1
Cayetano vs monsod
Facts: Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of chairman of the COMELEC. Petitioner opposed the
nomination because allegedly Monsod does not posses required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. The 1987
constitution provides in Section 1, Article IX-C: There shall be a Commission on
Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates for any
elective position in the immediately preceding elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Issue: Whether the respondent does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Held: In the case of Philippine Lawyers Association vs. Agrava, stated: The practice
of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding,
the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment
and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the
foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and
insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of
estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice. Practice of law
means any activity, in or out court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable
consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity
as an advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or
authorized to settle controversies. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the law,
or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law.”
The contention that Atty. Monsod does not posses the required qualification of having
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years is incorrect since Atty. Monsod’s
past work experience as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-
entrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of
both rich and the poor – verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement for the
position of COMELEC chairman, The respondent has been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years does In the view of the foregoing, the petition is
DISMISSED.
Esteves v sarmiento
This is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition[1] under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Resolution[2] of the Second Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in SPR No. 46-2007. Said resolution set aside
the Order[3] dated 8 September 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 96, Baler, Aurora and consequently dismissed the election protest filed by
herein petitioner Jeremias V. Esteves against private respondent Mayor Reynaldo
Teh Bitong.
As culled from the records of the case, the following antecedent facts appear:
In the national and local elections conducted last 14 May 2007, petitioner and private
respondent both ran for the position of municipal mayor of the Municipality of
Casiguran, Aurora. On 15 May 2007, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
private respondent as the duly-elected Mayor of Casiguran on the basis of the results
of the canvassing, which showed him having garnered 3,342 votes or with a margin of
48 votes over petitioner, who obtained 3,294 votes.[4]
On 25 May 2007, petitioner filed an election protest before the Regional Trial Court of
Baler, Aurora. The protest was docketed as Election Protest Case (EPC) No. 99 and
raffled to Branch 96 presided by Judge Corazon D. Soluren.[5]
The RTC then issued a precautionary protection order directing the Municipal
Treasurer and Election Officer of Casiguran to take immediate steps to safeguard the
integrity of all the ballot boxes, lists of voters and other paraphernalia used in the
elections and thereafter directed that all the election paraphernalia, including the
ballot boxes and lists of voters, subject of the protest be brought before the court.[6]
Private respondent then filed an answer, which the RTC admitted in an Order dated 2
August 2007. In the same order, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration of the
 2

dismissal of private respondent’s counter-protest on the ground of non-payment of
filing fee. Thereafter, the RTC ordered the creation of the revision committees.[7]
On 6 September 2007, private respondent filed a motion to dismiss the election
protest, arguing that it was defective in form and substance as it did not specify the
precincts where fraud and irregularities were committed. On 8 September 2007, the
RTC issued the order denying private respondent’s motion to dismiss for lack of
merit.[8]
Thus, private respondent filed before the COMELEC a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with application for temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of
preliminary injunction.[9] The petition sought to nullify the RTC Order dated 8
September 2007 denying private respondent’s motion to dismiss. It also prayed that
the election protest filed by petitioner be dismissed and the proceedings thereon
enjoined on the ground that the election protest failed to comply with the requirements
of Section 11(f), Rule 2[10] of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC. Petitioner filed an answer on 5
December 2007.
No. 99.[12] The other member of the Second Division, Commissioner Rene V.
Sarmiento, wrote a dissenting opinion.[13] It appears that before the issuance of the
assailed resolution, the third member of the Second Division, Presiding
Commissioner Florentino A. Tuazon, Jr. had retired from the service.
Hence, the instant petition, raising the following arguments: (1) the COMELEC
(Second Division) has no jurisdiction to entertain special relief cases like petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus; (2) the challenged resolution did not comply with
the constitutional requirement that it must be decided by a majority vote of all the
members; and (3) the challenged resolution negated the spirit and very purpose of
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) manifested that under Section 5, Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court, only the private respondent is required to appear and defend the
case, both on his own behalf and on behalf of the public respondent COMELEC, and
prayed that the COMELEC be excused from filing the required comment.[14] In a
Resolution dated 12 August 2008, the Court granted the motion of the OSG.[15]

After hearing private respondent’s application, the COMELEC (Second Division) The petition deserves dismissal.
issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) on 06 December 2007, which directed
Judge Soluren to desist from further proceeding with Election Protest Case No. 96
until further orders from the COMELEC.[11]
Section 3, Article IX-C of the Constitution expressly states:

Thereafter, petitioner filed before this Court a special civil action for certiorari and
Section 3. The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall
prohibition with application for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
promulgate its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases,
preliminary injunction. The petition, docketed as G.R. No. 180792, prayed that a
including pre-proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and
temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the COMELEC (Second Division)
decided in division, provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be
from taking cognizance of SPR Case No. 46-2007 and that the TRO issued by the
decided by the Commission en banc.
COMELEC be ordered lifted.

Also, Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides:

On 15 January 2008, the Court resolved to dismiss G.R. No. 180792 for failure of the
petition to state the material dates showing that the petition was filed on time, failure
to submit the required competent proof of identity in the verification/certification,
failure to give an explanation why service was not personally made and failure to Section 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its Members any
show that any grave abuse of discretion was committed by the COMELEC in case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for
rendering the challenged order. decision or resolution. A case or matter is deemed submitted for decision or
resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless otherwise provided by
this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each Commission may be
On 29 February 2008, the COMELEC (Second Division) issued the assailed
brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days
resolution penned by Commissioner Nicodemo T. Ferrer. The assailed resolution
from receipt of a copy thereof.
nullified the 8 September 2007 Order of the RTC and, accordingly, dismissed EPC
 3
Under the aforequoted constitutional provisions, the requirement that an aggrieved
party must first file a motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the Division to the
COMELEC en banc is mandatory and jurisdictional in invoking the power of review of
the Supreme Court. Failure to abide by this procedural requirement constitutes a
ground for dismissal of the petition.[16]
All election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by the
COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the
COMELEC en banc.[17] As held in Ambil v. Commission on Elections,[18] the power
of review of the Supreme Court of the rulings of the COMELEC is limited only to the
final decision or resolution of the COMELEC en banc and not the final resolution of its
Division. The Supreme Court has no power to review, via certiorari, an interlocutory
order or even a final resolution of a Division of the Commission on Elections.
Moreover, pursuant to Section 5 (c), Rule 3[19] of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
a resolution issued by a Division of the COMELEC must first be elevated to the
COMELEC en banc by filing a motion for reconsideration.
The filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory because the mode by which a
decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc may be elevated to the Supreme
Court is by the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration of the order,
resolution or decision of the tribunal, board or office is, subject to well-recognized
exceptions, a condition sine qua non to the institution of a special civil action for
certiorari. The rationale therefore is that the law intends to afford the tribunal, board or
office an opportunity to rectify the errors and mistakes it may have lapsed into before
resort to the courts of justice can be had.[20]
Since the COMELEC Rules of Procedure allows the review of a resolution of the
Division by the COMELEC en banc, the filing of the instant petition for certiorari and
prohibition is premature. The petition does not allege that petitioner indeed filed a
motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. The unquestioned rule in
this jurisdiction is that certiorari will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law against the acts of public
respondent.[21] Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse
consequences of petitioner’s own omission to file the required motion for
reconsideration.[22] A litigant should first exhaust the administrative remedies
provided by law before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide correctly the matter and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court.[23] The premature invocation of judicial intervention is
fatal to one’s cause of
action.[24]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition is DENIED. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Gallardo vs. Tabamo, Jr. January 29, 1993 218 SCRA 253
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Petitioners seek to prohibit, restrain and enjoin respondent Judge Tabamo
from continuing with the proceedings in a petition for injunction, prohibition and
mandamus with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and restraining order filed
as a taxpayer’s suit.
At the time of filing both the special civil action and the instant petition, petitioner
Antonio Gallardo was the incumbent Governor of the Province of Camiguin and was
seeking re-election in the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections. Petitioners Arevalo,
Echavez, Aranas, and Sia are the provincial treasurer, provincial auditor, provincial
engineer, and provincial budget officer of Camiguin. Their co-petitioners Rambuyon,
Primo and Noel Navarro are all government project laborers. On the other hand, the
private respondent was the incumbent Congressman of the lone Congressional
district of Camiguin, a candidate for the same office in the said synchronized elections
and the Regional Chairman of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) in Region
X.
FACTS:
On April 10, 1992, private respondent filed his Petition (Special Civil Action No. 465)
before the court a quo against petitioners to prohibit and restrain them from pursuing
or prosecuting certain public works projects as it violates the 45-day ban on public
works imposed by the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) because
although they were initiated few days before March 27, 1992, the date the ban took
effect, they were not covered by detailed engineering plans, specifications or a
program of work which are preconditions for the commencement of any public works
project. The questioned projects are classified into two (2) categories: (a) those that
are Locally-Funded, consisting of 29 different projects for the maintenance or
concreting of various roads, the rehabilitation of the Katibawasan Falls and the
construction of the Capitol Building, and (b) those designated as Foreign-Assisted,
consisting of fifteen (15) projects which include the construction of Human
Development Center, various Day Care cum Production Centers and waterworks
systems; the extension and renovation of various buildings; the acquisition of hospital
and laboratory equipment; and the rehabilitation of office and equipment.
 4
On the same day, respondent Judge issued the question TRO. In the same order, he
directed the petitioners to file their Answer within 10 days from receipt of notice and
set the hearing on the application for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
for April 24, 1992. Instead of filing the Answer, the petitioners filed the special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or temporary restraining order. They contend that the case principally involves an
alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code thus the jurisdiction is exclusively
vested in the Comelec, not the Regional Trial Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil
Action No. 465.
RULING:
The material operative facts alleged in the petition therein inexorably link the private
respondent's principal grievance to alleged violations of paragraphs (a), (b), (v) and
(w), Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881). There is
particular emphasis on the last two (2) paragraphs which read:
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. — The following shall be guilty of an
election offense:
(a) Vote-buying and vote-selling. —
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Conspiracy to bribe voters. —
xxx xxx xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of
public funds. Any public official or employee including barangay
officials and those of government-owned or controlled corporations
and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days before a regular
election and thirty days before a special election, releases,
disburses or expends any public funds for:
(1) Any and all kinds of public works, except the following:
xxx xxx xxx
(w) Prohibition against construction of public works, delivery of
materials for public works and issuance of treasury warrants and
similar devices. — During the period of forty-five days preceding a
regular election and thirty days before a special election, any
person who (a) undertakes the construction of any public works,
except for projects or works exempted in the preceding paragraph;
or (b) issues, uses or avails of treasury warrants or any device
undertaking future delivery of money, goods or other things of value
chargeable against public funds.
The court ruled that Comelec has jurisdiction to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of elections. The 1987 Constitution implicitly grants the
Commission the power to promulgate such rules and regulations as provided in
Section 2 of Article IX-C. Moreover, the present Constitution also invests the
Comission with the power to “investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of
violations of election law, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds,
offenses, and malpractices.
It is not true that, as contended by the petitioners, the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court under the election laws is limited to criminal actions for violations of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Constitution itself grants to it exclusive original
jurisdiction over contests involving elective municipal officials. Neither can the Court
agree with the petitioners' assertion that the Special Civil Action filed in the RTC
below involves the prosecution of election offenses; the said action seeks some
reliefs incident to or in connection with alleged election offenses; specifically, what is
sought is the prevention of the further commission of these offenses which, by their
alleged nature, are continuing.
There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no
legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus
Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the
commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith.
On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for
election offenses may be done motu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon
written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization
under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission.
However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the
Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election
Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal
or City Fiscal." As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously
concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a
stoppage of the public works projects because of their alleged adverse effect on his
candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done
the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong
authority.
The court, therefore, has no alternative but to grant this petition on the basis their
resolution of the principal issue. Nevertheless, it must be strongly emphasized that in
 5
so holding that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special
Civil Action No. 465
ALFREDO GUIEB, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LUIS M. FONTANILLA, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 42, Dagupan City, and MANUEL ASUNCION, respondents.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Revealed in this case is the parties' and the lower court judges' unfamiliarity with or
ignorance of the constitutional provision on the appellate jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in election contests involving elective
barangay officials and of the decision of this Court declaring unconstitutional a
provision of law vesting upon Regional Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over the said
cases.
We find it unnecessary to resolve the issue raised by the petitioner, viz., whether or
not a vote for a candidate for an office to which he did not seek to be elected is valid.
We shall, instead, deal with the validity of the challenged decision.
The antecedents are uncomplicated and uncontroverted.
The petitioner and the private respondent were candidates for the position of Punong
Barangay of Barangay Nilombot, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, in the barangay election
of 9 May 1994. After the canvass of votes in the said barangay, the former was
proclaimed as the winning candidate. The latter then seasonably filed an election
protest with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.
On 27 May 1994, the MTC, per Judge Lilia C. Español, rendered a decision
confirming the proclamation of the petitioner and dismissing the protest of the private
respondent.1
The private respondent appealed the decision to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Dagupan City. The case was assigned to Branch 42 thereof.
In its decision2 of 31 August 1994, the RTC, per respondent Judge Luis M. Fontanilla,
reversed the decision of the MTC, annulled the proclamation of the petitioner, and
declared the private respondent as the winning candidate with a plurality of four votes
over the petitioner.
After the petitioner's motion for reconsideration3 of the decision was denied 4 on 25
November 1994, the private respondent immediately filed a motion for the issuance of
a writ of execution.
In its order of 8 December 1994,5 the RTC declared that the motion should be
properly filed with the court of origin and that the decision of 31 August 1994 had
already become final; it then ordered the remand of the records of the case to the
MTC of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, for proper disposition.
On 12 December 1994, the petitioner filed with this Court a motion for extension of
time to file a petition for review on certiorari. On 29 December 1994, he sent by
registered mail his petition, which this Court received only on 25 January 1995. It
turned out, however, that his motion for extension of time to file a petition had already
been denied on 4 January 1995 for his failure to submit an affidavit of service of that
motion. On 8 February 1995, he filed a motion for the reconsideration of the denial.
Meanwhile, on 20 December 1994, the private respondent filed with the MTC a
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution. 6
In its order of 19 January 1995, the MTC deferred action on the said motion and
required the petitioner's counsel to inform the court of the status of his petition with
this Court.7 For failure of the petitioner's counsel to comply with the said order, the
court issued an order on 7 February 19958 granting the issuance of a writ of
execution. On 13 February 1995, however, the court received the said counsel's
Compliance dated 9 February 19959 wherein he informed the court of the petitioner's
motion to reconsider this Court's resolution denying the motion for extension of time
to file his petition.
In the resolution of 8 February 1995, this Court required the respondent to comment
on the petition.
On 16 February 1995, the petitioner filed with the MTC an Urgent Motion to Stay
and/or Suspend Execution. 10 This motion was, however,
denied 11 on the ground that the writ, having been hand-carried by the private
respondent to the office of the sheriff, must have already been implemented and,
therefore, the motion to stay or suspend the same has become moot and academic.
On 20 March 1995, the sheriff returned the writ of execution with the information that
in the presence of a barangay kagawad and barangay residents, he enforced the writ
and proclaimed the private respondent as Punong Barangay of Barangay Nilombot,
Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan. 12
In view of the issue involved, we resolved to give due course to the petition.
The RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction over the appeal interposed by the private
respondent from the decision of the MTC.
 6

Under paragraph (2), Section 2, subdivision C, Article IX of the Constitution, 13 it is the
COMELEC, and not the Regional Trial Courts, that has exclusive jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective barangay officials decided by courts of limited jurisdiction,
which are the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts. 14 In Flores vs. Commission on Elections, 15 this Court struck out as
unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of R.A. No. 6679 vesting upon the Regional
Trial Courts appellate jurisdiction over such cases.
The private respondent should have appealed the decision of the MTC to the
COMELEC; the MTC should not have given due course to the appeal; and the RTC
should have dismissed outright the appeal for want of jurisdiction.
In accepting the appeal and deciding the case on its merits, the respondent judge
manifested either ignorance or palpable disregard of the aforesaid constitutional
provision and decision. It must be noted that a judge is presumed to know the
constitutional limits of the authority or jurisdiction of his court. He is called upon to
exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with the laws; it is imperative that he be
conversant with basic legal principles. 16 Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics
requires that a judge should be "studious of the principles of the law." Thus, if the
respondent judge were only aware of the aforementioned constitutional provision and
decision, he would have cut short the journey of a very simple case and put an end to
the litigation. What this Court stated in Aducayen vs.Flores 17 deserves reiteration:
Nor is this all that has to be said. There is need, it does seem, to caution
anew judges of inferior courts, which according to the Constitution refer to all
those outside this Tribunal, to exercise greater care in the discharge of their
judicial functions. They are called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory
acquaintance with statutes and procedural rules. Moreover, while it becomes
hourly difficult to keep abreast of our ever-increasing decisions, a modicum
of effort should be exerted by them not to lag too far behind. Nor is it too
much to expect that they betray awareness of well-settled and authoritative
doctrines. If such were the case, then resort to us would be less frequent.
That way our time could be devoted to questions of greater significance. Not
only that, there would be on the part of party litigants less expense and
greater faith in the administration of justice, if there be a belief on their part
that the occupants of the bench cannot justly be accused of an apparent
deficiency in their grasp of legal principles. Such an indictment unfortunately
cannot just be dismissed as a manifestation of chronic fault-finding. The
situation thus calls for a more conscientious and diligent approach to the
discharge of judicial functions to avoid the imputation that there is on the part
of a number of judges less than full and adequate comprehension of the law.
respondent to appeal the same before the proper forum, and the writ of execution to
enforce the decision of the Regional Trial Court is hereby SET ASIDE and
ANNULLED.
Costs against the private respondent.
SO ORDERED
Antonio vs Comelec
The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay
Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila. After the board of canvassers proclaimed
protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T. Miranda, Jr. filed
an election protest against Antonio before the MTC. The trial court rendered a
Decision declaring the protestant Vicente Miranda as the duly elected Barangay
Chairman.
Antonio received the decision on 18 March 1998. Subsequently, Antonio filed a
Notice of Appeal with the trial court on 27 March 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt
thereof. Meanwhile, Miranda moved to execute the trial court’s decision. Rustico, in
his Opposition to the Motion for Execution or Execution Pending Appeal, argued
against Mirandas motion for execution. After the trial court denied the motion for
execution, the records of this case was forwarded to COMELEC’s Second Division.
On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this
COMELEC an Order dated 3 August 1998 stating that Antonio failed to perfect his
appeal within the five (5) days period prescribed for perfecting his appeal, as he filed
his Notice of Appeal only on March 27, 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt of the
decision sought to be appealed.
The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his
appeal within the said period deprives the Commission of its appellate jurisdiction.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged decision of 31 The instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and We AFFIRM the Order dated
August 1994 of Branch 42 of the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City and its order of 3 August 1998 of this Commission (Second Division).[3]
25 November 1994 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are hereby
SET ASIDE and ANNULLED for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the said court to
entertain and decide the appeal. The decision of 27 May 1994 of the Municipal Trial
Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, is hereby declared final for failure of the private
 7
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC committed
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the
appeal.
In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure which reads:
SEC. 21. Appeal From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may
appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of
the decision.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions of the
Municipal Trial Courts or Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay officials is
governed by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election
Code.
Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 reads:
SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed
with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly
filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for a barangay office within ten
(10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall
decide the election protest within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision
of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten (10) days from
receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which shall
decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose decision
on questions of fact shall be final and non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay
elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed.
Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:
SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. A sworn petition contesting the
election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan
trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been
voted for the same office within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the
filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be
appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the
regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission,
and whose decisions shall be final.
In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section 9 of
Republic Act 6779 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC
rationalized thus:
Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code providing for a ten-day period to appeal prevails over the provisions of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. According to Antonio, quasi-judicial bodies,
including this Commission, cannot amend an act of Congress and in case of
discrepancy between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the
former prevails. Generally, yes. But the situation herein does not fall within the
generic situation contemplated therein.
No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3)
grants and authorizes this Commission to promulgate its own rules of procedure as
long as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do not diminish, increase or
modify substantive rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in
1993 as amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is
promulgated by this Commission pursuant to a constitutionally mandated authority
which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or repeal.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the
decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on
Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision. Rule 22 Section 9
(d) of Our Rules of Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts
in election protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the Commission for
failure to file the required notice of appeal within the prescribed period.
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9)
day from receipt of the decision appealed from or four (4) days after the five-day
prescribed period to appeal lapsed. Therefore, the present appeal must be dismissed.
For it is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period
laid down by the COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also
jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed
period as required by the Rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a
party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. So
the High Court rules in Villanueva vs. Court of Appeals, et.al. (205 SCRA 537). And
so, it should also be in the case at bar.
Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or repealed
pursuant to the 1987 Constitution (Article VIII Section 5[5]) providing that rules of
procedure of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the
Supreme Court. But far from being disapproved the COMELEC Rules of Procedure
received approbation and has constantly been cited by the Supreme Court in a
number of decisions such as in the case of Pahilan vs. Tabalba (230 SCRA 205, at
211) and Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702, at 704). In the more
recent case of Calucag vs. Commission on Elections promulgated on 19 June 1997
(G.R. N.o 123673), the Supreme Court stated that:
 8

Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to Edding v Comelec
hear the appeal WHICH APPEAL MUST BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER THE
PROMULGATION OF THE MTC DECISION. Petitioner Norbi H. Edding and respondent Pablo S. Bernardo were among the
candidates for the office of the municipal mayor of Sibuco, Zamboanga Del Norte
during the May 1992 elections. After the canvassing of the election returns, Bernardo
was declared winner over Edding by 212 votes. Unconvinced and alleging massive
Relampagos v Cumba election fraud, Edding filed an election protest on June 9, 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga Del Norte docketed as Election Case No. SE-10.
Upon termination of the protest proceedings and recounting of the ballots, the RTC
Facts: In the elections of 11 May 1992, the petitioner Relampagos and private
rendered judgment on July 2, 1993 proclaiming Edding as the winner of the election
respondent Cumba were candidates for Mayor of Magallanes, Agusan del Norte. The
for the mayoralty seat of Sibuco, Zamboanga del Norte, and declaring as null and
latter was proclaimed the winning candidate, with a margin of twenty-two votes over
void the election of respondent Bernardo so that on July 15, 1993, Edding assumed
the former. Unwilling to accept defeat, the petitioner filed an election protest with the
office and replaced Bernardo.
RTC which found the petitioner to have won with a margin of six votes over the
private respondent and rendered judgment in favor of the petitioner. On 4 July 1994,
On July 16, 1993, Bernardo filed with the COMELEC a Petition for Certiorari with
the private respondent appealed the decision to the COMELEC. The petitioner, on 12
Application for Preliminary Injunction and for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining
July 1994, filed with the trial court a motion for execution pending appeal, which the
Order, docketed as SPR No. 5-93 seeking to enjoin the Order of the RTC granting
trial court granted On 3 August 1994. The private respondent filed a motion for
execution pending appeal. The COMELEC gave due course to the petition, and
reconsideration of the order of execution which was denied on 5 August 1994.
issued a temporary restraining order on July 19, 1993.
The private respondent then filed with the respondent COMELEC a petition for
ISSUE:
certiorari to annul the aforesaid order of the trial court granting the motion for
Whether the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of
execution pending appeal and the writ of execution. On 9 February 1995, the
Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election
COMELEC promulgated its resolution granting the petition. Accordingly, petitioner
cases.
was ordered restored to her position as Municipal Mayor, pending resolution of the
appeal before the Commission. Aggrieved by the resolution, the petitioner filed this
RULING:
special civil action.
This court upheld the jurisdiction of the COMELEC to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus over election cases where it has appellate jurisdiction by
Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
virtue of Section 50 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 697, which provides as follows: "SEC.
prohibition, and mandamus in election cases where it has exclusive appellate
50. Definition. - x x x The commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to
jurisdiction?
hear and decide petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election
cases."
Held: The Court in concluding that the aforesaid last paragraph of Section 50 of B.P.
697 has not been repealed by the Omnibus Election Code, held that the COMELEC
COMELEC has the power to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus,
has the authority to issue the extraordinary writs for certiorari, prohibition and
invoking Sections 2(2) and 3 of Article IX of the 1987 Constitution, which provides in
mandamus only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
part: "Sec. 2. The commission on elections shall exercise the following powers and
functions: x x x (2) xxx appellate jurisdiction over all contests involving elective
Hence, the trial court acted with palpable and whimsical abuse of discretion in
municipal officials decided by trial courts of general jurisdiction, or involving elective
granting the petitioner’s motion for execution pending appeal and in issuing the writ of
barangay officials decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction. xxx Sec. 3. The
execution. Any motion for execution pending appeal must be filed before the period
commission on elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate its
for the perfection of the appeal. Since the motion for execution pending appeal was
rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election case, including pre-
filed only on 12 July 1994, or after the perfection of the appeal, the trial court could no
proclamation controversies. x x x"
longer validly act thereon.
The Commission is hereby vested with the exclusive authority to hear and decide
COMELEC has jurisdiction, hence, it correctly set aside the challenged order granting
petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus involving election cases.
the motion for execution pending appeal and writ of execution issued by the trial
court.
 9
Loong v. COMELEC
G.R. No. 133676, April 4, 1999
Facts: In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on
December 22, 1997 prescribing the adoption of an automated election system. The
new system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular elections held in the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province of Sulu. Atty. Jose
Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of
the elections in Sulu.
During the election it was noticed that there was an error in the printing of the local
ballots, as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them
correctly.
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local candidates and the
military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. The meeting discussed how the
ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals. Some
recommended a manual count while other insisted on an automated count. In view of
their differences in opinion, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. requested the parties to submit their
written position papers.
Petitioner argues that he automated counting is mandatory and could not be
substituted by a manual counting. Where the machines are allegedly defective, the
only remedy provided for by law is to replace the machine. Manual counting is
prohibited by law;
Issue: Whether or not COMELEC had the authority to order a manual count.
Held: YES. In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy
where the error in counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-
seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC
from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C) of the Constitution
gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and
recall." Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to have COMELEC all the
necessary and incidental powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly,
honest, peaceful, and credible elections. Congruent to this intent, this Court has not
been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of COMELEC in the conduct of
our elections.
Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public
offices, candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to
make snap judgments to meet unforseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the
will of our voters. In the process, the actions of COMELEC may not be impeccable,
indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a swivel chair
criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances.
Akbayan youth v Comelec
Petitioners―representing the youth sector―seek to direct the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) to conduct a special registration before the 14 May 2001
General Elections, of new voters ages 18 to 21. According to petitioners, around four
million youth failed to register on or before the 27 December 2000 deadline set by the
respondent COMELEC under Republic Act No. 8189. Memorandum No. 2001-027 on
the Report on the Request for a Two-day Additional Registration of New Voters Only
is submitted but was then denied by the COMELEC under Resolution No. 3584 on 8
February 2001.
A request to conduct a two-day additional registration of new voters on February 17
and 18, 2001 was passed but it was denied by the COMELEC. Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 8189 explicitly provides that no registration shall be conducted during the
period starting one hundred twenty (120) days before a regular election and that the
Commission has no more time left to accomplish all pre-election activities.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court can compel respondent COMELEC, to conduct a special
registration of new voters during the period between the COMELEC’s imposed
December 27, 2000 deadline and the May 14, 2001 general elections.
HELD:
The Supreme Court could not compel Comelec to conduct a special registration of
 10
new voters. The right to suffrage is not absolute and must be exercised within the
proper bounds and framework of the Constitution. Petitioners failed to register, thus
missed their chance. However, court took judicial notice of the fact that the President
issued a proclamation calling Congress to a Special Session to allow the conduct of
special registration for new voters and that bills had been filed in Congress to amend
Republic Act No. 8189.
People vs. Inting
GR No. 88919 | July 25, 1990
Facts:
 On February 6, 1988, Mrs. Editha Barba filed a letter-complaint against OIC-
Mayor Dominador Regalado of Tanjay, Negros Oriental with the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC), for allegedly transferring her, a permanent
Nursing Attendant, Grade I, in the office of the Municipal Mayor to a very
remote barangay and without obtaining prior permission or clearance from
COMELEC as required by law.
 COMELEC directed Atty. Gerardo Lituanas, Provincial Election Supervisor of
Dumaguete City:
1. To conduct the preliminary investigation of the case
2. To prepare and file the necessary information in court
3. To handle the prosecution if the evidence submitted shows a prima
facie case
4. To issue a resolution of prosecution or dismissal as the case may
be
 After a preliminary investigation of Barba's complaint, Atty. Lituanas found a
prima facie case.
o Hence, on September 26, 1988, he filed with the respondent trial
court a criminal case for violation of section 261, Par. (h), Omnibus
Election Code against the OIC-Mayor.
 In an Order dated September 30, 1988, the respondent court issued a
warrant of arrest against the accused OIC Mayor. It also fixed the bail at five
thousand pesos (P5,000.00) as recommended by the Provincial Election
Supervisor.
 However before Mayor Regalado could be arrested the trial court set aside
its order on the grounds that Atty. Lituanas is not authorized to determine
probable cause.
o Atty. Lituanas filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was quashed
by the trial courts.
Issues:
 Does a preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election
Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the
Provincial Prosecutor, before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance
of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?
Held:
 Preliminary investigation should be distinguished as to whether it is an
investigation for the determination of a sufficient ground for the filing of the
information or it is an investigation for the determination of a probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. The first kind of preliminary
investigation is executive in nature. It is part of the prosecution's job. The
second kind of preliminary investigation which is more properly called
preliminary examination is judicial in nature and is lodged with the judge
 Article IX Sec 2 of the constitution states that The COMELEC has the power
to investigate but also prosecute violation of election laws. This means that
the COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases
involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine
probable cause and for filing an information in court.
 Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court
misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information
filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor. As indicated above what the
respondent trial court should have done was to enforce its September 30,
1988 order, to wit.
o It should have said probable cause exists, issued a warrant of
arrest and placed bail at Php 5,000.
 The order to get the approval of the Provincial Fiscal is not only superfluous
but unwarranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The questioned Orders dated
October 3, 1988, November 22, 1988 and December 8, 1988 are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. The respondent trial court's Order dated September 30, 1988 is
REINSTATED. The respondent court is ordered to proceed hearing the case with
deliberate speed until its termination.
SO ORDERED.
 11
People vs Delgado
The authority of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to review the actions of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of
election offenses filed in said court is the center of controversy of this petition.
On January 14, 1988 the COMELEC received a report-complaint from Atty.
Lauron E. Quilatan, Election Registrar of Toledo City, against private
respondents for alleged violation of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC
directed Atty. Manuel Oyson, Jr., Provincial Election Supervisor of Cebu, to
conduct the preliminary investigation of the case.
After conducting such preliminary investigation, Oyson submitted a report on
April 26, 1989 finding a prima facie case and recommending the filing of an
information against each of the private respondents for violation of Section 261
(y) (2) and (5) of the Omnibus Election Code. The COMELEC en banc in minute
resolution No. 89-1291 dated October 2, 1989 as amended by resolution No. 89-
1574 dated November 2, 1989 resolved to file the information against the private
respondents as recommended.
On February 6, 1990, fifteen (15) informations were filed against each of private
respondents in the RTC of Toledo City docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-
1220 to TCS-1234. In three separate manifestations the Regional Election
Director of Region VII was designated by the COMELEC to handle the
prosecution with the authority to assign another COMELEC prosecutor.
Private respondents, through counsels, then filed motions for reconsiderations
and the suspension of the warrant of arrest with the respondent court on the
ground that no preliminary investigation was conducted. On February 22, 1990
an order was issued by respondent court directing the COMELEC through the
Regional Election Director of Region VII to conduct a reinvestigation of said
cases and to submit his report within ten (10) days after termination thereof.
The Toledo City INP was directed to hold in abeyance the service of the
warrants of arrest until the submission of the reinvestigation report. 1
On March 16,1990 the COMELEC Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration and
opposition to the motion for reinvestigation alleging therein that it is only the Supreme
Court that may review the decisions, orders, rulings and resolutions of the
COMELEC. This was denied in an order dated April 5, 1990 whereby the respondent
trial court upheld its jurisdiction over the subject matter. 2
Hence, the herein petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition wherein the
following issues are raised:
(a) Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority
to order the Commission on Elections through its Regional Election
Director of Region VII or its Law Department to conduct a
reinvestigation of Criminal Cases Nos. TCS-1220 to TCS-1234;
(b) Whether or not the respondent court in issuing its disputed order
dated April 5,1990 gravely usurped the functions of the Honorable
Supreme Court, the sole authority that has the power to review on
certiorari, decisions, orders, resolutions or instructions of the
Commission on Elections; and
(c) Whether or not the respondent Court has the power or authority
to order the Comelec Law Department to furnish said respondent
the records of preliminary investigation of the above criminal cases
for purposes of determining a probable cause. 3
The main thrust of the petition is that inasmuch as the COMELEC is an independent
constitutional body, its actions on election matters may be reviewed only on certiorari
by the Supreme Court. 4
On the other hand, the respondents contend that since the cases were filed in court
by the COMELEC as a public prosecutor, and not in the exercise of its power to
decide election contests, the trial court has authority to order a reinvestigation.
Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following
powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall
(2) Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all contests relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional,
provincial, and city officials and appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving elective municipal officials decided by trial courts
of general jurisdiction or involving elective baranggay officials
decided by trial courts of limited jurisdiction.
Decisions, final orders, or rulings of the commission on election
contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices shall be
final, executory, and not appealable
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions
affecting elections, including determination of the number and
location of polling places, appointment of election officials and
inspectors, and registration of voters.
 12
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcement agencies and instrumentalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
(5) Register, after sufficient publication, political parties,
organizations, or coalitions which, in addition to other requirements,
must present their platform or program of government; and accredit
citizens' arms of the Commission on Elections. Religious
denominations and sects shall not be registered. Those which seek
to achieve their goals through violence or unlawful means, or refuse
to uphold and adhere to this Constitution, or which are supported
by any foreign government shall likewise be refused registration.
Financial contributions from foreign governments and their
agencies to political parties, organizations, coalitions, or candidates
related to elections constitute interference in national affairs, and,
when accepted, shall be an additional ground for the cancellation of
their registration with the Commission in addition to other penalties
that may be prescribed by law.
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions
in court for inclusions or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses,
and malpractices.
(7) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to minimize
election spending, including limitation of places where propaganda
materials shall be posted, and to prevent and penalize all forms of
election frauds, offenses, malpractices, and nuisance candidates.
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to
its directive, order, or decision.
(9) Submit to the President and the Congress a comprehensive
report on the conduct of each election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum, or recall. (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 52, Article VII of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881)
provides among the powers and functions of the COMELEC as follows-
Sec. 52. Power and functions of the Commission on Elections.-In
addition to the powers and functions conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the Commission shall have exclusive charge of the
enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of
elections for the purpose of securing free, orderly and honest
elections .... (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution reads thus —
SEC, 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its
Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days
from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. A case or
matter is deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the
filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
rules of the Commission or by the Commission itself. Unless
otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law any decision,
order, of ruling or each Commission may bebrought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from
receipt of a copy thereof. (Emphasis supplied.)
From the aforementioned provisions of Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution the
powers and functions of the COMELEC may be classified in this manner —
(1) Enforcement of election laws; 5
6
(2) Decision of election contests;
(3) Decision of administrative questions;7
8
(4) Deputizing of law enforcement agencies;
(5) Registration of political parties; 9 and
(6) Improvement of elections. 10
As provided in Section 7, Article IX of the Constitution, unless otherwise provided by
law, any decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC may be brought to the Supreme
Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
In Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. Ferrer, 11 this Court held that "what is
contemplated by the term final orders, rulings and decisions' of the COMELEC
reviewable on certiorari by the Supreme Court as provided by law are those rendered
in actions or proceedings before the COMELEC and taken cognizance of by said
body in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers." Thus, the decisions
 13
of the COMELEC on election contests or administrative questions brought before it
are subject to judicial review only by this Court.
However, under Section 2(6), of Article IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC may
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws,
including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices."
Under Section 265 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC, through its duly
authorized legal officers, "have the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable under this Code, and to prosecute the
same."
Section 268 of the same Code provides that: "The regional trial courts shall have
exclusive original jurisdiction to try and decide any criminal action or proceedings for
violation of this Code, except those relating to the offense of failure to register or
failure to vote which shall be under the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal
trial courts. From the decision of the courts, appeal will lie as in other criminal cases."
From the foregoing provisions of the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it
is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to
decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a
public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation
and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the
competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer,
conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima
facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court
thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case. Consequently, all the subsequent
disposition of said case must be subject to the approval of the court. 12 The
COMELEC cannot conduct a reinvestigation of the case without the authority of the
court or unless so ordered by the court. 13
The records of the preliminary investigation required to be produced by the court must
be submitted by the COMELEC. The trial court may rely on the resolution of the
COMELEC to file the information, by the same token that it may rely on the
certification made by the prosecutor who conducted the preliminary investigation, in
the issuance of the warrant of arrest. Nevertheless the court may require that the
record of the preliminary investigation be submitted to it to satisfy itself that there is
probable cause which will warrant the issuance of a warrant of arrest. 14
The refusal of the COMELEC or its agents to comply with the order of the trial court
requiring them to conduct a reinvestigation in this case and to submit to the court the
record of the preliminary investigation on the ground that only this Court may review
its actions is certainly untenable.
One last word. The petition is brought in the name of the People of the Philippines.
Only the Solicitor General can represent the People of the Philippines in this
proceeding. 15 In the least, the consent of the Office of the Solicitor General should
have been secured by the COMELEC before the filing of this petition. On this account
alone, the petition should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
COMELEC vs. SILVA
FACTS:
The Private Respondents, who were charged of having tampered some
certificates of canvass, moved for the Dismissal of the Cases filed against them. The
Chief State Prosecutor, who had been designated by the Commission on Elections to
prosecute the cases, filed a comment joining in private respondents' request.
Eventually, the cases were dismissed.
The COMELEC sought to appeal the dismissal of the cases to the Court of
Appeals. When the Chief State Prosecutor was required to comment, he stated that
he cannot give his conformity to the Notice of Appeal filed by the Comelec as it would
not be consistent with his position that he would abide by whatever finding the court
may come up with on the existence of probable cause as against the Private
Respondents. Thus, the judges denied due course to the appeal. The sole basis for
the denial was the fact that the prosecutor, whom the COMELEC had deputized to
prosecute the cases, had earlier taken a contrary stand against the COMELEC.
ISSUE: Who has the authority to decide whether or not to appeal from the orders of
dismissal — the COMELEC or its designated prosecutor?
RULING:
Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to
decide, not for Chief State Prosecutor whom it has merely deputized to represent in it
court.
The 1987 Constitution mandates the COMELEC not only to investigate but
also to prosecute cases of violation of election laws. This means that the COMELEC
is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election
offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing
an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.
Prosecutors designated by the COMELEC to prosecute the cases act as its
deputies. They derive their authority from it and not from their offices. Consequently, it
was beyond the power of Chief State Prosecutor to oppose the appeal of the
COMELEC. For that matter, it was beyond his power, as COMELEC-designated
prosecutor, to leave to the trial courts the determination of whether there was
probable cause for the filing of the cases and, if it found none, whether the cases
should be dismissed.
 14
People vs Basilia
As an aftermath of the May 1987 congressional elections in Masbate, complaints for
violations of Section 261 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP Blg. 881) were filed with
the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Masbate against the private respondents as
follows:
1) by Jolly Fernandez, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
Governor, against the spouses Jaime and Adoracion Tayong — for
violation of Section 261, paragraph a-1, for vote-buying;
2) by Ladislao Bataliran against Salvacion Colambot — for violation
of Section 261, paragraph a-1, also for vote buying; and
3) by PC/Sgt Arturo Rebaya against Melchor Yanson — for
violation of Section 261, paragraph p, for carrying of deadly
weapon.
After preliminary investigation of the foregoing complaints, the Provincial Fiscal of
Masbate filed in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, Cataingan, Masbate,. the
following criminal complaints: (1,) Criminal Case No. 324 against the spouses
Tayong; (2) Criminal Case No. 326 against Salvacion Colambot and (3) Criminal
Case No. 375 against Melchor Yanson.
In three (3) separate orders, all dated 6 October 1987, and Identical in tenor save for
the names of the accused respondent Judge Henry Basilla motu proprio dismissed
the three (3) informations filed by the Provincial Fiscal, giving the following
justification:
xxx xxx xxx
The record shows that the complainant filed the complaint with the
fiscal and not with the COMELEC. The COMELEC did not
investigate the case.
The Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines says:
"Sec. 2(6) of Art. IX (C) The Commission on
Election shall exercise the following powers and
functions:
xxx xxx xxx
... ; investigate and, when appropriate prosecute
cases of violation of election laws, including acts
or omissions, constituting election frauds
offenses, malpractices."
The Omnibus Election Election Code of the Philippines (BP Blg,
881) says:
Sec. 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall,
through its duly authorized legal officers, have
the exclusive power to conduct preliminary
investigation of all election offenses punishable
under this Code, and to prosecute the same. The
Commission may avail of the assistance of other
prosecuting arms of the government; Provided,
however, that in the event that the Commission
fails to act on any complaint within four months
from his filing, the complaint may file the
complaint with the office of the fiscal or with the
Ministry of Justice. for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1978, EC;
and Sec. 66. BP 697)
In the landmark case of De Jesus vs. People, L-60998, February
120 SCRA 760, the the Supreme Court ruled:
The grant to the COMELEC of the power. among
others, to enforce and administer all laws relative
to the conduct of election and the concomitant
authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses is not without compelling reason. The
evident constitutional intendment in bestowing
this power to the COMELEC is to ensure the free,
and honest conduct of elections, failure of which
would result i ii the frustration of the true will of
the people and make a mere Idle ceremony of
the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen
to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority
to investigate and prosecute election
offenses committed by public officials in relation
to their office would thus seriously impair its
effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional
mandate.
Consistently, and lately, in Corpu[s], et al. vs. Tanodbayan of the
Philippines', et al., L-62075, April 15, 1987, our Supreme Court
rules:
 15
An examination of the provisions of the
Constitution and the Election Code of 1978
reveals the clear intention to place in the
COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction
to investigateand prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private
individual or public officer or employee, and in the
latter instance, irrespective of whether the
offense is committed in relation to his official
duties or not. In other words, it is the nature of
the offense and not the personality of the
offender that matters. As long as the offense is
an election offense jurisdiction over the same
rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of
its all embracing power over the conduct of
election.
IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, inasmuch as the
election offense was not investigated and prosecuted by the
COMELEC. the case is motu proprio dismissed. 1
The People moved for reconsideration of respondent Judge's orders, without
success.
The instant Petition for Review assails the three (3) orders dismissing the three (3 )
criminal informations against the private respondents, as constituting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Petition argues principally that the
Commission on Elections ("Comelec") has authority to deputize the chief state
prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and
(8 ), Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, and that the Comelec did deputize such
prosecution officers to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints for alleged
violation of election laws and to institute criminal informations therefor.
The Petition must be granted.
There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus
Election Code and to prosecute such offenses in court. Section 265 of this Code
reads as follows:
See. 265. Prosecution. — The Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have the exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under
this Code, and to prosecute the same. The Commission may avail
of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the
government: Provided, however, That in the event that the
Commission fails to act on any complaint within four months from
his filing, the complainant may file the complaint with the office of
the fiscal or with the Ministry of Justice for proper investigation and
prosecution, if warranted. (Sec. 182, 1973 EC; and Sec. 66, BP
697) (Emphasis supplied)
We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct
preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the
Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance
of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987
Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all
its functions directly and by itself alone:
Section 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the
following powers and functions:
(1) Enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the
conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall.
xxx xxx xxx
(4) Deputize, with the concurrence of the President, law
enforcementi agencies and instrumantalities of the Government,
including the Armed Forces of the Philippines, for the exclusive
purpose of ensuring free orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible
elections.
xxx xxx xxx
(6) File, upon a verified complaint, or on its own initiative, petitions
in court for inclusion or exclusion of voters; investigate and, where
appropriate, prosecute cases of violation of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and
malpractices.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) Recommend to the President the removal of any officer or
employee it has deputized, or the imposition of any other
disciplinary action, for violation or disregard of, or disobedience to
its directive, order, or decision.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
 16
The concurrence of the President with the deputation by Comelec of the prosecuting
arms of the Government, was expressed in general terms and in advance in
Executive Order No. 134. dated 27 February 1987, entitled "Enabling Act for the
Elections for members of Congress on May 11, 1987, and for other purposes."
Executive Order No. 134 provided in pertinent portion as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
See. 11. Prosecution. — Commission shall, through its duly
authorized legal officers, have exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable as
provided for in the preceding section, and to prosecute the
same: Provided, That in the event that the Commission fails to act
on any complaint within two (2) months from filing, the complainant
may file the complaint with the Office the Fiscal or with the
Department for Justice for proper investigation and prosecution, if
warranted.
The Commission may avail of the assistance of other prosecuting
arms of the government.
(Emphasis supplied)
On 9 March 1987, the Comelec enacted its Resolution No. 1862. The pertinant
operative portions of this resolution are the following:
xxx xxx xxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the
powers vested in it by the Constitution of the Republic of the,
Philippines, the Omnibus Election Code and Executive Orders Nos.
50, 94, 134 and 144, has RESOLVED to designate, as it hereby
designates the Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial and City
Fiscalss and their respective Assistants as its deputies in
connection with the elections for Members of Congress on May 11,
1987, to perform the following duties and functions:
1. Conduct prelimiry investigation of complaints involving election
offenses under the Omnibus Election Code which may be filed
directly with them, or which may be endorsed to them by the
Commission or its authorized representatives; and
2. Whenever a prima facie case exists, file the proper information in
court and prosecute the same.
Preliminary investigation of cases filed directly with, or endorsed to,
Provincial and City Fiscals, and/or their respective Assistants shall
be conducted immediately and shall be finished within thirty (30)
days from the filing thereof and, for this purpose, they are enjoined
to hold office on a twenty-four (24) hour basis during the
registration of voters on April 11 and 12, 1987, on Election Day on
May 11, 1987, and until midnight on Revision Day on May 2, 1987.
Provincial and City Fiscals and their respective Assistants shall
submit to the Commission a report on every case directly filed with
them and thereafter, monthly progress reports on the status of the
cases handled by them, including those endorsed by the
Commission or its authorized representatives.
This Resolution shall take effect immediately. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
The contention of private respondents that the deputation by the Comelec of the
prosecuting arms of the Government would be warranted only before the elections
and only to ensure tree, honest, orderly, peaceful and credible elections, that is, to
perform the peace-keeping functions of policemen, lack substance. There is nothing
in Section 2 (4) of Article IX-C of the Constitution which requires such a pinched
niggardly interpretation of the authority of the Comelec to appoint as its deputies,
officials or employees of other agencies and instrumentalities of the government. The
prompt investigation and prosecution and disposition of election offenses constitute
an indispensable part of the task of securing free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections. The investigation and prosecution of election offenses are, in an
important sense, more important than the maintenance of physical order in election
precinct. 'without the assistance of provincial and city fiscals and their assistants and
staff members, and of the state prosecutors of the Department of Justice, the prompt
and fair investigation and prosecution of election offenses committed before or in the
course of nationwide elections would simply not be possible, unless, perhaps, the
Comelec had a bureaucracy many times larger than what it actually has. Moreover,
the prosecution officers designated by the Comelec become deputies or agents of the
Comelec and pro tantosubject to the authority, control and supervision of the
Comelec in respect of the particular functions covered by such deputation. The acts
of such deputies within the lawful scope of their delegated authority are, in legal
contemplation, the acts of the Comelec itself. The only limitation the Constitution itself
places upon the Comelec's authority over its deputies relates to the enforcement of
such authority through administrative sanctions. Such sanctions-e.g., suspension or
removal-may be recommended by the Comelec to the President (Sec. 2 [8], Article
IX-C, 1987 Constitution) rather than directly imposed by the Comelec, evidently, to
pre-empt and avoid potential difficulties with the executive department of the
Government where the prosecution and other officers deputized are ordinarily
located.
All this the respondent Judge disregarded when he motu proprio dismissed the
criminal informations filed in this case. The cases he cited in his identical orders —
De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983) and Corpus, et al. v. Tanodbayan, 149
 17
SCRA 281 (1987) can offer him no comfort at all; for these cases do not relate to the
authority of the Comelec to deputize the regular prosecution arms of the Government
for the investigation and prosecution of election offenses and those cases are not in
conflict with our ruling here.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED due course
and the Orders of the trial court all dated October 6, 1987 in Criminal Cases Nos.
324, 326 and 375 and the Order dated December 7, 1987 in the same cases denying
the People's Motion for Reconsideration, are hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
The trial court is ORDERED to proceed forthwith with the continuation of Criminal
Cases Nos. 324, 326 and 375 and until termination thereof. Costs against private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Magdalo para sa pagbabago vs Comelec
National press club v Comelec
Facts:
R.A. 6646 was enacted which prohibits any newspaper, radio, any person making the
use of media to sell or give free of charge of space or time for political purpose except
COMELEC Petitioners who were representatives of mass media assails its
constitutionality on the ground that it amounts to censorship because it single’s out for
suppression only publications of a particular content and it abridges freedom of
speech of candidates.
Issue:
Whether or not R.A. 6646 is valid.
Held:
Yes, the law banning political ads has since been repealed but the court made
important observation which is still pertinent.
The technical effects of Art. IX (C) (4) of the constitution may be seen to that no
presumption of invalidity arises in respect of exercise of supervisory or regulatory
authority on the part of the COMELEC for the purpose of serving equal opportunity
among candidates for political office, although such supervision or regulation may
result in same limitation of the rights of free speech and free press. The applicable
issue is the general, time honored are that statute is presumed to be constitutional
that party asserting unconstitutionality must discharge the burden of clearly and
convincing, proving that assertion.
Section II has not gone outside the permissible brands of supervision and regulation
of media operations. During election period Sec. II is limited in duration of applicability
and enforceability. Sec. II doesn’t purport in any way to restrict the reporting by
newspapers and radio or TV stations on news events relating to qualified political
parties.
Petitoners: representatives of mass media which are prevented from selling or
donating space and time for political advertisements; 2 candidates for office (1
national, 1 provincial) in the coming May 1992 elections; taxpayers and voters who
claim that their right to be informed of election issues and of credentials of the
candidates is being curtailed.
Adiong vs COmelec
FACTS: Public respondent promulgated a resolution prohibiting the posting of decals
and stickers on “mobile” places, public or private, and limit their location or publication
to the authorized posting areas that COMELEC fixes. Petitioner senatorial candidate
assails said resolution insofar as it prohibits the posting of decals and stickers in
mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles, wherein it is his last medium to
inform the electorate that he is a senatorial candidate, due to the ban on radio, tv and
print political advertisements.
ISSUE: WON a resolution prohibiting posting of decals and stickers is constitutional.
HELD: No. The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile”places
whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC
becomes censorship which is unconstitutional. There is no public interest substantial
enough to warrant the prohibition.
Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech; The COMELEC’s
prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or
private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and
void on constitutional grounds.-
The COMELEC’s prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places
whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC
itself is null and void on constitutional grounds.2. Constitutional Law; Commission on
Elections; Freedom of Speech; The qualitative significance of freedom of expression
arises from the fact that it is the matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every
other freedom.-
This qualitative significance of freedom of expression arises from the fact that it is the
matrix, the indispensable condition of nearly every other freedom. (Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 [1937]; Salonga v. Paño, 134 SCRA 438 [1985]) It is
difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free
elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is
denied and taken away.3. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of
Speech; Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be posted is
 18
so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property which in this case is
a privately-owned vehicle.-
The resolution prohibits the posting of decals and stickers not more than eight and
one-half (8-1/2) inches in width and fourteen (14) inches in length in any place,
including mobile places whether public or private except in areas designated by the
COMELEC. Verily, the restriction as to where the decals and stickers should be
posted is so broad that it encompasses even the citizen’s private property, which in
this case is a privately-owned vehicle. In consequence of this prohibition, another
cardinal rule prescribed by the Constitution would be violated. Section 1, Article III of
the Bill of Rights provides that no person shall be deprived of his property without due
process of law.4. Constitutional Law; Commission on Elections; Freedom of Speech;
The prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether public or
private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes
censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.-
In sum, the prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on “mobile” places whether
public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC
becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution.
TELEBAP vs COmelec
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines,
Inc. (TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of radio and television broadcasting
companies. It was declared to be without legal standing to sue in this case as, among
other reasons, it was not able to show that it was to suffer from actual or threatened
injury as a result of the subject law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other hand, had
the requisite standing to bring the constitutional challenge. Petitioner operates radio
and television broadcast stations in thePhilippines affected by the enforcement of
Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section 92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
“Comelec Time- The Commission shall procure radio and television time to be known
as the “Comelec Time” which shall be allocated equally and impartially among the
candidates within the area of coverage of all radio and television stations. For this
purpose, the franchise of all radio broadcasting and television stations are hereby
amended so as to provide radio or television time, free of charge, during the period of
campaign.”
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of the same law requires COMELEC to
procure print space in newspapers and magazines with payment, Section 92 provides
that air time shall be procured by COMELEC free of charge. Thus it contends that
Section 92 singles out radio and television stations to provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses running to several million pesos in providing
COMELEC Time in connection with the 1992 presidential election and 1995
senatorial election and that it stands to suffer even more should it be required to do
so again this year. Petitioners claim that the primary source of revenue of the radio
and television stations is the sale of air time to advertisers and to require these
stations to provide free air time is to authorize unjust taking of private
property. According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost P22,498,560.00 in providing free air
time for one hour each day and, in this year’s elections, it stands to lost
P58,980,850.00 in view of COMELEC’s requirement that it provide at least 30
minutes of prime time daily for such.
Issue:
Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 denies radio and television broadcast
companies the equal protection of the laws.
Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No. 881 constitutes taking of property without due
process of law and without just compensation.
Held: Petitioner’s argument is without merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the government. Airwave frequencies have to be
allocated as there are more individuals who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies to assign. Radio and television broadcasting companies, which are given
franchises, do not own the airwaves and frequencies through which they transmit
broadcast signals and images. They are merely given the temporary privilege to use
them. Thus, such exercise of the privilege may reasonably be burdened with the
performance by the grantee of some form of public service. In granting the privilege to
operate broadcast stations and supervising radio and television stations, the state
spends considerable public funds in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles out radio and television stations to provide
free air time as against newspapers and magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may provide is likewise without
merit. Regulation of the broadcast industry requires spending of public funds which it
does not do in the case of print media. To require the broadcast industry to provide
free air time for COMELEC is a fair exchange for what the industry gets.
As radio and television broadcast stations do not own the airwaves, no private
property is taken by the requirement that they provide air time to the COMELEC.
Sanidad vs COmelec
Facts: On 23 October 1989, RA 6766 (Act providing for an organic act for the
Cordillera Autonomous Region) was enacted into law. The plebiscite was scheduled
30 January 1990. The Comelec, by virtue of the power vested by the 1987
Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), RA 6766 and other pertinent
election laws, promulgated Resolution 2167, to govern the conduct of the plebiscite
 19
on the said Organic Act for the Cordillera Autonomous Region. Pablito V. Sanidad, a
newspaper columnist of “Overview” for the “Baguio Midland Courier” assailed the
constitutionality of Section 19 (Prohibition on columnists, commentators or
announcers) of the said resolution, which provides “During the plebiscite campaign
period, on the day before and on plebiscite day, no mass media columnist,
commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television
time to campaign for or against the plebiscite issues.”
Issue: Whether columnists are prohibited from expressing their opinions, or should
be under Comelec regulation, during plebiscite periods.
Held: Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution that what was granted to the Comelec was
the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of franchises, permits or
other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities, media of
communication or information to the end that equal opportunity, time and space, and
the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information
campaigns and forums among candidates are ensured. Neither Article IX-C of the
Constitution nor Section 11-b, 2nd paragraph of RA 6646 (“a columnist, commentator,
announcer or personality, who is a candidate for any elective office is required to take
a leave of absence from his work during the campaign period”) can be construed to
mean that the Comelec has also been granted the right to supervise and regulate the
exercise by media practitioners themselves of their right to expression during
plebiscite periods. Media practitioners exercising their freedom of expression during
plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there
are no candidates involved in a plebiscite. Therefore, Section 19 of Comelec
Resolution 2167 has no statutory basis.
ABS-CBN broadcasting Corp vs COMELEC
COMELEC issued a Resolution restraining ABS-CBN or any other groups from
conducting exit survey during the elections for national officials particularly for
President and Vice President. The electoral body believed that such project might
conflict with the official COMELEC count, as well as the unofficial quick count of the
National Movement for Free Elections (NAMFREL).
ISSUE:
Whether the COMELEC Resolution restraining survey polls infringes the Freedom of
Speech and of the Press.
HELD:
The holding of exit polls and the dissemination of their results through mass media
constitute an essential part of the freedoms of speech and of the press. Hence, the
COMELEC cannot ban them totally in the guise of promoting clean, honest, orderly
and credible elections. Quite the contrary, exit polls — properly conducted and
publicized — can be vital tools in eliminating the evils of election-fixing and fraud.
Narrowly tailored countermeasures may be prescribed by the COMELEC so as to
minimize or suppress the incidental problems in the conduct of exit polls, without
transgressing in any manner the fundamental rights of our people.
The freedoms of speech and of the press should all the more be upheld when what is
sought to be curtailed is the dissemination of information meant to add meaning to the
equally vital right of suffrage. The Court cannot support any ruling or order “the effect
of which would be to nullify so vital a constitutional right as free speech.” When faced
with borderline situations in which the freedom of a candidate or a party to speak or
the freedom of the electorate to know is invoked against actions allegedly made to
assure clean and free elections, this Court shall lean in favor of freedom. For in the
ultimate analysis, the freedom of the citizen and the State’s power to regulate should
not be antagonistic. There can be no free and honest elections if, in the efforts to
maintain them, the freedom to speak and the right to know are unduly curtailed.
Social Weather Stations vs Comelec
FACTS:
On the one hand, Social Weather Stations (SWS) is an institution conducting surveys
in various fields. Kamahalan Publishing Corp., on the other hand, publishes the
Manila Standard which is a newspaper of general circulation and features items of
information including election surveys. Both SWS and Kamahalan are contesting the
validity and enforcement of R.A. 9006 (Fair Election Act), especially section 5.4 which
provides that surveys affecting national candidates shall not be published 15 days
before an election and surveys affecting local candidates shall not be published 7
days before the election.
SWS wanted to conduct an election survey throughout the period of the elections
both at the national and local levels and release to the media the results of such
survey as well as publish them directly. Kamahalan, for its part, intends to publish
election survey results up to the last day of the elections on May 14, 2001.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the restriction on the publication of election survey constitutes a prior
restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech without any clear and present danger
to justify such restraint
RULING/RATIO:
 20

Yes, Section 5.4 of R.A. 9006 constitutes an unconstitutional abridgement of freedom

of speech, expression, and the press.

The power of the COMELEC over media franchises is limited to ensuring equal
opportunity, time, space, and the right to reply, as well as to fix reasonable rates of
charge for the use of media facilities for public information and forms among
candidates.

Here, the prohibition of speech is direct, absolute, and substantial. Nor does this
section pass the O’brient test for content related regulation because (1) it suppresses
one type of expression while allowing other types such as editorials, etc.; and (2) the
restriction is greater than what is needed to protect government interest because the
interest can e protected by narrower restrictions such as subsequent punishment.

Note: Justice Kapunan’s dissenting opinion basically says that the test of clear and
present danger is inappropriate to use in order to test the validity of this section.
Instead, he purports to engage in a form of balancing by weighing and balancing the
circumstances to determine whether public interest is served by the regulation of the
free enjoyment of the rights. However, he failed to show why, on the balance, the
other considerations (for example, prevention of last minute pressure on voters)
should outweigh the value of freedom of expression.