Juan P.

Villeno vs NLRC

Juan P. Villeno was employed on 29 December 1961 as electrician in

one of the vessels of private respondent Sulpicio Lines, Inc. Twenty-
seven (27) years later he was separated from the service

M/V Sulpicio Container XI after leaving the port of Cebu for Manila was
forced to return due to the death of the purser on board. Upon reaching
port, the crew members were instructed not to leave the vessel as it
would pursue its voyage immediately after turning over the body to the
proper authorities. The ship's cook however was granted permission
upon his request to leave the vessel to buy additional foodstuff for
their provisions. The petitioner on the other hand, without seeking
permission, left the vessel purportedly to settle a marital problem.
Before leaving he disconnected the ship's steering line cable so that
the vessel could not leave port without him. His explanation was that
he wanted to prevent pranksters from toying around with the steering
wheel as what had happened in the past.|||

According to petitioner, when he returned to the port thirty (30)

minutes later, the ship was only a few inches away from the wharf but
was prevented by a representative of respondent corporation from
boarding the vessel. It turned out that the vessel had hired another
electrician to reconnect the steering line cable. The consequence of
petitioner's actuation was that the departure of the vessel was further
delayed. Petioner filed against private respondents a complaint for
illegal dismissal

Labor Arbiter ruled that petitioner was indeed guilty of misconduct but
found the penalty of dismissal harsh considering that there was no
evidence showing that petitioner intended to sabotage the voyage of
the vessel. Besides, for the duration of his long years of service, it was
his first offense.||| (Villeno v. National Labor Relations Commission,
G.R. No. 108153, [December 26, 1995], 321 PHIL 880-889)

National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) held that the

circumstances that petitioner had been employed by respondent
corporation for a long period of time and that it was his first offense
were not by themselves sufficient to warrant mitigation of the
consequences of his serious misconduct. What were material were the
facts that he disembarked from the vessel despite explicit instruction
to the contrary, and he disconnected the steering line cable so that
the vessel could not leave, which in the context of respondent
corporation's business could not be tolerated.||| (Villeno v. National
Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 108153, [December 26, 1995],
321 PHIL 880-889)

Petitioner argues that although his reason for disconnecting the

steering line cable was personal yet it was highly commendable since
he was concerned with family unity. In addition, the disconnection was
done to protect the vessel from pranksters who in the past would play
with the steering wheel. By terminating his services respondent
corporation thus set to naught his twenty-seven (27) years of service,
completely ignoring the fact that it was his first offense. He claims
that the delay he caused to the vessel was almost nil considering that
it took him only thirty (30) minutes to return as compared to the delay
that the voyage had already incurred.||| (Villeno v. National Labor
Relations Commission, G.R. No. 108153, [December 26, 1995], 321 PHIL
880-889)

ISSUE: whether petitioner's act of disconnecting the steering line cable

and disembarking from the vessel without permission constitute
serious misconduct and willful disobedience justifying his dismissal

Ruling:

Yes, Among the basic duties of an employee are to conduct himself

properly and to yield obedience to lawful orders of his employer. It is in
this regard that serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the
employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
connection with his work is a just cause for his termination. This is
explicitly provided under Art. 282, par. (a), of the Labor Code. The
misconduct must be related to the performance of his duties and of
such grave character rendering him unfit to continue working for the
employer. As regards willful disobedience, we stated in San Miguel
Corporation v. Ubaldo 3 that at least two (2) requisites must concur:
(1) the employee's assailed conduct must have been willful or
intentional, the willfulness being characterized by a "wrongful and
perverse attitude;" and, (2) the order violated must have been
reasonable, lawful, made known to the employee and must pertain to
the duties which he had been engaged to discharge.

Consequently, we sustain the NLRC in holding that petitioner

was guilty of serious misconduct and willful disobedience —
. . . Granted that his act was without malice or willful
intent to cause damage, this does not excuse him for
putting his personal interests over that of his employers in
the sense that he . . . unnecessarily disrupt(ed) and
prejudice(d) the normal operations of respondent to attend
to personal matters. No amount of good faith or lack of
intention to cause damage can diminish the degree of
responsibility of complainant for his actuations . . . . 4
By disconnecting the steering line cable before disembarking,
petitioner must have deluded himself into believing that he was the
master in command of the vessel and that during his absence the
vessel should be immobile. His lack of concern for his employer's
interests or for his responsibility towards his employer
Petitioners engaged the services of private respondent as a packaging
clerk responsible for the following tasks:
1. Receives (sic) product from supplier and sort them out;
2. Record incoming and outgoing deliveries to stock ledger
and stock card;
3. Received (sic) requisition from branch retail outlets;
4. Select products from storage and place them inside the
box, label the boxes and prepare the corresponding
delivery receipts;
5. Make physical count at regular intervals and reconciles
physical count with book records;
6. Other assignments as and when required by supervisor
from time to time.
Initially, the private respondent's employment status was
probationary. Six months later, or on 1 March 1992, however, she
was regularized.
But before her employment status was made permanent, private
respondent was given a Memorandum by Miguel Acebedo III,
Operations Manager of petitioner corporation.

On 22 April 1994, a three-day suspension from work was imposed on

private respondent on the ground of her being tardy twenty-six times
within the period of January to March 1994. The suspension notice was
served on her via a Memorandum dated the same day. It was averred
that private respondent incurred twenty-six counts of tardiness within
the above-specified months which number far exceeded the maximum
allowable limit per month of only four times.||| (Acebedo Optical v.
National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July 17, 2007],
554 PHIL 524-547)

28 February 1995, private respondent was served a

fourth Memorandum. 10 For having incurred twenty-one counts of
tardiness for the months of [unreadable] to December 1994, the latter
was meted another suspension, this time for seven days, or four days
longer than the first.||| (Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July 17, 2007], 554 PHIL 524-547)
On 22 May 1995, private respondent filed an application for an
indefinite leave of absence and it was not approved considering the
nature of the leave.|| (Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July 17, 2007], 554 PHIL 524-547)

On 29 August 1995, private respondent was suspended for the third

time, this time for thirteen days. The reason given for the imposition of
such penalty was the employee's failure "to meet the company policy
on tardiness.||| (Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations
Commission, G.R. No. 150171, [July 17, 2007], 554 PHIL 524-547)

On 12 November 1996, private respondent did not report for work

allegedly due to the demolition of the place that her family was
renting.
On 2 December 1996, private respondent again absented herself
from work this time because her child was allegedly hospitalized.
Six days later, or on 8 December 1996, the Head of the Personnel
Department of petitioner corporation issued a Notice of
Termination against private respondent.
||| (Acebedo Optical v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. No.
150171, [July 17, 2007], 554 PHIL 524-547)

ISSUE: Whether or not employee had been dismissed for just cause

No, petitioners failed to marshal the obligatory quantum of evidence

needed to substantiate a ending of legitimacy or validity in the
termination of employment of private respondent, the reason for which
ewas supposedly her repeated deance of company policy. According to
the appellate court, petitioners' failure to adduce in evidence a copy of
the contravened company policy was fatal to their cause. Absent proof
of evidence of such document embodying the outed rule, the appellate
court, along with the labor arbiter and the NLRC, was unable to make a
categorical nding on the issue of whether or not the private
respondent's accumulated absences and/or tardiness were, indeed, in
violation of petitioner company's rules and regulations. Further, as to
the allegation of chronic absenteeism and/or tardiness for the period
of 1991 to 1995, the appellate court likewise held that the non-
presentation of the Daily Time Records (DTRs) for said period was a
grave error. It held that the numerous memoranda issued to private
respondent were mere self-serving evidence and made the following
observations —

Petitioners' stance is even incongruent with the evidence on record.

Thus, the Private Respondent was employed, (sic) on a probationary
basis or status . . . [she] incurred tardiness in the accumulated time of
one (1) hour and thirty (30) minutes for the month of August, 1991, and
yet, the Private Respondent was promoted and made a permanent
employee on March 1, 1992.

[A]fter her one (1) hour and thirty — four (34) minute tardiness in
September 1991, nothing on record reveals that she had been tardy for
the year 1992. The "Memorandum" reminding the Private Respondent
about her tardiness did not establish that Private Respondent again
incurred any tardiness. It is noted that Private Respondent was not
tardy in the year 1993. Although she was tardy during the period from
January to March 1994, however, she was ordered suspended on May
10 to 12, 1994. Thereafter, Private Respondent did not report late for
the rest of the year as the next "Memorandum" of the Petitioner
Corporation was issued on February 28, 1995, informing Private
Respondent of her suspension on March 6, 9, 14, 16, 21, 23 and 27,
1995.

Based on the "Memorandum" of the Petitioners, the Private

Respondent was tardy for seventeen (17) times for the quarter from
April to June, 1995. However, the "Memorandum" of the Petitioners did
not indicate the dates and precise times when the Private Respondent
was tardy. Without the "Daily Time Records" of the Respondent during
the period envisaged in the Memoranda of the Petitioners, it cannot be
ascertained whether Private Respondent's tardiness was habitual and
incorrigible.

Anent the nding by the NLRC that herein petitioners' appeal was led
iout of time, the Court of Appeals clarifid that Sec. 224 of the Labor
Code requires that both party and counsel must be served their
respective copies of the decision of the Labor Arbiter. In the instant
case, herein petitioners received a copy of the Labor Arbiter's decision
only on 5 March 1999. They then led an appeal, 15 March 1999.
Therefore, it cannot be said that their recourse to the NLRC was filed
out of time.