On June 23, 2000, Te moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s order of June 20, 2000, alleging that
the finality of
SECOND DIVISION
A.M. No. RTJ-02-1698 June 23, 2005
DANTE VICENTE, petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE JOSE S. MAJADUCON, respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a letter-complaint dated July 21, 2000, addressed to then Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo, Dante Vicente
charged respondent Judge Jose S. Majaducon of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, Branch 23,
with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and manifest partiality, praying that he be administratively
disciplined and terminated from the service.
The instant administrative complaint stemmed from a series of criminal cases involving a certain Evelyn Te of General
Santos City. The factual and procedural antecedents leading to the instant administrative case is summarized in this
Court’s Resolution of February 19, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 entitled, People of the Philippines vs. Evelyn Te,
pertinent portions of which read as follows:
In a joint decision dated May 31, 1995, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 23, General Santos City, found Evelyn Te
guilty on four counts of violation of B. P. Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, and sentenced her to
two (2) months of imprisonment on each count. The decision became final and executory after this Court had denied
Te’s petition for review from the affirmance of the trial court’s decision by the Court of Appeals.
On March 11, 2000, Te sought clarification from the trial court whether she should serve her sentences successively or
simultaneously. In an order, dated May 25, 2000, the trial court clarified that she should serve her sentences
successively, but ‘for humanitarian reason’ and in accordance with Art. 70 of the Revised Penal Code, it held that
‘instead of serving imprisonment of EIGHT months, the prisoner EVELYN TE should serve only six months.’
On June 2, 2000, Te filed a motion for reconsideration, which she prayed be also considered as a petition for issuance
of the writ of habeas corpus. Citing Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 298 SCRA 656 (1998), in which the sentence of
imprisonment of a party found guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 was reduced to a fine equal to double the amount of the
check involved, Te prayed that her sentence be similarly modified and that she be immediately released from
detention. In a supplemental motion, Te argued that she had been denied equal protection of the law because the trial
judge in another case involving multiple counts of robbery directed the accused to simultaneously serve his sentences.
On June 20, 2000, the trial court denied Te’s petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus on the ground that Te
was detained by virtue of a final judgment.
On June 22, 2000, Te filed an omnibus motion praying for her release on the ground that she had been in jail since
March 15, 2000 and had fully served the three months minimum of her total sentence under the Indeterminate
Sentence Law. In the alternative, Te prayed for release on recognizance.
the joint decision against her did not bar her application for the writ of habeas corpus. She prayed that pending
determination as to whether the Vaca ruling applied to her, she also be allowed to post bail pursuant to Rule 102, §14.
On July 5, 2000, the trial court allowed Te to post bail in the amount of one million pesos, holding that it would order
her release upon the approval of her bail bond and thereafter certify the proceedings to the Court as the latter has
concurrent jurisdiction over proceedings for habeas corpus.
On July 7, 2000, the trial court approved Te’s bail bonds in the reduced amount of ₱500,000.00 and ordered her
release. The trial court also directed its clerk of court to certify the proceedings to the Court.
On July 11, 2000, Assistant City Prosecutor Marie Ellengred L. Baliguiat moved for reconsideration of the trial court’s
resolution of July 5, 2000.
On July 18, 2000, Te filed a notice of appeal from the order, dated June 20, 2000, and the resolution, dated July 5,
2000, of the trial court.
On July 31, 2000, the trial court denied the motion for reconsideration of the Assistant City Prosecutor. It also denied
due course to Te’s notice of appeal on the ground that there was no necessity for the appeal to the Court of Appeals
because it had already ordered that the whole records be forwarded to this Court pursuant to Rule 102, §14. 1
In the present case, complainant, who claims to be the station manager of Radyo Bombo, General Santos City, alleges
that while Te was in prison, respondent judge allowed her to be released and confined at a local hospital in the guise
that she was suffering from certain illnesses. Complainant further alleges that respondent judge approved Te’s
application for bail as part of habeas corpus proceedings even though no petition for habeas corpus in favor of Te was
filed and docketed. As a result of respondent judge’s order allowing the provisional liberty of Te, the local media in
General Santos City made an uproar and criticized respondent judge for his action on the said case. In retaliation,
respondent judge cited for indirect contempt a group of mediamen who published a critical article against him.
Complainant contends that respondent judge will not hesitate to use his clout and power to stifle criticism and dissent.
In addition, complainant alleges that in a separate case, respondent judge allowed the release of the accused without
the posting of the necessary bail. On the basis of the above allegations, complainant prays that respondent judge be
investigated and if warranted, be terminated and removed from service.2
In his Comment, dated October 17, 2000, respondent judge submitted the following contentions which we quote
verbatim:
1. The certified records of the above-mentioned cases against Evelyn Te were forwarded to the Supreme
Court on August 5, 2000, upon the order of undersigned by the Branch Clerk of Court for review of our
questioned Order (attached as ANNEX ‘1’ of letter Complaint);
2. On June 2, 2000, Evelyn Te’s counsel filed not only a motion for reconsideration denying our previous
order denying her motion for release from detention but also a petition for Habeas Corpus in the same
cases;
3. In the exercise of sound discretion and after hearing the comment of the public prosecutor, we issued
the questioned Order, which is self-explanatory;
4. We believed then that we had the discretion to allow her to be released on bail, based on Sec. 14, Rule
102 of the Revised Rules of Court;
5. We were thinking then that in such a dilemma, whether or not to release her on bail, it was a better
judgment to release her from bail on a writ of habeas corpus, because, Evelyn Te might be right in her
contention that she is considered to have served her sentences simultaneously. If we denied her petition
for Habeas Corpus, and on appeal, she could get a favorable decision from the Supreme Court, surely,
she could return and charge us with a graver offense of ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion. She
could even file other cases against us under the Revised Penal Code, such as rendering an unjust order,
or under the Civil Code for moral damages in millions of pesos;
6. To obviate such a possible move on Te’s part, we opted to allow her release on bail through the writ
of habeas corpus proceedings. Anyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on that matter;
 7. Therefore, we are of the view that the letter complaint of Mr. Dante Vicente is legally premature as it
concerned cases which are still sub judice;
8. Besides, we are of the opinion that Mr. Vicente has no personality as a third party to charge us with
anything as he has not shown any damage that he could have suffered because of our Order;
9. We are convinced that Mr. Vicente is trying to pre-empt our move to charge his radio station for libel or
cite the announcer for indirect contempt of Court when his radio station and announcer had been reviling
and attacking us for many days on the air for having allowed Evelyn Te to be treated and confined in a
hospital upon recommendation of a government doctor and for having allowed her release from
imprisonment on bail; a certified Xerox copy of the letter of the Regional Director of the Department of
Transportation and Communication (National Telecommunications Commission) dated August 9, 2000, in
reply to our request for copies of the broadcast tapes, is attached herewith as ANNEX "1";
10. As to the charge that we are stifling criticism by the print and broadcast media, we are of the view that
if media has the privilege to criticize the Courts and the Judges, we have also the right to charge them for
indirect contempt of Court and libel, because there are laws regarding this matter. The article of a certain
Joseph Jubelag is now a subject of an indirect contempt charge before us, which we are about to resolve;
11. Regarding our Order in Criminal Case No. 14072 in the case of ‘People vs. Jhoyche Gersonin-Palma’,
RTC Br. 36, it was done with sound discretion on our part because it was already 6:30 in the evening and
the offices were closed and being a Friday, the accused would be detained for two days and three nights,
unless we accepted and approved the bail bond. Besides, the law requires judges to approve bail even
during the holidays. Immediately, on Monday, the money in the amount of ₱6,000.00 was deposited with
the Clerk of Court as shown in the official receipt (ANNEX ‘6’ of letter complaint);
12. Regarding our competence, honesty and integrity, modesty aside, as a judge for the last thirteen years
in General Santos City, the records of the Municipal Trial Court and RTC, Branches 23 and 22 (being a
pairing judge of the latter court since October last year) show that most of our decisions appealed to the
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court have been sustained or affirmed;
13. As to our reputation in the community, let other members of the media and a member of the Philippine
Bar speak about it. We are enclosing herewith a Xerox copy of a news clipping of Philippine Daily Inquirer,
July 8, 2000 issue (attached herewith as ANNEX ‘2’), about how we tried and decided the celebrated case
of Peoplevs. Castracion, et. al. when the Supreme Court assigned us to hear the evidence of the defense
and decide the case. We did our work in that case as best we could as we have done in all cases being
tried and decided by us, mindful of our duty to do our work with faithful diligence, honesty, and integrity.
We do not expect praises from others as we do not also wish to be criticized or attacked by Radio Bombo
station in General Santos City especially by its manager, Mr. Dante Vicente, without basis or competent
proof and evidence. Atty. Rogelio Garcia, who vouched for our honesty, competence and integrity is a
former assemblyman of South Cotabato and General Santos City, and an ex-Assistant Minister of Labor.
He has known us in the community for almost twenty five years;
14. Complainant Dante Vicente is just a newcomer to General Santos and he and his radio station have a
bad and notorious reputation of attacking the character and good name of some people here as shown by
cases for libel filed in our courts.3
In its Report dated March 11, 2002, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) confirmed that Criminal Cases Nos.
9456-9460 were indeed certified by respondent to this Court.4 However, this Court in its Resolution of February 19,
2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18, resolved to return the records of the consolidated cases to the RTC of General Santos
City, Branch 23, and to order the said court to give due course to Evelyn Te’s notice of appeal from the Order denying
her petition for habeas corpus and from the Order requiring her to post bail in the amount of one million pesos for her
release from detention. This Court made the following pronouncements:
Rule 102, §14 provides:
When person lawfully imprisoned recommitted, and when let to bail. – If it appears that the prisoner was lawfully
committed, and is plainly and specifically charged in the warrant of commitment with an offense punishable by death,
he shall not be released, discharged, or bailed. If he is lawfully imprisoned or restrained on a charge of having
committed an offense not so punishable, he may be recommitted to imprisonment or admitted to bail in the discretion
of the court or judge. If he be admitted to bail, he shall forthwith file a bond in such sum as the court or judge deems
reasonable, considering the circumstances of the prisoner and the nature of the offense charged, conditioned for his
appearance before the court where the offense is properly cognizable to abide its order or judgment; and the court or
judge shall certify the proceedings, together with the bond, forthwith to the proper court. If such bond is not so filed, the
prisoner shall be recommitted to confinement.
The foregoing provision, however, applies to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by
virtue of a criminal charge against him, not where, as here, he is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.
Indeed, Rule 102, §4 disallows issuance of the writ where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is ‘suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.’
The certification of a case under Rule 102, §14, moreover, refers to cases where the habeas corpus court finds that
the applicant is charged with the noncapital offense in another court. Thus, the certification of this case to this Court is
clearly erroneous.5
On the basis of the above-quoted Resolution and the provisions of Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, the
OCA, in its Report in the present case, found respondent judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended
that he be fined in the amount of ₱20,000.00.6
The Court agrees with the findings of the OCA except for the recommended penalty.
Section 24, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court is plain and clear in prohibiting the grant of bail after conviction by final
judgment and after the convict has started to serve sentence. It provides:
SEC. 24. No bail after final judgment; exception. – An accused shall not be allowed bail after the judgment has
become final, unless he has applied for probation before commencing to serve sentence, the penalty and the
offense being within the purview of the Probation Law. In case the accused has applied for probation, he may be
allowed temporary liberty under his bail, but if no bail was filed or the accused is incapable of filing one, the court may
allow his release on recognizance to the custody of a responsible member of the community. In no case shall bail be
allowed after the accused has commenced to serve sentence. (Emphasis supplied)
The only exception to the above-cited provision of the Rules of Court is when the convict has applied for probation
before he commences to serve sentence, provided the penalty and the offense are within the purview of the Probation
Law.
In the case of Evelyn Te, the judgment finding her guilty of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on four counts and imposing upon
her the penalty of imprisonment for two months on each count has already become final and executory. She did not
apply for probation. At the time respondent judge granted her bail she was already serving her sentence.
From the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. Respondent judge contends that under Section 14, Rule
102 of the Rules of Court, he has the discretion to allow Te to be released on bail. However, the Court reiterates its
pronouncement in its Resolution of February 19, 2001 in G.R. Nos. 145715-18 that Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules
of Court applies only to cases where the applicant for the writ of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal
charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present controversy, where the applicant is
serving sentence by reason of a final judgment.
The Court agrees with the observation of the OCA that respondent judge’s ignorance or disregard of the provisions of
Section 24, Rule 114 and Section 14, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court is tantamount to gross ignorance of the law and
procedure. A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules.7 It is imperative that he be conversant with basic legal principles and be aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines.8 He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion for truth, to the end that he be the
personification of justice and the Rule of Law.9 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply
apply it; anything less than that would be gross ignorance of the law.10
In the present case, considering that the granting of bail is common in the litigation of criminal cases before trial courts,
we are not impressed with the explanation of respondent judge in granting bail to Te. Respondent judge contends that
he was caught in a dilemma whether or not to grant bail in favor of Te. However, he thought that it would be better for
him to release Te on bail rather than deny her application; for if such denial is later found out by the appellate courts to
be erroneous, Te could charge him with gross ignorance of the law and abuse of discretion, or hold him liable for
rendering an unjust order or for damages. Hence, to obviate such possible move on Te’s part, he simply allowed her to
be released on bail and relieved himself of any burden brought about by the case of Te by certifying the same to this
Court contending that, "[a]nyway, the Supreme Court has the last say on (the) matter."
The Court finds respondent’s reasoning shallow and unjustified. He cannot simply shirk responsibility by conveniently In view of the foregoing, it is proper to impose the maximum fine of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the ₱100,000.00
passing the buck, so to speak, to this Court on the pretext that we have the final say on the matter. This is hardly the set aside from respondent’s retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-Ret.
kind of trait expected of a judge. Rule 3.02, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct provides that in every case, a
judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interests, public
opinion or fear of criticism. In Dimatulac vs. Villon,11 we held that: WHEREFORE, respondent judge is found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law or procedure. He is ordered to pay a
FINE of ₱40,000.00 to be deducted from the ₱100,000.00 set aside from his retirement benefits in A.M. No. 10874-
Ret.
The judge, on the other hand, "should always be imbued with a high sense of duty and responsibility in the discharge
of his obligation to promptly and properly administer justice." He must view himself as a priest for the administration of
justice is akin to a religious crusade. Thus, exerting the same devotion as a priest "in the performance of the most SO ORDERED.
sacred ceremonies of religious liturgy," the judge must render service with impartiality commensurate with public trust
and confidence reposed in him.12

In the present case, respondent judge fell short of the above-cited ideals expected of a magistrate.

Complainant’s allegation that no petition for habeas corpus was filed does not hold water. As borne by the records, the
Certification issued by one Atty. Elmer D. Lastimosa, Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City,
shows that Evelyn Te’s petition for habeas corpus was incorporated in the pleadings she filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
9456-9460, although no docket fees and other charges were paid.13 There is no showing that respondent should be
held administratively liable for the non-payment of docket and other lawful fees. At any rate, the matter may be
considered in the appeal taken by Te, as earlier adverted to in G.R. Nos. 145715-18.

Complainant further claims that on several occasions, respondent judge allowed Te to be released and confined at a
local hospital on account of false illnesses. However, the Court does not find sufficient evidence to prove this charge. THIRD DIVISION
On the contrary, records on hand show that the confinement of Te in the hospital is recommended by a panel of
government doctors and that such confinement is made without the objection of the public prosecutor.14Hence, the
Court finds respondent judge’s act of allowing the temporary confinement of Te in the hospital as justified. The Court G.R. No. 151876 June 21, 2005
agrees with the observation of the OCA that in the absence of contradictory evidence, the presumption of regularity in
the performance of official duty should be upheld in favor of respondent judge. 15
SUSAN GO and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
The Court likewise finds no sufficient evidence to find respondent judge guilty of the charge that he uses his clout and FERNANDO L. DIMAGIBA, respondent.
power to stifle criticism and dissent. In the present case, the Court finds nothing irregular or arbitrary in his act of
requiring a number of journalists to show cause why they should not be cited for indirect contempt. Freedom of speech
and of expression, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is not absolute. 16 Freedom of expression needs on occasion to DECISION
be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public interests such as the maintenance
of the integrity of courts and orderly functioning of the administration of justice.17 In the instant case, the Court finds
nothing whimsical or despotic in respondent judge’s act of issuing the subject show-cause order. Instead, respondent PANGANIBAN, J.:
is merely exercising his right to protect his honor and, more importantly, the integrity of the court which he represents.

As to the issue that respondent judge allowed the release of an accused in Criminal Case No. 14072, entitled People
vs. Jhoyce Gersonin-Palma, without the required bail bond being posted, it is not within the jurisdiction of this Court to
resolve the same on the basis of the OCA Report as it is already the subject of a separate administrative case against
respondent.18
Administrative Circular 12-2000, as clarified by Administrative Circular 13-2001, merely establishes a rule of
preference in imposing penalties for violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the "Bouncing Checks Law." When
the circumstances of both the offense and the offender indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone -- instead of imprisonment -- is the preferred penalty. As the Circular requires
a review of the factual circumstances of a given case, it applies only to pending or future litigations. It is not a penal
law; hence, it does not have retroactive effect. Neither may it be used to modify final judgments of conviction.

Having found respondent guilty of gross ignorance of the law, as discussed earlier, the Court now determines the
proper imposable penalty. Section 8(9), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended, classifies gross ignorance of the
law or procedure as a serious charge. Under Section 11(A) of the same Rule, the imposable penalties, in case the
respondent is found culpable of a serious charge, range from a fine of not less than ₱20,000.00 but not more than
₱40,000.00 to dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, except
accrued leaves, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office including government-
owned or controlled corporations.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the October 10, 20012 and the
October 11, 20013 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) (Branch 5), Baguio City.4 The October 10, 2001 Order
released Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba from confinement and required him to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment. The October 11, 2001 Order disposed as follows:

However, on February 24, 2002, respondent retired upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 70.19Considering
that respondent can no longer be dismissed or suspended, the Court is left with no recourse but to impose the penalty
of fine.
Further, it is noted that on July 8, 2002, the Third Division of this Court, in Administrative Matter No.10874-Ret.,
concerning the compulsory retirement of respondent, resolved to release his retirement benefits but set aside
₱100,000.00 thereof in view of several administrative cases still pending against him.20
"WHEREFORE, [in] applying the doctrine as held in the above-entitled cases in this case, the instant petition for
Habeas Corpus should be, as it is hereby, GRANTED. The Baguio City Jail Warden is hereby ordered to
IMMEDIATELY RELEASE the petitioner from confinement unless he is being held for some other lawful cause other
than by virtue of the Sentence Mittimus dated September 28, 2001 issued by CESAR S. VIDUYA, Clerk of Court, MTC
4, Baguio City. Further, the petitioner is required to pay a fine in the amount of ₱100,000.00 in lieu of his imprisonment,
in addition to the civil aspect of the Joint Judgment rendered by MTC 4 dated July 16, 1999." 5

In the administrative complaints filed against respondent, two cases have, so far, resulted in his being fined. In Chan
vs. Majaducon,21 respondent was found guilty of violating among others, Rules 1.01 and 2.01 and Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial conduct and was meted the penalty of fine in the amount of ₱10,000.00. In the more recent case
of Alconera vs. Majaducon,22 respondent was found guilty of gross ignorance of procedure and was fined ₱40,000.00.
The Facts
The pertinent facts are not disputed. Respondent Fernando L. Dimagiba issued to Petitioner Susan Go thirteen (13)
checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due dates, were dishonored for
the reason "account closed."6 Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 227 under
separate Complaints filed with the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Baguio City.8 After a joint trial, the MTCC
(Branch 4) rendered a Decision on July 16, 1999, convicting the accused in the 13 cases. The dispositive portion reads
as follows:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisition, this Court finds the evidence of the prosecution to have
established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged and imposes upon the accused
the penalty of 3 months imprisonment for each count (13 counts) and to indemnify the offended party the amount of
One Million Two Hundred Ninety Five Thousand Pesos (₱1,295,000.00) with legal interest per annum commencing
from 1996 after the checks were dishonored by reason ‘ACCOUNT CLOSED’ on December 13, 1995, to pay attorney’s
fees of ₱15,000.00 and to pay the costs."9
The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.10 On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the
appeal and sustained his conviction.11 There being no further appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), the RTC issued on
February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision.12
Thus, on February 14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence
as a result of his conviction. The trial court also issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.13
On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the
Order of Arrest and the modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment
also, should have been imposed on him.14 The arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the
Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on February 28, 2001. 15
In an Order dated August 22, 2001, the MTCC denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a
Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba.16 On September 28, 2001, he was arrested and imprisoned for the service of his
sentence.
17
On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The case was raffled
to Branch 5, which scheduled the hearing for October 10, 2001. Copies of the Order were served on respondent’s
counsels and the city warden.18
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of
Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of ₱100,000 in lieu of imprisonment. However, the civil
aspect of the July 16, 1999 MTCC Decision was not touched upon. 19 A subsequent Order, explaining in greater detail
the basis of the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, was issued on October 11, 2001.20
In justifying its modification of the MTCC Decision, the RTC invoked Vaca v. Court of Appeals21 and Supreme Court
Administrative Circular (SC-AC) No. 12-2000,22 which allegedly required the imposition of a fine only instead of
imprisonment also for BP 22 violations, if the accused was not a recidivist or a habitual delinquent. The RTC held that
this rule should be retroactively applied in favor of Dimagiba.23 It further noted that (1) he was a first-time offender and
an employer of at least 200 workers who would be displaced as a result of his imprisonment; and (2) the civil liability
had already been satisfied through the levy of his properties.24
On October 22, 2001, Petitioner Go filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the RTC Orders dated October 10 and 11,
2001.25 That Motion was denied on January 18, 2002.26
Hence, this Petition filed directly with this Court on pure questions of law.27
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for this Court’s consideration:
"1. [The RTC] Judge was utterly devoid of jurisdiction in amending a final and conclusive decision of the
Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, dated July 16, 1999, in nullifying the Sentence Mittimus, dated September
28, 2001, issued by x x x [the] Municipal Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City, and in ordering the release of
[Dimagiba] from confinement in jail for the service of his sentence under the said final and conclusive
judgment;
"2. Assuming only for the sake of argument that habeas corpus is the proper remedy, the Petition for
Habeas Corpus is utterly devoid of merit as [Dimagiba was] not entitled to the beneficent policy
enunciated in the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No.
12-2000; x x x
"3. Granting for the sake of argument that [Dimagiba was] entitled to the beneficent policy enunciated in
the Eduardo Vaca and Rosa Lim cases and reiterated in the Supreme Court Circular No. 12-2000, the
minimum fine that should be imposed on [Dimagiba] is one million and two hundred ninety five thousand
pesos (₱1,295,000.00) up to double the said amount or (₱2,590,000), not just the measly amount of
₱100,000; and
"4. [The RTC] judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
hearing and deciding [Dimagiba’s] Petition for Habeas Corpus without notice and without affording
procedural due process to the People of the Philippines through the Office of [the] City Prosecutor of
Baguio City or the Office of the Solicitor General."28
In the main, the case revolves around the question of whether the Petition for habeas corpus was validly granted.
Hence, the Court will discuss the four issues as they intertwine with this main question. 29
The Court’s Ruling
The Petition is meritorious.
Main Issue:
Propriety of the Writ of Habeas Corpus
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of
liberty.30 It was devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more
specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient
cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody.31 It is therefore a writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances
under which a person is detained.32
The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid
judgment.33 However, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial
proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3)
the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.34
In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-
2000, which allegedly prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent
sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being
excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the issuance of the writ.
However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for
Reconsideration35 of the MTCC’s Execution Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of
Execution.36 Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or authority to amend a judgment
issued by the RTC.
In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We
believe that his resort to this extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal
of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed.
But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition
for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and executory. Such
an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy
instead of instituting a different action in another forum.
The Court also finds his arguments for his release insubstantial to support the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.
Preference in the Application of Penalties for Violation of BP 22
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1) imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more
than one year; (2) a fine of not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case exceed
₱200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court. 37
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001,38 established a rule of preference in imposing the above
penalties.39 When the circumstances of the case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of
negligence, the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty.40 The determination of the
circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon the trial judge only.41 Should the judge deem that
imprisonment is appropriate, such penalty may be imposed.42
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment. The competence to amend the law belongs
to the legislature, not to this Court.43
Inapplicability of SC-AC No. 12-2000
Petitioners argue that respondent is not entitled to the benevolent policy enunciated in SC-AC No. 12-2000, because
he is not a "first time offender."44 This circumstance is, however, not the sole factor in determining whether he deserves
the preferred penalty of fine alone. The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each
case.45 It is the trial court’s discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of the law. SC-AC No. 13-2001
explains thus:
"x x x. Administrative Circular No. 12-2000 establishes a rule of preference in the application of the penal provisions of
BP 22 such that where the circumstances of both the offense and the offender clearly indicate good faith or a clear
mistake of fact without taint of negligence, the imposition of a fine alone should be considered as the more appropriate
penalty. Needless to say, the determination of whether the circumstances warrant the imposition of a fine alone rests
solely upon the Judge. x x x.
It is, therefore, understood that:
xxxxxxxxx
"2. The Judges concerned, may in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar
circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice,
or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the
social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperatives of justice;"
The Court notes that the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus relied mainly on the alleged retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-
2000, which supposedly favored BP 22 offenders.46 On this point, Dimagiba contended that his imprisonment was
violative of his right to equal protection of the laws, since only a fine would be imposed on others similarly situated.47
The rule on retroactivity states that criminal laws may be applied retroactively if favorable to the accused. This
principle, embodied in the Revised Penal Code,48 has been expanded in certain instances to cover special laws.49
The issue of retroactivity of SC-AC No. 12-2000 was settled in De Joya v. Jail Warden of Batangas City,50 which we
quote:
"Petitioner's reliance of our ruling in Ordoñez v. Vinarao that a convicted person is entitled to benefit from the reduction
of penalty introduced by the new law, citing People v. Simon, is misplaced. Thus, her plea that as provided for in Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 as modified by SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001
should benefit her has no basis.
"First. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 is not a penal law; hence, Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code is not
applicable. The circular applies only to those cases pending as of the date of its effectivity and not to cases already
terminated by final judgment.
"Second. As explained by the Court in SC Admin. Circular No. 13-2001, SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely lays
down a rule of preference in the application of the penalties for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. It does not amend B.P. Blg.
22, nor defeat the legislative intent behind the law. SC Admin. Circular No. 12-2000 merely urges the courts to take
into account not only the purpose of the law but also the circumstances of the accused -- whether he acted in good
faith or on a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence -- and such other circumstance which the trial court or the
appellate court believes relevant to the penalty to be imposed."51
Because the Circular merely lays down a rule of preference, it serves only as a guideline for the trial courts. Thus, it is
addressed to the judges, who are directed to consider the factual circumstances of each case prior to imposing the
appropriate penalty. In other words, the Administrative Circular does not confer any new right in favor of the accused,
much less those convicted by final judgment.
The competence to determine the proper penalty belongs to the court rendering the decision against the
accused.52That decision is subject only to appeal on grounds of errors of fact or law, or grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Another trial court may not encroach upon this authority. Indeed, SC-AC
No. 12-2000 necessarily requires a review of all factual circumstances of each case. Such a review can no longer be
done if the judgment has become final and executory.
In the present case, the MTCC of Baguio City had full knowledge of all relevant circumstances from which
respondent’s conviction and sentence were based. The penalty imposed was well within the confines of the law. Upon
appeal, the conviction was sustained by RTC-Branch 4 of Baguio City. Eventually, the Decision attained finality.
Hence, RTC-Branch 5 did not have the jurisdiction to modify the lawful judgment in the guise of granting a writ of
habeas corpus.
The doctrine of equal protection of laws53 does not apply for the same reasons as those on retroactivity. Foremost of
these reasons is that the Circular is not a law that deletes the penalty of imprisonment. As explained earlier, it is merely
a rule of preference as to which penalty should be imposed under the peculiar circumstances of a case. At any rate,
this matter deserves scant consideration, because respondent failed to raise any substantial argument to support his
contention.54
Modification of Final Judgment Not Warranted
The Court is not unmindful of So v. Court of Appeals,55 in which the final judgment of conviction for violation of BP 22
was modified by the deletion of the sentence of imprisonment and the imposition of a fine. That case proceeded from
an "Urgent Manifestation of an Extraordinary Supervening Event," 56 not from an unmeritorious petition for a writ of
habeas corpus, as in the present case. The Court exercised in that case its authority to suspend or to modify the
execution of a final judgment when warranted or made imperative by the higher interest of justice or by supervening
events.57 The supervening event in that case was the petitioner’s urgent need for coronary rehabilitation for at least
one year under the direct supervision of a coronary care therapist; imprisonment would have been equivalent to a
death sentence.58
The peculiar circumstances of So do not obtain in the present case. Respondent’s supposed "unhealthy physical
condition due to a triple by-pass operation, and aggravated by hypertension," cited by the RTC in its October 10, 2001
Order,59 is totally bereft of substantial proof. The Court notes that respondent did not make any such allegation in his
Petition for habeas corpus. Neither did he mention his physical state in his Memorandum and Comment submitted to
this Court.
Respondent seeks the retroactive application of SC-AC No. 12-2000 in his favor on the basis alone of the alleged
settlement of his civil liability.60 Citing Griffith v. Court of Appeals,61 he theorizes that answering for a criminal offense is
no longer justified after the settlement of the debt.
Respondent, however, misreads Griffith. The Court held in that case that convicting the accused who, two years prior
to the filing of the BP 22 cases, had already paid his debt (from which the checks originated) was contrary to the basic
principles of fairness and justice.62 Obviously, that situation is not attendant here.
The civil liability in the present case was satisfied through the levy and sale of the properties of respondent only after
the criminal case had been terminated with his conviction.63 Apparently, he had sufficient properties that could have
been used to settle his liabilities prior to his conviction. Indeed, such an early settlement would have been an indication
that he was in good faith, a circumstance that could have been favorably considered in determining his appropriate
penalty.
At any rate, civil liability differs from criminal liability.64 What is punished in the latter is not the failure to pay the
obligation, but the issuance of checks that subsequently bounced or were dishonored for insufficiency or lack of
funds.65 The Court reiterates the reasons why the issuance of worthless checks is criminalized:
"The practice is prohibited by law because of its deleterious effects on public interest. The effects of the increase of
worthless checks transcend the private interest of the parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the
interest of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation multiplied a thousand-fold can
very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of
society and the public interest. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property but an offense against
public order."66
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED and the assailed Orders NULLIFIED. Respondent’s Petition for habeas
corpus is hereby DENIED. Let this case be REMANDED to MTCC of Baguio City for the re-arrest of respondent and
the completion of his sentence.
The petition lacks merit.
Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus may be
availed of in cases of illegal confinement by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody
of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. In Feria v. Court of Appeals,5 the Court held that the writ
may also be issued where, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, (a) there has been a deprivation of a
constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c)
an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess. 6
None of the above circumstances is present in the instant case.

No pronouncement as to costs. Recall that petitioner was charged and convicted under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code which states:

SO ORDERED. Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. – Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any
of the following circumstances.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT 1. By using force or intimidation;
Manila

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

THIRD DIVISION
3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.
G.R. No. 170497 January 22, 2007

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION FOR THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS RECLASSIFYING SENTENCE
TO R.A. NO. 8353 IN BEHALF OF, ROGELIO ORMILLA, ROGELIO RIVERA, ALFREDO NAVARRO, Petitioners,
vs. Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the
THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, AND THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents. penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis added)

DECISION With the enactment of R.A. No. 8353, petitioner claims that the penalty of reclusion perpetua has become excessive,
as the new law now punishes rape with prision mayor, citing Article 266-B as follows:7

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Article 266-B. Penalties. --- x x x

1
This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus filed for and in behalf of Rogelio Ormilla, Rogelio Rivera
and Alfredo Navarro, praying for their release from confinement on the ground that an excessive penalty was imposed Rape under paragraph 2 of the next preceding article shall be punished by prision mayor.
on them.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
At the outset, we note that only Ormilla signed his conformity to the petition while Rivera and Navarro failed to manifest be prision mayor to reclusion temporal.
their conformity or sign the verification. Hence, the instant petition pertains only to petitioner Ormilla.
x x x x. (Emphasis added)
Petitioner, together with Rivera and Navarro, was convicted of two counts of rape and sentenced to reclusion
perpetua for each count. He is presently confined at the National Penitentiary in Muntinlupa and has served
approximately 17 years of his sentence.2 Petitioner’s reliance on the above-mentioned portion of Article 266-B is misplaced. Note that the penalty of prision
mayor is imposed for rape committed under paragraph 2 of Article 266-A which is committed by any person who
inserts his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice; or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice
In the instant petition, Ormilla alleged that he should be released from confinement by virtue of Republic Act No. 8353 of another person. It bears stressing that petitioner, together with Rivera and Navarro, was charged with and convicted
(R.A. No. 8353), otherwise known as "The Anti-Rape Law of 1997." He claimed that under the new rape law, the of rape by having carnal knowledge of a woman using force and intimidation under Article 335, which is now embodied
penalty for rape committed by two or more persons was downgraded to prision mayor to reclusion temporal. Thus, the in paragraph 1 of Article 266-A.
penalty of reclusion perpetua imposed on him is excessive and should be modified in accordance with R.A. No. 8353.
He prayed that he be released so he could apply for pardon or parole.
The full text of Article 266-A reads:

In their Comment,3 respondents, represented herein by the Office of the Solicitor-General, contended that the penalty
imposed under R.A. No. 8353 for rape committed by two or more persons is reclusion perpetua to death. Under Article Art. 266-A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape is committed –
704 of the Revised Penal Code, the duration of perpetual penalties is 30 years. Since petitioner was sentenced
to reclusion perpetua for each count of rape, the aggregate of the two penalties is 60 years. Respondents argued that
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following
petitioner has yet to complete the service of his first sentence, as he has been in confinement for only 17 years.
circumstances:
Respondents further argued that petitioner is ineligible for parole, because Section 2 of the Indeterminate Sentence
Law prohibits its application to persons convicted of offenses punished by life imprisonment.
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;lavvphil.net
The sole issue for resolution is whether the writ may be granted in favor of petitioner.
 b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances above be present;
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice,
or any instrument or object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person. (Emphasis added)
Under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, the penalty for rape committed by two
or more persons, using force, threat or intimidation is reclusion perpetua to death, to wit:
Art. 266-B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall
be reclusion perpetua to death.
xxxx
It must be emphasized that the same penalties were imposed under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code prior to the
enactment of R.A. No. 8353. It is clear therefore that R.A. No. 8353 did not downgrade the applicable penalties to
petitioner’s case.
Considering that the penalty of reclusion perpetua was properly imposed and that petitioner is confined under authority
of law, the petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
UDK No. 14817 January 13, 2014
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF MINOR SHANG KO VINGSON YU SHIRLY
VINGSON@ SHIRLY VINGSON DEMAISIP, Petitioner,
vs.
JOVY CABCABAN, Respondent.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
Petitioner Shirly Vingson (Shirly) alleged that Shang Ko Vingson Yu (Shang Ko),1 her 14-year-old daughter, ran away
from home on September 23, 2011. On November 2, 2011 Shirly went to the police station in Bacolod City upon
receipt of information that Shang Ko was in the custody of respondent Jovy Cabcaban Cabcaban), a police officer in
that station. Since Cabcaban refused to release Shang Ko to her, Shirly sought the help of the National Bureau of
Investigation NBI) to rescue her child. An NBI agent, Arnel Pura Pura), informed Shirly that Shang Ko was no longer
with Cabcaban but was staying with a private organization called Calvary Kids. Pura told her, however, that the child
was fine and had been attending school.
This prompted petitioner Shirly to file a petition for habeas corpus against respondent Cabcaban and the unnamed
officers of Calvary Kids before the Court of Appeals (CA) rather than the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City citing as
reason several threats against her life in that city.
In a Resolution dated December 18, 2012,2 the CA resolved in CA-G.R. SP 07261 to deny the petition for its failure to
clearly allege who has custody of Shang Ko. According to the CA, habeas corpus may not be used as a means of
obtaining evidence on the whereabouts of a person or as a means of finding out who has specifically abducted or
caused the disappearance of such person.3 The CA denied petitioner Shirly’s motion for reconsideration on January 8,
2013, hence, this petition for review.
In her Comment,4 respondent Cabcaban claimed that on September 28, 2011 police officers found Shang Ko crying
outside a church. When queried, the latter refused to give any information about herself. Thus, they indorsed her case
to the Bacolod City Police Women and Children Protection Desk that Cabcaban headed. After the initial interview,
Cabcaban referred Shang Ko to Balay Pasilungan , a temporary shelter for abused women and children.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that on the next day, a social worker sat with the minor who said that her
mother Shirly had been abusive in treating her. She narrated that on September 27, 2011 Shirly instructed another
daughter to give Shang Ko ₱280.00 and take her to the pier to board a boat going to Iloilo City.5 Shang Ko was told to
look for a job there and to never come back to Bacolod City. Since she had nowhere to go when she arrived in Iloilo
City, Shang Ko decided to return to Bacolod City with the money given her. She went to her best friend’s house but
was turned away for fear of Shirly. She called her sister so that she and her boyfriend could get her but they, too,
turned her down.6
Respondent Cabcaban also claimed that Shang Ko pleaded with the police and the social worker not to return her to
her mother. As a result, the Bacolod City Police filed a complaint7 against petitioner Shirly for violation of Republic Act
7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse, Exploitation, and Discrimination Act. The police sent notice
to Shirly inviting her to a conference but she refused to receive such notice. Two days later, however, she came and
spoke to Cabcaban, pointing out that Shang Ko had been a difficult child with a tendency to steal. From their
conversation, Cabcaban surmised that Shirly did not want to take her daughter back, having offered to pay for her daily
expenses at the shelter.
Respondent Cabcaban said that on October 29, 2011 she decided to turn over Shang Ko to the Calvary Kids, a private
organization that gave sanctuary and schooling to abandoned and abused children.8 On November 2, 2011 petitioner
Shirly showed up at the police station asking for her daughter. Cabcaban told her that Shang Ko was in a sanctuary for
abandoned children and that the police officer had to first coordinate with it before she can disclose where Shang Ko
was. But Shirly was adamant and threatened her with a lawsuit. Cabcaban claimed that Shang Ko’s father was a
Taiwanese and that Shirly wanted the child back to use her as leverage for getting financial support from him.
Respondent Cabcaban further claimed that one year later, NBI agents led by Pura went to the police station to verify
Shirly’s complaint that Cabcaban had kidnapped Shang Ko. Cabcaban accompanied the NBI agents to Calvary Kids to
talk to the institution’s social worker, school principal, and director. They provided the NBI agents with the child’s
original case study report9 and told them that it was not in Shang Ko’s best interest to return her to her mother who
abused and maltreated her. Shang Ko herself told the NBI that she would rather stay at Calvary Kids because she was
afraid of what would happen to her if she returned home.10 As proof, Shang Ko wrote a letter stating that, contrary to
her mother’s malicious insinuations, Cabcaban actually helped her when she had nowhere to go after her family
refused to take her back.11
Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus is available, not only in cases of illegal
confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, but also in cases involving the rightful custody
over a minor.12 The general rule is that parents should have custody over their minor children. But the State has the
right to intervene where the parents, rather than care for such children, treat them cruelly and abusively, impairing their
growth and well-being and leaving them emotional scars that they carry throughout their lives unless they are liberated
from such parents and properly counseled.
Since this case presents factual issues and since the parties are all residents of Bacolod City, it would be best that
such issues be resolved by a Family Court in that city. Meantime, considering the presumption that the police
authorities acted regularly in placing Shang Ko in the custody of Calvary Kids the Court believes that she should
remain there pending hearing and adjudication of this custody case. Besides she herself has expressed preference to
stay in that place.
WHEREFORE, the Court SETS ASIDE the Court of Appeals Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP 07261 dated December 18,
2012 and January 8, 2013 and ORDERS this custody case forwarded to the Family Court of Bacolod City for hearing
and adjudication as the evidence warrants. Meantime until such court orders otherwise let the minor Shang Ko
Vingson remain in the custody of Calvary Kids of Bacolod City.
Further the Court ORDERS petitioner Shirly Vingson Shirly Vingson Demaisip to pay the balance of the docket and
other legal fees within 10 days from receipt of this Resolution.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 210636 July 28, 2014
MA. HAZELINA A. TUJANMILITANTE IN BEHALF OF THE MINOR CRISELDA M. CADA, Petitioner,
vs.
RAQUEL M. CADA-DEAPERA, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
Before Us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court with prayer for injunctive relief
seeking the reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 17, 2013 as well as its Resolution dated
December 27, 2013 in CA-G.R. SP No. 123759. In the main, petitioner questions the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 130 in Caloocan City (RTC-Caloocan) to hear and decide a special civil action for habeas corpus in
relation to the custody of a minor residing in Quezon City.
The Facts
On March 24, 2011, respondent Raquel M. Cada-Deapera filed before the R TC-Caloocan a verified petition for writ of
habeas corpus, docketed as Special Civil Action Case No. C-4344. In the said petition, respondent demanded the
immediate issuance of the special writ, directing petitioner Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante to produce before the court
respondent's biological daughter, minor Criselda M. Cada (Criselda), and to return to her the custody over the child.
Additionally, respondent indicated that petitioner has three (3) known addresses where she can be served with
summons and other court processes, to wit: (1) 24 Bangkal St., Amparo Village, Novaliches, Caloocan City; (2) 118B
K9Street, Kamias, Quezon City; and (3) her office at the Ombudsman-Office of the Special Prosecutor, 5th Floor,
Sandiganbayan, Centennial Building, Commonwealth Avenue cor. Batasan Road, Quezon City.2
The next day, on March 25, 2011, the RTC-Caloocan issued a writ of habeas corpus, ordering petitioner to bring the
child to court on March 28, 2011. Despite diligent efforts and several attempts, however, the Sheriff was unsuccessful
in personally serving petitioner copies of the habeas corpus petition and of the writ. Instead, on March 29, 2011, the
Sheriff left copies of the court processes at petitioner’s Caloocan residence, as witnessed by respondent’s counsel and
barangay officials.3 Nevertheless, petitioner failed to appear at the scheduled hearings before the RTC-Caloocan.
Meanwhile, on March 31, 2011, petitioner filed a Petition for Guardianship over the person of Criselda before the RTC,
Branch 89 in Quezon City (RTC-Quezon City). Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition for guardianship on
the ground of litis pendentia, among others. Thereafter, or on June 3, 2011, respondent filed a criminal case for
kidnapping before the Office of the City Prosecutor – Quezon City against petitioner and her counsel.
On July 12, 2011, the RTC-Quezon City granted respondent’s motion and dismissed the guardianship case due to the
pendency of the habeas corpuspetition before RTC-Caloocan.4
The falloof the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,the subject motion is hereby GRANTED.Accordingly, the case is hereby
DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.5
Then, on August 4, 2011, Raquel moved for the ex parte issuance of an alias writ of habeas corpus before the RTC-
Caloocan, which was granted by the trial court on August 8, 2011. On even date, the court directed the Sheriff to serve
the alias writ upon petitioner at the Office of the Assistant City Prosecutor of Quezon City on August 10, 2011. 6 In
compliance, the Sheriff served petitioner the August 8, 2011 Order as well as the Alias Writ during the preliminary
investigation of the kidnapping case.7
Following this development, petitioner, by way of special appearance, moved for the quashal of the writ and prayed
before the RTC Caloocan for the dismissal of the habeas corpus petition,8 claiming, among others, that she was not
personally served with summons. Thus, as argued by petitioner, jurisdiction over her and Criselda’sperson was not
acquired by the RTCCaloocan.
Ruling of the Trial Court
On January 20, 2012, the RTC-Caloocan issued an Order denying petitioner’s omnibus motion, citing Saulo v. Brig.
Gen. Cruz,9 where the Court held that a writ of habeas corpus, being an extraordinary process requiring immediate
proceeding and action, plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of
said writ, the Court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent, as petitioner herein. 10
Moreover, personal service, the RTC said, does not necessarily require that service be made exclusively at petitioner’s
given address, for service may be made elsewhere or wherever she may be found for as long as she was handed a
copy of the court process in person by anyone authorized by law. Since the sheriff was able to personally serve
petitioner a copy of the writ, albeit in Quezon City, the RTC-Caloocan validly acquired jurisdiction over her
person.11 The dispositive portion of the Order reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Very Urgent Motion (Motion to Quash Alias Writ; Motion to Dismiss)filed by
respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante dated August 11, 2011 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
In the meantime, respondent Ma. Hazelina Tujan-Militante is hereby directed to appear and bring Criselda Martinez
Cada before this Court on February 10, 2012 at 8:30 o’clock in the morning.
SO ORDERED.12
Aggrieved, petitioner, via certiorari to the CA, assailed the issued Order.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Over a year later, the CA, in the challenged Decision dated May 17, 2013,13 dismissed the petition for certiorari in the
following wise:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 130 of
Caloocan City is DIRECTED to proceed with due dispatch in Spec. Proc. Case No. C-4344 for Habeas Corpus, giving
utmost consideration tothe best interest of the now nearly 14-year old child.
SO ORDERED.14
In so ruling, the CA held that jurisdiction was properly laid when respondent filed the habeas corpus petition before the
designated Family Court in Caloocan City.15 It also relied on the certification issued by the punong barangay of Brgy.
179, Caloocan City, stating that petitioner is a bona fide resident thereof, as well as the medical certificate issued by
Criselda’s doctor on April 1, 2011, indicating that her address is "Amparo Village, KC."16 Anent the RTC-Caloocan’s
jurisdiction, the appellate court ruled that service of summons is not required under Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC, otherwise known as the Rules on Custody of Minors and Habeas Corpus in Relation to Custody of Minors.
According tothe CA, the rules on summons contemplated in ordinary civil actions have no place in petitions for the
issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, it being a special proceeding.17
Petitioner sought reconsideration ofthe above Decision but the same was denied by the CA in its December 27, 2013
Resolution.1âwphi1
Hence, this Petition. xxxx

The Issues
At the core of this controversy isthe issue of whether or not the RTC Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeascorpus
petition filed by respondent and, assuming arguendo it does, whether or not it validly acquired jurisdiction over
petitioner and the person of Criselda. Likewise pivotal is the enforce ability of the writ issued by RTC-Caloocan in
Quezon City where petitioner was served a copy thereof.
The National Capital Judicial Region, consisting of the cities of Manila, Quezon, Pasay, Caloocan and Mandaluyong,
and the municipalities of Navotas, Malabon, San Juan, Makati, Pasig, Pateros, Taguig, Marikina, Parañaque, Las
Piñas, Muntinlupa, and Valenzuela. (emphasis ours)
In view of the afore-quoted provision,it is indubitable that the filing of a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas
corpus before a family court in any of the cities enumerated is proper as long as the writ is sought to be enforced within
the National Capital Judicial Region, as here.

The Court’s Ruling

In the case at bar, respondent filed the petition before the family court of Caloocan City. Since Caloocan City and
Quezon City both belong to the same judicial region, the writ issued by the RTC-Caloocan can still be implemented in
The petition lacks merit. The RTC-Caloocan correctly took cognizance of the habeas corpus petition. Subsequently, it Quezon City. Whether petitioner resides in the former or the latter is immaterial in view of the above rule.
acquired jurisdiction over petitioner when the latter was served with a copy of the writ in Quezon City.

Anent petitioner’s insistence on the application of Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC, a plain reading of said provision
The RTC-Caloocan has jurisdiction over the habeas corpus proceeding reveals that the provision invoked only applies to petitions for custody of minors, and not to habeas corpus petitions.
Thus:

Arguing that the RTC-Caloocan lacked jurisdiction over the case, petitioner relies on Section 3 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-
SC and maintains that the habeas corpus petition should have been filed before the family court that has jurisdiction Section 3. Where to file petition.- The petition for custody of minors shall be filed with the Family Court of the province
over her place of residence or that of the minor or wherever the minor may be found.18 As to respondent, she asserts, or city where the petitioner resides or where the minormay be found. (emphasis added)
among others, that the applicable rule is not Section 3 but Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC.19

We find for respondent.
In the case at bar, what respondent filed was a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus under Section 20 of
A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC and Rule 102 of the Rules of Court.20 As provided:
Lastly, as regards petitioner’s assertion that the summons was improperly served, suffice it to state thatservice of
summons, to begin with, is not required in a habeas corpus petition, be it under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court or A.M.
No. 03-04-04-SC. As held in Saulo v. Cruz, a writ of habeas corpus plays a role somewhat comparable to a summons,
in ordinary civil actions, in that, by service of said writ, the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent.22

Section 20. Petition for writ of habeas corpus.- A verified petition for a writ of habeas corpus involving custody of
minors shall be filed with the Family Court. The writ shall beenforceable within its judicial region to which the Family
Court belongs.
In view of the foregoing, We need not belabor the other issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated May 1 7, 2013 and its Resolution
dated December 27, 2013 are AFFIRMED.

However, the petition may be filed with the regular court in the absence of the presiding judge of the Family Court,
provided, however, that the regular court shall refer the case tothe Family Court as soon as its presiding judge returns No pronouncement as to costs.
to duty.

SO ORDERED.
The petition may also be filed with the appropriate regular courts in places where there are no Family Courts.

The writ issued by the Family Court or the regular court shall be enforceable in the judicial region where they belong.

The petition may likewise be filed with the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, or with any of its members and, if so
granted,the writ shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. The writ may be made returnable to a Family Court
or to any regular court within the region where the petitioner resides or where the minor may be found for hearing and
decision on the merits.

Upon return of the writ, the court shall decide the issue on custody of minors. The appellate court, or the member
thereof, issuing the writ shall be furnished a copy of the decision. (emphasis added)

Considering that the writ is made enforceable within a judicial region, petitions for the issuance of the writ of habeas
corpus, whether they be filed under Rule 102 of the Rules of Court orpursuant to Section 20 of A.M. No. 03-04-04-SC,
may therefore be filed withany of the proper RTCs within the judicial region where enforcement thereof is sought.21

On this point, Section 13 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (BP 129), otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization Act
of 1980, finds relevance. Said provision, which contains the enumeration of judicial regions in the country, states:

Section 13. Creation of Regional Trial Courts. – There are hereby created thirteen Regional Trial Courts, one for each
of the following judicial regions: