I.

Anti-Fencing Law

1. Gabriel Capili vs CA
(Fencing; elements)

Fencing is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another,
shall buy, receive, possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and
sell, or in any other manner deal in any article, item, object or anything of value
which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

The essential elements of the crime of fencing are:

1. A crime of robbery or theft has been committed;
2. The accused, who is not a principal or an accomplice in the commission of the
crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells
or disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the said crime;
3. The accused knows or should have known that the said article, item, object or
anything of value has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or
theft; and
4. There is on the part of the accused, intent to gain for himself or for another.”

At any rate, the law does not require proof of purchase of the stolen articles by the
accused as mere possession thereof is enough to give rise to a presumption of
fencing. GABRIEL, who was in possession of at least two of the stolen items, has not
rebutted this presumption.
Capili vs. Court of Appeals, 338 SCRA 45, G.R. No. 139250 August 15, 2000

2. Rodolfo Caoili vs CA
(Presumption of possession; when not applied)

The only issue posed in the petition is whether or not there is sufficient evidence to
indict Caoili. To be liable for violation of P.D. 1612, Section 2 thereof requires that
the offender buys or otherwise acquires and then sells or disposes of any object of
value which he knows or should be known to him to have been derived from the
proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

The allegations of Atule and Azuela do not indicate that respondent Caoili acquired
the skiving machines in question knowing that the same were stolen property.

The prima facie presumption of fencing from possession of stolen property does not
apply to Caoili as complainant reacquired the subject skiving machines not from
respondent Caoili but from Yip. It is difficult to give credence to the claim of Atule
and Azuela that respondent Caoili told them that he purchased the stolen skiving
 machines which he in turn sold to Yip. It is simply contrary to common human
behavior that a person would intimate to another or others an unlawful act, that he
purchased stolen items and then dispose of it at a profit. Evidence to be believed
must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness but it must be credible
in itself such as the common experience and observation of mankind can approve as
probable under the circumstances.

3. Ong vs People
(Proof of legit transaction)

In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go.
Logically, and for all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is
proof of a legitimate transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of
fencing; however, that defense is disputable.23 In this case, the validity of the
issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the prosecution was able to prove that
Gold Link and its address were fictitious.24 Ong failed to overcome the evidence
presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the transaction. Thus,
he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D. 1612.

There was evident intent to gain for considering that during the buy-bust operation,
Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing. Fencing
is malum prohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima facie presumption of fencing
from evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or
anything of value, which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a
higher penalty based on the value of the property.

II. Obstruction of Justice

1. Enrile vs Judge Omar

(PD 1829 absorbed in rebellion)

The prosecution must make up its mind whether to charge Senator Ponce Enrile
with rebellion alone or to drop the rebellion case and charge him with murder and
multiple frustrated murder and also violation of P.D. 1829. It cannot complex the
rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Neither can it prosecute him
for rebellion in Quezon City and violation of P.D 1829 in Makati. It should be noted
that there is in fact a separate prosecution for rebellion already filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In such a case, the independent prosecution
under PD 1829 can not prosper.

As we have earlier mentioned, the intent or motive is a decisive factor. If Senator

Ponce Enrile is not charged with rebellion and he harbored or concealed Colonel
Honasan simply because the latter is a friend and former associate, the motive for
 the act is completely different. But if the act is committed with political or social
motives, that is in furtherance of rebellion, then it should be deemed to form part of
the crime of rebellion instead of being punished separately.

In view of the foregoing, the petitioner can not be tried separately under PD 1829 in
addition to his being prosecuted in the rebellion case. With this ruling, there is no
need for the Court to pass upon the other issues raised by the petitioner.

2. Posadas vs Ombudsman
(No PD 1829 in illegal arrest)

Arrests; Presidential Decree 1829; Obstruction of Justice; Third persons have a right
to prevent the arrest of suspects where such arrest is illegal, and the same cannot be
construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, §l(c).—

In this case, petitioners’ objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed
as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, §l(c) without rendering it unconstitutional.
Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time
because their attempted arrest was illegal. Indeed, they could not have interfered
with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had
asked the NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina. On the other
hand, just because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not
authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.

3. Soller et al.
(Person liable)

Any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the
apprehension of suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by
committing any of the following acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting
the commission of any offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery,
misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or threats;

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or

object, with intent to impair its verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or
admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings in, criminal
cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has
reasonable ground to believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing
penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution and conviction;
 (d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading
prosecution or the execution of a judgment, or concealing his true name and other
personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;

(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process
or court orders or disturbing proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in
the courts;

(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with
knowledge of its falsity and with intent to affect the course or outcome of the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of

abstaining from, discounting, or impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;

(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon
his person, honor or property or that of any immediate member or members of his
family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the investigation of, or
official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or
unlawful, in order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in
official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law

enforcement agencies from apprehending the offender or from protecting the life or
property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in
confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and
not for publication and publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the
investigator or to the court.

In this case, the Informations subject of Criminal Cases Nos. 25521 and 25522
quoted earlier, fail to allege that petitioners had committed the offenses charged in
relation to their offices. Neither are there specific allegations of facts to show the
intimate relation/connection between the commission of the offense charged and
the discharge of official functions of the offenders

4. Judge Angeles vs Gaite

(unserved warrant)

“x x x It is a surprise to hear from petitioner who is a member of the bench to argue

that unserved warrants are tantamount to another violation of the law re:
“obstruction of justice.”

Petitioner is like saying that every accused in a criminal case is committing another
offense of “obstruction of justice” if and when the warrant of arrest issued for the
 former offense/ charge is unserved during its life or returned unserved after its
life—and that the accused should be charged therewith re: “obstruction of justice.”

What if the warrant of arrest for the latter charge (“obstruction of justice”) is again
un-served during its life or returned unserved? To follow the line of thinking of
petitioner, another or a second charge of “obstruction of justice” should be filed
against the accused. And if the warrant of arrest issued on this second charge is not
served, again, a third charge of “obstruction of justice” is warranted or should be
filed against the accused.

Thus, petitioner is effectively saying that the number of charges for “obstruction of
justice” is counting and/or countless, unless and until the accused is either arrested
or voluntarily surrendered.

We, therefore, find the position taken by petitioner as contrary to the intent and
spirit of the law on “obstruction of justice.” Angeles vs. Gaite, 605 SCRA 408, G.R.
No. 165276 November 25, 2009

5. Jackson vs People
(Illegal possession of lumber)

The factual allegations in the Information, as duly proved during trial, show that the
petitioners’ acts actually constituted a violation of Section 1(b) above. First, the
Information duly alleges all the essential elements of the crime of obstruction of
justice under Section 1(b). The factual allegations in the Information clearly charge
the accused of taking and carrying away the truck so that it could not be used as
evidence and to avoid its confiscation and forfeiture in favor of the government as a
tool or instrument of the crime. In the present case, the truck that carried the
undocumented lumber serves as material evidence that is indispensable in the
criminal investigation and prosecution for violation of P.D. 705. Particularly, the
truck is an indispensable link to the persons involved in the illegal
possession/transportation of the seized lumber as the permit for the transportation
of the lumber necessarily involves the truck and the lumber. According to DENR
forest ranger Rogelio Pajimna, the transport of lumber should be covered with
supporting documents that should be in the possession of the transporter.
III. ISLAW

1. People vs Nang Kay

(ISLAW Mandatory, except in SPL, not favorable to the accused)

In cases where the application of the law on indeterminate sentence would be

unfavorable to the accused, resulting in the lengthening of his prison sentence, said
law on indeterminate sentence should not be applied. The law on indeterminate
sentence as a rule was intended to favor the defendant in a criminal case
particularly to shorten his term of imprisonment, depending upon his behavior and
his physical, mental, and moral record as a prisoner, to be determined by the Board
of Indeterminate Sentence. It is one of the purposes of the law to prevent
unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness.

2. Batistis vs People
(Nang Kay doctrine was not applied for lack of justification)

We are aware that an exception was enunciated in People v. Nang Kay,30 a

prosecution for illegal possession of firearms punished by a special law (that is,
Section 2692, Revised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act 56
and Republic Act No. 4) with imprisonment of not less than five years nor more than
ten years. There, the Court sustained the straight penalty of five years and one day
imposed by the trial court (Court of First Instance of Rizal) because the application of
the Indeterminate Sentence Law would be unfavorable to the accused by
lengthening his prison sentence. Yet, we cannot apply the Nang Kay exception
herein, even if this case was a prosecution under a special law like that in Nang Kay.

Firstly, the trial court in Nang Kay could well and lawfully have given the accused the
lowest prison sentence of five years because of the mitigating circumstance of his
voluntary plea of guilty, but, herein, both the trial court and the CA did not have a
similar circumstance to justify the lenity towards the accused.

Secondly, the large number of Fundador articles confiscated from his house (namely,
241 empty bottles of Fundador, 163 Fundador boxes, a half sack full of Fundador
plastic caps, and two filled bottles of Fundador Brandy) clearly demonstrated that
Batistis had been committing a grave economic offense over a period of time,
thereby deserving for him the indeterminate, rather than the straight and lower,
penalty. Batistis vs. People, 608 SCRA 335, G.R. No. 181571 December 16, 2009

The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the Indeterminate Sentence
Law, whose Section 1 requires that the penalty of imprisonment should be an
indeterminate sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de Guzman, Jr., 271
SCRA 328 (1997) the imposition of an indeterminate sentence with maximum and
 minimum periods in criminal cases not excepted from the coverage of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its Section 2 is mandatory, viz.: The need
for specifying the minimum and maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is
to prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of liberty and to enhance the
economic usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from serving the
entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his physical, mental, and moral
record. The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal
offenses whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by special laws, with
definite minimum and maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal
range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed mandatory.

3. People vs Jaranilla
(ISLAW, applicable to recidivist)

Although recidivists, appellants Suyo and Brillantes are not habitual delinquents.
They are entitled to an indeterminate sentence (Sec. 2, Act No. 4103).

4. People vs Martinado
(ISLAW not applicable to escapee)

As modified, the two accused are found guilty of the crime of Homicide under Article
249 of the Revised Penal Code. In view of the aggravating circumstance of abuse of
superior strength, and the absence of any mitigating circumstance to offset it, and
applying the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, Hermogenes Martinado
y Aguillon is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging from Ten
(10) years and One (1) day of prision mayor maximum as minimum to Seventeen
(17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of reclusion temporal maximum as
maximum.

Accused Eliseo Martinado, however, shall not be entitled to the benefits of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law as he had escaped from confinement.

5. Zafra vs People
(Penalty not composed of 3 periods; Art. 76 & 65)

To determine the maximum periods of the penalties to be imposed on the

petitioner, therefore, we must be guided by the following rules, namely: (1) the
penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code constitute degrees;
and (2) considering that the penalties provided under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code are not composed of three periods, the time included in the penalty
prescribed should be divided into three equal portions, which each portion forming
one period, pursuant to Article 65 of the Revised Penal Code. Accordingly, the
 penalties prescribed under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code should be divided
into three periods, with the maximum period being the penalty properly imposable
on each count, except in any instance where the penalty for falsification would be
greater than such penalties for malversation.

Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is

imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum term. The
maximum term is the penalty under the Revised Penal Code properly imposed after
considering any attending circumstance; while the minimum term is within the
range of the penalty next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for
the offense committed.

6. People vs Mantalaba
(Minor drug offender)

Consequently, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority39 can now be

appreciated in fixing the penalty that should be imposed. The RTC, as affirmed by
the CA, imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua without considering the minority
of the appellant. Thus, applying the rules stated above, the proper penalty should be
one degree lower than reclusion perpetua, which is reclusion temporal, the
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority having been appreciated. Necessarily,
also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISLAW), the minimum penalty should
be taken from the penalty next lower in degree which is prision mayor and the
maximum penalty shall be taken from the medium period of reclusion temporal,
there being no other mitigating circumstance nor aggravating circumstance.40 The
ISLAW is applicable in the present case because the penalty which has been
originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua to death), where ISLAW is
inapplicable, became a divisible penalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the
presence of the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Therefore, a penalty
of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, and fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, would
be the proper imposable penalty.

IV. Probation Law

1. Pablo vs Francisco
(Probation in Multiple Conviction)

The law expressly requires that an accused must not have appealed his conviction
before he can avail of probation. This outlaws the element of speculation on the
part of the accused—to wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction
is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh at hand, and the service
of his sentence inevitable, he now applies for probation as an “escape hatch” thus
rendering nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his conviction. Consequently,
 probation should be availed of at the first opportunity by convicts who are willing to
be reformed and rehabilitated, who manifest spontaneity, contrition and remorse.

Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot extend to those not
expressly included. Probation is not a right of an accused, but rather an act of grace
and clemency or immunity conferred by the state which may be granted by the
court to a seemingly deserving defendant who thereby escapes the extreme rigors
of the penalty imposed by law for the offense of which he stands convicted. It is a
special prerogative granted by law to a person or group of persons not enjoyed by
others or by all.

The grant of probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which is to be
exercised primarily for the benefit of organized society, and only incidentally for the
benefit of the accused.

The multiple prison terms are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more than six (6) years, then
he is entitled to probation, unless he is otherwise specifically disqualified. The
number of offenses is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken
separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9, par. (a), P.D. 968, as
amended, uses the word maximum, not total, when it says that “[t]he benefits of
this Decree shall not be extended to those x x x x sentenced to serve a maximum
term of imprisonment of more than six years.” Evidently, the law does not intend to
sum up the penalties imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly
with the others.

2. Padua vs People
(Drug trafficker not eligible)

Padua was charged and convicted for violation of Section 5, Article II of Rep. Act No.
9165 for selling dangerous drugs. It is clear under Section 24 of Rep. Act No. 9165
that any person convicted of drug trafficking cannot avail of the privilege of
probation, to wit: SEC. 24. Non-Applicability of the Probation Law for Drug
Traffickers and Pushers.—Any person convicted for drug trafficking or pushing under
this Act, regardless of the penalty imposed by the Court, cannot avail of the privilege
granted by the Probation Law or Presidential Decree No. 968, as amended.

3. Bala vs Martinez
(Probation; Termination)

Probation is revocable before the final discharge of the probationer by the court,
contrary to the petitioner’s submission. Section 16 of PD 968 is clear on this score:
Sec. 16. Termination of Probation.—After the period of probation and upon
consideration of the report and recommendation of the probation officer, the court
may order the final discharge of the probationer upon finding that he has fulfilled
 the terms and conditions of his probation and thereupon the case is deemed
terminated. Thus the expiration of the probation period alone does not
automatically terminate proba-tion. Nowhere is the ipso facto termination of
probation found in the provisions of the probation law. Probation is not co-
terminous with its period. There must first be issued by the court of an order of final
discharge based on the report and recommendation of the probation officer. Only
from such issuance can the case of the probationer be deemed terminated.

Probation period may be shortened or made longer but not to exceed the period set
in the law

Revocation of Probation; An order revoking probation or modifying the terms

thereof is unappealable

4. Almero vs People
(appeal and probation mutually exclusive remedies)

Aside from the goals of according expediency and liberality to the accused, the
rationale for the treatment of appeal and probation as mutually exclusive remedies
is that they rest on diametrically opposed legal positions. An accused applying for
probation is deemed to have accepted the judgment. The application for probation
is an admission of guilt on the part of an accused for the crime which led to the
judgment of conviction. This was the reason why the Probation Law was amended:
precisely to put a stop to the practice of appealing from judgments of conviction —
even if the sentence is probationable — for the purpose of securing an acquittal and
applying for the probation only if the accused fails in his bid.

5. Villareal vs People
(Probation after appeal)

An application for probation shall be filed with the trial court, with notice to the
appellate court if an appeal has been taken from the sentence of conviction. The
filing of the application shall be deemed a waiver of the right to appeal, or the
automatic withdrawal of a pending appeal.
V. Anti-Alias Law

1. Ursua vs CA
(Use of alias / fictitious name)

Clearly therefore an alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be

used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his
real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute
name authorized by a competent authority. A man’s name is simply the sound or
sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they
distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these
are known as aliases.

Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person
in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known
by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the
prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench.

While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not
constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which
he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-
alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the
circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature
in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended.

2. People vs Estrada
(Exemption to CA 142; intent)

In order to be held liable for a violation of Commonwealth Act (C.A.) No. 142, the
user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall publicly be known
under that other name.—Albeit for a different reason, with the Sandiganbayan
position that the rule in the law of libel—that mere communication to a third person
is publicity—does not apply to violations of CA No. 142. Our close reading of Ursua—
particularly, the requirement that there be intention by the user to be culpable and
the historical reasons we cited above—tells us that the required publicity in the use
of alias is more than mere communication to a third person; the use of the alias, to
be considered public, must be made openly, or in an open manner or place, or to
cause it to become generally known. In order to be held liable for a violation of CA
No. 142, the user of the alias must have held himself out as a person who shall
publicly be known under that other name. In other words, the intent to publicly use
the alias must be manifest.

The presence of Lacquian and Chua when Estrada signed as Jose Velarde and
opened Trust Account No. C-163 does not necessarily indicate his intention to be
publicly known henceforth as Jose Velarde. In relation to Estrada, Lacquian and Chua
 were not part of the public who had no access to Estrada’s privacy and to the
confidential matters that transpired in Malacañan where he sat as President;
Lacquian was the Chief of Staff with whom he shared matters of the highest and
strictest confidence, while Chua was a lawyer-friend bound by his oath of office and
ties of friendship to keep and maintain the privacy and secrecy of his affairs. Thus,
Estrada could not be said to have intended his signing as Jose Velarde to be for
public consumption by the fact alone that Lacquian and Chua were also inside the
room at that time. The same holds true for Estrada’s alleged representations with
Ortaliza and Dichavez, assuming the evidence for these representations to be
admissible. All of Estrada’s representations to these people were made in privacy
and in secrecy, with no iota of intention of publicity.

3. Revelina Limson vs Gonzales

On the issue of the alleged use of illegal aliases, the Court observes that
respondent’s aliases involved the names “Eugenio Gonzalez,” “Eugenio Gonzales,”
“Eugenio Juan Gonzalez,” “Eugenio Juan Gonzalez y Regalado,” “Eugenio C.R.
Gonzalez,” “Eugenio J. Gonzalez,” and — per Limson — “Eugenio Juan Robles
Gonzalez.” But these names contained his true names, albeit at times joined with an
erroneous middle or second name, or a misspelled family name in one instance. The
records disclose that the erroneous middle or second names, or the misspelling of
the family name resulted from error or inadvertence left unchecked and unrectified
over time. What is significant, however, is that such names were not fictitious names
within the purview of the Anti-Alias Law; and that such names were not different
from each other. Considering that he was not also shown to have used the names
for unscrupulous purposes, or to deceive or confuse the public, the dismissal of the
charge against him was justified in fact and in law.

VI. Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act

1. People vs Lopez
(Elements of Sale and Illegal Possession)

The essential elements in the successful prosecution of offenses involving the illegal
sale of dangerous or prohibited drugs under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are:

(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and
(2) the delivery of the thing sold and payment therefor. Material in the successful
prosecution is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
 In the charge of illegal possession of a dangerous drug, the prosecution must prove
the following elements:

(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a

prohibited or regulated drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug.

2. People vs Figueroa
(Attempted sale of drugs, non-coordination with PDEA)

Under the Revised Penal Code, there is an attempt to commit a crime when the
offender commences its commission directly by overt acts but does not perform all
the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. This definition has essentially
been adopted by this Court in interpreting Section 26 of Republic Act No. 9165. Thus
in People v. Laylo, 653 SCRA 660 (2011), we affirmed the conviction of the appellant
therein and held that the attempt to sell shabu was shown by the overt act of
appellant therein of showing the substance to the poseur-buyer. In said case, the
sale was aborted when the police officers identified themselves and placed
appellant under arrest.

It is settled that Section 86 of Republic Act No. 9165 does not invalidate operations
on account of the the law enforcers’ failure to maintain close coordination with the
PDEA. Thus, in People v. Berdadero, 622 SCRA 196 (2010), the Court noted that
Section 86, as well as the Internal Rules and Regulations implementing the same, is
silent as to the consequences of the failure on the part of the law enforcers to seek
the authority of the PDEA prior to conducting a buy-bust operation. This Court
consequently held that “this silence [cannot] be interpreted as a legislative intent to
make an arrest without the participation of PDEA illegal or evidence obtained
pursuant to such an arrest inadmissible.”

3. People vs Ismael
(Selling, possession, chain of custody)

In cases of illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the dangerous drug
seized from the accused constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense. Thus, it is of
utmost importance that the integrity and identity of the seized drugs must be shown
to have been duly preserved. “The chain of custody rule performs this function as it
ensures that necessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are
removed.”

The first stage in the chain of custody rule is the marking of the dangerous drugs or
related items. Marking, which is the affixing on the dangerous drugs or related items
by the apprehending officer or the poseur--buyer of his initials or signature or other
 identifying signs, should be made in the presence of the apprehended violator
immediately upon arrest. People vs. Ismael, 818 SCRA 122, G.R. No. 208093
February 20, 2017

4. Amado vs People
(Possession of paraphernalia; Chain of custody)

The elements of illegal possession of equipment, instrument, apparatus and other

paraphernalia for dangerous drugs under Section 12, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 are:

(1) possession or control by the accused of any equipment, apparatus or other

paraphernalia fit or intended for smoking, consuming, administering, injecting,
ingesting, or introducing any dangerous drug into the body; and
(2) such possession is not authorized by law. In this case, the prosecution has
convincingly established that Saraum was in possession of drug paraphernalia,
particularly aluminum tin foil, rolled tissue paper, and lighter, all of which were
offered and admitted in evidence.

The chain of custody rule requires the identification of the persons who handled the
confiscated items for the purpose of duly monitoring the authorized movements of
the illegal drugs and/or drug paraphernalia from the time they were seized from the
accused until the time they are presented in court.

While the procedure on the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken, in
reality, it is almost always impossible to obtain an unbroken chain. Thus, failure to
strictly comply with Section 21(1), Article II of R.A. No. 9165 does not necessarily
render an accused person’s arrest illegal or the items seized or confiscated from him
inadmissible.

5. People vs Gayoso
(Chain of custody not established)

As a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be
established:

First, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the
accused by the apprehending officer;
Second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the
investigating officer;
Third, the turnover by the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic
chemist for laboratory examination; and
Fourth, the turnover and submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the
forensic chemist to the court.
 The chain of custody rule also requires that the marking of the seized contraband be
done
(1) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and
(2) immediately upon confiscation.”

In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized
items with their initials in the presence of appellant and immediately upon
confiscation

6. People vs Havana
(Informant; when necessary)

Neither is the presentation of the informant indispensable to the success in

prosecuting drug-related cases. Informers are almost always never presented in
court because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police.

Unless their testimony is absolutely essential to the conviction of the accused, their
testimony may be dispensed with since their narrations would be merely
corroborative to the testimonies of the buy-bust team.

7. Estipona vs Hon. Lobrigo

(Plea bargaining)

At this point, We shall not resolve the issue of whether Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165 is
contrary to the constitutional right to equal protection of the law in order not to
preempt any future discussion by the Court on the policy considerations behind
Section 23 of R.A. No. 9165. Pending deliberation on whether or not to adopt the
statutory provision in toto or a qualified version thereof, We deem it proper to
declare as invalid the prohibition against plea bargaining on drug cases until and
unless it is made part of the rules of procedure through an administrative circular
duly issued for the purpose.

8. Jaime vs People
(Use, residue, drug test)

Making the phrase “a person apprehended or arrested” in Section 15 applicable to

all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but
for all other crimes, is tantamount to a mandatory drug testing of all persons
apprehended or arrested for any crime.

To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our

pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and Philippine
Drug Enforcement Agency, 570 SCRA 410 (2008), to wit: x x x [M]andatory drug
testing can never be random and suspicionless.
 The ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked; neither are
they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a crime are charged,
they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.

The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s
office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do
not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To
impose mandatory drug testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a
medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of
RA 6195.

Drug testing in this case would violate a person’s right to privacy guaranteed under
Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused persons are veritably
forced to incriminate themselves.

VII. Law on Counterfeit Drugs

1. Roma Drug vs Glaxo

(Law on counterfeit drugs)

The section prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs, which under Section 3(b)(3),
includes “an unregistered imported drug product.” The term “unregistered” signifies
the lack of registration with the Bureau of Patent, Trademark and Technology
Transfer of a trademark, tradename or other identification mark of a drug in the
name of a natural or juridical person, the process of which is governed under Part III
of the Intellectual Property Code.

In this case, there is no doubt that the subject seized drugs are identical in content
with their Philippine-registered counterparts. There is no claim that they were
adulterated in any way or mislabeled at least. Their classification as “counterfeit” is
based solely on the fact that they were imported from abroad and not purchased
from the Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the drugs.

VIII. Anti-Child Pornography Act

1. Disini vs Secretary of DOJ

(Anti-Child Pornography online; no double jeopardy)
IX. Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act

1. Manuel vs Zoleta
(Sec. 3a)

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

(a) Persuading, inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act

constituting a violation of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent
authority or an offense in connection with the official duties of the latter, or
allowing himself to be persuaded, induced, or influenced to commit such
violation or offense.

The Court has reviewed the assailed resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman,
and finds that petitioner likewise failed to establish probable cause for violation of
Sections 3(a), (e) and (j) of RA No. 3019. Indeed, in the absence of a clear case of
abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with the exercise of the
Ombudsman’s discretion, who, based on his own findings and deliberate
consideration of the case, either dismisses a complaint or proceeds with it.

2. Mayor Fuentes vs People

(Elements of 3e)

Section 3 (e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or
giving any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall
apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with
the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Elements of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019 are as follows:

(a) that the accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial, or
official functions (or a private individual acting in conspiracy with such public
officers);
(b) that he acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or inexcusable
negligence; and
(c) that his action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government,
or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage, or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
3. Consigna vs People
(Mejorada Doctrine)

It becomes superfluous to dwell further on the issue raised by petitioner that Sec.
3(e) applies only to officers and employees of offices or government corporations
charged with the grant of licenses or other concessions. Nonetheless, to finally settle
the issue, the last sentence of the said provision is not a restrictive requirement
which limits the application or extent of its coverage.

This has long been settled in our ruling in Mejorada v. Sandiganbayan, 151 SCRA 399
(1987), where we categorically declared that a prosecution for violation of Sec. 3(e)
of the Anti-Graft Law will lie regardless of whether or not the accused public officer
is “charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.”

4. Duterte vs Sandiganbayan
(Section 3g ; effect of invalidated contract)

Under the facts of the case, there is no basis in law or in fact to charge petitioners
for violation of Sec. 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.

To establish probable cause against the offender for violation of Sec. 3(g), the
following elements must be present:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) he entered into a contract or transaction in behalf of the government; and
(3) the contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.

The second element of the crime—that the accused public officers entered into a
contract in behalf of the government—is absent.

The computerization contract was rescinded on 6 May 1991 before SAR No. 91-05
came out on 31 May 1991 and before the Anti-Graft League filed its complaint with
the Ombudsman on 1 August 1991. Hence, at that time the Anti-Graft League
instituted their complaint and the Ombudsman issued its Order on 12 November
1991, there was no longer any contract to speak of. The contract, after 6 May 1991
became in contemplation of law, non-existent, as if no contract was ever executed.
5. Carabeo vs CA
(purpose of SALN)

“Section 8 above, speaks of unlawful acquisition of wealth, the evil sought to be

suppressed and avoided, and Section 7, which mandates full disclosure of wealth in
the SALN, is a means of preventing said evil and is aimed particularly at curtailing
and minimizing, the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard
of honesty in the public service. “Unexplained” matter normally results from “non-
disclosure” or concealment of vital facts. SALN, which all public officials and
employees are mandated to file, are the means to achieve the policy of
accountability of all public officers and employees in the government. By the SALN,
the public are able to monitor movement in the fortune of a public official; it is a
valid check and balance mechanism to verify undisclosed properties and wealth.”

6. Bolastig vs Sandiganbayan
(Maximum period of oreventive suspension / purpose)

The duration of preventive suspension is thus coeval with the period prescribed for
deciding administrative disciplinary cases. If the case is decided before ninety days,
then the suspension will last less than ninety days, but if the case is not decided
within ninety days, then the preventive suspension must be up to ninety days only.
Similarly, as applied to criminal prosecutions under Republic Act No. 3019,
preventive suspension will last for less than ninety days only if the case is decided
within that period; otherwise, it will continue for ninety days.

The duration of preventive suspension will, therefore, vary to the extent that it is
contingent on the time it takes the court to decide the case but not on account of
any discretion lodged in the court, taking into account the probability that the
accused may use his office to hamper his prosecution.

Indeed, were the Sandiganbayan given the discretion to impose a shorter period of
suspension, say, 80, 70 or 60 days, as petitioner asserts, it would lie in its power not
to suspend the accused at all. That, of course, would be contrary to the command of
sec. 13 of Republic Act No. 3019.

Preventive suspension should therefore be ordered only when the legislative

purpose is achieved, that is, when "the suspension order . . . prevent(s) the accused
from using his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which
may be vital in the prosecution of the case against him." Corollarily, when the
legislative purpose is not achieved, preventive suspension is improper and should
not be decreed."
7. Rios vs Sandiganbayan
(Period of preventive suspension under LGU)

Preventive suspension is required to prevent the accused from using his office to
intimidate witnesses or frustrate his prosecution or continue committing
malfeasance in office. This is based on the presumption that unless the public officer
is suspended, he may frustrate his prosecution or commit further acts of
malfeasance or both.

The Sandiganbayan erred in imposing a 90 day suspension upon petitioner for the
single case filed against him. Under Section 63 (b) of the Local Government Code,
any single preventive suspension of local elective officials shall not extend beyond
sixty (60) days.

8. Henry Go vs Sandiganbayan
(Section 3g ; Conspiracy)

The precept that could be drawn from Luciano, Singian and Domingo, and which is
applicable to the present case, is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of RA 3019, including (g) and (h) thereof. This is in
consonance with the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of
public officers and private persons alike constituting graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto.

Following these truisms, the specific acts of petitioner Go in the alleged conspiracy
with Rivera in violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as well as the details on how
petitioner Go had taken part in the planning and preparation of the alleged
conspiracy need not be set forth in the Information as these are evidentiary matters
and, as such, are to be shown and proved during the trial on the merits. Indeed, it
bears stressing that “[t]o establish conspiracy, direct proof of an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and the decision to commit it is not
necessary. It may be inferred from the acts of the accused before, during or after the
commission of the crime which, when taken together, would be enough to reveal a
community of criminal design, as the proof of conspiracy is frequently made by
evidence of a chain of circumstances. Once established, all the conspirators are
criminally liable as co-principals regardless of the degree of participation of each of
them, for in contemplation of the law the act of one is the act of all.”
X. Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards

1. Posadas vs Sandiganbayan
(Public office – public trust ; private practice of profession)

This Court’s mandate is to uphold the Constitution and the laws. Our Constitution
stresses that a public office is a public trust and public officers must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty,
and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives. These
constitutionally-enshrined principles, oft-repeated in our case law, are not mere
rhetorical flourishes or idealistic sentiments. They should be taken as working
standards by all in the public service.

Consultancy is deemed private practice of profession. Under CSC Resolution

02126454 dated September 27, 2002, accepting a consultancy job under a part-time
status is subject to the following conditions:

1. It must not violate the rule against holding multiple positions;

2. The employee/officer must obtain permission or authority from his/her head of

agency as the same constitutes private practice of profession;

3. The consultancy job must not conflict or tend to conflict with his/her official
functions; and

4. It must not affect the effective performance of his/her duty.

2. Domingo vs Ombudsman
(No Penalty under section 4, RA 6713)

XI. Anti-Plunder Law

1. Estrada vs Sandiganbayan
(Plunder ; Mala inse)

According to Section 2 of RA 7080, plunder is committed when a public officer who,

by himself or in connivance with members of his family, relatives by affinity or
consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses,
accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts as described in Section 1 (d) of RA 7080 in the aggregate amount or
total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00). In addition, any person
who participated with the said public officer in the commission of plunder shall
likewise be punished.

The criminal acts described in Section 1 (d) are as follows:

1. Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or

raids on the public treasury;

2. By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage,

kickbacks or any/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or
by reason of the office or position of the public officer concerned;

3. By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the

National government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;

4. By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,

equity or any other form of interest or participation including the promise of future
employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;

5. By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combinations and/or implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit
particular persons or special interests; or,

6. By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection

or influence to unjustly enrich himself or themselves at the expense and to the
damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

In the original version of RA 7080, the offender was liable only if the aggregate
amount amassed is at least Seventy-five million pesos (P75,000,000.00) with the
corresponding penalty of life imprisonment with perpetual absolute disqualification
from holding any public office. However, RA 7659 (The Death Penalty Law)
amended Section 2 of RA 7080, and lowered the amount to Fifty million pesos and
increased the imposable penalty to death,

Thus when the Plunder Law speaks of “combination,” it is referring to at least two
(2) acts falling under different categories of enumeration provided in Sec. 1, par. (d),
e.g., raids on the public treasury in Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1), and fraudulent
conveyance of assets belonging to the National Government under Sec. 1, par. (d),
subpar. (3).

On the other hand, to constitute a “series” there must be two (2) or more overt or
criminal acts falling under the same category of enumeration found in Sec. 1, par.
(d), say, misappropriation, malversation and raids on the public treasury, all of which
fall under Sec. 1, par. (d), subpar. (1). Verily, had the legislature intended a technical
or distinctive meaning for “combination” and “series,” it would have taken greater
pains in specifically providing for it in the law.

As for “pat-tern,” we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this
term issufficientlydefinedinSec.4,inrelationtoSec.1,par.(d),andSec.2.—As for
“pattern,” we agree with the observations of the Sandiganbayan that this term is
sufficiently defined in Sec. 4, in relation to Sec. 1, par. (d), and Sec. 2—xxxx under
Sec. 1 (d) of the law, a ‘pattern’ consists of at least a combination or series of overt
or criminal acts enumerated in subsections (1) to (6) of Sec. 1 (d). Secondly, pursuant
to Sec. 2 of the law, the pattern of overt or criminal acts is directed towards a
common purpose or goal which is to enable the public officer to amass, accumulate
or acquire ill-gotten wealth. And thirdly, there must either be an ‘overall unlawful
scheme’ or ‘conspiracy’ to achieve said common goal. As commonly understood, the
term ‘overall unlawful scheme’ indicates a ‘general plan of action or method’ which
the principal accused and public officer and others conniving with him follow to
achieve the aforesaid common goal. In the alternative, if there is no such overall
scheme or where the schemes or methods used by multiple accused vary, the overt
or criminal acts must form part of a conspiracy to attain a common goal.

As regards the third issue, again we agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a
malum in se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his Concurring
Opinion—x x x Precisely because the constitutive crimes are mala in se the element
of mens rea must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy that the
amended information alleges that the crime of plunder was committed “willfully,
unlawfully and criminally.” It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
Estrada vs. Sandiganbayan, 369 SCRA 394, G.R. No. 148560 November 19, 2001