#1 Jaime Tan Jr.

vs CA
G.R. No. 136368; 16 Jan. 2002

FACTS:
On January 22, 1981, Tan, for a consideration of P59,200 executed a deed of absolute sale
over the property in question in favor of spouses Jose Magdangal and Estrella Magdangal.
Simultaneous with the execution of this deed, the same contracting parties entered into
another agreement where under Tan was given one (1) year within which to redeem or
repurchase the property. Tan failed to redeem the property until his death on January 4, 1988.

On May 2, 1988, Tan's heirs filed before the RTC at Davao City a suit against the
Magdangals for reformation of instrument alleging that while Tan and the Magdangals
denominated their agreement as deed of absolute sale, their real intention was to conclude an
equitable mortgage.

RTC rendered judgment finding for Tan, portion of which reads:

1) The Deed of Absolute Sale is, in accordance with the true intention of the parties, hereby
declared and reformed an equitable mortgage;

2) The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendants within 120 days after the finality of this
decision P59,200 plus interest at the rate of 12% per annum from May 2, 1988, the date the
complaint was filed, until paid;

3)xxx.

On Sept. 28, 1995, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto. Both parties received the
decision of the appellate court on Oct. 5, 1995. On March 13, 1996, the clerk of court of the
appellate court entered in the Book of Entries of Judgement the decision xxx and issued the
corresponding Entry of Judgment which, on its face, stated that the said decision has on Oct.
21, 1995 become final and executory.

Magdangals filed in the RTC a Motion for Consolidation and Writ of Possession alleging that
the 120-day period of redemption of the petitioner has expired.

On June 10, 1996, the RTC allowed the petitioner to redeem the lot in question. It ruled that
the 120-day redemption period should be reckoned from the date of Entry of Judgment in the
CA or from March 13, 1996. The redemption price was deposited on April 17, 1996.

ISSUE:
What rule should govern the finality of judgment favorably obtained in the trial court by the
petitioner?

HELD:
From 1991-1996, the years relevant to the case at bar, the rule that governs finality of
judgment is Rule 51 of the Revised Rules of Court. Its sections 10 and 11 provide:

SEC. 10. Entry of judgments and final resolutions. If no appeal or motion for new trial or
reconsideration is filed within the time provided in these Rules, the judgment or final
resolution shall forthwith be entered by the clerk in the book of entries of judgments. The
date when the judgments or final resolution becomes executory shall be deemed as the date of
its entry. The record shall contain the dispositive part of the judgment or final resolution and
shall be signed by the clerk, with a certificate that such judgment or final resolution has
become final and executory.

SEC.11. Execution of judgment. Except where the judgment or final order or resolution, or a
portion thereof, is ordered to be immediately executory, the motion for its execution may
only be filed in the proper court after its entry.

The 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, however, amended the rule on finality of
judgment by providing in section 1, Rule 39 as follows:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. Execution shall issue as a matter of
right, on motion, upon a judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the
expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if no appeal has been duly perfected.

If the appeal has been duly perfected and finally resolved, the execution may forthwith be
applied for in the court of origin, on motion of the judgment obligee, submitting therewith
certified true copies of the judgment or judgments or final order or orders sought to be
enforced and of the entry thereof, with notice to the adverse party.

The appellate court may, on motion in the same case, when the interest of justice so requires,
direct the court of origin to issue the writ of execution.

SC hold that section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Procedure should not be given
retroactive effect in this case as it would result in great injustice to the petitioner.
Undoubtedly, petitioner has the right to redeem the subject lot and this right is a substantive
right. Petitioner followed the procedural rule then existing as well as the decisions of this
Court governing the reckoning date of the period of redemption when he redeemed the
subject lot. Unfortunately for petitioner, the rule was changed by the 1997 Revised Rules of
Procedure which if applied retroactively would result in his losing the right to redeem the
subject lot. It is difficult to reconcile the retroactive application of this procedural rule with
the rule of fairness. Petitioner cannot be penalized with the loss of the subject lot when he
faithfully followed the laws and the rule on the period of redemption when he made the
redemption.

#2 Alvero vs. De la Rosa

G.R No. L-286; 29 March 1946

FACTS:
Margarita Villarica sold to Jose R. Victoriano 480 square meters area of land on October 1,
1940, for the sum of P6,000. Their agreement includes that Victoriano should make a down
payment of P1,700, and a monthly payment of P76.86 in 120 equal monthly installments.
Immediately after the sale, Victoriano took possession of the land and made improvements to
the amount of P800. On December, 1941, because of the war-time conditions then existing,
Villarica and Victoriano agreed verbally to suspend such payments until the restoration of
peace. Victoriano continued occupying said property not until December, 1944 because he
went to go to evacuation places, but returned thereto in February, 1945. The agreement also
includes that, upon failure of the purchaser to make payments of three (3) successive monthly
installments, the vendor would be free to sell the property again, forfeiting the payments
made, except in the case of force majeure.

Meanwhile, on December 31, 1944, Villarica, having claimed to forgot to have sold said land
to Victoriano, sold the same to Fredesvindo S. Alvero for P100,000 in Japanese military
notes. After liberation, she offered to repurchase said property from Alvero for of PHP8,000
but the latter refused to accept the offer. On the other hand, on January 3, 1945, Fredesvindo
S. Alvero presented the deed of sale, executed in his favor, to the Register of Deeds of the
City of Manila, and took possession of said property in December, 1944. Then, Alvero found
out that Victoriano is in the premises in February, 1945. Both Victoriano and Alvero,
although had presented the deed of sale they separately executed with Villarica, to the ROD,
had failed to secure the transfer of title.

On June 25, 1945, Victoriano filed a complaint, in the RTC of the City of Manila, against
Alvero and Villarica, (1) to declare in force the contract of sale of the subject land, made on
October 1, 1940, between Victoriano and Villarica, and (2) to declare subsequent sale of said
land to Alvero, null and void. In his answer, Alvero denied the allegations, and claimed
exclusive ownership of the land, and at the same time set up a counterclaim and cross claim,
demanding from Victoriano a P200-monthly rent on said property, beginning from February,
1945, plus P2,000 as damages. Villarica filed an answer, expressly admitting having sold said
land to Alvero , in December, 1944, in order to raise funds to support for herself and family,
and that forgot of the previous sale, but had offered repurchase of said property to Alvero, the
latter refused.

The RTC judge rendered his decision in favor of Victoriano, taking into consideration
Victoriano's document was older than that of Alvero, and that the former had taken
possession of said property, since October 1, 1940. Adjudging to Victoriano the title over the
property in question, including all the improvements existing thereon, and dismissed the
counterclaim.

On November 28, 1945, Alvero was notified of said decision; and on December 27, 1945, he
filed a petition for reconsideration and new trial, which was denied on January 3, 1946; and
of said order he was notified on January 7, 1946.

On January 8, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed his notice of appeal and record on appeal
simultaneously in the lower court, without filing the P60-appeal bond.

On January 14, 1946, Jose R. Victoriano filed a petition to dismiss the appeal, and at the
same time, asked for the execution of the judgment.

On January 15, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss,
alleging that on the very same day, January 15, 1946, said appeal bond for P60 had been
actually filed, and allege as an excuse, for not filing the said appeal bond, in due time, the
illness of his lawyer's wife, who died on January 10, 1946, and buried the following day.
On January 17, 1946, the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la Rosa, ordered the
dismissal of the appeal, declaring that, although the notice of appeal and record on appeal had
been filed in due time, the P60-appeal bond was filed too late.

On January 23, 1946, Fredesvindo S. Alvero filed a petition for the reconsideration of the
said order dated January 17, 1946, dismissing his appeal; and said petition for reconsideration
was denied on January 29, 1946.

Alvero filed petition for certiorari, on grounds of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
respondent judge and of the CA in not relaxing the rules.

ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent judge
and of the CA in not relaxing the rules.

HELD:
No, the petition is untenable. (1) Said petition is defective in form as well as in substance; (2)
There has been no excusable negligence, on the part of the petitioner, or grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the respondent judge, in the instant case.

Rules of courts, promulgated by authority of law, have the force and effect of law; and rules
of court prescribing the time within which certain acts must be done, or certain proceedings
taken, are considered absolutely indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the
orderly and speedy discharge of judicial business. Strict compliance with the rules of court
has been held mandatory and imperative, so that failure to perfect and file his appeal, within
the period fixed for that purpose, will cause the dismissal of the appeal.

As already stated, the decision rendered by the respondent judge, Hon. Mariano L. de la
Rosa, was dated November 16, 1945, of which counsel for Fredesvindo S. Alvero was
notified on November 28, 1945; that his motion for reconsideration and new trial was filed on
December 27, 1945, and denied on January 3, 1946, and that said counsel for Alvero was
notified of said order on January 7, 1946; and that he filed his notice of appeal and record on
appeal the following day, to wit, January 8, 1946, and that the P60-appeal bond was filed
only on January 15, 1946. Counsel for the petitioner Fredesvindo Alvero alleges as an
excuse, for his failure to perfect and file his appeal, in due time, the illness of his wife, which
ended in her death on January 10, 1946, and by which he was greatly affected. The attorney
for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero could have asked for an extension of time, within which
to file and perfect his appeal, in the court below; but he had failed to do so, and he must bear
the consequences of his act. A strict observance of the rules of court, which have been
considered indispensable to the prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy
dispatch of judicial business, is an imperative necessity.

It may not be amiss to state in this connection that no irreparable damage has been caused to
the petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, as Margarita Villarica, the vendor to the two, of the
land in question, has shown readiness to repair the damage done.

According to the computation erroneously made by the court, the last day for filing and
perfecting the appeal, in this case, was January 8, 1946, or which date, Fredesvindo S. Alvero
should have filed his (1) notice of appeal, (2) record on appeal, and (3) appeal bond. But the
P60-appeal bond was filed only on January 15, 1946.

Failure to perfect the appeal, within the time prescribed by the rules of court, will cause the
judgment to become final, and the certification of the record on appeal thereafter, cannot
restore the jurisdiction which has been lost. The period within which the record on appeal and
appeal bond should be perfected and filed may, however, be extended by order of the court,
upon application made, prior to the expiration of the original period.

No showing having been made that there had been merely excusable negligence, on the part
of the attorney for petitioner Fredesvindo S. Alvero, and that there had been gave abuse of
sound judicial discretion, on the part of the respondent judge, the petition for certiorari filed
in this case, is, therefore, dismissed.

#3 Bustos vs. Lucero

G.R. No. L-2068, 08 Mar. 1948

FACTS:
The petitioner in the present case appeared at the preliminary investigation before the Justice
of the Peace of Masantol, Pampanga, and after being informed of the criminal charges against
him and asked if he pleaded guilty or not guilty, pleaded not guilty. "Then the counsel for the
petitioner moved that the complainant present her evidence so that her witnesses could be
examined and cross-examined in the manner and form provided by law." The fiscal and the
private prosecutor objected to petitioner's motion invoking section 11, Rule 108, and the
objection was sustained. In view thereof, the accused refused to present his evidence, and the
case was forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pampanga.

ISSUE:
It is contended that section 11 of Rule 108 of the (old) Rules of Court 1 infringes section 13,
Article VIII, of the [1935] Constitution. It is said that the rule in question deals with
substantive matters and impairs substantive rights.
HELD:
We cannot agree with this view. We are of the opinion that section 11 of Rule 108, like its
predecessors, is an adjective law and not a substantive law or substantive right. Substantive
law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive right is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under
the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. (60 C.J., 980.) Substantive law is
that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights
and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion. (36 C. J., 27; 52 C. J. S.,
1026.)

As applied to criminal law, substantive law is that which declares what acts are crimes and
prescribes the punishment for committing them, as distinguished from the procedural law
which provides or regulates the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished.
(22 C. J. S., 49.) Preliminary investigation is eminently and essentially remedial; it is the first
step taken in a criminal prosecution.

As a rule of evidence, section 11 of Rule 108 is also procedural. Evidence — which is the
"the mode and manner of proving the competent facts and circumstances on which a party
relies to establish the fact in dispute in judicial proceedings" — is identified with and forms
part of the method by which, in private law, rights are enforced and redress obtained, and, in
criminal law, a law transgressor is punished. Criminal procedure refers to pleading, evidence
and practice. (State vs. Capaci, 154 So., 419; 179 La., 462.) the entire rules of evidence have
been incorporated into the Rules of Court. We cannot tear down section 11 of Rule 108 on
constitutional grounds without throwing out the whole code of evidence embodied in these
Rules.

The distinction between "remedy" and "substantive right" is incapable of exact definition.
The difference is somewhat a question of degree. (Dexter vs. Edmands, 89 F., 467; Beazell
vs. Ohio, supra.) It is difficult to draw a line in any particular case beyond which legislative
power over remedy and procedure can pass without touching upon the substantive rights of
parties affected, as it is impossible to fix that boundary by general condition. (State vs.
Pavelick, 279 P., 1102.) This being so, it is inevitable that the Supreme Court in making rules
should step on substantive rights, and the Constitution must be presumed to tolerate if not to
expect such incursion as does not affect the accused in a harsh and arbitrary manner or
deprive him of a defense, but operates only in a limited and unsubstantial manner to his
disadvantage. For the Court's power is not merely to compile, revise or codify the rules of
procedure existing at the time of the Constitution's approval. This power is "to promulgate
rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts," which is a power to adopt a
general, complete and comprehensive system of procedure, adding new and different rules
without regard to their source and discarding old ones.

Dissenting Opinion (J. Feria):

As above defined, substantive law is clearly differentiated from procedural law and practice.
But even assuming arguendo that it is difficult to draw the line in any particular case beyond
which the power of the court over procedure cannot pass without touching upon the
substantial right of the parties, what this Court should do in that case would be to abstain
from promulgating such rule of procedure which many increase, diminish or modify
substantive right in order to avoid violating the constitutional prohibition above referred to.
Because as this Supreme Court is not empowered by the Constitution to legislate on or
abrogate substantive rights, but only to promulgate rules of pleading, practice and procedure
which "shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights," this Court cannot step on
them in making the rules, and the Constitution must be presumed not to tolerate nor expect
such incursion as would affect the substantive rights of the accused in any manner.

#4 FABIAN VS DESIERTO, AGUSTIN EN BANC

G.R. No. 129742. September 16, 1998 [Express Limitations to Power of Legislation;
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court]

FACTS:
PROMAT participated in the bidding for government construction project including those
under the FMED. Later, misunderstanding and unpleasant incidents developed between the
parties. Fabian tried to terminate their relationship but Agustin refused and resisted her
attempts to do so to the extent of employing acts of harassment, intimidation and threats. She
eventually filed the aforementioned administrative case against him in a letter-complaint
dated July 24, 1995.

A complaint sought the dismissal of Agustin for violation of Section 19, R.A. No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) and Section 36 of P.D. No. 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an
ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension. The case later led to an appeal to the
Ombudsman - who inhibited himself - and transferred the case to the Deputy Ombudsman.
The deputy ruled in favor of Agustin and in the order exonerated the private respondents
from the administrative charges.

Fabian elevated the case to the SC, arguing that Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770
(Ombudsman Act of 1989) that all administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or
decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by filing a
petition for certiorari within ten (10) days from receipt of the written notice of the order,
directive or decision or denial of the motion for reconsideration in accordance with Rule 45
of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not administrative disciplinary cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court.

RULING:
No. Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court
from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It
consequently violates the proscription in Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a
law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court. No countervailing argument has
been cogently presented to justify such disregard of the constitutional prohibition which, as
correctly explained in First Leparto Ceramics, Inc. vs. The Court of Appeals, et al. was
intended to give this Court a measure of control over cases placed under its appellate
Jurisdiction. Otherwise, the indiscriminate enactment of legislation enlarging its appellate
jurisdiction would unnecessarily burden the Court.

#5 Commissioner vs. Mirant Pagbilao

G.R. No. 172129, 12 September 2008

FACTS:
MPC is a domestic firm engaged in the generation of power which it sells to the National
Power Corporation (NPC). For the construction of the electrical and mechanical equipment
portion of its Pagbilao, Quezon plant, which appears to have been undertaken from 1993 to
1996, MPC secured the services of Mitsubishi Corporation (Mitsubishi) of Japan.

In the light of the NPCs tax exempt status, MPC, on the belief that its sale of power
generation services to NPC is, pursuant to the Tax Code, zero-rated for VAT purposes, filed
an Application for Effective Zero Rating. The application covered the construction and
operation of its Pagbilao power station under a Build, Operate, and Transfer scheme.

MPC opted not to pay the VAT component of the progress billings from Mitsubishi for the
period covering April 1993 to September 1996 for the E & M Equipment Erection Portion of
MPCs contract with Mitsubishi. Apparently, it was only on April 14, 1998 that MPC paid
Mitsubishi the VAT component for the progress billings from April 1993 to September 1996,
with the aggregate amount of PhP 135,993,570.

On December 20, 1999, MPC filed on an administrative claim for refund of unutilized input
VAT in the amount of PhP 148,003,047.62 which was denied by the BIR because MPCs sale
of electricity to NPC is not zero-rated for its failure to secure an approved application for
zero-rating. MPC went to the CTA via a petition for review, which granted its claim for input
VAT refund or credit, but only for the amount of PhP 10,766,939.48. Aggrieved, MPC
appealed the CTAs Decision to the CA via a petition for review under Rule 43. The CA
agreed with the CTA on MPCs entitlement to (1) a zero-rating for VAT purposes for its sales
and services to tax-exempt NPC; and (2) a refund or tax credit for its unutilized input VAT
for the second quarter of 1998. However, CA brushed aside the CTAs ruling and disquisition
casting doubt on the veracity and genuineness of the Mitsubishi-issued OR. Their
disagreement, however, centered on the issue of proper documentation, particularly the
evidentiary value of OR No. 0189. CA denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence,
his Petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the SC may review questions of fact.

RULING:
As a matter of sound practice, the Court refrains from reviewing the factual determinations of
the CA or reevaluate the evidence upon which its decision is founded. One exception to this
rule is when the CA and the trial court diametrically differ in their finding, as here. In such a
case, it is incumbent upon the Court to review and determine if the CA might have
overlooked, misunderstood, or misinterpreted certain facts or circumstances of weight, which,
if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
In the instant case, the CTA, unlike the CA, doubted the veracity of OR No. 0189 and did not
appreciate the same to support MPCs claim for tax refund or credit.
#6 Sarmiento v. Zaratan

Facts:
Petitioner Gliceria Sarmiento filed an ejectment case against respondent Emerita Zaratan, in
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City. On 31 March 2003, the MeTC rendered
a decision in favor of petitioner. (MeTC ordered the defendant to pay plaintiff monthly rentals
and to vacate the premises.)

Respondent filed her notice of appeal. Thereafter, the case was raffled to the RTC of Quezon
City.

In the Notice of Appealed Case, the RTC directed respondent to submit her memorandum in
accordance with the provisions of Section 7(b) of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and petitioner
to file a reply memorandum within 15 days from receipt.

Respondent’s counsel having received the notice on 19 May 2003, he had until 3 June 2003
within which to file the requisite memorandum. But on 3 June 2003, he filed a Motion for
Extension of Time of five days due to his failure to finish the draft of the said Memorandum.
He cited as reasons for the delay of filing his illness for one week, lack of staff to do the work
due to storm and flood compounded by the grounding of the computers because the wirings
got wet. But the motion remained unacted.

On 9 June 2003, respondent filed her Memorandum. On 19 June 2003, the RTC dismissed the
appeal as follows:

Record shows that defendant-appellant received the Notice of Appealed Case, through counsel,
on May 19, 2003 (Registry Return Receipt dated May 12, 2003, Record, back of p. 298). Thus,
under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, she had fifteen (15) days or
until June 3, 2003 within which to submit a memorandum on appeal. As further appears on
record, however, the required Memorandum was filed by defendant-appellant only on June 9,
2003 (Record, p. 623), or six (6) days beyond the expiration of the aforesaid fifteen-day period.

Aggrieved, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which was granted
the petition of respondent. The appellate court nullified and set aside Orders of the RTC and
ordered the reinstatement of respondent’s appeal. Consequently, respondent’s appeal
memorandum was admitted and the case remanded to the RTC for further proceedings. Hence,
this appeal by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether the lack of notice of hearing in the Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum
on Appeal is fatal, such that the filing of the motion is a worthless piece of paper.

Held:
In this case, the answer is NO. Petitioner avers that, because of the failure of respondent to
include a Notice of Hearing in her Motion for Extension of Time to file Memorandum on
Appeal in the RTC, the latter’s motion is a worthless piece of paper with no legal effect.
It is not disputed that respondent perfected her appeal on 4 April 2003 with the filing of her
Notice of Appeal and payment of the required docket fees. However, before the expiration of
time to file the Memorandum, she filed a Motion for Extension of Time seeking an additional
period of five days within which to file her Memorandum, which motion lacked the Notice of
Hearing required by Section 4, Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 4. Hearing of Motion. - Except for motions which the court may act upon without
prejudicing the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the
applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served
in such a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date
of hearing, unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.

As may be gleaned above and as held time and again, the notice requirement in a motion is
mandatory. As a rule, a motion without a Notice of Hearing is considered pro forma and does
not affect the reglementary period for the appeal or the filing of the requisite pleading.

As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief
sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his right be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard. The three-day notice required by law is intended not for
the benefit of the movant but to avoid surprises upon the adverse party and to give the latter
time to study and meet the arguments of the motion. Principles of natural justice demand that
the right of a party should not be affected without giving it an opportunity to be heard.

The test is the presence of the opportunity to be heard, as well as to have time to study the
motion and meaningfully oppose or controvert the grounds upon which it is based. Considering
the circumstances of the present case, we believe that procedural due process was substantially
complied with.

There are, indeed, reasons which would warrant the suspension of the Rules: (a) the existence
of special or compelling circumstances, b) the merits of the case, (c) a cause not entirely
attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of rules, (d) a lack
of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (e) the other party
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby. Elements or circumstances (c), (d) and (e) exist in the
present case.

The suspension of the Rules is warranted in this case. The motion in question does not affect
the substantive rights of petitioner as it merely seeks to extend the period to file Memorandum.
The required extension was due to respondent’s counsel’s illness, lack of staff to do the work
due to storm and flood, compounded by the grounding of the computers. There is no claim
likewise that said motion was interposed to delay the appeal. As it appears, respondent sought
extension prior to the expiration of the time to do so and the memorandum was subsequently
filed within the requested extended period. Under the circumstances, substantial justice
requires that we go into the merits of the case to resolve the issue of who is entitled to the
possession of the land in question.

Further, it has been held that a "motion for extension of time x x x is not a litigated motion
where notice to the adverse party is necessary to afford the latter an opportunity to resist the
application, but an ex parte motion made to the court in behalf of one or the other of the parties
to the action, in the absence and usually without the knowledge of the other party or parties."
As a general rule, notice of motion is required where a party has a right to resist the relief
sought by the motion and principles of natural justice demand that his rights be not affected
without an opportunity to be heard. It has been said that "ex parte motions are frequently
permissible in procedural matters, and also in situations and under circumstances of
emergency; and an exception to a rule requiring notice is sometimes made where notice or the
resulting delay might tend to defeat the objective of the motion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision and the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals are hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.

#7 Republic of the Philippines vs. Caguioa

GR No. 168584 October 15, 2007
Facts:
In 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 also known as the Bases Conversion
and Development Act of 1992 which created the S ubi c Special Economic and Fre eport
Zone (SBF) and the Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA)

Included in RA 7227:

 Subic Special Economic Zone shall be operated and managed as a separate

customs territory ensuring free flow or movement of goods and capital within,
into and exported out of the S u bi c Special Economic Zone, as well as provide
incentives and equipment. However, exportation or removal of goods from the
territory of the Subic Special Economic Zone to the other parts of the Philippine
territory shall be subject to customs duties a n d taxes under the Customs and
Tariff Code….
 The provisions of e x i s t i n g laws, rules and regulations to t h e contrary
notwithstanding, no taxes, local and national, shall be imposed within the Subic
Special Economic Zone.

Pursuant t o the law, several private respondents a p p l i e d for and were granted
Certificates o f R e g i s t r a t i o n a n d Tax Exemption b y the SBMA. Their
respective certificates states that:

 The Company shall be entitled to, tax and duty-free importation of raw materials,
capital equipment, and household and personal items for use solely on the Subic Bay
Freeport Zone

Congress subsequently passed RA 9334 effective Jan. 1, 2005 which states that a l l
importations of cigars, cigarettes, distilled spirits, fermented liquors and wines into the
SBF, including those intended to be transhipped to other free ports in the Philippines,
shall be t reat ed as o r d i n a r y importations subject to all applicable taxes, duties and
charges, including excise taxes. (Sec. 6)

On Feb. 3, 2005, former BIR C o m m i s s i o n e r Payano, reques ted the Customs

Commissioner Jereos to immediately collect the excise tax due on imported alcohol and
tobacco products brought to the Duty Free Philippines (DFP) and Freeport zones.

On Feb. 7, 2005, S B M A issued a Memorandum directing the departments concerned

to require locators/importers in the S BF to pay the corresponding duties a n d taxes on
their importations of cigars, c i ga r e t t e s , liquors and wines before said items ar e cleared
and released from the Freeport. However, certain SBF locators which were exclusively
engaged in the transshipment of cigarette products for foreign destinations were
allowed by the SBMA to process their import documents subject to their submission of
an Undertaking with the Bureau of Customs.

On Feb. 15, 2005, p r i v a t e respondents wrote t h e o f f i c e s of the C o l l e c t o r o f

Customs and the SBMA Administrator requesting for a reconsideration of the directives
in the imposition of duties and taxes on cigars, cigarettes, liquor and wines. Despite these
letters, they were not allowed to file any warehouse entry for shipment.
Thus, the private respondent enterprises, brought before the RTC of Olongapo City a
civil act ion for declatory relief to have certain p r o v i s i o n s of RA 9334
declared unconstitutional. These are their arguments:

 RA 9334 should not be interpreted as altering, modifying or amending the

provisions of RA 7227 because repeals by implication are not favoured
 A general law like RA 9334 cannot amend RA 7227, which is a special law
 The assailed law violates the one-bill-one-subject rule embodied in Sec. 26 Art.
VI of the C o n s t i t u t i o n as w e l l as t he constitutional proscription against the
impairment of the obligations of contracts

The private respondents also prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and preliminary mandatory injunction
alleging that great and irreparable loss and injury would befall them as a consequence of
the imposition of taxes on alcohol and tobacco products brought into the SBF.

Petitioners opposed the private respondents’ prayer arguing that:

 Tax exemptions are n o t p r e s u m e d and e v e n when granted, are s t r i c t l y

construed against the grantee
 An increase in business expense is not the injury contemplated by law
 The drawback mechanism established in the law clearly negates t h e
possibility of the feared injury
 Taxes a r e t h e l i f e b l o o d of the g o v e r n m e n t and t h e i r p r o m p t and c e r t a i n
availability is an imperious need. Greater injury would be inflicted on the public
should the writ be granted.

On May 11, 2005, Caguioa granted private respondents’ application for issuance of writ of
preliminary injunction

Petitioners seek v i a petition for certiorari and prohibition to annul t he Ma y 4, 2005

Order issued by public r e s p o n d e n t Caguioa of the RTC granting private respondents’
application for issuance of writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue:
 Whether or not, Caguioa erred in the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction
 Whether or not, RA 9334 i s unconstitutional because it violates the constitutional
provision on the proscription against the impairment of obligations of contracts.

Ruling:
 The arguments raised by private respondents which pertain to
the constitutionality of RA 9334 subject matter of the case pending litigation
before the trial court have no bearing in resolving the present petition.
 On the i s s u e o f the i s s u a n c e of the p r e l i m i n a r y injunction and t h e p e t i t i o n e r s
petition for certiorari:
 The writ of certiorari to nullify and set aside the Order of May 4, 2005 as
w e l l as t h e Writ of Preliminary Injunction issued by respondent
Caguioa is granted.
  As a r u l e , courts should avoid issuing a writ of preliminary injunction
which would in effect dispose of the main case without trial.

#8 Atty. Tomas Ong Cabili vs. Judge Rasad G. Balindong, Acting Pres. Judge, RTC, Br
8 Marawi City, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2225, September 6, 2011

The doctrine of judicial stability or non-interference in the regular orders or judgments of a co-
equal court is an elementary principle in the administration of justice: no court can interfere by
injunction with the judgments or orders of another court of concurrent jurisdiction having the
power to grant the relief sought by the injunction. The rationale for the rule is founded on the
concept of jurisdiction: a court that acquires jurisdiction over the case and renders judgment
therein has jurisdiction over its judgment, to the exclusion of all other coordinate courts, for its
execution and over all its incidents, and to control, in furtherance of justice, the conduct of
ministerial officers acting in connection with this judgment.
#9 SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL. vs.MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO
SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA BAGUIO (CASE DIGEST) G.R. No. L-21450 - - April
15, 1968

FACTS:
The action at bar, which is a suit for collection of a sum of money in the sum of exactly P
1,908.00, exclusive of interest filed by Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog against Spouses
Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio, was originally instituted in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948. A month prior to the filing of the complaint, the Judiciary
Act of 1948 (R.A. 296) took effect depriving the Court of First Instance of original jurisdiction
over cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, is not more than P 2,000.00 (Secs. 44[c]
and 86[b], R.A. 296.)

The case has already been pending now for almost 15 years, and throughout the entire
proceeding the appellant never raised the question of jurisdiction until the receipt of the Court
of Appeals' adverse decision.

Considering that the Supreme Court has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all cases in
which jurisdiction of any inferior court is in issue, the Court of Appeals certified the case to
the Supreme Court along with the records of the case.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the appellant's motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Court of First Instance during the pendency of the appeal will prosper.

RULING:
A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different
reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel
by laches.

Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of
time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it
is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption
that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

The doctrine of laches or of "stale demands" is based upon grounds of public policy which
requires, for the peace of society, the discouragement of stale claims and, unlike the statute of
limitations, is not a mere question of time but is principally a question of the inequity or
unfairness of permitting a right or claim to be enforced or asserted.

It has been held that a party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to sure affirmative relief
against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question
that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by
way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether the court had
jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such
cases because the party is barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the
court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice cannot
be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.
Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering
an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power
of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis
etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the
Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a
court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same
jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

Upon this same principle is what We said in the three cases mentioned in the resolution of the
Court of Appeals of May 20, 1963 (supra) — to the effect that we frown upon the "undesirable
practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse — as well as in Pindañgan etc.
vs. Dans, et al., G.R. L-14591, September 26, 1962; Montelibano, et al., vs. Bacolod-Murcia
Milling Co., Inc., G.R. L-15092; Young Men Labor Union etc. vs. The Court of Industrial
Relation et al., G.R. L-20307, Feb. 26, 1965, and Mejia vs. Lucas, 100 Phil. p. 277.

The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party on July 31,
1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance
of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which,
according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior
courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well
as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief
and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse
decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of
jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, we would in effect be declaring as
useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948
and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and
unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting.

Coming now to the merits of the appeal: after going over the entire record, we have become
persuaded that We can do nothing better than to quote in toto, with approval, the decision
rendered by the Court of Appeals x x x granting plaintiffs' motion for execution against the
surety x x x

UPON ALL THE FOREGOING, the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed, with costs
against the appellant Manila Surety and Fidelity Company, Inc.

G.R. No. L-21450 April 15, 1968

SERAFIN TIJAM, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees,
vs.
MAGDALENO SIBONGHANOY alias GAVINO SIBONGHANOY and LUCIA
BAGUIO, defendants,

FACTS:
The spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog filed a case in the Court of First Instance of
Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from them the
sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest thereon from the date of the filing of the complaint until
the whole obligation is paid, plus costs.

The Court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs.

After the same had become final and executory, upon motion of the latter, the Court issued a
writ of execution against the defendants. The writ having been returned unsatisfied, the
plaintiffs moved for the issuance of a writ of execution against the Surety's bond, against which
the Surety filed a written opposition. The Court denied this motion.

Thereafter the necessary demand was made, and upon failure of the Surety to satisfy the
judgment, the plaintiffs filed a second motion for execution against the counter bond. On the
date set for the hearing thereon, the Court, upon motion of the Surety's counsel, granted the
latter a period of five days within which to answer the motion. Upon its failure to file such
answer, the Court granted the motion for execution and the corresponding writ was issued.

Subsequently, the Surety moved to quash the writ. The Court denied the motion, the Surety
appealed to the Court of Appeals from such order of denial and from the one denying its motion
for reconsideration.
The Surety filed MOTION TO DISMISS, alleging substantially that appellees action was filed
in the Court of First Instance of Cebu on July 19, 1948 for the recovery of the sum of P1,908.00
only; that a month before that date Republic Act No. 296, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Act of 1948, had already become effective, Section 88 of which placed within the original
exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions where the value of the subject-matter
or the amount of the demand does not exceed P2,000.00, exclusive of interest and costs. The
Court of First Instance therefore had no jurisdiction to try and decide the case. The Court of
Appeals required the appellees to answer the motion to dismiss, but they failed to do so.
Whereupon, the Court resolved to set aside its decision and to certify the case to Us.

ISSUE:
WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu for the first
time upon appeal.

RULING:
YES. SC believes that that the Surety is now barred by laches from invoking this plea after
almost fifteen years before the Surety filed its motion to dismiss raising the question of lack of
jurisdiction for the first time - A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in
different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed
or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an
unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence,
could or should have been done earlier - Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily
submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the
loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court -"undesirable practice" of a party
submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and
attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse.: Other merits on the appeal : The surety
insists that the lower court should have granted its motion to quash the writ of execution
because the same was issued without the summary hearing - Summary hearing is "not intended
to be carried on in the formal manner in which ordinary actions are prosecuted" (83 C.J.S. 792).
It is, rather, a procedure by which a question is resolved "with dispatch, with the least possible
delay, and in preference to ordinary legal and regular judicial proceedings" (Ibid,p. 790). What
is essential is that "the defendant is notified or summoned to appear and is given an opportunity
to hear what is urged upon him, and to interpose a defense, after which follows an adjudication
of the rights of the parties - In the case at bar, the surety had been notified of the plaintiffs'
motion for execution and of the date when the same would be submitted for consideration. In
fact, the surety's counsel was present in court when the motion was called, and it was upon his
request that the court a quo gave him a period of four days within which to file an answer. Yet
he allowed that period to lapse without filing an answer or objection. The surety cannot now,
therefore, complain that it was deprived of its day in court. The orders appealed from are
affirmed.
#10 ANTONIO B. BALTAZAR v. HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN, EULOGIO M.
MARIANO, JOSE D. JIMENEZ, JR., TORIBIO E. ILAO, JR. and ERNESTO
R. SALENGA 510 SCRA 74 December 6, 2006 (How subject matter or nature of the
action determined)

FACTS:
Paciencia Regala owns a seven (7)-hectare fishpond located at Sasmuan, Pampanga. Her
Attorney-in-Fact Faustino R. Mercado leased the fishpond to Eduardo Lapid for a three (3)-
year period. Lessee Eduardo Lapid in turn sub-leased the fishpond to Rafael Lopez during the
last seven (7) months of the original lease. Ernesto Salenga was hired by Eduardo Lapid as
fishpond watchman (bante-encargado). In the sub-lease, Rafael Lopez rehired respondent Salenga.
Ernesto Salenga, sent the demand letter to Rafael Lopez and Lourdes Lapid for unpaid salaries
and non-payment of the 10% share in the harvest. Salenga was prompted to file a
Complaint before the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(PARAB), Region III, San Fernando, Pampanga docketed as DARAB Case No.
552-P’93 entitled Ernesto R. Salenga v. Rafael L. Lopez and Lourdes L. Lapid for
Maintenance of Peaceful Possession, Collection of Sum of Money and Supervision of Harvest.
Pending resolution of the agrarian case, the instant case was instituted by
petitioner Antonio Baltazar, an alleged
nephew of Faustino Mercado, through a Complaint -Affidavit against private
respondents before the Office of the Ombudsman which was docketed as OMB-1-94-
3425 entitled Antonio B. Baltazar v. Eulogio Mariano, Jose Jimenez, Jr., Toribio Ilao, Jr. and
Ernesto Salenga for violation of RA 3019. Petitioner maintains that respondent Ilao, Jr. had
no jurisdiction to hear and act on DARAB Case No. 552-P’93 filed by respondent Salenga as
there was no tenancy relation between respondent Salenga and Rafael L. Lopez, and thus, the complaint was
dismissible on its face.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner has legal standing to pursue the instant petition? Whether or not the
Ombudsman likewise erred in reversing his own resolution where it was
resolved that accused as Provincial Agrarian Adjudicator has no jurisdiction over a
complaint where there exists no tenancy relationship?

HELD:
The "real-party-in interest" is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment
in the suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit. The Complaint -Affidavit
filed before the Office of the Ombudsman, there is no question on his authority and
legal standing. The Ombudsman can act on anonymous complaints and motu proprio inquire into
alleged improper official acts or omissions from whatever source, e.g., a newspaper. Faustino Mercado, is an
agent himself and as such cannot further delegate his agency to another. An agent cannot
delegate to another the same agency. Re-delegation of the agency would be detrimental to the
principal as the second agent has no privity of contract with the former. In the instant case,
petitioner has no privity of contract with Paciencia Regala, owner of the fishpond and principal of Faustino
Mercado. The facts clearly show that it was not the Ombudsman through the OSP who allowed
respondent Ilao, Jr. to submit his Counter-Affidavit. It was the Sandiganbayan who
granted the prayed for re -investigation and ordered the OSP to conduct the re-
investigation. The OSP simply followed the graft court’s directive to conduct the re-
investigation after the Counter-Affidavit of respondent Ilao, Jr. was filed. Indeed, petitioner
did not contest nor question the August 29,1997 Order of the graft court. Moreover, petitioner did not file any
reply-affidavit in the re-investigation despite notice.

The nature of the case is determined by the settled rule that jurisdiction
over the subject matter is determined by the allegations of the complaint.
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought not by the defenses
asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Respondent Salenga’s complaint and its
attachment clearly spells out the jurisdictional allegations that he is an agricultural
tenant in possession of the fishpond and is about to be ejected from it,
clearly, respondent Ilao, Jr. could not be faulted in assuming jurisdiction
as said allegations characterize an agricultural dispute. Besides, whatever
defense asserted in an answer or motion to dismiss is not to be considered in
resolving the issue on jurisdiction as it cannot be made dependent upon the allegations
of the defendant.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED for lack of merit, and the Order and the October
30, 1998 Memorandum of the Office of the Special Prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 23661
(OMB-1-94-3425) are hereby AFFIRMED
IN TOTO, with costs against petitioner employee.
I
F
t
sr
R
si
A
#11 FRANCEL REALTY CORPORATION vs. RICARDO T. SYCIP
G.R. No. 154684
September 08, 2005

FACTS: In November, 1989, petitioner and respondent entered into a contract to sell a house and lot. Upon

u
N
execution of the contract to sell, respondent made a down payment of P119,700.00. The townhouse subject of

a
the contract to sell was transferred in the name of respondent as evidenced by TCT No. T-281788. Despite the
transfer of the title in the name of respondent, the latter refused to pay the balance of P250,000.00. Despite several
demands made by petitioner to respondent, the respondent refused to re convey the subject property to petitioner.

e
C
Petitioner then a filed a case against respondent and a motion to dismiss was filed by the latter on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction. After trial, the court below dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

l The CA held that the case involved not just reconveyance and damages, but also a
determination of the rights and obligations of the parties to a sale of real estate under PD 957;

s
E
hence, the case fall exclusively under the jurisdiction of the HLURB. The appellate court

,
observed that respondent and other buyers of the townhouses had notified petitioner of their
intention to stop paying amortizations because of defective structures and materials used in the
construction; they had in fact filed other cases, also before the HLURB, against petitioner for

:
L
unsound real estate business practice.

C
Petitioner argues that the CA‘s affirmation of the trial court‘s dismissal of its case was erroneous, considering
that a full-blown trial had already been conducted. In effect, it contends that lack of jurisdiction could no longer
be used as a ground for dismissal after trial had ensued and ended.

R
W ISSUE: Whether or not the lower court can dismiss a case, after full blown trial had already been conducted,

i
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

E
h
HELD: Yes. Petitioner contends that the lack of jurisdiction could no longer be used as a ground for dismissal
after trial had ensued and ended. In Tijam v. Sibonghanoy, a party may be barred from questioning a court‘s

v
jurisdiction after being invoked to secure affirmative relief against its opponent. The ruling in
Sibonghanoy on the matter of jurisdiction is, however, the exception rather than the rule.
Estoppel by laches may be invoked to bar the issue of lack of jurisdiction only in cases in which

A
e
the factual milieu is analogous to that in the cited case. In such controversies, laches should be
clearly present; that is lack of jurisdiction must have been raised so belatedly as to warrant the

i
presumption that the party entitled to assert it had abandoned or declined to assert it.
Indeed, the general rule remains: a court‘s lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the

L
t
proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and lack of it
affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to render judgment on the
action. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined by the averments of the complaint, not by the

l
defenses contained in the answer.

T
h
From the very beginning, the present respondent has been challenging the jurisdiction of the
trial court and asserting that the HLURB is the entity that has proper jurisdiction over the case.

C
Even when the Motion was denied, he continuously invoked lack of jurisdiction in his Answer
with affirmative defenses, his subsequent pleadings, and verbally during the trial. This

Y
consistent and continuing objection to the trial court‘s jurisdiction defeats petitioner‘s

e
a
contention that raising other grounds in a Motion to Dismiss is considered a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court.

Rule 9 of the Rules of Court requires that all defenses and objections -- except lack of
jurisdiction over the subject matter, litis pendentia, bar by prior judgment and/or prescription -
- must be pleaded in a motion to dismiss or in an answer; otherwise, they are deemed waived.
As to the excepted grounds, the court may dismiss a claim or a case at any time ―when it
appears from the pleadings or the evidence on record that any of those grounds exists.

The Court has ruled that a suit to collect on a promissory note issued by a subdivision lot buyer
involves the ―sales of lots in commercial subdivisions; and that jurisdiction over such case
lies with the HLURB, not with the courts.

Petitioner avers that the present controversy is not cognizable by the HLURB, because it was
filed by the developer rather than by the buyer, as provided under PD No. 1344. The action
here is not a simple action to collect on a promissory note; it is a complaint to collect
amortization payments arising from or in connection with a sale of a subdivision lot under P.D.
Nos. 957 and 1344, and accordingly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
HLURB to regulate the real estate trade and industry, and to hear and decide cases of unsound
real estate business practices. Contrary to petitioner‘s contention, the HLURB is not deprived
of jurisdiction to hear and decide a case merely on the basis that it has been initiated by the
developer and not by the buyer.

#12 CALIMLIM vs. HON. RAMIREZ G.R. No. L-34362November 19, 1982118 SCRA
399
Facts:
Independent Mercantile Corporation filed a petition in the respondent Court to compel Manuel Magali to
surrender the owner's duplicate of TCT No. 9138 in order that the same may be cancelled and
a new one issued in the name of the said corporation. Not being the registered owner and the
title not being in his possession, Manuel Magali failed to comply with the order of the Court
directing him to surrender the said title. This prompted Independent Mercantile Corporation to file an ex-parte
petition to declare TCT No. 9138 as cancelled and to issue a new title in its name. The said petition was granted
by the respondent Court and the Register of Deeds of Pangasinan issued a new title in the name of the
corporation, TCT No. 68568. Petitioner, upon learning that her husband's title over the parcel of land had been
cancelled, filed a petition with the respondent Court, sitting as a cadastral court, praying forth cancellation of
TCT No. 68568 but the court dismissed the petition. Petitioner thereafter filed in the LRC Record No. 39492 for
the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 but the same was dismissed therein. Petitioners then resorted to
the filing of a complaint in for the cancellation of the conveyances and sales that had been
made with respect to the property, covered by TCT No. 9138, against Francisco Ramos who claimed
to have bought the property from Independent Mercantile Corporation. Private respondent Francisco Ramos,
however, failed to obtain a title over the property in his name in view of the existence of an adverse
claim annotated on the title thereof at the instance of the herein petitioners. Francisco Ramos
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground that the same is barred by prior judgement or by statute
of limitations. Resolving the said Motion, the respondent Court dismissed the case on the ground of
estoppel by prior judgment.

Issue:
Whether or not dismissal of the case is proper on the ground of estoppel by prior judgment

Held:
No. It is error to consider the dismissal of the petition filed by the herein petitioner in LRC Record No. 39492
for the cancellation of TCT No. 68568 as a bar by prior judgment against the filing of the subsequent civil
case. In order to avail of the defense of res judicata, it must be shown, among others, that the
judgment in the prior action must have been rendered by a court with the proper jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the proceeding in which the prior judgment or order was rendered. If there
is lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter of the suit or of the parties, the judgment or order
cannot operate as an adjudication of the controversy. This essential element of the defense of
bar by prior judgment or res judicata does not exist in the case. The petition filed by the petitioners in LRC
Record No. 39492 was an apparent invocation of the authority of the respondent Court sitting as a land
registration court. Reliance was apparently placed on Section 112 of the Land Registration Act
wherein it provides that a Court of First Instance, acting as a land registration court, is a court
of limited and special jurisdiction. As such, its proceedings are not adequate for the litigation
of issues pertaining to an ordinary civil action, such as, questions involving ownership or title to
real property.

#13 DE JOYA v MARQUEZ

FACTS:
•Manuel Dy filed a criminal case against Hao and Tan for syndicated estafa.

•Dy complained that he was enticed to invest in a large sum of money in State Resource
Development Management Corporation wherein he issued several checks amounting to
almost P144M and in turn the corporation issued several checks to Dy which
were dishonored due to insufficient funds.

•A resolution was issued by Prosecutor Nicdao finding probable cause to indict petitioner
and his other co-accused for syndicated estafa and a copy of the articles of incorporation of the
aforementioned corporation named petitioner as incorporator and director to which they had
knowledge of its activities and transactions.

•The Court finds that these documents sufficiently establish the existence of probable cause.

Probable cause – facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent
person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested

•Petitioner then filed for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the warrant of arrest
issued by Judge Marquez for estafa. Petitioner asserts that respondent Judge erred in finding
probable cause justifying the issuance of the warrant against him and his co-accused.

ISSUE:
May De Joya seek relief from Court/trial even though he continuously refuses to
surrender and submit to the Court’s Jurisdiction? NO

HELD:
•A person is not entitled to seek relief from the Supreme Court nor from the trial court where
he continuously refuses to surrender and submit to the court’s jurisdiction.

•His continued refusal to submit to the court’s jurisdiction should give this Court more reason
to uphold the action of the respondent judge.

•The purpose of a warrant of arrest is to place the accused under the custody of the law to hold
him for trial of the charges against him.

•It should be remembered that he who invokes the court’s jurisdiction must first submit to
its jurisdiction.
Note:

Requisites for the exercise of

j u r i s d i c t i o n a n d h o w t h e c o u r t a c q u i r e s s u c h jurisdiction:

a. Jurisdiction over the plaintiff or petitioner:

•T h i s i s a c q u i r e d b y t h e filing of the complaint, petition or initiatory pleading

before the court by the plaintiff or petitioner.

b. Jurisdiction over the defendant or respondent:

•This is acquired the voluntary appearance or submission by the defendant or

respondent to the court or by coercive process issued by the court to him,
generally by the service of summons

c. Jurisdiction over the subject matter:

•This is conferred by law and, unlike jurisdiction over the parties, cannot be conferred on the
court by the voluntary act or agreement of the parties.

d. Jurisdiction over the issues of the case:

•This is determined and conferred by the pleadings filed in the case by the parties,
or by their agreement in a pre-trial order or stipulation, or, at times by their implied consent as
by the failure of a party to object to evidence on an issue not covered by the pleadings, as
provided in Sec. 5, Rule10.

e. Jurisdiction over the res (or the property or thing which is the subject of
the litigation)

•This is acquired by the actual or constructive seizure by the court of the thing
in question, thus placing it in custodia legis, as in attachment or garnishment;
or by provision of law which recognizes in the court
the power to deal with the property or subject matter within its territorial jurisdiction, as in
land registration proceedings or suits involving civil status or real property in the Philippines
of a non-resident defendant.

#14 El Banco Español-Filipino vs. Palanca

Facts:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng executed a mortgage upon various parcels of real property
situated in Manila in favor of El Banco Espanol-Filipino as security for a loan. After he
executed the mortgage, Engracio returned to China and never went back to RP until he
eventually died. Because of non-payment, the bank filed a suit to foreclose the mortgage (at
this point Engracio was still alive). Since defendant was a non-resident, the bank gave notice
by publication. The Clerk of Court was also directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which was in China. However, it was not shown whether the
Clerk complied with this requirement. Nevertheless, the CFI proceeded with the case and a
judgment by default was rendered in favor of the bank. Mortgage was foreclosed and the
properties were sold in a public auction. After 7 years, Vicente Palanca, as administrator of
Engracio’s estate, filed a motion to set aside the judgment by default and to vacate all
subsequent proceedings on the ground that the judgment rendered was void since the court
never acquired jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.

Issue:
WON the CFI acquired jurisdiction over the defendant

Held:
YES.
Ratio: Tanquinyeng is a non-resident and having refused to appear in court voluntarily, the
court never acquired jurisdiction over him. This is, however, not essential since the foreclosure
of mortgage is an action quasi in rem and what is essential is the court’s jurisdiction over the
res. Jurisdiction over the property is based on the following:

(1) That the property is located within the district;

(2) That the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property by sale to an obligation fixed
upon it by the mortgage; and

(3) That the court at a proper stage of the proceedings takes the property into custody, if
necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of satisfying the mortgage debt.

And since jurisdiction is exclusively over property, the relief granted by the court must be
limited only to that which can be enforced against the property itself.

Therefore, whatever may be the effect in other respects of the failure of the Clerk of the Court
to mail the proper papers to the defendant in Amoy, China, such irregularity could impair or
defeat the jurisdiction of the court.

#15 OPTIMA REALTY CORPORATION v. HERTZ PHIL. EXCLUSIVE CARS,

INC., G.R. No. 183035, January 9, 2013

Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the following elements: (1) identity of parties, or at
least their representation of the same interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in
the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the
other case.

#16 Municipality of Kananga vs. Madrona GR No. 141375 | April 30, 2003

Facts:
1. There was a boundary dispute between the Municipality of Kananga and Ormoc City. Both
parties agreed to amicable settlement though a joint session of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of
Ormoc City and Sangguniang Bayan of Kananga.

2. Since no amicable settlement was reached, members of the joint session agreed to elevate
the case to the proper court for settlement which was reflected in the Resolution No. 97-01
3. The City of Ormoc filed a case before the RTC of Ormoc City to settle the boundary dispute

The Petitioners Case

4. Municipality of Kananga filed a Motion to Dismiss before the RTC based on the following
grounds:
a. RTC has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the claim.
b. There is no cause of action
c. That a condition precedent for filing the complaint has not been complied with
d. Ormoc is an independent chartered city

5. RTC Ruling: DENIED the motion of Municipality of Kananga

-Reason: Sec. 118 of the Local Government Code has been complied with when both parties
decided to an amicable settlement through a joint session. That being said, RTC has jurisdiction
over the case under BP Blg. 129.

6. Hence this petition by the Municipality of Kananga

Issue:
WON RTC of Ormoc City may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary
dispute between a municipality and an independent component city.

Held:
Yes
Ratio:
1. Under Sec. 118 of the 1991 Local Government Code,
boundary disputes between and among local government units shall, as much as possible, be
settled amicably.
This means that the parties concerned shall refer the issue for settlement in the Sanggunians
concerned.
2. In other words, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or a
municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other -- or between two or
more highly urbanized cities -- shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective
Sanggunians of the local government units involved.

3. Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a

municipality seeks to settle a boundary dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an
independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is an independent
component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

4. Even if the said provision is not applicable, both parties still decided to enter into an
amicable settlement but to no avail. They also issued a resolution agreeing to elevate the case
and bring the issue to the RTC for adjudication.

5. This means that the general rules governing jurisdiction, which is vested by law and
cannot be conferred or waived by the parties, as provided for by BP Blg. 129 or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 will be applied.
 6. Sec. 19 of BP Blg 129 states that RTC shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in
all cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal, person or body exercising
judicial or quasi-judicial functions.

7. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any court or agency
over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent
component city of the same province, RTC committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
the municipality’s Motion to Dismiss.

8. RTCs have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly
withheld from their plenary powers. They have the power not only to take judicial cognizance
of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so to the exclusion of all
other courts at that stage

As to whether Ormoc is an independent component or highly urbanized city:

9. Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. Further, Ormoc is
an independent component, city created under Republic Act No. 179.

10. Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized.
Ormoc is deemed an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from
voting for provincial elective officials. It is a city independent of the province. There is neither
a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor an allegation by the parties that it is highly
urbanized.
Case Law / Doctrine

The territorial boundaries define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of a local government
unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial
jurisdiction. Beyond these limits, its acts are ultra vires.

Dispositive Portion

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the challenged Order AFFIRMED.

#17 MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA VS. MADRONA, G.R. No. 141375 (April 30, 2003)

Since there is no legal provision specifically governing jurisdiction over boundary disputes
between a municipality and an independent component city, it follows that regional trial courts
have the power and authority to hear and determine such controversy.

Settling boundary disputes partakes of an administrative function.