Republic of the Philippines Serial No. D-716326 of Exhibit G, and in the last digit 9 of Serial No.
SUPREME COURT D-716329 of Exhibit H.
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16806 December 22, 1961
SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
P. N. Stuart del Rosario for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondent.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Accused of counterfeiting Philippine treasury notes, Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta
and Benedicto del Pilar were convicted by the Court of First Instance of Davao of illegal
possession of said forged treasury notes and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty
ranging from 8 years and 1 day to 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, and pay a fine of
P5,000, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, as well as a proportionate
part of the costs. On appeal, the judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals, except
insofar as the maximum of said indeterminate penalty which was increased to 10 years, 8
months and 1 day of prision mayor. The case is before us on appeal by certiorari taken by
Sergio del Rosario.
It appears that, after showing to complainant Apolinario del Rosario the Philippine
one-peso bills Exhibits C, E and G and the Philippine two-peso bill Exhibit H, and inducing
him to believe that the same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them,
although in fact they were genuine treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the
digits of each of which had been altered and changed, the aforementioned defendants had
succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23,
1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the manufacture of more counterfeit treasury
notes of the Philippines. The only question raised in this appeal is whether the possession
of said Exhibits C, E, G and H constitutes a violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal
Code. Appellant maintains that, being genuine treasury notes of our government, the
possession thereof cannot be illegal. We find no merit in this pretense.lawphil.net
It is not disputed that a portion of the last digit 9 of Serial No. F-79692619 of Exhibit C, had
been erased and changed so as to read 0 and that similar erasures and changes had been
made in the penultimate digit 9 in Serial No. F-79692691 of Exhibit E, in the last digit in
Articles 160 and 169 of the Revised Penal Code read:
ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of
credit. — Unless the act be one of those coming under the provisions of any of the
preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in his possession, with
intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer
the penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
ART. 169. How forgery is committed. — The forgery referred to in this section may be
committed by any of the following means;
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order
mentioned therein, the appearance of a true and genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters,
words or signs contained therein.
It is clear from these provisions that the possession of genuine treasury notes of the
Philippines any of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" in which had been erased
and or altered, with knowledge of such notes, as they were used by petitioner herein and
his co-defendants in the manner adverted to above, is punishable under said Article 168, in
relation to Article 166, subdivision (1), of the Revised Penal Code (U.S. vs. Gardner, 3 Phil.,
398; U.S. vs. Solito, 36 Phil., 785).
Being in accordance with the facts and the law, the decision appealed from is, accordingly,
affirmed, with costs against petitioner Sergio del Rosario. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon and De Leon,
JJ., concur.
Paredes, J., took no part.
Page 1 of 62
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 31012 September 10, 1932
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ESTELA ROMUALDEZ and LUIS MABUNAY, defendants-appellants.
Courtney Whitney, Vicente Nepomuceno and Julio Llorente for appellant Romualdez.
Vicente J. Francisco and Claro M. Recto for appellant Mabunay.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.
VICKERS, J.:
This is an appeal from the following decision of the Honorable E. P. Revilla, Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are charged with the crime of falsification of public
and official documents, committed, according to the information, as follows:
That in or about the month of February, 1927, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the
accused Estela Romualdez, who, by appointment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine
Islands, was then taking part in the discharge of public functions as secretary to the
Honorable Norberto Romualdez, one of the Justices of the Supreme Court, and by reason of
said duty had under her care the compositions and other papers and documents having
reference to the examinations for the admission of candidates to the bar held in the
months of August and September, 1926, which were then kept in the archives of the said
court, confabulating with her coaccused, Luis Mabunay, and acting in common accord with
him, who was then one of the candidates who took the said Bar Examinations, willfully,
illegally, and criminally extracted from the said archives of the Supreme Court certain
public and official documents, to wit: the compositions, which were written, prepared and
submitted by the accused, Luis Mabunay in that examination. Once in possession of the
same, the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay, conspiring together and
acting in common accord, willfully, illegally, and criminally erased the grade of fifty-eight
(58%) given by the correctors Alfonso Felix and M. Guevara to the composition in
Remedial Law, which was written and prepared by the accused Luis Mabunay, and in its
place wrote sixty-four (64%); and also erased the grade of sixty-three (63%) given by
correctors Jeronimo Samson and Amado del Rosario to the composition in Civil Law
written and prepared by the said Luis Mabunay, and in its place wrote seventy-three
(73%), and by means of these alterations the said accused Estela Romualdez and Luis
Mabunay were able to change the relative merits of those compositions, thereby
attributing to the said correctors, statements and declarations contrary to what they really
made, and the accused Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay thus succeeded by means of
falsifications made by them in the aforesaid public and official documents in making it
appear that Luis Mabunay obtained the general average required by the rules of the
Supreme Court, and in securing the latter's admission to the practice of law, as in fact he
was admitted, to the great prejudice of the public.
Upon arraignment the accused pleaded not guilty.
Both the prosecution and the defense produced an abundance of evidence, oral and
documentary, the presentation of which consumed considerable of the court's time.
UNDISPUTED FACTS
There is no question whatsoever as to the following facts which are not disputed either by
the prosecution or by the defense:
The accused Estela Romualdez was appointed upon the recommendation of Justice
Norberto Romualdez of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands as his secretary on
November 1, 1921, and continued as such until September 15, 1928.
The accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates duly admitted to the bar
examinations held in 1926.
The clerk of the Supreme Court, Mr. Vicente Albert, who was appointed to that office on
July 11, 1912, acts every year as the secretary ex oficio of the examination committee for
admission to the bar.
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands designated Justice Norberto Romualdez as
chairman of the examination committee for admission to the bar in the year 1926, and
upon recommendation of Clerk Vicente Albert, he appointed the following as members of
the examination committee, with their respective subjects: Attorney Francisco Ortigas,
Civil Law; Judge Vicente Nepomuceno, Mercantile Law; Attorney Godofredo Reyes,
Criminal Law; Judge Jose Abreu, Remedial Law; Attorney C. A. DeWitt, International Law;
Attorney-General Delfin Jaranilla, Political Law; and Attorney Carlos Ledesma, Legal Ethics.
Upon recommendation also of clerk of court Mr. Vicente Albert, a committee of correctors
was appointed, composed of the following attorneys: Amado del Rosario, Assistant
Director of Civil Service, and Jeronimo Samson, deputy clerk of the Supreme Court, as
correctors in Civil Law; Rafael Amparo, Secretary of Justice Johnson, and Fulgencio Vega,
Secretary of Justice Malcolm, as correctors in Mercantile Law; Cecilio Apostol, Assistant
Page 2 of 62
City Fiscal, and Remo, of the Bureau of Audits, as correctors in Penal Law; Marciano
Guevara, of the Bureau of Audits and Alfonso Felix, Assistant City Fiscal, as correctors in
Remedial law; Juan Lantin, of the Executive Bureau, and the accused Estela Romualdez, as
correctors in Political Law; Rufino Luna, of the Executive Bureau, and Zoilo Castrillo, of the
Bureau of Lands, as correctors in International Law; and Anatalio Mañalac, of the Bureau
of Lands, and Jeronimo Samson as correctors in Legal Ethics. On account of illness, Mr.
Remo was substituted by Jeronimo Samson as corrector in Penal Law. All said correctors
were designated by clerk of court Albert with the approval of the chairman of the
examination committee.
The work of the members of the examination committee was limited to the preparation of
the questions in their respective subjects and of a memorandum or note of the articles,
legal provisions and jurisprudence showing the sources from which the questions were
taken. The work of reviewing and grading the compositions was entrusted to the
correctors designated for each subject. Each corrector was furnished with this note or
memorandum, and a set of rules, patterned after those of the Civil Service, was prepared
by corrector Amado del Rosario to guide the correctors in grading the examination papers.
The correctors worked separately in reviewing and grading the papers on the subject
assigned to them, noting the grades given to each answer, not on the composition, but in a
separate note book, which were later checked with the grades given by the other corrector
in the same subject, for the purpose of determining the general average to be given to the
composition.
The report of the examination committee on the final result of the bar examination for the
year 1926 was submitted, under date of March 2, 1927, to the Supreme Court and was
published on the fifth of said month. In the list of successful candidates (Exhibit C-5) there
appeared the name of candidate Luis Mabunay with a general average of 75%. The grades
of Mabunay in each subject, according to the list Exhibit C-2, which was prepared after the
publication of the result of the examination, are: 73 in Civil Law, 77 in Mercantile Law, 69
in Penal Law, 76 in Political Law, 86 in International Law, 64 in Remedial Law, 80 in Legal
Ethics and Practical Exercises. However, a later revision of the composition of Luis
Mabunay showed that the grades of seventy-three (73 in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1), and
sixty-four (64) in Remedial Law (Exhibit B-2) had been written on the first page of said
compositions after striking out the grades of sixty-three (63) therefore given to the
composition in Civil Law, Exhibit B-1, and fifty-eight (58) theretofore given to the
composition in Remedial Law, Exhibit B-2. The investigation of this irregularity by the City
Fiscal of Manila led to the filing of the information in this case.
Admission of the accused Estela Romualdez
Before the prosecuting attorney had finished presenting his evidence tending to show the
identity of the person who altered the grades appearing on the first pages of the
compositions Exhibits-B-1 and B-2, the accused Estela Romualdez spontaneously and with
the conformity of her attorneys made of record an admission as follows (p. 395, s. n.):
"In Exhibit B-1 the words seventy-three and the figures 73% inclosed in parenthesis are in
my regular handwriting, and in Exhibit B-2 the words sixty-four and the figures 64%
inclosed in parenthesis appearing in said composition are also in my regular handwriting."
Authority of the accused Estela Romualdez to alter or change the grades
In view of the admission made by the accused Estela Romualdez that she was the person
who wrote on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the words and figures alleged to have
been falsified, it now appears that the burden of establishing the authority under which
said changes and alterations were made is on the accused. On this point the evidence for
the defense tended to show that the accused Estela Romualdez, both in her capacity as
private secretary of the chairman of the examination committee and as corrector and at
the same time supervisor of the correctors, was authorized by said chairman to revise the
compositions already reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given by
them.
Justice Romualdez, testifying as a witness for the defense, said that he considered the
accused Estela Romualdez and Deputy Clerk Samson as supervisors of the correctors; and
explaining the powers of the former he said (page 721, s. n.):
"As such supervisor I think there was on occasion when I gave her to understand that in
order to do justice to the compositions, she could review the compositions already graded
by the other correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done in order
to do justice to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were known."
Referring to the alterations made by the accused Estela Romualdez to the grades given by
the corresponding correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, this same witness
testified that said alterations were made within the limits of the powers he had given to
said accused (pages 723, 726, s. n.).
For her part the accused Estela Romualdez, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, said
that the chairman of the examining committee, gave her to understand that she "was
authorized to correct any composition in any subject" in the bar examinations of the year
1926 and that she had never corrected any composition after the name of the
corresponding candidate was identified (pages 782, 783, s. n.). She denied having known
Luis Mabunay, and said that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of
this case (page 783, s. n.).
Contention of the Prosecuting Attorney
Page 3 of 62
The contention of the prosecuting attorney with respect to the accused Estela Romualdez
may be summarized in two following propositions: 1st — that Justice Romualdez, as
chairman of the examination committee, did not have authority to delegate to his secretary,
the accused Estela Romualdez, the power to revise compositions in subjects in which she
was not a corrector and which had already been graded by the other correctors, and much
less the power to alter or change the grades given to and written on said compositions;
2nd — that granting that the chairman of the examination committee had such authority,
the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the same in the manner prescribed by said
chairman, namely, in order to do justice to the compositions and on the condition that the
revision and the changes of grades should be made before the names of the candidates, to
whom the compositions belonged, were known.
In support of the first proposition, the prosecuting attorneys maintains that Justice
Romualdez was appointed by the Supreme Court as chairman of the bar examination
committee of the year 1926, so that he would supervise the examinations in accordance
with law and the rules, and that precisely, in accordance with the rules the chairman can
not by himself exercise the individual powers of the committee, among which were the
powers to review, and to change or alter the grades given to the compositions.
As to the second proposition, the prosecuting attorney maintains that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution, specially the testimony of the Deputy Clerk Samson, shows
that the accused Estela Romualdez made the changes in the grades given by the correctors
to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2, in order to favor the accused Luis Mabunay, to
whom she knew said compositions belonged, thus violating the conditions imposed upon
her by the chairman of the examination committee when she was given said authority.
As to the accused Luis Mabunay, the prosecuting attorney also maintains that the evidence
for the prosecution shows that he was in connivance with the accused Estela Romualdez in
the alteration by the latter of his grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law for the purpose of
raising to 75% the general average of 72.8 which he had obtained.
Theory of the Defense
In reply to the contention of the prosecuting attorney, the defense argues that the power of
supervision given by Justice Romualdez to his secretary, the accused Estela Romualdez, is
not contrary to law, rules or precedents. This assertion is based on the testimony of said
Justice that the appointment of a committee of attorneys in accordance with section 2 of
the rules had not been followed by the Supreme Court for a number of years prior to 1926,
and that when said court designated Justice Romualdez as chairman of the examination
committee without designating the examiners, it left that function to said chairman, and
conferred upon him ample powers to do what in his judgment was most in line with justice
and the law, and that no Court of First Instance has jurisdiction to determine the propriety
or illegality of the procedure employed by the chairman of the examination committee, or
of the powers conferred by him upon his secretary, inasmuch as said chairman was
responsible only to the Supreme Court for his acts.
The defense also claims that the accused Estela Romualdez could not have known to whom
compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 belonged at the time of making the alteration of the
grades appearing on the first pages thereof, because, according to the testimony of said
accused, corroborated by that of Catalina Pons, who was one of those who helped in the
preparation of the list of candidates Exhibit C-1, the envelopes containing the names and
the identification numbers of the candidates were opened just one day before the
publication of the result of the examination, and that in order to finish this work and to
place the names of the candidates on said list, they had to work continuously from 8
o'clock in the morning until 8 o'clock in the evening on the day prior to the publication of
the result of the examinations.
Considerations on the evidence and contentions of both parties
Upon an examination of the testimony of Justice Romualdez, as a witness for the defense,
the court finds that the accused Estela Romualdez, as secretary of the chairman of the
examination committee, and Jeronimo Samson, as deputy clerk of the Supreme Court were
considered by said chairman not only as correctors in the subjects assigned to them but
also as supervisors of the correctors (page 721, s. n.), both of them with equal powers and
authority so that neither could consider himself superior to the other (page 727, s. n.). It
appears, however, that while the chairman of the committee gave his secretary, the
accused Estela Romualdez, to understand that she "was authorized to revise the
compositions already graded by the other correctors provided the new revisions were
made for the purpose of doing justice to the compositions and that the same were mad
before the names of the candidates were known" (pages 721, 722, s. n.), he did not do the
same with respect to Deputy Clerk Jeronimo Samson, to whom he said nothing about this
matter (page 768, s. n.). It also appears that the accused Estela Romualdez had never
informed the chairman of the committee about the corrections or alterations made by her
in compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2; neither did the latter examine said compositions to
determine whether or not their merits justified the changes so made, and he only knew of
said changes upon the filing of the information against his said secretary (page 728, s. n.).
For her part, she made no report to the chairman of the examination committee of any
error or injustice committed by any corrector, and she only told him during the progress of
the work of grading the papers that they were being graded very strictly and that "she
feared that some injustice might be committed" (page 729, s. n.), and for that reason
Justice Romualdez told his secretary, Estela Romualdez, that "should a case of the kind
come to her knowledge, she should take special notice of the same in order to do justice,"
that is to say, if any person should bring to her attention any such case in which, in her
opinion, some injustice had been committed, she was authorized to put things in order
(page 781, s. n.), and the revision in such cases was left to the judgment of his secretary
(page 780, s. n.).
Page 4 of 62
The powers conferred in the manner above stated, by Justice Romualdez as chairman of
the examination committee upon his secretary, Estela Romualdez, gave her so ample a
discretionary power of supervision that in its exercise she should act independently, not
only of the correctors and of her cosupervisor Jeronimo Samson, but also of the
examination committee. Now, granting that Justice Romualdez, as a chairman of the
committee appointed by the Supreme Court to conduct the bar examinations of 1926, was
authorized to confer such power of supervision upon his secretary Estela Romualdez, in
what manner did she exercise that power when she made the changes in the compositions
in question?
The accused Estela Romualdez who, according to her own admission, made the alterations
of the grades originally given by the correctors to compositions of Exhibits B-1 and B-2, is
the only person who could give an account of and explain the circumstances under which
said alterations were made. But said accused, testifying as a witness in her own behalf, was
not able to explain how and under what circumstances she made those alterations. When
pressed by the fiscal during the cross-examination to state the circumstances under which
she came across those compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 the accused Estela Romualdez
said: "If I were to make any statement with reference to the circumstances under which I
came across these compositions, you would compel me to tell a lie, because I do not really
remember" (page 823, s. n.). Neither does the accused remember why she did not put her
initials under or at the side of those alterations she made on compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2, limiting herself to say, when she saw the other compositions (Exhibits 3-1, X, X-1 and
X-2) bearing her initials which were exhibited to her by the fiscal, that she placed her
initials on said compositions because she graded them as corrector, and she did not put
her initials on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 because she revised them in her capacity
as supervisor (pages 824- 832, s. n.). She also said, that, as corrector, she had instructions
to put her initials when writing the original grade on any composition, but as supervisor
"she was under no obligation" to put her initials (page 830, s. n.) and that the chairman of
the examination committee "has not gone into such minor details" (page 831, s. n.). Upon
being questioned by the fiscal as to why she wrote the altered grade on composition
Exhibit B-2 on the same line and immediately before the initials of the correctors she said:
"Because on that occasion it pleased me to do so" (page 836, s. n.). Neither does the
accused remember whether or not she exercised her supervisory authority with respect to
the other five compositions forming part of those marked as Exhibits B-1 and B-2 (page
840, s. n.); and when asked by the fiscal for an explanation as to why the increase given by
her to the grades originally given to said compositions had the effect of raising the general
average of the compositions of the same candidate to 75%, the accused answered that "the
fiscal ought to know that in this life there are happy coincidences" (page 848, s. n.). With
these answers and others appearing in her testimony, the accused instead of giving a
satisfactory explanation of her conduct, has demonstrated that with the encouragement
given by Justice Romualdez to the effect that the new revision of the compositions was left
to her discretion (page 780, s. n.) she assumed that the powers exercised by her in the bar
examinations of 1926 were such that she could revise any composition in any subject
already graded and increase or decrease the grades given by the correctors; in other
words, that she could, at her pleasure, do or undo the work done by the correctors without
the necessity of accounting to anybody for it (page 834, s. n.), or of keeping a note or
memorandum of the compositions so revised and the alteration of the grades.
The evidence, however, shows that Justice Romualdez himself in reviewing, in his capacity
as chairman of the examination committee, the compositions of the candidates who filed
motions for reconsideration of the grades given them, after the publication of the result of
the examinations, performed his work with such diligence and zeal that he noted in a
memorandum book (Exhibit F) not only the grades given to each answer of the candidate,
but also the total grade obtained by the candidate in the revision, together with such other
data which would explain the increase of the grades of this or that candidate.
The court is loath to believe that Justice Romualdez had given his secretary to understand
that she had such unlimited powers, or that the Supreme Court in designating said Justice
as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year 1926, authorizing him to confer
such powers upon his secretary, because it is an undisputed fact that his designation was
made so that he should conduct the examinations in accordance with law and the rules.
But, even granting that when the accused Estela Romualdez altered the grades given by the
correctors to compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 she acted in the exercise of the powers
conferred upon her by the chairman of the examination committee, is there any ground in
support of her claim that she made those alterations only to do justice to the compositions,
and without knowing the name of the candidate to whom they belonged?
Without giving any weight to the testimony of the witness for the prosecution, Juan
Villaflor, which, according to the defense is not worthy of credit because of the
contradictions and inconsistencies therein noted, the record contains other evidence
establishing certain facts from which such knowledge can be inferred.
It has been proved that after the revision and grading of all the compositions numbering
over 8,000, a list, Exhibit C-1, was prepared in pencil. This list was prepared with the
intervention of the said Jeronimo Samson and Josephine Stevens, assisted by Catalina Pons,
Juan Villaflor and the accused Estela Romualdez. However, before the preparation of this
list, sometime during the first day of February, 1927, the sealed envelopes containing the
identification numbers attached to each composition were opened. Said numbers were
written either on the upper part of each envelope or on the first page of the composition,
and that work lasted several days (pages 162, 163, s. n.). In the list Exhibit C-1 the
numbers of the candidates contained in the envelopes attached to the compositions were
first written (page 166, s. n.), and then the grades in each subject, followed by the general
average (pages 71, 184, s. n.), leaving in the blank the space intended for the names (page
166, s. n.). Deputy Clerk Samson wrote on an adding machine the grades in each
composition as they were read out by one of the helpers, and then the corresponding
general average as computed by him (page 71, s. n.), and, at the same time, Josephine
Stevens wrote said grades in the space corresponding to each subject (page 188, s. n.). The
Page 5 of 62
roll of paper used by Deputy Clerk Samson on the adding machine was presented as
Exhibit C-6.
After the list Exhibit C-1 containing the grades in each subject and the general average of
each candidate, who was theretofore known by his identification number only, was
prepared, the envelopes containing the names corresponding to the identification
numbers written on said list were taken from the safe of the office of the clerk, and the
names of the candidates were inserted in said list by those who assisted in the preparation
thereof (pages 166, 167, s. n.) among whom was the accused Estela Romualdez, who
admitted, upon cross-examination, having written many of the names appearing on several
pages of said list (pages 859-861, s. n.). After said list Exhibit C-1 was prepared the
examination committee submitted to the Supreme Court a report recommending the
admission to the bar and not only for those candidates with a general average of 75% or
more, but also of those who had obtained a general average of 70 or more but below 75%,
and said automatic increase was ordered noted on said list Exhibit C-1. However, this
recommendation was not approved by the Supreme Court on the ground that said
automatic increase was arbitrary (pages 73, 74, s. n.), and for that reason the clerk of court,
Mr. Albert, instructed his deputy, Mr. Samson, to prepare another list containing only the
names of the candidates who had originally obtained a general average of 75% without
having obtained less than 60% in any subject, and in pursuance thereof the typewritten list
Exhibit C-5 was prepared (page 77, s. n.), which was approved by the Supreme Court and
published on March 5, 1927. In this list Luis Mabunay is included with an average of 75%.
Eight or ten days after the publication of the result of the examinations the list Exhibit C-2
was prepared in the same form as Exhibit C-1 taking the grades directly from the
compositions; while one of the helpers read them, Deputy Clerk Samson listed them on the
adding machine and computed the general average of each candidate. The roll of paper
used by Deputy Samson on this occasion was also presented and marked as Exhibit C-7.
Both rolls, Exhibits C-6 and C-7, as well as the lists Exhibits C-1 and C-2, were kept in the
office of Justice Romualdez and were only taken out when the investigation of the
irregularities in the examinations of 1926 was commenced (page 81, s. n.). And only in the
course of that investigation it was discovered that the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay,
identified with number 898 in roll Exhibit C-6 and in the list Exhibit C-1, which had been
prepared simultaneously, did not agree, because, while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the
grade in Civil Law of candidate No. 898 is 63, the list Exhibit C-1 shows that the grade of
the same candidate is 73; and while roll Exhibit C-6 shows that the grade of candidate No.
898 was 58 (in Remedial Law), his grade in the list Exhibit C-1 is 64 (in the same subject),
a difference also being noted between the general average of candidate No. 898 in Exhibit
C-6, which is 72.8%, and his general average on Exhibit C-1, which is 75% (pages 73, 74, s.
n.). This discovery led to the revision of the compositions of Luis Mabunay in the
examinations of 1926, which were united to his personal record (Exhibit B), which showed
that the grades given to, and written by the respective correctors on the compositions of
said candidate in Civil Law Exhibit B-1 and Remedial Law Exhibit B-2 had been altered,
and further, that the grades that appeared on said compositions before the alterations
were identical with those that appeared on the roll, Exhibit C-6. An ocular inspection of
page 29 of said Exhibit C-1 shows at first glance that the numbers 73, 64, and 75 in the
columns corresponding to Civil Law, Remedial Law and General Average, respectively,
were written after erasing with rubber what was there originally written. It may also be
noted, upon an examination of the alterations appearing on the first pages of compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, that the grades originally written by the correctors, authenticated by
their initials, had been stricken out in such a way that it is difficult to make out said
original grades, leaving, however, intact, the initials of the correctors.
From these facts it is inferred: First, that the person who erased and altered the grades
written by the correctors on the first pages of compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 wished to
make it appear that said alterations had been made by the correctors themselves; second,
that said alterations were made after the grades written by the correctors had been noted
on the adding machine in roll Exhibit C-6 and on the list Exhibit C-1 which were prepared
simultaneously; third, that after said alterations had been made, and in order that the
grades so altered should agree with the grades already written on the list Exhibit C-1, the
grades in Civil Law and Remedial Law were erased with rubber, and in place thereof were
written the grades now appearing in said compositions. The accused Estela Romualdez
having admitted that she was the author of such alterations, the only logical inference from
her admission and the facts above set out, is that she was also the person who erased not
only the grades originally written by the correctors on the compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 but also those appearing in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law
on the list Exhibit C-1, and the same person who wrote the grades now appearing in said
columns, and which agree with those written by her on compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
Now, if the accused Estela Romualdez erased in the manner stated the grades originally
written, and substituted for them the grades now appearing in said compositions Exhibits
B-1 and B-2 as well as in the columns corresponding to Civil Law and Remedial Law in the
list Exhibit C-1, it cannot be doubted that in making such erasures and alterations she not
only acted with the intent of concealing her identity, but she also knew the number and the
name of the candidate to whom said composition belonged, because at that time the
numbers and the names of the candidates were already written on the list Exhibit C-1, and
that list was kept in the office of Justice Romualdez (page 83, s. n.), were she had complete
and absolute control as private secretary and supervisor of the examinations.
Participation of the accused Luis Mabunay
Discarding the testimony of witness Juan Villaflor in which he says that one Luis Mabunay
called up the accused Estela Romualdez on the telephone a few days before the publication
of the results of the examinations, there is, indeed, no direct proof in the record showing
the participation of the accused Luis Mabunay. However, there is other evidence for the
prosecution establishing certain facts which show strong indications that he operated in
the act before or at the time of its execution by his coaccused. It has been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt that the accused Luis Mabunay was one of the candidates who took the
Page 6 of 62
bar examinations in 1926; that the general average obtained by him, according to the
computation appearing on the roll Exhibit C-6 of the adding machine and that originally
written in the list Exhibit C-1 was 72.8%; that after the Supreme Court denied the
recommendation of the examination committee that all grades from and between 70% and
75% be automatically raised to 75%, his name, nevertheless, appeared in the list of
successful candidates which was published on March 5, 1927 (Exhibit C-5), and that said
inclusion was due to the increase of these grades in Civil Law (Exhibit B-1) and Remedial
Law (Exhibit B-2), which was made by his coaccused by erasing and altering the grades
theretofore given by the correctors.
It is true that the accused Estela Romualdez, in her desire to show that she had no motive
whatsoever for favoring his coaccused Luis Mabunay, testified that she did not know him
and that the first time she saw him was on the first day of the trial of this case. However, in
view of her inability to explain why precisely the compositions of said Luis Mabunay had
been benefited by the revision, and in view of the admission of Justice Romualdez that the
power to revise conferred upon Estela Romualdez could be exercised by her in the
compositions already graded by the correctors in all cases of injustice which came to her
knowledge, or which might be brought to her attention (page 781, s. n.), her testimony
lacks foundation, because it is absurd to believe that her revision of the compositions of
her coaccused Luis Mabunay was due only and solely to a happy coincidence.
Furthermore, the accused Mabunay made no effort to contradict the evidence for the
prosecution with reference to his withdrawal of the amount of P600 from his savings
account in the Philippine Trust Company on the second day of March, 1927, or three days
before the publication of the result of the examinations (Exhibit I) which, when correlated
with the deposit of the sum of P400 made by the accused Estela Romualdez in her current
account (Exhibit H) with the Bank of the Philippine Islands on the seventh day of said
March, 1927, may, perhaps, give an explanation of the motive of said accused for
increasing the grades of Mabunay with just the necessary points to reach the lowest
passing general average. It is also true that Estela Romualdez testified that said amount
had been sent to her by her cousin named Prisca Magpayo Redona from the province for
the purchase of merchandise for sale at the latter's store (page 791, s. n.), but the
testimony in that respect was not corroborated either by her said cousin, or by any other
persons mentioned by her as the bearers of said amount, or by the corresponding check or
postal money order, as she had done when referring other deposits in the bank.
Conclusion
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court finds that the allegations of the
information are sufficiently supported by the evidence and that the accused, Estela
Romualdez and Luis Mabunay are guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; the former as
principal and the latter as accomplice, of the crime of falsification of official documents
with which they are charged and, therefore, a judgment is rendered sentencing Estela
Romualdez, who was a Government employee at the time of the commission of the crime,
to suffer, in accordance with article 300 of the Penal Code, as amended by section 1 of Act
No. 2712, six years and one day of prision mayor with the accessory penalties of the law, to
pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, without subsidiary imprisonment in view of the nature of the
penalty, and also to suffer the penalty of perpetual disqualification from public office; and
her coaccused Luis Mabunay, who was a private individual with respect to said
examination, to suffer, under the provisions of article 301 as amended by section 2 of Act
No. 2712 and article 67 of the Penal Code, the penalty of four months and one day of
arresto mayor, with the accessory penalties of the law, and to pay a fine of 250 pesetas,
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and each to pay one-half part of the
costs.
The appellant Estela Romualdez through her attorneys makes the following assignments of
error:
I. The trial court erred in finding the accused, Estela Romualdez, guilty of the crime of
"falsification of public and official documents" and in sentencing her to suffer
imprisonment without due process of law, contrary to section 3, Act of Congress of August
29, 1916, entitled "An Act to Declare the Purpose of the People of the United States as to
the future Political Status of the People of the Philippine Islands, and to Provide a More
Autonomous Government for those Islands".
II. The trial court erred in not finding, that the accused, Estela Romualdez, was fully
authorized to make the alterations she in fact made on the composition papers of Luis
Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2 of the Government, and in denying full credit to the
uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Justice Norberto Romualdez, chairman of the bar
examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority granted her.
III. The trial court erred in failing to extend to the accused Estela Romualdez a fair and
impartial trial.
The attorneys for the appellant Luis Mabunay allege that the trial court committed the
following errors:
I. The trial court erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez
with reference to his authority as chairman of the bar examination committee of the year
1926, to confer upon the accused Estela Romualdez, the powers he in fact conferred upon
her, in connection with said examination.
II. It also erred in not crediting the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Romualdez as to
the fact that he, as chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926, really and truly
conferred upon the accused Estela Romualdez the powers which she exercised in that
examination.
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III. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez did not exercise the
powers conferred upon her by the chairman of the bar examination committee of 1926,
within the limits fixed by said chairman, to wit: that the new revision and grading of the
compositions be made in order to do justice thereto, and before the names of the
corresponding candidates were known.
IV. It likewise erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez changed the general
average and the grades of candidate Luis Mabunay in Civil Law and Remedial law on the
list Exhibit C-1.
V. The lower court erred in not admitting the expert testimony of Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo
Feria, and Claro M. Recto, as well as Exhibits 26 and 27, containing the opinion of said
lawyers as to the grades to which said compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2 were justly
entitled.
VI. It also erred in not concluding that Jeronimo Samson used the same powers exercised
by the accused in the bar examination of 1926.
VII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez knew that compositions Exhibits B-1 and
B-2 belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay when she reviewed and regraded them, the
court erred in concluding that said act constitutes the offense charged in the information.
VIII. Granting that Justice Romualdez, as chairman of the bar examination committee of
1926, was not authorized by the Supreme Court to confer upon Estela Romualdez the
powers which she exercised in that examination, the court erred in concluding that she
altered the grades of said compositions willfully and feloniously.
IX. The lower court also erred in concluding that Estela Romualdez intended to conceal her
identity when she revised and regraded compositions Exhibits B-1 and B-2.
X. It also erred in concluding that the accused Estela Romualdez, in exercising her powers
as supervisor of the correctors in said bar examinations, revised compositions Exhibits B-1
and B-2 only, in order to regrade them.
XI. It also erred in suggesting that her motive, in revising and regrading said compositions
Exhibits B-1 and B-2, was the fact that she had received from her coaccused Luis Mabunay
the sum of P400.
XII. Granting that the accused Estela Romualdez committed the offense of falsification with
which she is charged, the lower court erred in concluding that Luis Mabunay participated
in its commission.
In addition to the usual brief for each of the accused, the attorneys for the appellants filed a
joint memorandum on July 10, 1929. The Attorney-General filed a brief on behalf of the
People of the Philippine Islands and a reply to the memorandum for the defense.
The court at that time consisted of nine members, one of whom, Justice Romualdez, was
disqualified to sit in this case. Upon a consideration of the case on its merits, four justices
were in favor of affirming the decision of the trial court and the same number were in
favor of acquitting the defendants. The court being unable to reach a decision in the usual
course, an attempt was made on February 11, 1930 to break the deadlock, as is evidenced
by the following resolution:
The court having under consideration again the case of People vs. Romualdez, et al., No.
31012, those participating being all the members of the court, except Mr. Justice
Romualdez, who was disqualified, it was moved that following precedents elsewhere,
particularly in the United States Supreme Court, to the effect that when there is an equal
division in the court and there is no prospect of a change in the vote the judgment
appealed from stand affirmed, and in accordance with the action taken in the case of
Nacionalista Party vs.Municipal Board of Manila, No. 21265 — the judgment in the case at
bar be affirmed. Mr. Chief Justice Avanceña and Messrs. Justices Malcolm, Ostrand, and
Johns voted in favor of the motion. Messrs. Justices Johnson, Street, Villamor, and Villa-Real
voted against the motion. Mr. Justice Johnson based his dissent on the peculiar statutory
provisions in force in the Philippine Islands. For want of a majority, the motion was lost.
The court thereupon directed that the clerk retain the record in the case until the further
order of the court.
On January 12, 1931 Luis Mabunay filed a motion praying that the case against him be
considered separately and he be absolved from the complaint. This motion was denied by
the court. He renewed his motion on August 1, 1931. This motion was also denied on the
ground that no severance had been asked for in the lower court, and for the further reason
that there was a prospect that the membership of the court would soon be increased.
The membership of the court was finally increased to eleven, and due to the death or
retirement of three justices only six of the former members remained. On June 23, 1932
Courtney Whitney as attorney for Estela Romualdez filed a petition praying that this case
be set for a rehearing before the court as newly constituted. This motion was granted. On
July 2, 1932 he filed a motion for the dismissal of the information, alleging that because of
the inability of the court to reach a determination from the facts as to the guilt or
innocence of the defendant-appellant Estela Romualdez, she had been denied her right to a
speedy trial. This motion was denied.
After a reargument of the case, the attorney for Estela Romualdez filed an additional
memorandum, to which the Attorney-General filed a reply.
Page 8 of 62
Under the first assignment of error, the attorneys for Estela Romualdez maintain that even
if the lower court's findings of fact be justified by the evidence of record, "they fail to
sustain that any criminal offense, recognized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, has
been committed." They contend that the appointment of the committee of attorneys by
Justice Romualdez to read and grade the examination papers was not warranted by law,
and that therefore the alteration by the defendant Estela Romualdez, under the
circumstances alleged in the information, of the grades in question did not constitute a
crime.
The testimony of Justice Romualdez, who was a witness for the defense, completely refutes
this contention. He testified that the bar examining committee was composed of two
groups of attorneys: Those that were appointed to prepare the questions, and those that
were appointed to grade the papers. He further testified that the court was informed of the
way in which the examination was conducted and that it approved thereof. There were
more than a thousand candidates and some eight thousand papers. According to the
contention of appellant's attorneys only the seven attorneys appointed to prepare the
questions or the court itself could lawfully grade these papers. Such a contention is clearly
untenable. The attorneys that prepared the questions did not intervene in the grading of
the papers, but they prepared a key to the questions, which served the other group of
attorneys, the readers or "correctors", as a guide in grading the papers. The intervention of
the "correctors" was just as legal as that of the attorneys that prepared the questions, and
the intervention of the two groups of attorneys was perfectly regular and valid.
It is also contended that the examination papers which the defendant Estela Romualdez
altered were not public or official documents. That contention is likewise without merit. As
stated by her attorneys, the examination of candidates for admission to the bar is a judicial
function. It cannot therefore be maintained with any show of reason that the papers
submitted by the candidates in the course of the examination were not public and official
documents, or that the alteration, under the circumstances alleged in the information, of
the grades given to such papers by the "correctors" was not a crime. (In re Del Rosario, 52
Phil., 399, where this court refers to the falsification of his examination papers as
"falsification of public documents"; People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil., 41, where the
conviction of Castro for the falsification of his examination papers was affirmed.)
In accordance with the established practice of the court to have one of its members each
year make all the necessary arrangements for the bar examination, the Chief Justice in
1926 designated Justice Romualdez for that purpose, and in pursuance thereof he
appointed one group of attorneys to prepare the questions and another group to grade the
papers. If any of these attorneys were designated by the clerk of the court, it was with the
advice and consent and on the authority of Justice Romualdez.
The phrase "falsification of a document" is not used in articles 300 and 301 of the Penal
code in the ordinary acceptation of the words. It has a technical meaning, and according to
article 300 may be committed in the following eight ways:
1. By counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric.
2. By causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when
they did not in fact so participate.
3. By attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements
other than those in fact made by them.
4. By making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
5. By altering true dates.
6. By making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its
meaning.
7. By issuing in authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original
document when no such original exists, or by including in such a copy a statement
contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original.
8. By intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol,
registry or official book.
The acts of the accused are covered by paragraphs 2, 3, and 6. She made the alterations in
the grades in such a way as to make it appear that the "correctors" had participated
therein, because she blotted out the grades of the "correctors" and wrote new and
increased grades opposite their initials, without indicating by her own initials that she had
made the alterations. She in that way attributed to the "correctors" statements other than
those in fact made by them. Her only explanation of why she altered the grades in that way
was that it pleased her to do so.
A decision in point has just come to hand. It is reported in 180 N. E., 725, and is referred to
in the American Bar Association Journal for August, 1932, p. 497. A bill was presented in
the Massachusetts Senate prohibiting the marking of the examination papers of applicants
for admission to the bar by any person not a member of the board of bar examiners. The
Senate wished to know whether such a bill, if enacted, would be an unconstitutional
interference with the functions of the Judicial Department, and asked the Justices of the
Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion. They replied that such a law would be
unconstitutional. In the course of the opinion they said: "If the judicial department decides
that the marking of the written examinations may be performed by competent persons not
members of the board but acting under the direction of such members, that pertains
directly to the ascertainment of the qualifications of applicants. It is a definite attribute of
the judicial department and not an immaterial incident." It was also stated that the plan of
Page 9 of 62
employing assistants to aid the bar examiners in marking the papers had been approved
by the Supreme Judicial Court.
In the second assignment of error, the attorney for Estela Romualdez maintains that the
trial court erred in not finding that she was fully authorized to make the alterations she in
fact made on the examination papers of Luis Mabunay, Exhibits B-1 and B-2, and in
denying full credit to the uncontradicted testimony of Justice Norberto Romualdez,
chairman of the bar examining committee for the year 1926, concerning the authority
granted her.
In the first place, we find it difficult to believe that Justice Romualdez ever gave the
accused the authority which she claims to have received; and in the second place, even if it
be assumed that he gave her the alleged authority, she did not exercise it in accordance
with the terms thereof.
The defense would have us believe that Justice Romualdez regarded his secretary, Estela
Romualdez, and the deputy clerk, Jeronimo Samson, who were themselves "correctors" as
supervisors of the other "correctors", and that he authorized Estela Romualdez to revise
any grade to correct an injustice, without consulting or notifying the other supervisor,
Samson, or the "correctors' who had graded the paper, without requiring her to initial the
alteration, or to make any record thereof or any report to him or to anybody else.
Justice Romualdez was designated by the Chief Justice to conduct the examination in
accordance with the law and the Rules of Court. He himself had no such authority as he is
alleged to have given his secretary. He is presumed to have discharged his duties in
accordance with the law, and it is inconceivable that he would without any warrant of law
give or attempt to give his secretary the unlimited authority which she claims to have
received, thereby enabling her to alter at will any grade or any paper, without making any
record thereof or any report to anybody. The mere statement of such a claim shows that it
is preposterous.
No such authority was given to Samson, who according to Justice Romualdez was regarded
by him as a supervisor of equal rank with Estela Romualdez. Samson was never notified
that he was regarded as a supervisor, and he never acted in that capacity.
Let us notice how this unlimited authority is alleged to have been granted to the accused
Estela Romualdez.
It was not in writing or evidenced by any memorandum. It was not even a positive
statement. Justice Romualdez testified that he believed that on a certain occasion he gave
his secretary to understand that if a case should be brought to her attention she might
revise any grade to prevent an injustice, so long as she did not know the name of the
candidate to whom the paper belonged. When asked where she was when the pretended
authority was given to her, the accused could not remember.
There was according to the theory of the defense nothing to prevent Samson from revising
the revision of Estela Romualdez, because she did not initial the changes made by her, and
he was supposed to be a supervisor of equal rank.
If it be admitted for the sake of argument that the accused Estela Romualdez was given the
authority which she claims to have received, nevertheless she was not authorized to
change the grades now in question, because when she made the changes she already knew
that the papers belonged to her coaccused Luis Mabunay. The evidence fully sustaining
that conclusion is carefully set forth by the trial court, and it is unnecessary for us to
review it. The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within
the authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a mere expression of
opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. The accused Estela
Romualdez did not even attempt to explain under what circumstances she raised the
grades of her coaccused so as to enable him to obtain the necessary general average of 75
per cent. She did not confer with the "correctors" who had graded the papers in question.
She di not attempt to explain how she arrived at the increased grades, or how she came to
revise the grades in question, how she happened to pick these two papers out of eight
thousand. She could not point to any other grades that had been altered by her.
Under the second assignment of error the attorney for Estela Romualdez also alleges that
she freely and voluntarily admitted from the start of the trial of her case that the
alterations had been made by her, and concludes therefrom that she acted in good faith.
We cannot agree either with the statement of fact or the conclusion. The accused Estela
Romualdez did not admit that the alterations were made by her until after the prosecuting
attorney had presented three hundred and fifty pages of testimony and announced his
readiness to prove by three handwriting experts that the alterations were in the
handwriting of the accused. The evidence shows that before the trial defendant's attorney
from the fiscal's office a photograph that had been made for the purpose of comparing a
specimen of defendant's handwriting and that of the altered grades. The fact that the
defendant Estela Romualdez made the alterations under the circumstances which we have
mentioned, when she already knew that the papers belonged to Mabunay, disproves any
contention that she acted in good faith.
In the case of the United States vs. Ballesteros (25 Phil., 634), this court said:
When the unlawful acts charged against an accused are established by competent evidence,
criminal intent may be and will be presumed, unless such intent is rebutted by the
introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome this presumption, and satisfactorily
disclosing the absence of such criminal intent.
Page 10 of 62
The third assignment of error made by the appellant Estela Romualdez is that the trial
court erred in failing to extend to her a fair and impartial trial. We shall not waste much
time on this assignment of error, which is utterly without merit. The record itself
completely refutes any such contention. If the learned trial judge erred, it was in
permitting the attorneys for the defendants too great latitude in arguing their objections.
Arguments four and five pages long were incorporated into the stenographic record of the
evidence. The record shows a most unjustifiable attack on the good faith of the fiscal and a
persistent effort to embarrass him in presenting his evidence against the accused.
The appellant Luis Mabunay makes twelve assignments of error. They are for the most
part embraced in the assignments of error of his coaccused which we have already
considered. These remain only his fifth, eleventh, and twelfth assignments of error. In his
fifth assignment of error it is alleged that the lower court erred in not admitting the expert
testimony of attorneys Wm. J. Rhode, Felicisimo Feria, and Claro M. Recto, and in rejecting
Exhibits 26 and 27, which contain the opinion of said attorneys as to the correct grades
which the examination papers Exhibits B-1 and B-2 deserved.
The lower court sustained the objection to the admission of the testimony of these three
attorneys on the ground that it was not the best evidence, and suggested that the defense
might call the members of the examining committee that prepared the questions in
Remedial Law and Civil Law and the key thereto. The attorneys for the defense did not see
fit to adopt the suggestion of the court. It is not true therefore that the lower court
deprived the accused of an opportunity of showing that the examination papers in
question deserved the increased grades which the defendant Estela Romualdez gave them.
The attorneys that prepared the questions and the key to the answers were certainly the
persons best qualified to decide whether or not the questions were correctly answered.
The opinion of other attorneys, who had nothing to do with the examination, would only
lead to confusion. We find no merit in this assignment of error.
The eleventh assignment of error is that the trial court erred in insinuating that the motive
of the accused Estela Romualdez in reviewing and regrading the examination papers
Exhibits B-1 and B-2 was the fact that she had received four hundred pesos from her
co-accused Luis Mabunay.
The twelfth assignment of error is that if it be assumed that the accused Estela Romualdez
committed the crime of falsification imputed to her in the information, the court erred in
concluding that the accused Luis Mabunay participated in its commission.
For the sake of convenience we shall consider these two assignments of error together.
In the first place we should like to say that there is no evidence to show that Estela
Romualdez ever reviewed the examination papers of her coaccused. So far as the evidence
shows, she merely raised his grades in two subjects, thus giving him by "a happy
coincidence", to use her own words, a passing mark. She could not or would not enlighten
the court as to why she raised the grades of Luis Mabunay so as to enable him to be
admitted to the bar. As already stated, the record does not show that she raised the grades
of any other candidate.
The evidence shows that Luis Mabunay had failed in two previous examinations, and that
he failed in the examination in question, receiving a general average of only 72.8%. The bar
examining committee recommended that not only those having the required general
average of 75 per cent be admitted, but also that those who had received between 70 and
75 per cent. This is referred to in the record as "an automatic increase". It was not
automatic but arbitrary, and was disapproved by the Supreme Court, and the committee
was directed to prepare a new list and to include therein only those who had obtained a
general average of 75 per cent. The name of Luis Mabunay was included in the new list
submitted three days later, notwithstanding the fact that he had obtained a general
average of only 72.8 per cent, precisely because Estela Romualdez had in the meantime
raised the grades now in question so that he appeared to have obtained the general
average required for admission to the bar.
The evidence shows that on March 2, 1927 Luis Mabunay withdrew P600 from the
Philippine Trust Co., and that on March 7, 1927 Estela Romualdez deposited P510 in the
Bank of the Philippine Islands. Luis Mabunay did not testify, and he did not present any
evidence to show for what purpose he withdrew P600 from the bank immediately after the
first list was disapproved.
In the case of United States vs. Tria (17 Phil., 303, 307), Justice Moreland speaking for the
court said:
An accused person sometimes owes a duty to himself if not to the State. If he does not
perform that duty he may not always expect the State to perform it for him. If he fails to
meet the obligation which he owes to himself, when to meet it is the easiest of easy things,
he is hardy indeed if he demand and expect the same full and wide consideration which
the State voluntarily gives to those who by reasonable effort seek to help themselves. This
is particularly so when he not only declines to help himself but actively conceals from the
State the very means by which it may assist him.
In the famous case of the Commonwealth vs. Webster (5 Cushing, 295, 316), Chief Justice
Shaw laid down the following rule:
When pretty stringent proof of circumstances is produced, tending to support the charge,
and it is apparent that the accused is so situated that he could offer evidence of all the facts
and circumstances as they existed, and show, if such was the truth, that the suspicious
circumstances can be accounted for consistency with his innocence, and he fails to offer
such proof, the natural conclusion is, that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting,
would tend to sustain the charge. But this is to be cautiously applied, and only in cases
Page 11 of 62
where it is manifest that proofs are in the power of the accused, not accessible to the
prosecution.
Estela Romualdez showed that of the sum of P510 P100 was paid to her by her mother and
only P10 by her brother, but she could not satisfactorily prove where the remaining P400
came from. She said it was sent to her by her cousin, Prisca Magpayo Redona, for the
purchase of goods, but she could not name the person that brought the money to her, or
explain why she deposited it in the bank. She did not attempt to show that she had paid it
out by means of checks for the purchase of goods for her cousin. She did not call her cousin
as a witness.
An accused person runs the risk of an inference against him because of failure to produce
evidence. The inference, unless the failure to produce evidence is explained away, is that
the tenor of the specific unproduced evidence would not support the party's case. (U.
S. vs. Sarikala, 37 Phil., 486.)
In the case just cited the court quoted with approval the following rules as stated by Dean
Wigmore in his work on Evidence, Vol. IV, p. 3148:
The failure to produce evidence, in general, other than his own testimony, is open to
inference against a party accused, with the same limitations applicable to civil parties.
Here the effect of the burden of proof has sometimes tended to confuse. It is true that the
burden is on the prosecution, and that the accused is not required by any rule of law to
produce evidence; but nevertheless he runs the risk of an inference from nonproduction.
This seeming paradox, which has been already sufficiently noticed in treating of the
general principle, has misled a few courts to deny that any inference may be drawn.
The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and
benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after
the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75 per cent.
The alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the
money after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed. It was under those
circumstances incumbent upon the accused Mabunay to present evidence to show for
what purpose he withdrew the six hundred pesos from the bank. As this court said in the
case of Worcester vs. Ocampo (22 Phil., 42):
When the circumstances in proof tend to fix the liability on a party who has it in his power
to offer evidence of all the facts as they existed and rebut the inferences which the
circumstances in proof tend to establish, and he fails to offer such proof, the natural
conclusion is that the proof, if produced, instead of rebutting would support the inferences
against him, and the court is justified in acting upon that conclusion.
The case of In re Del Rosario (52 Phil., 399), is directly on point. Felipe del Rosario failed
for the third time in the bar examination of 1926. He then filed a motion for the revision of
his grades, based on an alleged mistake in computation. This motion was granted, and he
was admitted to the bar. It was subsequently found that alterations had been made in his
examination papers, and he and Juan Villaflor were prosecuted for the falsification of a
public document. Villaflor assumed full responsibility for the commission of the crime, and
testified that Del Rosario did not know anything about the making of the alterations. The
trial court acquitted Del Rosario, but upon a view of the case for the purpose of taking
disciplinary actin against him Justice Malcolm, speaking for the court in banc, said:
It is asking a great deal of the members of the court to have them believe that Felipe del
Rosario was totally unaware of the illegal machinations culminating in the falsification of
public documents, of which he was the sole beneficiary.
The attorney's certificate of Felipe del Rosario was cancelled.
In the case of People vs. Bella Bautista (53 Phil., 158), the accused was charged with the
falsification of a public document. The evidence showed that in the Register of Attorneys
the name of an attorney had been erased, and that the accused had written his own name
in that space, although he had not admitted to the bar. The accused contended that he
wrote his name in the register under the direction of an employee of the court, and that he
acted in good faith. He was convicted, and on appeal the decision was affirmed. This court
in its decision said: "The trial court suggests in the opinion that the offense committed
required the participation of some unfaithful employee of the court. But this fact, as the
court found, did not lessen the criminal responsibility of the appellant."
It is alleged in the information that the accused conspired together and acted in common
accord in the commission of the crime. As the Attorney-General says, a conspiracy can
seldom be proved except by circumstantial evidence, but once it is proved, the acts of one
of the conspirators are the acts of all. (U. S. vs. Ipil., 27 Phil., 530.)
The existence of the assent of minds which is involved in a conspiracy may be, and, from
the secrecy of the crime, usually must be, inferred by the jury from proof of facts and
circumstances which, taken together, apparently indicate that they are merely parts of
some complete whole. If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards
the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative, indicating a
closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be
inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. Evidence of
actual participation, rather than of passive acquiescence, is desirable. But proof of
acquiescence in, or consent to, the actions of others is relevant to show the criminal
intention of the passive party, and generally the smallest degree of consent or collusion
among parties lets in the act or words of one against the others. (Underhill on Criminal
Evidence, pp. 795, 796.)
Page 12 of 62
For the foregoing reasons, we find that the conclusions of the trial court are fully justified
by the evidence.

As the accused Estela Romualdez took advantage of her official position in committing the
crime, the trial court found her guilty of a violation of article 300 of the Penal Code, as
amended by Act No. 2712, and sentenced her to suffer six years and one day of prision
mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, to pay a fine of 1,000 pesetas, and to
suffer perpetual disqualification to hold any public office.

The penalty provided by the Penal Code is prision mayor in full extent, or from six years
and one day to twelve years, and the penalty under the Revised Penal Code being the same,
and there being no aggravating or mitigating circumstance present in the commission of
the crime, the penalty should be imposed in the medium degree, which is from eight years
and one day to ten years. The penalty imposed on the appellant Estela Romualdez is
therefore increased to eight years and one day of prision mayor.

The trial court found the defendant Luis Mabunay guilty as an accomplice under article
301 of the Penal Code, the crime not being connected with the performance of his duties as
an employee of the Government, and sentenced him to suffer four months and one day
of arresto mayor, and the accessory penalties provided by law, and to pay a fine of
250 pesetas, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. The defendants were
each sentenced to pay one-half of the costs.

We find that the lower court erred in holding that Luis Mabunay was merely an accomplice.
He was a conspirator and coprincipal of Estela Romualdez. The penalty provided by article
301 of the Penal Code, as amended by Act No. 2712, is prision correccional in the maximum
degree, but that has been changed by the Revised Penal Code toprision correccional in the
medium and maximum degrees, and the medium degree of that penalty is from three years,
six months, and twenty-one days to four years, nine months and ten days. The prison
sentence of Luis Mabunay is therefore increased to three years, six months, and twenty-
one days of prision correccional.

The decision of the trial court is modified as hereinabove stated. In all other respects it is
affirmed, with the costs against the appellants.

Ostrand, Abad Santos, Hull, Imperial and Butte, JJ., concur.

Page 13 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-49483-86 March 30, 1981
SALUD P. BERADIO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
DE CASTRO, J.:
By petition for review on certiorari, Salud P. Beradio, an election registrar of the COMELEC
in Rosales, Pangasinan, who was convicted on four (4) counts of the crime of falsification
of public or official documents of the seven (7) separate informations filed against her for
making false entries in her daily time records, elevates to the Court, the decision 1 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. 20319 to 20322 promulgated on September 18, 1978,
affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered on July 30, 1976 by the Circuit
Criminal Court, Third Judicial District, Dagupan City. The dispositive portion of the
decision of the lower court reads as follows:
FOR THE FOREGOING DISCUSSION, and with the prosecution not having established by
proof beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the herein accused and for insufficiency of
evidence or the lack of it, the Court hereby finds. as it so holds, accussed Salud P. Beradio
NOT GUILTY of the charges in Criminal cases Nos. CCC-0258, CCC-0259, and CCC-0263;
consequently, she is hereby acquitted therefrom with costs de oficio; and decreeing the
bail bonds posted for her provisional release in these cases cancelled and discharged.
On the other hand, however, the Court so finds and holds accused Salud P. Beradio GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of falsification of public or official document as
charged in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 as to entry on July 13, 1973 only, Criminal Case No.
CCC-0261; Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 as to entry on May 28, 1973 only, and Criminal
Case No. CCC-0264, defined and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4, of the Revised
Penal Code, and absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance and applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Act, hereby accordingly sentences said Salud P. Beradio to serve
an indeterminate prison term in the following manner, to wit:
a) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0260 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) but without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency and, to pay the cost;
b) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0261 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS
of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to
pay the cost;
c) In Criminal Case No. CCC-0262 - a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correcional, as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay a fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the cost.
d) In Criminal Case No. CCC-026-1 — a prison term of from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR(4)
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
0NE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, to pay fine of
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2.000) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency,
and to pay the cost.
The penalties herein imposed shall be served successively with the maximum duration of
the sentences not to exceed threefold the length of tune corresponding to one penalty
imposed upon tier in accordance with Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.
As to charges of falsification on July 12, 1973 in Criminal Case No. CCC-0260, and on May
30, 1973, the Court finds no sufficient Evidence to hold the accused liable. Consequently,
the accused is hereby absolved therefrom.
The facts pertinent to the specified dates of falsification as found by the Court of Appeals
are as follows:
... On the following particular dates, as reflected in her daily time records (Exhs. "D" to "H"),
BERADIO reported her attendance in office and actual hours of work performed as:
On
1) March 15, 1973 7:35 a.m. 12:00 n.;
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
Page 14 of 62
 5) In the morning of June 22, 1973, Beradio appeared in Sp. Proc. No. 24-R before the Court
2) March 23, 1973 7:30 a.m. 12:00 n ;
of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at Rosales (Exh. "M").
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
6) In the morning of July 13, 1973, Beradio appeared as counsel for plaintiff at the pre-trial
3) May 28, 1973 7:45 a.m. 12:00 n; conference of Civil Case No. 137R, "Venancia Diaz vs. Armando Ordonio" before Branch XIV
of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan (Exhs. "L" to "I-3").
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
It is thus clear that while in the six abovementioned dates, BERADIO made it appear in her
4) June 6, 1973 7:30 a.m. 12:00 n ; daily time records that she was in her office and performed her work on the dates and
hours she specified, the facts were that she was elsewhere attending court sessions. 2
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.

5) June 22, 1973 7:35 a.m. 12:00 n ; From the said decision of the Court of Appeals and the denial of her motion for
reconsideration on November 28, 1978, Salud Beradio filed the instant petition for review
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on certiorari to the Court. We asked the Solicitor General to comment on the petition and
thereafter, We resolved to give due course to said petition it appearing that the issues
6) July 13,1973 8:00 a.m. 12:00 n ; raised are, in the main questions of law rendered novel by the peculiar circumstances of
the case. Thus, he raised the following legal issues:
1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
I
The veracity of the foregoing reports were negated by the following:
WHETHER THE CONVICTION OF THE PETITIONER TAKEN IN THE LIGHT OF THE
PROVISION OF ARTICLE 171, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IS LEGAL
1) On March l5, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the applicants at the initial
AND PROPER.
hearing and reception of evidence in land Registration Case No. 19-R before the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Rosales, in both morning and afternoon sessions
(Exhs. "K", "K-1" and "K-2"). II

2) In the morning of March 23, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the petitioner in WHETHER THE PETITIONER COULD STILL BE LEGALLY AND PROPERLY PROSECUTED
the hearing of Special Proceedings No. 24-R (summary settlement of the estate of Vicente FOR AN OFFENSE WHERE SHE WAS NO LONGER A PUBLIC OFFICIAL
Oria, Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, at Resales, which was called first in
open court and later, in chambers (Exhs. "M" and M-1 "). III

3) On May 28, 1973, in the same case, Sp. Proc. No. 24-R, BERADIO again appeared as WHETHER PETITIONER !S UNDER LEGAL OBLIGATION TO FILL UP AND SUBMIT TIME
counsel for the petitioner in the same court which held sessions from 8:45 to 11:45 (Exh. RECORD.
"M").
IV
4) In the morning of June 6, 1973, BERADIO appeared as counsel for the defendant in CAR
Case No. 19882-.TP '73, entitled "Pepito Felipe vs. Ismael Pontes and Camilo Tamce before ASSUMING THAT SHE IS, DO THE STATEMENTS THEREIN REFLECTED IN HER TIME
CAR Branch 11 in Tayug, Pangasinan (Exh. "J"). Minutes of the pre-trial conference which RECORD BEAR ANY' COLOR OF TRUTH'.
the appellant attended are manifest in the pre-trial order that was dictated in open court
(Exh. "J-1"). V

Page 15 of 62
WHETHER DAMAGE TO THE GOVERNMENT IN FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL
DOCUMENT IS TOTALLY OF NO MOMENT.
VI
IT FAILED TO HOLD THAT. UNDER THE ESTABLISHED FACTS, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
LAW AND WELL-SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE, PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO ACQUITTAL
ON THE GROUND OF REASONABLE DOUBT.
Salud P. Beradio, petitioner, is a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) on February 1, 1964 (Exhibits A and A-1). In 1972
and 1973, she was stationed in Resales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office, Office of the Election
Registrar, COMELEC holding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00
noon and from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was
field work, she was required to fill up and submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila
her daily time records after having been counter-signed by her provincial supervisor. 3
On March 29, 1973, the COMELEC by resolution (Exhibits 1 and 1-A, CCC-0261) granted
her request for permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the
case before the Court of Agrarian Relations in Rosales, Pangasinan. 4
During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo Valdez
filed with the COMELEC, sometime in September, 1973, an administrative complaint
charging her of unauthorized practice of law. On the other hand, Salud Beradio tendered
her resignation as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, which, by COMELEC
resolution (Exhibit B) of October 25, 1973, was accepted and made to retroact on the close
of office hours on September 30, 1973. She was duly granted clearance by all the offices of
the COMELEC, and she received her retirement benefits under the law.
Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the status of his administrative
case against Salud P. Beradio, and upon being informed of her separation from the service,
he initiated the filing of criminal charges against Salud Beradio on grounds of falsification
of daily time records defined and penalized under Article 17 1, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code as falsification of public documents. In the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Pangasinan where he lodged the criminal charges, Jose Peralta, and his wife Paz de
Guzman-Peralta, trial attorney of Agrarian Legal Assistance (DAR) submitted affidavits in
support of the charges against Salud P. Beradio.
On August 4, 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate
informations all dated July 7, 1975 with the Circuit Criminal Court, Third Judicial District,
Dagupan City, charging Salud P. Beradio with falsification of public or official documents
for making false entries in her daily time .records on: 1) October 12, 1972 in Criminal Case
CCC-0258; 2) September 4, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0259; 3) July 12 and 13, 1973 in
Criminal Case CCC-0260; 4) June 6 and 22, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0261; 5) May 28 and
30, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0262; 6) April 3, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0263; and 7)
March 15 and 23, 1973 in Criminal Case CCC-0264 that she submitted to the Commission
on Election in Manila. 5 The separate informations allege that petitioner was absent the
whole day on the days mentioned therein but to the "damage and prejudice of the National
Government," she made it appear in her time records that she was not so absent from the
office, when in fact she well knew that on such date or time she was in the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV, Resales, Pangasinan, appearing in her cases .
While petitioner raised the above-quoted legal issues which, to Us, point to the more basic
issues inherent in acts mala in se as contra distinguished from mala prohibita, We
narrowed down these issues, for proper disposition of the instant case, into whether or not
the alleged acts of falsification of public documents imputed against the petitioner were
tainted with criminal intent (dolo), and whether or not the act of alleged false narration of
facts in the daily time record bears, under the law, some semblance of colorable truth. This
We did in full considerations of the peculiar circumstances which render the instant case
novel in some respects, worthy of pronouncements from this Court.
At the outset, it must be emphasized that for a conviction of the offense of falsification of
public or official documents, defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, the requisite elements thereof must be clearly established, namely: 1)
the offender makes in a document false statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal
obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; 3) the facts narrated by him
are absolutely false, and 4) the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with
the wrongful intent of injuring a third person. 6
Of weight in Our criminal justice system is the principle that the essence of an offense is
the wrongful intent (dolo), without which it cannot exist. 7 Actus non facit reum nisi mens
set rea, the act itself does not make a man guilty unless his intentions were so. Article 3 of
the Revised Penal Code clearly indicates that malice or criminal intent (dolo) in some form
is an essential requisite of all crimes and offenses defined in the Code, except in those cases
where the element required is negligence (culpa).
On one point, however, the claim of the petitioner that she is not under strict obligation to
keep and submit a time record is not at all empty with justification. While it is true, as held
by the respondent court, 8 that the obligation to disclose the literal truth in filling up the
daily time record is required of all officers and employees in the civil service of the
government in accordance with Civil Service Rule XV, Executive Order No. 5, Series of 1909,
this vague provision, however, is rendered clear by Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service
Rule, dated December 3, 1962, later Memorandum Circular No. II, Series of 1965 which
exempt from requirements of keeping and submitting the daily time records three
categories of public officers, namely: 1) Presidential appointees; 2) chiefs and assistant
chiefs of agencies; and 3) officers in the three branches of the government. Clearly thus,
petitioner as Chief of theOffice, Office ofElection Registrar, COMELEC in the municipality of
Page 16 of 62
Rosales, Pangasinan exercising supervision over four (4) subordinate employess, would
fall under the third category aforementioned. An Election Registrar of the municipality
performing the powers, dutied , responsibilities of the COMELEC, a constitutional body, in
the conduct of national or local election, referenda, and plebiscites, in aparticular voting
district may be regarded as an officer who rank higher thab such chiefs or assistant chiefs
of agencies although he may not be a presidential appointee. Notwithstan ding such an
exemption, if the election registrars of the various municipalities all throughout the
country, who occassionaly work more than ordinary eight-hours on the last day of the
registration or on lection day, are keeping and submitting the daily time records to the
main office in Manila, it may be only to the sake of adminstrative procedural convenience
or as a matter of practice, but by reason of strict legal obligation.
On the main point, assuming, however, that petitioner is under strict legal obligation to
keep and submit the daily time records, We are definitely inclined to the view that the
alleged false entries made in the time records on the specified dates contained in the
information do not constitute falsification for having been made with no malice or
deliberate intent. Noteworthy is the fact that petitioner consistently did not dispute, but
admitted in all candor her appearances in six (6) different ways, on March 15, March 23,
May 28, June 22, July 13,, all in 1973 before the Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, Rosales,
Pangasinan, in the aforementiones cases, claiming that she did not reflect this absences in
her daily time records because they were for few minute-duration, the longest was on
March 15, 1973 being for forty-five (45) minutes; they could be absorbed within the
allowed coffee breaks of 30 minutes in the morning and in the afternoon; that as Chief of
Office, and all Election Registrars of the COMELEC for that matter, she is allowed to have
one (1) day leave during week days provided she worked on a Saturday: and that her brief
absences did not in any way interfere with or interrupt her official duties as an Election
Registrar. Above all, petitioner categorically emphasized that her appearances in court
were duly authorized by the COMELEC, which in certain instances were as counsel de
oficio, and no remuneration whatsoever from her clients was received by her,
Finding that the justifications claimed by Beradio as unavailing, the Court of Appeals ruled
that her various appearances in court were not on official business, and the permission
granted her by the COMELEC was to appear in behalf of her relatives, and she was still
obligated to reflect in her daily time records only the hours when she was actually in the
office. 9
We are not convinced. The Court of First Instance, Branch XIV, in Rosales, Pangasinan, is
only two (2) meters from her own office as Election Registrar in the said municipality. She
had standing authority to act as de oficio counsel given by the COMELEC evidently in
furtherance of the free legal aid service program of the Integrated Bar, and an Identical
policy of the Government itself, 10 especially as COMELEC lawyers, before any election had
been held during the regime of martial law, did not have much office work to keep them
busy. This state of virtual absence of electoral activities is what prompted COMELEC to
authorize its lawyers to take active part in the free legal aid program above adverted to, if
to do so would not unduly interfere with their work. In recognition of the long standing
policy of the COMELEC in response to the legal aid program of the Government 11 and the
"free access to the courts" provision of the 1973 Constitution, 12 the COMELEC, by
Resolution No. 1401, 13 formally created the Legal Assistance Office thereby constituting
all COMELEC lawyers with rank of division chief and below as COMELEC Legal Assistance
Officers. Even prior to the formal creation of the Legal Assistance Office, the liberal policy
of the COMELEC in allowing its Election Registrars to act as counsel in areas where there
are no lawyers available is, indeed, laudable.
Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to
commit the crime with which she is charged can be imputed against the petitioner. In the
information, it was alleged that the petitioner was not in her office for the full office hours
from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified dates therein
as she was then busy attending her cases in court. On the contrary, the evidence of the
prosecution belies its allegation of the wholeday absence in office as Election Registrar.
Records reveal that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40 or 45 minutes a day for
her appearances therein, at no instance exceeding one (1) hours.
If petitioner filled up her daily time record for the six days in question making it appear
that she attended her office from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m.
there is more than color of truth in the entry made. It is not shown that she did not report
first to her office as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, before going to the
courtroom just two (2) meters away. Petitioner thus likened her appearance to going out
for the usual coffee breaks. The comparison is not even apt for during the while she
appeared in court, she was rendering service more, if not wholly, for the public good, than
just for her own well-being as when she goes out for snack during the coffee-break period.
The court being only two (2) meters away from her office, she did not even have to go so
far as when one goes out for snack. What is more, everytime she appeared in court, she
surely must have made this fact officially of record in the court proceedings, something
which is not done with leaving the office room for coffee breaks. In fine, the entries in
petitioner's daily time records were not absolutely false. The alleged false entry may be
said to have a color of truth, not a downright and willful falsehood which alone would
constitute falsification as a crime. 14 As Cuello Calon stated: "La mera inexacted tio es
bastante para integrar este delito (Cuello Calon, Derecho Penal 6th Ed. Vol. 11, p. 216, cited
in People vs. Villena, et al., 51 O.G. 5691; People vs. La Corte, CA-G. R. No. 05818-CR; U.S. vs.
Bayot, 10 Phil. 518)."
In thus preparing her daily time record the way she did, it was evidently in her belief in her
belief that she was just making of record the fact that, as was her honest opinion, she was
entitled to receive her full pay even for those days she appeared in court, rendering what
she felt was no less a public service, being in furtherance of a public policy on free legal
assistance. As a lawyer, and as in officer of the court, she, for one, aids in the
administration of justice, oathbound servant of society whose duty is not solely for the
benefit of her clients but for the public, particularly in the administration of justice. The
Page 17 of 62
court a quo itself recognize, that the COMELEC registrars, at that time, are directed to
appear as counsel de oficio when there are no lawyers to represent the parties in
litigation. 15 If petitioner is not at all appointed as counsel de oficio strictly in accordance
with the Revised Rules of Court, Rule 138, it is an undisputed fact, as reflected in court
records, that petitioner, true to her oath, acted as counsel in certain cases. On this point, if
one fills up his daily time record in the belief that, on the basis of the time so indicated
therein, she is merely making an honest claim for the pay corresponding to the time so
indicated, no intent to commit the crime of falsification of public document can be ascribed
to her. In the case of the herein petitioner, she was only submitting a time record she knew
would be the basis for computing the pay she honestly felt she deserved for the period
indicated. Indeed, the time record is required primarily, if not solely, for the purpose of
serving as basis for the determination of the amount of pay an employee is entitled to
receive for a given period.
Further, on the issue of malus animus or criminal intent, it was ruled by the court a quo,
confirmed by the respondent Court of Appeals, that in falsification of public document, in
contradistinction to private document, the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third
person is unnecessary, for, what is penalized is the undermining or infringement of the
public faith and the violation of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed, invoking the
case of People vs. Po Giok Te, 96 Phil. 918. Arguing against this ruling, petitioner cited the
case of People us. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48, which the ponente in the instant case upheld in the
case of People vs. Motus, CA-G.R. No. 18267-CR when he was in the Court of Appeals, that
although the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary, htis Court
emphasized that "it must, nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in th epublic
document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change in the public
document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change the effects which it
would otherwise produce; for, unless that happens, there could not exist the essential
element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by Article 1 (now Article 3)
of the Penal Code.
We find the petitioner's stand tenable. the evident purpose of requiring government
employees to keep time record is to show their attendance in office to work and to be paid
accordingly. Closely adhering tot he policy of no work no pay, a daily time record is
primarily, if not solely, intended to prevent damage or loss tot he government as would
result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. The integrity of the daily
time record as an official document, however, remains untarnished if the damages sought
to be prevented has not been produced. As this ponente observed in the case of People v.
Motus, supra while it is true that a time record is an official document, it is not criminally
falsified if it does not pervert its avowed purpose as when it does not cause damage to the
government. It may be different in the case of a public document with continuing interest
affecting the public welfare which is naturally damaged if that document is falsified where
the truth is necessary for the safeguard and protection of that general interest. In the
instant case, the time records have already served their purpose. They have not caused any
damage to the government or third person because under the facts duly proven, petitioner
may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper permission
from her superiors. They may now even be condemned as having no more use to require
their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not been harmed by their contents, and
continuing faith in their verity is not affected.
As pointed out, the obligation to make entries in the daily time records of officers and
employees in the Government service is a matter of administrative procedural
convenience in the computation of salary for a given period, characteristically, not an
outright and strict measure of professional discipline, efficiency, dedication, honestly and
competence.
Under the proven and admitted facts, petitioner-appellant surely is entitled to receive the
pay as if she had stayed in her office the whole period covered by the official hours
prescribed. ,She had perhaps made herself even more useful in the general benefit of the
public than if she had remained practically Idle in her office as Election Registrar with
perhaps no work at all to attend to, its is generally the case long before elections take place,
specially during the martial law regime. The COMELEC must have been fully cognizant of
the legal implications of the peculiar facts and circumstances that obtained in this case,
when it gave petitioner full clearance after she presented her resignation when an
administrative charge was filed against her by the same complainant as in the criminal
charge. The courts, in the present criminal prosecution, should do no less. It would be too
harsh and cruel for the courts to punish petitioner not only with imprisonment but with
general disqualification and possible disbarment, for an act or omission which she
performed or failed to perform without any criminal intent. Such an insignificant
transgression, if ever it is one, would not beam the scales of justice against the petitioner,
for courts must always be, as they are, the repositories of fairness and justice. It is
inconceivable that a person who, without any attempt to conceal her appearances in court
for this is a matter always made officially of record in the court proceedings, emphatically,
not for his own private gain, but animated by the zeal of service not wanting in public
benefit, and as an officer of the court, petitioner could have acted with a deliberate
criminal intent. Moreover, what she stated in her daily time record, as earlier observed,
had more than a mere color of truth to exclude such act from the pale of the criminal
offense of falsification of public document with which she is charged.
WHEREFORE, finding the guilt of petitioner not to have been established beyond
reasonable doubt, the judgment of conviction rendered by respondent court in affirming
that of the trial court is hereby reversed, and petitioner, acquitted of the crime charged,
with costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Page 18 of 62
Page 19 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. L-55683 & 55903-04 February 22, 1982
PILAR S. LUAGUE, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Certiorari to review a decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. Nos. 22414-16 CR which
affirmed the decision of The Court of First Instance of Samar, Branch X, convicting the
petitioner of three counts of falsification of commercial documents in Criminal Cases Nos.
599, 600 and 601.
The facts are stated in the poorly written decision of the Court of Appeals thus:
Iluminado Luague, a teacher clerk in the district office of Laoang II, Northern Samar, died
at the G.B. Tan Memorial Hospital at around 7:00 o'clock in the evening of January 24,
1972 after he was confined in said hospital since January 3, 1972.
Thereafter, the then Bureau of Public Schools sent the deceased's salary warrants [Exhibits
A (599), A (600) and A (601)] to the Superintendent of schools at Catarman Northern
Samar who in turn forwarded them to the District Supervisor, Florencio Guillermo. A
payroll-warrant register accompanied the checks.
The paychecks delivered, Florencio Guillermo signed the payroll-warrant registers
certifying that on his official oath, each employee whose name appeared on the rolls had
received the salary warrant indicated opposite his name on February 7, 1972, February 17,
1972 and February 25, 1972, respectively, and returned the same to Jose Figueroa, the
District Administrative Officer of Northern Samar.
Exhibit A (599) was personally received by Pilar S. Luague, while Exhibit A (600) was
received by Glen S. Luague. Exhibit A (601) was received by Edmundo Echano, a relative of
Iliuminado Luague and who claimed to be employed in the Office of the District Supervisor.
Florencio Guillermo claimed that upon discovering his mistake, he asked appellant to
return the treasury warrants issued in the name of her husband Iluminado Luague, further
claiming that appellant promised to do so, but actually did not. Upon the receipt of the
xerox copies from the IBM Section of the Bureau of Public Schools, Guillermo discovered
that the treasury warrants in question had been encashed by appellant and Glen Luague
with different local stores at Laoang. Exhibit A (599) was cleared on February 22, 1972,
while Exhibit A (600) was deposited to the account of a certain Lee and/or Nicol Chu, Jr. at
Philippine Bank of Communications; and Exhibit A (601) was deposited to the account of
Colgate-Palmolive Philippines, Inc. Appellant admitted having endorsed the treasury
warrants by means of which she was able to encash the same.
For signing the name of her husband Iluminado Luague as payee on three treasury
warrants for purposes of endorsement, appellant stands charged with the crime of Estafa
thru Falsification of Commercial Document. [Note: The appellant was charged with three
counts of estafa thru falsification of commercial document but was convicted of
falsification only.]
It is the petitioner's contention before Us as well as in the Court of Appeals that she acted
in good faith or had no criminal intent when she cashed her deceased husband's paychecks.
As stated in the decision of the Court of Appeals:
Appellant puts up the defense of good faith in signing theme of her deceased husband in
the treasury warrants in question.
Her version: The late Iluminado Luague was on leave from January 3 to February 9, 1972,
as evidenced by his approved application for sick leave. On January 23, 1972, the Principal,
Jose Infante, while visiting Iluminado Luague in the hospital, handed to Luague a check
representing his differentials. Luague in turn handed over the check to his wife, the herein
appellant, who was then present. Before Infante left, he informed the Luague spouses that
Luague's pay check for the second half of January 1972 had arrived and advised Mrs.
Luague to get the same from Florencio Guillermo so that she could use it to pay for
medicine and hospital expenses of her husband.
Iluminado Luague instructed her [his (sic)] wife to get the check from Florencio Guillermo.
Appellant went to the house of Guillermo in the afternoon of January 23, 1972. Guillermo
asked her to sign the name of her husband on the payroll warrant register and
counter-sign with her initials. Guillermo then handed her the treasury warrant [Exhibit A
(599)].
Iluminado Luague died on January 24, 1972. From the proceeds of the warrants they
received were paid the amount the Luague family owed the drugstores owned by Amor
Carandang, Purisima Saba and Luz Tan. A treasury warrant was also paid to Edward Kam
from whom they bought construction materials for the tomb of the deceased and to Ong
Page 20 of 62
Kiat store for the payment of materials used for the coffin of the late Iluminado Luague attitude repeatedly urged by the First Lady, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos, would have been highly
which were purchased on credit. in order under the circumstances.

Upon the instruction of Amor Carandang and on her belief and upon suggestion of WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby granted; the decision of the Court of Appeals is
Florencio Guillermo himself that the warrants could be used to settle their financial reversed; the petitioner is acquitted of the charges against her. No costs.
obligations incurred by the hospitalization and death of her late husband, appellant
indorsed the said treasury warrants by signing the name of Iluminado Luague. SO ORDERED.

Heirs of deceased government employees are entitled to whatever unpaid salaries the Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., De Castro and Ericta, JJ., concur.
deceased employee failed to receive. Appellant claims that it was upon this honest belief
that she endorsed the treasury warrants of her late husband to defray for the necessary
Escolin J., took no part.
expenses incurred due to the latter's hospitalization, funeral and burial.

The Court of Appeals did not reject the petitioner's version, except in respect of the date
when the first paycheck was delivered. In affirming the decision of the trial court, the
Court of Appeals followed the simplistic procedure of applying literally the letter of the law,
namely: there was falsification because the petitioner "signed her husband's name in
indorsing the treasury warrants in question." The Court of Appeals failed to take into
account the following facts: That the petitioner signed her husband's name to the checks
because they were delivered to her by no less than her husband's district supervisor long
after the husband's death which was known to the supervisor; that she used the proceeds
of the checks to pay for the expenses of her husband's last illness and his burial; and that
she believed that she was entitled to the money as an advance payment for her husband's
vacation and sick leave credits the money value of which exceeded the value of the checks.
In the fight of these circumstances, We cannot ascribe criminal intent to the petitioner. We
sustain her claim that she acted in good faith.

During the hearing, it was brought out that the government did not sustain any financial
loss due to the encashment of the checks because the petitioner's husband had
accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value of which exceeded the value of the
three paychecks and the value of the checks was simply deducted from the money value of
the leaves. This explains why the petitioner was not convicted of estafa but of falsification
only. While we do not mean to imply that if there is no damage there can be no falsification,
We do say that the absence of damage is an element to be considered to determine
whether or not there is criminal intent.

We notice here the lack of compassion on the part of the prosecuting fiscal, the trial judge,
and the Court of Appeals. Even the Solicitor General who is alert in seeking to correct
improper convictions by trial courts has somehow misappreciated the evidence in this
case.

The accused is a poor widow who was obviously in a state of bewilderment due to the
recent death of her husband when she cashed the paychecks. She was also in dire need of
money to settle the expenses for her husband's last illness and his burial. A compassionate
Page 21 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines their office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify the Daily Report
SUPREME COURT of Securities/Documents under custody dated March 30, 1982, which is an official
Manila document evidencing the securities transactions and/or operations of the Makati Branch
of the aforenamed bank, and which it was their official duty to prepare and submit to their
EN BANC superiors, by then and there indicating in said document, for the purpose of hiding the loss
or disappearance while in their custody of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th series, with
face value of P500,000.00 each, that the beginning balance of securities under their
G.R. No. L-67472 July 3, 1987
custody as to volume was 1,533 pieces, when, the ending balance as to volume in the
previous day's report was 1,539 pieces and that the beginning balance as to face value in
DARIO CABIGAS Y CACHO, petitioner, the previous day's report was P610,095,000.00 and thereafter falsely stating in the
vs. footnote of the same document that the reduction was due to "Adjustment on Erroneous
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. Entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" the truth being that the six (6) pieces of treasury bills
with aggregate face value of P3,000,000.00 were not erroneously entered in either the
PARAS, J.: Securities Delivery Receipt or the Daily Report of Securities /Documents under Custody,
both dated March 9, 1982, but were discovered to have been missing after an inventory
Under separate informations both dated September 20, 1982, the Office of the Tanodbayan conducted by accused on March 20, 1982, thereby making an untruthful statement in a
charges Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto Reynes y Lopez on two (2) counts, with the narration of facts in violation of par. 4 of Articles 171 of the Revised Penal Code.
crime of Falsification of Official Documents allegedly committed in the following manner:
After arraignment and trial, the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision in both cases, the
(1) Criminal Case No. 6529 dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

That on or about March 29, 1982, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto
Reynes y Lopez, both public officers being then employed as Securities Custodian and 1. In Criminal Case No. 6529 ACQUITTING the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and
Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch, Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio and ordering their bail bonds in the said
a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring together, taking case cancelled.
advantage of their official position and committing the crime herein charged in relation to
their Office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify ... Securities 2. In Criminal Case No. 6938:
Delivery Receipt dated March 9, 1982 ... evidencing, among others, receipt by them in their
official capacity of Treasury Bills bearing Serial No. A-000064 up to A000082 of the 795th
a) Finding the accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
series, by then and there making alterations and/or intercalations thereon to the effect
principal of the crime of Falsification of a Public or Official Document defined and
that only treasury bills bearing SN-A-000064 to A-000076 were received by them on
penalized under Article 171, paragraph No. 6 of the Revised Penal Code without any
March 9, 1982, for the purpose of hiding or concealing the loss while in their custody of six
mitigating or aggravating circumstances; and applying the indeterminate Sentence Law,
(6) treasury bills bearing SN-A-000077 to A-000082 of the 795th series, thereby changing
hereby sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TWO (2) YEARS, FOUR (4)
the meaning of said Securities Delivery Receipt.
MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional as minimum, to EIGHT (8) YEARS and
ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as maximum, to pay a fine of P2,000.00 without subsidiary
(2) Criminal Case No. 6938 imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

That on or about March 30, 1982 in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, and within b) ACQUITTING accused Benedicto Reynes y Lopez, with costs de officio, an ordering his
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho and Benedicto bail bond cancelled.
Reynes y Lopez, both public officers, being then employed as Securities Custodian and
Securities Receiving Clerk, respectively, of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch,
SO ORDERED.
a government-owned and/or controlled corporation, conspiring together, and taking
advantage of their official positions and committing the crime herein charged in relation to
Page 22 of 62
The instant petition is an appeal, interposed by herein petitioner Dario Cabigas y Cacho
from the foregoing decision in Criminal Case No. 6938.
The following pertinent facts are not disputed: Petitioner Dario Cabigas is the Securities
Custodian of the Securities Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines assigned to its
branch at Makati, Metro Manila. Assisting him in his work is Benedicto Reynes, the
securities receiving clerk. The Fund Management Department (FMD) of the Land Bank of
the Philippines is engaged in money market and securities trading transactions. The
securities which are in the form of treasury notes and bills are in turn deposited with the
Securities Section of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati Branch.
On March 9, 1982, the Fund Management Department, delivered to the Securities Section,
Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines, for safekeeping, 112 pieces of treasury
notes and treasury bills worth P46,000,000.00 and for which a copy of the Securities
Delivery Receipt (SDR) Exh. D, was issued to the Fund Management Dept. while the
original of the same was retained by the Securities Section. Included in the securities
received on March 9, 1982 are 19 pieces of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to
A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of P500,000.00 each, or a total amount of
P9,500,000.00. After receiving the securities, the accused would prepare the Daily Report
on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the securities transactions
and operations of the Makati Branch of the Land Bank of the Philippines. This has been the
routine procedure being adopted by the accused in the performance of his duty as a
Security Custodian.
On March 29, 1982, in the course of their inventory of treasury notes and bills deposited
with them, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six (6) treasury bills of the 795th
series with a total value of P3,000,000.00. Upon verification that Securities Delivery
Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982, Exhibit C, was the source document of the missing
securities which were delivered to them for safekeeping, accused Reynes crossed out with
a red ink in the said document the last two digits "82" and the addition after them of the
figure "76" on the serial numbers A-000064 to A-000082 of the 19 treasury bills of the
795th series with a total maturity value of P9,500,000.00. Then at the bottom of the SDR
Cabigas placed the notation "For adjustment" and below it the date "3/29/82." Then upon
Cabigas' suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch manager, Aurora Pigram
When the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 was prepared, the number of treasury bills of the
795th series stood at 1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.00.
The following day, Reynes prepared a draft report for March 30, 1982 by Carrying forward
the ending balance of the treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC dated
March 29, 1982. However, instead of following the draft prepared by Reynes, Cabigas
prepared his own report-DR SDUC (Exh. "G ") dated March 30, 1982 wherein he indicated
1,533 pieces of treasury bills of the 795th series with a total amount of P607,095,000.00
which the latter claimed to be the number of securities of the 795th series in his
possession at the time of the preparation of said report. At the bottom of DR SDUC (Exh.
"G") Cabigas place the notation "Adjustment on Erroneous Entry (incoming) dated March 9,
1982" as legend of the asterisk (*) sign which appears after the figure "1,533."
On May 20, 1982, a certain Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central
Bank of the Philippines a treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 in the
amount of P500,000.00. Upon investigation by NBI agents, it was discovered that the Land
Bank of the Philippines Makati Branch Manager, Aurora Pigram was the one who
negotiated the said treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities. Further investigation
revealed that the five (5) missing treasury bills with series numbers A-000077 to
A-000081 were negotiated by Pigram with the Home Savings Bank to secure a loan. The
Land Bank immediately sought the assistance of the NBI in investigating the case. On May
24, 1982, Cabigas and Reynes were investigated by NBI agents. After the investigation,
Cabigas and Reynes were arrested for having allegedly conspired together in falsifying the
Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) dated March 9, 1982 (Exh. "C") and the Daily Report on
Securities/Documents under custody (DR SDUC) Exh. G dated March 30, 1982 and for
which the corresponding informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both accused
were acquitted in Criminal Case No. 6529. However, accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho was
convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938, while his co-accused was acquitted therein.
In convicting accused Dario Cabigas y Cacho, the Sandiganbayan stated in its now assailed
Decision that
In the case of Exhibit "G", the Daily Report on Securities/Documents Under Custody (DR
SDUC) for March 30, 1982, the alleged falsification consists of the following entries (figures)
pertaining to treasury bills: "1,533", "607,095,000.00", "1,533 and 607,095,000.00
"marked on the document as Exhibit G-1, and the legend of the asterisk (*) sign at the
bottom portion reading, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82"
marked as Exhibit G-2. The numbers "1,533" and "607,095,000.00" represent the volume
and the total face/maturity value, respectively, of the treasury bills supposedly in the
custody of the Securities Section as of March 30, 1982. Those entries were falsifications,
the prosecution maintains, because the correct number of treasury bills deposited with the
Securities Section as of that date was 1,539 valued at P610,095,000.00; that the said
figures were altered to "1,533 and 607,095,000.00," respectively, to conceal the loss or
disappearance of 6 treasury bills worth P3,000,000.00, and that the footnote at the bottom
portion of the document (Exh. G-2) was written to attribute the reduction in the number of
treasury bills from "1,539" to "1,533" to mistake or error in the entries in the Securities
Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982 (Exh. C).
The discrepancy in the figures is indeed apparent. In the DR SDUC for March 29, 1982 (Exh.
F), the ending balance on the number of treasury bills at the close of office hours on that
day was 1,539 pieces with a total face/maturity value of P610,095,000.00 (Exh. F-1).
Accordingly, the beginning balance on the number of the same treasury bills on the
following day, March 30, 1982, must also be 1,539 pieces with a total face/Maturity value
of P610,095,000.00. But as it was made to appear in the DR SDUC for March 30, 1982
Page 23 of 62
(Exhs. G and G-1), the beginning and ending balances on the number and value of treasury
bills for that date were 1,533 pieces and P607,095,000.00 maturity value.1avvphi1
The question now is, who caused the alterations and what was caused the alteration and
what was the purpose behind them.
xxx xxx xxx
By changing the original figures in the draft of the DR SDUC from "1,539" and "610" to
"1,533" and "607" respectively, and causing Reynes to type the final copy of the DR SDUC
on the basis of the corrected draft Cabigas caused the document to show that the treasury
bills in their custody as of March 30, 1982 were 1,533 pieces with a total face/maturity
value of P607,095,000.00. By placing, likewise, an asterisk (*) sign after the figure "1,533"
and writing the words "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as
legend of the asterisk (*) sign, Cabigas caused to make it appear that the discrepancy of 6
treasury bills valued at P3,000,000.00 was due to error in the entries in the Securities
Delivery Receipt of March 9, 1982(Exh. C). Considering that the said SDR of March 9, 1982
(Exh. C) did not contain any error but reflected the number of securities received by them
on that day, it is obvious that Cabigas made the alterations in Exhibit G and the misleading
footnote (Exh. G-2) in order to suppress, hide or conceal the fact that the 6 treasury bills
comprising the discrepancy were lost while in their custody.
The alterations amounted to falsification of Exhibit G, a public or official document, under
paragraph No. 4, Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code, by making untruthful statements
in a narration of facts. As Securities Custodian, Cabigas was under obligation to disclose in
the said document the correct number and total maturity value of the securities under his
official custody as of March 30, 1982.
It is a settled doctrine that in falsification by an employee under par. No. 4 of Article 171,
which reads-"by making untruthful statements in a narration of facts,"-the following
elements must concur-
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false; and
(d) That the perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful
intent of injuring a third person.
Herein petitioner contends that the foregoing elements are not present in the case at bar.
The correction of the figure from 1,539 to 1,533 pieces to conform to the actual number of
treasury under custody is not falsification because it was made to speak the truth (US vs.
Mateo, 25 Phil. 324). The placing of an asterisk (*) sign after the figure "1,533" and writing
the words, "Adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 3/09/82" as legend of the
asterisk sign, contrary to the ruling of the respondent court, was not effected to hide or
conceal the fact that the missing 6 treasury bills were lost. It would be far more difficult to
detect or discover the loss if there was no asterisk or footnote in the DR SDUC Exh. G. In
fact, the evidence discloses that immediately upon discovery of the loss on March 29, 1982,
petitioner reported the matter to his immediate supervisor, Estela L. Espiritu and Branch
Manager of the Securities Section, Aurora Pigram. This shows good faith and lack of motive
on the part of petitioner to conceal the said loss.
Petitioner further argues that the Daily Report on Securities/Documents under Custody
(DR SDUC) is a form purely devised and adopted by him. This form was never required,
neither was it introduced nor prescribed by the Land Bank. Petitioner, therefore, was not
under "legal obligation" to disclose in the DR SDUC or SDR, the correct number and total
maturity value of the securities under their official custody as of a given date. It is purely
optional on the part of petitioner to use the said forms.
The Honorable Solicitor General recommends that the accused be acquitted because —
There is nothing to show the DR SDUC dated March 30, 1982, Exh. G, for the alleged
falsification of which petitioner was convicted in Criminal Case No. 6938 is a form the
submission of which was or is required by law. In the petition for review, petitioner points
out that as testified by him the form was not an official form of the Land Bank. The form
was his own initiative adopted "for our own convenience and also for reference purposes."
Petitioner therefore, was not under legal obligation to disclose or reveal the truth by said
DR SDUC. In the absence of such obligation and of the alleged wrongful intent, defendant
cannot be legally convicted of the crime of falsification of public document with which he is
charged. (People vs. Quasha, 93 Phil. 333).
WHEREFORE, on ground of reasonable doubt, the decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 6938 is hereby REVERSED and another one rendered ACQUITTING the
petitioner, Dario Cabigas y Cacho.
Cost de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
Page 24 of 62
Page 25 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-33254 & G.R. No. L-33253 January 20, 1978
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, JUAN SAMSON and ANASTACIO
QUIRIMIT, defendants. JUAN SAMSON and defendant-appellant.
PROVINCE OF PANGASINAN, offended party-appellee,
vs.
HEIRS OF LICERIO P. SENDAYDIEGO, defendants-appellants. *
Norberto J. Quisumbing for appellant Sendaydiego.
Donato & Rillera for appellant Samson.
Office of the Solicitor General for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:
In these three cases of malversation through falsification, the prosecution's theory is that
in 1969 Licerio P. Sendaydiego, the provincial treasurer of Pangasinan, in conspiracy with
Juan Samson y Galvan, an employee of a lumber and hardware store in Dagupan City, and
with Anastacio Quirimit, the provincial auditor, as an accomplice, used six (6) forged
provincial vouchers in order to embezzle from the road and bridge fund the total sum of
P57,048.23.
The provincial voucher in these cases has several parts. In the upper part with the legend
"ARTICLE OR SERVICE" the nature of the obligation incurred is indicated. That part is
supposed to be signed by two officials of the provincial engineer's office and by the
governor's representative.
The middle part of the voucher contains five numbered printed paragraphs. Paragraph 1 is
a certificate to be signed by the creditor. It is stated therein that the creditor vouches that
the expenses "were actually and necessarily incurred". In the instant cases paragraph 1
was not signed presumably because it is not relevant to the purchase of materials for
public works projects.
Paragraph 2 is a certification that the expenses are correct and have been lawfully
incurred. It is signed by the provincial engineer.
Paragraph 3 contains these words: "Approved for pre-audit and payment, appropriations
and funds being available therefore." This is signed by the provincial treasurer.
Paragraph 4 is a certification which, as filed up in Exhibit K, Voucher No. 10724 dated
February 28, 1969, reads:
I certify that this voucher has been pre-audited and same may be paid in the amount of
sixteen thought seven hundred twenty-seven and 52/100 (P16,727.52) in cash or in check,
provided there is sufficient fund cover the payment.
This is signed by the auditor.
Paragraph 5 is a certification signed by the provincial treasurer that the account
mentioned in the provincial engineer's certification "was paid in the amount and on the
date shown below and is chargeable as shown in the summary hereof. ... ." It may be noted
that the provincial treasurer signs two part of the voucher.
Following paragraph 5, and as referred to therein, is the receipt of the signed by the
creditor. As accomplished in Exhibit K, the receipt reads (it was signed according to the
prosecution by Juan Samson, a point which is disputed by him):
Received this 31st day of March, 1969, from L P. Sendaydiego, Province of Pangasinan the
sum of seven hundred twenty-seven pesos & 52/100 (16,727.52) in full payment of the
above stated account, which I hereby certify to be correct. Paid by Check
No. .................................
CARRIED CONSTR. SUPPLY CO. By: (Sgd.) JUAN SAMSON
According to the prosecution, Samson also signed on the left margin of the six vouchers
below the stamped words: "Presented to Prov. Treasurer. By Juan Samson."
Voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K). — This Provincial voucher, dated February 28, 1969,
evidences the payment of PI 6,727.52 to the Carried Construction Supply Co. of Dagupan
City for lumber and hardware materials supposedly used in the repair of the bridge in
Barrio Libertad at the Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along the Nueva Ecija boundary
(Exh. K). The voucher makes reference to invoice No. 3327 and other supporting papers.
Page 26 of 62
The falsity of that provincial voucher is proven by the following intances:
(a) That there was no project for the repair of the bridge at Barrio Libertad (P. 1; Exh. Z).
(b) That the amount of P16,727.52 was never received by the Carried Construction Supply
Co The alleged official receipt No. 3025 of the company dated March, 1969 (Exh. K-6) is
forged.
(c) That the lumber and materials mentioned in Exhibit K were never delivered by the
company to the provincial government
(d) That in the provincial voucher, Exhibit K, and in the supporting requisition and issue
voucher (RIV) No. 2206 dated January 29, 1969 (Exh. A), covering the same lumber and
hardware ma the signatures of the following office were forged: Salvador F. Oropilla senior
civil engineer; Rodolfo P. Mencias, supervising civil engineer Victoriano M. Sevilleja, acting
provincial engineer, and Ricardo B. Probincias, chief of equipment of the governor's office.
These four office denied that their signatures in the two vouchers, Exhibits A and B, are
their genuine signatures.
(e) That the imprint of the rubber stamp on Exhibits A and B, containing the words
"Approved: For and By Authority of the Governor (signed) Ricardo B. Primicias, Chief of
Equipment", is not the imprint of the genuine rubber stamp used in Primicias office.
(f) That charge invoice No. 3327 of the Carried Construction Supply Co. dated February 18,
1969, containing a description and the prices of the lumber and hardware material (Exh.
B), is fake because, according to Ambrosio Jabanes, the company's assistant manager, the
company's invoice No. 3327 was issued to the Mountain Agricultural College (Exh. II-1).
Oropilla denied that his alleged signature on Exhibit B is his signature.
(g) That three other documents, supporting the provincial voucher (Exh. K), were also
forged. Those documents are the taxpayer's cate dated February 10, 1969 (Exh. C) stating
that no tax is due on the goods sold in the fake invoice No. 3327 and the two certificates as
to the samples of lumber allegedly purchased from the Carried Construction Supply Co.,
(Exh. D and E). Narciso P. Martinez, a district forester, denied that his signatures in
Exhibits D and E are his signatures.
(h) That Angelo C. Manuel the checker of the provincial auditor's office, denied that his
signature on the left margin is his signature (Exh. A-10).
The forged character of provincial voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K) is incontrovertible.
Other five forged voucher. — Five other provincial vouchers evidencing supposed
payments of certain amounts to the Carried Construction Supply Co. for lumber and
hardware materials supposingly used in the repair of other bridges were also falsified.
These five vouchers are the following:
(1) Voucher No. 11995 dated April 29, 1969 evidencing the payment of P14,571.81 for
number and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of Bayaoas bridge at the
Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road (Exh. O).
(2) Voucher No. 11869 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P5,187.28 'or
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Panganiban bridge at
the UminganTayug Road (Exh. P)
(3) Voucher No. 11870 dated April 28, 1969 evidencing the payment of P6,290.60 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Cabatuan bridge at the
Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. Q).
(4) Voucher No. 11871 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the payment of P9,769.64 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Casabar bridge at the
Binalonan-San Manuel Road (Exh. R).
(5) Voucher No. 11872 dated April 15, 1969 evidencing the Payment of P4,501.38 for
lumber and hardware materials allegedly used in the repair of the Baracbac bridge at the
Umingan-Guimba Road (Exh. S).
As in the case of voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), Oropilla, Mencias, and Primicias declared that
their signatures in the said five vouchers are not their genuine signatures. Samson, who
hand-carried the said vouchers for processing, did not turn over to the provincial auditor's
office the papers supporting the said vouchers after the vouchers had been pre-audited.
Hence, those supporting papers could not be presented in evidence.
Jabanes, the aforementioned assistant manager of the Carried Construction Supply Co.,
testified that the lumber and hardware materials mentioned in the five vouchers were
never delivered by his company to the provincial government. The charge invoices
mentioned in the said vouchers were cancelled invoices issued to the Mountain
Agricultural College. The projected repairs of the bridges were fictitious.
The company's cashier testified that the company never received the payments for the
lumber and hardware materials. The receipts evidencing payments (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4
are fake official receipts. The cashier produced in court the genuine official receipts (Exh.
LL to LL-7) bearing the serial numbers of the fake receipts. The genuine receipts do not
refer to transactions with the provincial government.
Samson played a stellar role in the processing of the six vouchers. He used to be an
employee of the pro treasurer's office. He resigned and worked with several firms doing
Page 27 of 62
business with the provincial government. In 1969 he was the collector of the Carried
Construction Supply Co. He represented that firm in its dealings with the offices of the
governor, provincial auditor, provincial engineer and provincial treasurer. He was
personally known to those provincial officials and the employees of their offices (21-22
Sendaydiego's brief).
The six (6) forged provincial vouchers, with their respective supporting papers, were
hand-carried by Samson. He delivered the papers to Carmencita Castillo, the ledger clerk in
the provincial engineer's office, for recording and for her signature (Ekh. DD).
Thereafter, Samson brought the papers to the provincial treasurer's office. Marcelo
Crusade, a laborer in that office who performed the chore of recording the vouchers and
payrolls, recorded Vouchers Nos. 11869, 11871 and 11872 (Exh. P, R and S). Crusadas
initials appear on the upper lefthand corner of the said vouchers with the date 4/17/69.
Samson signed on the left margin of the vouchers to indicate that he presented them to the
provincial t r's office. Crusade said that after Samson had presented the said papers to him,
Samson brought them to Ricardo Baraan, the book-keeper of the provincial treasurer's
office for processing and for the latter's signature (Exh. WW).
From Baraan's office, Samson hand-carried the vouchers to the provincial auditor's office.
He asked Virginia Cruz, a clerk to record the same (Exh. CC).
Afterwards, Samson asked Donato Rosete the assistant provincial treasurer, to initialled
the voucher After Rosete had initialled the vouchers, Samson went to the provincial
treasurer's office where the amounts covered by the voucher were paid by Sendaydiego to
him in cash (instead of by check) as representative of the Carried Construction Supply Co.
(Exh. EE). He received the payments on March 31 and April 29 and 28 (four payments on
that date) as shown on the face of the vouchers.
The signature of Sendaydiego and Quirimit, the auditor, on the said six vouchers are
admittedly authentic. Sendaydiego signed the vouchers ahead of Rosete, his assistant.
Sendaydiego's defense is that he signed the vouchers in the honest belief that the
signatures therein of the provincial office concerned were genuine because the voucher
had been pre-audited and approved by the auditor.
Samson denied the authenticity of his two signatures on each of the six vouchers showing
that he received from Sendaydiego the amounts covered thereby as representative of the
lumber and hardware firm (Exh. OO to TT) and that he presented the vouchers to the
provincial s treasurer 's office (Exh. 6-12 — Samson). Sendaydiego testified that Samson's
signatures are genuine.
In connection with the six vouchers, Sendaydiego, Samson and Quirimit were charged with
malversation through falsification in three docketed as follows:
1. Criminal Case No. 23349 involving provincial voucher No. 10724 dated February 28,
1969 in the sum of P16,7Z7.52 (Exh. X), L-33252.
2. Criminal Case No. 23350 involving provincial vouchers Nos. 11869, 11870, 11871 dated
April 15 (two dates) 28 and 15, 1969 for the respective amounts of P5,187.28, P6,290.60,
P9,769-64 and P4,501.38 (four vouchers, Exh. P, Q, R and S), now L-33253.
3. Criminal Case No. 23351 involving provincial voucher No. 11955 dated April 29, 1969 in
the sum of P14,571.81 (Exh. O), now L-33254.
After trial the lower court acquitted the auditor, Quirimit and found Sendaydiego and
Samnson guilty of malversation through falsification of public or official documents
imposing each of the following penalties:
(1) In Criminal Case No. 23349, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and
twenty-one-days, as minimum, to eighteen years, two months and twenty-one days
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and a fine of P16,727.52 and to indemnify solidarity
the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
(2) In Criminal Case No. 23350, the penalty of reclusion perpetua and a fine of P29,748.90
and to indemnify solidarily the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount;
and
(3) In Criminal Case No. 23351, an indeterminate sentence of twelve years, ten months and
twenty-one days, as minimum, to eighteen year two months and twenty-one days
of reclusion temporal as maximum , and a fine of P14,571.81 and to indemnify solidarity
the provincial government of Pangasinan in the same amount.
Sendaydiego and Samson appealed to this Court.
Sendaydiego died on October 5, 1976. His appeal as to his criminal liability was dismissed.
Death extinguished his criminal liability remained. The resolution of July 8, 1977
dismissing Sendaydiego's appeal read s follows:
The death of appellant Sendaydiego during the pendency of his appeal or before the
judgment of conviction rendered against him by the lower court became final and
executory extinguished his criminal liability meaning his obligation to serve the personal
or imprisonment penalties and his liability to pay the fines or pecuniary penalties (Art.
89[1], Revised Penal Code; 1 Viada, Codigo Penal, 4th Ed., 565).
Page 28 of 62
The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of
P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action
in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules of court). The civil action for the civil liability is separate and distinct from the
criminal action (People and Manuel vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287; Roa vs. De la Cruz, 107 Phil.
8).
When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final judgment
in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided' in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court (Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court).
The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered
against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on
appeal (Torrijos vs. Court of Appeals, L-40336, October 24, 1975; 67 SCRA 394).
The accountable public officer may still be civilly liable for the funds improperly disbursed
although he has no criminal liability (U S. vs. Elvina, 24 Phil. 230; Philippine National Bank
vs. Tugab, 66 Phil. 583).
In view of the foregoing, notwithstanding the dismissal of the appeal of the deceased
Sendaydiego insofar as his criminal liability is concerned, the Court Resolved to continue
exercising appellate jurisdiction over his possible civil liability for the money claims of the
Province of Pangasinan arising from the alleged criminal acts complained of, as if no
criminal case had been instituted against him, thus making applicable, in determining his
civil liability, Article 30 of the Civil Code (Note: The lower court had issued an order of
attachment against him on January 13, 1970 for the sum of P36,487 and in the brief for
said appellant, there is no specific assignment of error affecting the civil liability fixed by
the trial court.) and, for that purpose, his counsel is directed to inform this Court within
ten (10) days of the names and addresses of the decedent's heirs or whether or not his
estate is under administration and has a duly appointed judicial administrator. Said heirs
or administrator will be substituted for the deceased insofar as the civil action for the civil
liability is concerned (Secs. 16 and 17, Rule 3, Rules of Court). According to Sendaydiego's
brief, he had a wife and ten children named Arturo, Licerio, Jr., Prospero, Regulo, Eduardo,
Cesar, Nola, Aida, Wilfredo and Manolo (deceased).
The title of this case should be amended to show its civil aspect by adding thereto the
following. Province of Pangasinan vs. Heirs of Licerio P. Sendaydiego.
Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability
which is the basis of the civil liability for which his estate would be liable for which his
estate would be liable.
Sendaydiedo's appeal; civil liability of his estate. — In view of Sendaydiego's death, it is not
necessary to resolve his first two assignments of error, wherein he assails the imposition
of reclusion perpetua as a cruel and unusual penalty and wherein it is argued that there is
no complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
In the third assignment of error, it is contended that the trial court erred in allowing
private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo to prosecute the case thereby allegledly
subjecting the accused to proceedings marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias and
political self-interest.
Atty. Vicente D. Millora, a senior member of the provincial board actually handled the
prosecution of the case from the preliminary investigation, which started on June 5, 1969,
up to the termination of the trial on July 29, 1970.
At the commencement of the preliminary investigation, the counsel for the accused auditor
inquired whether Atty. Millora was authorized by the provincial board to act as private
prosecutor in representation of the province of Pangasinan, the offended party. Atty.
Millora replied that there was a board resolution designating him as a private prosecutor.
The acting provincial commander, who filed the complaints manifested to the trial court
that he had authorized Atty. Millora to act as private prosecutor (4-8 tsn June 5, 1969).
Another defense counsel filed a written motion to inhibit Millora and the others as private
prosecutors. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 18, 1969 (p. 40, Record
of Criminal Case No. 23350).
After the termination of the p investigation conducted by the lower court, the provincial
fiscal of Pangasinan and the city final of Dagupan City filed three informations against the
accused all dated November 4, 1969.
At the commencement of the trial on February 23, 1970 the city fiscal, an assistant
provincial fiscal and Atty. Millora, the private prosecutor, appeared for the prosecution.
The city fiscal moved "that the private prosecutor (Millora) be authorized to conduct the
examination subject to our (the fiscal's) control and supervision". The trial court granted
the motion (7 tsn).
At the hearing on April 23, 1970 the same city fiscal moved that Atty. Urbiztondo be
authorized to examine the prosecution witnesses under his supervision and control The
trial court granted the motion (155 tsn).
Page 29 of 62
The record shows that at every hearing the provincial fiscal, the city fiscal or an assistant
fiscal were present together with the private prosecutor.
Under the foregoing circumstances, we believe that there was substantial compliance with
the rule that the criminal action should be "prosecuted under the direction and control of
the fiscal" and that "the provincial fiscal shall represent the province" in any court (Sec.4,
Rule 110, Rules of Court; sec. 1683, Revised Administrative Code).
The observation of Sendaydiego's counsel, that the imposition of reclusion perpetua "could
have been the result of the undue publicity, prejudgment, bias and political interest which
attended the proceedings ", is not well-founded. The trial court's decision dispels any
doubt as to its impartiality. The evidence in the three cases is mainly documentary. The
unassailable probative value of the documents involved rather than bias and prejudice,
was the decisive factor on which the trial court anchored the judgment of conviction.
Moreover, as already adverted to, Sendaydiego's death had rendered moot the issue as to
the propriety of the imposition of reclusion perpetua. And, as will be shown later, reclusion
perpetua cannot be imposed in these cases because the crimes committed were not
complex.
The other seven assigmments of error made by Sendaydiego's counsel refer to the trial
court's conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
malversation through falsification or, specifically, that the provincial treasurer, in signing
the six vouchers, evinced "malice or fraud and that there must have been connivance
between" the two.
Several lances indicate that Sendaydiego conspired with Samson. Donato N. Rosete, the
assistant provincial treasurer, testified that, contrary to the usual procedure, he affixed his
initial to paragraph 3 of the vouchers after Sendaydiego had signed it. Rosete adhered to
that unusual procedure because the interested party, Samson who hand-carried the
vouchers, approached Rosete after he (Samson) had conferred with the provincial
treasurer and Samson told Rosete to initial the voucher because it was areglado na
(already settled) since the treasurer had already signed the voucher (54 tsn July 3, 1969).
Rosete's testimony and affidavit confute appellant Sendaydiego's contention that the trial
court erred in finding that he signed the questioned vouchers before Rosete had placed his
initial in them. After the treasurer had signed the voucher, Rosete's duty to initial it was
only ministerial (75 tsn July 3, 1969).
The bookkeeper in the treasurer's office testified that he indicated in the vouchers that the
amounts covered thereby should be paid in cash. That indication was made by means of
the symbol "A-1-1" placed at the bottom of the vouchers under the column "Account
Number". The bookkeeper was in. instructed by Samson to place that symbol Samson told
him that he (Samson) had an understanding with Treausrer Sendaydiego that the payment
should be made in cas. There were instances when the treasurer insisted on payment by
check to creditors other than Juan Samson.
The cash payments were made to Samson in the inner office of the provincial treasurer
where the cashier was summoned to make the cash payments (11-12 ton July 9, 1969; p.
11, Exh. EE). As noted by the trial court, it was unusual that the payments should be made
in the treasurer's office when that was a ministerial chore of the cashier.
The cash payments were made to Samson even if Samson had no power of attorney from
the Carried Construction Supply Co. authorizing him to receive the payments. The space in
the vouchers for the signature of the witness, who should be present when the payments
were received, was blank. The treasurer did not bother to have a witness to attest to the
payments or to require the exhibition of Samson's residence certificate.
Another apt observation of the trial court is that the forged character of the six vouchers
would have been unmasked by the supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., if
the payments had been made by means of checks. The company on receiving the checks
would have returned them to the treasurer because it knew that there was no reason to
make any payments at all. The trial court said that the cash payments prove Sendaydiego's
collusion with Samson.
Sendaydiego's counsel assails the lower court's finding that there was a conspiracy
between the provincial and Samson as shown by the fact that the amounts covered by the
vouchers were paid to Samson by the cashier in the treasurer's inner office. That point was
testified to by Rosete, the assistant provincial treasurer.
The cashier, Napoleon Ulanday, would have been the beet witness on how and where the
payments were made. However, Ulanday died before the preliminary investigation was
started. On May 27, 1969, after the anomalies were unearthed, he wrote a letter to the
provincial , stating that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by five vouchers in the of
Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido (Exh. 13).
Rosete was in a position to state that the cash payments were made to Samson in the
treasurers inner office because his table was near the main door of the treasurers office or
was about fifteen meters away (18 tsn). Rosete always knew when the cashier went to the
treasurers office because the cashier was oned by means of a buzzer (long buzz), and when
the cashier came out of the treasurer's office, he would be holding the voucher (12-13 tsn).
Sendaydiego's counsel that no gross negligence can be imputed to the treasurer
(malversation is a crime which can be committed by means of dolo or culpa and the
penalty in either case is the same). This argument does not deserve serious consideration
Page 30 of 62
because the facts proven by the prosecution show that he had a tieup with Samson and
that he acted maliciously in signing the six questioned vouchers.
The last contention put forward for Sendaydiego is that, because the trial court acquitted
the auditor, then the treasurer's exoneration follows as a matter of course. We see no
merit in that contention because the evidence for the prosecution against Sendaydiego is
not the same as its evidence against the auditor. For that reason the auditor was charged
only as an accomplice, whereas, the treasurer was charged as a principal. The auditor
based his defense on the undeniable fact that the treasurer had approved the six vouchers
"for pre-audit and payment" before they were passed upon by the auditor. In short, the
auditor was misled by the treasurer's certification which the auditor apparently assumed
to have been made in good faith when in truth it was made in bad faith.
We are convinced after a minutiose examination of the documentary and oral evidence and
an unprejudiced consideration of the arguments of Sendaydiego's counsel that his criminal
liability was established beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, the civil liability fo his
estate for the amounts malversed was duly substantial.
Samson's appeal. — Samson's brief has no statement of facts. He contends that the trial
court erred in disregarding the expert testimony that his signatures on the vouchers are
not his signature; in finding that he forged the vouchers and received the proceeds thereof,
and in relying on circumstantial evidence as proof of conspiracy.
As a preliminary issue, Samson argues that Judge Eloy B. Bello should have inhibited
himself "in fairness to the accused, in the interest of justice, and as a gesture of delivadeza"
because he had conducted the preliminary investigation.
Our searching study of the recrod fails to sustain Samson's insinuation that he was
prejudiced by the fact that Judge, who conducted the preliminary investigation, was the
one who tried the case and convicted him. Judge Bello tried the case fairly. His conduct of
the trial does not show that he had already prejudged their guilt.
Section 13, Rule 112 of the Rules of court, in allowing a Court of First Instance to conduct a
preliminary investigation, does not disqualify it from trying the case after it had found
probable cause and after the fiscal, as directed by the Court, had filed the corresponding
information. The rule assumes that the Judge, who conducted the preliminary
investigation, could impartially try the case on the merits.
We cannot assume that judges as a rule are opinionated and narrow-minded insomuch
that they would invariably be iron-bound by their findings at the preliminary
investigation.
The case of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, who conducts a preliminary investigation
and then tries the case on the merits, is similar to a situation where an inferior court
conducts a preliminary investigation of a grave or less grave offense falling within the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance and tghe inferior court. In such a case,
the inferior court after terminating the preliminary investigation is not obligated (por
delivadeza) to remand the case to the Court of First Instance for trial. The inferior court
has the option to try the case on the merits (People vs. Palmon, 86 Phil. 350; Natividad vs.
Robles, 87 Phil. 834; People vsw. Colicio, 88 Phil. 196). The assumption is that the inferior
court can try the case without any ingrained bias or undue prejudice.
Samson sought to prove, through Lieutenant Colonel Jose G. Fernandez, retired chief of the
Constabulary crime laboratory, a handwriting expert, that his signatures on the vouchers
are not his signatures.
Fernandez found that the questioned signatures and the alleged genuine signatures
(exemplars) of Samson have fundamental differences. The expert concluded that the
questioned signatures and the exemplar signatures of Samson were not written by one and
the same person (Exh. 20).
After examining the questioned and genuine signatures and analysing the evidence and
contentions of the parties, we find that the expert is correct in declaring that (as admitted
by the trial court) there are radical differences between the questioned and authentic
signatures.
But the expert is in error in concluding that Samson did not forge the questioned
signatures or in implying that Samson had no hand in the writing thereof.
The truth is that Samson used two forms of signature. His supposed genuine signatures
found in his residence certificates, income tax returns and the genuine office receipt of the
Carried Construction Supply Co. are "in an arcade form or rounded form of writing". The
surname Samson is encircled.
On the other hand, the questioned signatures used in Samson's transactions with the
provincial government are in angular form; his surname is not encircled, and the
questioned signatures terminate in angular and horizontal strokes.
Samson was consistent in his fakeries. Knowing that the six vouchers evidenced fictitious
transactions, he used therein his fake signature, or the signature which is different from
his signature in genuine documents. He used his forged signatures in the six fake official
receipts of the Carried Construction Supply Co., stating that the amounts covered by the six
vouchers were received by him (Exh. K-6, KK to KK-4). the expert admitted that a person
may have two forms of signature (186 tsn July 16, 1970).
Page 31 of 62
Signatures may be deliberately disguised with the dishonest intention of denying the same
as and when necessary (Mehta, Identification of Handwriting and Cross Examination of
Experts, pp. 4th Ed., 1970, p. 224; Harrison, Suspect Documents 418-419).
Sendaydiego himself testified that the questioned signatures of Samson in the six vouchers
were Samson's signatures (94-99 tsn July 31, 1969).
Fernandez, the handwriting expert, declared that the questioned signatures of Samson in
the vouchers were written by only one person (264-265 tsn July 16, 1970).
The evidence conclusively proves that Samson, as the representative or collector of the
supposed creditor, Carried Construction Supply Co., hand-carried the vouchers in question
to the offices of the provincial engineer, treasurer and auditor and then back to the
treasurer's office for payment. He actually received the cash payments. Under those
circumstances, Samson is presumed to be the forger of the vouchers.
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and be made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the
forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or
possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery. (U.S. vs. Castillo,
6 Phil., 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 Phil. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28; People vs.
Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338 People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253).
In the absence of a satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged
document and who used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of
Appeals, L-21846, March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs.Caragao, L-28258, December
27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993).
Samson's use of one form of signature for his crooked transactions with the provincial
government and another form of signatures of his valid transactions or papers shows the
deviousness of the falsifications perpetrated in these cases. (Note that Sendaydiego signed
the certification in the first voucher, Exhibit K, stating that proceeds thereof were paid to
Samson but Sendaydiego did not sign the same certification in the other five forged
vouchers, Exhibits O, P, Q, R and S).
As to the question of conspiracy, the statement of Samson's on page 19 of his brief, that
"the trial court made absolutely no finding of any supposed conspiracy' between Samson
and Sendaydiego, is not correct.
We have already noted that the trial court explicitly stated that the circumstance that
Sendaydiego signed the six vouchers ahead of his assistant shows that there was "malice
or fraud" on the part of Sendaydiego and that there was conivance between Samson and
Sendaydiego when the proceeds of the vouchers were paid to Samson in Sendaydiego's
inner office, instead of in the cashier's office (p. 23, 26, Decision, Appendix to Samson's
brief). The trial court said that the fact that Sendaydiego allowed payment in cash shows
"his collission with Samson (Ibid, p. 26).
Samson's contention that the trial court merely conjectured that he had received the
proceeds of the vouchers is not well taken. The trial court's finding on that point is based
on very strong circumstantial evidence (assuming that it was not proven that Samson
signed the vouchers).
Samson vehemently argues that there is no evidence that the total sum of P57,048. 23 paid
under the six vouchers "was really misappropriated". He asserts that the six vouchers are
genuine (although he contends that his signatures thereon are forgeries) and that there is
no proof that the amounts covered thereby were not paid for the construction materials
shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
These contentions appear to be untenable in thelight of the declaration of Jabanes, the
assistant manager of Carried Construction Supply Co., the alleged supplier, that the
materials shown in the six vouchers were never delivered by the company (Exh. HH).
And Leticia Sevilleja (wife of the provincial engineer), who was employed as cashier of the
carried Construction Supply Co., denied that Samson turned over to the company the
proceeds of the six vouchers which he was supposed to have collected for the company
from Sendaydiego. The six vouchers appear to be fake principally because they evidence
fictitious sales of construction materials.
Under the said circumstances, it cannot be contended that there was no malversation after
Sendaydiego admtte that Samson acknowledged in the six vouchers that he received from
Treasurer Sendaydiego the total sum of P57,048.23.
The assertion of Samson's counsel on pgae 29 of his brief, that the finding as to his guilt is
based on a shaky foundation or is predicated on circumstances which wre not proven, is
not correct.
Recapitulations. — In resume, it appears that the provincial treasurer wants to base his
exculpation on his belief that in the six vouchers the signatures of Samson and the officials
in the provincial engineer's office appeared to be genuine and on the fact that the auditor
had approved the vouchers. The tresurer claimed that he acted in good faith in approving
the payments of the proceeds of the vouchers to Samson as the representative of the
supplier, Carried Construction Co.
Page 32 of 62
On the other hand, Samson, by impugning his signatures in the vouchers, denied that he
received the said amounts from the cashier of the treasurer's office.
These conflicting versions of the treasurer and Samson have to be resolved in the light of
the inexpugnable fact that Samson had hand-carried the voucehrs and followed up their
processing in the offices of the provicial government the construction materials described
in the six vouchers and denied having received from Samson the prices of the alleged sales.
The result is the Samson's denial of his signatures in the six vouchers and in the six
receipts (Exh. K-6 and KK to KK-4) and the provicial treasurer's pretension of having acted
in good faith or having committed an honest mistake have to be disbelieved.
The unavoidable conclusion is that Sendaydiego and Samson were in cahoots to defraud
the provincial government and to camouflage the defraudation by means of the six
vouchers which have some genuine features and which appear to be extrinsically authentic
but which were intrinsically fake.
Penalties. — The trial court and the assumed that three complex crimes of malversation
through falsification of public documents were committed in this case. That assumption is
wrong.
The crimes committed in these three cases are not complex. Separate crimes of
falsification and malversation were committed. These are not cases where the execution of
a single act constitutes two grave or less grave felonies or where the falsification was used
as a means to commit malversation.
In the six vouchers the falsification was used to conceal the malversation. It is settled that
if the falsification was resorted to for the purpose of hiding the malversation, the
falsification and malversation are separate offenses (People vs. Cid, 66 Phil 354; People vs.
Villanueva, 58 Phil. 671; People vs. Geralde 52 Phil. 1000; People vs. Regis, 67 Phil. 43).
In the Regis case, supra where the modus operandi is similar to the instant cases, the
municipal treasurer made it appear in two official payrolls dated April .30 and May 2, 1931
that some persons worked as laborers in a certain street project at Pinamungahan, Cebu.
In that way, the two amounts covered by the payrolls, P473.70 and P271.60, were
appropriated and taken from the municipal funds. As a matter of fact, no such work was
done in the said street project and the persons mentioned in both payrolls had not
performed any labor.
It was held in the Regis case, that the falsification and malversation did not constitute a
complex crime because the falsifications were not necessary means for the co on of the
malversations. Each falsification and each malversation constituted independent offenses
which must be punished separately.
The municipal treasurer was convicted of two falsifications and two malversations. Four
distinct penalties were imposed.
In the instant cases, the provincial , as the custodian than of the money forming part of the
road and bridge could have malversed or misappropriated it without falsifiying any
voucher. The falsification was used as a device to prevent detection of the malversation.
The falsifications cannot be regarded as constituting one continuing offense impelled by a
single criminal impulse.
Each falsification of a voucher constitutes one crime. The falsification of six vouchers
constitutes six separate or distinct offenses (People vs. Madrigal-Gonzales, 117 Phil. 956).
And each misappropriation as evidenced by a provincial voucher constitutes a separate
crimes of malversation were committed. Appellant Samson is a co-principal in each of the
said twelve offenses.
As already stated, he is presumed to be the author of the falsification because he was in
possession of the forged vouchers and he used them in order to receive public monies
from the provincial treasurer.
He is a co-principal in the six crimes of malversation because he conspired with the
provincial treasurer in committing those offenses. The trial court correctly ruled that a
private person conspiring with an accountable public officer in committing malversation is
also guilty of malversation (People vs. Rodis, 105 Phil. 1294; U.S. vs. Ponte, 20 Phil. 379;
U.S. vs. Dato and Lustre, 37 Phil. 359; U.S. vs. Dowdell, 11 Phil. 4; People vs. Caluag, 94 Phil.
457).
Note that a different rule prevails with respect to a stranger taking part in the commission
of parricide or qualified theft. In such cases, the stranger is not guilty of parricide or
qualfied theft but only of murder or homicide, as the case may be, and simple theft, by
reason of paragraph 3, article 62 of the Revised Penal Code (People vs. Patricio, 46 Phil.
245).
Falsification of a public document committed by a private person is punished in article
172(1) of the Revised Penal Code by prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine of not more than P5,000.
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28 and P4,501.38, respectively covered by
vouchers Nos. 11869 and 11872 (Exh. P and S), the penalty provided in paragraph 2 of
article of the Revised Penal Code is prision mayorminimum and medium.
Page 33 of 62
For the malversation of the sums of P6,290.60 andP9,769.64, respectively covered by
vouchers Nos. 1187 and11871 (Exh. Q and R) the penalty provided in paragraph 3 of
article 217 is prision mayor maximum to reclusion temporal minimum.
For the malversation of the sums of P16,727.52 and 10995 (Exh. K and O), the penalty
provided in paragraph 4 of article 217 is reclusion temporal medium and maximum.
In each of the malversation cases, a fine equal to the amount malversed should be added to
the imprisonment penalty.
In the twelve cases the penalty should be imposed in the medium peiod since there are no
modifying circumstances (Arts. 64[1] and 685, Revised Penal Code). Samson is entitled to
an indeterminate sentence.
WHEREFORE, Samson is convicted of six crimes of falsification of a public document and
six crimes of malversation.
For the malversation of the sum of P9,769.64 covered by voucher No. 11871 (Exh. R),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as
maximum; to pay a fine of P9,769.64, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the
same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P5,187.28, covered by voucher No. 11869 (Exh. P),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision
correccional maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) of prision mayor minimum, as maximum;
to pay a fine of P5,187.28, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same
amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).
For the malversation of the sum of P4,501.38 covered by voucher no. 11872 (Exh. S),
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional
maximum, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor minimum, as maximum; to pay
a fine of P4,501.38, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the same amount
(Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

In lieu of the penalties imposed by the trial court, he is sentenced to the following
In the service of the twelve penalties meted to Samson, the threefold limit provided for in
penalties:
article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed (People vs. Escares, 102 Phil. 677),
meaning that the maximum penalty that he should serve is three times the indeterminate
For each of the six falsification of the vouchers (Exh. K, O, P, Q, R and S), Samson is sentence of twelve (12) years to seventeen (17) years, the severest penalty imposed on
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years of prison correccional minimum, as him, or thirty-six (36) years to fifty-one (51) years (see People vs. Peñas, 68 Phil. 533).
minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccionalmedium, as maximum, and to pay a fine
of three thousand pesos.
The maximum duration of his sentences should not exceed forty (40) years (Penultimate
par. of art. 70; People vs. Alisub, 69 Phil. 362; People vs. Concepcion, 59 Phil. 518, 68 Phil.
For the malversation of the sum of P16,727.52 covered by voucher No. 10724 (Exh. K), 530 and 69 Phil. 58).
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
The estate of the late Licerio P. Sendaydiego is ordered to indemnify the province of
maximum; to pay a fine in the amount of P16,727.52, and to indemnify the province of
Pangasinan in the sum of P57,048.23.
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case NO. 23349, L-33252).

Samson and the said estate are sojidarily liable for the said indemnity (Art. 110, Revised
For the malversation of the sum of P14,571.81 covered by voucher No. 11995 (Exh. O),
Penal Code). Samson should pay one-half of the costs.
Samson is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of twelve (12) years of prision
mayor maximum, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years of reclusion temporal medium, as
maximum; to pay a fine in the sum of P14,571.81, and to indemnify the province of SO ORDERED.
Pangasinan in the same amount (Criminal Case No. 23351, L-33254).

For the malversation of the sum of P6,290.60 covered by voucher No. 11870 (Exh. Q),
Samson is sentenced to an indertiminate penalty of nine (9) years of prision
mayor medium, as minimum, to thirteen (13) years of reclusion temporal minimum, as
maximum; to pay a fine of P6,290.60, and to indemnify the province of Pangasinan in the
same amount (Criminal Case No. 23350, L-33253).

Page 34 of 62
Page 35 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 82197 March 13, 1989
MANUEL L. SIQUIAN petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Cortes & Reyna Law Firm for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
CORTES, J.:
The information charging petitioner Manuel L. Siquian, the then municipal mayor of
Angadanan, Isabela, of the crime of falsification of public document under Art. 171, p. 4 of
the Revised Penal Code filed by Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal before Branch XX of the
Regional Trial Court of Cauayan, Isabela reads as follows:
That on or about the lst day of July, 1975, in the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of
Isabela, and within the preliminary jurisdiction of this Honorable court, the accused
Manuel L. Siquian, being then the Municipal Mayor of Angadanan, Isabela, taking
advantage of his position as such Municipal Mayor did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously prepare and, sign a false document, knowing it to be false, to wit. An official
communication to the Civil Service Commissioner, dated July 1, 1975, which is required by
law in order to support the appointment of a certain Jesusa B. Carreon to the position of
clerk in the Office of the Municipal Secretary which (sic) he appointed as such by stating
and making it appear in said document that there was such a position existing and that
funds therefore were available. When in truth and in fact, as said accused well-know (sic),
there was no such position or item and no funds were available for said position in the
Fiscal Budget of Angadanan for 1975-76, nor was there any special ordinance creating said
position and appropriating the necessary funds therefor.
xxx
[Rollo, pp. 23-24.]
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged and the trial of the
case ensued. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) are as follows:
It appears from the evidence that sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old,
single and a resident of Ilagan, Isabela, went to the accused Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the
Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela, to apply for employment in the office of
the Mayor. Earlier, she and her friends went to the Municipal Hall of Angadanan to ask
information if there was any vacancy. When she was informed that there was, she went to
see the accused in his house.
The accused must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of
the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The latter, however, was not there. Even so,
the accused told Jesusa Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should
be included in the budget. The accused then accompanied her to the Office of the Municipal
Treasurer, Calo Battung the treasurer agreed that she could report for work.
One week after, Jesusa Carreon went alone to the Office of the Municipal Secretary. He was
there. When she went to the accused, she was told to go back to the Municipal Secretary to
work for her appointment papers.
She was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary,
on July 1, 1975 by the accused.
xxx
Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of
funds CS Form No. 203) dated July 1, 1975, issued by the accused Manuel L. Siquian,
pursuant to the requirements of Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to
the Commissioner of Civil Service, Manila (Exh. "C").
xxx
Jesusa Carreon took her oath of Office (Exh. "A-l") on July 1, 1975, and promptly began to
work on the same day. Her monthly salary was P 120.00. She rendered services for the
months of July, August, September, October, November and December 1975 (Exhibits "B",
"B-l" to "B-5"). She was not, however, paid. As early as October 1975, she went to the
Municipal Treasurer to receive her salary, but she was told that there was no money yet. In
November 1975, she went to see the accused, but the latter told her to see the treasurer.
She went to the treasurer who told her that there was no money. because of this, she went
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan at the Provincial Capitol in Ilagan, Isabela, to ask (sic)
information regarding her unpaid salaries. She was interviewed by Atty. Efren Ambrosia
Provincial Administrator. Atty. Ambrosio asked her if she had complete appointment
Page 36 of 62
papers. hereafter, she filed her verified complaint dated April 20, 1976, against the accused.
Her complaint is addressed to Governor Faustino N. Dy (Exhibit "G" and "G-1").
It also appears from the evidence that the Municipal council of Angadanan, Isabela, failed
to enact the annual budget for the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 (Exhs. "H",
"H-l", and "H-2"). Accordingly, and pursuant to PD No. 477, the annual budget for the
previous Fiscal Year 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted (Exh. "H- l"). Thus, the Municipal
Plantilla of Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 is the same as the Plantilla of
Personnel for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976. No supplemental budget was enacted by the
municipal council of Angadanan.
In the Plantilla of Personnel for 1974-1975, which was deemed re-enacted for the Fiscal
Year 1975-1976, there was no new item or appropriation for the position of clerk in the
Office of the Municipal Secretary of Angadanan, Isabela. The new position of clerk in the
office of the Municipal Council appearing in the Municipal Plantilla for Personnel (Exhibit
"H-2") for 1974- 1975, was filled up as early as October 16, 1974 by the accused when he
appointed Clarita G. Ramirez to that position (Exhibits "J" and "J-2"). With respect to the
new position of a Clerk to the office of the Municipal Mayor in the Plantilla for 1974-1975,
it was already filled-up by the appointment of Miss Marivic A. Tallod on June 16, 1975, by
the accused (Exhibits "K" and "K-4"). As early as June 28, 1974, the same position was held
by Miss Felicidad Visitacion who was appointed by the accused, but she resigned (Exhs.
"K" and "K-l").
xxx
[Rollo, pp. 26, 28, 29-30.]
After trial, the Court found the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged and decreed:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Manuel L. Siquian guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of public document as charged in the information, the Court hereby
sentences said accused to suffer an indeterminate penalty of from FIVE (5) YEARS, EIGHT
(8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of prision correctional (sic) as minimum to SEVEN YEARS
of prision mayor as maximum and to pay a fine of THREE THOUSAND (P 3,000.00) PESOS.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 35.]
On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals ruled as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is in accordance with law and the evidence and
is hereby therefore affirmed. Costs against the accused- appellant.
SO ORDERED. [Rollo, p. 42.]
Hence, this petition for review seeking reversal of the CA decision and the acquittal of
petitioner Manuel L. Siquian. Petitioner contends that the respondent court has decided a
question of substance not in accord with law and jurisprudence when it affirmed the
decision of the trial court convicting him of the crime of falsification despite the following
A. The evidence on record which consists of the testimony of the prosecution's principal
witness, shows the absence of criminal intent on the part of the accused.
B. There is no evidence that the accused took advantage of his position as Municipal Mayor
when he made the allegedly falsified certification.
C. The statement that "Funds for the position are available" is not a narration of facts but a
conclusion of law.
D. The petitioner was deprived of his right to due process of law when the trial court
proceeded with the trial in his absence despite a pending petition for change of venue with
the Supreme Court. [Rollo, p. 13.]
Petitioner's arguments, however, are bereft of any merit.
The offense of falsification by a public officer under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code
is committed by "any public officer, employee or notary who, taking advantage of his
official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the following acts: . . . 4.
Making untruthful statements in a narration of fact; . . .' It is settled that in this fourth kind
of falsification, the following requisites must concur:
(a) That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b) hat he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c) That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false Cabigas v. People, G.R. No.
67472, July 3, 1987, 152 SCRA 18.
All these requisites had been fully met in the case at bar. Petitioner, a public officer, being
then the mayor of the municipality of Angadanan, Isabela, made an untruthful statement in
the narration of facts contained in the certification which he issued in connection with the
appointment of complainant Jesusa Carreon. The certification, having been issued by a
public official in the exercise of the function of his office is a public document [U.S. v.
Asensi, 34 Phil. 765 (1915)]. It is immaterial whether or not the Civil Service
Commissioner to whom the certification was addressed received the document issued by
petitioner. Since the certification was prepared by petitioner in accordance with the
Page 37 of 62
standard forms prescribed by the government (specifically the Civil Service Commission)
pursuant to law, the certification was invested with the character of a public document
[People v. Asensi, supra citing U.S. v. Vy Guico, 12 Phil. 209 (1908)] falsification of which is
punishable under Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. Here, falsification of such
document was committed when the petitioner stated that funds were available for the
position to which Jesusa Carreon was appointed when he knew that, in reality, the position
itself did not even exist and no funds had been appropriated therefor.
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts
but rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The respondent court, upholding the
Solicitor General's arguments, correctly ruled as follows:
Conclusion of law" is defined as a proposition not arrived at by any process of natural
reasoning from a fact or combination of facts stated but by the application of the artificial
rules of law to the facts pleaded [Levins v. Rovegno, 71 Cal. 273, 12 p. 161; Black's Law
Dict., p. 362].
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant
that 'funds for the position are available' does not require the application of the artificial
rules of law. To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do was (sic)
to refer to the budget and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if
such item exists and funds are allocated therefor.
In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no
position and funds therefor referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the
data provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available"
[Rollo, p. 41).
It is undisputed that the Municipal Council of Angadanan failed to enact the annual budget
of the municipality for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976 and therefore, the annual budget for the
last fiscal year, 1974-1975, was deemed re-enacted under P.D. No. 477. In the Municipal
Plantilla of Personnel (Exh. "B-2") accompanying the Annual Budget for the Municipality of
Angadanan, Isabela for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975, there is no such position as Clerk to the
Municipal Secretary in the Office of the Municipal Secretary, the position to which Jesusa
Carreon was appointed. Accordingly, there is no appropriation made in the Annual Budget
for the Fiscal Year 1974-1975 for such position, thus rendering petitioner's statement in
his certification utterly false. The requisite of absolute falsity of the statement made in the
document is met when there exists not even an iota of colorable truth in what is declared
in the narration of facts [U.S. v. Bayot, 10 Phil. 518 (1908)], as in this case. From the
foregoing, it can be seen that the first and third requirements laid down in
the Cabigas case, supra, are fully satisfied.
The second element of the offense is likewise present. Under the civil service rules and
regulations, specifically the Guidelines in the Preparation of Appointment for Original
Appointment (Exhs. "D" and "D-3"), a certification of the availability of funds for the
position to be filled up is required to be signed by the head of office or any officer who has
been delegated the authority to sign. As an officer authorized by law to issue this
certification which is designated as Civil Service Form No. 203, as revised, the petitioner
has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him in said certification
which includes information as to the availability of the funds for the position being filled
up.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the existence of a wrongful intent to injure a third person is
not necessary when the falsified document is a public document. This has already been
authoritatively decreed in the 1955 case of People v. Po Giok To [96 Phil. 913 (1955)]. The
Court in the aforementioned case explicitly stated that wrongful intent on the part of the
accused to injure a third person is not an essential element of the crime of falsification of
public document. The rationale for this principal distinction between falsification of public
and private documents has been stated by the Court in this wise: "In the falsification of
public or official documents, whether by public officials or private persons, it is
unnecessary that there be present the Idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for
the reason that, in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is
the violation of the public faith and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly
proclaimed" [People v. Po Giok To, supra at 918, citing People v. Pacana, 47 Phil. 48
(1924)]. In falsification of public documents therefore, the controlling consideration is the
public character of a document and the existence of any prejudice caused to third persons
or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial [People v. Pacana, supra].
Petitioner's plea for acquittal on the ground that the evidence for the prosecution shows
the absence of criminal intent on his part must be denied. While this Court has declared
good faith as a valid defense to falsification of public documents by making untruthful
statements in a narration of facts [U.S. v. San Jose, 7 Phil. 604 (1907)], such defense cannot
serve to exonerate the petitioner since the element of good faith has not clearly been
shown to exist in the case at bar.
Under the applicable law at the time, petitioner, as municipal mayor of Angadanan, Isabela
presides at all meetings of the municipal council [Section 2621 (d), Revised Administrative
Code] and signs all ordinances and resolutions passed by the municipal council [Section
2624 (c), Revised Administrative Code]. He was thus aware that (1) for failure to enact a
budget for the Fiscal Year 1975-1976, Ordinance No. V of the Municipal Council of
Angadanan, Isabela which was the Municipal Annual Budget of Angadanan, Isabela for
Fiscal Year 1974-1975 was re-enacted and (2) that under the Municipal Plantilla of
Personnel for that fiscal year, there were no funds appropriated for the position of clerk to
the municipal secretary. His knowledge of these facts is shown by the fact that he even
affixed his signature in attestation to the correctness of these documents; i.e. Ordinance No.
V and Municipal Plantilla of Personnel. [See Exhs. "H-1" and "H-2", Folder of Exhibits, pp.
27-32]. He cannot claim good faith in issuing a certification of the availability of funds for
the questioned position since at the time he issued such certification on July 1, 1975, the
Page 38 of 62
fiscal year 1975- 1976 had already commenced and no new ordinance creating the new
position to which he appointed Jesusa Carreon had been enacted by the municipal council.
In view of the foregoing considerations, petitioner must be held criminally liable for his act
of issuing the absolutely false certification as to the availability of funds for the subject
position. The law considers his act criminal since it amounts to an untruthful statement in
a narration of facts in a public document [Article 171 (4), Revised Penal Code]. Criminal
intent and the will to commit a crime are presumed to exist on the part of the person who
executes an act which the law punishes, unless the contrary shall appear [United States v.
Apostol, 14 Phil. 92 (1909)]. In this case, the presumption that petitioner committed the
act with criminal intention, which arose from proof of his commission of the unlawful act,
stands unrebutted.
Petitioner's claim that there was no showing that he took advantage of his official position
in falsifying the document should likewise be rejected. This essential element of
falsification of a public document by public officer requires that the offender "abuse his
office or use the influences prestige or ascendancy which his office gives him, in
committing the crime" [U.S. v. Rodriguez, 19 Phil. 150 (1911)]. Abuse of public office is
considered present when the offender falsifies a document in connection with the duties of
his office which consist of either making or preparing or otherwise intervening in the
preparation of a document [U.S. v. Inosanto 20 Phil. 376 (1911); People v. Santiago Uy, 101
Phil. 159 (1957)], as in the case of petitioner who was charged with the duty of issuing the
certification necessary for the appointment of Jesusa Carreon.
Finally, the alleged denial of due process of law committed by the trial court when it
proceeded with the trial of the case in the absence of the petitioner despite a pending
petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court is totally unfounded. A careful and
thorough review of the record reveals that petitioner had been afforded due process when
the trial court, in view of the absence of petitioner, granted continuances to enable the
defense to present its evidence although the prosecution had rested its case as early as
December 7, 1978. [See Original Records, p. 253, et seq.]
Thus, there is no denial of due process when an accused is afforded the chance to present
evidence on his behalf but due to his repeated, unjustifiable failure to appear at the
hearings, the trial court ordered the case to be deemed submitted upon the evidence
presented by the prosecution. For under such circumstances, he will be deemed to have
waived his right to be present during the trial [Section 1 (c), Rule 115 of the Revised Rules
of Court] and his right to adduce evidence on his behalf [People v. Angco, 103 Phil. 33
(1958).]
It is true that he filed a petition for change of venue with the Supreme Court. However, on
the date set for the hearing of the petitioner's urgent motion to suspend the proceedings in
the trial court due to the pendency of the petition for change of venue, he also failed to
appear [See Order dated January 18, 1985, Original Records, p. 428]. In fact, Atty. Romeo
Calixto, one of the counsel for the petitioner, manifested before the trial court that he was -
withdrawing as counsel for his client for the reason that he has lost contact with the latter
who already went abroad [See Original Records, p. 435]. Hence, the trial court cannot be
faulted for rendering its decision on the basis solely of the evidence presented by the
prosecution.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision being in conformity with law and settled
jurisprudence, the same is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

It is a basic postulate in law that what is repugnant to due process is not lack of previous
notice but absolute lack of opportunity to be heard [Tajonera v. Lamaroza, G.R. Nos.
L-48097 & 49035, December 19, 1981, 110 SCRA 438]. Hence, this Court laid down this
criterion to determine whether an accused in a criminal case has been properly accorded
due process of law:

. . . (I)f an accused has been heard in a court of competent jurisdiction and proceeded
against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry and
investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded
within the authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. . . . [People
v. Muit G.R. No. L-48875, October 21, 1982, 117 SCRA 696 citing People v. Castillo, 776 Phil.
73 (1946); Emphasis supplied.]
Page 39 of 62
 SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 43659 : December 21, 1990.]
192 SCRA 521
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. HON. FELICIDAD CARANDANG VILLALON
and FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Assailed in this special civil action for Certiorari is the order rendered by Judge Manuel
Castañeda on January 28, 1976 dismissing Criminal Case No. D-868 of the former Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan, and the order rendered in the same case on March 22, 1976
by his successor, the herein public respondent, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the aforesaid order of dismissal.
Culled from the records, 1 it appears that complainant Mariano Carrera and his brother,
Severo Carrera, are co-owners of a parcel of land located at Barrio Buenlag, Binmaley,
Pangasinan, registered in their names under Transfer Certificate of Title No. 47682.
On February 5, 1964, complainant allegedly executed a special power of attorney before
Notary Public Jaime B. Arzadon, Jr., naming private respondent Federico de Guzman as his
lawful attorney-in-fact. On February 13, 1964, private respondent mortgaged the parcel of
land with the People's Bank and Trust Company in Dagupan City using the said special
power of attorney, and was able to obtain the amount of P8,500.00 as a loan from the
mortgagee bank. Both the special power of attorney and the mortgage contract were duly
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Pangasinan on February 13, 1964.:- nad
After the expiration of the term of the mortgage, and the mortgage account not having
been paid, the mortgagee bank foreclosed said mortgage and the land was sold to one
Ramon Serafica and Vileta Quinto who were issued Transfer Certificate of Title No. 85181
for said property. In January, 1972, complainant allegedly discovered that their property
was already registered in the name of said Ramon Serafica when the latter filed on said
date an action for the ejectment of the former from the premises.
On March 29, 1974, Criminal Case No. D-868 for estafa thru falsification of a public
document was filed against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, the information reading as follows:
"That on or about the 15th day of February, 1964, in the City of Dagupan, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Court, the abovenamed accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN,
being then a private individual, after having in his possession Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 47682, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally falsify and forge the
signature of one MARIANO F. CARRERA, in a Power of Attorney, causing and making it
appear that the said MARIANO F. CARRERA, signed and affixed his signature in the said
Power of Attorney, which is a public document, when as a matter of fact and in truth, said
MARIANO F. CARRERA, did not in anyway (sic) participate in any acts thereof, nor gave his
permission, and in order to make good the acts of falsification, with intent of gain and by
means of fraud and other deceits, the said accused FEDERICO DE GUZMAN, thru the said
falsified public document (Power of Attorney) did succeed in securing the loan from the
People's Bank and Trust Company in the amount of EIGHT THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P8,500.00) Philippine currency, without the knowledge and consent of said
MARIANO F. CARRERA, to the damage and prejudice of the latter in the amount of
P4,250.00, and other consequential damages." 2
After arraignment where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the case proceeded to trial
and the prosecution presented complainant Mariano F. Carrera and one Melanio Esguig
from the Office of the Register of Deeds for the Province of Pangasinan. Another witness,
Col. Jose G. Fernandez, a handwriting expert, gave his partial testimony but the same was
not continued as counsel for private respondent moved for and was granted leave to file a
motion to dismiss.
On December 16, 1975, the motion to dismiss 3 was filed, wherein it was alleged that the
crime charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to the
effect that he authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of the
land owned by him and his brother. Said partial testimony of complainant was quoted,
with the emphasized portions, as follows:
"Q Mr. Carrera, do you know what happened to the title of your property at present?
A Yes, sir, I know.
Q Could you tell us what happened to your title?
A It was foreclosed by the Bank, sir.
Q Now, you said that it was foreclosed by the Bank. Do you know the reason why it was
foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir.
Q Could you tell this Honorable Court how it was foreclosed by the Bank?
A Yes, sir. On February 10, 1964, my brother Severo Carrera went to Manila and he asked
me to sign a document as a witness and I asked him he interpreted that this is an
authorization to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the
land which belongs to me, my brother said.
Q So sometime in 1964, your older brother Severo Carrera went to you in Manila and
asked you to sign a power of attorney authorizing de Guzman to mortgage the one-half
portion of that land owned by you and your brother. Do you have any document to show
that?
xxx
Page 40 of 62
ATTY. DIAZ:
Q Can you recognize that document which you signed in 1964 if shown to you?
A Yes, sir.
Q Now I am asking . . . I am showing here a document which is, your Honor, for the purpose
of identification, and may we request that it be marked as Exhibit B for the prosecution.
This document consist (sic) of two pages, your Honor, and the first page be marked as
Exhibit B and the second page be marked as Exhibit B-1, page two. Will you tell this
Honorable Court what is this?
A This is the document brought by my brother to Manila for me to sign, sir.
xxx
(Hearing of June 18, 1974, pp. 8-10; Emphasis supplied)" 4
Based on the aforequoted testimony, private respondent contends that there is no
sufficient basis for the charge and this fact warrants the dismissal of the case.
Private respondent also claims that the crime has prescribed since more than ten (10)
years had elapsed from the time the crime was committed. Since the information charges
the complex crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, then the penalty shall
be that for the more serious crime which shall be applied in its maximum period, as
provided for by Article 48 of the Penal Code. The more serious crime in the present case is
the falsification of the public document which is punishable with prision correccional in its
medium and maximum period and a fine not exceeding P5,000.00. Prision correccional
being a correctional penalty, the same prescribes in ten (10) years.
It was noted in said motion to dismiss that the information filed in the case merely alleged
the date of the commission of the crime which was February 5, 1964 and the information
was filed only on March 29, 1974. This being the case, private respondent claims that more
than ten (10) years has passed from the commission of the crime to the filing of the
information. No other allegation having been made as to the discovery of the alleged crime,
private respondent claimed that the period of prescription commenced on the day on
which the crime was committed. He asserts that, from the date appearing in the transfer
certificate of title covering the land mortgaged with the bank, the mortgage documents
were duly registered with the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1984,
hence the alleged crime became public knowledge on the same date. To support his theory,
private respondent made the following citation:
"The period of prescription commences to run from the date of the commission of the
crime if it is known at the time of its commission.:-cralaw
"Thus, if there is nothing that was concealed or needed to be discovered, because the
entire series of transactions was by public instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa
committed in connection with said transaction was known to the offended party when it
was committed and the period of prescription commenced to run from the date of its
commission. People v. Dinsay, C.A. 40 O.G. 12th Supp. 50 (The Revised Penal Code by
Justice Luis B. Reyes, Revised Edition 1967, Vol. I, pp. 711-712)." 5
The prosecution countered that the testimony of Mariano Carrera shows that what was
intended was an authority to mortgage only the one-half portion pertaining to his brother
and he was only quoting what his brother told him when he said that ". . . this is an
authority to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land
which belongs to me, my brother said." 6
It further submitted that the information was not filed out of time since the date to be
considered should not be the date of registration of the alleged power of attorney on
February 13, 1964. It argued that the crime was actually discovered only in January, 1972
when Ramon S. Serafica filed an action to eject complainant from the premises, which fact
was not alleged in the information because it was considered by the prosecution as a mere
evidentiary matter which would not be in accord with the legal truism that an
"information must allege only ultimate facts and not evidentiary matters." 7
With regard to the case of People vs. Dinsay cited by private respondent, petitioner
submits that "(t)he same has only a persuasive effect and not to be considered as an
interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code as the same is the sole prerogative of
the Supreme Court." 8
As earlier noted, then Presiding Judge Manuel Castañeda of the Court of First Instance of
Pangasinan, Branch III, dismissed the case on January 28, 1976 on the ground that the
crime had prescribed. The People's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
succeeding Presiding Judge Felicidad Carandang Villalon.
On March 25, 1976, the prosecution filed a notice of appeal from both orders of the trial
court. In a resolution dated May 13, 1976, this Court required the prosecution to file a
petition for review on Certiorari in accordance with Republic Act No. 5440. 9 Thereafter,
said petition for review and the corresponding comment and reply of the parties having
been filed, on February 21, 1977 the Court resolved to treat said petition as a special civil
action and required petitioner and private respondent to submit their respective
memoranda. 10
From the memoranda submitted, the Court is tasked with the resolution of the following
issues:
1. Whether the People could appeal from the order of dismissal because the private
respondent would thereby be placed in double jeopardy;
2. Whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document filed against the
private respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact; and,
3. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned criminal case is already
extinguished by prescription. 11
The bar of double jeopardy is not involved in the present recourse. As enunciated in
People vs. City Court of Manila, etc., et al.:
Page 41 of 62
"As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and plea of
the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense
which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the complaint or information
(Section 9, Rule 113). However, an appeal by the prosecution from the order of dismissal
(of the criminal case) by the trial court shall not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the
dismissal is made upon motion, or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the
dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of
the case; and (3) the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so
that should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the
defendant." 12
On the issue of whether the charge of estafa thru falsification of a public document has
sufficient basis to exist in fact and in law, we hold in the affirmative. The falsification of a
public document may be a means of committing estafa because before the falsified
document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been
consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of
falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is caused
by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence, the
falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to
commit the estafa. 13
Petitioner posits that the offense charged is supported by the fact that what was intended
to be mortgaged was the one-half portion pertaining to Severo Carrera, not the portion
pertaining to complainant, otherwise complainant would not have quoted his brother's
words. The theory of petitioner and the findings of public respondent are substantially the
same. We agree that the offense charged does exist in fact and in law, as explained in the
findings of the court below:
"In the light of the circumstances revealed by the partial testimony of complainant
Mariano Carrera and of the record, as regards the first ground, the court finds that the
contention of the defense that the authorization given to him to mortgage the whole
property is not sustained by the evidence because a cursory study of the answer made by
the witness complainant clearly shows that what was intended to be mortgaged was the
one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera, excluding that portion pertaining
to said complainant. (T.S.N.. pp. 8-10, hearing on June 18, 1974). In other words, the
alleged authorization given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half
portion of the land referred to the share of Severo Carrera only. This finding is based on
the following quoted answer:
'A . . . and when I asked him he interpreted that this is an authorization to Federico de
Guzman to get a loan from the bank on the half portion of the land which belongs to me,
my brother said.'
Mariano Carrera on June 18, 1974, gave the above-quoted testimony. He merely quoted his
brother Severo Carrera to whom the half portion of the land belongs. Severo Carrera, as
quoted by Mariano Carrera, did not use the phrase `which belongs to you.'" 14
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however,
determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.: nad
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that
for the most serious component offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In
the crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the
falsification which carries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172
of the Code. Crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years
pursuant to Article 90 of the Code, and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive
period commences to run "from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended
party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
The document which was allegedly falsified was a notarized special power of attorney
registered in the Registry of Deeds of Dagupan City on February 13, 1964 authorizing
private respondent to mortgage a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No.
47682 in order to secure a loan of P8,500.00 from the People's Bank and Trust Company.
The information for estafa thru falsification of a public document was filed only on March
29, 1974. We reject petitioner's claim that the ten-year period commenced when
complainant supposedly discovered the crime in January, 1972 by reason of the ejectment
suit against him.
People vs. Reyes 15 cites authorities on the well established rule that registration in a
public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive notice of its
contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
charged with knowledge of what it contains. On these considerations, it holds that the
prior ruling in Cabral vs. Puno, etc., et al., 16 to the effect that in the crime of falsification of
a public document the prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party
had constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the
Register of Deeds is not without legal basis.
It was also noted that in Armentia vs. Patriarca, et al., 17 in interpreting the phrase "from
the discovery" found in Article 1391 of the Civil Code which authorizes annulment, in case
of mistake or fraud, within four years from the time of the discovery of the same, the Court
also held that the discovery must be reckoned to have taken place from the time the
document was registered in the Register of Deeds, for the familiar rule is that registration
is a notice to the whole world and this should apply to both criminal and civil cases.: nad
We are further in accord with the conclusion in Reyes that the application of said rule on
constructive notice in the interpretation of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code would
most certainly be favorable to private respondent herein, since the prescriptive period of
the crime shall have to be reckoned with earlier, that is, from the time the questioned
documents were recorded in the Registry of Deeds.
Page 42 of 62
In the instant case, the special power of attorney involved was registered on February 13,
1964. The criminal information against private respondent having been filed only on
March 29, 1974, or more than ten (10) years thereafter, the crime with which private
respondent was charged has indubitably prescribed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit and the challenged orders
of public respondent are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Page 43 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 73905 September 30, 1991
MICHAEL T. DAVA, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and the INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, respondents.
KV. Faylona & Associates for petitioner.
FERNAN, C.J.:
On October 19, 1975, while driving a car along Shaw Boulevard, Mandaluyong, Rizal,
petitioner Michael T. Dava, then holder of non-professional driver's license No.
14744271 with official receipt No. 7023037,2 bumped pedestrians Bernadette Roxas
Clamor and Dolores E. Roxas, causing death to former and physical injuries to the latter.
As a consequence of said incident, Dava was brought to Mandaluyong Police headquarters
where his driver's license was confiscated by Cpl. Daniel Severino who later submitted
Dava's driver's license to the fiscal's office in Pasig, Rizal. license was thereafter presented
as prosecution evidence in criminal case for homicide and serious physical injuries
reckless imprudence filed against Dava in the then Court First Instance of Rizal in Pasig.3
On April 12, 1978, Antonio Roxas, the brother of Bernadette and the father of Dolores, saw
Dava driving a maroon Volkswagen (beetle-type) car with plate No. AD-902 B. Knowing
that Dava's driver's license was used as an exhibit in court and that no traffic violation
receipt had been issued to Dava, Roxas sought the help of then Minister of Defense Juan
Ponce Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving without a license.4 The Ministry of Defense
later indorsed Roxas' request for assistance to the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group
(CHPG).
At around 7:30 in the evening of July 21, 1978, M/Sgt. Domingo Lising and S/Sgt. Arturo
Viduya of the CHPG saw the maroon Volkswagen car described by Roxas parked in front of
the Uniwide Department Store near the then Nation theater in Cubao, Quezon City. When
the driver and his companion arrived, Lising and Viduya confronted them and asked the
driver for his license. They were shown non-professional driver's license No.
27068875 with official receipt No. 06058706 issued by Agency 2L Pampanga in the name of
Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed them that his
officemate had secured it for him.
Lising and Viduya invited Dava to the CHPG office in Camp Crame, Quezon City for
questioning. Dava refused to give a statement upon the advice of his lawyer. Lising then
submitted a spot report to Col. Maristela stating therein that "subject had violated Section
31 of RA 4136 for false representation in the application of a driver's license intended to
be used as a legal license."7 In his affidavit of apprehension dated November 16, 1978,
Lising stated that he was 'about to book him for violation of Section 31 of Rep. Act 4136,
when subsequent investigation revealed that the Driver's License above-mentioned is a
Fake and a Falsity' and therefore a case for falsification and use of falsified documents
under Section 172 of the Revised Penal Code should be filed against Dava.8 Lising
concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake because when he compared it with the
xerox copy of Dava's license which was attached to the record of the criminal case in Pasig,
the signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the two licenses did "not tally."9
Accordingly, an information for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in
the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch V at Quezon City.10 One of the prosecution
witnesses was Caroline Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT). He testified that hen was then the registrar of the said office when
Dava's driver' license was brought to him by lawyer Jose Francisco who was interested in
knowing whether it was genuine or fake and if was issued by the Angeles City agency of
the BLT. He examine it and found out that it was "fake or illegally issued" because form No.
2706887 was one of the fifty (50) forms which had been reported missing from their office
sometime in November, 1976 and that it was never issued to any applicant for a
license.11He added that any license that was not included their office index card was
considered as "coming from illegal source' and "not legally issued by any agency."12
Vinluan stated that although the form used for the license was genuine,13 the signature of
the issuing official was fake.14 He "believed" certain persons had been apprehended for
"plasticization" of licenses outside their office15 and that sometime November, 1976,
agents of the National Bureau of Investigation raided the house of a certain person who
had in his possession some of the forms which had been missing from office.16 He
concluded that the license was fake because the form was issued by the central office to
the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its face to have been issued the San Fernando,
Pampanga agency.17
Dava was convicted of the crime charged. He appealed to then Court of Appeals 18 which
affirmed the lower court's decision on January 29, 1982. Dava filed a motion for
reconsideration of the said decision contending that the lower court had no jurisdiction to
Page 44 of 62
try the case. On April 27, 1982, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside its decision and
issued a resolution the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, as prayed for, our decision is hereby reconsidered and set aside, and
another judgment shall be entered annulling the proceedings in the court a quo without
prejudice to the refiling of the charges with the proper court. (Rollo, pp. 35-36.)
Consequently, the case was refiled with the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga, Branch 47
at San Fernando as Criminal Case No. 2422. The information for falsification of a public
document reads as follows:
That on or about the 12th day of April, 1978, and for sometime prior thereto, in the
municipality of San Fernando, province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused MICHAEL T. DAVA, a
private individual, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause
to be falsified, a Non-Professional Driver's license with Serial No. 2706887 covered by
Official Receipt No. 0605870, dated January 24, 1978, a public document, by making it
appear that the signatories therein who are officials of the Pampanga LTC Agency
participated in the preparation thereof, when in truth and in fact they did not so
participate and the accused made use of the same knowing it to be falsified.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.
At the trial, the prosecution presented Antonio Roxas who testified on how he saw Dava
driving a car and that, knowing that Dava's license had been confiscated as a result of the
filing of the homicide and serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence case, he
thereafter sought the assistance of then Minister Enrile in apprehending Dava for driving
without a license.19 For his part, Domingo Lising, who apprehended Dava, narrated in
court how he first saw Daya driving a car along Banahaw and N. Domingo Sts. in Quezon
City until he finally confronted Dava at the vicinity of the Araneta Coliseum and confiscated
his driver's license. As earlier stated, he conclude that the driver's license shown to him by
Dava was fake because he noticed that, when compared with the license attached to record
of the criminal case filed against Dava, the license confiscated bore a different signature
and date of birth.20
Daniel Severino, a sergeant of the Mandaluyong police, testified that he investigated the
traffic incident along Shaw Boulevard on October 19, 1975 which involved Dava and the
two relatives of Antonio Roxas. He himself confiscated Dava's no professional driver's
license No. 1474427 which he later turn over to the fiscal's office.21
In the course of Severino's testimony, the defense counsel informed the court that, upon a
resolution of the Court of Appeals, Dava was allowed by the lower court having jurisdiction
over Criminal Case No. 16474 to withdraw his driver's license 1474427 from the records
of said case.22 When confronted by the court, Dava volunteered that he withdrew said
license in December, 1982 and surrendered it to the BLT Western District Office so that he
could renew his license.23 Hence, the evidence presented before the Court was a mere
xerox copy of said license24 which also bears a notation that Dava received original driver's
license and its receipt on December 15, 1982.25
Victor Martin, who had been the head of the San Fernando Pampanga branch of the BLT
and whose name appears registrar thereof in official receipt No. 0605870 which was
supposed to be attached to Dava's driver's license No. 270688 admitted that the form of
the said license was genuine although he could not tell whether its contents were likewise
genuine because it was "opened" and "spliced."26 He asserted, however, that since the said
form "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed" over his name,
said license was "not OK".27
Martin said that he was informed by the property section of the BLT regional office that
the number in the license was one of "the numbers requisitioned by (the) Angeles City
agency."28 He affirmed that drivers license No. 2706887 "was not issued by (their)
agency"29 although when recalled to the stand, he admitted that the "2L" filled in the space
for "Agency Code No." on the face of license No. 2706887 referred to the San Fernando
agency.30 Martin also confirmed the genuineness of official receipt No. 0605870 although it
was his assistant who signed it for him31 and affirmed that the amount of P10.00 indicated
therein had been collected and received by his office.32
Lawyer Jose Francisco testified that he went to the Angeles City office of the BLT to see its
chief and inquire about the number of driver's license issued to Dava and whether said
office had indeed issued them. According to him, the head of the office, Caroline Vinluan,
advised him to verify from the index card in the possession of the License Division head
whether the Angeles City agency had indeed issued Dava's license.33 Thereafter, the
officer-in-charge of the License Division of the BLT in East Avenue, Quezon City, Leonardo
R. Medina, issued a certification dated December 24, 1979 to the effect that
non-professional drivers license No. 2706887 in the name of Dava was "not registered in
(their) Index Card."34
Francisco also informed the court that Carolino Vinluan, the former head of the Angeles
City BLT agency, had died on May 12, 1980.35 He offered in evidence Vinluan's death
certificate as Exh. J.
Another evidence presented by the prosecution was the transcript of stenographic notes of
the testimony of Carolino Vinluan which was taken on January 8, 1980 at the trial of
Criminal Case No. Q-10759 before the then Court of First Instance Rizal, Branch V at
Quezon City. It was marked as Exh. K said exhibit was part of the record of Criminal Case
No. 10759 which was transmitted to the Regional Trial Court Pampanga.36
Page 45 of 62
The defense presented only one witness: Felizardo Manalili. A friend of Dava and his
former co-trainee at the Sandoz Philippines, a pharmaceutical firm, Manalili testified that
Dava quested him to secure a driver's license for him because he had none. Manalili went
to the San Fernando office of the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) where he used to
secure own license. At the LTC branch office, he was "approached"37 the fixers who roamed
around the compound. When he as them how much it would cost to secure a driver's
license, he told that it would amount to P70 .00.38 He agreed to pay amount and gave the
fixers the personal data of Dava.39
After an hour, the fixers gave Manalili the license which was inside a plastic jacket.
(Manalili identified the license as Exh. B.) He examined it and found out that it looked "like
a genuine and authentic driver's license" to him. The license, which opened and unsealed,
bore a signature in the portion which showed the name Romeo Edu and contained all the
personal data of Dava. Because it did not bear the signature of Dava Manalili immediately
gave the license to Dava and told him to sign it immediately. Dava did so in Manalili's
presence.40
On March 22, 1984, the lower court rendered a decision41 finding that the license in
question was "fake or spurious", that was not duly issued by any proper government
licensing age and that the accused directly participated in the commission of the
falsification or caused said falsification. The court took into account the facts that Dava was
"in dire need' of a license because of his work as a detailman; that he received his genuine
license from the court only on December 15, 1982, and that Dava himself personally
requested his friend, Manalili, to secure the license for him. It arrived at the conclusion that
since Dava was the possessor or user of the fake license, he himself was the forger or the
one who caused its forgery or falsification. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds the accused Michael T. Dava guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, as principal of the came of Falsification of a Public Document, as defined
and penalized under the provisions of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, and
considering the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance, hereby sentences
him under the Indeterminate Sentence Law to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment of
one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correecional as minimum, to four (4) years,
nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision correccional as maximum; and to pay a fine of
Two Thousand Five Hundred (P2,500.00) Pesos, Philippine Currency, plus the costs of this
suit.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dava appealed to the then Intermediate Appellate Court,42 which on September 30, 1985
affirmed in in toto the decision of the trial court. On February 27, 1986, the appellate court
denied Dava's motion for the reconsideration of said decision finding that no new grounds
had been raised therein. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioner assails herein the reliance of the courts below on the testimony of Carolino
Vinluan on the ground that being a part of the annulled proceedings in Criminal Case No.
Q-10759, it may not be considered as admissible in evidence as it cannot qualify as a
"testimony at a former trial" under the provisions of Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of
Court.
We find petitioner's contention to be meritorious. The resolution of the then Intermediate
Appellate Court in CA-G.R. No. 24312-CR, expressly annulled the proceedings had in
Criminal Case No. Q-10759 for lack of jurisdiction of the Quezon City court over the case.
That ruling is founded on solid jurisprudence. We had time and again held that in the
absence of proof that the party raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction is barred by
estoppel,43 a decision rendered by a court without jurisdiction is a total nullity.44 Being
worthless in itself, all the proceedings founded upon it are equally worthless.45 Hence, the
testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in evidence but may well be considered as
totally nonexistent.
With the testimony of the late Carolino Vinluan out of the way, is there sufficient evidence
to warrant the conviction of petitioner for the crime charged?
The information specifically charges the petitioner with having made it appear in his
driver's license No. 2706887 that "officials of the Pampanga LTC agency participated" in
in-preparation and with having used the said driver's license knowing that it was falsified.
The charges therefore are found on the provisions of Article 172 (1) of the Revised Penal
Code which punishes any private individual who shall commit any the falsification
enumerated in Article 171 specifically paragraph 2 thereof which penalizes the act of
causing it to appear that persons (public officials) have participated in any act proceeding
when they did not in fact so participate. The information also charges Dava with having
knowingly used a false document under the last paragraph of Article 172.
The evidence at hand proves that petitioner, misrepresenting that he had no driver's
license, asked his friend, Manalili, to secure one for him. Sometime in November, 1976,
Manalili, who used to get his own driver's license in San Fernando, Pampanga, was able to
secure petitioner's driver's license No. 2706887 through fixers at the Land Transportation
Commission (LTC) agency in said locality.46 On January 24, 1978, petitioner renewed his
license at the said office by paying the amount of P10.00 for which he was issued official
receipt No. 0605870.47
In the renewal of drivers' license, the practice then was simply to present an official receipt
showing that at the previous year the licensee had paid for his driver's license to any
agency of the LTC, and to pay the renewal fee. As long as the transaction did not involve
the issuance of "another form," a driver did not have to fill up an application form for the
renewal of a license. The said agency would then issue an official receipt evidencing the
renewal of the license but the driver's license itself would not be changed.48
Page 46 of 62
Thus. on January 24,1978, when driver's license No. 2706887 together with official receipt
No. 86432149 were presented to the San Fernando LTC agency, the personnel therein
issued official-receipt No. 0605870 in the name of petitioner. Although the receipt was not
personally signed by office registrar Victor Martin but by his assistant, the receipt50 was
genuine and the amount indicated therein was actually paid to and collected by the San
Fernando agency.51 The driver's license itself may not have been issued by said
agency52 but its form was likewise genuine. However, according to Martin, it was 'not OK'
because it "did not emanate" from his office and "a facsimile was not printed over" his
name therein.53 Moreover, according to the officer-in-charge of the license Division of the
Bureau of Land Transportation in East Avenue, Quezon City, non-professional driver's
license No. 2706887 in the name of Michael Dava Tolosa "is not registered" in their index
card.54
Hence, while there is no doubt that driver's license No. 2706887 was a spurious one, the
evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, however, there
are pieces of evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification
and made use of the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.
The elements of the crime of using a falsified document in transaction (other than as
evidence in a judicial proceed penalized under the last paragraph of Article 172 are
following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by another person; (b) the
false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1 and 2 of Article
172; (c he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of the false
document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such
damage.55 Except for last, all of these elements have been proven beyond reason doubt in
this case.
It is not disputed that it was petitioner himself who requested Manalili to get him a license.
He misrepresented to Manalili that he has not at any time been issued a driver's
license.56 Through this misrepresentation and capitalizing on Manalili awareness of the
dire necessity of obtaining a driver's license the shortest time possible to enable petitioner
to perform duties as detailman, petitioner was able, in a very subtle clever manner, to
induce Manalili to deal with "fixers" in securing the subject driver's license. For indeed,
there was no way Manalili could obtain a drivers license in so short a without having to
deal with "fixers." Thus, as petitioner calculated, Manalili, who appeared to have been
motivated by a sincere desire to help a friend, did not hesitate to deal with three fixers
whom he knew were not employees of the LTC to whom he paid P70.00 for the license
even if the legal fee then was only P15.00.57 As it was in truth petitioner who induced and
left Manalili with no choice but to seek the aid of fixers, the fact that it was Manalili and not
petitioner who dealt directly with said fixers cannot exculpate petitioner from the charge
of falsification. He is, beyond reasonable doubt, a principal by inducement in the
commission of said crime.
Petitioner cannot feign ignorance of the spurious character of his second driver's license
No. 2706887. Having already obtained a driver's license, he knew that it was not legally
possible for him to secure another one. Otherwise, there would have been no need for him
to misrepresent to his friend Manalili that he was not then a holder of a driver's license.
But even with this misrepresentation, petitioner cannot even begin to believe that Manalili
would be able to secure a driver's license through legal means in about an hour's
time.58 The patent irregularity in obtaining driver's license No. 2706887 was more than
sufficient to arouse the suspicion of an ordinary cautious and prudent man as to its
genuineness and authenticity. In fact, Manalili testified that he himself was surprised when
the fixer handed to him the plastic jacket of the driver's license of Michael Dava on
November 4, 1976, a few hours after he had sought the fixer's assistance.59 In those days,
all plastic jackets emanated from the LTC Central Office, which accounted for the delay in
the release of the license applied for. Under these circumstances, no "reasonable and
fairminded man" would say that petitioner did not know that his license was a fake. 60
A driver's license is a public document within the purview of Articles 171 and 172. The
blank form of the drivers license becomes a public document the moment it is
accomplished.61 Thus, when driver's license No. 2706887 was filled up with petitioner's
personal data and the signature of the region of the San Fernando LTC agency was affixed
therein, even if the same was simulated, the driver's license became a public document.
The third element of use of the falsified document is proven by the fact that when
petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his possession and it was
what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a detailman who
did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date of
issuance) until April 12, 1978, petitioner used driver's license No. 2706887.
The driver's license being a public document, proof of the fourth element of damage
caused to another person or at least an intent to cause such damage has become
immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing being
punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed
therein.62
In his attempt at exculpation, petitioner asserts that the following ruling in People vs.
Sendaydiego,63 should be applied in his favor:
The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use of it
(uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification. This is especially true if the use or uttering of the
forged documents was so closely connected in time with the forgery that the user or
possessor may be proven to have the capacity of committing the forgery, or to have close
connection with the forgers, and therefore, had complicity in the forgery (U.S. vs. Castillo, 6
Phil. 453; People vs. De Lara, 45 PMI. 754; People vs. Domingo, 49 Phil. 28: People vs.
Astudillo, 60 Phil. 338; People vs. Manansala, 105 Phil. 1253). In the absence of a
Page 47 of 62
satisfactory explanation, one who is found in possession of a forged document and who
used or uttered it is presumed to be the forger (Alarcon vs. Court of Appeals, L-21846,
March 31, 1967, 19 SCRA 688; People vs. Caragao,
L-28258, December 27, 1969, 30 SCRA 993). (Emphasis supplied.)

We agree with the petitioner that the presumption enunciated in the Sendaydiego case is
not absolute as it is subject to the exception that the accused should have a satisfactory
explanation why he is in possession of a false document.64 His explanation, however, is
unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili. As stated
above, Manalili himself could not have acted on his own accord without the prodding of
petitioner.

We cannot help but comment on petitioner's allegations on the role of fixers in

government agencies. To him, a fixer is a "necessary evil" who could do things fast for the
right amount. He is "not necessarily involved in the commission of forgery or falsification
of official documents" and he shares his fees with "insiders."65

Fixers indeed appear as undetachable fixtures in government licensing agencies. Why they
proliferate is a sad commentary not only on our bureaucracy but also on our own people.
While not all fixers are engaged in illegal activities for some simple serve as "facilitators,"
they nonetheless provide sources for exploitation of the unknowing common people who
transact business with the government and for corruption of the gullible government
employees. Their unwanted presence must be dealt with accordingly and the soonest this
is undertaken by our government agencies the better for all of us.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed. Let a copy
of this decision be served on that Department of Transportation and Communication. Cost
against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Page 48 of 62
Page 49 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 74727 June 16, 1988
MELENCIO GIGANTONI y JAVIER, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
YAP, C.J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court
in AC-G.R. No. 01119 entitled "People of the Philippines v. Melencio Gigantoni y Javier,"
promulgated on November 13, 1985, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 159, Pasig, Metro Manila, finding the accused guilty of usurpation of
authority under Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code with modification of the penalty by
reducing the same to one (1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor to one (1) year and
one (1) day of prision correccional, after crediting the accused with a mitigating
circumstance analogous to voluntary confession of guilt.
Petitioner Melencio Gigantoni y Javier, was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Rizal,
Pasig, with the crime of usurpation of authority in violation of Article 177 of the Revised
Penal Code upon an information alleging that the crime was committed as follows:
That on or about the 14th and 15th day of May, 1981, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro
Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, who is not a bonafide agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully, knowingly and falsely represented himself as a bonafide agent
of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary, said accused, knowing fully well his representation to
be false.
After arraignment during which the accused pleaded not guilty and after trial, the lower
court rendered judgment finding the accused guilty as charged. On appeal to the appellate
court, the judgment was affirmed with modification only as to the penalty imposed.
The facts of the case, as recited in the decision of the appellate court, are as follows:
During the period material to this case, or in 1981, accused-appellant Melencio Gigantoni
was an employee of Black Mountain Mining Inc. and Tetra Management Corporation,
which are both private companies doing business in the Philippines .... On May 14, 1981, as
an employee of said companies, Gigantoni went to the office of the Philippine Air Lines
(PAL) at Vernida Building, Legaspi Street, Makati, Metro Manila, allegedly to conduct
verification of some travels made by Black Mountain's officials. Upon reaching the said PAL
office, he falsely represented himself to the PAL legal officer as a PC-CIS agent investigating
a kidnapping case, and requested that he be shown the PAL records particularly the
passenger manifests for Manila-Baguio-Manila flights covering the period February 1 to 3
1981. He explained that he was then at the tracking stage of aforementioned kidnapping
case. ... To further convince the PAL officials of his supposed mission, Gigantoni exhibited
his Identification card purporting to show that he was a PC-CIS agent. ... Thereupon, his
aforesaid request was granted, and PAL legal officer Atty. Conrado A. Boro showed to him
the requested PAL records. Gigantoni then secured xerox copies of the requested
manifest ...and the used PAL tickets of one Cesar (Philippe) Wong, an SGV auditor, and that
of a certain Daisy Britanico, an employee of Black Mountain. Thereafter, he left the PAL
premises.
When Gigantoni was no longer around, PAL general counsel Ricardo Puno, Jr., inquired
from Atty. Boro about Gigantoni's purpose in securing copies of PAL records. They then
became suspicious of the accused" real identity prompting them to conduct verification
from the PC-CIS office. They subsequently learned from General Uy of PC-CIS that
Gigantoni was no longer a CIS agent since June 30, 1980 as he had been dismissed from the
service for gross misconduct ... brought about by the extortion charges filed against him
and his final conviction by the Sandiganbayan for the said offense.... Upon discovering the
foregoing, Atty. Puno immediately alerted the NBI as Gigantoni would be coming back to
the PAL office the following day. ...
On May 15, 1981, when Gigantoni returned to the Makati PAL office, he was brought by
Atty. Puno to their conference room while awaiting for the arrival of the NBI agents who
were earlier contacted. In the presence of Atty. Boro and a PAL security, Gigantoni was
confronted by Atty. Puno as to his real Identity. He later admitted that he was no longer
with the CIS; that he was working for the Black Mountain Mining Corporation; and that he
was just checking on a claim for per diem of one of their employees who had travelled. ...
Upon the arrival of NBI agents Teodoro Pangilinan, Lolito Utitco and Dante Crisologo, Attys.
Puno and Boro turned over the person of Gigantoni to the NBI. They also submitted a
complaint affidavit against Gigantoni .... On that same day, after the investigation, arrest
and booking conducted by the NBI, Gigantoni was charged before the Office of the
Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, thru its office in Makati, with the crime of Usurpation of
Authority.
The petitioner-accused raised substantially the same errors on appeal to respondent
appellate court, to wit:
Page 50 of 62
1. The appellate court erred in interpreting that presumption that official duty has been
regularly performed, its applicable in the case at bar;
2. The appellate court erred in its interpretation of the difference between suspension and
dismissal.
The gist of petitioner's contention is that he could not be guilty of the crime charged
because at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, he was still a CIS agent who
was merely suspended and was not yet informed of his termination from the service.
Furthermore, he avers that the receipt by him of the notice of dismissal, if there was any,
could not be established on mere presumption of law that official duty has been regularly
performed.
Article 177 of the Revised Penal Code on usurpation of authority or official functions,
under which the petitioner was charged, punishes any person: (a) who knowingly and
falsely represents himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or
agency of the Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or (b) who, under
pretense of official position, performs any act pertaining to any person in authority or
public officer of the Philippine Government or any foreign government or any agency
thereof, without being lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of
usurpation of authority under which the petitioner stands charged, while the latter act
constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.
The question before us is—did petitioner knowingly and falsely represent himself as an
agent of the CIS, Philippine Constabulary? Petitioner admits that he received a notice of his
suspension from the CIS effective June 20, 1980. This admission is supported by the record
(Annex "D") which shows the letter of Lt. Col. Sabas Edades to petitioner, dated June 23,
1980, regarding said action. Said official letter was also sent to the Commissioner of the
Merit Systems Board, Civil Service Commission, the Minister of National Defense and the
Commanding General of the CIS. However, as to petitioner's alleged dismissal effective
June 20, 1980, he denies having been informed thereof. The record is bereft of any
evidence or proof adduced by the prosecution showing that the dismissal was actually
conveyed to petitioner. That is why the court, in convicting him, relied on the disputable
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed, that is, that it is presumed
that he was duly notified of his dismissal.
charged lies on the prosecution. Hence, it was incumbent upon the prosecution to establish
by positive evidence the allegation that the accused falsely represented himself as a CIS
agent, by presenting proof that he knew that he was no longer a CIS agent, having been
duly notified of his dismissal. It is essential to present proof that he actually knew at the
time of the alleged commission of the offense that he was already dismissed from the
service. A mere disputable presumption that he received notice of his dismissal would not
be sufficient.
The Solicitor General has argued in his memorandum, that it makes no difference whether
the accused was suspended or dismissed from the service, "for both imply the absence of
power to represent oneself as vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to an office
to which he knowingly was deprived of " (Emphasis supplied). The observation of the
Solicitor General is correct if the accused were charged with usurpation of official function
(second part of Article 177), but not if he is charged merely with usurpation of authority
(first part of Article 177). The information charges the accused with the crime of
usurpation of authority for "knowingly and falsely representing himself to be an officer,
agent or representative of any department or agency of the Philippine Government."
Petitioner is not accused of usurpation of official functions. It has not been shown that the
information given by PAL to the accused was confidential and was given to him only
because he was entitled to it as part of the exercise of his official function. He was not
charged in the information for such an offense. In fact, it appears from the record of the
case that the information, which was not claimed to be secret and confidential, was readily
made available to the accused because PAL officials believed at the time that he was a CIS
agent. And this was the only offense with which he was charged in the information, that
he knowingly and falsely represented himself to be a CIS agent.
Premises considered, the decision of the respondent Appellate Court affirming the
judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court is reversed and set aside.
Petitioner-accused, Melencio Gigantoni y Javier is hereby aquitted of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

The failure of the prosecution to prove that petitioner was duly notified of his dismissal
from the service negatives the charge that he "knowingly and falsely" represented himself
to be a CIS agent. The constitutional presumption of innocence can only be overturned by
competent and credible proof and never by mere disputable presumptions, as what the
lower and appellate courts did when they presumed that petitioner was duly notified of his
dismissal by applying the disputable presumption "that official duty has been regularly
performed." It was not for the accused to prove a negative fact, namely, that he did not
receive the order of dismissal. In criminal cases, the burden of proof as to the offense
Page 51 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-63817 August 28, 1984
CORAZON LEGAMIA y RIVERA, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Felipe O. Pascual for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent Appellate Court.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari to review and reverse a decision of the Intermediate
Appellate Court.
In the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila, Corazon Legamia was accused of using an
alias in violation of Commonwealth Act No. 142, as amended. The information against her
reads:
That on or about November 4th, 1974, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully and unlawfully
use the substitute or alias name CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from Corazon
Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by which she has been known since
childhood, nor as a pseudonym for literary purpose and without having been previously
authorized by a competent Court to do so; that it was discovered only on or about
November 4th, 1974. (Rollo, pp. 11-12.)
She was convicted by the trial court which sentenced her to an indeterminate prison term
of only (1) year, as minimum, to two (2) years, as maximum; to pay a fine a fine of
P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to pay the costs. The trial court
recommended, however, that she be extended executive clemency. On appeal to the
Intermediate Appellate Court, the sentence was affirmed in toto. Hence the instant petition.
The facts:
Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8, 1955 to
September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement they produced a
boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was born on October 18, 1971.
From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon was
known as Corazon L. Reyes; she styled herself as Mrs. Reyes; and Emilio introduced her to
friends as Mrs. Reyes.
Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit Administration
when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's death, Corazon filed a letter in
behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit Administration for death benefits. The letter
was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the
amount of P2,648.76 was also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."
For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima Reyes who
was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's prosecution.
Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of that which is due to
each legitimate child in accordance with the provisions of the Civil Code" per advice given
by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural Credit Administration to Felicisima.
(Rollo, pp. 14-15.)
The law:
Commonwealth Act No. 142 provides in Section 1:
Section 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other
entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally
accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was
registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry, or with which he was baptized for
the first time, or in case of an alien, with which he was registered in the Bureau of
Immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a
competent court: Provided, That persons, whose births have not been registered in any
local civil registry and who have not been baptized have one year from the approval of this
act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name
shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. (As amended by R.A. No.
6085.)
The issue:
Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts abovestated?
The resolution:
Page 52 of 62
It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the wife and
use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man is married to
another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but neither is it unduly
frowned upon. A number of women can be Identified who are living with men prominent
in political, business and social circles. The woman publicly holds herself out as the man's
wife and uses his family name blithely ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet
none of the women has been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a
bigoted but a tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural
environment that the law must be construed.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He introduced
her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name without any sinister
purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for benefits upon his death not for
herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender years was under her guardianship. Surely,
the lawmakers could not have meant to criminalize what Corazon had done especially
because some of them probably had their own Corazons.

WHEREFORE, the decision under review is hereby set aside; the petitioner is acquitted of
the charge. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Concepcion, Jr., Escolin and Cuevas, JJ., concur.

Makasiar (Chairman) and Guerrero, JJ., are on leave.

Page 53 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-65006 October 31, 1990
REOLANDI DIAZ, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, respondents.
Paterno R. Canlas Law Offices for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
In Criminal Case No. 934 of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, Fifth Judicial District,
Branch VI, San Fernando, Pampanga, petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime
of Falsification of Official Document committed as follows:
That on or about the 5th day of December 1972, in the Municipality of San Fernando,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, Reolandi M. DIAZ, then a Senior Clerk at the Jose Abad Santos High
School and, therefore, a public employee, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously commit falsification of official documents, to wit: by executing and filing in the
office of the Civil Service Commission of said municipality a Personal Data Sheet, CS Form
No. 212(65), an official document, stating and malting it appear therein that he was a
fourth year Bachelor of Arts student in 1950-54 at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian
Colleges which document is a requirement for his reappointment as School Administrative
Assistant I of the Jose Abad Santos High School and wherein the academic requirement to
said Position is at least a fourth year college undergraduate, when in truth and in fact, the
said accused well knew that the statement is false and he did not reach the fourth year in a
Bachelor of Arts degree course, and consequently, by reason of said untruthful narration of
facts, his appointment to the said position was approved by the Civil Service Commission.
All contrary to law. (p. 44, Rollo)
After trial following a plea of not guilty upon arraignment, petitioner was found guilty as
charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE and in view of all the foregoing, this Court finds the accused Reolandi M. Diaz
guilty as charged of the crime of falsification of official document penalized under Article
171, paragraph 4, of the Revised Penal Code, and he is therefore sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) years and (1) day of prision mayor, as
maximum, and to pay a fine of ONE THOUSAND (P1,000.00) PESOS without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Costs against the accused. (pp. 55-56, Rollo)
Petitioner appealed the aforesaid judgment of conviction to the Intermediate Appellate
Court, said appeal being docketed thereat as CA-G.R. No. 24580- Cr.
In its Decision promulgated on April 7,1983, the respondent court modified the trial
court's decision by increasing the maximum of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
in the event of non-payment of the fine due to insolvency, but affirmed the verdict of
conviction in all other respects. The pertinent and dispositive portions of respondent
court's decision read:
The penalty for the offense of falsification of an official document committed under Article
171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code is (prision mayor) and a fine not to exceed
P5,000.00. The correct penalty that should be imposed on the appellant applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law is imprisonment of Two (2) Years, Four (4) Months and One
(1) Day of (prison correctional) as minimum to Eight (8) Years and One (1) Day of (prision
mayor) as maximum In cam of non-payment of the fine of P1,000.00 due to insolvency, the
appellant should be subject to subsidiary imprisonment.
WHEREFORE, with the above modification as to the penalty and the imposition of
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, the decision appealed from is affirmed in
all other respects with costs against accused- appellant' (P. 68, Rollo)
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied, hence, the present recourse.
It is the contention of petitioner that he is entitled to an acquittal because—
1. The findings of the lower court adopted by the respondent intermediate Appellate Court
that he was not a fourth year A-B. College student is contrary to the evidence presented.
2. The respondent intermediate Appellate Court gravely commuted an error of law in
convicting him as he did not have any legal obligation to state in CS Form 212 that he was a
fourth year college student.
Page 54 of 62
3. The Intermediate Appellate Court committed a grave abuse of discretion in finding that
the transcript of records (Exhibit I) is spurious.
Upon the following facts, found by both the trial court and respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court, to have been sufficiently and satisfactorily established by the evidence on
record, it appears that petitioner Reolandi Diaz was a senior clerk at the Jose Abad Santos
High School in San Fernando, Pampanga.
In 1972 he sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant I of the same school
and as one of the requirements for appointment to said position, filled up the prescribed
personal information sheet, Civil Service Form 212, and swore to the truth and veracity of
the data and information therein furnished by him before the proper administering officer.
As one of the required informations, he indicated in Exh "A" that his highest educational
attainment was Fourth Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued or obtained at the
Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges, respectively, during the years 1950 to 1954
inclusive. On the basis thereof, he was extended an appointment as School Administrative
Assistant I (Exh. "B"). His personal information sheet (Exh. "A") together with his
appointment paper (Exh. "B"), the certification as to the availability of funds for the
position (Exh. "C") and the resolution of the Provincial Board of Pampanga creating the
position (Exh. "D") were all forwarded to the Civil Service Commission for the approval of
petitioner's appointment.
But contrary to petitioner's claim that his highest educational attainment was Fourth Year
A.B. which he allegedly took at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian Colleges during the years
1950 to 1954, he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges which later became the
Abad Santos Educational Institution and still later the Ortanez University-at any time
during the period covering the years from 1950 to 1954, inclusive as certified to by the
Registrar of Ortanez University, Mr. Atilano D. Solomon. Likewise, petitioner was never a
student at the Harvardian Colleges in Tondo, during the first quarter of school year
1953-1954, inclusive, as certified to by the school's President, Mrs. Virginia King vda. de
Yap.
Neither did petitioner ever enroll as a collegiate student at the Harvardian Colleges in San
Fernando, Pampanga after he finished his secondary course in the same school in June
1950, as certified to by its Executive Director, Atty. Arnulfo Garcia.
Also, the name of petitioner was not included in all the enrollment lists of college students
submitted to the then Bureau of Private Schools of the Department of Education by the
Harvardian Colleges at San Fernando, Pampanga and at Tondo, Manila, during the period
during which petitioner claimed to have been enrolled. The same thing is true with the list
submitted by the Cosmopolitan Colleges to the said bureau.
The petitioner did not take the witness stand. He only presented in evidence an alleged
transcript of record (Exh. 1) purporting to show that he took up collegiate courses at the
Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo, Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the
school year 1951-1952 up to the first quarter of school year 1953-1954 which transcript
of record was allegedly signed by Mrs. Virginia King vda. de Yap, for and in behalf of the
then President of the school, Ildefonso Yap. But Mrs. Virginia Yap, testifying for the
prosecution disowned the said signature. Besides, at the bottom portion of the transcript is
a printed notation reading — this is only valid with the college seal and signature of Pres.
Ildefonso D. Yap. Exhibit "I" lacks the imprint of the college seal and the signature of
President Ildefonso Yap himself. No other corroborating piece of evidence was presented
by petitioner.
Contrary to petitioner's posture, there was ample, solid and conclusive evidence adduced
by the prosecution to prove that he was not a fourth year A.B. undergraduate.
It was clearly established that the statement made by the accused — that he reached
fourth year A.B. and that he studied for this course (Liberal Arts) at the Cosmopolitan
Colleges and the Harvardian Colleges from the years 1950-1954, is devoid of truth. The
records of these colleges do not at all reveal that petitioner was even enrolled at any time
from 1950 to 1954 in its College of Liberal Arts. His name does not appear and could not
be found in the enrollment lists submitted to the Bureau of Private Schools by these
colleges.
While the petitioner in his defense presented an alleged transcript (Exh. purporting to
show that he took up collegiate course at the Philippine Harvardian College in Tondo,
Manila, beginning from the first quarter of the school year 1951-1952 up to the first
quarter of the school year 1953-1954, both the trial court and the respondent court
correctly disregarded said transcript as having emanated from a spurious source. The
transcript presented lacks the authenticating marks-the imprint of the college seal and the
signature of the President of the college.
As correctly observed by the trial court —
It is also quite significant to note in this score that the accused in his defense failed to
present any corroborating piece of evidence which will show that he was indeed enrolled
in the Philippine Harvardian Colleges from the first quarter of the school year 1953- 1954.
If he had enrolled as a student during this period of time and he was positive that the
transcript of records issued to him and in his possession is genuine and valid, it could have
been easy for him to introduce corroborating evidence, i.e., the testimony of any of his
classmates or teachers in the different subjects that he took to support his claim that he
studied and passed these collegiate courses at the said school. But this he failed to do
despite all the opportunities open to him and in the face of damning evidence all showing
that he had not really enrolled in this school or in the other school mentioned by him the
personal information sheet that he filed up as requirement for his appointment. (p.
53, Rollo)
Page 55 of 62
Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz, No. (b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer, authorized to
L-15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255 and the earlier case of United States v. Tupasi Molina, receive and administer oath.
29 Phil. 119, the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is perjury. This offense, as
defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the willful and corrupt assertion of a (c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate assertion of a
falsehood under oath or affirmation administered by authority of law on a material matter. falsehood.
The said article provides —
(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law or made
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. The penalty for a legal purpose.
of arresto mayorin its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall
be imposed upon any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being
All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.
included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall testify under oath or make
an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to administer
an oath in cases in which the law so requires. Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a lesser penalty. The penalty for
this crime is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period. Since there is no mitigating and aggravating circumstance the penalty should be
Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any
imposed in its medium period. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section shall
should be from four (4) months of arresto mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1)
suffer respective penalties provided therein.
day of prision correccional as maximum.

In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the accused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an application form
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from is
(Civil Service Form No. 2) for the patrolman examination. He stated therein that he had
modified as follows:
never been accused, indicted or tried for violation of any law, ordinance or regulation
before any court, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he had been
prosecuted and tried before the Justice of the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. (a) The accused Reolandi Diaz is found guilty of the crime of perjury defined and penalized
The application was signed and sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta, under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code; and
Rizal.
(b) The accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of from four (4) months
This Court in that case held: of arrests mayor as minimum to one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional as
maximum.
This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine Commission, which was
formerly the law punishing perjury. Under said section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case SO ORDERED.
of United States v. Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated under oath
in his application to take police examination that he had never been convicted of any crime, Melencio-Herrera (Chairperson), Padilla, Sarmiento and Regalado, JJ., concur.
when as a matter of fact he has previous convictions, committed perjury. The facts in that
case are almost exactly analogous to those in the present, and we find no reason, either in
law or in the arguments of the Solicitor General to modify or reverse the conclusion of this
Court therein. More so, because all the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art.
183 of the Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.

The elements of the crime of perjury are —

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon a material
matter.

Page 56 of 62
Page 57 of 62
 Republic of the Philippines As expected, the highest bid submitted, and thus accepted by the RFC, was that of
SUPREME COURT Francisco Echavez, who offered P27,826.00 for the land .6 Echavez paid the sum of
Manila P5,565.00 representing 20% deposit of the prefferred price. 7

FIRST DIVISION A week later, Echavez sent a letter to Ouano regarding the P2,000.00 paid by the latter's
wife to the Bonsucan group. 8 It said:
G.R. No. L-40203 August 21, 1990
Because the owner of the money which I deposited for your share has stipulated that today
PATERNO J. OUANO, petitioner, is the last day for the return of his money ... I would like to request you that for the
vs. P2,000.00 which you have advanced to Mrs. Bonsucan and company, I will just give you
COURT OF APPEALS and FRANCISCO B. ECHAVEZ, respondents. 250 sq. meters right in front of your house at P8.05 per sq. meter ... (N.B. 250 x P8.05 equals
P2,012.50.)
De Castro & Cagampang Law Offices and Fiel Manalo for petitioner.
Still later, or two weeks after Echavez won the bid, a document simply entitled
"Agreement," was signed by him and Ouano. 9 That document, prepared by Echavez in his
Arturo M. Tolentino and Asuncion, Asuncion, Arcol & Kapunan Law Offices for respondents.
own handwriting, reads as follows: 10 |par KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:

Inasmuch as it was Francisco B. Echavez who won in the public bidding held at the RFC
office for Lot 3-A-1 last April, 1958, it is hereby agreed between us, Francisco B. Echavez
NARVASA, J.: and Paterno J. Ouano, that we share the said lot between us according to the herein sketch:

The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land with an area of about 3,710 (Sketch omitted ...)
square meters, situated in Mandawe, Cebu, Identified as Philippine Railway Lot No. 3-A-1
It was covered by Torrens Title No. 7618 in the name of the registered owner,
That each of us takes care in paying direct to the RFC office Cebu Branch, the installments,
Rehabilitation 'Finance Corporation (RFC), now the Development Bank of the Philippines
interests and amortizations on a ten-year plan in our respective names, such that we
(DBP). Adjoining Lot 3-A-1 are lands belonging to Francisco Echavez, private respondent
would request the RFC to have the said Lot 3-A-1 subdivided into two portions: A portion
herein, and petitioner Paterno J. Ouano. What will have to be resolved are the conflicting
of Lot 3-A-1 for Francisco B. Echavez to contain 1882.5 sq. m. more or less depending on
claims over this lot by the vendee thereof, Echavez, and Ouano.
the actual survey based on the above sketch, and another portion of Lot 3-A-1 for Paterno J.
Ouano to contain 1827.5 sq. m. more or less also based on the above sketch.
The property was offered for sale by public bidding by the RFC on April 1, 1958.1 Actually
this was the second public bidding scheduled for the property. The first 2 in which both
That they have agreed to share proportionately all legal expenses that may be assessed
Ouano and Echavez participated, together with others was nullified on account of a protest
and incurred in connection with the acquisition of the said lot in case such expenses are
by Ouano. 3
levied as a whole against Francisco B. Echavez, but if such expenses are levied separately
after the RFC consents to the subdivision and registration in our respective names our
Now, it appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed that share of the said lot, then we take care individually of paying such expenses if there be any.
only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property
in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success of their enterprise, they also
In witness whereof, we hereby set our hand and sign this agreement this 15th day of April,
agreed to induce the only other party known to be interested in the property-a group
1958 at Mandawe, Cebu, Philippines, subject to the approval of the RFC, Cebu Branch and
headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from presenting a bid.4 They broached the matter to
Manila.
Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the
sale; and Ouano's wife paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. 5
On the same day that the "Agreement" was executed, Echavez set down in writing a
computation of the sharing of expenses of his joint venture with Ouano, viz.: 11

Page 58 of 62
1827.5 — No. of sq. meters for Paterno Ouano 7.50 91375 127925
P13706.25 .20 P 2741.25
-1016.55 — Share of Echavez for the P2,000.00 given to Mrs. Bonsucan & Companions
P1,724.70 — Balance payable by Mr. Ouano to FB Echavez for the deposit made by the
latter at the RFC. This is subject to the approval of the RFC, Cebu Branch.
Mandawe, April 15, 1958.
(Sgd.) F.B. ECHAVEZ.
Thereafter, on various dates, Ouano and/or his wife delivered sums of money to Echavez
aggregating P1,725.00, obviously in payment of the balance indicated in Echavez's
computation just mentioned, viz.: P500.00 on April 19,1958, another P500.00 on April 20,
and P725.00 on April 27,1958. Receipts therefor were given by Echavez, all similarly
worded to the effect that the money was being received "as part of their reimbursement
for the deposit (of P5,565.00) I have made with the RFC for Lot 3-A-1 which I won in the
bidding and which lot I have consented to share with Mr. Paterno J. Ouano, subject to the
approval of the RFC. 12
However, the RFC never approved the sharing agreement between Echavez and Ouano
concerning Lot 3-A-1. It approved the sale of the lot to Echavez only, on May 9, 1958, on
the condition that the purchase price of P27,825.00 be paid in cash. Apparently Echavez
found great initial difficulty in complying with this condition. It took all of four years, and
patient negotiation and diligent effort on his part, for him ultimately to acquire title to the
property, which came about in December, 1963. His travails are succinctly narrated by the
Trial Court as follows: 13
... Apparently, the successful bidder was caught flatfooted, for he was not able to comply
with this condition, notwithstanding the fact that he has been making efforts to acquire the
property (See Exhibit 21, letter of March 29, 1958; also Exhibit 22). So, he exerted much
effort to change the terms of the sale from cash to monthly amortization plan (Exhs. 24 and
10). But the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation was adamant. The terms of the bid giving
the option to pay the balance of the purchase price either in cash or within ten years on
monthly amortization plan at 6% interest notwithstanding, said Corporation denied
defendant's request in a letter dated September 18, 1958 signed by Chairman Romualdez
(Exh. 11). This went on for more than 4-½ years, with none of the parties herein having
secured the conformity of the RFC or DBP to a novation of the original terms of the sale.
Thus, the said sale was finally cancelled, and the deposit of P5,549.72 made by the
defendant to the RFC forfeited as of April 4, 1962 (Exh. 12). However, on July 18, 1962,
upon request of the defendant, this cancellation was considered under the condition,
among others, that the price of the sale of P27,825.00 be payable 20% down and the
balance in 5 years at 8% interest per annum on the monthly amortization plan,
commencing retroactively on June 9, 1958, and that a payment of P2,000.00 be applied to
the total arrearages of P25,799.00, which had to be paid within 90 days. The defendant
paid on August 28, 1962 a further amount of P2,000.00. On September 3, 1962, the deed of
conditional sale, covering the property in question, was entered into by the DBP and the
defendant (Exh. D, same as Exh. 4), culminating in the signing of the corresponding
promissory note dated September 7,1962 (Exh. E, same as Exh. 5). It is admitted that the
defendant is now the registered owner of the property, after having fully paid P29,3218.87
on account of the price to the Development Bank of the Philippines, as per Deed of
Absolute Sale dated December 9,1963 (Exhs. 14 and 34).
It was pursuant to the absolute sale of December 9, 1963 just mentioned, that a Torrens
title (TCT No. 10776) was issued in Echavez's name. 14
Ouano, in his turn, tried to have DBP either accept and implement his sharing agreement
with Echavez, or allow him to pay the full price of the lot in Echavez's behalf. By his own
account, he sent a letter dated June 3, 1 963 to the DBP, "handcarried by his wife,"
"requesting among others, that he be permitted to pay immediately either for his share in
the aforesaid lot comprising 1,828 sq. meters at the bid price of P7.50 per sq. meter
including charges, or for the whole lot;" and that he in fact tried to make such payment but
the Bank turned down his request.15
Shortly after his representation with the DBP were rebuffed more precisely on June 24,
1963, months before the deed of absolute sale was executed by the DBP in Echavez's favor
Paterno J. Ouano filed suit for "specific performance and reconveyance" in the Court of
First Instance of Cebu against Francisco Echavez and the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP).16
In his complaint,17 Ouano recited substantially the facts just related, and further alleged
that —
... on June 3, 1963 plaintiffs wife and his attorney conferred with defendant ... Echavez for
the purpose of again requesting said defendant to sign a document which would be
notarized and to permit plaintiff to pay for his share direct to the defendant DBP, but said
defendant refused and instead informed them that there had been no agreement regarding
joint bidding and joint ownership of Lot 3-A-l.
The complaint was amended a few weeks later, chiefly to allege that DBP was on the point
of rescinding its contract with Echavez; and that Ouano's offer to the DBP to pay in
Echavez's behalf the price of the lot in full (P28,206.61), had been rejected; and that
consequently, and "to show his good faith," he had consigned the amount with the Court
"for and in behalf of defendant ... Echavez.18 The amended complaint specifically prayed
that —
Page 59 of 62
1) pending trial, and upon such bond as may be fixed by the Court, a writ of preliminary
injunction issue to restrain Echavez and RFC "from rescinding, cancelling or in any way
terminating the conditional sale contract with respect to Lot 3-A-1 TCT 7618;"
2) after trial, Echavez be ordered" to sign an agreement in accord with Annex A and the
foregoing allegations which should be notarized;"
3) by virtue of aforesaid agreement and his deposit in Court of P28,206.61, Ouano be
declared as "legally subrogated to the rights, interest and participation of defendant ...
Echavez in Lot 3-A-1 to the extent of 1,828.5 sq. m.
4) Echavez be ordered to reimburse Ouano P14,358.37 corresponding to defendant ...
Echavez' share of 1,882.5 sq. m.
5) should Echavez be unable to pay said amount within 15 days, Ouano be declared
"legally subrogated to the rights, interest and participation of ... Echavez in Lot 3-A-1 to the
extent of 1,882.5 sq. m.;"
6) DBP be ordered to consider the deposit made by Ouano for and in behalf of Echavez as
"complete and valid payment of Lot 3 — A-1 and to execute the necessary documents of
sale in (the former's) favor ... for 1,827.5 sq. m. and in favor of ... Echavez for 1,882.5 sq. m.
7) DBP be ordered to hold the deed of sale in favor of Echavez for 1,882 sq. m. in abeyance
until the latter has reimbursed Ouano "the amount of P14,385.3 7 corresponding to ...
Echavez's share of 1,882.5 sq. m and should Echavez be unable to do so within 15 days,
DBP be ordered to "execute said deed of sale in favor of plaintiff and
8) Echavez be ordered to pay Ouano P1,000.00 as attorney's fees, P5,000.00 as moral
damages, and P5,000.00 as exemplary damages, as well as the costs of suit.
The DBP moved to dismiss the amended complaint, alleging that no cause of action was
therein stated against it.19The Court found the motion to be well taken, overruled Ouano's
opposition thereto, dismissed the amended complaint and dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunction, by Order dated August 27, 1963. 20 It subsequently denied Ouano's
motion for reconsideration. 21 Ouano appealed but on learning of the absolute sale of Lot
3-A-1 executed by DBP in Echavez's favor on December 9, 1963-which according to him
rendered moot the case for legal subrogation and injunction as far as DBP was concerned
he withdrew the appeal and moved instead for admission of a second amended
complaint, 22 which the Court admitted in the absence of opposition thereto. In the second
amended complaint, dated January 4, 1964, 23 the DBP was no longer included as a party.
Echavez was the sole defendant. The second amended complaint adverted to the dismissal
of the case as against the DBP and additionally alleged that Echavez, "in gross and evident
bad faith, mortgaged the whole of Lot 3-A-1 to one Dr. Serafica." It prayed particularly that
Echavez be commanded:
1. To execute a public document embodying and confirming the oral contract of joint
ownership of Lot 3-A-1, TCT 7618, of April 1, 1958 between plaintiff and defendant...;
2. To execute a deed of reconveyance of 1,827.5 sq. m. of Lot 3-A-1 ... after reimbursement
of the sum of P14,821.24 by the plaintiff;
3. To pay plaintiff P1,000 as attorney's fees, P5,000.00 as moral damages, P5,000.00 as
exemplary damages and the expenses of litigation; and
4. To pay the costs.
Trial ensued after which the Trial Court rendered judgment on June 29,1968. It found that
the sharing agreement between Ouano and Echavez could not be enforced in view of the
absence of consent of the RFC (DBP) which the latter never gave; apart from this, the
agreement had an unlawful cause and hence could "Produce no effect whatever" in
accordance with Article 1352 of the Civil Code, because involving a felony defined in
Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
ART. 185. Machinations in public auctions. — any person who shall solicit any gift or
promise as a consideration for refraining from taking part in any public auction, and any
person who shall attempt to cause bidders to stay away from an auction by threats, gifts,
promises, or any other artifice, with intent to cause the reduction of the price of the thing
auctioned, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine
ranging from 10 to 50 per centum of the value of the thing auctioned.
The decision accordingly dismissed the Second Amended Complaint, ordered Ouano, "to
vacate the portion of Lot No. 3-A-1 he occupied pursuant to Exhibit C," and also dismissed
Echavez's counterclaim.
Ouano appealed to the Court of Appeals. Here he fared no better. He enjoyed initial success,
to be sure. Judgment was promulgated on February 28, 1974" setting aside the Trial
Court's judgment, and directing: (a) Echavez "to execute a deed of conveyance in favor of
plaintiff of 1827. 5 square meters as the latter's share in the property in controversy and
(b) Ouano "to pay defendant the amount of P14,821.24 representing the cost of his share."
However, on a second motion for reconsideration presented by Echavez, the Appellate
Court, on November 21, 1974, reconsidered its decision of February 28, 1974 and entered
another "affirming in toto the decision appealed from without costs.25 This second decision
found that the documentary evidence 26 preponderantly established that "the parties have
manifested their intention to subordinate their agreement to the approval of the RFC."
"Consequently," the decision stated,
Page 60 of 62
... had the plaintiffs and defendant's proposal been accepted by the RFC (DBP) two
separate contracts, covering the two segregated lots according to the sketch would have
come into existence, to be executed by the RFC separately in favor of the pi plaintiff and
the defendant. But unfortunately, the RFC disapproved the proposal as the sale was to be
for cash. As a result, the obligatory force of the 'agreement' or the consent of the parties,
which was subordinated to the taking effect of the suspensive condition that the
agreement be subject to the approval of the RFC never happened. This being the case, the
agreement never became effective. The rule is settled that:
When the consent of a party to a contract is given subject to the fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, the contract is not perfected unless the condition is first complied with'
(Ruperto vs. Cosca 26 Phil. 227).
And when the obligation assumed by a party to a contract is expressly subjected to a
condition, the obligation cannot be enforced against him unless the condition is complied
with (Wise & Co. vs. Kelly, 37 Phil. 696; Philippine National Bank vs. Philippine Trust Co.,
68 Phil. 48).
At best, the non-fulfillment of the suspensive condition has the effect of negating the
conditional obligation. It has been held that what characterizes a conditional obligation is
the fact that its efficacy or obligatory force is subordinated to the happening of a future
and uncertain event, so that if the suspensive condition does not take place, the parties
would stand as if the conditional obligation had never existed Gaite vs. Fonacier, L-11827,
July 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 831).
Motions for reconsideration and for oral argument filed by Ouano were denied by
Resolutions dated February 6, February 11, and February 21, 1975, the last containing a
suggestion "that appellant go to the Higher Court for relief. 27
Ouano is now before this Court, on appeal by certoriari to seek the relief that both the Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals have declined to concede to him. In this Court, he attempts
to make the following points, to wit:
1. The verbal agreement between the parties to acquire and share the land in proportion to
their respective abutting properties, and executed by the immediate occupation by the
parties of their respective shares in the land, is a perfected consensual contract and not "a
mere promise to deliver something subject to a suspensive condition" (as ruled in the
second decision of the Court of Appeals); hence the petitioner is entitled to compel private
respondent to execute a public document for the registration in his name of the
petitioner's share in the land in question pursuant to Art. 1315 of the Civil Code (as held in
the first decision of the Court of Appeals).
2. The agreement to acquire and share the land was not subject to a suspensive condition.
3. Assuming in gratia argumenti the agreement to be subject to a suspensive condition,
since the condition consisted in obtaining the approval of the RFC-a third party who could
not in any way be compelled to give such approval the condition is deemed constructively
fulfilled because petitioner had done all in his power to comply with the condition, and
private respondent, who also had the duty to get such approval, in effect prevented the
fulfillment of the condition by doing nothing to secure the approval.
4. The circumstances show that Echavez clearly acted in bad faith, and it is unjust to allow
him to benefit from his bad faith and ingenious scheme.
Two material facts, however, about which Ouano and Echavez are in agreement, render
these questions of academic interest only, said facts being determinative of this dispute on
an altogether different ground. These facts are:
1) that they bad both orally agreed that only Echavez would make a bid at the second
bidding called by the RFC, and that if it was accepted, they would divide the property in
proportion to their adjoining properties; and
2) that to ensure success of their scheme, they had also agreed to induce the only other
party known to be interested in the property a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist
from presenting a bid, 28 as they did succeed in inducing Mrs. Bonsucan's group to
withdraw from the sale, paying said group P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses. 29
These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and Echavez had
promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for Ouano's refraining
from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted to cause and in fact
succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the auction. in order to cause
reduction of the price of the property auctioned In so doing, they committed the felony
of machinations in public auctions defined and penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal
Code, supra.
That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact that
thereby only one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in consequence of which
Echavez eventually acquired it. The agreement therefore being criminal in character, the
parties not only have no action against each other but are both liable to prosecution and
the things and price of their agreement subject to disposal according to the provisions of
the criminal code. This, in accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the
Civil Code.
Article 1409 of said Code declares as "inexistent and void from the beginning" those
contracts, among others, "whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy," or "expressly prohibited ... by law." Such contracts
"cannot be ratified "the right to set up the defense of illegality (cannot) be waived;" and,
Page 61 of 62
Article 1410 adds, the "action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence ... (thereof)
does not prescribe." Furthermore, according to Article 1411 of the same Code 30 —

... When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and
the act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no
action against each other, and both shall be prosecuted. Moreover, the provisions of the
Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a crime shall be applicable to
the things or the price of the contract.

xxx xxx xxx

The dismissal of Ouano's action by both the Trial Court and the Court of Appeals was thus
correct, being plainly in accord with the Civil Code provisions just referred to.31 Article
1411 also dictates the proper disposition of the land involved, i.e., "the forfeiture of the
proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed," as
mandated by the provisions of Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code, this being obviously
the provision "of the Penal Code relative to the disposal of effects or instruments of a
crime" that Article 1411 makes "applicable to the things or the price of the contract."

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the Court of Appeals is MODIFIED, so that in

addition to affirming the Trial Court's judgment dismissing Ouano's complaint and
Echavez's counterclaim in Civil Case No. R-8011, Lot No. 3-A-1 subject of said case is
ordered FORFEITED in its entirety in favor of the Government of the Philippines. No
pronouncement as to costs. Let copy of this Decision be furnished the Solicitor General.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Gancayco, J., took no part.

Page 62 of 62