Sufficient Provocation

URBANO v. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 182750, JANUARY 20, 2009

Facts:

On September 28, 1993, at around 8:00 p.m., the victim Brigido Tomelden and
petitioner were at the compound of the (LIWAD) in, Pangasinan, having just arrived
from a picnic in the nearby town of Bugallon, Pangasinan, where, with some other co-
workers, they drank beer in a restaurant. While inside the compound, the two had a
heated altercation in the course of which Tomelden hurled insulting remarks at
petitioner. Reacting, petitioner asked why Tomelden, when drunk, has the penchant of
insulting petitioner.

The exchange of words led to an exchange of blows. Cooler heads succeeded in

breaking up the fight, but only for a brief moment as the protagonists refused to be
pacified and continued throwing fist blows at each other. Then petitioner delivered a
lucky punch, as described by eyewitness, on Tomelden’s face, which made him topple
down. Tomelden was on the verge of hitting his head on the ground but their
companions prevented the fall. The blow, however, caused Tomelden’s nose to bleed
and rendered him unconscious.

Petitioner, upon arriving home from the LIWAD office at around 6:00 p.m. of that
day, he informed his wife, Rosario, of the fight the previous night and of his having been
rendered unconscious. He complained of pain in his nape, head, and ear which
impelled Rosario to immediately bring him to the Lingayen Community Hospital where
Dr. Daisy Arellano examined him and treated his lacerated left index finger, contusions,
and hematoma at the right cerebrum.

On October 2 and 7, 1993, Tomelden went back to the hospital complaining of

dizziness, headache, and other pains. On October 8, 1993, Rosario brought Tomelden to
the Sison Memorial Provincial Hospital in Dagupan City, where the attending physician,
Dr. Ramon Ramos, diagnosed Tomelden suffering from brain injury, secondary to
mauling to consider cerebral hemorrhage.[3]

Tomelden was confined in the provincial hospital until 3:00 p.m. of October 10,
1993, and, due to financial constraints, was thereafter discharged despite signs negating
physical condition improvement. Upon reaching their house, however, Tomelden again
complained of extreme head pain, prompting his wife to bring him back to
the Lingayen Community Hospital where Dr. Arellano again attended to him. This time,
things turned for the worst, the doctor noting that Tomelden appeared to be semi-
conscious, sleepy, uncooperative, and not responding to any stimulant. Tomelden died
at 9:00 p.m. of that day due, per Dr. Arellano, to cardio-respiratory arrest secondary to
cerebral concussion with resultant cerebral hemorrhage due to mauling incident.

The defense presented petitioner who denied having any intention to kill,
asserting that hypertension, for which Tomelden was receiving treatment, was the
cause of the latter’s death.

On April 30, 2001, the RTC charged the accused of homicide.

On January, 25, 2008, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC but awarding
moral damages to the heirs of Tomelden.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstances of

sufficient provocation on the part of the victim.

Held:

Yes. When the law speaks of provocation either as a mitigating circumstance or

as an essential element of self-defense, the reference is to an unjust or improper
conduct of the offended party capable of exciting, inciting, or irritating anyone; it is not
enough that the provocative act be unreasonable or annoying; the provocation must be
sufficient to excite one to commit the wrongful act and should immediately precede the
act. This third requisite of self-defense is present: (1) when no provocation at all was
given to the aggressor; (2) when, even if provocation was given, it was not sufficient; (3)
when even if the provocation was sufficient, it was not given by the person defending
himself; or (4) when even if a provocation was given by the person defending himself, it
was not proximate and immediate to the act of aggression.

In the instant case, Tomelden’s insulting remarks directed at petitioner and

uttered immediately before the fist fight constituted sufficient provocation. This is not
to mention other irritating statements made by the deceased while they were having
beer in Bugallon. Petitioner was the one provoked and challenged to a fist fight. When
so informed, Tomelden insulted petitioner, telling the latter he had no business
stopping him from further drinking as he was paying for his share of the bill. Chastised,
petitioner returned to his table to report to Navarro. Also, upon reaching the LIWAD
compound, Tomelden allegedly slapped and hurled insults at him, calling him sipsip just
to maintain his employment as Navarro’s tricycle driver. Tomelden allegedly then
delivered several fist and kick blows at petitioner, a couple of which hit him despite his
evasive actions. Petitioner maintained that he only boxed the victim in retaliation,
landing that lucky punch in the course of parrying the latter’s blows. These provocative
acts of Tomelden were testified by Salazar. It is abundantly clear from the above
transcript that the provocation came from Tomelden. In fact, petitioner, being very
much smaller in height and heft, had the good sense of trying to avoid a fight. Hence, the
Court finds the contention of herein petitioner meritorious.
Passion/Obfuscation

PEOPLE v. IGNAS
G.R. NO. 140514, SEPTEMBER 30, 2003

Facts:

Appellant is an elementary school graduate. He resided at Cruz, La Trinidad,

Benguet, where he operated a bakery. He is married to Wilma Grace Ignas, by whom he
has a son of minor age. Wilma Grace used to be the cashier of Windfield Enterprise,
which is owned by Pauline Gumpic. Pauline had a brother, Nemesio Lopate. It was he
whom appellant fatally shot.

On September 1995, appellant’s wife confided to her close friend, Romenda that
she was having an affair with Nemesio.

On the evening of October 16, 1995, Wilma Grace, Romenda, and Nemesio went
to Manila. Romenda and Nemesio were sending off at the NAIA as she was leaving for
Taiwan to work as a domestic helper. Upon arrival in Manila, the trio checked at
Dangwa Inn, with Nemesio and Wilma Grace sharing a room. All three of them stayed at
the inn until October 18, 1995, when Wilma Grace left for Taiwan.

Thereafter, Romenda received from Taiwan four letters written by Wilma Grace
on various dates. Although all the letters were addressed to Romenda, two of them were
meant by Wilma Grace to be read by Nemesio. In the other two letters, Wilma Grace
instructed Romenda to reveal to appellant her affair with Nemesio.

It was only sometime late in February 1996 that Romenda, following her bosom friends
written instructions, informed appellant about the extramarital affair between Wilma
Grace and Nemesio. Romenda informed him that the two had spent a day and a night
together in a room at Dangwa Inn in Manila. Appellant became furious. He
declared Addan to aldaw na dayta nga Nemesio, patayek dayta nga Nemesio (There will
be a day for that Nemesio. I will kill that Nemesio). Appellant then got all the letters of
Wilma Grace from Romenda.

That same week Alfred Mayamnes, appellant’s neighbor who was presented at
the trial as a prosecution witness, had a talk with appellant. Mayamnes wanted to
confirm if the appellant’s wife had an affair with Nemesio which the appellant
confirmed.

Shortly after their talk, appellant closed down his bakeshop and offered his
equipment for sale. Among the potential buyers he approached was Mayamnes, but the
latter declined the offer.

Sometime during the first week of March, Mayamnes saw appellant load his
bakery equipment on board a hired truck and depart for Nueva Vizcaya.
 On March 10, 1996, there were two persons who witnessed the killing at the
Trading Post, La Trinidad, Benguet. Both of them had recognized bloodied body of
Nemesio and the appellant who was just about several inches away from Nemesio. One
witness also said that she was instructed to throw away the empty cartridges from the
gun of Ignas after having been served of refreshments. There were also two persons
who testified that the appellant confessed to them of what he did to Nemesio.

Dr. Jovellanos through the autopsy determined that the cause of death to be
Hypovolemia due to gunshot would.

Appellant also voluntarily admitted the crime he did to SP04 Arthur Bomagao.

Appellant only interposed the defense of alibi, stating that he was baking bread
with Anoma in Kayapa on the night Nemesio was killed. The alibi was corroborated by
Ben Anoma.

The trial court disbelieved appellant’s defense and sustained the prosecutions
version. Hence, convicting him of murder.

Hence this instant petition to the Court.

Issue:

The trial court committed reversible error when it did not appreciate in favor of
the accused-appellant the mitigating circumstances of immediate vindication of a grave
offense, passion and obfuscation and voluntary surrender.

Held:

The Court fins the alleged mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
inexistent. The rule is that the mitigating circumstances of vindication of a grave offense
and passion and obfuscation cannot be claimed at the same time, if they arise from the
same facts or motive. In other words, if appellant attacked his victim in proximate
vindication of a grave offense, he could no longer claim in the same breath that passion
and obfuscation also blinded him. Moreover, for passion and obfuscation to be well
founded, the following requisites must concur: (1) there should be an act both unlawful
and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (2) the act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable
length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his moral equanimity. To
repeat, the period of two (2) weeks which spanned the discovery of his wife’s
extramarital dalliance and the killing of her lover was sufficient time for appellant to
reflect and cool off.
 PEOPLE v. OLOVERIO
G.R. NO. 211159, MARCH 18, 2015

Facts:

On October 2, 2003, at around 3:00 p.m., Pogay and Panday saw Gulane walking
away from them with Oloverio trailing behind him. Oloverio allegedly tapped Gulane’s
right shoulder and hacked him on the chest and extremities with a bolo until Gulane
collapsed on the ground. Oloverio then allegedly took Gulane’s money from his pocket.

Pogay heard Oloverio shouting the words, "Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San
Pablo!" ("The rich man in San Pablo is already dead!") Gulane managed to tell Oloverio,
"Man luba ka man, Ling?" ("Ling, why did you stab me?") After, Gulane died. Panday
proceeded to inform Gulane’s family of the incident.

Oloverio alleged that at the time, Gulane had been accusing him of having an
incestuous relationship with his mother. He allegedly kept his cool and told Gulane to go
home, but the latter continued to mock him.

Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by
drawing his own bolo. They grappled with it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up
stabbing Gulane, which resulted in the latter’s death. Accompanied by a barangay tanod,
Oloverio went to the municipal hall to surrender to the authorities. He admitted that he
stabbed Gulane because he could no longer bear the insulting remarks against him

Lamoste, then Barangay Captain of Barangay Belen alleged that Gulane and
Oloverio had an altercation before the incident. He alleged that Oloverio’s daughter had
once confided to Oloverio that Gulane wanted to touch her private parts. About a month
later, he allegedly heard Gulane ask Oloverio "in a joking manner about his incestuous
relationship with his mother."9 Oloverio allegedly got mad and they ended up fighting,
but Lamoste was able to subdue them. He, however, admitted that he was not present
during the incident.

On January 29, 2010, Branch 17 of the Regional Trial Court of Palompon, Leyte
rendered its Decision finding Oloverio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder. The
trial court ruled that the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not
present in this case since it could not co-exist with the presence of treachery.

On January 29, 2013, the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision affirming the
conviction. Upon review, the CA entitled him to the mitigating circumstance of passion
and obfuscation.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in entitling the accused of the mitigating

circumstance of passion and obfuscation.
Held:

No. To be able to successfully plead the mitigating circumstance of passion and

obfuscation, the accused must be able to prove the following elements: that there be an
act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and that said act
which produced the obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime
by a considerable length of time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal
equanimity. The court also cited the case of People v. Lobino where it has been held that
"There is passional obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate
stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason." The Court also held that to appreciate the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation, the facts must be examined in a
case-to-case basis.

In the instant case, these are the considerations the Court recognized that the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present:

1. Accused-appellant referred to Gulane as the "datu" or rich man of Barangay San

Pablo. Gulane enjoyed an economic ascendancy over accused-appellant, a
mere barangay tanod;
2. Gulane not only threatened to molest accused-appellant’s daughter but also
accused him in public of having incestuous relations with his mother. Gulane was
said to have insulted accused-appellant in full view of his immediate superior,
the barangay captain;
3. Both victim and accused-appellant lived in the small locality of Palompon, Leyte.
As with any small town, it was a place where a person’s degrading remarks
against another could be made the measure of the latter’s character. Gulane’s
insults would have been taken into serious consideration by the town’s residents
because of his wealth and stature in the community;
4. There was neither a reason given why Gulane acted that way towards accused-
appellant nor any evidence to show that accused-appellant had previously
wronged him; and
5. The prosecution did not deny that Gulane insulted accused-appellant on various
occasions. The witnesses could not state with reasonable certainty that Gulane
did not provoke accused-appellant a few minutes before the incident; they could
only testify to the incident itself and the seconds which preceded it.
 ROMERA v. PEOPLE
G.R. NO. 151978, JULY 14, 2004

Facts:

In the afternoon of October 4, 1998, petitioner was with the victim, Roy, and five
other men namely, Beboy, Bobong, Ric, Bebing and Franklin. They were for Biasong to
play volleyball. When they reached Biasong, it was raining, so they decided to wait at
the house of Ciriaca. Franklin Generol hung a string made of cigarette foil on Bebing’s
pants and said, "There’s a monkey among us." Everybody laughed except Roy, who got
angry and chided Franklin Generol to stop lest he make enemies. Bebing also got angry
and pointed a finger at Franklin and said, "Even if you are stronger and older, if you will
be hit by my fist, you will crawl." Petitioner then stood up and warned everyone, "You
all watch out in Balaguan." He pulled Franklin to join him and said, "Let’s go, there are
many boastful people here." Thereafter, petitioner and Franklin left the group.

At 6 p.m., Roy and his companions arrived in Balaguan. On their way home, they
passed by the house of one Antonio. In said house, which is about one kilometer away
from petitioner’s own, they saw petitioner already carrying a bolo waiting for them.

Suddenly, raising the bolo with his right hand, petitioner uttered, "Here are the
brave ones." Roy and his companions ran away but Roy slipped. Petitioner approached
Roy and said, "Come here, brave one." He held Roy up by the collar and stabbed him in
the stomach. Roy fell unconscious. When he woke up, he found himself at the provincial
hospital where he underwent surgery and stayed for more than three weeks.

After the stabbing incident, petitioner voluntarily surrendered to a certain Tibo

Ramos (CAFGU). Ramoso accompanied petitioner to the Balingasay police station.

Petitioner testified that he and his family were having dinner in their house at
around 11 p. m. then they went to bed. While lying in bed, they heard Roy call petitioner
and his wife, asking if they had beer and a fighter for sale. He did not answer Roy
because he knew that he was already drunk. Roy asked for petitioner but when the
latter’s wife told him that petitioner was already asleep, he told her to wake her
husband up. Petitioner went down the house and asked who was at the door. Just as he
opened the door for Roy, Roy thrust his bolo at him. He successfully parried the bolo
and asked Roy what it was all about. Roy answered he would kill petitioner. Petitioner
tried to prevent Roy from entering, so he pushed the door shut. As Roy was hacking at
the wall, petitioner’s wife held the door to allow petitioner to exit in another door to
face Roy. He hurled a stone at Roy, who dodged it. Roy rushed to him and hacked him,
but he parried the blow. Petitioner grappled for the bolo and stabbed Roy in the
stomach. Wounded, Roy begged petitioner for forgiveness. According to petitioner, he
ceased harming Roy for fear he might kill him.
 The trial court charged petitioner of frustrated homicide but taking into
consideration the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.

The CA affirmed the decision of the lower court.

Issue:

Whether or not mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation present in

this case.

Held:

Yes. The Court held that thrusting his bolo at petitioner, threatening to kill him, and
hacking the bamboo walls of his house are, in our view, sufficient provocation to enrage any
man, or stir his rage and obfuscate his thinking, more so when the lives of his wife and children
are in danger. Petitioner stabbed the victim as a result of those provocations, and while
petitioner was still in a fit of rage. In our view, there was sufficient provocation and the
circumstance of passion or obfuscation attended the commission of the offense.

But, the Court stressed that provocation and passion or obfuscation are not two
separate mitigating circumstances. Well-settled is the rule that if these two
circumstances are based on the same facts, they should be treated together as one
mitigating circumstance.7 From the facts established in this case, it is clear that both
circumstances arose from the same set of facts aforementioned. Hence, they should not
be treated as two separate mitigating circumstances.