died.
 She ruled that the property levied upon was her paraphernal property, and praying that her
liability be fixed at one-half (½) of the amount awarded in the judgment and that pending the
resolution of the issue an order be issued restraining the Sheriff from carrying out the auction sale
scheduled on October 26, 1960.
MARAMBA DOCTRINE vs VDA DE PADILLA DOCTRINE effected during the marriage is clear & logical because of the bar against transfers
(whether by donation or by sale) during marriage. (Art. 1490, NCC). Hence, it can only
Ques: When does ownership of improvements made on the separate property of the spouses at the be effected or fulfilled after said marriage has been dissolved & the conjugal partnership
expenses of the partnership or the original owner-spouse, as the case may be? is liquidated.
(3) Between the construction of the building & the payment of the value of the land during
Ans: The 3rd paragraph of Art. 120 of the FC provides that the ownership of the entire property
the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, said partnership is not only the usufructuary
shall be vested upon the reimbursement of the cost of improvement to the conjugal partnership or
but also the conditional owner; in other words, it has already acquired a hope or
of the value of the property to the owner-spouse w/c shall be made at the time of the liquidation of
expectancy over the land w/c is protected by law. (Arts. 1181, 1187, 1188, NCC.)
the conjugal partnership. In the case of Maramba vs Lozano (20 SCRA 474), it was declared that
(4) To say that the land becomes conjugal upon payment is juridically not possible because
“the construction of a house at conjugal expense on the exclusive property of a spouse does not
by then, the conjugal partnership has already been dissolved.
automatically make it conjugal. It is true that, in the meantime, the conjugal partnership may use
the land & building, but it does not as owner, but as usufructuary. The ownership of the land
remains the same until the value thereof is paid. This payment can only be demanded on the
liquidation of the partnership.”

Ques: Is the doctrine enunciated in the case of Maramba vs Lozano the same doctrine enunciated
in the case of Vda. de Padilla vs Paterno (113 Phil 656)?

Ans: No. In the case of Vda de Padilla vs Paterno, w/ the factual background stated in question
No. 44(b), the effects of the fulfillment of the suspensive condition (that the value of the lots are
reimbursed to the widow at the of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties) should be
deemed to retroact to the date of the constitution of the obligation (Art. 1187, NCC). In other
words, their conversion from paraphernal to conjugal property should be deemed to retroact to the
time the buildings were first constructed thereon, or at the very latest, to the time immediately
before the death of the husband. That would be the only logical conclusion, because, if we say
that they become conjugal only at the time when the reimbursement is made, that would be
equivalent to saying that a conjugal partnership w/c no longer existed would still be able to
acquire ownership over such properties. Certainly, that would be juridically impossible.

Exponents of the doctrine enunciated in the Vda de Padilla vs Paterno case adhere to the
said view for the ff reasons:

(1) The mode by w/c the right of ownership over the land is transmitted to the conjugal
partnership is not the payment of the value of the land but the law itself. To say that such
transmission is effected by the payment would be creating another mode of acquiring
ownership w/c is not recognized by law. (Art. 712, NCC)
(2) The payment of the value of the land is merely a suspensive condition imposed by the
law in order that said land shall become conjugal in character. That it could not be